A new kind of brigade has appeared in the Souiet force structure. ~It provides additional capabilities that haue not been arailableto the Soviets in thepast. This articleprouides a look at this newelement and considers its organ ization and role.

Major Roger E. Bert, US Army

Air Assault Brigades:

‘btd

i

‘,;:New Ele knt in the

Soviet !ibesantForce ‘!ructure‘$.*.

MILITARY REVIEW

Introduction

SOVIET military doctrine, as is well-known, has always placed heavy em-

phasis on the employment of desant orlanding forces.’ Within the desant forcespectrum, uozdushno-desan tnyye uoyska(VDVI or the airborne force, in particular,has been the eubject of special attentionand interest. The organization of theSoviet airborne force began in 193o, and,under the direction of then Red army chiefof staff, ,Marshal M. N. Tukhachevski, itpioneered the development of airdrop andair-landing tactics.

The historically la-ge size of the stand-ing VD V force reflects its perceived valueto the Soviet military. Currently main-tained at a level of 50,000 to 60,000 per-sonnel, the VDV strength has been ashigh as 100,000 during the postwarperiod. As the world’s largest airborneforce, it has been constantly mo$lernizedand re-equipped to improve mobility andfirepower and has reached a point wheretoday it fights essentially as a motorizedrifle force once it is on the ground. As afurther confirmation of its perceived util-ity to senior Soviet ground force com-manders. virtually all major So}riet exer-cises have included the use of troops fromthe airborne force.

Given this background, it is not surpris-ing that the S?vie@ have introduced anew unit in the airborne desan t forcestructure: tbe so-called “air assaultbrigade.’” The appearance of this type ofbrigade represents a significant increasein the number of airborne-dedicated per-sonnel in addition to the already sizableW2 V force. As a newly organized anddeployed force,’ tbe air assau~t brigadepresumably provides a new capability for

..

performing certain missions that previ-ously belonged to other forces or certainnew missions that resulted from a re-evaluation of future combat require-ments.

With this in mind, I will address thesubordination, organization and deploy-ment of air assault brigades, as well as,most importantly, their prospective mis-sions. To properly evaluate potential mis-sions, it will be necessary to speculateabout why these units were organized,deployed and in response to whatstrategy.

Air Assault Brigade:Organization and Deployment

Air assault brigades are believed tohave been deployed with Soviet forces forthe past three to four years. So far, theyhave been detected in the Soviet Union’swestern military districts (M Ds) and inthe forward-deployed Groups of Forces

(GOFS) in Eastern Europe: covering anarea that constitutes essentially theWestern tewtr uoyny (7TI or theater ofwar.’ Based on the deployment pattern ofthese forces, it is assumed that thebrigades are MD or front-level (in war-time) assets. Tberd have been some tenta-tive indications that these brigades maybe assigned as low as army level, but thisremains unconfirmed.

A comparison of the air assault bri-gade’s organization and weapons distri-bution (Figure 1) with those of a standardBi14D airborne amphibious infantry com-bat vehicle (AA lCV)-equipped airborneregiment (Figure 2)8indicates that the air-borne regiment was probably the baeic..model for the brigades. As is typical ofSoviet airborne units, the air assault bri-gade has a very high density of crew-

22 October

AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

I Au Assault 1

L_.._J

GElm”Bmsupply

Company

,

I Ant!a#rcraft II Engineer

Battery Company I# I t

ri

I MeiftcalPlatoon/ Company I

L I

Principal Items of Equipment

D30 122mm towed how!tzer 18 S044 a5mm aux!hary-propelled field gun 6

M1943 120mm mortar 6 RPGJ6D antitank grmade launcher 150

SA7 Grad surface-to-air mss!le.

45 A(XJ 7 30mm automat!c grenade Iaunchel 24

ZU23 23mm antiaircraft gun E RPKS74 545nMn Ilght machmegun 111

BRDM AT3f5 antttaok gu!ded m]ssde launcher 9 BMD ambome amphibmus infantry combat vehtcle 64

Manpack AJ3/4 antitank gu!ded mmwle 14 BRDM and BRDM2 amph]blous scout cars 4

SPG9 73mm recodless antitank gun 36

Ih!s represents a Provisional assessment of the strength, orgamzawm and equtpment of the a!r assault brigade, basedon fragmental mformat)on from several sources

Figure 1

served and individual antitank weapons—the ratio in terms of number of weaponsper 1,000 troops is nearly twice that foundin a standard motorized rifle division.’However, there are noticeable differences.The brigade has more combat battalions,a mixture of two BMD-equipped and twoparachute assault battalions and anorganic artillery battalion.

The combination of two BAfD-equipped

battalions and two parachute battalionsis very intriguing. The BMD battalionsare totally in keeping with the recenttrend toward increased mobility withinthe VD V where all divisional regimentsare being equipped with the BMDAA ICV.8 However, the existence ofstandard parachute battalions within theair assault brigade in contract to the over-all transition within the VD V toward

1983 23

MILITARY REVIEW

“heavier” airborne units might seem con-tradictory, The explanation for this istwofold.

First, air assault brigades and, in par-ticular, their non-BJ4D-equipped bat-talions would, in some cases, be employedcloser to the forward line of own troops{F LO1l. As a front-level asset, these unitswould support armies and di~,isions in thefront commander’s maneuver plan atdistances favorable for early linkup or firesupport. As a result, it is less critical forthese battalions to have ~heincreased fire-power and mobility that l?I?fDs provideunits operating farther in the enemy’srear area.

Second, it is assumed that the airlift forthese brigades would be provided primar-ily by the front’s tactical air army (TAA).Inasmuch as the lift capability at front

level is limited (a point that will bediscussed in more detail later), it simply isnot feasible to equip air assault brigadeswith more equipment than can be movedwithout excessive external support.

In the final analysis, it probably is noaccident (as the Soviets are fond of eay-ing) that the air assault brigade sbructurestrongly resembles that of a reinforcedairborne regiment. In Soviet exercise playsubsequent to 197o, most airborne unitssupporting frontal operations have been

IAwbome

Regiment (BMtT)1,455 I

I

mE3Elmmmm

—

I I

mlz!$!zl\ Principal Items of Equipment

M1943 120mrn mortar 6 AGS17 30mm automattc grenade launcher 18SA7 Grad surface-to.alr missile 36 RPKS74 545mm bght machmegun

123 23mm antimrcraft gun83

6 BMII awborne amphibious infantry combat vehicle 90

BRDA4 AT 315 afmtank gu!ded mmsde launcher 9 BROM and BRDM2 amphibious scout cars 4RPGJ6D ant!tank grenade launcher 111

Tha represents d prowsonal assessment of the strength, organization and equipment of the aIr assault brigade, based”on fragmentary mformat,on from several sources

Figure 2

24 October

AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

of the regimental eize.gWith only minor differences in size and

, organization, the Soviet front com-manders opposing NATO now have an in-tegrrd, airborne-capable force availablefor use in their operations. Nevertheless,it is more probable that, unlike support-ing sirborne regiments, sir assault bri-gades would be deployed not as integralunits but as tailored subunits-that is,

one or two battaon task forces. This issuggested first hy the number of bat-talions and the differences in mobility

(BiMD-equipped versus parachuteassault) and, second, by the inadequatefrontal airlift available for a brigade-sizemovement. A large-scale operation couldbe mounted under current conditions onlywith higher echelon support.

The questions that logicsfly arise areWhy were these brigades created, forwhat roles and missions, and why werethey assigned to the fr’on t level? Before at-tempting to address these questions, it isnecessary to note that the bulk of theopen-source information about new Sovietum.ts is normally derived from exerciseplay and from what the Soviets choose torevesf about unit activities or from dis-cussions in theoretical journals. As yet,the Soviet military press has been verycircumspect about discussing the airassault brigade as au organization. There-fore. speculation about its missions andemployment must be based on:

. An anrdysis of capabilities implicit inits organization.

. An inference of its uses as indicatedin general references to sir assault forcesin the Soviet military press.

. An identification of the shortcom-ings in front capabilities it addresses.

e A determination of its role in the con-text of overall Soviet operational-leveldoctrine.’”

The last point is especially crucial to an

underst snding of the intended role of airassault brigades. It is crucisf because ofsignificant changes that have occurredand will continue in the Soviet opera-tional-level approach to fighting and win-ning a war in Europe. To fully appreciatebow sir assault brigades might be used, itis important to understand this fun-damentrd alteration in Soviet militarythinking about how to defeat NATO.

The “Operational Maneuver Group”:Tha Soviet Answer to the “Active Defense”

C. N. Donnelly, a frequent and respectedauthor on Soviet military affairs at theSoviet Studies Centre, Royal MilitaryAcademy, Sandhurst, in the United King-dom, argues persuasively in a recentarticle that the Soviets have introduced anew operational-level concept specificallydesigned to counter NATO’s activedefense strategy which is acknowledgedas a “very effective form of defense. ‘“ ]According to Donnelly, Soviet militarydoctrine holds that, if war breaks out inEurope, it must be won very quickly “if itis to be won at all.’’” If the war were tocontinue too long, it could develop into acatastrophic strategic nuclear exchange,as well as engender internal centrifugalpressures that could blow the Soviet blocapart.

(he primary task of the Soviets, there-fore, is to reduce NATO’S prepsrationtime since surprise is so crucial tosuccess. Ia If successful, NATO’S defenses

would not likely be heavily fortified, eche-loned in depth or have a strong ope~a-tionsf reserve.

Soviet planners well realize that theearly and effective use of NATO’s tacticaJnuclear weapons would severely disrupt ifnot destroy their offensive. Thus, a strat-

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MILITARY REVIEW

egy and an operational plan would beneeded to forestafl the implementation ofNATO’s tactical nuclear option and to ac-complish a rapid collapse of NATO’spolitico-military system. Such a strategywould require:

o The achievement of surprise and-’ assume NATO’s defense to be off-balance.

. A maximum amount of shock in thefirst few hours of attack.

. Paralyzing NATO’s command andcontrol system.

● The achievement of rapid rates of advance on severaf important axes deep intoNATO’s territory to shatter the defense.

● The reduction of risk repreeemted byNATO’s tactical nuclear option.”

In studying N ATO’s defense planning,}t’arsaw Pact military analysts seeseveral aspects of the active defense strat-egy that could be exploited given the cor-rect operationrd tactics. These are, for ex-

ample. NATO’S need tO identify the m~nthrust early, its lack of a strong opera-tional reserve and the consequent require-ment to pull units from one part of tbedefense line to strengthen another.”

Tbe Soviet operational-level answer tosuccessfully exploiting these factors andthue achieving the strategic requirementsis the resurrection of a World War I I con-cept —the “mobile group” —currently re-ferred to as the “operational maneuvergroup” or OMG. These organizationswere the “meet successful means of ex-ploitation that the Soviets found to turntactical succe;s into operational successand achieve a high rate of advance togreat depth’ ‘“ during the war.

.Juet what is an OMG, and what doee itdo? At army level, the basis for an OMG

would be a tank d]vision, while at frontlevel it would be major eiements of a tankarmy. Tailored and possibly reinforced tomeet specific requirements, these groupswould likely be deployed by many of the

armies in an offensive on several axesalong a broad front on the first or secondday of hostilities. Supported by frontalaviation, organic helicopter gunships andartillery, OM Ge would seek the

rapid transfer of the attackingfo;c;s”’ efforts into the enemy’s opera-tional deferrsiue depth and the conduct ofthe offensive with decisive goals, at thehigh tempos and at a great depth. ”

Specific missions assigned to OMGSalong their axes of advance would includeto:

e Destroy nuclear weapons and de-livery systems.

● Destroy or neutralize command

posts, electronic warfare units andfacilities, and air defense weapons.

e Prevent the withdrawal of enemy

troops.e Delay the advance of reserves from

the enemy’s depth.o Paralyze the enemy’s logistical sys-

tem.e Capture major important areas and

objectives to be held until the main forcesarrive.”

Operating at a considerable distance infront of an OMG would be its “forwarddetachment.” This ehment, consisting ofa battalion task force for an army OMG ora regimental task force for a front OMG,would be separated from the OM G mainbody by 20 to 40 kilometers.” Forwarddetachments would generally conductreconnaissance for the OMG, identifyingweak points to be attacked by the OMG.Forward detachments would try to denythe enemy the opportunity to consolidateon favorable lines of defense, conductraiding operations and seize tmgets if, bydoing so, they would significantly aid theadvance of the main body.’” Relying’ ‘to aconsiderable degree” on the “able, bold,and decisive operations of forward detach-ments,” the Soviets hope to achieve ad-

25 flctober

vance rates of at least 40 to 50 kilometersper day.”

The OMG concept is still evolving boththrough discussion in Soviet militaryjournals and in actual practice during ex-ercises. As Donnelly emphasizes, theOM G is not a new formation; it is the useof existing units in a different way and assuch represents “a concept of the verygreatest importance– a specific design todefeat present NATO defensive plans.’ ‘2’

Air Assault Brigades:An OMGConnection?

Soviet discussions concerning therevival of the mobile group conceptreportedly started around 1976 and havesubsequently intensified, with particu-larly broad coverage in the military pressin 1979.2! The time of these discussions,quite apart from other factors, suggestssome correlation between air assaultbrigades and the OMG ccmcept in that itrepresents the approximate lead time re-quired to decide unit formation, organir.a-tion and then deployment ( 1976-79).

Apart from the time coincidence,however, the key role of forward detach-ments and raiding operations in the OM Gconcept and the concomitant emphasis inrecent OM G literature on the importanceof tacticaf air assaults and desant opera-tions seem to clearly indicate a major rolefor air assault brigades in OIMG opera-tions, if not an interrelationship. Severalstatements from Soviet/Warsaw Pactsources addressing OMGS and airborne/air assault operations may further illus-trate this:

. in contrast (o the past, [offensive]capabilities have nou~ considerably ex-panded, especially in the depth to whichblou~s can be deliuered by rocket forces,

AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

aviation, long range artillery, and the ex-tensive use of air assault/airborne forces.(Emphasis added.)”

. . pn”neipal tasks of the air force are.to land tactical desants drawn from theraiding and maneu uen”ng forces or fromthe main forces of ground troops acting insupport of the operational maneuvergroups, This task involves transportaircraft or helicopters landing groundtroops. . ..25

the essence of [the theory of a deepoffensiue operation] consisted of thesimultaneous suppression of the enemy ‘Sdefense along its entire depth, penetrationof its tactical zone on a selected a;is witha subsequent rapid extension of tacticalsuccess. into the operational zone by intro-duczng exploitation forces [tanks,moton”zed n’fle troops, cavalry] and land-ings of airbornelair assault forces for themost rapid achievement of the ass?gnedmissio n.”

. these [mobile] groups and [forward )and special] detachments together u,ithatrborne forces. prouided experience forthe Lmprouement on the theory of deepcombat opera tions. ”

Certainly, airborne and air assaultforces are considered to be importantelements of the OM G force structure. Thequestion that remains, however, is: I Iowdoes, the role of the air assault brigadesdiffer from that of conventional airborneor heliborne forces? The answer lies in ex-

amining the factors that influenced thecreation of the units.

Two factors influenced the decisions toform and deploy these units. First was theneed to fill what could be termed thefront’s airborne/heliborne force employ-ment “dead zone.’” Doctrinally, theSoviets have maintained that heliborneassaults and landings can be conducted asfar forwwd of the FLOT as 50 kilometers—that is, tactical depth (see Figure 3). In

1983 27

,

.

MILITARY REVIEW

Strategic

Operational

F,gure 3

practice, however, these assaults rarelyextend beyond 15 to 20 kilometers for-ward of the forward edge of the battle areaand are often much closer.” The apparentreason for this substantial difference be-tween theory and practice lies in tbe prin-cipal weaknesses of heliborne forces—thelack of mobility and firepower. To surviveat greater distairces, these forces need ar-tillery and,aviation fire support and earlylinkup with advancing units.

Airborne operations in support of frorr-tal offensives have generally been of regi-mental size in exerciees. Althoughtheoretically possible anywhere within 50to 500 kilometers forward of the FLOTwhen supporting a front, such operations

are usually conducted at depths muchgreater th& 50 kilometers. Thus, a deadzone appears-an area of somewhere be-tween 20 and approximately 100 kilo-meters deep in the enemy defensive zone.

This dead zone has existed ae a result ofthe front commander’ inability to reachvertically heyond 20 kilometers into theenemy’s defensive zone. If the frorzt com-mander wanted to assault deeper into theenemy’s rear area, he was forced to re-quest airborne assets from the GenerrdStaff or its wartime manifestation, theStauka (general headquarters staff):’ The

commander could not be assured that hisrequest would be approved or that anoperation would be launched quicklyenough to exploit a fleeting opportunity.

As the new OMG concept implies,Soviet military planners envision anumber of rapid, deep penetrations aJongseveral axes or “main directions, ” as theSoviets term it, by army-level and possi-bly even front-level OM Gs. To maintainthe high rates of advance consideredposeible under nonnuclear condition,OMGS would be called upon to seize keyterrain-that is, river-croseing sites,’”passes, crossroads, rail junctione, and soforth to deflect reacting enemy reservesend, in short, to perform the full range ofrear area missions.sl

In addition, these operations should becarried out, according to Soviet strategicconsiderations, in a relatively compressedtime frame if an offensiw against NATOie to be successful. This relatee to the sec-ond factor responsible for air assault bri-gade formation–the need to provide the

front commander and (possibly) subordi-nate army commanders with organic airassault forces that would be availablefrom the st=t of the operations.

With planning aimed at a relatively”short, intense conflict with the commit-ment of OMGS on D+l or D+2, it would

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AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

seem consistent that these operationaJ-level commanders need integral air-de-livered forces to help maintain the requi-site speed of advance. Further, theseforces would provide a rapid responeecapability— a means by which to react toany abrupt change in the combat situa-tion. The vrdue of these forces in an over-afl environment that demands the utmostflexibility and adaptability of com-manders is self-evident.

The need to extend the reach of thefront commander into NATO’s opera-tional defense in support of OJNIGSis re-flected in the BLfD battalion componentsof air assault brigades. These battalions’more substantial firepower end mobilitywould permit them to survive at greaterdistances from the FLOT for longerperiods of time than heliborne troops. Asa bonus, the availability of air assault bri-gades could reduce somewhat the commit-ments of airborne divisions. Althoughclearly VD 1~units would be used exten-sively in support of fron ta/ operations,there should be a greater availability ofthem for strategic reserve (Reserves ofthe Supreme High Command) missions orto carry out missions at even greateroperational/strategic depths.

In short, the air assault brigade would

aPPem to be the solution to the problem ofproviding the fi-on t-level commander anorganic force for vertical movements. Theemphasis on the OMG as a viable meansat the operational level by which to defeatNATO, a level which previously did gotpossess such forces, further reinforces theperception of a direct relationship.

What kinds of missions could be ex-pected for air assault brigadee? Howwould they be employed with OMGS? Asa probable threedimensionsd or verticalextension of an OM G, air assault bri-gadea, in generaf, would have the samekiuds of missions as the unit they sup-

port. Of foremost importance would bethe destruction of nuclear weapons anddelivery systems, as well as commendpeats, radio-electronic means of combatand air defense weapons.” In ExerciseNEMAN, held in the Baftic MD in 1979,an airborne battaIion with B’MD.s wasdropped on an enemy division commandpost on the second day of the exercise.”Although it is not known whether this “unit was from err air assault brigade or astandard airborne division, it highlights apossible mission for air assault brigadeelements.

Probably one of the single most impor-,tant miseions to be asaigned to air%sauftbrigades in support of OMGS would bethe seizure end occupation of key terrain—in particular, river-crossing sites. It isvirtually impossible to identify afiy signi-ficant Soviet exercise in the western MDsand GOFS that does not incorporate sometype of river-crossing operation. WhileSoviet military writers extol the need forsuccessful fording of water obstacles fromthe march by forward detachments, beli-borne or airborne assaults, in most cases,are used to seize and hold bridgeheads un-til relieved by advancing forces.”

If OMGS are to sustain daily rates of ad-vance of at least 40 to 50 kilometers, oneof the key factors in this achievementwould be the crossing of water barrierswithout delay—that is, without beingforced to deploy and seize or find a cross-ing point. Although timely river crossingsare obviously very important, other ter-rain objectives, such as mountain passes,crossroads, gap crossings, and so forth,which could impede the advance of OMGSwould also be likely objectives for airassaults.

Another mission for air assault bri-gades would be the widespread conduct.ofraids in support of OMGa. Raids would beconducted by company or even battalion-

1983

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MILITARY REVIEW

size elements on t ergets in front of orparrdlel to the OMG’e main azis of ad-vance. Raiding operations would disruptenemy forces reacting to the OM G‘spassage, as well as simply increase theamount of confusion in the rear area.Lieutenant General V. G. Reznichenko,assistant commandant of the FrunzeMilitary Academy, in an article citing thecurrent offensive application of lessonsimrmed from the Battle of Moscow, noted

approvingly the ad hoc formation of rtrid-ing detachments to attack targets in theenemy rear to “destroy personnel andequipment, deny the enemy rest, to sowpanic.’ ‘3’ He went on to add that:

. . . these [mobile] groups and detach-ments together with airborne troops usedfor the first time in the Battle of Moscorohave provided experience for the improve-ment of the theory of deep combat opera-tions.8s

Other raiding operation cited for theireffectiveness and current applicabilityy in-clude the crossing of the Dnieper River in1943 and the Manchuria Campaign of1945. During the Dnieper ckossing,groups of 600 to 800 airborne troopsoperated independently behind Germantines for two months. During the two-week Manchuria Campaign in 1945, 20airborne parties of 50 to 500 personnelwere inserted in the Japanese rear areas’

In addition to raid operations in directsupport of OMG movements, air aesaultbrigades could be useful for variouseconomy-of-force missions. As notedpreviously, a perceived weakness ofNATO’e ,active defense strategy is theneed for main thrusts of an attack to beidentified early in the conflict. Landingsof air assault troops could easily be usedas feints or deceptions to confuse thedefender about the location of the mainobjectives. In Exercise ZAPAD 81, for ex-

ample, a diversionary hetiborne assault

was Iauncbed in the enemy’s rear area todraw away reserves, while a second airassault was aimed at seizing a river-crossing site for the 0MG.98

The greater depth in the enemy’s defen-sive zone to which air assault forces canbe projected and the high mobility of theBMD battalions make them ideal for re-connaissance support of OMGS and theirforward detachments. The Soviets envi-sion OM G forward detachments operat-ing from 20 to 40 kilometers in front of themain body. The importance Soviet mili-tary writers attach to these detachmentscannot be overemphasized.sg

One of the lessone prominent in Sovietliterature about World War- H operationsof mobile groups (and forward detach-ments) is that reconnaissance of tbeenemy and bhe terrain along the group’smain azis of advance must be improved.”Certainly, the insertion of air assaultforces at various depthe along the pro.jetted OMG “main direction” of advancewould be invaluable in providing timelyinformation on route conditions, as wellas enemy troop movements. Indeed, it isnot unreasonable to characterize such airassault reconnaissance elements as the“forward detachment’s forward detach-merit, ” and, when operating as such, enOMG might stretch from “head to toe” asmuch as 100 kilometers.

Finafly, another poseible air assaultmission is uniquely associated with theOMG concept. OMGS operating inN ATO’s rear areas would

. . . require considerably more in the wayof support and protection than do forcesin the first echelon of the battle formationof the main forces. This coupled with thegreat uariety and the great importattce ofthe tasks these groups perform makesa widespread use of aviation necessary’to snpport them effectively. (Emphasisadded. P’

AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

Although close air support by fixed-wing aircraft is included, the primarymeans of air support, as expressed by Ma-jor Wojciech Mlchalak, would be heli-copters. In his discussion of possible bas-ing modes for helicopter units supportingOMGS, these three sh,ernatives were pro-posed:

8 The creation of EMorganic OMG “air

echelon” that penetrates u,ith OMGS intothe enemy’s rear areas and is based andoperates directly with OMGS.

. That helicopters support OMGS byconventional methods—that is, frombases sited with the main forces.

e That helicopters initially supportfrom bases with main forces, but “at deci-sive moments in the operation the heli-copters, after carrying out specific mis-sions, land in the gi-oupings of the raidingor maneuvering troops. There they areserviced and replenished and they returnto battle operating jointly with the rsid-ing and maneuvering forces. . .‘“’

Of the three proposals, the last is thepreferred choice. To successfully imple-

ment this basing option, as Ivfichslaknotes, it would be necessary for OMGunits to locate, secure sad defend suitablehelicopter Ianding zones. Certainly, thereconnaissance of landing zones is a possi-ble mission for forward-deployed airassault tits, and, in fact, the securing andtemporary defense of Iaqding zones audrdrstrips are both very probable tasks.

For example, doring ZAPAD 81, a heti-borne assault was conducted on an air-field in the enemy’s rear area. After theassault force had secured the landingstrip, transport aircraft followed with“combat vehicles ‘ and additional forces.These forces immediately departed to link

up with advancing naval infantry unitswhich had just carried out au amphibiousassault.” It is apparent that this type ofoperation is ideafly suited for air assaultbrigades. The parachute battalions can beinserted either by airdrop or helicopterlanding, with the BMD batttilons landingshortly thereafter.

Indeed, it is more and more Iikely thatsir landing, with its shortened time in the

MILITARY REVIEW

landing area, not airdrop operations maybe the preferable method of air aesaultforce insertion. Lieutenant General N.Pavlenko, VD V chief of staff, notes thatthe primary goaf for sirborne forces is to“shorten the time needed by units (regi-ments) and subunits (battrrfions and com-panies) to prepare for lending and combatoperations.’”4 And, lest one believe he isonly referring to airdropped forces,Pavlenko emphasizes that “in the name ofour force Vozdushno-Desan tnyye Voyskathe word ‘parachute’ is missing. Thefuture of tirborne operations looks moreimpressive than the present.’”5 BY this,Pavlenko seems to imply an equally im-portant role for both airlanded and air-dropped forces. With the airlanding of airassault forces either by helicopter ortransport aircraft, a significant reductionin deployment time is achieved. As tofeasibility under combat versus interven.tion conditions, Soviet airborne forcescenied out 20 separate sirborne assaultoperations during the 1945 ManchuriarrCrnnpaiFY-afl were airlanded$c

There are, of course, other m&hods ofinserting air assault brigade elementswhich would take advantage of the per-sonnel’s airborne skills, and there aresituations where air-landing operationsare not possible. Any of a number of prac-tical variations exist. For example, air-borne elemente maybe dropped to estab-tish a bridgehead at a river-crossing sitefor the OM G‘s forward detachment with afollow-on drop of BA4D units for supportif linkup ie expected to take some time. Orthe BA4D-equipped units could bedropped at a greater depth to securesnother crossing site rdong the OMG’saxis of advance. The greater survivabilityof these units would permit them to per-form these missions more readily thanstrictly parachute or heliborne assaultforcee.

Figure 4 shows an example of the use ofairborne forces to seize several crossingcites on a breakthrough force’s axis of ad-vance, as well as a deeper insertion todelay enemy reserves. With the exceptionthat a heliborne assault would probablybe employed today for the first objective,this is a very representative schematic ofhow air assault brigadee might be used ineupport of an OMG or any exploitationforce.” ;.

Unanswered Questions

The air aesault brigade, psrticulwly incombination with OM Gs, and its pot en-tiaI uses are impressive. But it is impor-tant to emphasize that a number of ques-tions need to be answered before a fullunderstanding of ite intended employ-ment is attained. As Donnelly points outabout OMGS, while the concept has beenadopted by Soviet military plannere, theimplementation details have not been re-solved.’a Much the same can be said of airassault brigades.

Soviet military literature has extolledthe past and prospective value of air- ,borne/air assault forces, both in generafand in relation to OMGS. However, it haenot been specific about which kinds ofoperations are the most important for airassault brigades or the mechanics of theirexecution. Indeed, without open acknowl-edgement of their existence, and, in lightof the continuing evolution of the OMGconcept, it is probable that there are noSoviet answers to these questions at thepresent time.

Certainly, the missions and possibletactics of air assault brigades outfinedpreviously are within unit capabilities and’are based on either tbe resuk.s of exercises

or a careful reading of Soviet military

32 October .,

Schematic of How Air Assault Brigades Might Be Used

-5. ~Q Ikw3tmal mrborne Lmdmg

legend:

c1 Cmnmrtmen! 1,”, of breakthrough em,),. MRC Motmmd rtf!, mrw Afl Army ,“$,l ,0”

AL Am, Corm AR wly r,sww

ID

BEE Breakth, owh ,. P10,2,, <.” echelon

I“f,”tq dw,ston

F]gure 4

literature. That listing of missions andschemes of maneuver, however, is an ag-gregate-air assault brigades would notbe able to carry out every mission simul-taneously or consecutively in a short con-flict. This suggests that, as the Soviets acquire more experience in the employmentof these brigades, certain priority mis.sions and operationrd profiles shouldprecipitate out of this aggregate-as willproblems with their execution.

What are the problem areas and vulner-abilities of air assault brigades with whichthe Soviets could be expected to cope?First and foremost is the problem of lift.Figure 5 illustrate the helicopter liftcapability normally available to a front orarmy. In addition, there are approxi-

mately 11 light transport aircraft in thefront’s TAA–normally the An-26 Curlwhich has a range of 900 to 2,250 kilo-

meters end a troop capacity of 40.’gAlthough the theoretical front lift capa-

city appears large, it is, in fact, muchsmrdler. The front end army assault heli-copter regiments primarily provide firesupport and are used for troop transportonly when available. The fron t‘s main lifteupport comes from the transport heli-copter regiment. The regiment’s Mi-6Hook heavy lift squadrons are, as a rule,used to move artillery, armored vehicles,heavy equipment, and so forth which, inpractice, reduces the fronr’s lift capabilityto the Mi-8 Hip medium lift squadronsand the An-26 Curls. Currently, it isassessed that a front “s organic helicopterassets can move only a 500-man force in asingle lift.’”

As is evident from these figures, a frontcurrently does not have the organic assetsto simultaneously move large elements of

1983L,

33

MILITARY REVIEW

Soviet

Type MI-8 HIP MI-6 Hook” MP24 Hmd

Range lkdometets) 425 620 360

Troop Capacdy 28 65-70 8-12

Speed (kilometers per hour] 260 300 275

“The M, 26 Halo A armeared m 1978 as the M, 6 replacement The M,.6 can carrv 1 B!#O, The MI.26 can carry 2 BMDsand 1 BMP

Helicopter

Army—Assault Helmopter Regtmentr

2 MI 24 Hr.d 0/[ squadrons (4o helicopters~

2 MI 8 HID CIE squadrons (20 hehcoptersy”

front – Independent Hehco@ Regment (Assault)

2 M, 24 squadrons (40 helmopters~

2 Ah 8 squadrons (20 helmopters)

Independent Helicopter Regiment (Transport)

2 M, 6 heavy Ilft squadrons (16 helicopters)

2 M, 8 med!um lift squadrons (26 helicopters)

Units—Front/Army

L!ft CapacNy2

320-480

560

Total 880.1.040

bft Capacity

320-480

560

Total 880-1,040

1,020

728

Total 1,748

“Secondary role IS troop transport, primary rnlsslons are attack/fire support [Hind D) or antdank (H!nd-E)

““Normal{y, one squadron fs ttansport-oriented (HIP C), whale the other IS attack/f!re suppoti-ortented (HIP Q

Not,,

Assault h,l,coder re~,mmt, may be ,It,th,d to ,,.,,, ,, m,ded but ,,, n,! ,,ta”,, to tank m mmb,md arms ,,.,,% by Iabl,, .1 or~a”$zat,m md

W“wne”!

1l,l! wabll! b,, ,r, ,,;cu IXM ,, Ih,,, theoretlc?lly w,,,bl, 1“ ,,l”,! ,1? Ilft w!8bllIt+,$ ,r, much 10.,,. ,%”I!!w fro. wI,,., .,ss,0” (,1!,,1 “,,$”$

,ra,wor,, OW,,,Q,,I ,,,$1, W,,, ,,w,x,m,tel” 80 wce”ti md Other .,ss,0” ,wJ,rem,”t,

Figure5

an sir assault brigade. In addition, withthe exception of the Mi-6 Hook heli-copters, there ie not another fi-ont-levelairframe capable of transporting theB&f,!) AA ICVS of the sir assault brigades.Further complicating the situation is thefact that if the front commander decidesto conduct a conventional heliborneassault with a motorized rifle battalionbasq–the standard Soviet force for suchan operation—his entire helicopter lift

capacity is essentially committed.Thus, it is clear that a major problem

exists with organic front lift capabilitiesand the employment of sir assault bri-gades. The size of the problem variesdirectly with the size of the intendedoperation. If air assault units areemployed as company-size raiding par-,,ties, for example, then the front com-mander can shift his lift assets more com-fortably. If, on the other hand, he wants

34 October .

to deploy a battalion task force, hardchoices concerning mission priority wouldhave to be made or very careful opera-tionef sequence planning conducted.

Looking at the OMG concept, in partic-ular, with its implicit high operationaldynamics and compressed time frame, itseems likely that the front commanderwould eventually receive additions liftassets to enable him tc mount additionaloperations in support of his army OMGS.This can be done in either of two ways.The front tir assault brigades may bedirectly supported with heavier lift eir-craft for BMDs by Soviet military trans-port aviation or uoyenno-transportnayaauiatsiya (VTA) units, or front TAAs

might be augmented with additional heli-copterhransport aircraft units.

The second option would seem more at-tractive if only to reduce the coordinationproblems created by the first option.Further, if, in fact, sir assault brigadeswere created to give tbe fi-ont commanderan organic force to influence action deeperin bis operational zone, it would only belogical that he afso receive organic meansfor employing it. ~

A second, somewhat related factor, cer-tain to affect air assault brigade opera-tions in support of O.MGS, is air support—in tbe sense of fire eupport and aerialresupply. As noted previously, the exten-sive use of helicopters is envisioned bySOviet/tt’srsaw Pact military arrafysts asa means for providing the fire support indepth that ie vital to the eurvivaf ofOMGS and their attached air assaultelements, as well as the resupply of theseunits. Proposed support schemes includetemporarily basing helicopter units in theenemy’s rear area to better assist unitsoperating there. This is ambitious, if notaudacious, planning to say the least.

Even as the sir battle rages above 100meters’ attitude for control of the sky in a

AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

Central European conflict, a eimilsr con-flict would be waged for control of the 106meters beneath it where helicopter forceswould normafly operate. It remains to beseen whether the Sotiets would be able toconsistently project helicopter nir support in operational depth for OMGS andattached units which will be deployedover substantial dietsnces in the enemy’srear.

Warsaw Pact OMG advocates have al-ready acknowledged that the expected“ sizeable loss rate among helicopters”supporting OMGs “seems to hea funds- “mental factor when deciding the cppacityof the ~ound forces to operate in thedepth of the enemy formations. ““ Thisfactor may indeed be the fulcrum onwhich rests the operational success offailure of OMGS supported by sir assaultbrigades.

A third question or factor srisingefromsir assault brigade operations in. supportof 0.!4 Gs is command and control. Airassault brigade elements would probablybe assigned in support of armies’ rfivi-sionef OMGS hy the front commander.Further, the front would alao have to alln-cate airlift support for each detached airassault unit elthougb an army might heable to provide its own fire support if anassault helicopter regiment is attached.The planning and coordination problemsspanning these echelons of command areobvious, but these would be exacerha:edeven further by the distances separatingthem.

While initisf operational planning endexecution might be successful,~ aubee-quent operations would unavoidably beplanned and conducted in a fluid endrapidly changing combat environment.Divisional OMGS, if successful in pene-trating NATO’s operational defense zone,would be attempting to coordinate anddirect the operations of their forward de-

1983 35

1

MILITARY REVIEW

tachments some 20 to 40 kilometers to thefront, the operations of supporting airassault units either on the azes of advanceor conducting raids astride them, and theoperations of attached or supporting aircover for the entire zone of operations.

Will commanders of OMGS, forward de-tachments, air assault units, and so forthbe able to coordinate these operations suc-cessfully? The Soviets recognize the prob-lem but are unsure of its solution. Rezni-chenko writes that:

. . . the success of offensive combat isdirectly dependent on the level of trainingof commanders and staffs: the lower thatIeuef, the greater must be the degree ofcentralized control. (Emphasis added.)’z

It is, at best, uncertain whether in-creased external control, if feasible con-sidering the locus of operations, would en-sure successful coordination of theseunits’ activities. In any case, this wouldbe a problem requiring resolution throughfurther refinement of these types of opera-tions.

Conclusions

The air assault brigade, as a new ele-ment of the Soviet force structure,represents a significant increase in front-level capabilities. Whereas previously thefront commander hadto rely on Ministryof Defense/General Staff-controRed air-borne forces for tmgets more than 20 kilo-meters forward of the FLOT, he now hasan organic capability for vertical assaultsinto this heretofore dead zone. Thesebrigades, with their combination of para-chute and BMD assault battalions, com-pensate for the mobility and firepowershortcomings of heliborne assault forcesthat limited the extent of their employ-ment and created this dead zone.

While it is unconfirmed whether airassault brigades were formed as a directresult of the OMG concept’s resurrection,they will definitely ease the implementa-tion of its goals. Together with otherSoviet rear area forces, such as diver-sionary brigades, regular airborne divi-

sions and even KGB (Committee of State ISecurity) saboteure, these brigades exa-cerbate even further N ATO’s behind-the-Iines security planning problems. Withthe addition of air assault brigades,Soviet forces are now preparing to con-duct vertical assaults throughout the fulldepth of theater operations.

The air assault brigade is capable of per-forming a myriad of missions, but, asmore operational experience is gained, itwill probably end up performing certainspecific types of missions more frequentlythan others. Chief among these, particu-larly in support of OMG operations,would be the se;zure of key terrain criticalto a successful advance such as obstacle-crossing sites and so forth.

Although air assault brigades arepotentially rich in employment possibil-ities, ezisting problems demand atten-tion. These include the source of initialairlift, subsequent air-delivered fire sup-port and resupply, and control by andcoordination with supported maneuverforces. These are not insignificant prob-lems by any means, and it is not at all cer-tain that they can be solved satisfactorily.

Nevertheless, air assault brigadesrepresent a further manifestation of theSoviet emphasie on desant operations andtheir projected scale in a war with NATO.Unlike many who argue that the use ofairborne/air aseault forces is pass6, Sovietmilitary planners continue to demon-strate confidence in such forces. The ,.organization and deployment of airassault brigades are the most recent con-firmation of thie.

36

,.

AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

NOTES

, D,cfm”.ry “f B,,>. M,r,,.ry Term, CA Sow.{ V,,WL S.LW,”

WIIO.”1OI Documents, uSGOvernm,nl Prrnfr”g Otl,ce, Wa,h,nQ

10”, DC, 1965 067 l.the Sov,elm,l$tar, !ex,con, Oesan,.r,,l.”dmg ,.,.,$, ,, Oer, ”ed ,, -troop, ,“lended ‘., ,Mnd,r,g, C,, Wh,ch

thaw ,!?.,0” ,ana’ea. 0. enemy.o.c.!ya temtory. m, me p“qm,e

(JI cons.ct,ng combat .0.,.,,.”s Accocd, ng to lhe tm.,tmr,

me!hod”,ed, a,and!”g force ma” beamp.!b,ou, a,rt,oroe 0,.orn

b,ned a“daCC0rG2.0 10ZtSS’a$, ,”QO”rDOSe sue. alorcemavbe

Watwy. ODwat>m:tm lactwa ,2 The term a,r .S,,UH !m$gade ,s ,t,,mly of Wesler”.r< g,.

rel,ect!.rja we,,ern u”der,,and!.g el, ”.s,zeand q.,umed,ole ,!

IS “.? ,“”W. ho. ,., so”!.!.,,1,>tomes,.“!1s

3 I“ Sov Ief mact,ce I., Meat<.” of brmad, .“G ..,.. s,,,

..8$s .tth Ihal s!xctft nomenclature c% ritwwly mm suchmga”!zalso.s .S”a!ly Wveellk?r . 9!3,, !11,Wogramcalm!s s!.”m area 01 r,sm..!ill!!y or can m., a SD.. !*IC COrmal rmsslo.

f.?,e.a”’.le .,1., ” W. Sowel $.,,. SNuc!.re .!, ,ewe!.1 .!,mob,le .3s,..!, Lwqade. .h<’h We O@Olo”ed !“ “IOU”,., ”..,

bord.r rewon, 01 the USSRSU!lgest, ng .Wograoh,. ally relateam!, s!on

4 Th,, Oe.lo,ment “alter” ,, ““I neces,.r,ly .“”s”,! as yetThe S.,,,, Gr.uDs .1 For.,. ,GOFS1, ,Parlx.u!.cw ,. East Germany,

We$tern ena Far Eastern M$l$tarb D,str,ct$ lMD.l. .orma11vrece,.el,mt pt,.r,?, . ..eweIDmentan dUd!t$t$ generally !.that”orm II.

h.$,ov, r a>r as.a.lt br,gade. are “01 subseck,enlly clePlow?d

t.roug”o.t lb, oI!w? MD, $“ the uSSR ?.$. would s.gge,, a

s.ec,l,c ope!al!onal role v!sa.v,s NATO forces5 The We.,,,. ,healer of war or ,,.,, .0,”, ,lVl, O”.8,t, d

,P.erfl, !t!eat.r, of nil, s,aryom-flt!onsor ,ea,r”o,e”n,hh tie”s,v(”{7vD0 P?e. umanly, tke Western TVhe. at lea9t tree TVDS the

Western (NATO central reg,onl It!, N.,ttweste, n ,S.andtna,, an

Cou.tr, em ..0 me Sou$htiemler. (Turkey, Greece, 11.1? and meMedt,er,a.can) F“! f,,rt”er ,nlorm.a,o” on Sov,et TV, . . . TvD

CO”, IW1. .ePDe”n,. M Rmg So,rel w.wfmIe Command anCI Con.,,., [..!” ,0. ., ,,, ,,,,, Defense Conlm,,,ee ,/7, s,..,.,

7,..,??, s 0, w,, 8.(7 rhea, e,, .fM, ?l,.9ry 00,,,,,0., A,, ““,”,,.

,$1, Max. ell A,r ForcenBa,e Ala ?9766 7..., erqa”,,atm”al ,..,1, nave DeP”ex!racleO trOm COOr

a!natq malt Fwlo Ma.. al IFVI 10023 Sowel .41m, T,00Psllrganr,aton a“. fquvmm”, Department of the Arr”, W.,h, ng

ton DC 1982 DD4180..O4I887 ,. ,,,”’ - d ,... ..1. ..,1,,, ,0,,. m,,,>,,, ,., .,,10 t,

ne.rr. 3 to 1 S,. Ma, or MIct’a.l Cr.tcher. The S0,,,1 A,rborne

D,.,,,.. He.,e. 01’ the SovCeI GrO. ”0 Forces Defense 1“I. 11,LI, ”c, AQency ,DIA), *ash, ”gto”, DC, March <980, D 3

8 see Co.ra,nat, nc Draft FM 10023 SOWWArm, rroom

Orqdn<,ata *.U Cwir”en,, 0. C!! p. 192 P.e.m. sly SO. (,S.!rbOrn@d,v!$ O”. had””. 8MDw.!M,”l. ”OIW’J LMrschuterermmen,, M,” .“,, .“. Bf,4D COmt,a-ny each W,,.!” ,“. D.., few

year., all %“!.t .,rOOr”, 0,”’.,0., .8”, been t,.”, !t,O”, ”Q Io P.”al! BMD. .,,,on., con,, gu, a,!on The BMDamDh!OrO”, a,rbOr”, !”

Ia.lry COmb.i?eh,Cle W., f,r,t l“trOduced l”tO!he SOvlet ,,<bOr”,Ior,esa, least ase,, !ya, 1970 wbenob3eme0, nExerC&3e DVlNAProDer,, ,ons,.ered, ”ea, rborne forces ve,s!.nof t.e BMP!”fan

twcornbat.ehc,e ,t,se9.,ccea *$tha73mm m.,. 9 . . . ..tkta.krms$, !e ,,.. ,,,, and ,“reemacn!”eq. ns !Kwe!gh, 75nletr!c!Qns,

,s arr o,oPP.01. anG can s.rm US!ng the .ater,et system Olher

BMDva, #ant, ”,, u.ec Omm.”da”OCO”7r01 ma#”E”a”ce,”!JDO.

and a r.ce”r ,erslon ,0. IDD,O w!,. a 30mm .umma,, c ,,.”.” $“,,.. .+ ,“, 7hVn gun

9 Thela.t kro*ncomPletea .raropo faSo.feta $rBornea, v,s,o.m exercme play occurred during Exercise DvINA ,. 1970 sm..

men, ,. mamr Sov,et exe!c, ses such as SHrELD 76, BROFHER

HOOD iN4RMS80a.a2APAD87 .Lrborne reg, mentshavepart$c,Da,,. For a“ ,..,l ,’+”, summary.” Postwar Sov, et ,,rbomeexec

C!S.S see Rlc.ara Oden and Frank Ste!.ert TheSov!et A!rborneT,00L,s, /7,,,,,+ .1 ,., s.,,,, 0, . . . . force, DIA Washs”gto”

DC Va!ch 1980 cm 517 For a .W.IO,W,I LIe”eh3PrlIe”t of alr

lands.. iorces m ,Oz..s.nouewnmvve VOVSN. IVDW from the

SOV-,et-PerSDeCt, Ve, See Ma, Or Ge”eral’~ KO,iyle”. Sfanovden8 ye!

eezv, t,ve voW. sh.o DesantnW Voysh,., Vorenno lstorlcheskw

Zh.rn.l lM$l,farv wrsfo,,cal Journal), SeDlember 1975, PP808510 1. SOV, P! mmtmy art there lsama!or lntermed,ate levelb+

1*.en Wat. gy . . .. WX3SS..9 m,l,tary cmeratmns at the global,..

t,on.1 .! meater 1...1 and fa.ucs enmmnpaswq those combat

OPerat! O”, .0..5 ”.,,0 a, d,,,,,.” ,,”,, and lower The SW.!

rm!wlq uses an ,Iltemlea!al estage, Iheoperat,ormt 1.,,1, govern.

t“g the act,.”. of },0.,s .“$ arm,., and, .! lb,, level, Places ,t. emph.,,. for tile , . . . . ..!.$ a.hteveme”l of Strateg,c goal$

31 C N Do.”elly, ,TheSo,,etO Pe,al,.n,lM anoe””,eG,ouP 6

New Challe”.e 10, NATO.’, !.,erne,,.na! Defense Re.,em. Vol.rne

15, Number i 1982, PP 1,177.86 (RePrm@d m M,i!ta,y R,”,,w,

March ,983, DD4360 ) U“!es. otherw,,e “01,0, the ,ema,ntier .1 the

Omcussmn ,s essentr.lty . s.mmary 01 hey pojmslrom ttv sex.

.,1 lent am<!,12 Q",.k,y,, ,"these.set nattneS ov,et, mus,dest,oye"ouSh

o, NATO, “.c,.3a, w?aPon,, del$”eW SySlem. a”d Pert,”e”t corn.

mend ,“6 .0”[,0, “.,worx 10 make tile,, “s.. ,“1,?.s,5). before

““.1,,, ,.1..,. ,. .I,thor,zed .4. Donnelly go,”t. .“1, NATOIea.ae.s nave categoncai!y smwa mat m.y WII! c.m.w f,ght wtm

.o.vermonai mea.ons foF.,f,ve.o r,,alew,,oaYs 11x$ mes.mablvW,*W” m,$tmetramet hatIhesovret.wilt.rwtllnot ammlmhthetr goals See Donnelly ‘The S.,,.1 Opem.tmn.a! Manoe”vre

Gro.v ANew C..!! engelor NATO,,l nrernat,..atD efenseRe.!ew,OP c,, , DPl,177a”dl ,181,

13 BYdef,.$t,on, fflhe Sovtetleadecs bel!eve survr,;&.ann0lbea.h,evea they wII not attack ..!,$ It ce. tm

14 00.”. i, Y.., Tbe SOvt.tOD.rattO. aIM8R0..vG,01DlD AN.w

C!m!lenge for NATO: Intem.tm.al Defense Rewew .D .,1, P1,179

15 10$. .3,78<16 ,O,d, P1,183

17 Ma,or Gem?rall Kr. oche”ko ,S.osobvR a.vtt!vaUsDekh.v

@Pr.t,.~oy Gmme S;,.m Te.,ri.vkfi “AW. fa..ovYMIMeklm(,,mva”ny,h Ko,Pu..,, Vowmokfoncheshw Zh.rnal

iMtl,tarv Hfsrorrc.l Jo.r..n, J.ly 1981, P2018 Me,., wo,ctecn Mtctlalak, Av,at,o” ,“ 1., Ra,a Maneuvar

00.,, !,.., of Ground %!.,s,’, P.i#.h A,< f.,., .“.s A,, &fe”Se

ftev,ee, February ?982 P 1 c,,edby Do”nell), ,TheSo.,e!Ooe,a.

1$...1 Ma.oe..re Group A New challenge for NATO l.ter”a,>ona, De fe”,e Re.,ew w c,, , D 1,182

19 Colonel N K,reye” .nd 0310”.1 Don,yenko, ..fz OP”fa

t?,, ,.”0 Pr!menenwa Peredo””k h OtIVadov T.”” ovwh ,Mek lmmz,

ro.annwh) %JW..SOV,, voye””o lslor,cheskw Zh.ma! (M:lrtary

H)s,or?’al Jo.r”zO, Seotember 1982, P 2S

20 M.rm.lo LOW ,BoyevoveP r,mene.,YeB ro.elanNovYkhl,tde.tia”?z, ro.. ”n”kh VOysk., Vo,mm Istor<ches,,y Zhurn. t

lM81#tam Hrsr.rtcal Jo.r.an November %982. .48

2? Kr.p.henko, Wwsiby RamWa Uspb.ha . ODeratwnoY

Gluome Smm, TankcWhhArmK Ta.kovykh, Mekh.n,2rrava..yk.voye.no lsmr!chestuy Zh.rn.l owmt.ry Hrslonc.i

::%”’:P c,, P 13 Both K, UC,Che”kO .“fl K,r,y,” and

Don venko [see foom.te 191 ,mdcate 40to 50 kdorneters !9., day as

standard .ava..e fates, but they m.. note. baseo on worm War II

emer,ence, mat rates .pto80t090 k$lom.ters Der aay may be

feasible

22 Donnelly, ’TheSov,etO oerat,o.alM a.oeuvreGroup ANe*

Challenge for NA1O,. lnrern. t!onal Defense Rewe.. 09 Cit., D,,77

23 1.9,0, D1,18324 Kr.c!chenkO, Sposoby R.?tmya UsPekha . Oper.twnoy

Gr.bmes,lamti la.kovvkh Army. Ta.kovvhh !Mehhan,zrro.a.. yKhKorcmso, voyenno ls(ortcheskry zh.r.al Wf,l,t,ary H!s!orrcal

Jo.r.z%oD o, D20 Theterm for.irborne oratrassa.l! forces

mat Krulmhenk. uses $. vozti.shno aes..lnwe Vo?sk.. which,I,eral,y ,ra”slated m Russ,,” m.,”, %wr].nd,ng fo,ces. Th!s

term has commonly been tra.st.teo t“ Western merat.re on SOvmt

m,litar, o.eratro.s as,. a!rbornelor.es ,, Throughout th!sart,.le. in

vt’aw O; me deployment of .,, assault brrgades,-t!us term, when en.

co. n!ereo m S..,.! sources, has been transmteo to reflecl the

greater number of operational .ar,at,o”s rmpltc,t m atrlandt.gforces rather than lust slmmy a$rborne forces

25 Mwha!eh, Avtat,on m the ReCa Mwm.vw Operations of

Gro."a Force$,,P ol,shA,rF orcea.dA,rD eFenseRe.rew.o P CIt,

Ilp 54

26 CoIo.el N Rama.,chev. R.zvlt#veTe .rlvlPr aht!k#Bovevovo

Pr,me.e”, Ye vozti.shfio Desa.tnYkh Voysk Mezfi.ovennyy

Perma, Voyen.o.fsfor(chesksy Zhur.al tMIIIlarY Wstorlcar Jo.r

“Wl, October 1982, D72

27 LCe.@nant General V Rezntche. ho, ,Razvltlye lam?!

MILITARY REVIEW

Nasf.mtelno.o Bova,. !Joyen.o I$torrche$rn,y Zn.m.! IMrwa!vH,smr,cal Jo.rnaO, December 1981, D 37

28 t. Exercise NEMAN, .ona.cted m 1979. a helrtmrne assault

m se(ze a mm crossI.Q We was Iauncma altertn.dwssonal forward detachment w,?. ““able to force the r!”er from the march 1“

mmucb as tanks were .01. to s. PDort the crossing by d,fect f!re,

th,s .sw3.11 was carr,eo 0.1 very close m aa.a.c,. g Ir,e.alv forces2S! There we. number of ..,13 mat both m Wa.et,me and war

l,me belong exclusively to tn. Sov,et General Sta!f or Stavk.

resoectlvely These ..(M mcl.de all vuv lorces, SDec, a SQ.. I,.,

l,$lery anti even corrmnea arms rownat!cms Th, s pool of forces wcal, ed ,IIe R“GK {Reserves o, the SuPrwne Wgh Conmnand) They

.,, “CJIII.IIY COmmtlt,o O“IY ,“ dve,t ,uDDO,t 0? S,a.k. P1anneO. . . . . . ...=.........=

30 Tne Seuure.1 we, cms.mg Stes m esDec#aw cr,vcal m theE.ro,e8n theater of 0,,,,:,0”s Accor d,.. to a 1965 Sov,et Stud,,

m.ces ,. thts theater vm.lo encounter waief otmtacles *DO meters

woe every 35 m 60 kilometers 700 m 300 meters w,ae every 100 to150 k,, ometers .“0 g,..,., ,.,”300 me, er, w,de every 250 to 300

,I[orne, e,,

31 For an e..ellent art$cle 0. Sovret rear W,, rn$ssmns am IX’

ltc. see C N Do.. + Owrat,ons m me Enemy Rem,, Mt.,“a,ro..l Defense Revrew VOl. me 13. Number 1 1980 .. 3541

32 M!chala. Av,at, on ,“ the Raca Maneuver OP&on, of

Gro.no Forces P.I,s. Art f.,.. e.o Arr Defense Rev!ew, 00 c$t~,

33 S.e Krasnaya Zero. (Re. star) 2429 July >979 For . full

anawt!cal account of NCMAN, see R!ctmrd ode., ,, Exerc!se

NEMAN, RLW,ew .! me So., et G,mmu Forces, DiA b%?tungton,DC ,,. ”.,.” ?980 ““ 5,.

36 FO, .xamDIe, during Exerc,5eS NEMAN 79 BROTHE8H000

,N 4RMS 80 and 2APA0 87, hel,borne .ss,”,!s were .sed to secure,,.., .,Ossl ... 1., ,0,”,,”, .,.[0!,,,,0” 10.,,s

37 K~s!”le”. Sla”ovlen,, ? ! Ra,vrt(ye VO$OU,””O Desa”!n,khv..,. vove””o ls,o,, cr,es,,, Zh. ma, (M>),,.,. tl,.sfor, cal

,o;r”aO, w ‘of $@ 83-84

38 A Shem ..0 R ode., Exerc,se ZAPAD 81. Rem. of fhe

Sowet Gro””O Force3 L71A, W.s.l”bto”, D C Alml 1982, P 4

39 For example, Rezn>che. uo Ra. v,l!ye T.8!!R,

Nast.oaiel .0.. 8.,., VOW... !st.r,cheshv Zh.mal IMslmaryH<8!or>c.1 20”r”all 0. 0,[ P 38 .,$te, that the !ncreaseO ,01, 01

ows,o”al Iorwaro Celachment. t. me Cons.ct of maneuver .Dera,,0”s 1, 0“, of the mla”rtan! fa, !O,S m the .Ch,e”eme”l .1 h,Qh D,

Ie.sve tempos Lmm Boyev.ye Pr,menenwe Bronelamo.veh (Mekh. ”,,rm. a””, ti. V..,* V..,.”. Is,ortcfies k,, Zhum. J

lwd.r, H’slor,cal Jo.r.. ft, .0 it Chief 0, me him. ovskvA.aLIwny 01 the Tam Forces, note, that the large role PlaYeO byforward deiachme”, s I“ wcmd war 1+has .01 lost [!1s1 swn, f,ca.ce

u.uer contemporary CO. akt,ons. See .1s. K$reYe; an-a D-on yen%.,, 0..,, 60,.0.0 Pr?menenf”a PSredo”vhb Otre”.o” rs”ho.”kfi

(Mehham2,r0”aflWM/ KO%WSO”. vow... !s mrrkshv Z..ia (

wJ,I,!arv H,. Iorc.: Journal .O .,1 D 27 ..5 General d 1.. ArmyM KOZ!OV Paz.,lsw Srr.teg,, 10perarm”ov. Isk.$. tva,, Voyenrm

,s,.,,c.,sMvo Z?7UC”.1 (Mrl, !a,y tft, for(ca! 30”,”,0, November19B2, D 14

4D Re, ”Whe”kO R,av(l,ye Takf,ks Nast.oateI’nou. 80”.

‘/.”,””0 Is?.nche,hr, Zn.r”aJ (M,M.W H,$forrcal JOur”aI1 0P cft

II 3641 M#chalak, A.,.,,.. m !,. Ilatd Mane.,., 0De,at02nS 01

Ground Forces. Polish Au Fo,ce anti A,r Defense Revle.. 0.0 .,t.Llz

42 lb(ti cm 24

43 For a full account, see v Atahu s Verlo!etov. Kras.aYaz.ez.a lRea star), 11 seotember 1983. D 2 W!we .ncertaln. ‘t IS mv

Qel,ef mat th!s .ss..11 was carried ..! w alr assault brog.de

elements The hoops co.d.cl!ng me OPeratm” were newr referredto ., ,nOtortz,d rifle troom as ,s often done when de, C,<tl”9 “.It.

PartlclDetm9 m he!, tmrne assaults Further, me .sqe of the Iwmcombat veh!c! es, Pre$urnebly relwr!”g to infantry combal

“eh,cle, 9S Iwrc’o,ely vague, SUWW,WW some type ot ccmIDat vehrcl. othe! than rmght w expect..- for exern me,. eMO r.mer than

. BMP BMD means ,comDat veh,cle, a,morne,. while BMP IS

combat “axle. ,nfa”!r”44 L,e”te”a”t G.”; ,., P Pavle”ko, %2”,1 <”, r.kt,t!?

Vo2ti. NmO DeSa”,”,kh V.,,,., ‘/.,,””. ls,or(chesB(” Zh”r”.1

(Mr$(t.,y H,stormal Jo.mzI), Ja”u.w 1980 D 32 KOStylev, aSS,St..t

!0 the commander ‘/DV !., rml,tar” Ceao, ”ess alla ea.c.tm. alsohas rlsc”ssed the O“W”Q ,efmement of ,Q”, ”me.t anti land, ng

t.dl”, q”., .Nh .“ Wlli?ha,,$ 0“ ~.w q“,ck,, .,rbor”e ““#t, c.”

clear I..’OQ.Q areas and move I.1O combat See .. POYSA .8

UChen,”: Kr.s”.”a Z“eZUa (R,. Sfar), 5 Au$3”3t 1981, P 245 C(teO 1“ 0.,” and Ste,”ert ‘The SOV, W A,rbor.e TIOOPS

%,(,. .1 tn. So”ret Ground Forces OP crI P i246 Kosty!ev, S,.”. ”!,”(”, , %zv,tfye Vosdus.no Desa”l”ykh

Voysh voyen. o )stomcoeskw Zmmnaf IMll, taw Mlstorjcal

Jo.m.11 OP .,1, P 84 .,corn bat vs ,nterve”lmn COndttro.$ refers

tome e.wcled scale.1 oppos,t,on POSSLW t“ me area of emPloYment 4 re,, ew of ,,,,.1 ,“!.,,,.110”, 0, armed tomes reveals that

,.,, look 01,.. m an omrat!ond e“”[r.”me”tmn, !derabl, m.r.!?,.,.. than the one Vih!ch vmuld .,,,.,1 under omen, ! was All

o;he; la,tors Del”g ,0.,1, 0“, would “.arrnally be m;,, .onf!de”t ,“a PI.. mr an mnmng t,.oDs ,. an Imwrvent, On sce”arm ma. m a

9,..,.1 *.,47 RWnan!che, ,R.z.,,!,e 1.0((! r .?.kwf B.,e”.a.o Pmllale

“!.. “Ozdushno Des. n,”. #h Uo. sh Mezhvovennw” Per, od.

k+,”.. Is W!C.,,”T 2..,;.3 (Md,tart HWmJCa;JO.kSO00 .,1,D 76 A,lhwgh Ihls art,cle Drwnar,ly .3WC USS.S the cIeveloLwIe”l of

awOOrn# 10!.!3s and t.. !!,, !“ the USSR bet.,. Wo,,d W,? 1, a, w!!hmany such arttcles lesson, learned from these Per,o(ls are used a,

an ex.m Ple for current aPD1, cal#On Ih,s a#awam t. wobaDly veryreF,re.e”lat!”e 0} a scheme 01 rna”e””er of a,, a,.a”,t force, !“

,“PDort Of . breakthrough

48 Do”.. IIY, The Sows Owat,..al tv!moe.we Gro.o A NewCnal!enge for NATO l.tem.t,onai Deten.e Re.,e* 00 c,t P

1,17749 Coomc”atmg D,,,, FM ,0023, so”,., Arm” Troops Oqa.c,e

,!0” .“0 @.>m77e”f OD C(, PO d 173 .“6 4 77450 Coord#”atma Draft FM 10022, Sow,, Army S,w.ra,m?d War

t.,. 6’. 0$7,,, Area S.L’.or, D,oartment of the Ann, Wasn, rqtcm

D C Au..,t 1982 03.5

51 M>;halak Av>at,on I. the R.,. !4..,.,,, ODW.,,0., of

Gm..a Force,, Polo. Afr t arm .“0 Arr Defense Re.,e* on .,:,L13

52 !?e, nk.hen. o Raz”,!(”e 7,8 I,*, Na, !”oa?elno.o Boy,

Vo”emm lSIOrrche$.r, Z/win. ( (Mcl,tery Firstor(cd Journal), o. cc,

D 38

Major Roger E. Bert is currently u student atthe US Army Russ inn Znstztuce, Garmwch, WestGermany. He receuxd a B.A J?om Syrrzcum Uni.uersity, an M L.A from Johns Hopkins Uniuepsity and an MA. from Georgetown Unwersity.He has held various command and staff posi-trons L. Korea and the C’ontnzental Unitedstates, 1,-

38 October .

I