After 9/11: Television Viewers, Newspaper Readers and Public Opinion

about Terrorism’s Consequences

Staci L. Rhine

Associate Professor of Political Science Wittenberg University srhine@wittenberg.edu

Stephen E. Bennett

Research Professor of Political Communication Appalachian State University

Richard S. Flickinger

Professor of Political Science Wittenberg University

Abstract. We are interested in whether the actions of Al Qaeda on September 11 and subsequent actions by U.S. authorities seem to have any connection to levels of support for government and attitudes about civil liberties, when filtered through TV and newspaper coverage. We compare the reactions of those who get their news primarily from television with those who get their news primarily from newspapers. Users of both mediums demonstrated high levels of support for government actions and figures. However, television viewers were more supportive than newspaper readers. Newspaper readers initially expressed greater concern over potential government threats to civil liberties, but these differences had essentially disappeared by the end of 2001. The conclusion considers whether media differences may re-emerge as a “rally effect” wanes.

Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Boston, Massachusetts, August 29 - September 1, 2002

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September 11, 2001 joined the small number of dates on which events transpired that had

the capacity to alter the ways Americans thought about themselves and public affairs. December

7, 1941 (Pearl Harbor), April 13, 1945 (FDR’s death), November 22, 1963 (JFK’s assassination),

and August 8, 1974 (Richard Nixon’s resigna tion from the presidency), probably qualify as

historic dates akin to 9/11/01.

But how do media exposure patterns affect the ways people react to an event? It is

commonly assumed that everyone reacts to a historic event in a similar vein? But, is that true?

We seek to answer that question concerning 9/11.

Our two principal concerns in this paper are the relationships between television and

newspaper use, on the one hand, and support for the government and perceptions of the trade-off

between civil liberties and security, on the other. Regardless of the intrinsic interest in support

for government and civil liberties in a democratic society, there are special reasons for

considering them in the context of a terrorist attack. Among the generally recognized goals of

terrorism are: 1) undermining confidence in the government and 2) encouraging government

repression as a means toward undermining its legitimacy (Combs 2000; Stohl 1985). Terrorism

scholar Michael Stohl has used a theatrical analogy to make these points. Terrorists, he says,

“are primarily interested in the audience, not the victims” (Stohl, 1985, 4). “How the audience

reacts [to the terrorist incident] is as important as the act itself” (Stohl, 1985, 3).

From the point of view of Osama bin Laden and his associates, the attacks in Washington

and New York may well have been designed, in part at least, to weaken the U.S. government--

this as a means to achieving their goals in the Middle East and beyond. But achieving such

outcomes depends upon the media. As Paul Wilkinson (2000, 177) puts it, “When one says

‘terrorism’ in a democratic society, one also says ‘media’. For terrorism by its very nature is a

psychological weapon which depends upon communicating a threat to the wider society.”

Thus we are interested in whether the actions of Al Qaeda on September 11 and

subsequent actions by U.S. authorities seem to have any connection to levels of support for

government and attitudes about civil liberties, when filtered through TV and newspaper

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coverage. We compare the reactions of those who get their news primarily from television with

those who get their news primarily from newspapers. Users of both mediums demonstrated high

levels of support for government actions and figures. However, television viewers were more

supportive than newspaper readers. Newspaper readers initially expressed greater concern over

potential government threats to civil liberties, but these differences had essentially disappeared

by the end of 2001.

The Dominance of Television

The first problem confronted by someone wishing to assess the respective effects on

public opinion of reliance on television or on newspapers is TV’s ubiquity in American society.

According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000, 567), over 98 percent of American

households have at least one television set, and the average person spends almost 31 hours per

week viewing TV (2000, 566). According to A. C. Nielsen’s “Media Research,” the average set

is on seven hours and 24 minutes per day (2000). In 2000, Americans told the General Social

Survey that they watched television nearly three hours per day, but that figure is probably an

under-estimate (see Robinson and Godbey 1999). Doris Graber argues that “Television’s

greatest impact, compared with that of other media, is derived from its ability to reach millions

of people simultaneously with the same images” (2002, 197). As a result, George Gerbner and

his co-authors rightly note that “Television’s central role in our society makes it the primary

channel of the mainstream in our culture” (2002, 51). In short, it will be difficult to isolate the

respective effects of the two news media Americans say they rely most upon for news about

public affairs (Stanley and Niemi 2000, 173).

Another vexatious issue is that many people who rely on television for the news also rely

on newspapers, and vice versa. Polls conducted for the Times Mirror/Pew Research Center for

The People and The Press from 1985 on show that between 40 and 70 percent of adults regularly

rely on TV and newspapers for the news. Approximately one-fifth of the public rely on TV but

not on newspapers, and roughly one-tenth relies on newspapers but not television. Widespread

media usage “over- lap” makes it very difficult to sort out the respective effects of each medium.

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That said, however, communications research since the 1950s has identified important

differences in the types of people who rely each medium, and in the respective effects each

medium has on Americans’ political engagement and opinions (Dean Alger [1996] and Graber

[1997] summarize this literature). Persons who rely more on newspapers than on TV tend to be

well educated, well- to-do, middle-aged white men, who are more psychologically involved in

public affairs. The profile of those who rely mostly on TV is a good deal more diverse, which is

not surprising, given that medium’s ubiquity in our society and the fact that more people tell

survey interviewers that they get most of their news from TV (Stanley and Niemi 2000, 173). It

is also important to note that the factors behind reading newspapers are heavily influenced by the

fact that papers are “local,” while the dominant TV news media are national in scope.

Perhaps the most important difference between television’s impact and that of

newspapers lies in the area of information acquisition. As Graber notes, “Each medium ... does

make unique contributions to learning” (1997, 189).

Because of its visual quality, television excels at transmitting realism and emotional

components of the political realm (Graber 2001, 2002). In addition, because of its immediacy,

television is often the medium people turn to first to get breaking news stories. For example,

when the Pew Research Center asked a random sample of American adults in the days

immediately afterward which medium they turned to first for news about the terrorist attacks on

September 11, 2001, 88 percent said “television,” six percent said “radio,” two percent said “the

Internet,” and only two percent said “newspapers.” When asked about their second source of

news about the terrorist attacks, 44 percent of those who claimed a second source said

“newspapers,” 37 percent said “radio,” and only nine percent said “TV.”

When it comes to transmitting “the facts,” the print media are primary. In the main, that

means newspapers. Researchers have found for decades that print media, i.e., newspapers,

convey a great deal more factual knowledge than do television or radio. Indeed, people can

recall so little of what they’ve seen on TV newscasts, even when asked only minutes or hours

after these shows aired (Neuman 1976), that John Robinson and his co-authors (Robinson and

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Davis 1990; Robinson and Levy 1986, 1996) have argued that despite claiming they get most of

their news from television, the print media are actually the major source of what Americans

know about public affairs.

We see much the same pattern when it comes to knowledge about foreign affairs.

Although 70 percent of American adults told interviewers for the Times Mirror Center for the

People and The Press that they got most of their news from television in January, 1994, persons

who were reliant on newspapers, but not on TV, were more knowledgeable about foreign affairs

than people who relied television news, but not on newspapers. On a five-item scale of

knowledge about foreign affairs (see Bennett et al. 1996), those who said they regularly read a

newspaper, but did not regularly view TV newscasts got an average of 1.92 items correct (s =

1.62, N = 164), compared to a mean of 1.37 for people who regularly relied on television but not

on newspapers (s = 1.48, N = 462).

When it comes to assessing the media’s impact on opinions about public affairs, whether

the topic be domestic or foreign policy, one sees little sign of consensus among researchers.

Granted, the notions of “hypodermic needle” media effects—public opinion merely mirrors the

messages conveyed in the media (see Lang 1996)—and even of “minimal” media effects—

beyond reinforcing pre-existing tendenc ies the media have little impact (Klapper 1960)-- are no

longer widely believed. Instead, they have given way to a plethora of theories about the mass

media’s impact on public opinion, including “uses and gratifications” theories, agenda-setting

theories, framing theories, and so on (see Graber 2002 for useful summaries).

Consensus evaporates when it comes to assessing the media’s impact on public opinion

about foreign policy, especially if American military forces engage in armed conflict. Although

many attributed changing public support for U.S. military engagement in Vietnam to shifts in

media, particularly TV, coverage—one thinks of Lyndon Johnson’s claim that if he had lost CBS

“Evening News” anchor Walter Cronkite’s backing, the Vietnam War was good as lost

(however, see Hallin 1986), students of the Persian Gulf War generally do not think the mass

media had much impact on the course of public opinion (see, e.g., Mueller1994).

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The American public has expressed considerable concern about terrorism as a threat to

U.S. security interests, domestic as well as international, since the mid-1980s (Kuzma 2000).

How public opinion on terrorism may have been shaped by the media has received less

systematic attention. Most of the literature on terrorism and the media either does not

differentiate among types of media or focuses on television, where some see it mostly as a tool of

the terrorists but others regard it as generally providing support for the authorities (Crelinsten

1997, Pillar 2001, Wilkinson 2000).

The Readers and the Viewers

We come, then, to an assessment of the impact of reliance on television and on

newspapers for opinions about the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and their

consequences. Our data come primarily from three polls conduc ted on behalf of the Pew Center

for The People and The Press in the days and months following September 11, 2001. The

September poll was conducted September 13-17. The November poll was conducted November

13-19. Finally, the January 2002 poll was conduc ted January 9-13. Thus we have measures

immediately following the attack, two months after the attack and four months after the attack.

The Pew Center asked respondents where they get most of their news. This wording

differs from their usual choice of media measures. Fortunately, we can use these new measures

to look for differences between newspaper readers and television watchers. Unfortunately, we

cannot compare the results with earlier surveys.

In the first survey after September 11, the question asked “How have you been getting

most of your news about the terrorist attacks? From television, from newspapers, from radio,

from magazines, or from the Internet?” They asked follow-up questions about other sources.

But we are using the first mention provided by the respondent. In the September survey, 88

percent of the respondents reported that they got most of their news from television. In contrast,

only about two percent report getting most of their news from newspapers. The skewed

responses in this survey affect our comparisons later in the paper. The paucity of respondents in

the newspaper category means that in some instances we cannot make meaningful comparisons.

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In the November survey, they asked “How have you been getting most of your news

about terrorist attacks and the war on terrorism? From television, from newspapers, from radio,

from magazines, or from the Internet?” Two months after the attack, 76 percent report getting

most of their news from the television. People who get most of their news from newspapers

compose 11 percent of the survey. The question wording is slightly different, but we do not

think that is the cause of the shift. Right after September 11, people turned to television to see

what was happening. Moreover, even the networks provided 24-hour news, suspending their

normal programming. Since then more people are reading about the events. The war on

terrorism does not offer compelling visuals, in contrast to the attack on the World Trade towers.

Instead, it requires stories about domestic and international efforts, some of which provide no

visuals whatsoever.

By January 2002 we see an even greater shift. The survey asked “How have you been

getting most of your news about national and international issues? From television, from

newspapers, from radio, from magazines, or from the Internet?” Four months after the attack,

only 66 percent report getting most of their news from television. Clearly television is still the

most popular source. But we see a decline from the September numbers. In contrast, 15 percent

report getting most of their news from newspapers.

One thing we need to note. Time’s passage after September 11 led to a slight decline in

the percentage of the public claiming to rely most on TV newscasts, and a corresponding

increase in reliance on newspapers. In short, as the events of September 11 receded, people

began to return to “typical” patterns of media reliance.

In these three surveys, people who got most of their news from television differ in

important ways from those who get most of their news from newspapers. Newspaper readers are

significantly more informed than television viewers. For example, from the November survey,

newspaper readers were significantly more likely to be able to name the current Vice President

of the United States. In the January survey, newspaper readers were significantly more likely to

identify Argentina as the Latin American country with a political and economic crisis.

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One of the reasons for this difference is the level of political interest among the

respondents. People who read newspapers report higher levels of political interest. Television

viewers are more likely to be bored by what goes on in Washington, according to the November

survey. They also are less likely to be interested in following local politics. This is not

surprising given that one would find little coverage of local politics on television. Thus part of

the answer is the differing motivations of newspaper readers and television viewers.

Another part of the answer is the demographics of the consumers. People who rely

primarily on the newspaper are different from those who rely primarily on the television. In

these three surveys, newspaper readers tend to be better-educated, older males with higher family

incomes. Thus they have more resources to process and use the information they acquire. There

are not clear partisan differences, however, between readers and viewers. In the latter two

surveys, readers were slightly more likely to be politically independent. But the differences are

not statistically significant. Hence, when we find differences pertaining to support for President

Bush and government efforts, these are not driven by the partisanship of the respective

audiences.

Presidential Approval

For our analysis, we were not able to create a single, elegant model. Instead, we pored

over dozens of comparisons between newspaper readers and television viewers. The results are

not definitive. But they are suggestive of differences between the two audiences. We begin with

presidential approval.

Many analyses of presidential popularity rely on one version or another of the item

developed by George Gallup in the late 1930s that allegedly elicits opinions about presidential

job performance. The Gallup item and related queries have been questioned on technical

grounds (Crespi, 1989, pp. 116-17; Orren, 1978; Roll & Cantril, 1972, pp. 128-29; Sigelman,

1990; Zukin & Carter, 1982). It is important to note that the presidential approval item used by

the Times Mirror/Pew Research Center mimics the query developed by the Gallup Organization.

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Nevertheless, a sizable corpus has emerged over the years plumbing presidential

approval, and seeking to explain the ebbs and flows of public opinion about how an individual is

handling the job (see, e.g., Brace and Hinckley 1992; Brody 1991, 1998; Edwards 1983;

Edwards with Gallup 1990; Graber, ed. 1982; Greene 2001; Greenstein 1969; Monroe 1984;

Mueller 1973, 1994; Shogan 2001). A sizable portion of this literature links presidential

approval levels to economic conditions (Clarke, Rapkin, and Steward 1994; Monroe 1984).

Other writers focus on the nexus between presidential approval levels and foreign affairs, be it

crises such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco or the occupation of the American embassy in Teheran, or

wars from Korea to the Persian Gulf crisis (Mueller 1973, 1994).

In addition, as Irving Crespi wrote, “assessments of a president’s performance in office

encompass judgments about how the state, as well as the government, is functioning” (1980, p.

40). Responses to a query about presidential job performance tell as much about views of the

“political state of the nation” (Crespi, 1980, p. 43) as they do about an incumbent’s standing with

the public (Edwards, 1983, pp. 224, 227).

At the beginning of each survey, Pew asked respondents their standard presidential

approval question. “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his

job as president?” This was asked after September 11, in November, and again in January. As is

already well known, President Bush’s job approval soared after September 11. After eliminating

the respondents who could not evaluate his performance, 90 percent of the September and

November respondents approved of his performance. By January it falls only to 88 percent

approval. Thus if one goal of terrorism is to undermine public support for its leadership, that

goal failed miserably.

We then compared presidential approval with the respondents’ reported main source of

news. We find that in the first two surveys, television viewers were more positive than

newspaper readers (See Table 1). The differences, moreover, are statistically significant. In

September, television viewers rated his approval more than 18 percentage points more positively

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than newspaper readers. In November, the difference is about 8 percentage points. By January

the gap closes to a couple percentage points, which is not statistically significant.

We wonder if the president’s televised address had more impact on television viewers.

They would have more opportunities to see it replayed than those who get more news from the

newspaper. Indeed, they rated the speech more highly than did newspaper readers. Television

viewers remain more positive in November, too. Of course, both viewers and readers were

overwhelmingly positive toward the president. So, in a sense, we have less variation to explain

with this question.

One of the most interesting facets of presidential popularity is the so-called “rally,” a.k.a.,

“rally-round-the-flag” phenomenon (see Brody 1991, chap. 3; Mueller 1973, 208-213). John

Mueller wrote that “a rally point [in public approval of a president’s job performance] must be

associated with an event which (1) is international and (2) involves the United States and

particularly the president directly, and it must be (3) specific, dramatic, and sharply focused”

(1973, 209). Intense, international crises—whether or not the crisis involves direct participation

by American armed forces—produce substantial increases in a sitting president’s level of popular

support. According to Richard Brody (1991, 46), “External threat gives rise to the belief that

one’s patriotic duty requires the appearance of solidarity which, in the public at large, manifests

itself as an unexpected jump in approval of presidential job performance.”

A rally need not follow success. John F. Kennedy’s approval ratings rose after the Bay of

Pigs fiasco in early 1961, and support for Jimmy Carter went up after the American embassy in

Teheran was seized by radical Iranian “students” in late 1979.

A surge in public approval following an intense international crisis will sooner or later be

followed by waning support. The history of the ebbs and flows of public approval of presidents’

job performance indicates that high rates of approval in the immediate aftermath of a rally event

return to “normal” as the initiating event recedes in time, and other, perhaps more divisive, issues

come to fore on the public agenda.

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An intriguing facet of rally events is whether surges in public approval transcend the

president. Could it be that favorable public “moods,” which are well captured by presidential job

approval questions, spread to other facets of public affairs, such as the government generally and

even the mass media?

Government Efforts

We also looked at questions that tapped support for government policies or initiatives.

Once again, we find overwhelming support for the government and possible responses. We then

compared the reactions of television viewers and newspaper reader. For example, looking at

support for military action in September, we do not find differences between tv viewers and

newspaper readers (See Table 1). Both are equally ready to favor military action. There may be

some differences on this question, but the distribution of responses makes the significance tests

problematic.

By the November survey, some interesting differences occur. People who get their news

from television may be more eager to fight the enemy. When asked if they favor or oppose

military action, even if it means thousands of casualties among U.S. armed forces, tv viewers are

significantly more supportive of military action. TV viewers are more likely to report that media

criticism prevents leaders from doing their job rather than preventing leaders from doing things

that shouldn’t be done. They also are more likely to report confidence that the government is

giving the public an accurate picture of efforts to deal with terrorism in the United States (See

Table 1).

TV viewers are also more likely to believe that the media should support the government.

The survey asked a similar question in two forms, each to half of the respondents. “In your

opinion, which is better, that news coverage of a war be pro-American or that news coverage of a

war be neutral?” Also, “In your opinion, which is better, that news coverage of a war be pro-

American or that news coverage of a war show all points of view, including those of countries

not friendly to the United States?” While more than half of the respondents for both questions

selected neutral or all points of view, the support for such coverage was greatest among

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newspaper readers. In contrast, television viewers were more likely than readers to prefer pro-

American coverage in both question formats (Table 1).

Similarly, Pew asked several questions about dependence on government information or

control. “Which is more important to you: that the government be able to censor news stories it

feels threaten national security or that the news media be able to report stories they feel are in the

national interest.” TV viewers are significantly more likely to believe that the government

should be able to censor the news. The survey also asked, “When covering events in the war on

terrorism, should journalists be digging hard to get all the information they can for their reports,

or should they trust government and military officials to officially release some information.”

Newspaper readers are more likely to believe journalists should dig hard. TV viewers are

significantly more likely than newspaper readers to believe that journalists should trust the

government to release the information (Table 1).

The November survey also asks some general questions about perceptions of the

government and elected officials. These general questions do not produce significant differences

between tv viewers and readers. Thus whatever is driving some of the differences we find

above, it is not shaping general perceptions of the government (Table 1).

We cannot tell if we are detecting a stronger rally effect for the government among

television viewers. They appear more supportive of the government and its officials and more

willing to cede power and authority to it. Does television viewing in a time of war produce such

differences? Or are we merely detecting differences based on the nature of the audiences.

Now turning to the January survey, we find that TV viewers are more likely to positively

evaluate George Bush’s handling of the economy. They also are more supportive of military

efforts to remove Saddam Hussein. When given various arguments for invading Iraq, television

viewers found each potential reason more important than newspaper readers. Also, television

viewers were more likely to favor military action to destroy terrorist groups in Sudan. Finally,

television viewers were more worried than newspaper readers about another terrorist attack on

the United States (Table 1). To the extent that TV users were less informed than their newspaper

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reading counterparts, we may be seeing an illustration of Crelinsten’s (1997) claim that the

primary effect of television coverage of terrorism on the less informed “is to create fear and

anxiety about the possibility of future victimization” (23).

In the January survey, we also found numerous questions without significant differences.

For example, television viewers and newspaper readers are equally likely to approve of

Democratic leaders in Congress. They also held similar attitudes toward the success of the

military against terrorist groups. Television viewers were more ready to dispatch our military to

Somalia, the Philippines and Indonesia to fight terrorist groups, but the differences were not

statistically significant. Both groups were similarly likely to support the continued presence of

US troops in Afghanistan (Table 1).

Thus we may be seeing a greater willingness to use force among television viewers.

They are consistently more likely to commit American troops abroad. Not all the comparisons

are statistically significant, but that is partly due to the small number of cases when questions are

asked of only half the respondents. But the overall trend is clear.

One possibility is that television leads people to react differently. Perhaps the visuals

make people angrier and more willing to use force. Another possibility is that what viewers see

on television is sanitized enough so that they do not fear many US casualties. In war coverage,

the Pentagon greatly controls the access to stories. Reporters are not free to roam about

Afghanistan. Many of the pictures are approved by the military. Moreover, many of the

standard file pictures that the networks use convey only military strength. For example, if an F-

15 crashes, the networks, lacking the crash picture, would show a file photo of an F-15 takeoff.

Another possibility is that newspaper readers are exposed to many more perspectives than

television viewers. As David Gergen (1990, 50) notes, “By its very nature, television is an

instrument of simplicity in a world of complexity.” Because television usually shows that day’s

headlines, the stories are often framed around the Administration, its goals and its statements.

Those same stories are in the newspapers. But perhaps other kinds of stories are in the

newspaper, too. For example, there might be more coverage of the internal dissension in the

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Bush Administration about war with Iraq. Perhaps there are more details about potential

casualties. While newspaper readers also favored force, they did so at lower levels. Perhaps

readers had followed stories about the difficulty of nation building in other countries around the

globe and thus were more circumspect.

Civil Liberties and the Media

The literature on the media’s impact on “tolerance” or opinions about civil liberties is in

disrepair. Although Samuel Stouffer, in his classic study of grassroots attitudes about civil

liberties for unpopular political groups in the 1950s (1955), believed that, along with increased

exposure to higher education, the spread of television would increase Americans’ tolerance

levels, the major studies of Americans’ tolerance/civil liberties attitudes that have appeared since

do not explore the media’s effects on these attitudes (Davis, 1975; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-

Morse, and Wood 1995; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus

1982). Some writers claim to see increased tolerance for unpopular political groups, but attribute

shifting attitudes to the declining salience of the Soviet threat and/or to the emerge of younger

birth cohorts, better educated and less imbued with hostility toward communism and socialism

(see, for example, Davis 1975; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978). Other writers dismiss the

notion of a generally improved “climate” for tolerance, and instead focus on perceived “threats”

of specific groups (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). None, however, explores patterns of

exposure to different types of news media.

Our own analyses of the Times Mirror Center’s May, 1987 poll suggests that frequent

exposure to newspapers or to TV newscasts does not contribute to civil liberties opinions. We

constructed a “Civil Libertarian” Scale from seven specific items: requiring drug tests for federal

government employees, restricting AIDS patients’ access to public places, firing homosexual

school teachers, belief that nude magazines or X-rated movies were harmful to public morality,

restricting freedom of speech to groups such as the KKK or the American Communist Party, and

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allowing police to search the houses of suspected drug dealers. The seven- item index had a

coefficient alpha of .71, which satisfies the criterion of internal consistency.

When the Civil Libertarianism Scale was regressed on twelve predictors, whether the

respondent frequently reads a newspaper (0 for no, 1 for yes), whether the respondent frequently

watches TV newscasts (0 = no and 1 = yes), marital status (0 = unmarried, 1 = married), region

(0 = South, 1 = Non=south), strength of partisanship (five categories ranging from apoliticals to

strong partisans), family income (eight categories), age (actual age), race (0 = black, 1 = white),

gender (0 = women, 1 = men), Hispanic identity (0 = no, 1 = yes), education (actual year of

school completed), and occupation (eight categories), the two media exposure variables were the

only variables that were not statistically significant. All the other predictors were significant,

and the model accounted for 22 percent of the Civil Liberties Scale’s variance.

In short, our analysis of the 1987 poll dovetails with the findings of most empirical

studies of tolerance/civil libertarianism since Stouffer’s time: reliance on newspapers or on TV

newscasts do not predict Americans’ opinions on most civil liberties measures. Now let us

consider what happened after 9/11. Civil Liberties after September 11

After September 11, declining support for civil liberties did occur. Pew asked “In order

to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary to give up some civil liberties,

or not?” Fully 55 percent said “yes,” 35 percent said “no,” and 10 percent did not know. The

support for giving up civil liberties was dramatically higher than when this same question was

asked about five years earlier (Kuzma 2000). Thus terrorists may have been more successful in

encouraging government repression that may subsequently lead some to question the

government’s legitimacy.

We also found that media usage was relevant to these attitudes. The first poll after

September 11 found many similarities and a few sharp differences on civil liberties. Those

relying on television as their principal news source were much more likely than newspaper

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readers to believe that it would be necessary to curb civil liberties to cope with the terrorist threat

(See Table 2.). When asked whether they were more concerned that the government would fail

to enact strong anti-terrorism laws or that it would enact laws restricting civil liberties, television

“reliants” were more concerned with the former and newspaper readers with the latter, though

the differences were not statistically significant. However, when the same three items were

repeated in the January 2002 poll these inter-group differences had disappeared, with the paper

readers now being equally convinced that some restrictions on civil liberties would be necessary

and now equally concerned that the government might fail to enact strong anti-terrorism

measures. However, both groups showed slight increases in their concern that the government

might restrict civil liberties (Table 2).

The September poll had a battery of six items asking opinions about potential anti-

terrorism measures. Television users were much more likely to favor requiring the use of ID

cards to be shown on demand. Otherwise, response patterns were similar. Both groups

supported allowing the CIA to work with criminals and both supported the use of assassination

overseas, though newspaper readers were some what less in favor of the latter. Both media user

groups were alike in offering little support for placing legal immigrants in internment camps,

allowing government to monitor e-mail or phone calls or permitting government to monitor

credit card purchases (Table 2). This appears to support the conclusion of earlier work that, “The

crucial determinant of public attitudes toward government security policies seems to be who is

affected by them” (Crelinsten 1997, 22).

The November Pew Center poll included several items on censorship. TV viewers were

significantly more likely to believe that government should be able to censor stories threatening

national security. Majorities of both groups believed the military was censoring information

about the war in Afghanistan, but even larger majorities believed these restrictions were good.

(The numbers for paper readers were lower in both these instances, but the difference was not

statistically significant.) More than 40 percent of each group also believed the government was

withholding some information about Anthrax attacks, but majorities believed this a good thing.

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However, paper readers were significantly less likely to see withholding information as good.

On a question asking whether it was more important for government to be able to censor or the

media able to report all information, TV users were more likely to favor the censorship option.

That news coverage should show all points of view was supported by more than 75 percent of

respondents regardless of which source was used. However, again the newspapers readers were

more likely to endorse this perspective (Table 2).

A final civil liberties related item was included in the January 2002 poll. It asked

whether respondents approved of the government’s plan to use military tribunals to try some

terrorist suspects. More than 60 percent of each group of media users approved (Table 2).

Several conclusions emerge from this brief survey, despite the limitations of having only

a few repeated items across the three polls. The data suggest that paper readers are more

concerned about civil liberties and censorship than TV viewers, but these differences are not

always statistically significant. Both groups recognize that some constraints may be required and

they tend to support the ones they see in place. But they also express considerable concern about

measures that would intrude on personal privacy or disrupt the flow of information and diverse

points of view in the media.

Elsewhere we have found that reading is positively related to political tolerance (Bennett,

Rhine and Flickinger 2000). We hypothesized that readers understand more of the tradeoffs in

such questions. Hence, they are less likely to support some policies that may be initially

appealing. If the differences we find are enduring, this may be one plausible explanation.

Multivariate Test

We cannot test all of the questions we compared for this paper in multivariate analyses.

But we did test some. Below we have used logistic regression to explain presidential approval

from the November survey. We want to be sure that our media measure is not simply a surrogate

for education or political interest. Therefore, we are including the media measure, gender, age,

education, partisanship and whether the respondent is generally bored by what goes on in

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Washington. The partisanship measure was recoded to run from Republican to Independent to

Democrat. We are using the response to the Washington question to measure political interest.

Table 3 has the results of our analysis. With this simple model, only media usage,

gender, age and partisanship are statistically significant predictors of presidential approval. Men

and older people are more likely to approve of Bush’s performance. Not surprisingly,

Republicans are more likely to approve of him. For the purposes of this paper, the most

interesting finding is the media measure. Newspaper readers are less likely to approve of his job

performance, even after controlling for interest, partisanship and some demographic measures.

Thus the difference is not just driven by the audience who use the different mediums. Something

about the mediums affect the respondents’ evaluations.

Potential Explanations

Explanation 1. By its nature, television covers headline news. There are fewer stories

than in most daily papers, and they are shorter than stories in most daily papers. Furthermore,

television covers the president because he can easily convey the federal government (Kerbel

1999). Coverage of individual members of Congress and stories about the Courts are much

rarer. The President, by contrast, offers a recognizable leading man. This situation is magnified

in foreign news. “The bulk of foreign affairs news for American media actually originates in

Washington from various beats in the executive branch, especially the White House, the State

Department, and the Pentagon” (Graber 356, 2002). Thus while the Administration cannot

control how the information will be used, they are the primary source of foreign policy

information.

We wonder if the theme of the nightly news is more consistent with the Administration’s

position, particularly in the early phases of war time. Because television has limited time and

space, they will cover the major pronouncements and events of the day. They do not have time

to cover the various interpretations of all the events they cover.

In contrast, daily newspapers have more and longer stories. Certainly television stories

are driven by the stories in the elite newspapers that day. Yet they cannot cover all of the stories

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mentioned. Newspapers cover those same pronouncements by the Administration. But they also

have smaller stories that may not make the news. For example, a small story about civilian

casualties in Afghanistan may appear in the newspaper but not on television. A story about the

State Department’s differing position on Iraq may appear in a newspaper but not on television,

especially if no one will speak for the camera. The varying reactions of Middle East states may

appear in the newspaper but not always on television. Finally, newspapers have institutionalized

space for disagreement: the opinion and editorial pages. If one reads these articles, one can

easily find criticisms of existing policies and proposals. Thus one plausible explanation is that

newspaper readers are bombarded with more and contradictory cues on policy. This may explain

their differing reactions.

Explanation 2. People who get their news primarily from TV are less interested in and

less informed about news. Therefore, another potential explanation is that they are more easily

swayed by what they see (Crelinsten 1997). If coverage on TV is more consistent, it is

reasonable to assume that viewers are picking up those cues. Zaller (1992) argues that people

need to be attentive to pick up such cues. Therefore, we might conclude that television viewers

are particularly unlikely to follow such direction. However, this is an unusual time period.

There is a great deal of interest in the news, even among the previously disinterested. For

example, in the November survey, television viewers report being generally more interested in

the news than before the terrorist attacks. There also is a great deal of coverage of these events.

It would be harder for news averse citizens to avoid news stories. Furthermore, given that the

Administration dominates the news, citizens can more easily grasp and accept the

Administration’s positions.

Explanation 3. A third explanation is that the experience of people who watch television

has a longer lasting impact than of those who read the newspaper. People who watched a lot of

television have seen the horrors of the events of September 11 again and again. Perhaps the

visual reminders of the attacks reinforces their anger and anguish. This may make them more

20

willing to commit troops and sacrifice rights. This may also create a stronger rally around the

President as a symbol of the country under attack.

Similarly, both television and newspapers ran numerous stories on the victims and their

families. Perhaps the television stories were more compelling. It is plausible that the visuals and

accompanying music of television stories evoked a greater reaction.

Explanation 4. A fourth explanation is that what we are seeing is not a media effect but

an education effect. Better educated newspaper readers react somewhat differently because they

are better educated, not because they are newspaper readers. However, we ran numerous

multivariate models using the questions with statistically significant differences in the bivariate

comparisons. In those models media usage has an independent effect on attitudes even after

controlling for education.

Explanation 5. A fifth potential explanation is that TV viewers, being more afraid of

another terrorist attack, favor stronger reactions to the crisis. This occurs in the January survey,

which is fully four months after the initial attack. This may explain their greater desire for action

and their stronger support for Bush. Of course, we cannot explain why they are more afraid.

Perhaps the televised version of events is more frightening. It also is difficult to theorize why

newspaper readers perceive less of a threat. Nonetheless, this fear may be producing some

differences.

Discussion and Conclusions

Public opinion after September 11 had many of the elements of a classic rally

phenomenon (see above). Support for the President shot up, but this spike in support was not the

President’s alone. Government institutions, leaders of both parties and even the press gained

much support. Beyond support for institutions and political leaders, the public was highly

confident that the government’s counter-terrorism policies were succeeding and would continue

to be successful. One is tempted to term this an ‘era of good feeling’ in the face of a crisis. In

the short run, polls provided no evidence that the terrorists had succeeded in undermining the

U.S. government--quite the contrary. To this extent the poll evidence from the first months after

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9/11 supports the conclusions of those who have examined responses to terrorism in other

countries--the authorities are supported, perhaps because their perspectives dominate the news

(Crelinsten 1997). A closer look at the post-9/11 rally tells us that TV viewers were quicker to

rally than were newspaper readers, both in their support for leaders and in their willingness to

endorse measures that might curtail civil liberties. But by January, many of these differences

had disappeared.

The rally phenomenon by its nature implies an end of the rally--a return to a more normal

pattern of support for leaders and institutions and increased concern about the costs and

effectiveness of the government’s response to crisis. The polls we have analyzed show little

evidence of this. But more recent polls by the Pew Center and others suggest that the rally is

ebbing (rallies graphically resemble the profile of a drumlin with a steep upward slope followed

by a gradual downslope until the original baseline is reached--apologies to geologists). More

people are questioning the effectiveness of counter-terror efforts; criticism of the press has

increased sharply and even the President’s extraordinary job ratings have slipped a bit (Pew

Center poll of July 2002). What we cannot tell until these data become available for analysis is

whether people’s media reliance patterns are associated with their more recent views of counter-

terror policies and performance. For example, recently some in the national press have given

increased attention to civil liberties issues associated with counter-terrorism. Will readers, then,

express more concern about this than the TV viewers?

It is also possible that the rally is ebbing because other matters, e.g., the economy, are

grabbing people’s attention. Other analysts of public opinion about terrorism have noted how the

publics’ concern waxes and wanes depending upon proximity in time to a terrorist act (Huddie

2002, forthcoming, Kuzma 2000). But what has not yet ebbed is the fear factor. People’s level

of concern for the prospects of new attacks or of a loved one becoming a terror victim in June

2002 were similar to those reported in October 2001 (Pew Center poll).

Finally, given TV’s dominance as the information medium of choice should we look

more closely at differences within the vast TV audience? Preliminary explorations of the data

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available to us find little evidence of differences in the response to 9/11 among network, cable

and local news viewers. But that may not be the end of this story. Pew’s January 2002 poll

includes an item asking TV viewers which broadcast or cable network they most rely on to get

the news. There are tantalizing and statistically significant differences among networks’ viewers

when it comes to questions of presidential approval, support for selected policies and civil

liberties. But with only one poll to go on that is, as the barkeep in Irma la Duce was wont to say,

“another story.”

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Table 1. Support for the System. Question TV Viewers Newspaper Readers September 2001 Survey Presidential Approval 90.5 72.2* November 2001 Survey Presidential Approval 92.3 84.4* Favor military action 91.9 88.0 Favor military action despite casualties 88.1 75.5* News criticism inhibits leadership 38.6 29.4* Criticizing the military weakens defenses 43.7 42.5 Confidence military giving accurate picture of war 29.3 32.8 Confidence govt giving accurate picture of terrorism 21.0 11.9* Military should exert more control over news 56.4 47.9 News coverage should be neutral 67.1 76.8* News coverage should show all points of view 76.2 84.9* Government should be able to censor news 55.7 47.2* Journalists should trust govt to release facts 42.2 34.5* January Survey 2002 Survey Presidential Approval 89.1 86.5 Approve Democratic congressional leaders 70.8 69.0 Approve Bush’s handling of economy 69.7 60.3* Military effort to destroy terrorist groups going very well 41.1 35.0 Government doing excellent job building home defenses 13.0 12.1 Favor military action against Iraq 84.4 75.6* Favor military action against Iraq despite casualties 66.6 62.7 Reasons for using military force against Iraq: Very important if learned of weapons of mass destruction 81.3 76.0* Very important if Iraq helped terrorists 88.1 79.7* Very important if Iraq harboring terrorists 81.4 70.0* Favor military action if Iraq won’t allow inspections 76.5 68.8 Should attack Iraq even if allies won’t join us 42.9 40.1 Favor military action against terrorist groups in Somalia 82.2 78.4 Favor military action against terrorist groups in Sudan 87.2 76.5* Favor military aid to Philippines and Indonesia to combat terrorist groups 78.0 73.4 US should keep forces in Afghanistan 73.8 70.8 Very worried about another terrorist attack in US 21.4 14.0* Source: September 2001, November 2001, and January 2002 Pew polls. We express our gratitude to the Pew Center for the People and the Press for making these data available.

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Table 2. Media Source and Civil Liberties Question Television Newspapers September 2001 Curbs on civil liberties are necessary 56% 28%* Concerned gov’t won’t enact strong anti-terror law 40 22 Concerned gov’t will restrict civil libs. 34 36 Favor requiring ID 71 31* Favor CIA to contract with criminals 67 64 Favor CIA to assassinate abroad 69 54 Favor interning legal immigrants 29 26 Favor gov’t. monitoring of e-mail & phones 27 23 Favor gov’t. monitoring of credit card purchases 40 40 November 2001 Gov’t should be able to censor on national security 61 50* News reports from Afghan are being censored by mil. 60 53 Restrictions on Afghan reports are a good thing 80 73 Anthrax reports are being censored by gov’t. 47 42 Restrictions on anthrax reports are a good thing 66 52* Mistakes in Afghan media stories due to US gov’t. 51 62 Mistakes in anthrax media stories due to US gov’t. 56 41 Military is hiding bad news about Afghan 15 11 Government. is hiding bad news about anthrax 21 23 Military should have more control over news reports 56 48 More important gov’t be able to censor 56 47 More important media be able to report 36 47 News coverage should be pro-American 24 15* News coverage should show all points of view 76 85* January 2002 Curbs on civil liberties are necessary 56 59 Concerned gov’t won’t enact strong anti-terror law 41 40 Concerned gov’t will restrict civil libs. 43 43 Approve plans for military tribunals 66 62 *difference is significant at the .05 level Source: September 2001, November 2001, January 2002 Pew polls.

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Table 3. Logistical Regression of Presidential Approval

Predictor b s.e.b Wald p Television or Newspaper 1.084 .210 26.687 .000 Gender .326 .166 3.872 .049 Age -.022 .005 17.748 .000 Education -.013 .051 .062 .803 Generally bored by Washington -.151 .093 2.669 .102 Partisanship 1.048 .119 78.058 .000 Constant -5.081 .562 81.807 .000 Model -2 Log Likelihood=1080.338 Model Chi-square= 133.175, df=6, p = .000 Cox and Snell Pseudo R2 = .062 Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .140 Overall Classification = 91.5% Correct N = 1131 Source: November 2001 Pew Survey