Air Interdiction on the Golan

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LESS.ONS FROM I S R m L I BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION DURING

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LESSONS FROM ISRAELI BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION DURINGTHE BATTLE FOR GOLAN, OCTOBER 1973

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

byTHOMAS D. ENTWISTLE, MAJ, USAF

B.S., East Texas State University, 1975

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1988

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Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited


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MASTER OF MI LI TARY ART AND SCI ENCETHESI S APPROVAL PAGE

Name of c andi dat e: Thomas D. Ent wi st l e, MAJ OR, USAFTi t l e of Thes i s : Les sons f r om I s r ael i Bat t l ef i el d Al rI nt er di c t i on Dur i ng t he Bat t l e f orGol an, Oct ober 1973

Appr oved by:

, Thesi s Comm t t ee Chai r manMaj or Ri char d P. McKee, M. S.bhd .l./n,v , Member , Gr aduat e Facul t yMaj or Ger al d M Post , M B. A.-(zLl.wc2++ Member , Consul t i ng Facul t yCol onel Edwar dv. Vi t z t hum Ph. D.Accept ed t hi s3t - d day of J t f u 1 9 8 8 by:bLdV J g ?fif?LLDi r ect or , Gr aduat e Degr ee Pr ogr ams

Phl l i p J . Br ookes , Ph. D.The opi ni ons and concl usi ons expr essed her ei n ar e t hose oft he st udent aut hor and do not necess ar i l y r epr esent t hevi ews of t he U. S. Ar my Command and Gener al St af f Col l ege orany ot her gover nment al agency. ( t ushoul d in t L)


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ABSTRACTLESSONS FROM ISRAELI BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION DURING THEBATTLE OF GOLAN, OCTOBER, 1973, by Major Thomas D.Entwistle, USAF, 86 pages.This study establishes lessons, and draws conclusions fromIsraeli Air Force air-to-surface operations during thebattle for Golan in October, 1973. The Israeli air missionand principal operational factors are identified anddescribed. A historical analysis then considers how theprincipal factors influenced Israeli fighter operations, anddetermines what results were achieved.The study shows that Israeli air-to-surface operationsduring the battle were equivalent to current US Air Forcedoctrine for Battlefield Air Interdiction. Enemy groundforces and their objectives, Israeli assets, threats tofighter operations, and environmental conditions aredescribed and analyzed to establish how they influencedoperations. The results of operations are then measuredagainst the doctrinal goals of Battlefield Air Interdictionto determine Israeli success.The study concludes that Israeli air operations effectivelycontributed to the defeat of enemy ground forces, but thedelayed nature of the effects produced important risks tothe outcome of the battle. Further, the principal factorshad a significant and mixed influence on the results of airoperations.


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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage

APPROVAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l i iCHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTIONPROBLEM STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1RESEARCH QUESTION 2METHODOLOGY 3ASSUMF'TIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6DELIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6ORGANIZATION 7CHAPTER 2 MISSION AND FACTORSMISSION 9FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13CHAPTER 3 DESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTION 17CHAPTER 4 ANALYSISINFLUENCE OF PRINCIPAL FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35IAF EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

. . CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 5 5 .RECOHMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 ..APPENDIX 1 REVIEW OF RESEARCH LITERATURE . . . . . . . 64APPENDIX 2 LIST OF TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

. . .._

APPENDIX 3 DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS 15BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80


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CHAPTER 1...

INTRODUCTIONf l

:YI..... .

-he purpose of this study is to identify lessons anddraw conclusions from Israeli Air Force (IAF) airinterdiction operations during the battle for Golan Heightsin October, 1973. The study attempts to demonstrate how IAFoperations fit the current United States Air Force' W A F )model of Battlefleld Air Interdiction ( B A I ) . Conclusionsare applied broadly to future BAI operations.aackaroand

At 1400 hours on 6 October 1973, the Syrian armyinitiated an attack on Israeli positions on the GolanHeights. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was greatlyoutnumbered and IDF mobilization of reserve ground forces.Ihad only begun. Syrian forces, using Soviet tactics andequipment, attempted a rapid penetration of Israelipositions to occupy the Golan Heights. 2

- Tactical fighters of. the IAF were .-employed to help -3stop the Syrian divisions. The Syrian air defense system,

however, employed a wide variety of surface-to-air missiles( S A n s ) , anti-aircraft artillery ( A AA ) , and fighter aircraftto protect ground forces from the I A F . 4

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This battle is an important event for students oftactical fighter employment because of its intense actionand the use of advanced technologies.

Many analysts sought to correlate events of thatconflict with a litany of air power issues. Monroe andFarrar-Hockley 1974) said, ...the advent of the missllesuggests that the day of the main battle tank and thewarplane may be ending.n6 Herzog 1975) concluded that, Toa degree air power will obviously not be as influential asit has been and will affect the battlefield less than itdid. m 7

These statements reflect a significant episode Inthe application of modern air power. Therefore it 1simportant to draw accurate conclusions from the lessons ofthis intense and technologically sophisticated battle.-

hat are the lessons from the IAF Air Interdlctionmlsslon during the October, 1973 battle for Golan?

Sub-questions for the study are:1. What was the rnisslon for the IAP?2. Uhat IAF fighters and assets were employed?3. What factors influenced mission accompllshment?4. How is mission success measured?5 . How effective were IAF operatlons?

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k B u Q u YThis paper presents a description of Information and

a historical analysis of data found in the researchliterature. The descriptions and analysis produce lessonsfrom the Golan battle, that in turn, support conclusionsabout I U perations and prompt recommendations.

The research literature consists of primary andsecondary sources represented mostly in published books andperiodicals. US Government publications are also used. Allsources used are unclassified.

The search for information cantered on documentsavailable through the Combined Arm Research Library (CARL)located at Bort Leavenworth, Kansas. A computer search wasmade for BAI, Close Air Support (CAs), and air supportdocuments. The data base for this computer search wasthe Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). The CARLcard catalog was investigated for works on the subjects ofArab-Israeli War, Yom Kippur war, Golan Battle, Mideast War,and the IAF.

Abetracts published by' the United States Air Force(USAB) Air University were reviewed. These abstractsreflect papers written for the Air War College and the AirCommand and Staff College.

Texts used by the US Army Command and General StaffCollege were reviewed for applicable data. Also, texts andstudent study guides used for the USAF Fighter Weapons

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factor 1s considered indlvldually and as a component of thewhole.

I A F effectiveness 1s measured by analyzlngcontrlbutlons made by IAF flghter resources and thelrsupporting assets. This measurement 1s based on the degreeand quality of degradatlon lnfllcted on major Azab units.In total, the discussion In chapter 4 provides the lessonsfrom the eperatlon.BJsumDtions

1. Combat performance by major enemy ground units 1s arellabla Indicator of BA1 mlsslon success.

2. The crlterla accurately reflect success and failure.

1. BAI - Battlefield air interdiction 1s that portionof an air interdiction campaign designed to affect theground battle with near term results. The goals of alrlnterdlctlon are to destroy, disrupt, delay and divert enemycombat power before it can affect frlendly operations. It1s a characterlstlc of BAI that operations are conducted atsuch a dlstance from frlendly ground forces that closecoordination with the ground commander 1s not requlred inthe executlon phase of the mlsslon.

2. Destroy - To break up or completely ruin elementsof combat forces, Command, Control and Communlcatlons ( C )networks, transportation networks,.and military supplies.

3

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3. Disrupt - To disturb or interfere with the enemy'sscheme of operation and contxol of forces.

1 Delay - To retard the build-up or arrival of enemyforces and supplies.

5. Divert - To fozce a new direction or subordinateapplication of important military assets.LuLauma

Many IAQ operations during this battle remainclassif led.

Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian accounts of IAFoperations are generally unavailable in unclasslfied works.Dellmitations

Only IAF fighter operations in the BAI role areconsidered.

Only the Golan battle will be considered.No attempt will be made to apply the lessons to any

particular aircraft or specific theater of operations.

Effective employment of tactical fighters in theBAI mission requires full understanding of air powercapabilities and llmitations. Past episodes of fighteroperations provide valuable insights for this understandingonly when they correctly reflect the lssues and events.

The IAF participation in the 1973 battle for Golanprovided an important opportunity to study fighteremployment. I f the correct lessons from that experlence are

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identified and applied, effective fighter employment isfacili tated

USAF planners and practitioners will understand theIAF role in the Golan battle. With greater appreciation forthe objectives, challenges, and results of these airoperations, they will make better application of the lessonsto their areas of responsibility.

US Army personnel also will gain insight to theadvantages and disadvantages of BAT operations and how theirown actlvitles may be affected.

Chapter 2 describes and validates application of BAIto I U operations, and ldentifles factors that influencedoperations and results. This chapter also describes thecriteria for measuring IAF success. Chapter 3 describesthe factors to support analysis. Chapter 4 analyzes how thefactors influenced operations and measures I U results.chapter 5 establishes conclusions from analysis and presentsrecommendations for further study and development.

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CHAPTER 1

END NOTES

'Kenneth S . BrowerI The Yom KiQpur War , nilitarvRcvlcw. (March 1974 1, pp. 25, 2 6'Trevor N. Dupuy, W v e V i c t a r v : The -- 19781, pp. 4 4 1 , 4 4 33A . J . Barker, - (19811, p. 1274DUQuy, u Z t ? - p. 4 4 1'Herbert J . Coleman, ' I s rae l i A i r F o r c e D e c i s i v e i nWar , avi ati ohWeck h 3 December 19731,

Q. 1 86 E l l z a b e t h Monroe and A. H. Farrar-Hockley.1973. Sv- Adelphl

7Chalm Herzog. O C t q b e LP ap e r s t111. (London, 1974/51, p. 34.n ( 1 9 7 5 1 , p . 261.


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CHAPTER 2MISSION AND FACTORSm

In 1973 the term Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAIdid not exist for either the United States Air Force (USAFor the Israeli Air Force I A F ) . Air Interdiction (AI) anClose Air Support (CAS) were the operative terms and themissions were readily distinguishable. Mission objectivesand the nature of coordination with friendly ground,forces,.during planning and execution, defined the two missions.

Current USAF, doctrine incorporates the termBAI as a component of the A1 mission. To understand the BAIconcept, air interdiction doctrine must first be presented.

Air interdiction objectives are to delay,disrupt, divert or destroy an enemy's militarypotential before it can .be brought to bear,effectively against friendly forces. These combatoperations are performed at such distances fromfriendly surface forces that detailed integrationof specific actions with the fire and movement offriendly forces is normally not required. Airlnterdlction attacks are usually executed againstenemy surface forces, movement networks (includinglines of communication), command, controi andcommunications networks, and combat supplies.Two components of A1 doctrine make this mission

distinctive. These are the timing of the effect, and thedegree of coordination required with the ground forcecommander. The effect of interdiction is not immediately

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felt on the front lines because A1 targets are enemy forces,not yet engaged. The coordination requirements in A1 arefewers because the risk of fratricide and waste by redundanttargeting are avoided through horizontal target separation.

A review of USAF doctrine highlights the importantfeatures of the CAS mission.

Close Air Support objectives are to supportsurface operations by attacking hostile targets inclose proximity to friendly surface forces... Allpreplanned and immediate close air support missionsrequire detailed coordination and integration withthe fise and maneuver plans of friendly surfaceforces .BAL results and procedures bridge the gap between AXand CAS.

Air interdiction attacks against targets whichare in a position to have a near term effect onfriendly land forces are referred to as battlefieldair interdiction. The primary difference betweenbattlefield air interdiction and the remainder ofthe interdiction effort is the level of interest andemphasis the land commander places on the processof identifying, selecting, and attacking certaintargets. Therefore, battlefield air interdictionrequires joint coordination at the component levelduring planning, but once planned, battlefield airinterdiction i s controlled and executed by the aircommander...

BAI then, is the aerial attack of hostile groundforces with the near term, but not immediate, effect ofdestroying, disrupting, delaying or diverting their combatpower. With BAI the friendly ground commander contributesto target planning but not mission execution. Consequently,BAI influences the ground battle more directly than does AI,but without the restrictions inherent to CAS.

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Current USAF doctrine for -AI, BAI and CAS missions,and I A F operations during the Golan battle, are conceptuallyparallel. While the term BAI wasn't used, the concept was.

At midnight on the opening day of the Golan battlethe IAF Chief of Staff, Benyamin Peled, gave clear orders:...try and block, stifle and stop with everything we hadthe onslaught of the Syrian armor onto the (Golan)Heights... ' This identifies an air mission to attack enemyground forces to divert, disrupt and delay them.

Major General Peled further directed: The place toget them (enemy ground forces) is where they areConcentrated, where they want to get to engagement with yourforces.n6 With this statement Peled is describing two keyfacets of USAF BAI. The flrst is, the interdiction of enemyforces which are positioned to have a near term impact onfriendly forces, and the second, that concentrated forcespresent a lucrative target for air power.

General Peled's words are closely aligned with thethen Chief of Staff for the Israeli Defense Force (IDF),Lieutenant General David Elazar.

I see the Air Forcels main role in the supportof ground forces in interdiction - to achievedestruction of the enemy's military infrastructure,cause havoc among troop movemeqts and, in one word,to paralyze the enemy forces.General Elazar thus identifies destruction,

disruption and delay as components. of the main IAF supportrole...interdlctlon.

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This brings up. another important point inidentifying the IAF mission. The CAS mission was notprimary. Quating General Elazar: Even before 1973, Iconsidered the subject of Close Alr Support the lastpriority task of the Air Forceen'

In fact strong evidence indicates that CAS wasneither planned nor flown during the Golan battle to anysignificant extent. General Peled said:

Close support in our definition is that typeof air-to-ground operation where a ground commanderassesses his awn situation, evaluates that he needsan alr weapon to solve his Immediate problem, callsfor it, and gives the Air Force all the relevantdata in order to get his address. The Air Forcesends a number of aircraft, and tells the commanderof those aircraft to contact the ground commanderand become hi3 subordinate for the duration ofthe operation.

This description of I A F close support isconceptually similar to USAF CAS. The key elements are thatthe qrouna commander selects targets of immediate import andensures the integration of air power into his operation.General Peled further discounted the use of close support.

In this respect, I can count on the fingers ofmy two hands, in all the wars we have fought, thecases where this (close support) was done by thisdefinition. All other operations of the Air Forcethat were loosely called close support were neverreally close support; they were a combination ofinformation put through ground forces ctqnnelsto Air Force planners and decision makers...

This parallels the USAF doctrinal approach to BAIwith Army target nomination and Alr.Force execution.

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Clearly, the IAF mission in support of friendlyground forces during the Golan battle was equivalent to theUSAF mission of BAI. The operational concepts, objectivesand procedures support this correlation. The rest of thispaper will use the term BAI for IAF operations.

Several factors interact to refine a specificmilitary mission from the general concepts of doctrine.These factors also influence the results of operations. Theprincipal factors contributing to the specific IAF missionwere enemy forces and objectives, and friendly ground forcedispositions. Factors that influenced mission resultsincluded IAF assets, threats to fighter operations andenvironmental conditions. 11

IAF assets for BAI included fighter aircraft,aircraft systems, weapons, people, and elements of combatsupport. Elements of combat support were aircraftmaintenance, C I, and threat suppression.

Threat factors were fighter aircraft, radar guidedSurface-to-Air Missiles SAMs) , Infra-Red (IR) guided S M s ,and Anti-Aircraft Artillery AAA) . Environmental conditionswere depicted by factors of geography, terrain, meteorology,and battlefield conditions.- 2The goals of BAI are to destroy, disrupt, delay anddivert enemy combat power to effect a near term advantage

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for friendly surface forces. The enemy combat powertargeted for degradation includes combat forces, LoCs, c Iand supplies.

3

The destruction goal is achieved through attritionof forces and supplies. Disruption causes the enemy toadjust his scheme of maneuver or degrades his ability tocommand and control his forces. A destroyed command postcauses disruption just as an air-deployed mine obstacle maydeny him a favored axis of advance.

Diversiom is forcing the enemy to shift valuableresources from their intended use. When an ammunitionconvoy is destroyed, the parts trucks employed to haul theammunition have been diverted. Another example of diversionis a combat unit, rsserved for counterattack, which has beencommitted early to compensate for another unit which hasbeen delayed.

A delay retards the arrival or build-up of combatforces or their supplies. Attacking an enemy unit'smarshaling azea may disrupt that unit's organization orprevent its timely employment. Delay is also achieved whena significant number of needed river crossing devices aredestroyed. 13

A key feature of these four goals is that theyinteract to produce a collective effect that is greater thantheir individual value. So . . the best measure ofeffectiveness is not gained by counting destroyed equipment

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Instructor Course were reviewed for information. Theseswritten for the naster of Military Art and Science programat Fort Leavenwoath, Kansas were researched as well.

The CARL special bibliography number. 42, 1 9 7 3Middle Bast War, was also used. This document was revisedin January, 1982 and lists books, reports and periodicals.

The validity of sources was determined in twoways. Official United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine, aspublished in government documents, was taken at face valueand assumed accurate. For all other sources thepreponderance of evidence was used to balance theinformation and exclude extreme deviations.

This paper describes and analyzes the researchinformation by developing three chapters for studying IAFoperations in the interdiction mission. Together, theseChapters answer the research sub-questions.

Chapter 2 discusses the W A F concept of BAI andrelates it to the primary IAF air-to-surface mission duringthe battle for the Golan. It then identifies the principalfactors that contribute to defining the specific IAFmission and influenced the outcome. Finally, the criteriafor measuring IAF success is described.

Chapter 3 describes the principal factors focusingon their relationship to the BAI mission. Chapter 4analyzes the influence of the factors and measures IAFeffectiveness in terms of the four goals of BAI. Each

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and dead soldiers. The most valid measure comes fromdetermining the success of enemy ground units that have beensubjected to B A I . When possible, their strength, cohesion,tlming and location must be compared to their plan andobjectives.SUmmeLY

This chapter has established the I A F mission, itsclose relationship to USAF BAI doctrine, the factors whichinfluenced mission results, and the criteria by whichsuccess can be measured. This foundation allows a detaileddescription of the factors that lnfluenced the IAF misslon.

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CHAPTER 2ENDNOTES

'US Air Force, O a c t r f n c o n 14 ;(1980): p 3.

3AFH 1-1: p 3-4.Am 1-1: p 3-4.

SInternational Symposium, JerusalemY L i l uAauof the - (1975): B 2 4 1 .6Symposium: p 256, 257.7Symgosium: p 249.8Sympos1um: p 249.9Symposium: p 255.

10Symposium: p 255.US Army Command and General Staff College, Battle12US Air Force Fighter Weapons School,

(1987): p 7-13.8 F-16 Miss- FactpIQ, (1983):

p 13, 14.l 3 m 1-1: p 3-3.

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CHAPTER 3DESCRIPTION

By the outbreak of hostili.-:s on 6 October, 1913the Syrian army amassed five divisions and two independentbr igades The Sth, 7th and 9th Mechanized InfantryDivisions formed the first echelons, the 1st and 3rd ArmorDivisions formed the second echelon forces while the twoindependent armor brigades formed the reserve. 1

This Syrian force comprised mostly armor with 28,000men, over 1200 tanks and 1000 Armored Personnel Carriers

About 600 field artillery tubes, rocketAPCS).launchers, and armored bridging vehicles supported thishighly mobile force.' Syrian armor, supplied by the SovietUnion, included the proven T-54 and T-55 tanks as well asthe new T-62 tank with its smooth bore main gun. The APCswere Soviet BTR-60s.

2

4Syrian tactics called for echeloned forces with

tanks up front supported by bridging and mine clearlngvehicles composed of bulldozers and 'flail' tanks. Theinfantry followed close behind in ApCs, many with anti-tankweapons. 5

To facilitate mobility the Syrians formed longcolumns along existing roads with three or four vehicles


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line abreast on either side of the road. An Australianmajor who was an observer for the United Nations cease firearrangement from the previous war, saw 300 tanks in fourcoluntns moving toward the Golan. Second and third waveswere made up of tanks and APCs. 7

Syrian objectives were somawhat adjusted from theiroriginal plan to terminate the Israeli state. Closecooperation with Egypt led to operations Spark and Badrwherein the two Arab nations would simultaneously attack ontwo fronts, Golan and Sinai. Syria would limit heroperation to capture territory lost in the 1967 war. Thismeant gaining all of the Golan plateau, including thewestern escarpment, and sections of the Jordan river.

The western escarpment of Golan was militarilydecisive because of its steep vertical development andcommanding view of the Jordan River valley. Any IDFreinforcements would have to cross that valley maklnq use oflimited roadways. One critical roadway was the Bridge ofThe Daughters of Jacob. Being the only significant Line ofCommunication (LOCI into the central Golan from Israel,controlling this bridge was a specific Syrian objective. 9

The Syrians planned to break through forward IDFpositions with the three mechanized divisions. In the norththe 7th Division (Mechanized), supported by elements of the3rd Division (Azmor), constituted the supporting attack. Inthe south the 5th and 9th Divisions (Mechanized) formed the

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main effort. l o These units would bypass the defenders intheir strongholds and sweep the armored echelons rapidlythrough to occupy and consolidate on the Golan. l1 BypassedIDF positions would be taken out by infantry.

Speed and mass were indispensable for this operationbecause hurriedly mobilized IDF forces were anticipated tostiffen the resistance. The Syrians enjoyed superiornumbers, surprise and a low state of IDF readiness due toIsraeli observance of Yom Kippur. 12

The Syrians intended to hold all of Golan by the 2ndnight so that by Sunday, 7 October victory would beachieved. l3 At 1400, 6 October, Syrian jets attacked IDFpositions. A massive artillery preparation followed and onehour later the first tank battles started in the north. 14

The IDB had one division holding the Golan on 6October. Roughly two armor brigades and one infantry. The7th Azmor Brigade defended the northern sector while the188th Azmor Brigade defended the larger southern sector.These brigades had four armor battalions each and weresupported by 11 batteries of artillery. The 7th Brigade hadabout 105 tanks and the 188th Brigade had 90. Before thebattle began, General Eitan, Golan Division Commander,transferred one armor battalion from 7th Brigade to improvethe southern brigade's reserve strength. 15

Additionally, 17 strongholds, including the Mt.Hermon observation complex in the extreme north, were

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developed on advantageous hilltops along the breadth of theOolan. Each of these had 10 to 30 soldiers assigned. Thesestrongholds comprised as many as 112 separate pillpoxes orblockhouses from which the infantry operated. 16

Although this combination of vell establishedstrongholds and highly mobile armor represented arespectable force, some aspects of the defense reduced theinherent combat power available.

In the southern sector the 188th Brigade had axelatively large area of responsibility and the hilltopswere spaced farther apart than in the north. This causedthe fires from the strongholds to overlap only at theirextreme range. 11

Further, the IDF forward units were manned at lowerthan normal levels. This was attributed to the observanceof Yom Klppur, the Jewish day of atonement. Besidessoldiers on leave, the logistics system had slowedconsiderably. 18

Another limitation to IDF combat power wasthe relatively small amount of artillery available to theGolan defenders. Since previous episodes of battle showedthe I M to be a decisive and reliable component, theemphasis on artillery deployment was reduced. 19

Nonetheless, by 1400, 6 October, when the Syriansinitiated their offensive, the -1.DF was alerted to the

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impending hostilities and Israel was 6 hours into a 72 hourmobilization process. 20

Israel started the 1973 War with 522 combat aircraftof all types. Many of these were unsuited for the BAImission and others were generally dedicated to roles otherthan air-to-surface operations.

The IAF had 162 A-4 'Skyhawk' attack fighters, 127F-4 'Phantom' multi-role fighters, 70 'Mirage 111' fighters,20 'Super Mysteres' and, 25 'Barak' fighters. 21 The A-4 andF-4 aircraft were produced in the United States (US), theMirage and Super Mysteres were of French origin and -theBaraks were built in Israel.

Other aircraft included 6 F-SE reconnaissanceplanes, 32 transport type aircraft, 75 helicopters and anumber of US built, Teledyne-Ryan 124 drones. 22 With theexception of the F - ~ s , these aircraft are discussed asassets later.

The mainstays of the BAI mission were the A-4s andto a lesser degree the F-4s. The Mirages and Baraks wereemployed exclusively in the air-to-air role which isappropriate for their capabilities. The F-4s were used forboth air-to-air and air-to-ground roles while the A-4s didonly air-to-ground missions. 23

The A-4 and F-4 had several important subsystems incommon. Electronic Countermeasure .LECU) pods, Radar WarningReceivers R W R ) , flare dispensers and some chaff capabillty.

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The purpose of an ECn pod is to defeat radar threat systemsby interfering with the electromagnetic signals used by thethreat. RWR equipment serves to give a pilot an indicationthat he is being illuminated by a radar system. Blares areused t o decoy infra-red guidance devices so they will guideto the flare instead of the hot exhaust from an aircraftengine. Chaff is radar reflective material, deployed instrips that can decoy radar guidance devices so they willguide to the chaff reflection instead of the aircraft body.Chaff may also be used to farm clutter through which radarscamnot see. 2 1

The IAF used ECPI pods with a capability to defeatSA-2 and SA-3 Surface to Air Hissiles ( S A U s ) but not the SA-6 The radar frequency of IAF pods was not tuned tothe radar used with the SA-6. 26 The SA-7 SAn . also used byArab ground forces. was not affected by jamming pods becauseit used IR information. not radar. IAF R V R gear was limitedfor the same reasons.

Chaff capabilities were different between the F-4and A-4. m i l e the A-4 employed specifically designed chaffdispensers the F-4the aircraft speed

The A-4sparticularly well

was relegated to packing chaff bundles inbrake well. 27had some other equipment that wassuited to the surface attack role.

Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) were28along with Head-up Displays (HUD).

installed in the A-4sThese systems are

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designed to improve tactical navigation and weaponsde very.

The IAF had a wide variety of air-to-surface weaponsfor use in the BAI mission. General purpose bombs, napalm,rockets, aircraft cannons and illumination flares. Both theF-4 and A-4 were originally equipped with 2 0 m cannons butthe IAF substituted a 3 0 m cannon, the 'Aden', for the 20mmin its A-4s. The 30mm gun was more effective against tankand APC targets. 29 The IAF also had a limited number ofspecial purpose weapons available to them.

Perhaps the most signiflcant asset of an air forceis its people. Pilots plan and execute the mission. Havingenough good pilots is essential to successful operations.The IAP had plenty of pilots, about three for everycockpit. 30 The remaining issue then, is the quality of thepilots.

Historically the IA? has been an underlying strengthof the Israeli military. 31 In prior conflicts the IAFpllots consistently outperformed their Arab counterparts anda zepeat was expected in 1913 that would make for a short

32war.Several reasons have been suggested to explain the

consistently high quality of I A F pilots but the main issueseems to be training. The IAF training system was highlydeveloped and high standards were set for performance. IAFfighter pilots received twice as much flying time per month

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as did Arab pilots. 33 IAF training also emphasized thetypes of missions flown during the Golan battle. Typically,Israeli pilots sought quick, decisive results and wereaccustomed to getting them. 3 4 Also, the IAF pilots wereintimately familiar with the Golan terrain. Clearly, thesemen were espacially well prepared for the Golan battle. 35

The final asset for discussion is combat support.Since most IAF aircraft were bought from outside sources atgreat expense, these resources were hard to come by and goodmaintenance was required. An example of their efficiency Isthat they could turn around a combat sortie, from the timethey got the plane until it was ready again, in eightminutes. 36

Like the pilot force, maintenance had highstandards. At any time it was possible for 8 0 of theavailable aircraft to be in full commission. 31 Indeed, thehigh in-commission rates, quick turn-arounds and rapiddamage repairs are cited as reasons for the IAF actually

3 8flying more sorties than all the combined Arab air forces.In quantifiable terms, the IAF maintenance was able toprovide 500 sorties a day over Golan alone at the time theyweie most needed. 39

3IAF C I was centralized and responsive to missionneeds. High technology made this centralized system work Inthe swiftly changing environment of air operations. Asingle command post controlled operations through an

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excellent communications network. Leaders were keptinformed and the air effort was well coordinated. 2 Targetintelligence information was made available through the useof drones. 43 These could be used to help find mobiletargets much as they were during the recently concluded 'Warof Attrition'.

Threat suppression .was another element of combatsupport available to the IAF. The US built Teledyne Ryan -124 reconnaissance drones were employed as SAM decoys andchaff dispensers. Helicopters were loaded with powerfulradar jamming equipment and flew ECn support missions toaugment the on-board capabilities of Phantoms andSkyhawks. 45

When the Syrians moved up the roads leading to theOolan Plateau they brought wlth them an integrated system ofair defense. This Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) wasunique in the history of warfare. It incorporatedoverlapping, redundant, and mutually supportive componentsthat when applied In concert, covered the entire battlefleldfrom the surface to 70,000 feet. 6

Components of this IADS were designed andmanufactured by the Soviets and the Azab operators receivedexpert training on their use. 4 7 The IADS incorporated highSpeed and maneuverable fighters, radar guided S m s , IRguided SAUs, and a host of Antl-Aircraft Aztlllery. 48

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The primary aircraft of the IADS consisted of theSoviet built UIG-21 'Fishbed', although other types existed.The Syrians had more than 300 fighter aircraft in their airforce; 200 U 1 G - 2 1 ~ ~0 MIG-17s and 30 SU-7s. 49

Syrian radar guided BAUs included the SA-2'Guideline1, the SA-3 'Goal and SA-6 'Gainful1. The numberof SAM systems is estimated at 12 SA-2s and SA-3s and 32 SA-

506s.The Syrians also employed an IR SAU , the SA-7

Grail@. This was deployed in two ways. One, the missilewas carried by individual soldiers with one gripstock andfour reloads and, two, launch tubes were installed ontracked vehicles vith the capability to fire salvos of 4 or8 missiles. 5 1

Syria deployed a variety of conventional AAA usingradar and optical fire direction. These systems includedthe S-60 57mm, the ZSU 23-4, and the ZU 23-2. The hundredsof automatic weapons and thousands of small arms that may beemployed against aircraft targets are not described buttheir presence is hereby noted. 52

The geographic area for the Golan battle was smallyet complex. The immediate area of the Golan Heights isbounded to the north by Lebanon, to the east by Syria, andto the south by Jordan. 53 To the northeast, through Syria,1s Iraq. These Arab states were .all potential adversariesof Israel and with the exception of Lebanon, eventually

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contributed surface forces to the Golan battle on the sideof Syria. 4

The proximity of these borders represents a verysmall area. Damascus was less than 3 5 miles from theGolan. 55 The depth of the Golan defensive belt for the IDFwas only 17 miles. 56 Further, the entire breadth of theGolan front, from Mount Hermon, in the north, to the YarmukRiver and the Jordanian border, was less than 40 miles. 57

To gain an appreciation for how close thesedistances are in terms of time, an F - 4 Phantom travelingunrestricted at a combat speed o f 500 miles per hour, couldcross the Golan's depth in fractionally over two minutes.Four minutes and 10 seconds later, that Phantom would beover downtown Damascus.

The Israeli cultural centers of Galilee and theJordan River are immediately to the west of the GolanPlateau. The Uediterranean Sea is a short 40 miles to thewest. 58

The terrain of the Golan was also an importantconsideration. The 17 miles from the 1967 cease-fire lineto the western escarpment of the plateau contained nonatural obstacles. While the terrain -varied from the openrising slopes of the south to the hilly approach to MountHermon in the north, the Golan was essentially all opencountry. The steep western escarpment gives a commanding

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view of the Jordan River Valley, the Israeli settlements,and limited LOCs below. 59

Though mostly open terrain, the Golan surface waslargely rocky and in many sectors the ground was strewn withboulders. 60Only sparse and sporadlc vegetation existed.

The Golan suffered from a very primitive network ofroads. Many secondary roads existed on Golan but the onlymajor road ran from central Syria, southwest through Golan,down to the Bridge of the Daughters of Jacob over the JordanRiver. This bridge was at the base of the escarpment whichoverlooks Galilee. 61

Two other man-made features are notable. The IDFengineers constructed a tank ditch obstacle to thwart aninvasion. The ditch was 15 feet deep, had a 12 foot bank onthe Israeli side, and was supported by a mine field.62

In Syria a rather extensive defensive belt wasestablished. This was constructed under the advice ofSoviet engineers and was prepared to withstand artillery and

63air delivered weapons.Only one example of cloud cover is considered. The

Israells claim that on 6 October a low cloud over Golanprevented preemptive air operations in the area. 6 4 NOmention 1s made of precipitation or dust storms and the windgets no attention in any of the source documents.

The battlefield conditions. on the Golan representeda close and vigorously fought battle. Forces were

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intermingled. Massive numbers of vehicles scattered acrossthe terrain and a Syrian victory was very nearly won.

The intermingling of forces occurred soon after thefirst shots were fired. On the first night the Syrians wereable to cross the IDF tank ditch whereupon close armoredcombat was forced. With this penetration, the Syrian armorbypassed IDF positions as planned, and spread generally lntothree columns.65

Prior to meeting IDF resistance the ?uabs keptclosely to the roads where massive build-ups of armor movedslowly and became confused. After breaking through,however, Syrian armor followed the path of least resistanceand joined attack formations of six or seven tanks. 66

I n the south, four of the eight IDF forwardstrongholds were evacuated but the other half were enclrcledand isolated. The bypassed units swung their guns andcontinued to fire at the passing Syrians from behind. SomeIsraeli tanks added to the confusion by movlng east to checkon the status of IDF units that had been cut off?

'The large number of vehicles on the Golancontributed to the confusion also. The first two days ofthe conflict constituted the largest tank battle since theBattle of the Bulge in World War 11. 68

From the 1200+ Syrian tanks sent to Golan, almost900 were left on the battle ground. Some 200 Israeli tanks

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added to the refuse, while thousands of other vehicles andand artillery pieces were left behind. 6 9

The hard pressed 188th Brigade, in the south, hopedfor a lull in the fighting the first night but the Syrianscommitted 300 more tanks to their penetration, consolidatedtheir forces, and continued the attack. These tanks fromtho Syrian 5th Armor Division got within three miles of thewestern escarpment, just north of the Sea of Galilee.a lmaKY

7 1

This descriptive segment gives insight to Syrianobjectives and capabilities. It also shows what factorsaffected IAF operations dueing the battle. This informationprovides the basis for analyzing how IAF operations wereinfluenced and what results were achieved.

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CHAPTER 3ENDNOTES

'Elizabeth Monroe and A. H. Farrar-Hockley.L. October 1973. and Events,(1974/5) p 22.

(19851 p 30.2prank &ex, -973: The3nfsraelis Outmanned , - u p4Edgar O'Ballance, m v i c tw- NO v508Eallance: p 125, 127.6Aicer: p 20 .

15 October 1973, p 18.(1978) p 36.

Aker: p 3 0 .8ooBallance: p 40.'A. J. Balker, - (1981) p 123.Chaim Herzog, -eli - Wars, (1982) p 318.o'mllance: p 124.Barker: p 123.

l3aer: p 2014Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars: p 318.15Trevor N. nupuy, U i v e w c t o r v :16nupuy: p 437.

-he1947 1974, (1978) P 444.lNadav Safran, IsEpel: The , (1978)p 294.

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lenBlack October: Old Enemies At War Again , w 519Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars: p 360.Kenneth S. Brower, The Yom Kippur War ,

21nIsrae1i Aircraft, Arab SAns In Key Battle',ek 22 October, 1973, p 16.2201Ballance: p 287.2 3 ~ e r : 48.(w.s. spurs Countermeasures to Israel , nviation251nsight Team of the London Sunday Times,26Robert R. Rodwell, The Mideast War: 'a damn close-2 7 ~ ~ . ~ .purs countermeasures : p 20.28nW.S. Equips Israel With 'Smart' Guided Weapons ,29nIsraeli Air Force Decisive in War , aviation Week3001Ballance: p 207.3pws Congress,32Black October: p 32.330'Ballance: p 287.3401Ballance: p 287.3SSubcommittee Report: p 5.360'Ballance: p 288 .37Duprpy: p 550.3a~upuy: 549.39Dupuy: p 450.

October, 1973, p 31.

March 1974, p 25, 26.

h 22 October, 1973, p 20.

(1974) p 186.run thing' ,-ebruary, 1974, p 39.Byiation Week h &.ace Technoloav. 5 November, 1973, p 18.5 Snare Te- 3 December, 1973, p 43.

m o r t of the Suecial Subcommittee onw s t ar, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973, p 6 .

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40wThe Lessons of October ,4 1 1 ~ecisive: p 21.42Safran: p 291.4301Ballance: p 287.441nsight Team: p 188.Insight Team: p 161.4 6 ~ e m : 37.~ker: p 33.Insight Team: p 185.Dupuy: p 441.

500~Ballance: p 285.51wSA-7 Avoids Homing On Flares ,'*Barker: p 147.53Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars: p 325.

lJerry Asher, Q &lor The

3 December, 1973, p 13.

a e e- 5 November, 1973, p 17.

(1978) p 272.5 5 ~ n o l d Sherman, rqd J ,(1973) p 17.5 6 ~ e r : 20, 21.57Herzog, Arab-Israeli War: p 325.Barker: p 125.

59Batker: p 123.60Monroe: p 22.61Dupuy: p 438.62nonroe: p 22.63Rlad N. El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, - War,(1973) p 30.

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64Chafm Herzoq, = Z Q65Dupuy: p ,449.

(1975) p 255.

66Dupuy: p 445.67Desmond Blow, (1974) p 39.68wThe Two Front war , 22 October, 1973,p 63.69Safran: p 300 301.70Barker: p 127.%upuy: p 454.

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CHAPTER 4ANALYSIS

The Syrian Air Force S A F ) was not, in itself, adecisive factor in preventing Israeli Air Force (IAF)mission accomplishment. An improved combat entity overtime, the SAR was unable to significantly impair IAFfighters or protect the Syrian air space.

SAF fighters aggressively pursued aerial combat withthe I A F but fewer than 10% of all IAF losses were air-to-airlosses. The Syrians committed all available aircraft tothe Golan battle to compensate for somewhat reduced Surface-to-Air-Missile ( S A M ) and Anti-Aircraft Artillery ( A A A )coverage vis-a-vis the Egyptians. This commitment,however, complicated the SAM operator's mission for fear ofhittlng their own planes. 3

It is reasonable to assume that concern offratricide decreased the Syrian pilots performance as wellbut, when the joint IAF/Israeli Defense Force (IDF)suppresslon effort terminated SAM operations for severalhours, the IAF still was able to perform Battlefield AirInterdiction (BAI) with hardly a . oss. Further, in theSyrian rear, where SAM coverage was drastically decreased,

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the IAF was able to inflict significant damage to militaryand industrial targets. ultimately Syria called on Egyptto step up operations in the Sinai to relieve some IAFpressure. 6

There are several reasons why the SAF wasineffective. First the Arab emphasis for control of theskies was on SAMs and AAA and not the air arm.of training would likely decrease under those circumstances.5vidence suggests that the Arab pilots, as a whole, lackedaircraft systems knowledge and suffered from underdevelopedtraining .

The quality

aTraining wasnt the only problem though. Several

operational constraints degraded the SAF performance duringthe battle. Syrian surveillance radar systems wereinadequate for providing fast, accurate targetinformation. Their maintenance was unable to generate thelarge sortie numbers required to meet a dedicated airoffensive. Further, the IAF had apportioned a significantpercentage of their assets strictly to the aerial combatrole. These issues, when applied to the S A P S generallydefensive posture, smaller numbers, and diminished training,almost ensured an ineffectual showing regardless of thepilots aggressive spirit.Some students of this battle touted the hightechnology radar SAns as the decisive element in modern war.One observer regarded them as the English longbow of the

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20th century with the aircraft filling the role of theimpaled knight. 10

This somewhat enlarged view of their effectivenesslikely reflects the tactical surprise achieved with thenewly introduced SA-6 Gainful. while ElectronicCountermeasures (ECn) had proven its worth in dealing withthe SA-2 and SA-3 systems, only advanced US equipmentoffered a working ECn solution to the SA-6. Thesesophisticated American jamming pods were costly, took timeto adjust and were initially unavailable. 11

In total, the SA-6 afforded some important tacticalgains to Sryia. First, it worked. With a total of 80 I AFaircraft lost at Golan, 50% to AAA, 10% to air and one ortwo by SA-I engagements, a reasonable estimate would putlosses to the Gainful at 40% or about 30 aircraft. l2 Thisrepresents about 1 of all I AF fighter resources and issignificant even for a battle o f 19 days.

The SA-6 was also the only effective high altitudethreat to I AF fighters when the other SAns and SAFinterceptors are discounted. Without effective ECM a goodvisual search and radical defensive maneuvers became moreImportant. This often meant turning down into the lowaltitude threat. This particular technique, when attemptedat night, introduced another serious challenge in avoidlngthe terrain. Another reward brought by the SA-6 was the

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overall reduction of BAI sorties because assets werediverted to suppress the missiles. 13

The immense volume of guided missiles to which theGainful contributed, was one of the main advantages of theSA-7, Grail. Often reported to have a warhead too small tobring down a jet fighter, the SA-7 was prolific. l4 Itsunlque pontability made this system omni-present and thatdenied the low altitudes as a sanctuary.15

Farther, the greater intensity of air operationsamid hundreds of heat seeking missile launches affected theefficiency of BAI sorties because defensive .reactions wereneeded.

The more conventional form of air defense, AAA, wasthe potent threat to IAF fighters. Over half of all IAFlosses were to AAA. l6 These low altitude systems werenumerous and effective i f only by the volume of fire. ADutch observer with the United Nations estimated that threeof every five aircraft that appeared overhead were hit bymisslles or gunfire.

Were these figures universally correct, the damagerepair effort alone would be staggering. The presence ofthe ZSU 23-4, however, brought high technology efficiency tothis otherwise humble aspect of air defense. As many as 160of these highly mobile and accurate AAA systems wereemployed by the Syrians, increasing the range and lethalityof the AAA threat.17

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The collective effect of the threat factors was thatBAI aircraft were lost and damaged, limited resources werediverted, and sortie efficiency was reduced.

The environment also played a significant role inthe effectiveness of fighter operations. These factors bothstrongly supported the BAI effort and dictated a formula fora near disaster.

The local geography had this dual influence bymandating mission requirements for the initial phase of thebattle and by providing important offensive and defensiveopportunities afterward. In the first decisive days of thisbattle, geographic factors forced the IAF to.directly engagethe leading elements of armor units. 18

Since the observance of Yom Kippur reduced manning onthe Golan front and the effective surprise slowed themovement forward of IDF reserves, the preferred firstmission of threat suppression was virtually discarded somaximum BAI could be flown. Besides dictating the grimreality of flying into the teeth of an undiminished IADS,the lack of defensive depth. forced fighter operationsagainst the well protected and dispersed leadingechelons.19

The distance and time elements simply didn't allowfor adequate reinforcement of IDF ground forces before theoverwhelming Syrians could reach. the Israeli heartland.Therefore, the IAF was committed to direct confrontation. 2 0

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There were some advantages to Israel from geographythough. The same proximity that brought the Arabs to thestrategic heights of Golan with such appalling speed alsoallowed extraordinary numbers of short-duration sorties fromthe I Y . 1 An important side benefit from quick sorties isa lower fuel requirement. This provided for faster speeds,heavier weapons loads, diverse routes and deeperpenetration.

The short distances not only brought the Arab capitalin range but also major Command, Control, Communications andIntelligence C31 facilities, transportation hubs andmilitary installations. 2 2 The Israeli centralized commandand control system was also aided by the small area ofoperations. Good communications and coordination gaveIsraeli leaders the flexibllity to orchestrate an effectiveair effort including BAI. 23

With Jordan and Lebanon belng relativelydemilitarized end.so near the battlefield, a comparatively

24low-threat axis of attack was provided to Golan targets.It's likely that this contributed to aircraft survivabilityby providing unpredictable routes and decreased responsetimes to the Syrian threats.

The terrain also contributed to fighter survival insome respects. The technique of terrain masking involvesdefeating threat sensors, such as .radar, Infra-Red (I R) andoptlcal, by hiding behind terrain or blending in with a

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terrain background. This technique is useful for avoidingdetection and for restricting sensor, discrimination of itstarget. Since the southern Golan Plateau rose gradually tothe west, terrain masking would be possible only atextremely low altitudes. In the north with Mt. Hermon andits foothills, and at the western cliffs, masking terrainwas readily available.

Another terrain feature that supported fighteroperations was the rough, boulder-strewn ground that wasopen enough to deny natural cover and concealment but toorugged to traverse quickly. This worked in conjunction withthe limited road network and the Syrian goal of rapidmovement, to produce predictable, visible, and vulnerabletargets. The IDF tank ditch and mine obstacles made thesesame targets lucrative for air power. 25

The meteorological factors had a real influence onfighter operations in that almost no adverse conditionsexisted foz the duration of the battle. This includes:clouds, precipitation, obscurations to visibility and winds.The reported low cloud over Golan Heights on the afternoonof the 6th is considered to be a politically inspiredjustification for not preempting Syria's attack. 26 This1s based on the isolation of the cloud report, the fact thatmany sorties actually were launched to the Golan, and thevalue of not preempting Syria to s.ecure US support. 1

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With the favorable meteorological conditions, theIAF operated without the adfled restrictions inherent withbad weather. These restrictions would include, navigation,route of flight, altitude Iimitations, target acquisit.ionand, ordnance dellvery parameters.

O f course, darkness was a present condition for muchof the battle and evidence suggests this was a meaningfulinfluence to mission conduct. It was during the first nlghtthat Syrian armor effected their breakthrough in thesouth. 2 a The Israelis hoped for a lull in the fightingduring darkness but the Syrian advance continued.

Apparently the Syrians emphasized night fighting intheir offensive doctrine of continuous operations whilethe Israelis made only limited advances since the lastwar. 29

Syrian convoys on the Golan were targeted by IAF30fighters at night with the aid of illumination flares.

Most air operations though, when reported with reference tolight conditions, show a preference f o r day combat. A dawnattack in conjunction with artillery is reported. 31 Late i nthe afternoon of the first day, pairs of fighters attackedArab armor. This attack was launched hurriedly to takeadvantage of remaining light after the temporary groundingon the 6th had cost valuable daylight attackopportunlties. 32 Also, the IDF counterattack in the northwas delayed until morning when alr support was available. 3 3

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I t is not surprising that night operations overGolan were limited. The radar threat operates well at nightand lacking adequate ECM, sophisticated night systems, oreven the protection of terrain masking, the nightenvironment was dangerous.

The final group of environmental factors,battlefield conditions, made air attacks in close proximityto friendly troops less viable than BAI operations which didnot require careful integration and close control.

In the first days, battlefield conditions providedno clear distinction between friendly and enemy positions.Opposing forces were intermingled. 34 Encircled IDF troopswere firing from the enemy rear. 3 5 One account evendescribed friendly artillery intentionally firing on anoverrun IDF position. 36

Enemy armor at the front was dispersed and followedno predictable path. With all this, hundreds of defeatedtanks and a host of other veI)icles from both sides litteredthe battlefield. 3 7

This confusion on the battle ground meant that anyCAS effort would be extremely difficult. The likelihood ofIAF pilots finding and hitting the correct targets wasquestionable under the circumstances. The situation on theground, then, argued against CAS operations i n favor of BAI.

The dramatic numerical superlority enjoyed by Syriaput enormous pressure on the IAF as well as the Israeli

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ground forces. In numbers, the Syrians posessed a 5 to 1advantage overall, and a 12 to 1 ratio where Arab armor was

Under theassed for penetration in the south.circumstances, immediate results from air attack had aspecial value.

38

As might be expected, the two categories ofinfluencing factors, threat and environment, played asignificant role in the BAI effort. A complicatedrelationship existed between suppoztive and degradingaspects of the factors and their influence on fighteroperations.-efore the Syrian artillery barrage began the Golanbattle, the X A F was fully alert and ready to execute itsprebattle plan for a preemptive strike against Arab forces.The plan called for a massive suppression effort toneutralize Arab surface-to-air threats so subsequent airOperations would achieve more and cost less. Thispreemption, however, was canceled for political reasons. 39

When the Syrian and Egyptian attacks begansimultaneously, Israeli leadership thought the Sinai frontwas more threatening and that the Golan was relativelysecure. 0flrst wave of IAF fighters was to the Sinai wheresuppression, not BAI, was conducted..

Based on this analysis, the main effort for the

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when it became evident that the Golan was thegreater risk, the IAF was concentrated there. This newcommitment not only suffered from a change in direction, butalso from a change in mission which forced a reconfigurationof the aircraft. 41

After this initial delay, the IAF launched BAIsorties to the Golan where the volume and efficiency of theSyrian IADS downed 30 IAF fighters, damaged many more andprevented any significant success. 4 2 The shock of thisdevastation caused General Elazar to ground the IAF shortlyafter 1600 hours, on that first afternoon, so tactics couldbe rethought. 43

The initial response of the I A F to the BAI missionat Golan was significantly impaired by these events. Thefailure of intelligence to accurately present Syrianintentions and capabilities led to a misdirected firstresponse to the Sinai. Further, the IAF was not preparedfor the effectiveness of the surface-to-air threat. Thistactical surprise contrlbuted to aircraft losses, and to areduced sortie effectiveness in the near'term.

Also, the failure of the Israeli command structureto clearly depict the Golan situation contributed to adisjointed IAF effort. It was a notable achievement,however, that when the real danger in the north wasdetermined, the control and communications assets were ableto redirect the IAF main effort swiftly.

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The period of no flying yielded three changes to IAFoperations. These were expressly designed to enhancesurvival even at the cost of mission effectiveness. First,the previously employed frontal assault was replaced withflanking attacks from Jordanian airspace. 4 4 Second, theuse of direct terrain masking was emphasized to reduce therange and effectiveness of the radar SAUs . Mostsignificantly, a temporary flight restriction kept fighters15 miles away from the old cease-fire line. 5

The alternate approach axis of Jordan and theemphasis on terrain masking enhanced survival withoutdetriment to mission success because the four goals of BAIwere well served by survivable tactics. The 15 milerestriction, though, directly interfered with BAI missionobjectives.

With only 17 miles of battlefield depth, a 15 milerestriction implied operations against the leading elementsof the Syrian divisions 0 and left the vulnerable rearvirtually undisturbed. 4 6 This is significant because theleading armor, dispersed, mobiie and protected, was lesssusceptible to aerial attack than were the follow-on forces.The follow-on forces, including sustainment assets, wezebunched together, relatively immobile, and vulnerable to themajority of I A F weapons.

Though some data documents.the direct destruction ofarmozed combat forces by I A F fighters, the greatest impact

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of Israeli BAI on front-line armor was by indirect means.General Peled assessed the situation in these words;

Air power was undoubtedly not going to bemeasured by the number of tanks that we destroyed onthe battlefield, but by the fact that, after 5:30A.M. on Sunday, the Syrlan forces turned back fromtwo key points on the Golan Heights rom 5:30 thatmorning till about 10:30 A.M. there were no groundforces to oppose th em on either of those two routes. n47Some sources indicate that not a single tank was

actually destroyed by IAF fighter operations. Yet, theSyrians did stop short of the western cliff and as few as 15tanks from the 188th Brigade survived the fighting on thefirst night. 48 The 5th Division advanced t o within threemiles of their objective, the western escarpment, after the

497th Division wore down most of the IDF 188th Brigade.With the 188th nearly depleted and reinforcements not yet atthe battle, the only effective force to stop the penetrationwas the IAF. That th ey were stopped short is the mostpointed illustration of I A F success and all four BAI goalsplayed a role.

United Nations observers, trapped in thelr bunkers,reported that almost no fuel or ammunition moved forward toresupply the Syrian front elements, The reason was IAFinterdiction of the supply convoys. During the day of theattacks the sustainment convoys were either held up by theoverloaded roads or they were intimidated by the threat ofIsraeli air power. During the first night, however, the

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convoys did attempt to move their vital supplies forward butwere destroyed, disrupted and delayed by BAI sorties. 50

The devastating results of these attacks isindicated by the fact that one fourth of all the m a b tanksleft on the battlefield were operational except they wereout of fuel. 51number of tanks that ran out of ammunition and subsequentlywere destroyed by IDF ground forces.

Furthermore, there is no accounting for the

In the north the Israeli lines held against theSyrian 9th Division. Better force ratios, defenslvepositions and air power coordination are contributingfactors. 5 2 The ground in the north facilitated terralnmasking and the density of the IADS was relatively lightsince only one division attacked there. Both of theseconsiderations would positively influence fighter operationsin the immediate battle area. nore to the point, though, 1sthe same interdiction effort that contributed to the Syriancollapse in the southern sector would have affected thenorthern sector a s well.

On the second day of the battle, BAI operationscontinued to weaken the Syrian strength while IDFreinforcements flowed at an ever increasing rate to thefront. Syrian forces continued to push to their objectivesbut heavy pressure from the IAF thwarted them stlll. 3

By Sunday night the Syrian army was spent. Thelrsupplles had been destroyed or delayed, and their plans were


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disrupted. On Monday, the 8th, the IAF was diverted fromthe BAI mission to cpncentrate on suppression of the Arabair defenses. This shift of emphasis preceded the IDFcounter-offensive which was'supported by the IAF. 5 4

In conjunction with this suppression mission, theIAF began strategic and interdiction operations deeper intoSyria. 5 5 It is no stretch of BAI objectives to say thatmany of these deeper sorties met the goals and timingcriteria that define BAI. With these targets so near thebattle, an y interdiction of combat power would be near term.

On October 9th, 10th and llth, the deep attacks tookthe BAI effort farther away from the immediate battlefield.Among the interdiction targets hit on the 9th, electricpower generating plants at Damascus and Horn were all butdestroyed. The Syrian Ministry of Defense in Damascus and aC I site at Barouch Ridge in Lebanon were struck. Fuelsupplies and port facilities at Tartous, Adra and Latakiawere also damaged.

3

5 6Hitting these targets caused disruption and delayed

the employment of critical war supplies on the Golan. Onthe 10th and llth, air interdiction continued to reduce theArab war fighting potential. In the process, the IAFdirectly disrupted the Syrian land line communications.Another indirect value to these damaging raids was thatSyrian SAMs were diverted from the Golan front to protectthe deep resources. Flnally, such pressure was put on Syria

5 1

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through these deep strikes that Egypt was asked to increaseher operations on the Sinai front to divert some of the airoperations. 5 8

By Wednesday, October loth, the IBP mobilization wasadequate to support a counter-attack on the weakenedSyrians, The IAF preceded the ground maneuver and artillerywith air strikes on Syrian positions near Khushniye, and byWednesday night the Israelis had recovered almost all groundthey initially lost. Thursday the counterattack continuedwith I B F suppozt and further gains were made. 5 9.w the Syrians retreated into prepared defenses, andas Iraqi and Jordanian forces entered the battle, theIsraeli counterattack stalled. The defenses were built towithstand aerial attack so the effects of the IAF effortswere diminished. 6 o The battle for Sinai had alsointensified and on the 13th General Blazar called for amaximum economy of IAF operations. 61

Thus, the importance of IAF operations on the Golanfront were decreased. Deep Operations continued through the18th, however, with marginal Impact. 6 2

The effectiveness of the BAI misslon during theGolan battle was of great significance to the overalloutcome of the battle. The initial response was marred bymisdirection and tactical surprise but the results fromsubsequent operations fulfilled the-prescribed objectives ofthe BAI mission.

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That severe losses were incurred by the fighterforce is significant, but the over-riding consideration isthat the mission was accomplished. The battlefield wasInterdicted, and the ground battle was positively influencedas a result.

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CHAPTER 4ENDNOTES

'Robert R. Rodwell, The Mideast War: 'a damn Close-2D. K. Palit, W D S - 1974) p 156.3Desmond Blow, m e 1974) p 36.rank &ex, 1973: The -

' ~sraeli Air6Trevor N. Dupuy, E l w i v e Victorv: The'Edgar O'BallanCe, KO vietor. NO V The'Mer: p 51, 52.9 ~ e r : 48.' Battlefield Post-Mortem , m 12 November,Blow: p 45.IAF Decisive: p 19, 21.131AF Decisive: p 19.141AF Decisive: p 19.A. J. Barker, - (1981) p 147.16Aker: p 50.170'Ballance: p 285.Aker: p 2 4 .

run thingow,-ebruary, 1974, p 40.(1985) p 24.

Force Decisive 'in warn,3 December, 1973, p 18. -m 1947 1974, (1978) p 465.(1978) p 285.

1973, p 63.

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191Ap Decisive: p 1 9 .Chairn Herzog, of A ?

(1975) p 255.2iBrower: p 26.2209Ballanca: p 295.2 3 ~ ~ecisive: p 21.24Rlad N. El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, F h e O c t o b e r . W a r .2 5 ~ e x : 25 .

(1973) p 1 4 .

26Herzog, Atonement : p 255.

29Herzog, Atonoment: p 271.301ns igh t Team of the London Sunday Times,3 1 ~ e r : 91.

(1974) p 183.

32Ellzabeth Monroe and A . H. Farrar-Hockley.Even-X k(1974/5) p 23.

33Nadav Saf ran , I srael : The , 1978)p 299.3 4 ~ 1 0w :49.3 5 B a ~ k e r 128.3 6 ~ e r : 2 1 .37Safran: p 300, 301.

I38US A i r Force , BEpr 1 1 US A i r a s1 9 8 4 ) : p 3-3.3 9 ~ ym p o s i u m :47.Avraham Adan, p0 t h e E~lk.51 f t h e u e z, (1980)p 4 1 .

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41~upuy: 450.42 ~s ra ei i iICxaft, Arab 8-s: p 14.430*Ballance: p 290.44Batker: p 134.Aker: p 41.

48~afran: 294.49Dupuy: p 454.Insight Team: p 182.

5'~nsigtat Team: p 183.5 2 ~ e r : 21.53E1-Rayyes: p 11, 12.54Dupuy: p 465.55nonroe: p 26.5601Ballance: p 295.57~pposium: 242.

59~0nr0e: 25, 26.58Dupuy: p 465.

60El-Rayyes: p 30.

62Dupuy: p 533.

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CHAPTER 5CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ConclusionsIAW interdiction operations during the Golan battle

were equivalent to the current USAF mission of BAI. Theoperational concepts, mission objectives and proceduressupport this correlation.

IAW operations were an effective application oftactical air power. Through BAI operations, the IAFsignificantly contributed to the defeat of Syrian armoredforces in the Golan battle. During air Operations the I A Fsuffered significant losses and while the issue of combatlosses was related to mission success, it did not supersedethe importance of mission accomplishment. The situation onthe ground convinced Israeli leaders that initially high IAFlosses were preferable to the consequences of not performinga maxlmum BAI effort.

The total effect of BAI may not be immediate. Thegoals and direct targets of IAF operations did not result inthe instant cessation of the enemy's combat effort. ThroughBAI, engaged combat forces were allowed t o continueoperations largely unhindered by air power. However, theirsustainment, C I, and reserves were interdicted. In thls

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application, individual tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers(APCs) were not directly stopped by air in significantnumbers, but major armored units were. The chiefdisadvantage to this concept of employment was that friendlyground forces had to deal with leading enemy forces withoutthe benefit of concentrated Close Air Support (CAS).

When immediate results from air power are required,BAI may be inadequate. In the Golan battle, Syrian forcesvery nearly achieved their objectives. The Syrianadvantages of surprise, numerical superiority, momentum, andshort range objectives combined to reduce their dependencyon the very object of BAI operations. The relatively smallsize of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the lack ofsufficient, organic fire support exacerbated the defenders'difficult situation. That the IDF held the leading Syrianunits until BAI results could influence the battle wasremarkable and, perhaps, not repeatable. The Golan battledemonstrated that a strategy of forward defense, combinedwith a reliance on BAI, has considerable risk.

Aircraft durability was crucial to mission success.I A F fighter resources were subjected to rather extremeconditions during the Golan battle when numerous effectivesorties were needed to bring success. The first issue isaircraft readiness rates. For each 10% net available, afleet of 400 aircraft is reduced by 40. Consequently, the80 rate seen by the I A F during the time of the battle meant

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that more aircraft were down for maintenance than were lostin combat. Also, since analysis indicates that manyaircraft were hit by surface-to-air threats but were able toland safely, the importance of durability is clear.

This battle demonstrated how complex the electronicbattlefield had become. Caught short in some importantareas of Electronic Combat (EC), the IAF immediately putgreat emphasis on increasing its EC capabilities. Jammingpods, Radar Warning Receivers (RWR), and chaff systems wereof particular importance.

The Arabs demonstrated the capability to moveaggressively during the hours of darkness. This tactic wasconsistent with their objective of rapid, continuous combatand they had some success vith it. Syrian sustainment andreserve forces used the cover of darkness to move forwardand join the fight. IAF fighter systems, for the most part,were reliant on visual target acquisition and weaponsdelivery. For night BAI employment the IAF depended onillumination flares for locating and hitting their targets.This technique restrlcted attacks to the timing and spatiallimitations of the illuminating flares.

.Highly trained and dedicated pilots and maintenancepersonnel were crucial to mission success under extremecircumstances. The capabilities of these people wereclearly equal to the challenges o f . this intense operation.While no basis for comparison exists between the Syrian and

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Israeli pilots in the surface attack role, the air-to-airrole showed that IAF pilots achieved successes greater thanequipment advantages alone could account for.

The quick response of the IAF was largelyattributable to an all regular force structure. The smallIAQ force, by numbers alone was more responsive tomobilization than the much larger land component. With farless transition required to establish a wartime status, theregular IAF was able t o commit maximum combat power almostimmediately.

Although planning called for a decisive suppressioncampaign at the onset of hostilities, the IAF was forced todedicate maximum assets to th e BAI mission. This left theSyrian Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) undisturbedduring the initial fighting. A successful suppressioneffort would have provided a degree of protection for thefirst strikes, and likely reduced the requirement to 'di ver tBAI assets to the suppression mission in later operations.

Centralized Command, Control, Communications, andIntelligence ( C I ) gave flexibility and responslveness tocomplex IAF operations. Late breaking information about thedanger at the Golan front caused Israeli leaders to changethe IAF mission in three significant ways. The azea, themission and the totality of effort were all hurriedlyadjusted to reflect the Golan situation. It is unlikely

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that the main effort of the IAF could have been shifted so3quickly with a decentralized C I system.

3The existent IAF C I system was slow to targetmassed Syrian columns at the onset of the battle. As aresult, lucrative BAI target opportunities were missed andmore Arab combat power was allowed to become engaged asplanned. This shortcoming was reflected by the initiallyunder valued estimate of the Syrian threat approaching theGolan, and by the 15 mile operating restriction from the1967 cease-fire line. These errors demonstrated missedopportunities which diminished the effectiveness of BAI.

The location, numbers and types of surface-to-airthreats were not accurately depicted. The IAF was not onlysurprised by the effectiveness of the SA-6 Gainful and ZSU23-4 Shilka, they were also stunned by the large numbers ofthreat: systems employed. Additionally, the Israelitargeting system was ill prepared t o deal with the rapidmobility of so many threats. The Israeli C I system wasalso late to realize that the Syrian rear was so lightlydefended. IAF exploitation of this weakness in air defensewas delayed long enough for critical Syrian assets to moveforward unhindered.

3

A dense and sophisticated Integrated Air DefenseSystem (1AL)S) had multiple effects on BAI operations. BAIoperations called for penetration.of enemy airspace, and tothe degree that airspace was controlled by enemy threats,

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BAI results suffered. This decrement was in the form oflost fighter resources, ineffective sorties, lower sortierates, and ultimately, greater enemy combat power for theground battle.

The Israeli air defense system effectivelycontrolled the airspace over Israeli territory and negatedan y real opposition from the Syrian Air Force. Theseconditions allowed efficient I AF ground Operations, isolatedthe threat geographically, and reduced the overall threatvolume. The value of these conditions cannot be quantifiedbut an increased Arab air threat would certainly havepresented a negative influence to BAI operations.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery ( A AA ) continued to be aprlmary threat to fighter operatlons. With over half of allGolan losses attributed to AA?i, this battle reinforced thepreeminence of thls conventional threat.

The limited geographic size of the combat zone had aprofound effect on I AF operations. The lack of operationaldepth for the Israeli defenders dictated the immediateI AF mission of BAI and forced air operations inhighly threatening airspace. Also, the short distancesconcentrated the threat and compressed the time available torecover from a disadvantaged position. On the positiveside, the geography supported high sortie rates andunrestricted tactical techniques. , T h e eography allowed fordeep penetration to the enemy's source of milltary strength

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and it permitted the circumnavigation of an isolated threatstructure.

The meteorological conditions did not restrict BAIoperations. IAF fighter resources and weapons reliedheavily on visual techniques for offensive employment.Further, with the deficiency in ECM capabilities, fighterpilots were forced to use visual methods of threatacquisition and defense. successful night combat wasparticularly dependent on clear air conditions. Thefavorable weather strongly supported visual operations forboth offensive and defensive requirements.Recommendations

The real value of lessons is in their carefulapplication to current and future situations. This paperprovides an accurate representation of events and underlyinginfluences. The lessons established herein should beapplied to appropriate United States Air Force U S M Ioperations.

W A F tactical fighter units with BAI capabilityshould emphasize realistic BAI training. The Golan battlevalidates the existent doctrine and supports the continuedemphasis on BAI as an effective appllcatlon o f air power.Specific training for BAI enhances its value throughimproved pilot performance, better cooperation withsupporting assets and deeper understanding of Its effects.CAS capabilities, however, must not be discarded because the

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unique effects of CAS operations may be required in a futureconflict

The Air Staff should commission a study to evaluateand quantify the delayed effects aspect of BAI operationsand incorporate the results into joint planning. I f the BAImission is flown at the expense of CAS operations, groundforces must be prepared to deal with the delayed results.

The USAF should continue t o emphasize durability andmaintainability in aircraft design. With large numbers ofaircraft, even a small decrease in availability represents asignificant loss in combat power. Starting a conflict atfull strength and maintaining strength are both important.

Tactical Air Command must ensure that fightersystems incorporate highly capable ElectronicCountermeasures (Ern) systems to protect aircraft from avariety of surface-to-air threats. These systems must beimmediately available and quickly programmable to deal withchanging, or newly discovered threat characteristics. Thisensures a degzee of protection to fighter assets fromsurface-to-air threats when the tactical situation precludesan early suppression effort. An organic ECM capability willalso be advantageous when a committed suppression effort isonly partially successful.

Tactical Air Command must strive to develop abroad-based night attack capability. Effective andsurvivable operations during hours of darkness must be used

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to deny the enemy a primary sanctuary. This is particularlyimportant when BAI is used in conjunction with a forwarddefense strategy on the ground.

The USAF should accelerate the development anddeployment of a real-time target acquisition and directionsystem to support BAI operations. This system should bereliable, survivable, and dedicated to the BAI mission. Itmust be able to acquire moving and stationary targets atgreat range and under adverse meteorological conditions.

Tactical A i r Command must ensure that the AAA threatis recognized and trained for by fighter pilots preparing toconduct B A I . This threat to fighter operations deservescareful consideration in the development and employment oftactical options.

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APPENDIX 1

REVIEW OF RESEARCH LITERATUREThis appendix reviews literature that applies t o the

study. The references discussed here are organized insequence by books, periodicals, and US Governmentpublications. The relevance to the methodology isdescribed for each item listed.BMks

- - by A. J. Barker (HippocreneBooks, Inc., 1980) provides a broad overview of Israeli AirForce (IAF) missions, objectives and results. It provides auseful but brief description of IAF fighter aircraftcharacteristics.

Qg&lfor the 0- by Jerry Asher and Eric Hammel,(William Morrow and Co. Inc., 1987 is most valuable for thedescription of the Syrian armor attack. This is importantfor understanding the missions and environmental factorsfacing the IAF. Some space is given to discussing resultsof IAF fighter employment.

Elusive V ictorv., by Trevor N. Dupuy, (Harper h Row,1978.) is an outstanding work. The author's in-depthanalysis of the ground battle helps ldentify and describe

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missions and factors that affected the results. A sectiondedicated to the air war helps measure the results.

w s f Cou- by Avigdor Kahalani, (GreenwoodPress, 19841, shows some specific examples of BAI results.

the m e d - by Nadav Safran,(Belknap Press, 19781, supports the description of missionsand factors. Further, it helps analyze the effect of someenvironmental conditions.

The S the in the M Wby Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, (Praeger Publishers, 19871,

contributes to the analysis of threat influences on IAFoperations.

ects of the - conflict ?International Symposium, Jerusalem, Editor: Louis Williams,(University Publishing Projects, (Tel Aviv, 19751, is thesingle best source for identifying IAF missions andobjectives. Specific successes and failures are alsodescribed. This book quotes the IDF Chief of Staff and theIAF Chief of Staff for the Golan battle.

- by Edgar O'Ballance,(Presidio Press, 19781 is one of the outstanding referencesfor the Golan battle. Background information helps put theopening events into perspective, particularly with respectto Syrian intentions and operations. The author elaborateson the composition and use of Syrian armor forces. Clearestimates of Syrian air defense strengths and disposltions

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are given al.ong with IAF fighter assets. The descriptionsof the IAF weapons and tactics used 'to defend against theSyrian IADS are particularly good.

er 1973: The - by Frank Aker,(Archon Books, 1985) is another outstanding reference forstudents of this conflict. The author's descriptions ofthe Syrian attack help describe IAF missions andenvironmental factors. This work is replete with examplesof IAF oblectlves, missions, tactics, and results. Someexpressions of IAF successes are a little inflated, however.

D. K. Palit's Re_turn to S w P.alit PalitPublishers, 1974) was primarily helpful in understanding thecomplexities of the IADS and how they affected BAIoperations.

ZaJsg Now Thv SQIL (Howard Tinunins, 1974) by DesmondBlow, helps identify IAF missions and environmental factors.Further, it provides valuable, though general, insights intothe Syrians' use of surface-to-air missiles.3 by ElizabethMonroe and A. H. Farrar-Hockley, (the InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, 1975) is an excellentsource for determining operational factors such as thethreat, geography and terrain. BAI results are alsoidentified.

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- by chain Herzog (RandomHouse, 1982) describes IAF .readiness, deep operations andthreat factors. Usable mission results are identified.

he Octob-tS. Dby Editors of An-Nahar Research Staff, (An-NaharPress Services, 19731, covers most of the IAF missions andweapons. One notable contribution is the impact of the IAFeffort during the Golan counter-offensive.

by Chain Herzog, (Little,Brown, 1975) is very useful for understanding the initialresponse of the IAF. It shows how some preparations for warwere undermined by the surprise Syria orchestrated.

Yom lllppur War, by The Insight Team of theLondon unday Tirnea., (Doubleday 6 Company, Inc., 19741,describes missions, assets and factors for BAI operations.It also aids the analysis process with information on howfactors influenced the events.

m e n God Judaed U n ied, by Arnold Sherman,(Bantam Books, Inc., 19731, describes IAF BAI contributionsto the battle and how threat factors affected thoseoperations.Peliodlcals

has been aremarkable source of technical information and informedperspectives. Fourteen articles , directly contributed toseveral aspects of this study.

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An Israeli Aerospace Industries engineer,interviewed for the article, Israeli Aerospace ActivitiesNear Normal , provides interesting insights on thetechnological signilicance of the Yom Kippur War.

I n Israelis Outmanned the immensity of Israel'sstrategic dilemma is presented. The combined Arab forcestrength is explained in the context of Israel's smallstanding army and requirement for mobilization.

The Lessons of October gives a particularlysuccinct overview of several operational and tacticallessons resultlng from the 1973 Mideast War. Most of thesehave relevance to the Golan battle.

Israeli Aircraft, Arab SAMs in Key Battle presentsan outstanding review of Arab IADS effectiveness, I AF lossesand self protection measures used to defeat Arab defenses.

Israeli Air Force Decisive in War is anextraordinary article for its presentation of the I AFsurface attack role during the war and especially the Syrianfront.

Soviet Aid Sparks Arab Gains provides someinformation on air

Documents

Air Interdiction on the Golan