Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-122-Russia-10-68

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-122-Russia-10-68

“the resource wars”—a possible future world war or a series of major regional conflicts, predicted to occur sometime “before 2030.”

RUSSIA could be set to invade Europe within a year and the US Army is now too weak to stop it, a senior military expert has said."The bottom line is that Russia could win a war fast in Eastern Europe if it faced an opponent no better postured than the US Army is today."

A “New Look” Army.

Will the "New Look" reforms lead to the "reappearance of the Red Star," the symbol of the former Soviet Army? Russia’s military reforms have been misunderstood and its capabilities underestimated by the United States and Europe. That’s the conclusion of a new report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). First, increasing professionalism by overhauling the education of personnel and cutting the number of conscripts; second, improving combat-readiness with a streamlined command structure and additional training exercises; and third, rearming and updating equipment. In October 2008, the Occasus Alliance Defense Ministers announced the launch of a new stage of military reform, aimed at transitioning the Armed Forces to a new look. The changes affected all the main elements of Armed Forces – strength, command and control, organization, and officer training. Containment of NATO, if it is still relevant, can only be done with a nuclear deterrent. The development of command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. In general, as has already been stated, the ultimate goal of the reforms is to create modern, well-trained Armed Forces equipped with the latest weapons and military equipment.

(C4ISR) systems, as well as firepower leading to an increase in the importance of the actions and the combat effectiveness of rela- tively small groups of “combat units.” Combat operations are carried out

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston ChurchillCees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent Page 1 of 8

01/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]


very rapidly, and are distinctive in their rapid and constant maneuvering, including “vertical” maneuvering. The massing of forces and resources and fires, is no longer a decisive factor in military superiority. Military operations are designed to not only defeat the enemy physically, but also to crush their morale, and not just of the troops but also of the people and the government. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” segments of society is disappearing. Changes in the contribution of the services and combat arms of the Armed Forces in achieving the ultimate goal of combat operations. ECFR ; “For the first time, the Russian army had a pyramid structure, with few decision-makers at the top and more officers servicing the troops,” the study reads. Furthermore, officer salaries were increased five-fold and more modern management methods introduced. These reforms also resulted in substantial savings which were used to increase the percentage of professional soldiers within the Russian Armed Forces:This allowed the troops to use more high-tech equipment (conscripts serve too short a period to be effectively trained on complex weapons systems) and increased the combat-readiness of elite forces (paratroopers, naval infantry, and special forces).The military education system was also reformed – partially based on the systems of Switzerland and Austria—with the aim of introducing “state of-the-art (Western) leadership techniques.” Moreover, new uniforms and personal equipment were introduced boosting overall moral and confidence.The second part of the reforms dealt with streamlining command structures and re-organizing the Russian Armed Forces into smaller more agile units by reducing the nominal size of the military by 43 percent—out of 23 old divisions 40 “new look” brigades were formed.The old Soviet-era practice of mobilization—calling up reservists to achieve combat strengths—was abolished and unnecessary administrative commands scrapped. “The [new] military districts were transformed into joint forces commands, and their number was reduced. This cut the levels of hierarchy as the military districts now have access to all land, air, and naval forces in their zone,” according to the ECFR paper.Furthermore, the number of military drills was substantially increased and large-scale “snatch exercises” conducted continuously, testing the combat-readiness of airborne units and “new look” brigades. (New units should be able to deploy within 24 hours.)“While such high readiness levels have not yet been achieved, one has to bear in mind that before the reforms some Russian divisions needed about a year of preparation before deploying to Chechnya,” the study notes.The result of these reforms was that Russia was capable of maintaining a force of 40,000 and 150,000 men in full combat-ready formations along the Russian-Ukrainian border for months, while conducting military drills involving around 80,000 troops in other parts of the country.The report does not note that the three phases of the grand military reform are far from complete—in particular the last phase dealing with the introduction of new equipment. It is when analyzing the last phase that Western observes made the mistake of overemphasizing the difficulties of the Russian defense industry in delivering new military hardware and inferring a general failure of the reforms. “However, this is a misunderstanding of the nature of the reforms. The initial stages were not designed to create a new army in terms of equipment, but to ensure that existing equipment was ready to use, and to make the organization that uses it more effective and professional,” according to the ECFR paper.This led to Western military analysts underestimating Russian military capabilities and neglecting new operational concepts such as Russia’s unique approach of merging conventional with unconventional warfighting methods, among other things.


01/05/2023



Discussing Vladimir Putin’s military adventure in Syria, the report notes that it does not “not draw on the core strengths of the armed forces, or on Moscow’s military vision.” The report furthermore states that due to the limited logistical capabilities of the Russian military outside Europe and the post-Soviet periphery, operations –particularly those involving heavy Russian land platforms–would be fairly limited and cannot be sustained for a prolonged amount of time.

External” conflicts near Russia’s borders pose a genu-ne threat to Russian security Accordingly, the need to preserve and increase the effectiveness of the Strategic Nuclear Forces is dictated not only by the imperatives of maintaining strategic stability in relation to the U.S. and NATO, but also the need to contain China.

As part of defense reforms, most Russian ground forces are to be professionalized and reorganized into formations of a few thousand troops for low- and medium-intensity conflicts. The Airborne Assault Forces, which comprises about 35,000 troops and whose commander answers directly to Putin, is Russia's elite crisis-reaction force.

Russian warships drive away Dutch sub in Mediterranean DEBKAfile November 10, 2016, 8:03 AM (IDT)The Russian defense ministry said that a Dutch Walrus-class submarine was driven away Wednesday while 20km away from the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier and its escorts, including the nuclear-powered Peter the Great missile cruiser. The fleet is on a mission to Syrian shores. The spokesman added that such “clumsy” attempts to maneuver close to the Russian ships could have resulted in an accident. A NATO official said the alliance’s navies have been monitoring the Russian fleet in recent weeks in a “measured and responsible way, as is customary”. He refused to elaborate on how NATO was doing that.

Short-Term Personnel Contracts Negate Goals of Russia’s Military ReformsPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 180By: Aleksandr GoltsNovember 9, 2016 The Kremlin’s growing geopolitical ambitions have once again undermined previous successes of Russian military reform. In particular, the Defense Committee of the State Duma (parliament) recently approved amendments to the law “On Military Duty and Military Service.” The amendments, originally proposed by the Ministry of Defense, will allow military personnel to conclude service contracts with the Russian Armed Forces for a period of six months to a year. Until now, the shortest possible contract period was three years. Contracts can be signed not only with individuals in the reserves, but also with conscripts a month away from completing their mandatory service. According to the draft law, these short-term contracts apply only during extraordinary circumstances, such as for dealing with a natural disaster or other emergency, when additional forces are needed to restore the constitutional order, or to maintain or restore peace and security abroad (Rossiyiskaya Gazeta, November 1). The Explanatory Memorandum to the bill explicitly insists that short-term contracts will help to solve problems that have arisen as the result of “a change in the military-political situation, [and the] intensification of activities of international terrorist and extremist organizations.” In this situation, the “need to increase the mobility of troops, to form aggregated and non-standard units and staffing them in a short time” becomes urgent. The bill also takes into account the specifics of military service of the crews of the ships and submarines of the Navy (Duma.gov.ru, October 19). With regard to naval service, the authors of the law note that the


01/05/2023



mandatory service term of sailor-conscripts can sometimes end in the middle of a long ocean voyage. Though this concerns only several hundred sailors. Therefore, commanders must be able to offer these sailors short-term contracts to extend their service. In fact, several years ago, the defense ministry had planned to transfer all sailors serving on ships into permanent, long-term service contracts. Ironically, defense ministry officials at that time argued that these contract-service reforms would bring about greater “professionalization” of all Navy crews—the identical argument being employed now for the proposed short-term contracts. It is important to focus on the draft law’s intent to create “aggregated and non-standard units” in the Armed Forces and to rapidly equip them. This is the first time such formations have ever been mentioned in official Russian documents. Their introduction by the Ministry of Defense appears to be an attempt to give legal status to those Russian citizens who, as reported, are already fighting in Syria and before that in Ukraine (Haaretz, November 5). These people are hired through intermediaries to undertake combat roles, but their activities abroad are not covered by current Russian legislation. More recently, the government has attempted to legalize their existence by adopting a law on private military companies. However, that bill is stuck in the Duma due to opposition by the Federal Security Service (FSB), which strongly opposes sharing the state’s monopoly on violence with private entrepreneurs. Many Russian military experts contend that the defense ministry intends to solve the military’s manning problems via these proposed short-term contracts. “We have long been fighting in modern conditions; we need to form groups and forces for specific purposes… In such a way, it is possible to assemble a team of professionals selected for a particular task on different war fronts,” insisted Ivan Konovalov, the director of the Moscow-based Centre for Strategic Trend Studies (RIR, October 18). In fact, however, such an arrangement represents the legalization of mercenaries. The establishment of contracts for Russian soldiers dates back to a 2003 federal target program to change the military from an overwhelmingly conscript- to a partially contract-service force. This decision immediately generated numerous abuses. Conscripts were frequently compelled—sometimes through violence or even forms of torture—to sign service contracts to become “professional” soldiers in the Armed Forces. For instance, commanders would keep soldiers who refused to sign the contract stuck outside in the cold for hours. As a result, more than 80 percent of so-called “kontraktniki” newly signed to the Armed Forces were troops with no more than six months of service under their belts. Officers would promise 18-year-old boys, not too experienced in legal matters, that they could voluntarily terminate their contract after serving the required two years of compulsory service. However, this represented only a partial termination, and after leaving, their salaries went into the pockets of commanders. If the deception was discovered, the soldiers were immediately declared as deserters. Not coincidentally, in 2009, after their “successful” completion of the program, the number of deserters amounted to 7,000 men (Lenta.ru, February 11, 2009). This negative experience pushed then–defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov to annul the possibility of extending contracts to draftees; the option was retained only for reservists who, after completing their full two years of conscript service, spent some time in civilian life. A person who signs the contract is then required to pass an additional special three-month training session before being assigned to a military unit. On the other hand, the newly proposed short-term service contracts seriously undermine the professionalism and necessary skill set of military personnel. Moreover, a man who decides to fight in the military for a few months for the money will likely lack any significant devotion to his motherland. The six-month service-contract initiative may in fact indicate that the Kremlin is seriously considering a major ground operation in Syria in the near future. Clearly, the brutal air strikes over Aleppo did not bring the desired military effect so far. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s army is too anemic to effectively utilize Russia’s air support, and the Syrian government forces’ attack on Aleppo has once again become bogged down. Short-term conscripts could, therefore, play a role in implementing the operational plan worked out last year during the strategic exercise Tsentr (Center) 2015. Reportedly, these maneuvers practiced using a 100,000-strong


01/05/2023



ground force to capture an unnamed country overrun by terrorists. Russian defense ministry officials later admitted openly that the “Syrian theater” was on their minds vis-à-vis the exercise (Voenno-Promishlenniyi Kurier, November 4, 2015). But putting together such a large ground force for action in Syria is not easy: the Russian have authorities repeatedly promised not to send conscripts to fight abroad. Whereas, the government apparently does not feel it bears such responsibility for the lives of contract soldiers—even short-term ones—who, presumably, have voluntarily chosen the risky profession of a soldier. It seems, therefore, Russia is abandoning the priority of improving the quality of its military personnel in favor of simply pushing up the numbers of men-under-arms who can be sent into battle.

Russia’s ‘Youth Army’: Sovietization, Militarization or Radicalization?Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 180By: Sergey SukhankinNovember 9, 2016In addition to concrete steps aimed at upgrading Russian military capabilities, Moscow has launched a vigorous campaign promoting the cult of the military within Russian society, particular focusing on younger generation of Russians. On September 1, the government launched the so-called “Yunarmia” military-patriotic movement, to be composed of Russian schoolchildren. Two months later, it is said to have already assembled around 27,000 members (Mil.ru, accessed November 9). The movement was initiated by the Ministry of Defence (it is frequently nicknamed “the army of Sergei Shoygu,” the present minister of defense) and enjoys the full support of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It currently consists of 5,000 branches all across Russia, on the basis of the Central Sport Club of the Army (CSKA) and the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF). In the majority of regions, the local Yunarmia branches are headed by veterans of the Afghan or Chechen wars. The main agenda of the movement is concerned with nurturing the young generation in accordance with Russian national traditions that reject such “foreign” elements as LGBT rights, religious fanaticism, radical nationalism, various sects, and “aggressive minorities” that allegedly seek to overthrow “legitimate governments.” Moreover, it is construed as an “inoculation against Fascism” (Russkaya Pravda, April 10). Also, there is an explicit reference to some “contemporary stage of Russian patriotism” that is based on restoring all “spiritual staples” (a notion introduced by Putin in 2012) and a readiness of ordinary people to serve the motherland (Tretya Mirovaya Voyna, accessed November 9). Russian Minister of Defence Shoygu has also been very explicit as to the goal of the Yunarmia movement: the popularization of military ideology and the fostering of a special bond between young Russians and the army. “Paratroopers and racketeers, infantrymen and tank crew are determined to invite each and every member of ‘Yunarmia’ into their circle,” he noted earlier this year. On the other hand, Alexander Kanshin, the head of the National Association of Reserve Officers, has claimed that even in a short-term prospect, the youth movement is likely to accept “hundreds of thousands” of new members. Indeed, Yunarmia was conceived as a militarized wing of the “Russian movement of schoolchildren,” and thus it potentially has truly immense human resources at its disposal. Moreover, even though membership is officially “voluntary,” there are serious doubts in this regard—particularly considering Russo-Soviet historical tradition. Some observers have already compared the new organization to its historical predecessor of the mid-1980s, which played the role of a military supplement to the Soviet Pioneers youth organization. The alleged similarity is not only based on the visible ideological commonalities between the two, but is also underscored by the uniforms its members are given (Kp.ru, May 25). One should not, however, conflate Yunarmia with such artificially created pro-Kremlin projects of the early 2000s as “Nashi”: the former is, by no means, just another “patriotic” initiative created by Russian political technologists. Rather, Yunarmia is a growing movement closely linked with the


01/05/2023



Russian Armed Forces. And considering the militaristic ideology now seen growing in the country, it the new “youth army” should be understood as an organic “part of the Russian state” (Openrussia.org, August 12). Notably, Kaliningrad oblast—the Russian “island in Europe,” which is currently also being subjected to profound Soviet-style militarization (see EDM, November 7)—seems to have been chosen by Moscow to showcase Yunarmia’s launch. The ceremony of acceptance of the first Yunarmia members in the oblast was carried out with unprecedented pomp: not only was it attended by prominent Russian sportsmen, it also allowed the new members to undertake a short sea voyage on the naval corvette Steregushchiy (Tvzvezda.ru, July 9). The “militarization of public conscious” in Kaliningrad has more recently taken yet another turn. On October 26, the holding company AO “Voentorg” had an opening ceremony for the first store in the exclave oblast that will sell consumer goods branded “Russian Army” (“Armija Rossii”). All in all there are only six stores of this kind across Russia; the one located in Moscow is physically situated right in front of the United States Embassy. The launch event for the Kaliningrad store was overseen by the commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral Alexander Nosatov (Newkaliningrad.ru, October 26). Aside from products aimed at adults—the so-called “Polite People” brand, styled in the Soviet tradition of goods dating from the early 1940s—the shop offers a special line for children branded “Polite Bears.” The children’s line also adheres to the currently extremely popular “military style” (Minoborony Rossii, October 25). Undoubtedly, the last aspect should be viewed as an extremely dangerous and far-reaching trend that underscores the growing link between the youngest members of Russian society and the cult of militarism. Quite recently, the Russian blogosphere was appalled by the release of a children’s bed designed to look like the notorious “Buk” missile system, which was used to down the MH17 Boeing passenger jet over eastern Ukraine, in July 2014 (Mk.ru, October 1). Admittedly, it would be quite inaccurate to claim that today’s Yunarmia and its Soviet-era predecessor are entirely analogous. In fact, today’s “youth army” appears to be a much more ominous phenomenon for Russian society. Given the extent of xenophobia and the cult of the military in Russian society today, the emergence of a mass popular youth movement like Yunarmia reflects a much darker time of the last century when young people became tools of totalitarian regimes in Europe. It will be up to Russians to make sure Yunarmia does not retread these footsteps of the past.

Regards Cees***RUSSIA could be set to invade Europe within a year and the US Army is now too weak to stop it, a senior military expert has said. And a top military expert has warned that the US military is "woefully unprepared" for a fight against Russian troops, blasting: "America’s Army is poised for defeat in a European war."

Loren Thompson, Chief Operating Officer of the Lexington Institute defence think tank, said the US Army was "gravely deficient" in a number of key areas and that Putin's military could win any war on the continent "very quickly". His comments come after the country's most senior generals warned its fighting forces are now so depleted any war with Russia would result in massive casualties.

The chiefs of the army, navy, air force and marines told the armed services committee told US senators that conflict with Moscow would be a "high military risk" where victory could not be guaranteed.

Senator John McCain, said: "The world has only grown more dangerous over the past five years but the resources available to our military have continued to decline. "Our fighting forces are becoming effectively hollow against great power competitors." Their remarks echoed those of Mr Thompson, who has written a paper detailing how a lightning attack by Russia would carve open defenceless eastern Europe and lead to the reinstallation of the Iron Curtain. He said that whilst US Army planners believe they may have to fight a "near-peer" adversary -


01/05/2023



probably Russia - within five years, an invasion could come as early as next year. And the military expert argued the US Army is currently "postured to lose" any such conflict following years of drastic cuts which have left it with low troop numbers and ageing equipment. He wrote: "There’s plenty of evidence that Russia’s military is on the move in the Baltic region, near Ukraine, and elsewhere."Because the biggest concentrations of Russian military power are close to the border and thus can move with minimal warning, Moscow might achieve its objectives before US forces arrive."The Army is gravely deficient in air defenses, electronic warfare, precision firepower and adequately protected vehicles. It can’t match what Russia has."The bottom line is that Russia could win a war fast in Eastern Europe if it faced an opponent no better postured than the US Army is today."

Mr Thompson pointed out that Moscow has embarked on a huge modernising spending spree for its military, launching a 700 billion dollar programme to update its arms and equipment whilst the US Army has largely stood still.

US Marines chief General Robert Neller said: "Our potential adversaries have recapitalized and from ground up built a force that has very significant capability and grows every day." Meanwhile, the number of American troops stationed in Europe has also been steadily cut by both Barack Obama and his predecessor George Bush, and now consists of just two brigades. And there is the possibility the US presence could be cut even further if Donald Trump becomes the country's next president, with the Republican having expressed half-hearted support at best for NATO.

UK General Sir Richard Barrons, the recently retired commander of Joint Forces Command, told defence secretary Michael Fallon the Government was "lucky" Mr Putin did not appear interested in a conflict with Britain which he would comfortably win. He blasted: “Neither the UK homeland nor a deployed force - let alone both concurrently - could be protected from a concerted Russian air effort.” His dire warning was backed up by Sir Mike Jackson, the former Chief of the General Staff, who said he was "absolutely in agreement" with the assessment.

Regards Cees***

The Arctic Joint Strategic Command is a Russian military command established on December, 1st, 2014. The Arctic Strategic Command area of responsibility includes Russian territories in the Arctic. Now the Arctic’s defense is depending on not only the Navy and Aerospace Defense Forces, but also troops from the ground forces, serving under extremely harsh climactic conditions. “In 2012, the creation of a [new] separate Arctic brigade was announced. In 2014, the government signed a corresponding decree. And on January 17, 2015, the 80th Motorized Arctic Brigade (stationed in the locality of Alakurtti on the Kola Peninsula) received its colors,” journalist Oleg Polevoy said. “Even judging by the publications available in the media, the eye catches the fact that both the 200th and 80th brigades feature non-standard reconnaissance formations, but recon battalions. The troops carry out airborne and mountain (alpine) training. The material provisions for Arctic brigades are also special; new two-tiered tractors, snowmobiles and hovercraft are currently being developed for them,” the journalist said. “The protection of the Arctic from the ground will rest not only on the Arctic motorized infantry,” Polevoy stated. “In 2014, the Novosibirsk archipelago was used for training exercises by Russia’s Airborne Forces; 350 troops of the 98th Airborne Division conducted airdrop training, becoming the largest mass landing in the Arctic’s history. And, it seems, setting records was not their only goal. Airborne Forces Commander Vladimir Shamanov stated recently that ‘the establishment of an Arctic Airborne force is only a matter of time.’”

“The Arctic is one of the most economically promising regions in the world. The Arctic Circle


01/05/2023



holds enormous reserves of hydrocarbons and other minerals; the region also provides the shortest path for transporting goods from the Pacific to the Atlantic oceans. According to the norms of international law, a substantial part of the territory in Arctic waters belongs to Russia, thanks to the large extent of our continental shelf.” The Russian military plans to create two new military brigades for use by a united Arctic strategic command by 2016. The addition of new air bases in 2015 will grant additional strategic flexibility for the Russian military. According to a recent report by IHS Jane’s 360 based on official Russian sources, Russia is looking to have 14 operational airfields in the Arctic by the end of the year. Currently, Russia uses and operates four airfields. According to Russian Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Bulgakov, an additional ten will be in place by the end of 2015, helping the Russian state better monitor and enforce its Arctic claims. The addition of new air bases in 2015 will grant additional strategic flexibility for the Russian military. All of these changes are part of Russia’s Arctic doctrine, which was enunciated in 2008. Under the doctrine, Moscow will plan to field a combined-arms force, including military, border, and coast guard units, within the Arctic region of the country by 2020.


01/05/2023


Documents

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-122-Russia-10-68