Nilo vs CA

Facts: These petitions are jointly heard to question the effectivity of of RA 6839, which amended Sec 36 (1) of RA 3844 allowing a landowner to eject an agricultural lessee or tenant on the ground that the owner shall personally cultivate the land himself.

GR No L-34586: Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of riceland at Barrio San Roque, San Rafael, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-76791 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the agricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65. On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian flied an ejectment suit against petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844. Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the ejectment suit was but an act of reprisal and retaliation because he elected the leasehold system, The RTC and CA ruled in favor of private respondents. Upon MOR to the CA, the petitioner "personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee has been eliminated under Republic Act No. 6389. The CA denied the motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive application.

GR No. L-36625: Thisis an appeal raised by petitioner Fortunato Castro to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing his complaint for the ejectment of his tenant, respondent Juan Castro, on the ground of personal cultivation. The landowner wants to personally cultivate the land owned by him located in Pulilan, Bulacan with an area of 6,941 square meters. Petitioner Fortunato Castro questioned the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389 which amended Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844. After the enactment of Republic Act No. 6389 on September 10, 1971, the respondent moved for the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground that the new law eliminated personal cultivation by the landowmer as a ground for the ejectment of an agricultural tenant. The Court of Agrarian Reln dismissed the complaint.

Issue: W/N the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover cases that were filed during the effectivity of the repealed provision.

Ruling: NO Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. The general rule therefore, is that statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein (Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172). The petitioner-tenant in G.R. No. L-34586 contends that since Republic Act No. 6389 is a social legislation and passed under the police power of the State, it should be liberally interpreted in favor of the tenants We agree with the petitioner-tenant that the law in question is social legislation. But social justice is not for tenants alone. The disputed land in L-36625 is only 6,941 square meters. The area of the land in L-34586 is slightly bigger, about two (2) hectares. A person with only one or two hectares of land to his name is equally deserving of social justice. Precisely, the legislators, in providing "personal cultivation" as a ground to eject tenants intended to encourage and attract the landowners to go to their respective provinces and till their own lands. Unfortunately, the ground of "personal cultivation" was abused and used as a pretext to eject the tenant and this led to the amendatory law. This unfortunate consequence should not work an injustice upon those small landowners proven to have thebona fideintention to personally cultivate their lands.

Baltazar vs CA

Facts: In 1969, private respondent bought two parcels of riceland having an aggregate area of 3.2 hectares. On the ground of converting the same into a residential subdivision, she filed, that same year, a complaint for ejectment of petitioner, the agricultural lessee and share tenant of the properties since 1912. Petitioner claimed that the former landowner, in violation of sections 11 and 13 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. 3844 which took effect in 1963 until amended by R.A. 6839 in 1971) sold the properties without giving him notice, and registered the sale without the required Affidavit to the effect that the notice requirement had been complied with. By way of counter-claim, petitioner, in the exercise of his right of redemption, tendered and deposited P5,000.00 with the Agrarian Court to cover the purchase price of P4,608.32 paid by private respondent to the former owner. In a decision dated August 20, 1970, the Agrarian Court upheld petitioner's right of redemption and ordered private respondent to convey the properties to him. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, the complaint for ejectment was dismissed based on thestatus quoprovision of Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and 316 which were both issued during the pendency of the appeal. Hence, this petition. Petitioner now seeks a review of CA decision dismissing the ejectment suit against a tenant filed by a landowner who wanted to convert her land into a residential subdivision, but denying to the tenant the right of redemption, premised upon the retroactive application of Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and 316.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in according retroactive application to Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and 316.

Ruling: YES It will thus be seen that the action was instituted on 24 December 1969, long before Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and 316 took effect on 21 October 1972 and 22 October 1973, respectively. Decision was rendered by the trial Court on 20 August 1970, also prior to the effectivity of said decrees. The case had been pending before the Court of Appeals since 1970, again prior to the promulgation of said Decrees, although its Decision was rendered after their enactment. There being no express nor clearly implied authorization embodied in PD Nos. 27 and 316 allowing retrospective application, prospective construction is called for. But even if applied retroactively, PD Nos. 27 and 316 will find no application considering that ejectment proceedings herein were not filed to harass the tenant but to convert the land into a subdivision, a reason perfectly valid under the laws then in force. It is Republic Act No. 3844, which took effect on 22 August 1963, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 6839 on 10 September 1971, that should govern the relationship between the contending parties and which should determine whether or not the trial Court's findings that petitioner had properly exercised his right of redemption is correct. Private respondent herself failed to give the required notice under section 36 (1) of the same Code prior to the filing of ejectment proceedings. Considering that petitioner could not exercise his right of pre- emption for lack of notice and the sale was consummated, he must be held to be entitled to the lawful exercise of his right of redemption allowed under Section 12 of the same Code. Harmonizing the foregoing provision together with section 36,supra, even if a landowner desires to convert under section 14, a lessee possesses the right to be secured in his tenure until a just cause for his dispossession is proved and his ejectment is authorized by the Court. The right of a lessee to pre-empt or redeem a landholding cannot be exercised if the owner bought or holds the land for residential purposes. However, the limitation to the lessee's right to pre-empt or redeem is conditioned upon the fulfillment by the landowner of the following requisites: (1) that the property is suitably located; (2) that the conversion be in good faith; and (3) that the conversion is substancially carried out within one year from the date of sale.9These conditions must concur, otherwise, the land is subject to redemption by a tenant. The trial Court found that the foregoing requisites had not been fulfilled by private respondent. The latter had not proven suitability. Petitioner was admittedly the agricultural lessee of the lands from which he was being sought to be ejected. Private respondent had no approved plan of subdivision. She did not have the approval of the proper authorities to convert the properties into a subdivision, nor had the construction been readied.10The trial Court also found that there was some measure of bad faith on the part of private respondent in seeking the dispossession of petitioner, and that no substantial conversion had been undertaken by private respondents. The Supreme Court held, that Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and 316 may not be applied retroactively, so that petitioner, who is entitled to the right of pre-emption and redemption under the provisions of R.A. 3844, the law then in force, had validly exercised his right to redeem, his right of preemption not having been made available to him due to lack of notice of the sale. Decision of the Court of Appeals set aside and decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations affirmed.

PNR vs Del Valle

Facts: PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30. meters adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way running from Manila to Legazpi. Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on both sides of the track, not actually occupied by the railroad track, after a competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three (3) years and under conditions hereinbefore set forth. Bingabing, however, failed to take possession because respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land, had a house thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant of previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself. Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the premises in the Court of First Instance of Albay. Doltz' answer in that case averredinter aliathat the had been a tenant on the property for over twenty years; that he had been placed thereon by the deceased Pablo Gomba who leased the property from the then Manila Railroad Company (now PNR); that he became the tenant of Demetrio de Vera, Gomba's successor; that he is the tenant of Bingabing, having given the latter's share of 1/3 during the last two harvests; and that the case is properly cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the crops, and reliquidation of past harvests. Petitioners opposed and maintained that CAR has no jurisdiction over the case. CAR, nevertheless, resolved in favor of Doltz. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N the land here involved an agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code?

Ruling: NO. According to Section 3 of theAgricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of landdevoted to agriculturebelonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both." It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture Indeed, the land which adjoins the railroad track on both sides is part of PNR's right of way. That right of way is not limited to the particular space occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also includes the portions occupied by the telephone and telegraph posts. It extends to a width of 30 meters which reasonably gives the train locomotive engineer a clear commanding view of the track and its switches ahead of him. Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural activities. Even on the assumption that the land is agricultural, there is the circumstance that PNR prohibits the sublease of the premises. PNR's lessees cannot give what they are not allowed to give. This ushers us to a principle shaped out by jurisprudence that the security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy law may be invoked only by tenantsde jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.

HIDALGO v HIDALGOCMU vs. DARABG.R. No. 100091

Facts:Petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for and agricultural school in Mindanao.In 1960s it was converted into a college with campus in Musuan, and became known as the CMU. Primarily an agricultural university, the school was the answer to the need for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao.On January 16, 1958 the late president Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.In the early 1960s student population of the school was less than 3000. By 1988, the student population had expanded to some 13000 students. To cope with the increase in its enrollment, it has expanded and improved its educational facilities partly from government appropriation and partly by self-help measures.In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, a livelihood program called Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program, the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4-5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees.Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants, who were not members of the faculty or non-academic staff of the CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the participants in this program.When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the re-organization law of the CMU.Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement2among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups of "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year.The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or members of their family to establish any house or live within the vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impart of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants.The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

Issue:Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public use by presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for which they are reserved?

Held:The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.

CASE DIGEST #6: ATLAS VS AGRAFacts: Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the constitutionality of some portions of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention Archie's Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional.

Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner:1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands.2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated, and differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and employment opportunities.4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments in aquaculture even as Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v.Secretary of Agrarian Reform regarding the inclusion of land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the same above-mentioned provisions insofar as they include in its coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms.Issue: Whether or not Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform are unconstitutional.

Held:No, the contested provisions of R.A. 6657 and of A.O. Nos. 8 and 10 are not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands. In aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and, hence, as held in "Luz Farms," they too should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just as lands devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same reason.When the case was pending, RA 7881 was approved by Congress amending RA 6657. Provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn are excluded from the coverage of CARL.Thus, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.HELD:PETITIONERs contention

First argument: that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, this Court has already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not agriculture lands, for the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and, hence, should be excluded from R.A. 6657.

Second argument: that R.A. 6657, by including fishponds and prawn ponds in the same classification as agriculture violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and is, therefore, void. the intent of the consti framers is to exclude industrial lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong.Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform are, likewise, unconstitutional, as held in Luz Farms, and are therefore void as they implement the assailed provisions of CARL.Further, that in fishponds and prawn farms, there are no farmers, nor farm workers, who till lands, and no agrarian unrest, and therefore, the constitutionally intended beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution do not exist in aquaculture.COURTs decisionThe question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has been rendered moot and academic because RA 7881, approved by congress on February 20, 1995, expressly states that fishponds & prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL.The court will not hesitate to declare law or an act void when confronted with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative & Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment said law or act.

CASE DIGEST #7Luz Farms (petitioner) vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (respondent) G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990Ponente: Facts:This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. On June 10,1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80). On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657. Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2,1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9,1989.Issue:Whether or not the Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) is constitutional.Held:Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional in so far as they include lands devoted to raising livestock, swine and poultry within its coverage. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration of productivity in this industry. The Supreme Court held that:The transcripts of deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the government.The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of RA 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).The Supreme Court noted that the intention of the Committee to limit the application of the word "agriculture" is further shown by the proposal of Commissioner Jamir to insert the word "arable" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties. The proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, 7 August 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).

Moreover, in his answer to Commissioner Regalado's interpellation, Commissioner Tadeo clarified that the term "farmworker" was used instead of "agricultural worker" in order to exclude therein piggery, poultry and livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

CASE DIGESTSta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CAFacts:Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP. The landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.Issue:Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657Held:Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.

G.R. No. 122256 October 30, 1996REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL CORPORATION,respondents.FACTS:Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Private respondent's certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings ("LISTASAKA") which private respondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower "Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated .Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP.Private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter's Revised Rules of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in violation of the DARAB's rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the PARAD.Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied Private respondent therefore filed a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 56-57 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.Issue: whether in cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to the RTC. RULING:The contention has no merit.It is true that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "allpetitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that theoriginalandexclusivejurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.Morta v. OccidentalGR No. 12341710 June 1999 FACTS:Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit against Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for allegedly gathering pili nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land, delivered the produce to Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and pineapple plants. The court considered the cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Occidental, etal. appealed, contending that the case was cognizable by the DAR Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). Occidental claimed that he was a tenant of the actual owner of the land ,Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and Padilla were notactually the owners of the land inquestion.The trial court ruled in favor of Morta and Padilla.Thus, the RTC reversed the lower court and ruled in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a tenancy-related problem which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA affirmed the RTC.regarding the ownership of theland are not conclusive to settlethe matter. ISSUE: W/N the cases are properly cognizable by the DARAB. RULING:NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, the issue is clearly outside DARABs jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARABFor DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land anddestroying their banana and pineapple plants. At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightfulowner of the land, the case cannot be considered tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the requisites, the issue involved isnot tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionervs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 78742July 14, 1989

Facts:

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.

The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land.

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Issue:

Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657.

Held:

P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.

Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.