Al-Ghazalis_Cosmology_in_the_Veil_Section.pdf

Al-GhAzls CosmoloGy in the Veil seCtion of his Mishkt al-anwr

Frank Griffel

In memoriam Friedrich Niewhner (19412005)

The past twenty years have produced a lively and controversial debate about al-Ghazls (d. 505/1111) views on cosmology, that is, how God creates and how He governs over His creation. Initially, al-Ghazl was regarded as a faithful Asharite theologian who followed the Asharite model of an occasionalist

universe in which God is the only direct and indirect cause of events.1 However, an

ever-growing appreciation of al-Ghazls complex relationship with Aristotelian

philosophy, particularly the philosophy of Ibn Sn (Avicenna, d. 428/1037), has

led to the realization that this is not the whole truth. Long before scholars started

to discuss al-Ghazls ambivalent relationship with philosophy, however, his

cosmology had already been debated. The discussion was initiated almost one

hundred years ago by the publication of al-Ghazls Arabic book Mishkt al-anwr (The Niche of Lights).

The Mishkt al-anwr was a relative latecomer among the major works of al-Ghazl known to Western scholars. Apart from brief studies that were based on manuscripts of the text and its medieval Hebrew translation,2 Western scholars

1 See, for instance, B. Carra de Vaux, Gazali (Paris, 1902), pp. 7982; A. J. Wensinck, La Pense de Ghazzl (Paris, 1940), pp. 69, or M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averros and Aquinas (London, 1958), pp. 5682.

2 See R. Gosche, ber Ghazzls Leben und Werke, Abhandlungen der philos.-histor. Klasse der Knigl. Akademie der Wissenschaften [Berlin] (1858), 239311 (pp. 26364); and M. Steinschneider, Die hebraeischen bersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher: Ein Beitrag zur Literaturgeschichte des Mittelalters, meist nach handschrift-lichen Quellen (Berlin, 1893), pp. 34548.

28 Frank Griffel

began to read and analyze the book only after the publication of its Arabic editio princeps in Cairo in 1905.3 Soon the challenges of this text became evident. In an article published in 1914, William H. T. Gairdner (18731928) sketches out a num-ber of problems that are posed by passages in Mishkt al-anwr where al-Ghazl puts forward teachings that he criticizes and rejects in some of his better-known

works. In an attempt to explain and reconcile these apparent contradictions,

Gairdner suggested that al-Ghazl published two different sets of teachings, one

in works written for the ordinary people (awmm), and a different set of teach-ings in works that were written for an intellectual elite (khaw). The Mishkt was of the latter kind, Gairdner suggested, written for a readership that was able

to properly evaluate possible conflicts of its teachings with the widely accepted

religious doctrines found in the more popular books by al-Ghazl.4 But if these

two teachings were equally true, Gairdner asked, did al-Ghazl teach a doppelte

Wahrheit,5 a double truth? Did he teach one truth for his less educated readers,

and another for his well-trained close followers?6 Gairdner called this question the

3 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwar, ed. by A. Izzat and F. Zak al-Kurd (Cairo, 1322/190405). The text was reprinted by the Mabaat al-Sada in Cairo in 1325 (190708). The text of these two early editions, however, is unreliable. The Mishkt al-anwr has not yet been critically edited. For this article I have used two semicritical editions and two manuscripts. The editions are by Ab l-Il Aff (Cairo, 1383/1964), who established his text from two manuscripts in Egypt (?) and the editio princeps, and by Abd al-Azz Izz al-Dn al-Sayrawn (Beirut, 1407/1986). The latter edition is based on Affs earlier print along with two manuscripts not used by Aff, one of which is Beirut, Jafet Library of the American University, MS 297.3: G 41 mA. This is the oldest known manuscript of the text, copied in 541/1147. In my study of the Mishkt I compared the text in these editions with the manuscript from the American University in Beirut and MS Escurial 1130, fols 73a81a, copied in 611/121415. The Escurial MS had not been used in the two editions by Aff and al-Sayrawn. S. Dughaym, however, has edited the text of the Escurial MS (without knowledge of its providence and without identifying it) in his edition Mishkt al-anwr f tawd al-jabbr (Beirut, 1994). All translations are mine unless noted otherwise.

4 W. H. T. Gairdner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr and the Ghazl Problem, Der Islam, 5 (1914), 12153 (p. 153).

5 Gairdner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr, p. 153, quotes the term in German.6 The accusation of teaching a double truth was initially levied against some Latin

followers of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) in Paris during the late thirteenth century. They were accused of holding that there is one truth on the side of religion and another on the side of philosophy. In his 1277 condemnation of 219 philosophical theses, tienne Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, accused some Averroists at the Paris University of saying that there are teachings which are true according to philosophy but not according to the Christian faith, as if there were two contrary truths [duae contrarirae veritates] and as if there stood

Al-GhAzls CosmoloGy 29

Ghazl-problem. The difficulty was, in Gairdners words: What is the absolute Islamic truth in his view? Is it the exotericism of the pious awmm, or the eso-tericism of the mystic khaw ? 7 Gairdners comments were prompted by what he called the Veil Section, a relatively brief passage of about eight to ten pages at

the end of Mishkt al-anwr.8 Here, al-Ghazl classifies various religious sects according to how thickly they are veiled from the light. In the earlier parts of the

book, al-Ghazl had explained that the word light should be regarded as refer-ring to God as the source of all being. In the closing part of the Veil Section, at the

very end of the book, al-Ghazl describes the insight of those people who are

not veiled and thus have a proper knowledge of the divine. It is this report of the

knowledge of the unveiled and initiated that baffled Gairdner. Al-Ghazl states

here that the people who are not veiled understand that God is neither a being

that moves the heavens nor one that govern the heavens movements. He is high

and exalted over these kinds of activities. God is too sublime even to command

(al-amr) the heavens to move. All these actions al-Ghazl assigns to other beings, who are below God and who are, in fact, His creations. In al-Ghazls view, those

who have full insight into the divine assume that there are several vice-regents of

whom the highest one is the one who gives the command (al-mir). The lower beings who receive his order identify him as the one who is obeyed (al-mu ).9 Given the fact that the unity of God was the anxious care of al-Ghazl, Gairdner

finds this division of labour, so to speak, most disturbing.10 He points to an apparent

contradiction of this teaching with what al-Ghazl has put forward in his popular

autobiography al-Munqidh min al-all (The Deliverer from Error), where he

against the truth of Holy Scripture the truth in the sayings of the damned gentiles (Chartu-larium Universitatis Parisienis, ed. by H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, 4 vols (Paris, 188997), i, 54355 (p. 543)).

7 Gairdner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr and the Ghazl Problem, p. 153 (empha-sis in the original).

8 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, pp. 8493; ed. al-Sayrawn, pp. 17587. Cf. the English translations by W. H. T. Gairdner, Al-Ghazzls Mishkt al-anwr (The Niche for Lights) (London, 1924), pp. 9598, and D. Buchman, al-Ghazl, The Niche of Lights: A Parallel English-Arabic Text (Provo, UT, 1998), 4453.

9 Gairdner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr, p. 128: Not only is Allh now denied to be the immediate efficient cause of the motion of the outermost Sphere, but and this is startling it is even denied that that Sphere is moved in obedience to His command. For even this supreme function is explicitly transferred from Allh to a Being whose nature is left obscure, since our only information about him is that he is not (the) Real Being [al-wujd al-aqq ].

10 Gairdner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr, p. 132.

30 Frank Griffel

teaches that nature (al-aba) does not work by itself, and that all creatures, even supernal entities such as the sun, the moon, and the stars, are subject to the Creators

command (amr); they have no action by themselves coming from themselves.11Gairdner claimed that in the Munqidh, al-Ghazl taught an occasionalist

model of divine creation wherein God is the immediate creator and commander

of His creatures, whereas in the Mishkt Gods creative activity is mediated by vice-regents, most notably the mu. Gairdner realized that he was not the first scholar stunned by the teachings in the Veil Section; he quotes from the works of

Ibn ufayl (d. 581/118586) and Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), who were equally taken

aback by this apparent contradiction in al-Ghazls writings.12 The matter does

not lack in strangeness, and it certainly looks as if [al-Ghazls] esoteric theory of

divine action differed considerably from his exoteric one.13

Gairdners Ghazl problem of 1914 has yet to be brought up into the ongo-ing debates over al-Ghazl, which have been raging for some twenty years.14 The problematic nature of the passage is closely connected to al-Ghazls teachings

on cosmology, where we are just beginning to understand the ranges of opinions

he expressed. In a more extensive publication I aim to address the larger issues

11 Gairdner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr, p. 143. See al-Ghazl, Al-Munqidh min al-all / Erreur et dlivrance, ed. and trans. into French by F. Jabre, 3rd edn (Beirut,

1969), p. 23.1113. Cf. the English translation in Deliverance from Error: An Annotated Translation of al-Munqidh min al all and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazl, by R. J. McCarthy, 2nd edn (Louisville, KY, 2000), p. 66.

12 Gairdner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr, pp.13334, 138, 14551. He refers to Ibn Rushds comment in [al-Kashf an] Manhij al-adilla f aqid al-milla, ed. by M. Qsim (Cairo, 1969), pp. 18384, and to Ibn ufayls remarks in the introduction to his ayy ibn Yaqn, ed. by L. Gauthier (Beirut, 1936), pp. 1718.

13 Gairdner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr, p. 144.14 For other helpful attempts to interpret the Veil Section see Gairdners introduction to

his English translation of the Mishkt, pp. 58; A. J. Wensinck, On the Relation Between Ghazls Cosmology and his Mysticism, Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeeling Letterkunde, 75, ser. A, 6 (1933), 183209 (pp. 20102); A. J. Wen-sinck, Ghazls Mishkt al-anwr (Niche of Lights), in Wensinck, Semietische Studien uit de Nalatenschap (Leiden, 1942), pp. 192212 (pp. 196, 20210); W. M. Watt, A Forgery in al-Ghazls Mishkt?, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1949), 522; V. Cantarino, The-ory of Light in Al-Ghazzls Mishkt al-Anwr, in American Oriental Society, Middle West Branch: Semi-Centennial Volume, ed. by D. Sinor (Bloomington, 1969), pp. 2740; A. Ansari, The Doctrine of Divine Command: A Study in the Development of Ghazls View of Real-ity, Islamic Studies (Islamabad), 21 (1982), 147, especially pp. 3637; H. Landolt, Ghazl and Religionswissenschaft: Some Notes on the Mishkt al-Anwr, Asiatische Studien: Zeitschrift der Schweizer Gesellschaft fr Asienkunde, 45 (1991), 1972, especially pp. 3162.


involved in al-Ghazls cosmology. There I argue that al-Ghazl was ultimately

undecided whether God governs over every element of his creation immediately

and as the only cause, or whether His creative activity is mediated by other beings,

who are themselves His creations. In some places al-Ghazl puts forward an oc-casionalist model of divine creation, but in others he endorses a model that allows

for the existence of secondary causes which mediate the divine creative activity.

Al-Ghazls indecisiveness about the way God creates and governs over

His creation is expressed in some of his latest works.15 Whereas Gairdner voiced pessimism whether the problem can ever be solved,16 I suggest that once the

epistemological status of knowledge about Gods creative activity is taken into

account, the apparent contradiction in al-Ghazls teachings on cosmology will

be better understood, and maybe even solved. As the two positions quoted by

Gairdner are clearly distinct from one another, they represent different specula-tive attempts to explain Gods creative activity. Overall, al-Ghazl readily admits

to having no decisive knowledge about whether God creates immediately and as

the only cause, or by means of secondary causes. Al-Ghazl acknowledged that we have no demonstrative knowledge of Gods

creative activity, but, nonetheless, he developed speculative models that aim to explain the cosmos and its connection to the divine. This article focuses on what is probably the most interesting of these speculative models. It is in the Third Division (al-qism al-thlith) of the Veil Section at the end of Mishkt al-anwr. My analysis of this passage leads to the conclusion that, at least in the Mishkt al-anwr, al-Ghazl puts forwards a hierarchical order of celestial beings that are created by God in order to govern the universe. Although the point is not directly touched upon in this work, the model suggests that God governs His creation by

means of secondary causality.

The Cosmology of the Veil Section in Mishkt al-anwr

The Veil Section at the end of the Mishkt is a commentary on the non-canonical hadith: God has seventy veils of light and darkness; were He to lift them, the august

glories of His face would burn up everybody whose eyesight perceives Him.17

15 See my Al-Ghazls Philosophical Theology (New York, 2009), pp. 26474. 16 It also looks as if we shall never know the whole explanation of the matter (Gaird-

ner, Al-Ghazls Mishkt al-Anwr, p. 144).17 The hadith does not appear in the six books. Versions of it are mentioned, for instance,

in Ibn Frak, Kitb Mushkil al-adth wa-baynih (Hydarabad, 1362/1943), p. 183.

32 Frank Griffel

Al-Ghazl aims to explain what the veils of light and darkness are, and he clas-sifies various religious groups according to what kind of veil prevents them from

understanding the nature of Gods existence. In the first group are those veiled

by pure darkness (mujarrad al-ulma). These are people who do not believe in God and in the Day of Judgement, meaning they do not believe in an afterlife and deny that acts in this world lead to reward and punishment in the next. Al-Ghazl

characterizes them as people who do not believe that God is the cause of the

world be it because they believe that nature ( ab ) is the cause or because they havent developed any interest into what causes the world. The latter can

be hedonists, egoists, materialists (in a moral sense), or simply people who are

interested in gaining honour and fame. Such people often confess Islam but do

this mainly out of conformity or in order to achieve some benefit. In reality, how-ever, they worship idols like pleasure, power, personal wealth, fame, or honour.18

The second group is made up of people veiled from God by light combined

with darkness (bi-nr maqrn bi-ulma) and they fall into three types. The first are veiled by a darkness that is created by their faculty of sense perception (iss). These people believe in the existence of a God, but assume that He inheres within

an idol; their Lord is contained in a piece of metal or stone. Others of this group, like

some among the furthest Turks, assume that their Lord is a particularly outstanding

human being. Yet others assert that their Lord is contained in a prime element, like

fire, or in a celestial being, like a planet; they may worship the sun as their Lord.

The highest sub-group of those veiled by sense perception consists of those who

assume that light itself is the highest being and should be considered the Lord.19

Among those who are veiled by a mixture of light and darkness are two other

groups. One is veiled by some light combined with the darkness of the faculty

of imagination [khayl ].20 This group is of a single kind, namely the anthropo-morphists (mujassima) who believe that the Lord is some kind of a mighty and sublime body, having human attributes such as sight, wrath, etc. The third and

final group of those veiled by a mixture of light and darkness are the ones veiled

by the divine lights combined with rational analogies.21 Here, al-Ghazl has in

mind people who understand divine predicates like hearing, seeing, talking,

18 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, pp. 8587; ed. Sayrawn, pp. 17779.19 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, pp. 8789; ed. Sayrawn, pp. 18082.20 Bi-ba al-anwr maqrna bi-ulmat al-khayl: Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed.

Aff, p. 89.8; ed. Sayrawn, p. 182.5.21 Bi-l-anwr al-ilhiyya maqrna bi-maqyist aqliyya: Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-

anwr, ed. Aff, p. 89.17; ed. Sayrawn, p. 182.14.


knowing, powerful, and so on, as if they were the perfection of the equivalent

human attributes. Thus, they miss that the essence of the divine is unlike any-thing in His creation.

This last characterization suggests an Asharite critique of Mutazilite theology.

That this is in fact the case emerges from al-Ghazls linking this group with the

position that the divine will (irda) comes into being in time, just as the human will does.22 Baghdadian Mutazilites like al-Nam (d. c. 225/840) understood the word irda in the sense of an act of volition rather than the eternal divine will of the Asharites. Such a divine volition precedes every divine act. Yet because

there can be no delay in the realization of Gods volition, it does not temporar-ily precede the divine act. For early Baghdadian Mutazilites at least, every divine act is prompted by a divine volition (irda) that comes into existence at the very moment of the divine act, while for the Asharites the divine will (irda) is part of Gods essence and thus eternal (qadm).23

The Third Division: Three Groups of Those Veiled by Pure Lights

Most interesting is the third group (qism), those veiled by pure lights (ma al-anwr). These are the people who have gained some insight into Gods being. They are divided further into three subgroups that represent different levels of

insight into the divine. As noted by Hermann Landolt, the division follows closely

the Qurnic narrative (6. 7579) of Abrahams unassisted discovery of monothe-ism, a passage that was very dear to al-Ghazl, who refers to it often.24

Al-Ghazl introduces this story in an earlier passage of the Mishkt.25 Accord-ing to the commentary literature, the young Abraham grew up in the darkness of a

22 Ql f irdatihi innah ditha mithlu irdatin: Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, p. 90.56; ed. Sayrawn, p. 183.45.

23 See J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: Eine Geschichte des religisen Denkens im frhen Islam, 6 vols (Berlin, 199197), iii, 40103; iV, 44546, and Wilferd Madelung, Der Imam al-Qsim ibn Ibrhm und die Glaubensleh-re der Zaiditen (Berlin, 1965), pp. 16566.

24 Landolt, Ghazl and Religionswissenschaft, p. 39. Cf., for instance, al-Ghazl, Fayal al-tafriqa bayna l-Islm wa-l-zandaqa, ed. by S. Duny (Cairo, 1381/1961), pp. 19098.

25 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, pp. 6768; ed. Sayrawn, p. 154. For a trans-lation and discussion of this earlier passage on Abrahams discovery of monotheism in the Mishkt that also sheds some light on the Veil Section see A. Treiger, Monism and Mono-theism in al-Ghazls Mishkt al-anwr, Journal of Quranic Studies, 9 (2007), 127.

34 Frank Griffel

cave in order to avoid the persecution of the Mesopotamian king Nimrod.26 It was there that he began his search for his Lord. When he left the cave one night, he saw a star rising in the east and concluded that it was the Lord. Once the star sat in the west, however, that notion was dismissed. Next he saw the moon rising in the east and assumed this it was the Lord. Again, when the moon sat in the west, he rejected the notion. The same happened with the sun. He saw it rise in the morning and thought that the sun was the Lord, until it sat in the evening. Finally, Abraham concluded that none of these celestial bodies was the Lord. Rather, the maker of them, that is, the creator of the heavens and the earth, is the true Lord

and only He should be worshipped.Abrahams discovery of true monotheism has great significance for al-Ghazl.

He compares the three groups of scholars who are veiled by pure light to the three false levels of insight that Abraham had gained during his youth. Only a fourth group of people who is not veiled, those who have arrived (al-wiln), represents the highest level of those who really understand who the true Lord is. Only this

group has gained a proper understanding of tawd. Al-Ghazl connects the false insight gained by the three groups in each case

with a celestial being they assume as being the Lord. These celestial beings are known from al-Frbs model of cosmology. The fourfold model in this section (three false conclusions and one correct one) draws upon philosophical cosmology as well as doxography and even heresiography. In the philosophical model of the cosmos, the heavens are made up of spheres that are governed by movers. Bas-ing himself upon earlier philosophical and astronomical models, al-Frb taught that there are ten spheres. The lowest is the sublunar sphere of generation and corruption where humans, animals, and plants live. Above the sublunar sphere are the spheres of the moon, the sun, and the five (premodern) planets. Above these are two more spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars and the starless sphere.

The spheres encompass each other like the layers of an onion. In al-Frbs model, God directly acts only upon one being, the highest being;

His oneness prevents Him from acting upon anything else. The highest created

being is the first intellect, which is the cause of the form and matter of the starless

26 See al-abar, Jmi al-bayn an tafsr al-Qurn, ed. by M. M. Shkir and A. M. Shkir, 16 vols (Cairo, 195468), xi, 48083, and Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz, al-Tafsr al-kabr [aw Mafti al-ghayb], ed. by M. M. Abd al-amd, 32 vols (Cairo, 1352/1933), xiii, 47. The information about Abrahams youth comes from Rabbinical literature (Bereshith Rabb 38; Talmud Nedrm 32, etc.) For parallel Jewish tales of great antiquity about Abraham becom-ing convinced of the error of worshiping the elements by observing how they subdue one another see L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, 7 vols (Philadelphia, 1968), v, 210 n. 16.


sphere, that is, the highest, outermost sphere. The first intellect also brings into

being another intellect, the second intellect. This second intellect, in turn, causes

the second sphere (with its form and matter) that of the fixed stars to exist.

It also causes the third intellect. This process continues until ten intellects and ten

spheres are created. The intellects of these spheres are secondary causes (asbb thawn) by which God mediates His creative activity down to the lowest celestial intellect, the Active Intellect (al-aql al-fal), which is the cause of the existence of all the beings in the sublunar sphere, viz. the beings on earth.27Al-Ghazl knew

well this cosmological model from al-Frbs al-Siysa al-madaniyya (The Politi-cal Regime). He includes the relevant passage from al-Frbs book in his report of

philosophical teachings on metaphysics that is preserved in London, British Library,

MS Or. 3126.28 Hints at this cosmology are dispersed throughout the Mishkt.29 In his commentary on the veil-hadith, al-Ghazl employs the cosmology put forward

by al-Frb in al-Siysa al-madaniyya. Significantly, however, and crucially, he adds to it an additional being on the top of the chain, amounting to an additional

layer of creation. Therefore, whatever al-Frb and other philosophers thought

about the creator and designer of the world is only partly true. The falsifas creator is for al-Ghazl a created being. Beyond him is the real Creator, the real

Lord, the one God.

The First Veiled Group

Al-Ghazls description of the three groups of scholars who have developed some

knowledge of the divine, yet who are still veiled from true insight, is unfortunately

27 Al-Frb, al-Siysa al-madaniyya, ed. by F. M. Najjr (Beirut, 1964), pp. 3138. The Farabian text has been translated but not published by T.-A. Druart. I am grateful to her for making her translation available to me. For an analysis of this passage see T.-A. Druart, Al-Frbs Causation of the Heavenly Bodies, in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. by P. Morewedge (Delmar, NY, 1981), pp. 3545, and D. Reisman in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. by P. Adamson and R. C. Taylor (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 5660.

28 MS Or. 3126, fols 240a247a. Cf. F. Griffel, MS. London, British Library Or. 3126: An Unknown Work by al-Ghazl on Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, Journal of Is-lamic Studies (Oxford), 17 (2006), 142 (pp. 15, 18). In this book by al-Ghazl, he refers to al-Frbs text as a letter on the arrangement and the order (risla fi l-tartb wa-l-nim).

29 For example, If there is a different state through change [fa-in kna min taghayyur l] it is the descent unto the heaven of this world, I mean through elevation [al-ishrf] from high to low (Mishkt, ed. Aff, p. 61.56; ed. Sayrawn, p. 145.24). The heaven of this world (sam al-duny) is the sublunar sphere of generation and corruption.

36 Frank Griffel

vague. The lowest of these three groups is said to hold the opinion that the mover

of the highest heaven, which is the next-to-outermost sphere, that is, the sphere

of the fixed stars, is the creator of the world:

The first among them is a group [ifa] that knows the meanings of the [divine] attributes properly [taqqan] and realizes that the nouns speech, will, power, and knowledge, and others cannot apply to Gods attributes the way that they apply to humans. In their teaching [tarf ] about God these people avoid using these attributes. When they teach about Him they draw on the relation [of God] to the created things, just like Moses, peace be upon him, taught about God in his answer to Pharaohs question: What is the Lord of the Worlds? [Quran 26. 23] These people say the Lord, who is the Holy One and who is exalted above the meanings of these attributes, is the mover of the heavens and the one who governs [dabbara] them.30

Compared to the groups mentioned earlier in the Veil Section, this group has

developed a proper understanding of the divine attributes and their transcen-dence. This group understands that the Lord is exalted above all anthropomorphic

attributes. When they use words like speech, will, power, and knowledge in their description of the Lord, they have a meaning in mind that transcends the ordinary

sense of these words.

And when they are pressed by their opponents to explain who is the Lord of

the worlds, they answer just as Moses replied to Pharaoh, namely that He is the

Lord of the heavens and the earth and all in between (Quran 26. 24), and that

He is your Lord and the Lord of your forefathers (26. 26). While Pharaoh asked

him about the essence (mhiyya) of the divine, al-Ghazl remarks earlier in the Mishkt, Moses responded about the acts of God.31 This seems to lead to the insight that the Lord is the one who moves and governs the heavens (muarrik al-samawt wa-mudabbiruh).

The shortcomings of this position, however, are still quite significant; they be-come clear in the course of the discussion of the next higher group. The second

group is introduced by the following sentence:

The second group leaves these people behind insofar that it became clear to them that there is multiplicity [kathra] in the heavens, and that the mover of each single heaven is a different being that is called an angel, of whom there are many. Their [scil. the angels] relation to the divine lights [al-anwr al-ilhiyya] is the relation of the stars.32

30 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt, ed. Aff, p. 90.13ult.; ed. Sayrawn, p. 183.11ult.31 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt, ed. Aff, p. 68.1016; ed. Sayrawn, p. 155.38.32 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt, ed. Aff, p. 91.13; ed. Sayrawn, p. 184.13.


This first group incorrectly believes that the mover of the next-to-outer sphere,

who may be regarded as the governor (mudabbir) of all visible heavens and the cause for the existence of the planets, the sun, the moon, and the earth, is the

Lord. They assume the existence of a single mover of one heavenly sphere and

are unaware of the existence of multiple spheres, each having a mover, who may

also be called an angel (malak). This first level of insight into the divine is likened to the one Abraham reached

when in Quran 6. 76 he erroneously thought that the star (al-kawkab) is his Lord. This is expressed by the sentence that the angels, who are the movers of the

spheres, are comparable to the stars that Abraham first identified as his Lord.

The identification of this group proves more difficult than any of the others.

The passage about the transcendence of divine attributes makes one think about

the Asharites, particularly since the Mutazilites and their shortcomings have just

been mentioned. Of course, al-Ghazl would have in mind a more traditional

kind of Asharite than he was himself. The passage about cosmology points to a

group that has little knowledge about the makings of the heavens. They naively

assume that there is only one sphere and that the one who ordered the visible

heavens and the earth is the Lord.

Yet, particularly this last passage about a single heavenly sphere and its mover

and governor has next to nothing to do with Asharism. To the extent that early

Asharites delved into cosmological speculations, they were prompted to do so

by Quranic passages about the seven heavens (e.g., 2. 29). The Quran mentions

that God assigned to each of the seven heavens its command (amr, 41.12) and that God governs over this command (yudabbir al-amr, 13.2). One can argue that

all Muslim groups are therefore aware of multiplicity in the heavens and none

fits this description. Muslim groups would also not deny that there are numerous

angels in the heavens.

It will become apparent, however, that in his description of the third group of

the Veil Section, al-Ghazl adopts a distinctly philosophical perspective and looks

at the world with eyes trained in Farabian cosmology. From that point of view,

multiplicity in the heavens means the existence of different celestial spheres in

which the residing soul can act only upon its own sphere, but not on any other.

The highest being, for instance, cannot act directly on any of the lower spheres;

for this, it must rely upon the mediation of other celestial beings.

The cosmology of the early Asharites, by contrast, follows an occasionalist

model, which assumes that God acts directly upon every being in the heavens and

on earth. He does not mediate His government even of all events in the sublunar

sphere, but rather creates them immediately and directly. Those who accept the

38 Frank Griffel

Farabian model as true may well say that the Asharites fail to understand the ex-istence of multiplicity [kathra] in the heavens, and that the mover of each single heaven is a different being that is called an angel, of whom there are many. Of

course, early Asharites do not deny the existence of angels, but they do deny that

these angels are the movers of celestial spheres.

There is, however, a second possibility as to whom al-Ghazl had in mind

when he drafted these words. We have already observed that the language al-

Ghazl adopts here is distinctly philosophical. The cosmological beliefs of this

first group may also point towards an early and naive group of philosophers. The

Arabic doxography of pseudo-Ammonius, which was available from the middle

of the third/ninth century, reports that pre-Socratic philosophers like Thales

and Pythagoras taught the transcendence of the divine attributes. Neither the

human intellect nor the soul is able to comprehend them.33 A generation after

al-Ghazl, al-Shahrastn (d. 548/1153) repeats these reports in his Kitb al-Milal wa-l-nial (Book of Religions and Creeds).34 Two generations later, Maimonides (d. 601/1204) writes in his Dallat al-hirn (Guide of the Perplexed) about the cosmology of the earliest generations of philosophers who lived at the time

of the Sabians, the pagan polytheists against whom Abraham struggled.35 Mai-monides writes:

33 U. Rudolph, Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonios: Ein Beitrag zur neuplaton-ischen berlieferung im Islam (Wiesbaden, 1989), pp. 50.69, 51.26.

34 Al-Shahrastn, al-Milal wa-l-nial, ed. by W. Cureton, 2 vols (London, 184246), ii, 254.36, 265.17ult. Cf. the French translation in Livre des religions et des sects, trans. by D. Gimaret, G. Monnot, and J. Jolivet, 2 vols (Paris, 198693), ii, 181, 200. Shahrastn pro-vides himself a three-page commentary on Abrahams discovery of his Lord (Q 6.7579) within his doxographic treatment of the Sabians, the pagan polytheists of antiquity. He interprets the full Quranic passage as a historic account of how Abraham defeated the proponents of the structures (aab al-haykil), a subgroup of the Sabians, by realizing and pointing out that the structures (haykil) they believe in, i.e., the seven celestial bod-ies, are moved and governed by a superior power. See al-Shahrastn, al-Milal wa-l-nial, ii, 24748; trans. Gimaret, Monnot, and Jolivet, ii, 16466.

35On the Sabians and their role in Maimonidess ideas about the history of philosophy, see S. Pines in the introduction to his English translation The Guide of the Perplexed, 2 vols (Chicago, 1963), i, p. cxxiv, and S. Stroumsa, Sabens de arrn et sabens de Mai-monide, in Maimonide: Philosophe et savant (11381204), ed. by T. Lvy and R. Rashed (Leuven, 2004), pp. 33552, and S. Stroumsa, Entre arrn et al-Maghreb: La Thorie maimonidienne de lhistoire des religions et ses sources arabes, in Judios y musulmanes en al-Andalus y el Magreb: Contactos intelectuales, ed. by M. Fierro (Madrid, 2002), pp. 15364, especially p. 156.


The utmost attained by the speculation of those who philosophized in those [early] times consisted in imagining that God was the spirit of the sphere [r al-falak ] and that the sphere and the stars are the body of which the deity, may He be exalted, is its spirit. Ab Bakr ibn al-igh [= Ibn Bjja] has mentioned this in the commentary on [Aristotles] Physics (al-Sam [al-ab]).36

In his commentary on Aristotles Physics, the philosopher Ibn Bjja (d. 533/1139), again a figure who wrote one generation after al-Ghazl, explains

that the ancients among those who followed a philosophical method in physics

(aqdamna mimman tafalsafa f l-aba) differed in their methods; some of them even held opinions that violate sensual experiences. Their achievements were

compromised by their limited expertise in logic. They all agreed, Ibn Bjja reports,

that there are no differences between existing beings and thus treated them all

as if they were of one kind. This was during the times of Parmenides and Melis-sus, before Aristotle alerted philosophers to the fundamental difference between

certain beings.37 But despite Aristotles attempts to create physics as a science, the

teachings of these earliest philosophers prevailed down to his own time, when,

so complains Ibn Bjja, they were upheld by the mutakallimn:

In their enquiries these people were not concerned with natural dispositions [al-ib ] until one of them denied their existence. They spoke about something that is set in motion by the natural dispositions only when rejecting [the views] of their adversaries. For example, when they assert that atoms exist, without, however, having enquired much into the matter, [they make this claim] not in order to pro-vide causes for the natural phenomena, but rather because they have encountered it in their polemics with one another.38

Pre-Socratic attempts at physics and the opinions of the mutakallimn are for Ibn Bjja erroneous for one and the same reason: they disregard the distinctions that

lie at the heart of Aristotelian physics, namely the difference between substance and

accident as well as between compound beings in the sublunar sphere and simple

beings in the heavenly spheres. The atomism of the Asharite mutakallimn and

36 Maimonides, Dallat al-irn, ed. by S. Munk, 3 pts (Paris, 185666), iii, 62b; Eng-lish trans. by S. Pines, The Guide of the Perplexed, 2 vols (Chicago, 1963), ii, 515.

37 Ibn Bjja, Shar al-sam al-ab, ed. by M. Fakhr (Beirut, 1973), p. 17.20ult.; ed. by M. Ziyda (Beirut, 1398/1978), pp. 16.817.1. On Aristotles teachings in Physics i, ii, and iii, 184b88a, and the commentaries of John Philoponos (d. c. 570), Ab Al Ibn al-Sam (d. 418/1027), Ibn Bjja, and Ibn Rushds middle and long commentary on this passage see P. Lettinck, Aristotles Physics and its Reception in the Arabic World (Leiden, 1994), pp. 3853, 71, 7882.

38 Ibn Bjja, Shar al-sam al-ab, ed. Fakhr, p. 18.48; ed. Ziyda, p. 17.510.

40 Frank Griffel

by implication their occasionalism is just one expression of this disregard for the

Aristotelian distinctions of beings. For an Asharite occasionalist all beings consist

of indistinguishable small parts that are all equally close to Gods creative activity.

The failure to understand the multiplicity in the heavens may indeed refer to

both: the philosophical approach of pre-Aristotelian thinkers and the occasional-ism of the Asharites. We will see that the next group can be roughly identified with

Aristotle and his followers. It thus seems that here, in describing the first group,

al-Ghazl invokes views widespread in his day about the history of philosophy.

He has in mind an early stage of philosophy that preceded the teachings of Ar-istotle. Yet, the same description, which is deliberately unspecific, also fits the

cosmological thought of most pre-Ghazalian Asharites.

The Second Veiled Group

The second group of those veiled by pure light has gained superior insight and

believes that the next higher celestial being, the mover of the highest sphere, is their

Lord. This groups understanding that there are many heavenly spheres and that

each sphere has its own mover has already been quoted. The passage continues:

Then it became evident to them that these heavens are inside another celestial sphere that moves all the others through its motion once [each] day and night. They said the Lord is the mover of that celestial body which is furthest away and which envelops all celestial spheres, since multiplicity is denied of Him.39

In comparison with the first group, this group has a proper understanding of

astronomy and the celestial spheres. Their Lord is the mover of the highest rotating

sphere, the starless sphere. Given that there are no physical movements above this

sphere, He himself is not in motion. On the other hand, this group fails to realize

that even if there are no physical movements beyond the highest sphere, there

are still higher beings. This failure to realize the existence of beings higher than

the mover and governor of the outermost sphere leads them to their false assump-tion that he, the mover of the outermost sphere, is the Lord of the World. Again,

the error is pointed out only when al-Ghazl introduces the next higher group:

The third group leaves these people behind. They say that moving the bodies by way of directly acting upon them [bi-arq al-mubshira] should be [yanbagh an] [regarded as] a service to the Lord of the Worlds, an act of worship towards Him, and an act of obedience [a] towards Him by one of His servants who is called an

39 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, p. 91.46; ed. Sayrawn, p. 184.36.


angel. His [scil. the angels] relation to the pure divine lights is the relation of the moon among the sensory lights.40

This group is in error when they think that moving the highest sphere is the

most supreme task, and thus worthy of the Lord. In fact, anything that acts directly

on a physical object, for instance, by moving it, cannot be regarded as a truly

supreme being. Rather, such a being does a service to the true Lord. Moving the

highest sphere is the way its mover obeys the Lord and worships Him. The mover

itself can be compared to the moon in Abrahams story, meaning that this second

level of insight into the divine is compared to Abrahams false understanding in

Quran 6. 77 that the moon is his Lord.

This group is characterized by a single conviction, namely that the Lord is

the mover of the highest sphere, who himself does not move. The Aristotelian

kinematic proof for Gods existence as the unmoved mover immediately comes

to mind.41 Al-Ghazl was well aware of this proof. In his extensive doxography of

philosophical metaphysics preserved in MS Or. 3126, he distinguishes between two

types of proofs for the existence of God, the first type being Aristotles kinematic

proof, the second, Ibn Sns cosmological proof of God as the being necessary

by virtue of itself. Ibn Sns proof, which will become important for the third group of those

veiled by pure light, starts with the simple observation that some things do exist. Aristotle had already said that all existing things, considered by themselves, must either be possible or necessary.42 This distinction between things that are necessary by themselves and those that are possible is, according to Ibn Sn, a distinction that we find a priori in our minds. If something that is necessary by virtue of itself really exists outside our minds, its existence cannot be called into question and its eternal existence would thus be demonstrated. God is a being that is necessary by virtue of itself. The things that we witness as actually existing, however, are not necessary by themselves. Their existence is only possible and not necessary, that is, it is contingent and depends on something else that causes it. This other

40 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, p. 91.710; ed. Sayrawn, p. 184.710.41 Aristotles kinematic proof for Gods existence is developed in Physics, 256a259a

and Metaphysics xii.7.1072a73a. He argues from the necessity of every movement to be the effect of a mover for the fact that, since there are evidently movements and thus mov-ers in the world, there must be somebody or something that has caused the very first movement. First here is not understood temporally, but rather ontologically. Cause and effect must exist simultaneously. Thus God who is the cause of the first movement and the prime mover exists co-eternally with this world.

42 Aristotle, Metaphysics, xii.7.1072b.1013.

42 Frank Griffel

being, that is, the necessary existent, makes the existence of contingent beings necessary for as long it maintains their existence. Or, to put it another way: the actual existence of a contingent being must derive from some other being. This other being can itself be either necessary by itself or contingent. If it is contingent, the same conditions apply to it as in the previous step. We would thus arrive at a chain where one being that is contingent by itself would necessitate the existence of another being that is contingent by itself. Each of these beings exists only be-cause there is another being that causes its existence, which itself is caused by a third, and so on. By virtue of itself, the entire chain is contingent and thus has nothing that maintains its existence; in short, it cannot exist. Therefore, there must be something outside of our minds that is necessary by itself and that causes the existence of those beings that we witness and that are themselves only contingent. This being is an uncaused cause, it is incorporeal and is one. It is God who, for

Ibn Sn, is the necessary existent being (wjib al-wujd).43

Al-Ghazls report in the MS Or. 3126 about the difference between Aristotles

and Ibn Sns proof reads as follows:

Know that a group amongst the ancients [mutaqaddimn] argued by way of the contingent for (the existence of) the necessary and by way of the effect for (the existence of) the cause. They started with composed beings. They analyzed them and ascended from there to the simple things [basi = celestial beings]. They proved demonstrably that there is nothing that moves without (being moved) by a mover, until they arrived at a mover who does not move (himself). He is the first mover. The more recent ones [mutaakhkhirn] argued by way of the creator for [the existence of] his created beings. They began with the elementary beings then moved up from them to discover the necessity of the creators existence from [the fact of] His very existence. Once they had established this, they established (the existence of) contingent beings through it. They said: This type of argument is more reliable and nobler, because if we consider the state of being, [we find that] absolute being [wujd mulaq] inasmuch as it is exists, bears witness to Him. So we had no need for the ascent from low to high, because the closest [awl ] thing [to mind] is giving evidence to the created things by way of their creator and not giving evidence to Him by way of the created things. This is all good, but the sec-ond [method] is better.44

43 Ibn Sn, al-Shif , al-Ilhiyyt, ed. by I. Madkr, G. S. Qanaw and S. Zyid, 2 vols (Cairo, 1960), i, 3742; Ibn Sn, Kitb al-Najt, ed. by Muy al-Dn abr al-Kurd (Cairo, 1357/1938), pp. 23540; Ibn Sn, al-Ishrt wa-l-tanbht, ed. by J. Forget (Leiden, 1892), pp. 14042. On this proof see Toby Mayer, Ibn Sns Burhn al-iddiqn, Journal of Islam-ic Studies, 12 (2001), 1839, and Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford, 1987), pp. 281310.

44 Al-Ghazli, MS Or. 3126, fol. 3ab.


This passage is, of course, al-Ghazls report of Ibn Sns position that his

proof is superior to Aristotles. It should not be identified with al-Ghazls own

opinion. One possible source of the report is Ibn Sns al-Ishrt wa-l-tanbht (Pointers and Reminders), which is briefly quoted in the same passage.45 The re-port, however, demonstrates al-Ghazls awareness of the differences between

these proofs and of Ibn Sns claim that his proof conveys a higher level of insight

into Gods being. In the London manuscript, al-Ghazl calls those who use the

kinematic proof for Gods existence al-mutaqaddimn, the ancient ones. This group seems to be the second of those who are veiled by pure light.

The Third Veiled Group

If this identification is correct, then the more recent philosophers, that is, phi-losophers who see in God the giver of existence rather than the first mover, are the third and highest group of those who are veiled by pure light. Their realization that moving cannot be the most supreme action, but rather an act of obedience

worship to the Lord, has already been quoted. The passage continues:

These people claim that the Lord is the one who is obeyed [al-mu ] by this mov-er and [they claim that] the Lord, exalted, is the mover of everything by way of the command [al-amr ], not by way of directly acting upon [other things]. Then, there is an obscurity when they try to make the command and its essence [mhiyya ] understood, and this places limits to the deeper understanding. This book does not go into that.46

The Lord of the second group moves the highest sphere as an act of obedience

(a) for the being that this third group considers the true Lord. The Lord of this group is the one who is obeyed (al-mu ). This Lord governs not by causing the movements of lower beings, but by giving the command, a vague term that is

nowhere explained. Al-Ghazl blames this group for his own lack of explanation

of what the command really is.

The more recent philosophers might, for instance, understand it as the order

to exist: Be! (Quran 6. 73). Al-Frb had already developed Aristotles causation

of motion into a causation of being.47 Equally, Ibn Sn characterizes God not as

45 Ibn Sn, al-Ishrt wa-l-tanbht, pp. 146.1517; cf. Griffel, MS. London, British Library Or. 3126, p. 17.

46 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, p. 91.1012; ed. Sayrawn, p. 184.1012.47 See T.-A. Druart, Al-Frb: Metaphysics, in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. by E. Yar-

shater (London, 1982 ), ix, 21619.

44 Frank Griffel

a mover, but as the being that bestows existence (wujd) upon His creation. Yet, even these scholars al-Frb, Ibn Sn, and their followers are, according

to al-Ghazl, misguided. The shortcomings of their views are again pointed out

at the beginning of his portrayal of the next, fourth and final group:

These groups are all veiled by pure light. Only a fourth group are the ones who arrive. It has also been disclosed to them [tajall lahum ayan ] that this one who is obeyed [al-mu ] is characterized by an attribute that is incompatible with pure and utmost perfection, on account of a secret that this book cannot reveal. [It has also been disclosed to them] that the relation of the one who is obeyed is the rela-tion of the sun among the sensual lights. Therefore, they have turned their faces from the one who moves the heavens [i.e., the Lord of the second group] and from the one who commands their movements [i.e., the Lord of the third group] to the one who created the heavens and who created the one who gives the command [al-mir ] that the [heavens] are moved.48

The being that these philosophers consider to be the Lord is himself only the

mediator between the real Lord and His creation. Al-Ghazl compares this mu to the sun, meaning that this third group is comparable to Abraham discovering in Quran

6. 78 that the sun is the Lord. The model al-Ghazl has in mind is quite compelling.

The god of philosophers such as al-Frb and Ibn Sn, out of whom this world

emanates according to His nature, is for al-Ghazl simply the creation of the real

God. The real God is the originator of the being that the falsifa consider to be god. Al-Ghazls view of cosmology consists of two main elements: First, he adopts

the cosmology of al-Frb with all its spheres, movers, and the First Being a

cosmology that Ibn Sn had also accepted.49 Secondly and crucially, al-Ghazl

adds upon it another layer of creation. The being that bestows existence on oth-ers and that is obeyed (mu ) by the movers of the spheres is the first creation of the real God. In fact, the real God does little more than to create this mu and to continuously emanate being onto him. The mu mediates Gods creative activity, converting it into the command (al-amr) by which means the creation of heavens and earth unfolds.50

48 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, p. 91.1392.1; ed. Sayrawn, p. 184.1318.49 Ibn Sn disagreed with al-Frb on secondary issues like the number of spheres

and intellects in the lower celestial spheres or whether the celestial souls are purely ratio-nal or have imagination; all points that have no bearing upon the present discussion. See A. Hasnawi, Fay, in Encyclopedie philosophique universelle, gen. ed. A. Jacob, 4 vols (Paris, 198998), ii, 96672 (pp. 96770).

50 It seems al-Ghazls uses the word amr with more than one meaning. A. J. Wensick, On the Relationship, pp. 199201, remarks that it is used as a synonym for malakt and


Since the Farabian and Avicennan philosophers developed an understanding

of the mu that is nearly correct, many elements of their teachings on cosmol-ogy are true under the condition that it is not God whom they describe in their

teachings but the mu , the highest created being. This seems to be the reason why al-Ghazl writes: To [the fourth group] it has also been disclosed. He implies that the fourth group accepts many teachings of the third, yet still has superior

insight. The third group found out that the world, for instance, is a product of the

mut according to his essence. The fourth group adds that this is not Gods es-sence. The mu has no choice regarding what to create and follows the necessity of his nature. God, however, is not affected by the limitations set by the mu s nature since He is its originator. The mut himself does not act directly upon the creation, but indirectly via the command (al-amr). He relies on the mediation of the celestial spheres and their movers in order to act on the lower spheres, including

the sublunar sphere. His acting upon all creatures other than him is by means of

the command. For the falsifa, God is the ultimate end point of all causal chains. Al-Ghazl seems ready to accept that the mu is the end-point of all causal

chains that are governed by necessity. It is therefore likely that the command is

also a reference to causal necessity, that is, the set of laws of nature by which the

mu governs the world. Yet, in this model the immediate connection between the mu and God seems to be determined by Gods free choice, rather than by causal necessity.

The Fourth Group: Those Who Have Arrived

Only the last of the four groups, those who have arrived (al-wiln) at a correct understanding of who is the Lord, understand the created nature of the philoso-phers god. The text continues:

These people arrived at a being that is exalted above everything that sight has per-ceived previously. The august glories of His face [subut wajhih] the First and the Highest burn up everything that the sight and the insight of the theologians [al-nirn] have perceived since they find in Him someone holy and exalted above everything that we have described before.51

means the opposite of the created world. Its most general meaning is concept or idea; see a passage at the beginning of the thirtieth book in al-Ghazl, Iy ulm al-dn, 5 vols (Cairo, 1387/1967), iii, 473: Every existing thing that is bare of quantity and measure is part of the world of the amr.

51 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, p. 92.24; ed. Sayrawn, p. 184.18ult.

46 Frank Griffel

This highest level of insight is likened to Abrahams discovery that his Lord is He

who created the heavens and the earth in Quran 6. 79. He is the only true existence;

and He is the one who truly bestows existence on His creatures. Only those who

have arrived know of Him and understand that He is the only existence. Among

them are a subgroup made up of those who understand that He is the only one

who truly exists. This realization leads to their annihilation (fan):

Then these people divide into smaller groups. Among them is the one for whom everything that he sees is consumed, perishes, and annihilates but he still re-mains, observing the beauty and holiness [of God], and observing his own self within His beauty, [a state] that he attained by the arrival at the divine presence [al-ara al-ilhiyya]. With regard to these people, the objects of vision perish, but not he who sees.

Another group, who are the elect of the elect, pass beyond this. The august glo-ries of His face consume them, and the power of glory overcomes them [or: takes control of them]. They are perished and annihilated. No glance at themselves is left to them, for they annihilate from themselves. And nothing remains save the One, the Truth. The Quranic verse everything perishes save His face [28. 88] becomes for them an individual experience [dhawq, literally taste] and a state [l ]. We referred to this in the first chapter where we mentioned how they apply the word becoming one [al-ittid ] and how they think of it. And this is the [utmost] limit of those who arrive [al-wiln].52

Conclusions

In his description of the third and highest class of those who are veiled from God,

al-Ghazl articulates something like a brief history of philosophy that highlights

the progress in the field of metaphysics and philosophical theology. Having this

history terminate with a group whose knowledge surpasses that of even the most

advanced philosophers of his time makes the passage into a statement about

Ghazalian cosmology. The most advanced philosophers came close to an un-derstanding but still failed to realize that their Lord is superceded by yet another,

even higher being. The language al-Ghazl uses to describe his cosmology picks

up Quranic expressions like the command (al-amr, Q 41.12) and governing the command (yudabbir al-amr, Q 13.2), but with expressions like sphere

52 Al-Ghazl, Mishkt al-anwr, ed. Aff, p. 92.513; ed. Sayrawn, p. 185.17. Ac-cording to an earlier passage in Mishkt, ed. Aff, pp. 57.paenult.58.5, ed. Sayrawn, p. 141.39; annihilation (fan) is not the becoming one (ittid) with God. Becoming one, al-Ghazl says, is only a metaphor for understanding the true meaning of tawd, namely the realization that all being is He.


(falak), mover (muarrik), highest celestial body (jirm aq), as well as world of the amr (lam al-amr), it employs the technical language of astronomy and peripatetic philosophy.53 The key term, the one who is obeyed (al-mu ), is of Quranic origin (Q 81. 21), like so many others that al-Ghazl employs. It was

used by philosophers like Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) and Ibn Sn. However, its

usage in a cosmological context is an innovation of al-Ghazl.54

The cosmological model presented on the last pages of Mishkt al-anwr solves two major problems al-Ghazl had with Ibn Sns metaphysics. Accord-ing to al-Ghazl's new cosmology, God created the mu , and, along with the creation of the mu, God created the mus nature, thus determining how the world that flows out of the mu will look. Expressed in the language of the falsifa, for al-Ghazl only the creation of the mu is an ibd a creation ex nihilo while the creation of the other spheres and intellects are acts of inbith, emanations of form and matter from an intellect.55 Thus, the first major problem,

53 For lam al-amr as a philosophical term for the highest celestial spheres just below the lam al-rubbiyya of the First Principle and above the Throne (al-arsh) and also above the lam al-khalq, see al-Frb, Fu al-ikam, ed. by M. . l Ysn (Qom, Iran, 1405/1985), pp. 6162. The lam al-amr is where the pen (al-qalam) writes on the Preserved Tablet (al-law al-maf). The human spirit (r) is from the lam al-amr (ibid., pp. 7172), and whoever turns from emotions, sense perception, and imagination towards the intelligibles (al-maqlt) will reach the lam al-amr, the highest malakt, and unity with the highest felicity (ibid., pp. 8182).

54 In the context of cosmology mu appears a few other times in al-Ghazls oeuvre; see F. Jabre, Essai sur le lexique de Ghazali (Beirut, 1970), p. 156. See, for instance, Marij al-Quds f madrij marifat al-nafs, ed. by M. abr al-Kurd (Cairo, 1346/1927), p. 149.169: The second method to establish the first amr is that we say: It has been established and confirmed through demonstrations that the First Principle is a king who is obeyed [malik mu] who has [lahu] the entirety of the creation as His dominion and property. Every king has in his authority an amr. However, the authenticity of the Marij is not fully established. The phrase a king who is obeyed (malik mu) appears in Miskawayh, Kitb al-Fawz al-aghar, ed. by . Uayma (Tunis, 1987), pp. 13033, and in Ibn Sn, al-Najt, p. 223ult. Al-Ghazl copied these passages into some of his works, such as the text in the London MS and Miyr al-ilm; he employs similar language in his Iy (see Griffel, MS. London, British Library Or. 3126, p. 20). Miskawayh and Ibn Sn and subsequently al-Ghazl use the term in a non-technical sense simply as a metaphor for the souls government over the body. The term also appears in a purely political sense, namely that the ruler needs to be obeyed by his subjects (suln mu ) in al-Ghazl, al-Iqtid f-l-itiqd, ed. by A. u-buku and H. Atay (Ankara, 1962), p. 236.67.

55 If the existence [of a thing] comes after absolute non-being [lays mulaq ] its proceed-ing from the Cause in this manner is an ibd , and it is the most excellent [afal ] mode of existence-giving: Ibn Sn, al-Shif, al-Ilhiyyt, ii, 267.67. Cf. Hasnawi, Fay, p. 968.

48 Frank Griffel

namely how to reconcile a creator whose nature cannot change according to the falsifa with the theological requirement of creation ex nihilo and in time, is solved. While for Ibn Sn, God cannot but create, and from all eternity emanates being onto the first intellect, al-Ghazls God created the mu at one point in time. This mu is the being that falsifa like Ibn Sn mean when they talk about the First Principle or the First Being that cannot but emanate unto the intellect of the outermost sphere. Al-Ghazl takes nothing away from Ibn Sns teachings about the First Principle and his attributes. He just adds that the falsifas First Principle is itself a temporal creation (mudath) of the real God who appears now omnipotent and therefore able to change from being a non-creator to being

a creator at any point in time, should He wish to do so.

Al-Ghazls God has chosen a certain arrangement that involves the media-tion of His creative activity. He maintains this arrangement by exuding existence

to the apparatus of spheres and their souls. This arrangement solves the second

major problem of Avicennan metaphysics for al-Ghazl, namely the provenience

of the essences, which God turns into existences when He creates. Ibn Sn had no

answer as to where the essences of the beings that God puts into existence come

from other than saying: from Gods nature.56 Ibn Sn implies that the essences

are superior to God, who must thus accommodate the existing classes of beings

when He creates. For Ibn Sn, God cannot create anything that is not already

determined as a possible existence within His essence. This is an implicit denial of

Gods omnipotence. In al-Ghazls model, God creates the essences of all things

together with the mu. They become part of the mu s nature, and thus they are creatures of God, who deliberately decided to create the set of essences that

we witness in the existing things.

By creating the mu and His essence God created a mechanism that led to the world in which we live. The design of the mut, which need not follow any predetermined rules, and which can be an act of free choice and liberum arbitrium on the side of God, determines the design of the universe. Once the mu is created, Gods creative activity follows from Him according to the rules that have been determined within the mu s essence. Al-Ghazls universe is one where all events past, present, and future are determined with the

voluntary creation of its very first creature. Being (wujd) is the power source of the universes mechanism, so to speak, and it keeps the mu and his apparatus

56 I highlight this problem of Avicennan metaphysics in my review of Robert Wis-novskys Avicennas Metaphysics in Context (London, 2003) in Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie, 88 (2006), 10712.


going. God infuses being (wujd) into the mu, who by means of secondary causality transforms it into the universe and realizes the goals that God had

desired when He created this world.

Yale University

Documents

Al-Ghazalis_Cosmology_in_the_Veil_Section.pdf