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Christopher Paul, Harry J. Thie, Katharine Watkins Webb,

Stephanie Young, Colin P. Clarke, Susan G. Straus,

Joya Laha, Christine Osowski, Chad C. Serena

Prepared for the United States Marine CorpsApproved for public release; distribution unlimited

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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The research described in this report was prepared for the United StatesMarine Corps. The research was conducted within the RAND NationalDefense Research Institute, a federally funded research and developmentcenter sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the

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iii

Preface

Since 2001, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) intelligence enterprisehas demonstrated its agility in tailoring its organization to meet evolv-ing expeditionary force demands. Tis has resulted in a number ofad hoc arrangements, practices, and organizations. Moreover, as theUSMC has grown in strength over recent years, it has also addedintelligence personnel. Te USMC Director of Intelligence asked theRAND National Defense Research Institute to broadly review

the organizational design of the USMC intelligence enterprise. Testudy addressed how to align the organization of USMC intelligenceto eciently and eectively carry out current and future missions andfunctions. Te study was designed to focus on organizational struc-ture and, because of the short duration, to be fairly general in nature.Specically, it considered the organization of (and possible improve-ments to) the Intelligence Department, the Marine Corps IntelligenceActivity, the intelligence organizations within the Marine Expedition-

ary Forces (specically, the intelligence and radio battalions), and intel-ligence structures in the combat elements.

Tis research was sponsored by the USMC and conductedwithin the Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National DefenseResearch Institute, a federally funded research and development centersponsored by the Oce of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Sta,the Unied Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, thedefense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. Te princi-pal investigator is Harry Tie. Comments are welcome and may be sentto [email protected].
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iv Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of USMC Intelligence

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director (contact information is provided on the web page).
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v

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

ChAPT OIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Recent History of Marine Corps Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Organization of Tis Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

ChAPT TO

Approac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Literature on Organizational Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Marine Corps and Marine Corps Intelligence Strategy, Plans, and

Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Interview Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Interview opics and Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Development and Assessment of Alternative Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16


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vi Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of USMC Intelligence

ChAPT Th

Current Organization of Marine Corps Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Te Organization of Marine Air-Ground ask Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17Te Organization of the Intelligence-Supporting Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Manpower Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Distribution by Organization Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Distribution by Grade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Use of Inventory in a Deployed Setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Marine Corps Intelligence Units of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

ChAPT FO

Literature on Organizational Design and Analytic Framework. . . . . . . . 25

Organizational Fit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Hierarchical Criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Basic Organizational Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

ChAPT FI

Strategic Intent and Organizational Assessment:SMC Intelligence Strategy, Plans, Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Strategic Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Objectives for the Organization of Marine Corps Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Eectiveness and Eciency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

ChAPT SIx

Issue Identication and Analysis of Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Ranking the Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Why Include Nonstructural Issues, and Why Prioritize? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

ChAPT S

Alternative Structures and eir Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

Intelligence Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

As Is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Should Be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Improving Fit and Mitigating Specic Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85


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Contents vii

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

As Is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87Should Be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Improving Fit and Mitigating Specic Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Marine Expeditionary Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

As Is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Should Be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Improving Fit and Mitigating Specic Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95

Combat Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96As Is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Should Be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

ChAPT IhT

Addressing emaining Marine Corps Intelligence Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Issues Aected by Structural Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99Issues Not Addressed by Structural Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

ChAPT I

Conclusions and ecommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Te Intelligence Department Reects an Accumulation of

20 Years of Organizational Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Te Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Lacks Customer Orientation

and Has Unclear Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Te Focus of the Marine Expeditionary Force Is Up and

Disciplinary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Te Combat Elements Have Recently Shifted from a Functional

to a Matrix Structure but Are Hampered by a Lack of

Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Other Issues Relate to Mission, Workforce, Leadership, Culture,and echnology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113


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viii Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of USMC Intelligence

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Te Intelligence Department Is a Functional Hierarchy and Should

Stay Tat Way While Making Opportunistic Improvements . . . . . . 114Te Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Should Reorganize into a

Specialized Matrix Known as a Front-Back Organization . . . . . . . . . . 114

Te Marine Expeditionary Force Could Be More Eective if

Organized into Integrated Matrix Habitual Relationships . . . . . . . . . 114

APPDIxS

A. Organizational Design Literature Considered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

B. Army Intelligence Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121C. Complete Interview Topics and Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

D. ecent history of Marine Corps Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

. Current uidance egarding te Strategic nvironment. . . . . . . . 173

F. Details of Alternative Structure Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Bibliograpy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195


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ix

Figures

S.1. Structure of Marine Corps Intelligence and the FourOrganizational Levels Analyzed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv

3.1. Distribution of Manpower, by Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213.2. Distribution of Manpower, by Grade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223.3. Ocer Grade Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223.4. Structure of Marine Corps Intelligence and the Four

Organizational Levels Analyzed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244.1. Eects of Organizational Structure on Inputs and

Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264.2. Assessment of Organizational Emphasis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .294.3. Four Basic Organizational Structural Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304.4. Notional Mapping of Structural Alternatives with

Dierent Organizational Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .337.1. Notional Intelligence Department Functional Hierarchy. . . . . . 857.2. Notional MCIA Divisional Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887.3. Notional MCIA Specialized Matrix Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

7.4. Notional MEF Intelligence/Radio Battalion Organization . . . 94B.1. An Army Military Intelligence Brigade, Prior to

Reorganization in 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126B.2. An Army Military Intelligence Brigade, ask-Organized,

as Deployed in 2003. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127B.3. Battleeld Surveillance Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132B.4. Heavy Brigade Combat eam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135B.5. Infantry Brigade Combat eam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

B.6. Stryker Brigade Combat eam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136


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xi

Tables

5.1. Needed Intelligence Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466.1. Prioritized Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527.1. Summary of Structural Assessment and Recommendations . . . 83B.1. Core Competencies for Army Intelligence Analysts . . . . . . . . . . . 137F.1. End States and Concerns for I-Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184F.2. Assessment of Alternatives for I-Dept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185F.3. End States and Concerns for MCIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186F.4. Assessment of Alternatives for MCIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

F.5. End States and Concerns for MEF Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189F.6. Assessment of Alternatives for MEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190F.7. End States and Concerns for the Combat Elements . . . . . . . . . . . 192F.8. Assessment of Alternatives for the Combat Elements . . . . . . . . . 193


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xiii

Summary

Background

U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) intelligence personnel collect, analyze,and disseminate intelligence to support USMC operational compo-nents and leaders. Te geopolitical landscape within which this occurshas changed drastically since the 1994 Intelligence Plan (Van RiperPlan) sought to restructure USMC intelligence in response to per-

ceived shortcomings exposed by the rst Gulf War.1

oday, interna-tional security concerns abound, and issues such as the rise of lethalnonstate actors, nuclear proliferation by rogue nations, and shiftingpower dynamics in strategically vital regions all threaten global sta-bility. Tese external developments have unfolded alongside an ongo-ing internal reorganization of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC),as well as the workforce and structure of USMC intelligence morespecically.

Not only have the threats changed since the implementation ofthe Van Riper Plan, but the tools needed to counter a diverse arrayof adversaries have changed as well. Globalization, sophisticated satel-lite technology, and the ubiquitous reach of the Internet, among otherdevelopments, have spawned advances in real-time communication. omeet the demands of this complex security and information environ-ment, the USMC has grown to 202,000 marines, and the number ofmarines with intelligence military occupational specialties has more

1 See C4I Sta, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Te Future of Marine Corps Intelli-gence,Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 78, No. 4, April 1995, pp. 2629.


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xiv Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of USMC Intelligence

than doubled since 1994. Continuous counterinsurgency operationshave changed tactical support structures, and technological innova-

tions have provided new tools and capabilities. Furthermore, theUSMC has been tasked with taking the lead on issues of cultural intel-ligence within the broader IC.

With Operation Iraqi Freedom coming to a close and an Opera-tion Enduring Freedom drawdown a distinct possibility, a new USMCforce posture will begin to take shape. Despite the possibility that theservice will have both less money and fewer troops, the USMC intelli-gence enterprise will no doubt be called upon to remain alert and ready

while doing more with less, a common theme expressed in interviewsand a mainstay of USMC culture.

Purpose of This Research

Te USMC asked the RAND National Defense Research Instituteto review the organizational design and assess how the USMC intel-

ligence enterprise can more eciently and eectively carry out cur-rent and future missions and functions. Te study was designed tofocus explicitly on organizational structure. Te research consideredfour organizational levels, depicted in Figure S.1: (1) the IntelligenceDepartment (Director of Intelligence [DIRIN] and immediate sta),(2) the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, (3) the intelligence andradio battalions, and (4) the combat elements, primarily the ground

combat element.Our ndings are based on a review of the literature on orga-nizations and organizational theory, interviews with more than100 marines or USMC civilians, and a structured assessment process.

Key Findings

The Marine Corps Intelligence Department Reects an Accumulationof 20 Years of Organizational Change

Te USMC Intelligence Department (I-Dept), by virtue of its head-quarters placement, focuses more on inputs (e.g., money, manpower)


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Summary xv

than customers (e.g., the operating forces). Moreover, the I-Dept hasgrown rapidly and reactively rather than in a planned manner. As aresult, names of subunits do not reect their actual functions, and theorganization is somewhat opaque to outsiders, making it di cult toengage. Tere has been an inconsistent long-term strategic focus onoverall IC goals because the various I-Dept o ces are more consumedwith day-to-day activities.

Figure S.1Structure of Marine Corps Intelligence and the Four Organizational LevelsAnalyzed

RANDMG1108-S.1

1

MARFOR Central

I MEF

CMC

MCCDC

TECOM MCSC

IID

1st Intel Bn 1st Radio Bn

DIRINT

MCIA

MCSB

PM IDF&DPM Intel

MCIS

Ground Combat Element Air Combat Element Logistics Combat Element

2nd Intel Bn 2nd Radio Bn 3rd Intel Bn 3rd Radio Bn

II MEF III MEFMARFOR Korea

MARFORCOM

MARFOR Europe

Intel Support Bn

Intel Bn

Company L, MCSB

MARFOR Africa

MARFOR South

MARFOR Reserve

MARSOC

MARFORCYBER

MARFOR Pacific

2

3

4

NOTE: Bn = battalion. IID = USMC Intelligence Integration Division. MARFOR = USMCForces. MARFORCOM = USMC Forces Command. MARSOC = USMC Forces SpecialOperations Command. MCCDC = USMC Combat Development Command.MCIA = USMC Intelligence Activity. MCIS = USMC Intelligence School. MCSB = MarineCryptologic Support Battalion. MCSC = USMC Systems Command. MEF = MarineExpeditionary Force. PM IDF&D = program manager, intelligence data fusion anddissemination. PM Intel = program manager, intelligence systems. TECOM = USMCTraining and Education Command.

Supporting establishment Command element


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xvi Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of USMC Intelligence

The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Lacks Customer Orientation

and Has Unclear Priorities

Serving multiple masters complicates coordination processes in MCIA,and resources do not always align with priorities. Its multiple custom-ers (e.g., IC, DIRIN and I-Dept, operating forces) and its functionalorganization lead to frequent reach in by knowledgeable personnelto gain needed data, information, or assistance, to the detriment ofoverall organizational functioning. Customer service is lacking, andMCIA has neither an eectively oriented web presence nor 24/7 ser-vice. Products and services lack functional integration focused on cus-

tomer needs.

The Focus of the Marine Expeditionary Force is Up and

Disciplinary

Support of the combat elements is generally described as lacking in thatit is not relevant and not timely. Moreover, products are not sucientlyintegrated across functions. When there are competing demands, ser-vicing the up customer takes priority, irrespective of real need. Te

intelligence battalion trains as an intelligence battalion but does notdeploy as a battalion, while the radio battalion is perceived as residingin its own cocoon.

Combat Elements Have Shifted from a Functional to a Matrix

Structure but Are Hampered by a Lack of Experience

Over the past few years, the intelligence structure at the GroundCombat Element (GCE) has shifted from functional to matrix, from abattalion-level functional S2 intelligence structure to a company-levelintelligence cell in which intelligence personnel from the battalion S2section are matrixed with infantry marines at the company level. Teliability of a matrix structure in the present environment is that intel-ligence personnel assigned to battalion level need to be experienced andexpert in their craft, and that is not always the case.


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Summary xvii

There Are Other Issues Related to Mission, Workforce, Leadership,

Culture, and Technology

Some of these issues might be construed as organizational in abroader sense; others, not. We discuss these points throughout thismonograph because they have the potential to aect USMC intelli-gence strategic objectives and thus may require attention or resolutionthrough organizational changes or other approaches. Organizationalchange could improve performance in these issue areas, or it could becounterproductive and hamper the eectiveness of the organizationalchanges analyzed in Chapter Seven.

Recommendations

The Intelligence Department Is a Functional Hierarchy and Should

Stay That Way, but Opportunistic Improvements Are Needed

Te issues and concerns that we identied in I-Dept can be addressedwithout changing the nature of the departments functional structure,

but rather by realigning it. Specically, several of the resourcing func-tions could be grouped together. Appropriate roles and reporting rela-tionships should be established for senior civilians. One subunit withan operational orientation (the Intelligence Estimates Branch) couldbe placed elsewhere because it is functionally dierent from all othersubunits. However, because it supports high-level oces (primarily, theCommandant of the Marine Corps), it is best kept in the I-Dept.

The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Should Reorganize into a

Specialized Matrix Known as a Front-Back Organization

For MCIA, we recommend a structural alternative that is a specializedmatrix form called a front-back organization. Tis structure is designedto accommodate both customer and product eectiveness and func-tional eciency. It can also better accommodate absences for trainingor deployment. Furthermore, it has the advantage of maintaining easy

access and habituation with customers but allocates expertise moreeciently, and it allows more functional training and development ofexpertise because experts are a pooled resource. Te ability to manage


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xix

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, we would like to acknowledge the contribution ofthe marines, retired marines, and Marine Corps civilians whom weinterviewed for this project. Respondents were assured of anonymity,but you know who you are, and this study would not have been possi-ble without your generosity with your time and candor regarding yourexperiences and insights.

We can thank by name several individuals at Marine Corps Intel-

ligence Department: Colonel im Oliver, who initiated the projectwith us; Cheryl Young, our sponsor point of contact, project monitor,and project facilitator; and the Director of Intelligence himself, Briga-dier General Vincent R. Stewart. Teir personal attention enabled usto gain access to and speak with a large number of Marine Corps intel-ligence personnel. Within RAND, we beneted from comments oninterim briefs and drafts by colleagues Jim Bruce, Ben Connable, andMike Hix. We also thank Susan Everingham and Mark Sparkman for

their formal reviews and helpful suggestions for the draft monographas part of RANDs quality assurance process. Without the eorts ofRAND communication analyst Jerry Sollinger and administrativeassistants Alexander Chinh and Maria Falvo, this monograph wouldbe less well organized, less clear, and supported by fewer citations.Finally, we thank our RAND publications editorial and productionteam, Matthew Byrd, Carol Earnest, and Lauren Skrabala, for improv-ing the readability and internal consistency of this monograph andseeing it through production into the nal form you see here.

Errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authorsalone.


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xxi

Abbreviations

ACE Air Combat Element

BC brigade combat team

BfSB battleeld surveillance brigade

C2 command and control

CE command element

CI counterintelligence

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CLIC company-level intelligence cell

COIN counterinsurgency

DCI Director of Central Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DIRIN U.S. Marine Corps Director of Intelligence

DoD U.S. Department of Defense

DOMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel,leadership and education, personnel, andfacilities

EMW expeditionary maneuver warfare

FY scal year


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xxii Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of USMC Intelligence

G-2 derived from -2 for intelligence in theNapoleonic stang system; the intelligence

sta (see also S2)GCE Ground Combat Element

GEOIN geospatial intelligence

HUMIN human intelligence

IC U.S. Intelligence Community

I-Dept U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Department

IID U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence IntegrationDivision

INSCOM U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

I information technology JMIP Joint Military Intelligence Program

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

LCE Logistics Combat Element

MAGF Marine Air-Ground ask Force

MARFOR U.S. Marine Corps Forces

MARFORCOM U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command

MARSOC U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special OperationsCommand

MASIN measurement and signature intelligence

MCCDC U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development

CommandMCIA U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity


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Abbreviations xxiii

MCIS U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence School

MCISR-E U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance,

and Reconnaissance Enterprise

MCSB Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion

MCSC U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MI military intelligence

MIC MEF Intelligence Center

MIP Military Intelligence Program

MOS military occupational specialty

NDS National Defense Strategy NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NIP National Intelligence Program

NMS National Military Strategy

NSA National Security Agency

NSS National Security Strategy

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

PIR priority intelligence requirement

PM IDF&D program manager, intelligence data fusion anddissemination

PM Intel program manager, intelligence systems


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1

ChAR O

Introduction

Background

U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) intelligence is assigned mission responsi-bility for all USMC intelligence matters, with functions ranging fromconducting intelligence collection to conducting analysis in support ofoperating forces in combat and deployed around the world. It also rep-resents the Marine Corps in the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and

supports the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) resource allocationprocesses. Particularly since 2001, the USMC intelligence enterprisehas demonstrated agility in tailoring its organization to meet evolv-ing expeditionary force demands. Tis has resulted in a number ofad hoc arrangements, practices, and organizational structures. USMCoperations include distributed operations, irregular warfare, amphibi-ous warfare, and joint and coalition warfare. Tese demands, com-bined with the increasingly rapid pace of technological change, have

challenged the organizational capability of USMC intelligence to bothmeet the requirements of Fleet Marine Forces in the current operat-ing environment and ensure eective participation in the broader IC,including compliance with various IC and DoD mandates.

Tere are multiple reasons to review the organizational structureand design of USMC intelligence. First, it has been more than 15 yearssince the 1994 Intelligence Plan (the so-called Van Riper Plan) waslaunched in response to perceived shortcomings exposed by the Gulf

War. It is an open question how many of that eras issues were eec-tively addressed through the implementation of the 1994 plan; furtherchallenges have emerged since then, and others may have been cre-


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2 Alert and Ready: An Organizational Design Assessment of USMC Intelligence

ated through the plans implementation. Second, in addition to thechanges wrought by the 1994 Intelligence Plan, a decade of sustained

employment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Endur-ing Freedom (OEF) has led to changes in the workforce and struc-ture of USMC intelligence. Since 2006, the USMC itself has grownfrom 175,000 to 202,000 marines, and the number of marines withintelligence military occupational specialties (MOSs) has more thandoubled since 1994.1 Continuous counterinsurgency (COIN) opera-tions have changed tactical support structures, and technological inno-vations have provided new tools and capabilities. Tird, the attacks of

September 11, 2001, led to reform in the larger IC, with some impacton USMC intelligence, including changed relationships within the ICand the establishment of the USMC as the IC lead for cultural intel-ligence. Fourth, the information environment itself has changed sub-stantially since 1994, with dierent sources of information becomingavailable and more prevalent, new information-gathering technologiesbeing developed, and evolving needs for and means of disseminatinginformation and intelligence among the operating forces. Finally, withOIF concluded and the end of OEF in the foreseeable future, a newera of austerity looms. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has alreadylaunched initiatives to reduce defense spending over the next ve years.2

Rumors have also suggested that the USMC will draw down from itscurrent end strength of 202,000; the 2011 report of the USMC ForceStructure Review Group plans for a force of approximately 186,800active-duty marines following the conclusion of operations in Afghani-

stan.3

What does this mean for USMC intelligence going forward?Te USMC Director of Intelligence (DIRIN) asked the RANDNational Defense Research Institute to examine ways of aligningthe organizational structures of the USMC intelligence enterprise to

1 All Marines Memo 008/07, Marine Corps End Strength Increase, February 7, 2007.

2 Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, SECDEF Statement, Washington, D.C.,

August 9, 2010.3 Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Reshaping Americas Expeditionary Force in Read-iness: Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group, Washington, D.C.,March 14, 2011.


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tions, problems with intelligence training, and a persistent crisis ofcredibility for intelligence personnel.7

Te past two decades have also seen institutional change, bothat the national and USMC intelligence levels. National-level changesincluded the establishment of the Oce of the Director of NationalIntelligence in 2005 as part of broader eorts to improve coordinationand integration of intelligence activities. Tere have been signicantinstitutional changes in the USMC as well. In 1999, it established threeintelligence battalions, one to support each MEF.8 Te next year, theCommandant established the Intelligence Department (I-Dept), rais-

ing intelligence from its previous position as a division within com-mand, control, communication, computers, and intelligence.9 In 2001,USMC headquarters raised the prole of the U.S. Marine Corps Intel-ligence Activity (MCIA) by changing it from a eld activity into acommand. Te change to MCIA, and an expansion of its capabilities,reected an emphasis on providing better tactical support to opera-torsas had been envisioned by the Intelligence Plan.10

For almost a decade, USMC intelligence has been an organi-zation at war. Tis has posed signicant challenges, but it has alsooered unique opportunities. USMC responsibilities have includedconventional forced-entry operations, counterterrorism, and COINoperations. o meet these challenges, the Secretary of Defenseapproved an expansion of USMC end strength to 202,000.11 TeUSMC has also pursued innovative approaches to the organizationof intelligence resources, such as the widely discussed distribution of

intelligence below the battalion level. Recent operations have high-lighted the need to bolster key areas of expertise, especially in the selec-

7 E. Ennis Michael, Te Future of Intelligence,Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 83, No. 10,October 1999, p. 46.

8 R. Liebl Vernie, Te Intelligence Plan: An Update, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 85,No. 1, January 2001, p. 54.

9 Michael, 1999, p. 46.

10 Vernie, 2001, p. 54.

11 F. G. Homan, Te Corps Expansion, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 91, No. 6,June 2007, p. 42.


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Introduction 5

tion and training of intelligence analysts and midcareer personnel.Moreover, deciding how to capture lessons learned to retain hard-won

capabilities to meet challenges beyond current operations will be a cen-tral concern for USMC intelligence as it organizes for the future. SeeAppendix D for a recent history.

Organization of This Monograph

Chapter wo outlines the approach that the research team used for

its assessment. Chapter Tree documents the current organizationand manpower of the USMC intelligence enterprise. Chapter Fourreviews the relevant literature on organizational design. Chapter Fiveuses USMC documentation as the basis for a statement of strategicintent in the form of objectives for USMC intelligence. Chapter Sixoutlines the issues that surfaced in the semistructured interviews thatthe research team conducted with a range of USMC personnel andcivilians. Chapter Seven discusses organizational structure issues

and makes recommendations, while Chapter Eight discusses the reso-lution of the issues identied in Chapter Six. Chapter Nine providesconclusions and overall recommendations. Te six appendixes sum-marize the organizational literature reviewed for this study, the orga-nization of Army intelligence capabilities as a point of comparison, theinterview topics and questions, a recent history of USMC intelligence,current strategic guidance, and additional details about the assessment

of organizational alternatives, the results of which were presented inChapter Seven.


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7

ChAR wO

Approach

Tis chapter describes our approach to this study. Tis undertakinginvolved ve mutually supporting and related strands of research eort:

a review of the literature on organizational design a review of documents for and about USMC intelligence semistructured interviews of personnel in USMC intelligence

organizations

analyses of these data the development and assessment of organizational alternatives forMarine Corps intelligence.

In this chapter, we discuss each of these areas in turn.

Literature on Organizational Design

o develop a framework to assess the organizational baseline of USMCintelligence and to evaluate alternative courses of action and identifyissues of concern, we scoured the existing literature on organizations.Te sources we reviewed are listed in Appendix A. Using both formalacademic organizational theory sources and concepts in the broaderbusiness literature, we identied a host of models, schemes, frame-works, and approaches with which to study organizations. Te review

also included RAND reports on military organizations that outlinedorganizational assessment methods and conclusions that are specic tothe military.


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From each source, we collected information about organizationalcharacteristics, features, or criteria that the various contributors iden-

tied as relevant to organizational design or analysis. We then deter-mined why they highlight those aspects (i.e., their theory), with a focuson characteristics of organizations, such as strategy, missions, environ-ment, leadership, and technology. We also examined basic organiza-tion types, including their functional structures, divisional structures,and organizational matrices. Findings from the synthesis of this litera-ture review are reported in Chapter Four.

After selectively reviewing the literature, we chose to rely pri-

marily on the organizational work of Burton, DeSanctis, and Obel.1Specically, they provide a methodological approach to organizationalassessment that relies on the concept of organizational t. A struc-tural form should t with the goals of the organization and its envi-ronment. Moreover, other aspects of an organization should then twith the chosen structural form. Given our research charge, we did notpursue the full Burton analysis, but we used his approach to informour assessment of structure as it ts with the goals and environment ofUSMC intelligence. While we relied primarily on Burton, the remain-ing literature provided a rich source of detail for implementing cer-tain organizational structures, such as a matrix. Finally, as discussedin Chapter Four, the use of the design literature was tempered by theresearch teams experience with prior organizational studies.

Marine Corps and Marine Corps Intelligence Strategy,Plans, and Doctrine

With a foundation for the assessment of organizational design inplace, we sought to contextualize USMC intelligence within our orga-nizational design framework. We started this process with a reviewof material on the USMC and USMC intelligence. Te goal of thisreview was twofold. First, we sought to understand the current (and

1 Richard M. Burton, Gerardine DeSanctis, and Brge Obel, Organizational Design: AStep-By-Step Approach, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.


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Approac 9

recent historical) organization of and challenges facing USMC intelli-gence. Second, we sought to understand current and evolving strategic

goals and guidance for the USMC in general and USMC intelligencespecically. Tis review contributed to the overviews presented inChapter Tree, which examines current organization, and ChapterFive, which addresses strategic intent. Te review of strategic intent, inturn, contributed to our broader analysis of organizational alternatives(Chapter Seven and Appendix F) and helped establish a scheme for pri-oritizing the issues identied in Chapter Six.

Specically, our review of the strategic guidance included the

following:

Te Marine Corps Intelligence Plan (1994) National Military Strategy(2004) Te Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais-

sance Roadmap (2006) A Cooperative Strategy for a 21st Century Seapower(2007) National Defense Strategy(2008) Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 (2008) Vision 2015by the Oce of the Director of National Intelligence

(2008) National Intelligence Strategy(2009) Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review(2009) National Security Strategy(2010) Quadrennial Defense Review Report(2010)

Te Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceEnterprise (MCISR-E) Roadmap (2010) Marine Corps Operating Concepts(2010).

In addition to these strategic-level documents, we reviewedUSMC doctrine on intelligence, MOS roadmaps for intelligence, anda variety of lessons learned and observationsboth formal (i.e., fromthe USMC Center for Lessons Learned) and informal (i.e., as recorded

in theMarine Corps Gazetteand other periodicals). It is interesting tonote that many of the recent innovations in Marine Corps intelligence


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were, in fact, pioneered in the infantry battalions before spreading intothe intelligence function.

Interviews

A review of USMC intelligence doctrine, documents, and strategycould carry our understanding of the organization of USMC intel-ligence only so far. o collect additional data on the nature and func-tioning of USMC intelligence organizations for use in our organi-

zational design framework, we conducted a series of interviews withUSMC personnel and civilians. Tese interviews proved foundationalfor our understanding of the current USMC intelligence organiza-tion, conrming our document-based evaluation of strategic intent.Feedback from the interviews was also essential to our holistic analy-sis, which involved making assessments of organizational t (seeChapter Seven). Furthermore, as discussed later, the interviews pro-vided a trove of gripes, many of which, when distilled and synthe-

sized, contributed to a list of issues of potential concerns. While manyof these issues were not directly structural or organizational, their enu-meration and prioritization should still be valuable to the USMC intel-ligence leadership as it seeks to improve the enterprise. Many of theseissues can potentially be resolved by the organizational alternatives rec-ommended in Chapter Seven; some suggestions for progress on non-structural issues are oered in Chapter Eight.

We sought to interview respondents who were broadly represen-tative of the breadth of USMC intelligence, including the supportingestablishment, the command element, and the combat elements.2 Weidentied potential respondents based on structural position (who iscurrently serving in which positions in which commands) and by refer-ral (i.e., we usually asked respondents to recommend others whom wecould speak with regarding the issues under discussion). In all cases,interviews were voluntary and contingent on our ability to contact the

2 Ideally, we would also have interviewed an extensive array of intelligence customers in theUSMC, but that did not prove feasible in the time available.


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In practice, 82 questions are too many to pose in an interviewof reasonable length. Terefore, we provided the interview topics and

questions to many of the subjects as read-ahead material and then usedthe list as a reference to help guide and focus our discussion. Withother respondents, we targeted specic questions based on their posi-tions and relevant experience. Interviews ranged from 30 to 120 min-utes, depending on time available, the intensity of the discussion, andthe number of appointments scheduled during a particular site visit.Te list of interview topics and questions is presented in its entirety inAppendix C.

Data Analysis

Te interviews, once the notes were transcribed, produced a very richdatabase. In addition to the valuable holistic insights drawn from con-ducting the interviews and reviewing the transcripts (which supportedour understanding of the as-is organization of USMC intelligence

and our analysis of organizational alternatives), we sought to conducta more structured analysis using software for the management andcoding of qualitative data.

We used ALAS.ti (version 6) software to classify responses toour interview questions into categories.3 ALAS.ti enables the ana-lyst to select any segment of a document (in this case, notes from theinterviews) and assign it to one or more user-dened categories.

Te segments that the user selects are referred to as quotes, and theuser-dened categories are referred to as codes. Quotes were codedat a broad level to provide a general picture of the topics discussed. Asingle quote could be coded into multiple categories. For example, thefollowing statements were selected as one quote and coded into sev-eral categories, including innovation, mission/strategy/planning,and manpower and stang.

3 ALAS.ti is a product of ALAS.ti Scientic Software Development GmbH.


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Approac 13

Much of the work is reactive. But we get a lot of mileage (a lot ofwork done), especially relative to our size. We dont have much

time to look ahead, so we set aside time to do that. ry to freeup one or two people to do the big things, like the roadmap. Te[executive steering advisory group] is one of the ways we lookahead.

Tis group of people tries to do the day-to-day work and leave thebig thinkers the ability to stay free and think about the future.

[Te] MC intel community is small, everybody knows each other.

We coded the transcripts from the 65 interview sessions, compris-ing 120 individual interview respondents. We derived 24 codes fromour review of the organizational literature that informed our interviewquestions and from themes that emerged in interviewees responses.Te substantive codes included the following:

agility

authority/grade/rank bureaucracy career progression combat operations (relationship with) competitive advantage culture enterprise nancial resources/budget information and communication technology and tools innovation intra- and interorganizational relationships knowledge management location of intelligence organizations (geographic location) manpower and stang mission/strategy/planning

organizational structure peacetime and in-garrison activities personality


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reachback and reachforward standards

training value of intelligence (how intelligence is perceived by others) other.

In addition to coding substantive themes, we classied commentsin terms of the organization being referenced by the interviewee. Tesecodes included the following:4

ACE (Air Combat Element) CE (command element) CI/HUMIN (counterintelligence/human intelligence) G-2 (intelligence sta ) HQ (headquarters) I-Dept infantry battalion intelligence battalion

logistics battalion MAGF (Marine Air-Ground ask Force) Marine Corps Forces (MARFOR, e.g., MARFOR Command

[MARFORCOM], MARFOR Pacic, MARFOR SystemsCommand)

MCCDC (USMC Combat Development Command) MCIA MCIS (USMC Intelligence School) MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) radio battalion three-letter agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency [CIA],

National Security Agency [NSA], National Geospatial-Intelli-gence Agency [NGA]).

4 We originally employed a broader set of organizational categories but dropped manybecause of low frequency of reference.


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Approac 15

Once the interview notes were coded, we reviewed the quotes foreach code to identify themes pertaining to the key topics of interest

and specic issues of concern to multiple respondents. Te resulting listof 48 unresolved issues is discussed in Chapters Six and Eight.

While that list includes many issues that do not pertain directlyto organizational structure, we include all of the identied issues herebecause of their possible utility to those seeking to reform and improveUSMC intelligence. Rather than simply providing the USMC witha simple list of issues to consider or address, we sought to prioritizethem, suggesting which issues should be of greatest concern. How-

ever, we were unable to do so on the basis of frequency of mentionor occurrence in our interview sample for several reasons. First, oursample is not a probability sample and is not proportionally representa-tive of a discernable and distinct portion of the broader USMC intel-ligence enterprise. Our sample includes representatives from all of theorganizational elements that we sought, but not in xed proportions.Second, there were variations in the number of personnel available ateach of the organizations during our site visits, and we added addi-tional respondents through direct referral from interviewees. Tird,although our respondent sample was broadly representative of USMCintelligence organizations, the actual interviews varied in both dura-tion and in the specic questions asked or topics discussed. In general,interview respondents are inclined to mention and discuss areas high-lighted in the line of questioning and less inclined to mention areas notasked about. For these two reasons, we refrained from attempting to

make inferences based on the frequency with which an issue is men-tioned, beyond requiring that an issue be mentioned by more than onerespondent before we considered it a conrmed issue and not just asingle respondents pet peeve.

Since we could not prioritize the issues based on their appearancesin the interview responses, we sought an external referent. Fortunately,our broader organizational assessment eort required that we iden-tify clear goals and objectives for USMC intelligence organizations.

We derived a set of seven organizational objectives from our review ofthe existing strategic guidance. Tis eort, supported by our reviewof USMC doctrine, is described in greater detail in Chapter Five. We


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17

ChAR hR

Current Organization of Marine Corps

Intelligence

Tis chapter describes the current organization of USMC intelligence.In Appendix B, we have included a discussion of Army intelligence forthose who are inclined to ask the obvious comparative question, Howdoes the Army organize for intelligence?

USMC intelligence manpower and units are housed at the head-quarters level (called the supporting establishment) and in operationalforces consisting of several forces-level commands and their subordi-

nate units. Operational emphasis is placed on the MAGF, whichcomprises forces organized by task under a single commander and isstructured to accomplish a specic mission. Te MAGF has four coreelements: the CE, GCE, ACE, and LCE.1

The Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

Te four core elements are present in the three types of MAGFs, thelargest of which is the MEF, typically a three-star command. Tere arethree MEFs, each with an intelligence battalion and a radio battalion.Te intelligence battalion is composed of a battalion headquarters, aheadquarters company, a production and analysis company, a produc-tion and analysis support company, a CI/HUMIN company, and

1 Tis summary is drawn from a number of sources, including USMC websites; Headquar-ters, U.S. Marine Corps, Organization of Marine Corps Forces, Washington, D.C., MarineCorps Reference Publication 5-12D, October 13, 1998; and the structure provided by theotal Force Manpower Management System.


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a CI/HUMIN support company. A number of sections and teamsmake up the company-level units. In total, there are about 75 ocers

and 600 enlisted personnel in a battalion. Of this number, about 550have an intelligence MOS, either in the 02 or 26 career eld, with thevast majority in 02.2

Te intelligence battalion is responsible for planning, produc-ing, and disseminating intelligence, as well as providing CI supportto the MEF CE. Te radio battalion handles both signals intelligence(SIGIN) and electronic intelligence.

Second in size to the MEF is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade

(MEB), which is capable of conducting missions across a full range ofmilitary operations. Te smallest type of MAGF is the MEU, whichis structured as an expeditionary quick-reaction force, ready to respondimmediately to any crisis. Te MEF, MEB, and MEU are part ofthe CE.

Te elements are the operating forces at the division, wing, andlogistics levels and below. Intelligence personnel are part of the man-power component in each of these units, ranging from about 60 at thedivision level to around ten in an infantry battalion and even fewerin a logistics or engineer battalion. Te ACE is the core element of aMAGF that is task-organized to conduct aviation operations. TeACE is usually composed of an aviation unit headquarters and variousother aviation units or their detachments. Te GCE is the core elementof a MAGF that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. Itis usually constructed around an infantry organization but can vary in

size from a small ground unit of any type to one or more divisions thatcan be independently maneuvered under the direction of the MAGFcommander. Te LCE is the core element that is task-organized to pro-vide the combat service support necessary to accomplish the MAGFmission. Te combat service support element varies in size from a smalldetachment to one or more force service support groups.

2 MOS codes have four digits, with the rst two denoting the occupation (or career) eld.An MOS beginning in 02 is in the intelligence career eld; an MOS beginning in 26 is inthe SIGIN/ground electronic warfare career eld.


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Current Organization of Marine Corps Intelligence 19

The Organization of the Intelligence-SupportingEstablishment

Te USMC intelligence-supporting establishment consists of head-quarters-related organizations, and a key layer is the I-Dept. Te I-Deptis responsible for overseeing policy, plans, programming, budgets, andpersonnel supervision in USMC intelligence. Te department, headedby the DIRIN, supports the Commandant of the Marine Corps.Te DIRIN is assisted and supported by the Assistant Director ofIntelligence and sta. Te Intelligence Plans Division is responsible for

oversight of intelligence requirements and capabilities planning, devel-opment, and integration. In addition, the division coordinates geospa-tial intelligence (GEOIN), SIGIN, meteorology and oceanography,and electronic warfare programs. Te Intelligence Operations Divi-sion, on the other hand, provides intelligence support to headquartersand CI, SIGIN, and HUMIN management. Te division is alsoresponsible for intelligence estimates, which fall under the IntelligenceEstimates Branch. Among its various tasks, the Intelligence Estimates

Branch compiles and disseminates completed intelligence reports tothe Commandant and principal sta ocers. It also acts as a liaisonwith other national and departmental intelligence services, such as theCIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and participates inthe formulation of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta documents pertaining tointelligence matters.

MCIA, another part of the supporting establishment, provides akey reachback resource for marines and a locus for analytical eorts.It consists of sta elements and three military components: a produc-tion and analysis company, the Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion(MCSB), and a CI/HUMIN support company. Te production andanalysis company provides imagery support as well as both all-sourceand cultural intelligence. Te MCSB provides regionally focused sup-port to SIGIN analysis and coordinates with the radio battalions.Te CI/HUMIN support company is responsible for service-level

HUMIN collection management.Te Intelligence Integration Division (IID) of the MCCDC, thePM Intel (program manager, intelligence systems), the PM IDF&D


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(program manager, intelligence data fusion and dissemination), andthe intelligence schools account for the remaining key elements of the

intelligence-supporting establishment.

Manpower Resources

Growth

Authorizations for USMC intelligence personnel increased in the early1990s and again after September 11, 2001, as the USMC itself grew to

202,000 personnel. Te intelligence structure has grown from 478 o-cers and 2,642 enlisted in 1994 to more than 1,050 ocers and 5,170enlisted. In scal year (FY) 2000, intelligence personnel represented2.6 percent of the USMC. Tis increased to 3.6 percent in FY 2009, agure comparable to the density of intelligence personnel in the Army.See Appendix B for a description of how the U.S. Army organizes forintelligence.

Distribution by Organization Level

Te CE has the majority of all intelligence manpowerocers andenlisted personnel in occupational elds 02XX and 26XX. (Civilianpersonnel and contractors are not included in these numbers.) Fifty-vepercent of military intelligence (MI) personnel are in the CE, largelyin the intelligence and radio battalions. Another 20 percent is in thesupporting establishment, mainly at MCIA. Te combat elements,

the GCE, ACE, and LCE, account for 13, 11, and 1 percent of man-power, respectively. Tese data are shown in Figure 3.1.

Distribution by Grade

In terms of intelligence authorizations, the more experienced ocersare in the supporting establishment and CE, while the less experiencedare in the three combat elements. More than 70 percent of the autho-rizations for lieutenants are in the combat elements, while over 65 per-

cent of captains are authorized in the CE and supporting establish-ment. Among majors and lieutenant colonels, more than 90 percent arein the CE and supporting establishment (see Figure 3.2).


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Tere is another factor that plays into this authorization gradedistribution: the actual grade makeup of the inventory of intelligenceocers. Because there has been recent growth in the number of o-cers, and due to the closed nature of the military personnel system, theinventory of intelligence ocers is more junior than that of other occu-

pations. USMC intelligence ocers are overrepresented in the O-1,O-2, and O-3 grades and underrepresented at the O-4 and O-5 level,compared to infantry and artillery ocers (see Figure 3.3).

Moreover, intelligence ocers have, on average, less experienceat the grade of O-3 than their counterparts. ime will eventuallyresolve both these issues, given comparable promotion and retentionoutcomes.3

3 Tis is an assumption based on experience with other closed-entry systems in which ittakes time for new additions of large numbers of junior personnel to move through thesystem and gain experience in grade. Our expectation is that when the recent rapid growth

Figure 3.1Distribution of Manpower, by Level

SOURCE: Data from the USMC Total Force Structure Management System, as ofApril 12, 2010.RANDMG1108-3.1

Military

Civilian

0

1,500

500

2,000

1,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

Intelligen

ce

authorizations

LCEACEGCECESupportingestablishment


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Figure 3.2Distribution of Manpower, by Grade


0

60

40

30

20

10

70

50

80

90

100

Percentage

O-5O-4O-3O-1O-2

Combat elements

CE and supportingestablishment

Figure 3.3Ofcer Grade Distribution


0

25

20

15

10

5

30

35

O-5O-4O-3O-1 O-2

Intelligence

Infantry

Artillery

Percentage


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Te enlisted grade distribution by organization level is similar tothat of ocers, with more than 80 percent of E-5 and E-6 authoriza-

tions and nearly 90 percent of E-7, E-8, and E9 authorizations in theCE and supporting establishment.

Use of Inventory in a Deployed Setting

Because the USMC typically task-organizes, we also examined theorganizational location for deployed intelligence marines. At issue isthis question: Are large numbers of intelligence personnel located inregimental and below areas of operation, or are they in more central-

ized locations, such as Camp Leatherneck? A snapshot on one day inJuly 2010 showed that one-third of all intelligence marines deployedto Afghanistan were outside a central location, while two-thirds werecentrally located. Tis varied signicantly by organizational level. Forexample, 75 percent of GCE personnel were outside a central location(division sta being the major exception), but all ACE personnel werein a central location. Seventy-ve percent of the LCE was centrallylocated, as was 80 percent of the CE and 70 percent of the intelligenceand radio battalions. In essence, while some of the CE capability is inthe regimental and below areas, it is not a large percentage.

Marine Corps Intelligence Units of Analysis

Figure 3.4 summarizes the intelligence structure discussed earlier. Our

study focused on four organizational levels: (1) the I-Dept (DIRINand immediate sta), (2) MCIA, (3) the intelligence and radio battal-ions, and (4) the combat elements, primarily the GCE.

in the number of intelligence personnel (far more rapid than in most USMC occupationalelds) is assimilated and matures, the distribution of personnel by grade will come to moreclosely resemble that of other occupational elds. In other words, over time, ocer gradedistribution will normalize, with the distribution of intelligence ocers looking much moresimilar to the distributions in infantry and artillery. Tis assumption and the rate at which

it is being realized could be tested by tracking the progress of the data informing Figure 3.3over time. Tis expected trend toward similar experience levels could fail to materialize ifretention of intelligence marines signicantly lags retention in other USMC occupationalelds.


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Figure 3.4Structure of Marine Corps Intelligence and the Four Organizational LevelsAnalyzed

RANDMG1108-3.4

1

MARFOR Central

I MEF

CMC

MCCDC

TECOM MCSC

IID

1st Intel Bn 1st Radio Bn

DIRINT

MCIA

MCSB

PM IDF&DPM Intel

MCIS

Ground Combat Element Air Combat Element Logistics Combat Element

2nd Intel Bn 2nd Radio Bn 3rd Intel Bn 3rd Radio Bn

II MEF III MEFMARFOR Korea

MARFORCOM

MARFOR Europe

Intel Support Bn

Intel Bn

Company L, MCSB

MARFOR Africa

MARFOR South

MARFOR Reserve

MARSOC

MARFORCYBER

MARFOR Pacific

2

3

4

NOTE: Bn = battalion. MARSOC = USMC Forces Special Operations Command.MCCD = USMC Combat Development Command. MCIA = USMC Intelligence Activity.MCSC = USMC Systems Command. MEF = Marine Expeditionary Force.TECOM = USMC Training and Education Command.

Supporting establishment Command element


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literature and to develop our interview topics and questions to includeall likely relevant categories (see Appendix C). Tird, we used the ana-lytical approach of organizational t as suggested in work by Burtonet al. and incorporated it into our analytic framework and approach.2

Organizational Fit

Our framework is based on the synthesis and consolidation of a consid-erable list of organizational characteristics of interest from the designliterature. Te core framework, many of the initial categories, and thenotion of organizational t come from Burton et al.3 However, muchof the organizational design literature reviewed in Appendix A con-tains similar methods of analysis and structural prescriptions, and

2 See Burton, DeSanctis, and Obel, 2006.

3 Burton, DeSanctis, and Obel, 2006.

Figure 4.1Effects of Organizational Structure on Inputs and Outputs

RANDMG1108-4.1

Strategy Structure

Culture

Deliverproducts and

services

Engage withother

organizations

Manageconflict

Affect Relate ProduceCreate

outcomes

Missions

Environment

Leadership

Technology

NOTE: The left side of the model is described as what the organization needs, thecenter as what the organization is, and the right as what the organization does.


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Literature on Organizational Design and Analytic Frameork 27

these sources provided details on the benets and costs of dierentstructural forms.

We present the key aspects of our organizational framework here,along with the nested logical nature of the various elements.

1. In terms of design, one does not design an entire organizationglobally because key design elements (e.g., goals, strategy, envi-ronment) might be dierent for each piece of the organization.

2. Each of the design elements ts better or worse with otherdesign elements. At each step of the application of this method,

one can assess t (e.g., strategy ts with goals and environ-ment) or mist (it does not).

3. One can analyze each piece of the organization as is (in itscurrent state) and ask where would it should be (e.g., in termsof goals or strategy) if its elements do not t in their currentalignment.

Te Burton methodology works through sequential steps by

answering a series of diagnostic questions in particular areas. Te rststep is goals, the next is strategy, the third is environment, and next isstructure, followed by process, people, coordination, and control.

Hierarchical Criteria

Our framework calls for the assessment of (and an assessment of the

t of) four elements of each part of an organization: goals, strategy,resources and authority, and environment. Each varies in two dimen-sions. In this section, we review the questions that facilitate such anassessment.

Organizational goals focus on eectiveness or eciency (or acombination of both). Te core diagnostic question is, Are your goalsfocused on the product (eect) or the process (ecient)? Tis can

be further sharpened by asking, Is your focus the customer or theinstitution?


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tures are simple, functional, divisional, and matrix. Figure 4.3 illus-trates them graphically.

A simple structure is one in which there is an owner, supervisor,manager, or leader and a group of workers. Tis form is typical of asmall, private business. Tere is no hierarchy because the owner reportsto no one. Tis form is not likely to exist in a military environmentbecause, even at the lowest levels of organization, such as a team orsquad, there is a vertical and horizontal hierarchy to consider.

Te functional structure, however, is typical of many organiza-tions. Te functions can represent a number of dierent dimensions.In this case, we represent the functions as the intelligence expertisethat people bring to the organization. USMC intelligence is tradition-ally largely organized by function. Another example is Headquarters,USMC, where the various deputy commandants represent functionalareas such as manpower, aviation, and logistics.

Te divisional structure represents self-contained, independent,decisionmaking units. Tese units may be allocated by customer orgeography. For example, in private enterprise, one unit may target

Figure 4.2Assessment of Organizational Emphasis

RANDMG1108-4.2

Goal

Strategy

Resources

Environment

Complex andunpredictable

Moreresources

Initiative

Product andcustomer

Combatelements Battalions MCIA I-Dept

Combatelements Battalions MCIA I-Dept

CombatelementsBattalions MCIA I-Dept

Combatelements Battalions MCIA I-Dept Complex and

predictable

Fewerresources

Rules

Process andinstitution

Organizational emphasis


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Tere are several ways to implement a matrix form of organiza-tion. One suggested by several organizational designers is called a front-

back hybrid matrix.4

In this form, the front end is a customer-facingunit organized by geography, customer segments, or both. Te backend is organized around business units and large-scale functions. Tisis a dual structure in which both halves are multifunctional units.Tis form achieves customer responsiveness in the front and globalscale in the back. Te diculty is in ensuring that the front and backare linked. Tis form can also be structured to provide customers witha consistent point of contact that understands their missions and needs.

Tis habitual relationship can increase organizational eectiveness inthe eyes of the customer.

Te military uses the matrix structure in forms such as generalsupport, direct support, attached, and assigned.5 In general support,

4 See, for example, Jay R. Galbraith, Designing Matrix Organizations Tat Actually Work:How IBM, Procter & Gamble and Others Design for Success, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2009,

or Edward E. Lawler, From the Ground Up: Six Principles for Building the New Logic Corpora-tion, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996.

5 Te terms organic, assign, attach, direct support, andgeneral supportrefer to specic com-mand relationships. In Army Field Manual 101-5-1/Marine Corps Reference Publication5-2A, acommand relationship is dened as the degree of control and responsibility a com-mander has for forces operating under his command. Organicis dened as [a]ssigned toand forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are thoselisted in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assignedto the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy.Assign is dened intwo parts as follows:

1. o place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively

permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or per-

sonnel for the primary function, or the greater portion of the functions, of the unit or

personnel

2. o detail individuals to specic duties or functions where such functions are primary

and/or relatively permanent.

Attach is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placementis relatively temporary. Direct support refers to a mission requiring a force to support

another specic force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported forces requestfor assistance. General supportis dened as the support which is given to the supportedforce as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof (Headquarters, U.S. Depart-ment of the Army, and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Operational erms and Graphics,


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discussion, Chapter Six identies the issues of concern with regard

to the current functioning of the USMC intelligence enterprise thatmight aect structural decisions.

Figure 4.4Notional Mapping of Structural Alternatives with DifferentOrganizational Characteristics

RAND MG1108-4.4

Functional Matrix

Simple Divisional

Less

Less

More expertise

More productorientation


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35

ChAR FI

Strategic Intent and Organizational Assessment:

USMC Intelligence Strategy, Plans, Doctrine

When organizational leaders express a new strategic intent, they need toalign the organizational structure with the new direction while accom-modating history and resources. Tus, structure becomes an instru-ment for executing organizational strategic intent. Te organizationaldesign of USMC intelligence can be viewed through the lens of chang-ing strategic intent and emerging strategic intent as seen in MCISR-ERoadmap and Marine Corps Operating Concepts.1 Tis chapter distills

existing strategic guidance into seven obje

Documents

Alert and Ready_An Organizational Assessment of Marine Corps Intelligence