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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-137-Caliphate- How are IS and AQ different, are they??

This is one of a series of three

Al-Qaeda will wait and watch: For the Al-Qaeda the situation cannot get better than this.

C: Nearly a year since the self-declared Islamic State (ISIS-Daesh); Thus far, Al Qaeda has lost and is still losing ground in the grim war against Isis. J.M. Berger, Editor of intelwire.com and author of Jihad Joe: Americans who go to war in the name of Islam, says, Isis "has thrown down the gauntlet to Al Qaeda and seeks to supplant its former ally as the symbol and leader of a global movement." Even the strongest of the Al Qaeda affiliates, Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has denounced the US decision to launch air attacks on Daesh. AQAP described the US move as an "act of war" against Muslims goading all to join this war alongside Daesh.

Yet, it is virtually impossible to determine the extent of erosion of Al Qaeda's support. And it will certainly be hasty to write Al Qaeda's epitaph. We admit that it is virtually impossible to gauge the extent to which Al Qaeda has lost its leadership to Daesh. But it is equally true that given the increasing expression of support for Daesh we can understand and estimate the degree to which Al Qaeda's support base has corroded. Therefore, to Al Zawahiri the United States is his best ally and in its success against Daesh he sees his best chance to overcome the challenge he and Al Qaeda are now facing.

There has been very limited reporting in the past week revealing that al-Qaeda’s global leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri is thinking of disbanding the terrorist organization Osama bin Laden founded over two decades ago. Given al-Qaeda’s (and especially Zawahiri’s) waning global influence in the face of the Islamic State group, Zawahiri is purportedly thinking of “relinquish[ing] his authority – or what’s left of it – over [al-Qaeda] branches globally and absolving them of their allegiance to him,” citing the Islamic State group’s expansion into Yemen and elsewhere.

As far as U.S. policy is concerned, the disbanding of al-Qaeda, the most well-known and by some estimates, the most deadly terrorist group in the last 20 years, could have a profound impact especially under the guise of the current debate between Congress and the Obama administration over passing a new authorization for use of military force (AUMF) specifically tailored toward the Islamic State group. The US administration is currently relying on the 2001 AUMF, originally authorized to specifically fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, to conduct operations against the Islamic State group. However, it would be hard to justify the statute’s applicability if al-Qaeda is no more.

Since there is limited reporting on Zawahiri’s relinquishment of authority, most analysis is hypothetical. For example, consider the prospect of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, al-Qaeda central’s number two and the leader of AQAP, taking the mantel from Zawahiri to keep the group intact. The “new” al-Qaeda would likely look different with some groups, particularly al-Shabaab, potentially not pledging fealty, and new organizations possibly pledging allegiance. Moreover our western political and Military leaderships claim of “halted the Daesh momentum and start of “Strategic defeat” could result in a “swing” of well trained, battle hardened and equipped (foreign) fighters to the old guard”, that has a plan.

Or, on the other hand, consider that the disbandment is just an unfounded rumour, or do we fall victim to; taqiyya'.. C: According to sharia, in certain situations, deception – also known as 'taqiyya', based on Quranic terminology, – is not only permitted but sometimes obligatory. . According to the authoritative Arabic text, Al-Taqiyya Fi Al-Islam: "Taqiyya

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[deception] is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it. We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream...Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era." The primary Quranic verse sanctioning deception with respect to non-Muslims states: "Let believers not take for friends and allies infidels instead of believers. Whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah – unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions." (Quran 3:28; see also 2:173; 2:185; 4:29; 22:78; 40:28.)Both of the aforementioned will serve the old guard well.

Since the West and the Arab states have a common interest in degrading, if not eliminating, radical militants, their collaboration must be strategic in order to avoid the potential of creating a new crisis. Does the US know what the fate of Syria and Iraq will be once ISIS is defeated, and how that will impact the Sunni-Shiite ‘war’ spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and Iran? To be sure, countering violent radicalism will be a long and costly campaign. It will take foresight, courage, and wisdom to learn from past mistakes. Together with the West, the Arab states must chart a new course of trust and mutual respect to tackle the herculean job that lies ahead. By: Dr. Alon Ben-Meir

Al-Qaeda will wait and watch: For the Al-Qaeda the situation cannot get better than this . And as a branch of al-Qaeda (Qaida), he confirmed that they see the US and its allies meddling in the Muslim world as an obstacle to their goals, and are therefore a part of the wider conflict with the West. "Their choice is simple," he told me. "Leave our lands, stop interfering in our affairs or face perpetual war." -- Abu Sulayman Muhajir

• Driven by a lack of stable governments and the movement of trained and ideologically committed recruits from battlefields in Iraq and Syria, extremist groups – such as IS and Al Qaeda – are spreading their reach into new areas of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. They are becoming more sophisticated in their communications, more lethal in their tactics, and more adept at fundraising. But while some groups may be working together, creating the specter of a worldwide movement, deep fissures persist among the groups that will likely prevent them from becoming a global network.

Formerly Al Qaeda in Iraq, IS broke away from Al Qaeda in early 2014 because of a series of personality, ideological, and tactical disputes. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, could not bear coming under the control of Al Qaeda any longer. And IS’s anti-Shiite attacks and brutal executions, including beheadings and burnings, were too extreme even for Al Qaeda. But IS and Al Qaeda have a similar goal: to establish a radical Islamic emirate.

• While IS and other extremist groups have made some gains, in the long term they face a challenge because their firebrand version of Islam is unpopular.

The al Qaeda message was essentially, "If we continue these attacks, we will one day realize the caliphate" — and this became frustrating for many idealist jihadists. When the Islamic State came along with its message of, "The caliphate is here," it attracted many of those who were dissatisfied with al Qaeda's more gradual approach and its focus on striking the United States rather than local enemies.

• Jihadist groups' tendency to splinter means that, rather than adding to the jihadist realm, the Islamic State is siphoning off former al Qaeda jihadists or picking up jihadists al Qaeda did not want or who did not like al Qaeda.

April 11, As the battle in Yemen rages on, we know today who the enemies of the Al-Qaeda are. The Yemen battle is a ten way fight and there are ten players all engaged in battles both

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for and against the regime in the country. The announcement by the Al-Qaeda that it would reward 20 kilograms of gold to anyone bringing dead or alive former President of Yemen Abdullah Saleh and the leader of the Houthi rebels, is a clear indicator of who its enemy is. The Al-Qaeda which operates under the banner of the Al-Qaeda in the sub-continent in Yemen has been the strongest group in the region for several years. It has been engaged in a battle with the United States of America since 2002. The announcing of a reward to capture Saleh and the Houthi leader is an indicator as to who the Al-Qaeda treats as its enemy. The target is not any of the other players in Yemen, but the Al-Qaeda wants to see the back of the Houthis and Saleh who are battling in tandem against the regime. Al-Qaeda will wait and watch: For the Al-Qaeda the situation cannot get better than this. The Saudis and the Americans are fighting against the Houthis in a bid to ensure that the Hadi regime stays in power. Both the Saudis and the Al-Qaeda have a common enemy in the Houthis. The Saudis striking at the Houthi bases is only advantageous to the Al-Qaeda and it goes on to solve a majority of its worries. Moreover the Al-Qaeda which is a force restricted to the ground would wait for the Saudis to clean up the Houthis through air strikes. However if the Saudis manage to do that then the Al-Qaeda would come all guns blazing to take control over the ground. For now however it is the Houthis and Saleh against all the rest of the players. The question is will the conflict end in cases the Houthis are beaten down? The answer is no because post such a scenario, it will be the Al-Qaeda fighting for Sunni dominance in the region.Read more at: http://www.oneindia.com/feature/yemen-we-know-who-the-al-qaeda-s-real-enemies-are-1710668.html

March 2015, CIA Director John Brennan told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York that the self-proclaimed Islamic State, or ISIS, is facing dissension in its ranks and is finding it hard to govern the territory it controls. These are the same problems terrorist groups that try to govern have faced in the past. John Brennan claimed the forward movements of ISIS terrorists have been “blunted” and halted in Iraq and Syria because of U.S. allied airstrikes – but cautioned against considering Iran an ally in the fightApril 2015, Vice President Joe Biden “ISIL’s aura of invincibility has been pierced,” “ISIL’s momentum in Iraq has halted and in many places has been flat out reversed.

C: with these significant claims made: Who will fill the Void? There has been considerable misinformation and confusion over the rise of the Islamic State (IS, or ISIS as it is commonly called). In order to demystify the organization the following is a backgrounder on its heritage, ideology and methods. The Islamic State has its origins in Al-Qaeda, and AQ has a plan.

April 10, Leader of Tunisia's Ennahda movement, Rachid Ghannouchi described the fighting youth "who are influenced by foreign groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS" as terrorists. He said that they are "graduates of schools that did not successfully embrace them and guide them down the right path of understanding Islam's concepts of moderation, balance and openness." According to his official website, Ghannouchi stated on Thursday that "these individuals will fail and will be defeated because they are going down the wrong path and are defending murder and crime. I believe that terrorism will fail." In his lecture at the National

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Islamic University in India, Ghannouchi reiterated his views by explaining that "ignorance with regards to Islam, weak development, and poverty are the main reasons behind the spread of takfirist terrorism. Therefore, we must be keen on educating the youth on Islam's teachings of moderation and balance and its values of tolerance, co-existence, and accepting others."

How are IS and al-Qaeda different? Reporter and producer Nagieb Khaja writes about his story on Western Jihadis, with more background on IS and al-Qaeda and the conflict between them in Syria. By Nagieb Khaja 23 Mar 2015 In May 2014, I met a group of foreign fighters in northern Syria who introduced me to members of Jabhat al-Nusra, the local al-Qaeda franchise. I immediately began to negotiate access to film with them. Nusra is one of the most powerful, and certainly the most secretive rebel group in Syria. It shares its roots with IS. Key members of both groups fought in the brutal Iraqi insurgency of the 2000s, and IS and Nusra were initially close allies, fighting under the al-Qaeda banner. But then in mid-2013, a violent conflict over territory and ideology erupted between the two groups. This local dispute has huge implications for global security, with different jihadist groups around the world pledging allegiance either to al-Qaeda or IS. The footage I shot with Nusra provides a fascinating insight into al-Qaeda's vision for the future of Syria, and its strategy for beating IS in the battle for hearts and minds in the region and beyond. IS's spectacular military victories and its declaration of a caliphate drew thousands of defectors from other groups. But while the media has focused on the territory IS holds in the east, al-Nusra and its allies have quietly been building their own Islamic State in north west Syria.Negotiations to film took several months, but finally, the group's leader, Abu Muhammed al-Jowlani, sanctioned an interview with one of their senior officials, Abu Sulayman Muhajir. An Australian of Egytian descent, he is a high-ranking member of Nusra's Sharia council, and served as a mediator between al-Qaeda and IS when the two groups split. He eventually sided with Nusra - releasing videos on jihadi internet forums in which he publicly accuses IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, of breaking a sacred oath to al-Qaeda's head, Ayman al-Zawahiri.Some analysts believe that Jabhat al-Nusra and IS are essentially the same, but my experience on the ground, and my conversations with Nusra members, from foot soldiers to those in leadership positions, convinced me that there are profound differences between them. Both IS and Nusra subscribe to a fundamental version of Islamic law, but it is in the interpretation and implementation that they vary. Abu Sulayman told me that contrary to IS, which has declared itself the only legitimate Islamic authority, Nusra sees itself as part of a wider movement that works with other Islamic groups. He said that Nusra regard IS as a criminal group that has gone astray from Islamic law, and that they would only reconcile with them if they repented and accepted judgement in an independent Islamic court. For example, Abu Sulayman criticises IS's killing of western aid workers, calling such acts crimes under Sharia. Nusra is fighting the Assad regime in Syria, but at the same time Abu Sulayman told me that they are fighting for an Islamic revival in the Middle East, with the ultimate goal of establishing their own caliphate. And as a branch of al-Qaeda, he confirmed that they see the US and its allies meddling in the Muslim world as an obstacle to their goals, and are therefore a part of the wider conflict with the West. "Their choice is simple," he told me. "Leave our lands, stop interfering in our affairs or face perpetual war." When the US began targeting IS with air strikes in September 2014 they also hit Nusra units. The US denied attacking Jabhat al-Nusra, however, claiming they had only hit the so-called Khorasan Group - an al-Qaeda cell which the White House alleged was dedicated to planning attacks on US soil. Abu Sulayman refused to comment on this, however, citing security reasons. Whatever the truth about the Khorasan Group, immediately after the

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strikes, Nusra moved against the last remaining US allies in region - two relatively secular rebel groups which the US has armed and trained, the Syrian Revolutionary Front and Harakat Hazm. The Syrian Revolutionary Front was quickly defeated and expelled from Syria, and more recently Nusra declared victory over Harakat Hazm, taking over their territory and seizing their US supplied weapons. It is yet another setback for US strategy in the region. Nusra have further consolidated their hold over north west Syria, and plan to be there for the long-term.

How big a threat are the world's jihadi groups?Sophisticated and lethal, growing in number, Islamic State and other extremist groups won't become a global force. Here's why.By Seth G. Jones March 29, 2015 Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim looked like any ubiquitous insurgent commander in southern Afghanistan. He had a sunbaked complexion, serried black beard, charcoal eyes, and the usual accessory – an AK-47 slung over his shoulder. But there was something distinctive about him, which alarmed American officials. He had recently defected from the Taliban and joined Islamic State (known as both IS and ISIS), creating concern that the militant extremist group was expanding its footprint in South Asia. So on Feb. 9, a US aircraft locked onto the vehicle he was traveling in near the village of Sadat in Helmand Province. It fired a missile, killing Mr. Khadim and five of his companions. “The Islamic State is increasingly active in the region,” says a senior American military official in Kabul, Afghanistan, though cautioning not to inflate their size or significance – at least not yet. “Some locals appear to be attracted to their battlefield success in Iraq. And everyone loves a winner.” A year ago, the prospect that IS might emerge in South Asia, the birthplace of Al Qaeda, seemed preposterous. True, IS operatives and their Sunni allies had pushed into western Iraq, seizing the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, and moved rapidly across other parts of the country. But they had yet to establish much of a presence elsewhere in the restive Islamic belt, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. These, after all, were strongholds of Al Qaeda, traditionally a fierce IS competitor, and the Taliban. But since last fall, IS has been slowly and methodically forging ties with militant groups in these two countries as well as other places around the globe. “The initial ISIS reports began as rumors,” notes an Afghan defense official. “But not anymore.” IS efforts to gain a foothold in South Asia and other regions highlight a disturbing trend. Islamic extremism is rising in key areas of the world.Driven by a lack of stable governments and the movement of trained and ideologically committed recruits from battlefields in Iraq and Syria, extremist groups – such as IS and Al Qaeda – are spreading their reach into new areas of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. They are becoming more sophisticated in their communications, more lethal in their tactics, and more adept at fundraising. But while some groups may be working together, creating the specter of a worldwide movement, deep fissures persist among the groups that will likely prevent them from becoming a global network. Many Islamic fighters disagree about how much, if at all, to target Western countries and their citizens. Others disagree about the size and global nature of their desired emirate, the legitimacy of attacking Shiite Muslims, and the morality of killing civilians. In some countries, such as Syria, extremists have even engaged in intense battles with each other, widening already significant splits.For all the strengths of today’s Islamic extremists, most are not committed to – or even capable of – conducting sophisticated attacks in the West. What’s more, polls show there is little popular support for most groups. Over the long run, their lack of local support and legitimacy may well undermine any fleeting gains – and the threat they pose to the West. • • •

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Competing networks The narrow valleys and swelling rivers of the Hindu Kush mountains, along the Afghan-Pakistani border, make the terrain inhospitable. But it was here, nearly three decades ago, that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri started Al Qaeda in the waning years of the war against the Soviets. Bearded tribesmen clog the streets of many of the border towns, clad in their dusty sandals and shalwar kameez, the loose-fitting trousers and long, baggy shirts worn by locals. Most of Al Qaeda’s surviving leaders still remain in the area, despite the attempts by IS to recruit here. Today, the terrorist landscape centers around these two broad movements: Al Qaeda and IS.Al Qaeda is led by Mr. Zawahiri, the fiery Egyptian who took over when Mr. bin Laden was killed by US Navy SEALs in 2011. Al Qaeda’s goal remains establishing a loose Islamic caliphate that extends from Africa through the Middle East, South Asia, and parts of the Pacific. Al Qaeda’s primary strategy from its base here is to work with its affiliates – such as Al Shabab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria – to overthrow local regimes. Zawahiri and his colleagues seek to replace these governments with ones that implement an extreme interpretation of Islamic law, or sharia. “Al Qaeda leaders continue to encourage their affiliates to create states,” says a US State Department official in Kabul. “In a sense, it’s extremist nation-building.”That’s what Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the head of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is hoping to do. Mr. Wuhayshi is a thin, olive-skinned Yemeni with dark hair and crooked teeth. He explains in a letter to fellow extremists that the “places under your control are a model for an Islamic state.” And he encourages them to provide basic services to locals, much like a government might do. This type of state sounds eerily similar to what IS leaders are trying to create. IS has emerged as Al Qaeda’s premier Pan-Islamic competitor. Formerly Al Qaeda in Iraq, IS broke away from Al Qaeda in early 2014 because of a series of personality, ideological, and tactical disputes. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, could not bear coming under the control of Al Qaeda any longer. And IS’s anti-Shiite attacks and brutal executions, including beheadings and burnings, were too extreme even for Al Qaeda. But IS and Al Qaeda have a similar goal: to establish a radical Islamic emirate. “Rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state,” says Mr. Baghdadi in a recent announcement, asking for volunteers to immigrate to Iraq and Syria to fill key positions. IS leaders such as Baghdadi have focused most of their operations on Iraq and Syria. But they have also attempted to expand their network into Africa, other countries in the Middle East, and South Asia. In Nigeria, for instance, the terrorist organization Boko Haram recently pledged its allegiance to IS. While the move might end up aiding the group with fundraising and recruitment, it was largely seen as a public relations stunt to help counter recent military setbacks Boko Haram has suffered at the hands of Nigerian and neighboring government forces. In Libya, IS sent emissaries in late 2014 to meet with extremist groups across the country in an effort to establish a formal relationship. IS fighters now control key sections of Libyan cities like Surt, along the Mediterranean coast. In Egypt, leaders from the group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, based in the Sinai Peninsula, pledged their loyalty to IS after a series of meetings and electronic communications. In addition, other jihadist groups, such as the various Ansar al-Sharia organizations in Libya, exist that aren’t members of either IS or Al Qaeda. The rise of these groups has forced the umbrella networks to compete more for fighters, money, and influence.While IS and Al Qaeda both want to establish Islamic emirates, they differ in important ways. IS has a separate command-and-control structure with committees that cover the media, administrative activities, military operations, Islamic law, and other matters.

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IS is also less reliant on funding from Persian Gulf donors and raises money from such activities as smuggling oil, selling stolen goods, kidnapping and extortion, and seizing bank accounts. While both movements view Shiite Muslims as infidels, IS has conducted more attacks against Shiites than any other jihadist group. As its beheadings and burnings highlight, IS operatives have also been more inclined to conduct grisly attacks. A decade ago, Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri wrote a letter to extremists in Iraq – the predecessors of IS – warning that their gruesome practices were counterproductive. “Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable – also – are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages,” Zawahiri scolded. The warnings went unheeded. And the differences between IS and Al Qaeda have turned key parts of the Islamic world into a fierce competition between the two movements. Among the most intense battlegrounds is the Horn of Africa. • • •Where they flourish The heat in Djibouti is oppressive. Sun-baked, mud-brick buildings dot the country’s landscape, caked in a layer of dirt and dust. Its capital, Djibouti city, is built on coral reefs that jut into the southern entrance of the gulf. The country is strategically located on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which separates the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden. For US counterterrorism officials, Djibouti sits on a critical seam. It borders Somalia, home to the Al Qaeda-affiliated group Al Shabab. And it lies less than 20 miles from Yemen, home to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. “The trend is unmistakable,” says a US military official in Djibouti. “There are more violent extremists in this region than we’ve ever seen before. No comparisons.”Take Yemen. In January, the government collapsed as Houthi rebels, a Zaidi Shiite movement from northern Yemen, took control of key ministries, and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, an American ally, resigned. Over the past several weeks, Al Qaeda fighters have expanded their attacks across multiple provinces. Meanwhile, Al Shabab distributed a video on Twitter recently threatening attacks against malls in the West. “What if such an attack were to occur in the Mall of America in Minnesota?” asks a masked fighter, cloaked in a checkered head scarf and wearing military fatigues. “Or the West Edmonton Mall in Canada? Or in London’s Oxford Street?” Based on these developments, Djibouti has become a major base of operations. In 2001, the Djiboutian government reached an agreement with the United States to use Camp Lemonnier as a hub of counterterrorism activity. Since then, the US presence has grown. Camp Lemonnier now serves as the US headquarters to train, advise, and assist governments in the region in fighting extremist groups, under the command of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa. It’s also a critical node for strikes against groups in Yemen, Somalia, and other countries.But the surge in terrorist activities isn’t just confined to the Horn of Africa. In addition to Yemen, Libya has become a breeding ground for new groups because of the collapse of its government only four years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi. While Mr. Qaddafi’s demise and the July 2012 democratic elections represented a remarkable achievement for political freedom, Libya faces massive challenges. The bureaucracy is weak, well-armed militias control much of the countryside, and extremist groups have attacked Sufi shrines across the country by digging up graves and destroying mosques and libraries. Ansar al-Sharia Libya, a loose collection of extremist groups, has emerged in this vacuum. Based in such cities as Benghazi, Darnah, and Misurata, which hug the Mediterranean coast, Ansar al-Sharia Libya seeks to establish sharia in the country.

Overall, the total number of extremist groups across the region jumped 58 percent between 2010 and 2013, according to a study by the RAND Corp. The number of extremist fighters increased dramatically, too – more than doubling between 2010 and 2013, to a high of more than 100,000 fighters. The war in Syria is the most important attraction for fighters.

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Extremist groups represent a significant portion of the Syrian rebel manpower against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, including IS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Suqour al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid.

The levels of extremist violence have also grown. Among Al Qaeda affiliates alone, the number of attacks more than doubled between 2010 and 2013. But most are not directed at the US – or the West more broadly. Roughly 98 percent of these attacks targeted local regimes and civilian populations across such countries as Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia.This rise in extremism has been caused, in part, by a growing weakness of governments across Africa and the Middle East, where the Arab uprisings created an opportunity for radicals to secure a foothold.

Since 2010, governance indicators in these areas have dropped markedly in such categories as political stability, rule of law, and control of corruption, according to World Bank data. The surge has also been caused by the transnational movement of fighters trained on battlefields in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These wars have provided a unique environment for extremists to pray, share meals, train, socialize, and fight together. A growing number of these operatives have moved from these battlefields to new locations in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.Not surprisingly, these trends have caused alarm in Western capitals, including London. • • • Risk of the returning recruit The headquarters of Britain’s domestic intelligence agency, MI5, is nestled along the Thames River in central London. The building, called Thames House, was designed by Sir Frank Baines in the imperial neoclassical tradition. Statues of St. George and Britannia dot the building’s Portland stone facade. The Westminster coat of arms, mounted on the building, aptly reads “Custodi civitatem domine” in Latin – or “Lord protect the citizens.” MI5 has a long history of trying to protect its population from terrorism and working closely with its American partners. Of particular concern to the agency today are Islamic extremists trained in Syria and Iraq, who also pose a threat to the US. Approximately 600 British extremists have traveled to Syria and Iraq, MI5 estimates. Many have joined IS. British agencies have watched with unease the growing number of attacks and plots across the West tied either formally or informally to Syria and Iraq. These include attacks in Brussels in May 2014; Ottawa in October 2014; Sydney, Australia, in December 2014; Paris in January 2015; and Copenhagen, Denmark, in February 2015. More broadly, more than 20 terrorist plots in the West were either directed or provoked by extremist groups in Syria between October 2013 and January 2015, according to MI5.“Our surveillance resources are overwhelmed,” says one British government official.Despite the challenges, MI5 and local counterterrorism units remain aggressive. In England and Wales, terrorist-related arrests have jumped 35 percent since 2011. And more than 140 individuals have been convicted of terrorism-related offenses since 2010, according to MI5 statistics.The British are not alone. Counterterrorism agencies across Europe and North America are under tremendous pressure to prevent attacks. A growing contingent of foreign fighters – more than 20,000 – is traveling to Syria to fight in the war, according to data collected by the US National Counterterrorism Center. Approximately 3,400 fighters, or 17 percent, appear to be coming from the West, especially from Europe. It is difficult to predict whether most of these fighters will remain in Syria, move to future war zones in other regions, or return to the West. And even if some return, it is uncertain whether they will help hatch terrorist plots, focus on recruiting and fundraising, or become disillusioned with terrorism. Still, foreign fighters have historically been agents of instability. Volunteering for war is often the principal steppingstone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy.

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And this struggle is as much about ideas as it is about military combat. It is a clash increasingly occurring online and on social media forums. Indeed, IS’s sophisticated use of social media has created opportunities for the group to reach potential recruits or influence those inspired by its message. One of the most important forums is IS’s online magazine, Dabiq. • • •How dangerous, really? The seventh issue of Dabiq, published in February, boasts a sleek cover photograph. It shows two imams, clad in creamy white robes and wearing snuggly fitting prayer caps, holding signs emblazoned with the words “JE SUIS CHARLIE” (“I AM CHARLIE”). It is the slogan adopted by those who denounced the January attack against the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. Like all issues of Dabiq, which is printed in several languages including English, the seventh installment includes an assortment of articles intended to establish the religious legitimacy of the group and encourage extremists to come to Syria and Iraq – or else conduct attacks in their home countries. The feature article, which accompanies the cover image, is titled “The Extinction of the Grayzone.” It starkly divides the world into two camps: Islam, represented by IS and its supporters, and the West and its followers. The article denounces Muslims that show sympathy for the victims of the Charlie Hebdo attack as apostates – guilty of abandoning Islam. Since its expansion in Iraq and Syria, IS has become a growing threat to the US. Rather than the complex attacks on 9/11, which involved years of training and meticulous planning, the most likely IS threat today comes from smaller, less-sophisticated attacks from individuals who have taken up the cause. “The uptick in moderate-to-small scale attacks in the West since last summer by individual extremists reinforces our assessment that the most likely and immediate threat to the Homeland will come from Homegrown Violent Extremists, or individuals with loose affiliation to terrorist groups overseas,” said Nicholas Rasmussen, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, at a US Senate hearing in February.IS is not the only extremist group that could mount an attack on US soil. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula provided training to two operatives involved in the Charlie Hebdo shootings, Said and Chérif Kouachi. Several Yemen-based operatives continue to plot attacks against the US as well. Core members of Al Qaeda, based in Pakistan, also present a threat to the US homeland. But their leaders have had difficulty recruiting – or even inspiring – competent operatives in the West. That’s why Zawahiri sent a small group of operatives, referred to as the Khorasan Group, to Syria to plot attacks in Europe and America.In addition, a small number of individuals who have embraced Al Qaeda’s ideals, like the Tsarnaev brothers, who perpetrated the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, concern security officials. Still, terrorists have had difficulty striking the US because of robust counterterrorism steps by the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other federal and local agencies. Authorities have thwarted all but four of more than 40 home-grown terrorist plots since 9/11. Several groups pose what experts consider a medium-level threat because of their capability to target US citizens overseas, not the US homeland. Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia, for instance, has planned attacks against American diplomats and infrastructure in Tunis, including the US embassy. In Somalia, Al Shabab’s objectives are largely parochial: to establish an extreme Islamic emirate in Somalia and the broader region. But it does possess an ability to strike targets in East Africa.Other extremist groups represent, at best, a low-level threat to the US. These groups do not possess the capability or intent to target America domestically or overseas. They include organizations such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is mainly interested in Chinese targets. Even in Afghanistan, many local groups have little interest in attacking the US homeland.

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• • • A threat overrated While IS and other extremist groups have made some gains, in the long term they face a challenge because their firebrand version of Islam is unpopular. After the IS execution of Jordanian Air Force pilot Muath Kassasbeh by immolation in early February, a groundswell of opposition surfaced across the Muslim world. Numerous activists on Twitter accounts and English-language jihadist forums condemned the actions as un-Islamic. They argued that burning Muslims is strictly forbidden in Islam. “I have become very troubled upon hearing this news, because I thought that burning anyone (even animals) was not allowed under any condition in Islam,” posted one participant on the Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum, using the name “pathoftrials.”Islamic scholars have also been widely critical of IS. “What happened to the Jordanian pilot is by all means a crime. This barbaric action is far away from humanity, much less religion. Islam is innocent of this act,” said Sheikh Shawki Ibrahim Abdel-Karim Allam, the grand mufti of Egypt. What’s more, support for extremist groups across the Muslim world is low, according to survey data from the Pew Research Center. Al Qaeda received negative marks in all 14 countries surveyed. In addition, the vast majority of respondents, both Muslims and Christians, have an unfavorable view of Boko Haram in Nigeria.Concern about Islamic extremism is growing among countries with substantial Muslim populations as well. It jumped from 81 percent in 2013 to 92 percent in 2014 in Lebanon, 71 percent to 80 percent in Tunisia, and 69 percent to 75 percent in Egypt, according to the Pew Research Center. Viewed in this context, the rise of extremist groups may well be fleeting. With little local support, they lack the foundation necessary for a sustainable movement. Even IS has had trouble holding ground on its home turf, as Iraqi government forces and local militias have retaken control of key portions of cities like Tikrit, Iraq. Deep divisions also exist among these groups about ideology, tactics, and objectives. For all the strengths of today’s Islamic extremists, most are not committed to or capable of conducting sophisticated attacks in the West, like on 9/11. “Most of the plots uncovered in the United States were amateurish schemes that were detected long before they got close to being operational,” says Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert at the RAND Corp. “Two-thirds of the US plots involved single individuals. Most of the remaining plots were tiny conspiracies. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.” Seth G. Jones is director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corp., and adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies. His most recent book is “Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa’ida Since 9/11.”

The Islamic State's Appeal Security Weekly March 26, 2015 | Scott StewartThe events of the past week have created a lot of discussion about the Islamic State's expansion. First there was the March 18 armed assault at the Bardo National Museum in Tunis that resulted in the deaths of 23 people, 20 of who were foreign tourists. Then there was the March 20 triple mosque bombing in Sanaa, Yemen, that resulted in at least 142 deaths. Finally, on March 23, there were rumors that a brigade of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb fighters may be defecting to the Islamic State and that some al Shabaab members in Somalia also want to join the group. These developments follow the announcement earlier this month that Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram has joined the Islamic State, as well as earlier announcements that jihadists in Pakistan, Algeria, Libya and Egypt have joined the group. The seemingly rapid spread of the Islamic State has caused some concern, and to help understand the group's rise, we first need to understand its appeal.The Draw of a New Brand After the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda became the leading global jihadist brand. Following al Qaeda's success — and a massive public relations success it was — a number of existing jihadist groups became al Qaeda franchises in an effort to benefit

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from its popular brand. These included Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Jamaat al-Tawhid and Jihad group in Iraq, which in 2004 became al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers. After a series of name changes, the group would eventually break away from al Qaeda in 2014 to become the Islamic State.Other organizations that adopted the al Qaeda brand include the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, which in 2006 became al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and several smaller jihadist groups in Yemen that joined together in 2009 under the leadership of Nasir al-Wahayshi to become al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.Adopting the al Qaeda brand was seen as a way to rejuvenate the existing jihadist groups by gaining the additional attention, funding and recruits that came with the al Qaeda name. In some places, the strategy worked. For example, foreign recruits and funding flowed into the Iraqi al Qaeda franchise following its entry into the al Qaeda constellation. Indeed, the franchise gained so much funding and manpower that it siphoned off resources from the al Qaeda core to the point where the core leadership had to ask al-Zarqawi for financial help in 2005. But in other places, the al Qaeda branding was simply ineffective; for example, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, which changed its name to Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, withered away.As we have discussed for the past decade now, once the United States and its allies focused their power on al Qaeda, the group became severely degraded and its ability to launch attacks was heavily affected. As franchise groups in places such as Iraq grew in power and influence, the core struggled for relevance. This struggle was not only on the physical battlefield, but also on the ideological battlefield. There was a lot of ideological tension between the al Qaeda core and some of the new franchises. As early as 2005, this tension became visible from the interactions between core leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi. There was also tension within the franchises, especially al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, over whether to continue following the al Qaeda ideology.The al Qaeda core's influence had diminished so much that by mid-2013, the Islamic State felt it could defy al-Zawahiri. The group split from al Qaeda in January 2014 and declared the establishment of the caliphate on June 29, 2014.One of the primary factors that contributed to al Qaeda's decline was the frustration that many jihadists felt over al Qaeda's empty claims and threats. The group repeatedly threatened to strike the United States with an attack more devastating than the ones on 9/11, generating a lot of excitement in the jihadist realm. However, as the years passed and al Qaeda was unable to deliver on its threats, the group increasingly became seen as hollow. Indeed, the al Qaeda core has not been able to strike the U.S. homeland since 2001.Jihadists who were initially excited and energized by the thought of the United States and its European and Muslim allies being attacked and defeated became increasingly disaffected and dissatisfied with al Qaeda's ineffectiveness as the years dragged on. Osama bin Laden had become an iconic leader for his defiance of the Americans and their allies in addition to his boldness in attacking U.S. interests. Yet, before his death, rank-and-file jihadists had began criticizing him for being a coward who was hiding from the Americans rather than fighting on the front lines and leading the charge. Bin Laden's death and replacement by the irascible al-Zawahiri was also a critical event that undermined the morale of the global al Qaeda movement.In just a little more than a decade, the group that had at first appeared to be an exciting new alternative to the older, ineffective and marginalized jihadist groups had gradually been reduced to the same state of irrelevancy as the former groups that had assumed the al Qaeda brand name.This dynamic is very similar to what we have seen in other radical movements, including the white supremacist movement and the environmentalist and animal rights movement.

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Younger members of the movement become frustrated that the old guard is not doing anything, so they break off from the more mainstream groups to form more radical splinters. Generally these new radical groups learn that being an effective terrorist organization is not as easy as it would seem at first, especially when confronted by heavy pressure from law enforcement and security services. Eventually, the new splinters become moribund like their parent organizations, and the cycle starts again. It is easier for a group to criticize others for a lack of attacks than it is to plan and execute the attacks of its own.The al Qaeda message was essentially, "If we continue these attacks, we will one day realize the caliphate" — and this became frustrating for many idealist jihadists. When the Islamic State came along with its message of, "The caliphate is here," it attracted many of those who were dissatisfied with al Qaeda's more gradual approach and its focus on striking the United States rather than local enemies. The Islamic State's initial battlefield successes in Iraq served as an additional multiplier to convince jihadists that it was the real deal and that the thing they had been waiting for had finally come. The jihadist grassroots were primed to accept the brash, uncompromising and apocalyptic message of the Islamic State.Many people have expressed surprise that the atrocities committed by the Islamic State have not alienated more jihadists. This is because the transcendent purpose of the Islamic State is so powerful that it overrides any qualms about how it is to be achieved. To quote leadership guru Simon Sinek, "People don't buy what you do; they buy why you do it. And what you do simply proves what you believe." The Islamic State is pursuing a "why" that has a very powerful appeal to grassroots jihadists around the globe. Its barbaric actions prove that its members are true believers who do not care about any consequences or repercussions.This is a very powerful force that has an incredible pull — especially on the marginalized individuals who tend to flock to cults, gangs and radical groups. We are seeing this pull not only in the young aspiring fighters and brides that are traveling to Syria, but also in the grassroots jihadists who are practicing leaderless resistance and conducting attacks in other places. However, while the appeal is powerful, it is only powerful for a very limited segment of people. The Islamic State's brutality and attacks on other Muslims have alienated many of their intended audience.Impact of the Appeal One impact of the Islamic State's appeal that goes beyond branding is that certain groups, such as Boko Haram before it actually pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in August, are attempting to copy its method of operations. This has included kidnapping large numbers of girls, attacking Muslims declared to be apostates and declaring an Islamic Caliphate after seizing a large piece of territory. Recent suicide bombings of mosques by Islamic State supporters in Yemen also appear to have been influenced by the Islamic State's actions in Iraq and Syria. Such attacks are a way of differentiating Islamic State followers from al Qaeda adherents. The Islamic state also has shown a mastery of social media that eclipses al Qaeda's. This social media activity, along with the group's dramatic progress in mid-2014, has attracted funding and foreign volunteers. It has also helped motivate a number of grassroots terrorists to conduct attacks in the West. It remains to be seen if the surge in grassroots attacks in recent months is a temporary phenomenon or if it will be sustainable.

It is important to understand that not even a year has passed since the Islamic State declared the establishment of its caliphate. The shine is only now beginning to wear off as the group, which promotes itself as an inexorable force blessed by Allah, experiences significant and repeated defeats on the battlefield. Its leaders will attempt to deflect some of these defeats through apocalyptic ideology that claims the group will suffer heavy losses until a small core of true believers is led by the Prophet Isa, which is Arabic for Jesus, in a

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final battle at Dabiq in Syria, where they will finally defeat the "crusader forces" led by the Antichrist.This justification may convince some of the most-hardcore idealists, but it will probably not be accepted globally. The others will become disenchanted once they realize the Islamic State will not be able to deliver on its promises. There have been many reports of foreign fighters being executed for attempting to leave the Islamic State and return home, so disillusionment may be starting to take root and spread through the ranks of the group's fighters. Such executions will even serve to further the spread of disenchantment.When considering the impact of the Islamic State's appeal, it is also important to keep in mind that in every instance outside of Syria and Iraq where the Islamic State has claimed to have established a new franchise — what they refer to as a "wilayat," or province — that new group has sprung up in areas where jihadists were already active. Indeed, Tunisia, where the Bardo Museum attack happened last week, has been plagued by a jihadist problem for quite some time now, and the Tunisian authorities have been fighting a counterinsurgency against the jihadist Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade and Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia in the mountainous Kasserine province near the Algerian border since 2012. (Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, and the Tunisian government believes the group was responsible for the Bardo attack.) We have written repeatedly about the danger jihadists pose to Tunisia and were not surprised they carried out an attack in Tunis. The only real surprise was that the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack instead of another group.In most cases, pre-existing organizations or splinters of a jihadist organization are rebranding themselves as Islamic State franchises rather than new groups forming to claim the name. There are numerous examples of this: Jund al-Khalifa in Algeria (a splinter from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb); the Sinai faction of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in Egypt; Boko Haram; some elements of the Pakistani Taliban; the Dagestani faction of the Caucasus Emirates; and a faction of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.As we noted above, radical groups have a natural tendency to fracture, especially after they have proved themselves ineffective in making progress toward their stated goals. However, the Islamic State's emergence and its success in Iraq have dramatically accelerated this process. Moreover, the Islamic State's scathing and repeated public attacks on al Qaeda's leadership will make it very difficult to gloss over the differences and reconsolidate the jihadist movement unless the Islamic State can do so by force, which is not likely, given the constraints the group faces.Jihadist groups' tendency to splinter means that, rather than adding to the jihadist realm, the Islamic State is siphoning off former al Qaeda jihadists or picking up jihadists al Qaeda did not want or who did not like al Qaeda. In many places such as Syria, Pakistan and Libya, these Islamic State franchise groups have even engaged in combat against other jihadists. This means that as jihadist groups splinter and weaken, and as jihadists kill other jihadists, the global jihadist movement will experience a net loss rather than a victory.CIA Chief Says Governing Is Too Big A Job For ISIS

Friday, March 13, 2015 Dina Temple-Raston / NPR CIA Director John Brennan told an audience in New York on Friday that ISIS is facing internal divisions.CIA Director John Brennan told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York today that the self-proclaimed Islamic State, or ISIS, is facing dissension in its ranks and is finding it hard to govern the territory it controls. These are the same problems terrorist groups that try to govern have faced in the past.The director was cautiously optimistic that the group, which stormed across Syria and Iraq last summer and has held much of the territory it captured since then, is stumbling.

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"I do think the great image of ISIL, in terms of its being able to prevail and be successful inside Iraq and Syria is being pierced," Brennan said, using an alternate name for ISIS. "We see that they are having setbacks, we see that there is some dissention in the ranks. We see that a lot of the requirements that are attendant to having control of territory and having the responsibility to run it administratively is not really the strong suit of these thugs who are joining this band wagon."Brennan said the group is still recruiting foreigners at breakneck speed — some estimates say that more than 1,000 foreign fighters are showing up in Syria to sign up with ISIS every month — but fissures are starting to appear.There are defectors who have tried to leave the group only to be captured and killed for doing so. Residents who live in ISIS-controlled areas have complained about food shortages and spotty electricity and they have also tried to leave."I do think we're seeing right now some very significant indicators that ISIL's engine is suffering," Brennan said. "That doesn't mean it is out of steam. It means it is going through a phase of development — and hopefully its ultimate demise — that is consistent with some other groups."Al-Qaida's arm in Yemen, known as AQAP, tried its hand at running parts of Yemen. It fired local administrators and tried to set up its own mini-caliphate, but it didn't work, and the group eventually gave its territory back to the ruling government. The leader of al-Qaida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has long maintained that his group needs to focus on attacking the West and driving it from Muslim lands and it should leave governing a caliphate to a later time. This is one of many reasons the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, decided to split with al-Qaida and set up his own terrorist organization.

ISIS: Salafism, Recruitment, Organization and MethodStephen Pitt-Walker 04.06.15There has been considerable misinformation and confusion over the rise of the Islamic State (IS, or ISIS as it is commonly called). In order to demystify the organization the following is a backgrounder on its heritage, ideology and methods. The Islamic State has its origins in Al-Qaeda. It developed in Syria and Iraq, especially early under the leadership of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi is often considered the founding father of IS. Hence, it may be argued that the organization had ‘bin-Ladin-style Sunni’ roots that originated during the anti-Soviet jihadist movement in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Today the group has developed well beyond the organization that was headed by Zarqawi. He was killed in 2006. The group evolved in Iraq and Syria, until its emergence under its current leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who claims historical legitimacy through the lineage of the great mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul (Salafism). He delivered a Ramadan sermon as the first caliph in generations with the aim of establishing a caliphate in Iraq and Syria and beyond.After its various formulations and fluctuating fortunes IS split from al-Qaeda and has risen to independent prominence as arguably the most disciplined and well-organized jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. As described by Gary LaFree the group is born of traditional political grievances. It was in the mosque that al-Zarqawi first discovered Salafism, a doctrine that in its contemporary form advocates a return to theological purity and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. Salafists deem western-style democracy and modernity not only fundamentally irreconcilable with Islam, but the main pollutants of Arab civilization, which after World War I stagnated under the “illegitimate” and “apostate” regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. At the most extreme end of their continuum, Salafists are also adherents to jihad, a word that denotes “struggle” in Arabic and contains a multitude of definitions. However, since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, however, its primary definition has been violent armed resistance and struggle.

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This overarching ideology is used as the pretext to attract recruits who have both personal and political grievances, are vulnerable, and may be easily swayed by a ‘quest for significance’ etc. Having appealed to, or sold, the segue of grievance and created a cognitive opening in the individual, IS the organization uses the ideology delivered through its propaganda, via agents, social media, news media, social coalitions and recruiters via militant organizations to mobilize the recruit to violence by joining the group and fighting.In examining the organizational structure that best describes the Islamic State it is reasonable to look at why the organization has been misunderstood by the west. First, it is noteworthy that bin Laden viewed his terrorism as a prologue to a caliphate which he did not expect to see in his lifetime. Jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group’s priorities and current leadership. The west has tended to see jihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al Qaeda to IS, an organization that it has decisively eclipsed.The Islamic State has become much more sophisticated and technologically savvy than al-Qaeda, and is much better equipped and organized. The Islamic State may best be described as a hierarchical organization, with elements of networked and cellular organizations. By comparison to its antecedents and other groups it is sophisticated in its capability which is specialized and defined by units of expertise to draw upon in a vertically and horizontally integrated organization. As such IS demonstrates a very highly sophisticated operational capacity. The features of this are its ability to mobilize and focus resources, conduct complex and destructive attacks, and campaigns of violence over time.

However, as a result of IS’s decision to pursue this greater ‘operational capacity’ its ‘operational security’ is lower. This means that its ability to conduct operations without law enforcement intervention, disruption and interdiction is relatively poor. This follows a strategic decision made by IS leaders who have chosen to engage in a more conventional form of terrorist conflict, in which commanders praise and laud the ‘rank and file’ fighters rather than the ‘heroic elites.’ Other features include: more formalized units; high division of labour; strict chain of command; and a higher degree of safe haven.The overarching goal of the the Islamic State is to create a so-called “theologically pure” Islamic caliphate in Iraq and Syria and ultimately beyond, in order to defeat infidels, apostates (Takfir), and mohareb. This fulfils a requirement, as they interpret it, the will of Allah in accordance with their interpretation of the prophecy of the apocalypse.Of the five strategies most often deployed by terrorist organizations the strategy that most closely fits IS operation is that of attrition and, to a lesser extent this is complemented by outbidding and intimidation. IS has extended and superseded AQ’s attrition strategy against the Iraqi Shia government and the Syrian Alawite regime. The Islamic State is pursuing the visionary goal of establishing a ‘New Islamic’ – ‘pure’ caliphate in the tradition of al-Baghdadi’s claim to legitimacy through Salafism. Additionally, IS has leveraged the myth that the US delivered Iraq into the hands of Iranian Shia vassals via the 2003 war. It is oft perceived and touted as a grievance against the west that the Iraq war upset the balance of power in the region in Iran’s favour. The Arab world talks of secret deals between Iran and the United States, and laments that the US ‘gave Iraq to Iran.’ This geopolitical perception somewhat accounts for one of the primary reasons that Sunnis have been attracted to IS.As Syria was engaged Iraq was but one more staging ground in the fight against “western ideology worldwide.” In this respect, al-Masri was closer to al-Zawahiri as a grand strategist. “He came from [the] outside, he was the agent provocateur sent by al-Zawahiri and bin Laden to be their man in Iraq…But instead he joined with al-Baghdadi, who as we know was an Iraqi Salafist, so there existed a type of inside-outside partnership. Al-Baghdadi lent the street credibility to the operation and al-Masri was the supervisory mujahid supporting

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them.” Under the current leadership the attrition campaign against the west and other combatants continues as the US’s and coalition’s war ‘weariness’ and ‘wariness’ take their toll and the campaign continues to cost lives, exhaust resources and causes alarm and fear globally. Within the strategic logic demonstrated by IS the attrition strategy and its complements fit well with the ‘rational actor’ theory as it is applied to terrorist organizations and individuals. The strategic logic and narrative created and usurped, the ideology, the logic, recruitment, propaganda and channels for radicalization and recruitment all support the strategy of the organization.Recruits believe in the cause and the rewards in this life and the next that await them as fighters and martyrs. They believe in the righteousness of their ideals and ideology as do members of cult organizations who are coopted and indoctrinated by the dominant logic and their cognitive opening is exploited by defining rewards and incentives that are promised thus perpetuating the cycle. The aim of all this is to achieve the territorial claims that the caliphate requires. As well as attrition, IS has certainly escalated violence and horrific spectacles, atrocities that are exposed to the world to outbid its progenitor AQ. Along with intimidation used to control local populations under threat of death and torture if they do not comply and adhere to their form of Islam, such as in Diyala province (Iraq), recently where Sunni inhabitants are afraid to go outdoors after IS occupation. The group’s operation in conventional fighting, holding ground, organization, war-fighting capabilities, use of multi-media for propaganda, creating fear and using social media, ethno-cultural groups and agents to radicalize then mobilize recruits – support and suborn off-shoots and promote idealized violence around the globe (e.g. in Australia). They use the internet and online jihadist magazines to inspire, motivate and teach disaffected prospective recruits. All this speaks to the strategy of attrition. In concert with intimidation and outbidding (via violent burnings, crucifixions, beheadings and genocidal mass murders that are widely disseminated via all forms of media, as well as rape, religious policing and intimidation) the IS strategy and its strategic logic is demonstrated. The aforementioned are tactical features of the group and its modus operandi.In my view IS is organizationally and tactically effective albeit not strategically effective. The central aspect of counter-terrorism with respect to IS, given its highly complex, sophisticated operational capacity but low operational security, is to focus on degrading its ability to radicalize, recruit and fund itself. Demythologizing and de-romanticizing the group and making it less appealing from the ideological perspective at the same time as addressing the perceived grievances that are exploited by IS in its narrative and story-telling to help radicalize and recruit the vulnerable. Financing and supply-chain interdiction in all forms is another aspect of a coordinated approach to denying IS its legitimacy and resource based capability that must be pursued.As with any counter-terrorism campaign it must be multi-faceted and relentless. Future questions may best examine how the global community will respond through a combination of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power measures to the threat and real issues posed by IS in the near, medium and long term. The issue of stopping the flow of foreign fighters and defeating the militant jihadist ideology is of special significance to counter-terrorism and specifically to defeating IS. I contend that the ideology is, and will be, the most difficult issue to address, combat and ultimately defeat given its mass appeal and deep historical roots of violent jihad prevalent today.

Regards Cees

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