Africa Regional Summary - Max Security...foreign aid workers and attacks on a Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu may indicate the group's reprisal. ... The World Health Organization has

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Africa Regional Summary April 15, 2014


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Month, Day, Y Executive Summary HIGH RISK

2 | P a g e

While political tensions and evolving militant and rebel threats continue to destabilize

states across Africa, other countries face growing economic threats from government

interference and work stoppages.

Following growing support for Burkina Faso's new opposition movement, President

Compaore's party held a rally to demonstrate its commitment to holding onto power in

spite of growing dissent. Simultaneous fractures in both Zimbabwe's ruling Zanu-PF and

the main opposition faction, MDC-T, are indicative of political instability on the horizon. By

contrast, the appointment of a new prime minister in Mali is poised to help the country's

transition as Moussa Mara has declared his strong commitment to national reconciliation.

Growing violent attacks across Nigeria's Middle Belt and stretching into northwestern

Nigeria coupled with evolving Boko Haram operations spreading beyond the northeast

indicate multivalent challenges to the country's strained security forces. Meanwhile, CAR's

already existent security vacuum is likely to widen as Chad has withdrawn its troops from

the African Union mission and the U.N. is not set to commence its operations in the

country until September. Increasing rebel gains in South Sudan have likely caused deep

concern in President Salva Kiir's administration, potentially prompting a consideration of

new alliances to end the country's months-long attrition warfare. While international and

Somali troops continue to rout al-Shabaab from its strongholds in Somalia, the killing of

foreign aid workers and attacks on a Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu may indicate the

group's reprisal. Kenya's arrest of 4,000 illegal Somali immigrants in an effort to

crackdown on militancy and criminality within this community carries the potential to

ignite retaliatory actions as well.

While Sierra Leone faces persistent challenges to economic progress, the government's

recent initiatives to crackdown on corruption could serve as positive signs to potential

investors. By contrast, the Zambian government's ongoing struggle with Konkola Copper

Mines, culminating in recent threats of KCM's misuse of funds, will serve to discourage

potential investors. As Mozambique's longtime rebel movement Renamo has carried out

an attack targeting Vale mining company's cargo train as well as attacking government

soldiers in the country's coal-rich Tete Province, there is potential for mining companies to

suspend operations, carrying damaging consequences for the country's economy. In South

Africa, the growing impact to mining businesses of a weeks-long strike in the platinum

sector has been illustrated by Amplats and Lonmin's declaration of force majeure to their

suppliers.


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The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past two weeks. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its name below.

EXTREME RISK

West Africa – Ebola Virus Outbreak ............................................................................. 4

CAR ......................................................................................................................... 6

Somalia .................................................................................................................... 8

South Sudan ........................................................................................................... 11

HIGH RISK

Mali ....................................................................................................................... 14

Nigeria ................................................................................................................... 16

MEDIUM RISK

Burkina Faso ........................................................................................................... 20

Burundi .................................................................................................................. 22

Kenya .................................................................................................................... 25

Mozambique .......................................................................................................... 28

South Africa ............................................................................................................ 31

LOW RISK

Sierra Leone ........................................................................................................... 35

Zambia ................................................................................................................... 37

Zimbabwe .............................................................................................................. 40

Notable Dates for the Period of April 16 – April 30, 2014 ..................................................... 43


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EXTREME RISK

West Africa – Ebola Virus Outbreak

The total official number of cases and deaths for the Ebola virus in Guinea stands at 158

cases and 101 deaths; in Liberia 21 cases have been confirmed and 11 deaths reported.

The World Health Organization has released a report that they anticipate the Ebola

outbreak to continue for the next two to four months.

Those operating or residing in West Africa, particularly in Guinea, Liberia, Mali, and

Sierra Leone, where suspected cases have been reported, are strongly advised to

practice heightened health precautions and proper hygiene due to the Ebola outbreak.

Back to Table of Contents

ASSESSMENTS

On April 4, residents of Macenta, in the southeastern forest region of Nzerekore, in

Guinea staged violent demonstrations against health workers, particularly employees of

Doctors Without Borders (MSF), who are in the town to treat local victims of the Ebola

virus. No MSF employees were injured in the unrest, but the aid workers reportedly left

the local medical treatment facilities during the demonstrations due to security

concerns. Residents chanted that “Ebola is false” and alleged that the medical

treatments administered by the aid workers have killed people, rather than the Ebola

virus. Residents claim that the aid workers are exacerbating the medical situation in

order to make profits. Reports indicate that MSF volunteers returned to the area on

April 11.

In Mali, the Ministry of Health has reported six suspected cases, two of which have

tested negative for the virus. The remaining cases in Mali are unconfirmed. In Mali’s

capital, Bamako, on April 4-5, residents of Lassa Quarter in the 4th Commune

demonstrated violently against the announcement that a quarantine facility for

suspected Ebola cases would be established in their neighborhood. On April 5, they

marched through the streets and burned the residence of a local government official.

In Ivory Coast, one suspected case of Ebola has been reported at the Central University

Hospital (CHU) in Treichville, Abidjan. The man arrived in Abidjan and presented

symptoms on the evening of April 9. Samples for confirmation are currently being

tested, and medical teams in the capital have reportedly been placed on alert. In Ghana,

the Ministry of Health has ruled out a suspected case of Ebola in a girl who died in

Kumasi City. Thus, no confirmed cases of Ebola have been reported in Ghana. In Sierra

Leone, there have been no new reported cases beyond the two unconfirmed cases

previously recorded. On April 9, reports emerged of possible Ebola cases in Morocco.

However, the Moroccan Ministry of Health denied these reports, stating that there are

no suspected or confirmed cases of the virus in the country.

The WHO and French Red Cross have reported that they are undertaking increased

emergency training sessions aimed at stemming the spread of the Ebola outbreak. These


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initiatives aim to train local volunteers and health professionals to teach them how

implement necessary disinfection procedures and garner their efforts to track down

individuals who may have come into contact with the disease. WHO is also establishing a

special alert and response operation center for the Ebola outbreak with the Guinean

Health Ministry.

Countries across Africa, including Togo, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, DRC and Congo-

Brazzaville, have announced the implementation of precautionary measures to stem the

spread of the virus. These measures include setting up monitoring systems at borders

and entry points, including airports, which will screen the cross border flow of people,

especially those coming from affected countries. Gambian authorities have informed

airlines that they will not accept flights which have picked up passengers from Guinea,

Liberia or Sierra Leone, three of the countries where suspected cases of Ebola have been

reported.

France has deployed medical teams to the Conakry International Airport in order to

minimize the risk of infected people travelling from Guinea to France. French Minister of

Social Affairs has maintained that there are no cases of Ebola on French soil.

Senegal has implemented increased surveillance and precautionary measures at the

Leopold Sedar Senghor International Airport in Dakar on all flights originating in

countries currently reporting suspected cases of Ebola. Upon landing in Dakar,

passengers and flight crews will be asked to report all suspicious medical symptoms

before disembarking. Additionally, emergency medical and sanitizing kits will be

provided on all flights. Senegal’s border with Guinea remains closed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Those operating or residing in West Africa, particularly in Guinea, Liberia, Mali, and

Sierra Leone, where suspected cases have been reported, are strongly advised to

practice heightened health precautions and proper hygiene due to the Ebola outbreak.

2. We advise to reconsider travel to Guinea’s capital Conakry, and to avoid all travel to the

country’s southeastern forest region, Liberia’s northern regions and Sierra Leone’s

border regions as Ebola cases have been confirmed in those areas.

3. Check with your health provider to determine necessary health protocols for travel in

West Africa.



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EXTREME RISK

CAR

Chad pulls out of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African

Republic (MISCA) as the U.N. augments its peacekeeping mission.

Attacks against troops of the international mission continue, underscoring further

deterioration of security in outlying areas.

We advise against all travel to the CAR at this time due to the volatile security situation

in the country. If travel is unavoidable, it is advised to remain within the confines of the

Bangui M’Poko International Airport compound.


ASSESSMENTS

Chad pulls out from MISCA mission as U.N. establishes peacekeeping mission

On April 3, the Republic of Chad announced its withdrawal from MISCA. Chad’s

withdrawal from the MISCA mission came in the aftermath of a March 29 incident in the

PK12 neighborhood of Bangui, the CAR's capital. According to reports, Chadian troops

allegedly returned fire in a crowded market after facing a grenade attack, resulting in the

deaths of at least 24 people. A subsequent United Nations inquiry into the March 29

event concluded that the Chadian soldiers were not provoked but acted in an offensive

matter.

The public outcry and United Nations report condemning the actions of the Chadian

soldiers prompted a negative reaction in N'Djemena, Chad's capital. Following the

outcry, numerous Chadian officials stated that their soldiers were targets of a media

campaign seeking to discredit them in the eyes of the world. Chad's announcement of its

departure from the MISCA framework occurred while Chadian President Idriss Deby was

attending an African Union-European Union summit in Brussels. We therefore assess

that European and African leaders, most notably French President Francois Hollande,

were unsuccessful in convincing President Deby that Chad’s continued presence in the

MISCA mission was critical to both Chad and the future stability of CAR.

That said, while Chad has begun its troop withdrawals in Bangui and some areas of the

CAR, it is unlikely that Chad will entirely evacuate the country. Chadian forces will most

likely redeploy in areas where they had previously unilaterally deployed apart from

MISCA, most specifically in the northern and predominantly Muslim areas.

Consequently, we assess that the partial withdrawal will complicate the ability of the

international mission to stabilize CAR, as the chain of command between the MISCA

forces and Chadian troops remaining in CAR will be unclear. This will likely be most

evident as French Sangaris and African Union troops deploy to the northern regions of

CAR to launch disarmament campaigns for Christian anti-balaka and Muslim ex-Seleka

rebels.

Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution

authorizing the deployment of 10,000 military and 1,800 police personnel to the CAR on

April 10. The resolution augments the existing mission, in addition to enabling French


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troops to use all means necessary to provide support to the new United Nations

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA). The future U.N.

peacekeeper deployment will take over from the 2,000 French and 6,000 African Union

forces currently on the ground in the country. However, the U.N. mission has been

slated to be launched in mid-September, provoking criticism from international

observers. In light of this, we assess that the slow pace at which the new U.N. mission

will begin will likely enable current levels of instability to persist in the weeks and

months ahead.

Attacks against international troops persist, underscore further deterioration of security in

outlying areas.

On April 8, clashes between Christian anti-balaka militiamen and Muslim ex-Seleka

rebels in the Kemo Prefecture, 300 km north of Bangui, resulted in the deaths of at least

30 people – many of whom were civilians. Moreover, reports indicate that on April 10

armed Muslim youth reportedly opened fire and threw rocks at French Sangaris and

African intervention forces deployed to a hospital in Bria, 400 km northeast of Bangui,

resulting in the injuries of several soldiers.

As the April 8 clashes occurred both outside of Bangui and in the center of the country,

we assess that it may highlight an evolution in the conflict, with violent Muslim-Christian

clashes occurring outside of Bangui. This is most likely as the international mission

strengthens its control over Bangui and the remaining Muslim Central Africans leave the

capital. Therefore, we assess that there will be a further increase in clashes between

anti-balaka and ex-Seleka forces in outlying areas of the country in the weeks and

months ahead.

Moreover, the attacks by Muslims on April 10 against the international forces in Bria

underscore the wider negative sentiment towards the international troop presence. We

assess that this is likely because of the widespread opinion that the international

community failed to act swiftly enough in order to prevent the ethnic cleansing of CAR’s

Muslim population. As such, we assess that anger and resentment within both Christian

and Muslim communities directed against the intervention will continue prompt further

unrest against international mission in both Bangui and outlying areas of the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We continue to advise against all travel to the CAR at this time given extreme security risks

and volatility. If travel is unavoidable, it is advised to remain within the confines of the

Bangui M’Poko International Airport compound.



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EXTREME RISK

Somalia

Two Western U.N. workers killed at Galkayo Airport while Turkish engineers seriously

wounded in rocket attack in Mogadishu, highlighting extreme risks posed to foreigners.

AMISOM and Somali forces continue to regain territory amid ongoing offensive against

al-Shabaab, as Islamists' targeted attacks and counter raids against lost bases persist.

We advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland

and Somaliland regions, which is for essential purposes only, due to the volatile security

situation in the country.


ASSESSMENTS

Attacks against foreigners

A British police officer and a French researcher working for the U.N. Drug and Crime

Agency (UNODC) were shot and killed on April 7 by an assailant dressed in military

uniform at the Abdullahi Yusuf International Airport (GLK) in Galkayo, located 575 km

northeast of Mogadishu in central Somalia. The assailant, who was armed with an AK47

rifle, initially fled the scene, but was later apprehended. Following the incident, the U.N.

began evacuating international staff from the Bosaso, Garowe and Galkayo cities in the

semi autonomous region of Puntland in northeast Somalia. U.N. staff reportedly

requested the evacuation, fearing chronic insecurity and the increasing attacks against

U.N. and other international aid agencies’ workers.

The UNODC is responsible for repatriating convicted Somali pirates from neighboring

countries and has been involved in the reconstruction of prisons for pirates in Puntland

and Somaliland. Additionally, the two Westerners killed were reportedly experts on

tracing illicit money flows and finding links between money transfer systems and piracy

networks. Given the entrenchment of piracy networks in these two aforementioned

regions, we assess that there remains an increased probability that the workers were

killed for their challenge to these criminal networks. That said, foreign nationals working

in Somalia, including Westerners and Africans, are frequently targeted by the al-Shabaab

Islamist militant group. Independent of the motive behind the April 7 attack, the incident

highlights the variety of threats posed to foreigners as well as the entrenchment of

criminal and militant networks throughout Somalia, including within the security forces.

Furthermore, the U.N. decision to evacuate international staff from the major towns in

Puntland underlines the increased volatility in the region, which is partly elevated due to

a migration of al-Shabaab militants northwards, who are fleeing the ongoing African

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) offensive against the group in southern and central

Somalia.

On April 10, militants fired multiple rockets at the construction site of the new Turkish

Embassy building in Mogadishu, seriously wounding two Turkish engineers working at

the site. Sources indicate that several security guards at the construction site were also


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arrested after an alleged failed assassination attempt against a Turkish construction

manager. The attack on the construction site of the new Turkish Embassy comes after

repeated threats against Turkish nationals from al-Shabaab, in addition to a car bombing

by al-Shabaab in July 2013 against the Turkish Embassy complex, which killed four

people. We assess that the attack on Turkish citizens is likely due to the fact that Turkey

is one of the most prominent foreign countries in Somalia, having had an active embassy

since mid-2011, in addition to large investments in aid and infrastructure development

in the country. These investments have been viewed by al-Shabaab as helping to

entrench the Somali Federal Government and normalize the running of the areas under

the control of the central administration. In light of the past rhetoric and the April 10

attack, we assess that the militant Islamic group will likely attempt further attacks

against the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu as well as against Turkish and other foreign

nationals throughout Somalia. Such attacks may be conducted through the use of mortar

shelling, vehicle laden explosive devices as well as suicide bombings coupled with

subsequent militant gunfire, underscoring al-Shabaab's persistent capabilities in the

capital despite significant setbacks over recent weeks due to the international forces'

offensive against the group.

Counterinsurgency offensive against al-Shabaab continues

Amid the intensification of the joint AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) offensive

against the Islamist militants in southern and central regions, several clashes have

occurred over the past week. On April 5, Ethiopian contingencies of AMISOM reportedly

attacked and seized numerous al-Shabaab bases in the southwestern Bakool Region,

leaving an undisclosed number of casualties. Moreover, SNA officials claimed that at

least 15 al-Shabaab militants were killed and dozens injured on April 10 following heavy

clashes with AMISOM and SNA forces in the central region of Galgaduud. The fighting

reportedly took place on the outskirts of El Bur, which is the second largest city in

Galgaduud and a previous stronghold of al-Shabaab, from where the Islamist were

ousted from last month. Several Burundian troops and at least five bystanders were

killed by a suspected roadside bomb on April 9 that targeted a military convoy near an

African Union (A.U.) base in Lower Juba’s port city of Kismayo. In Mogadishu, a bomb

planted under the car of the Wadajir District Secretary was detonated as he was driving

through the Hodan District in the morning hours of April 9.

Given that El Bur was one of al-Shabaab's major commercial hubs in the central regions,

their ousting from the city constitutes a significant blow to the insurgent's previous hold

of the area as well as al-Shabaab's ability to keep a continuous money flow, in order to

finance their operations. AMISOM and SNA have experienced increased successes over

the past weeks in regaining territory formerly held by the Islamist militants, and reports

indicate that more than ten strategic towns, previously under al-Shabaab control, have

been liberated. Having been driven out of these areas, al-Shabaab has increasingly

targeted AMISOM and government forces in outlying areas and former strongholds of

the group throughout the country, mainly through the use of ambushes and guerilla

tactics. Therefore, we assess that such assaults on security forces will likely continue

over the coming weeks, focusing on outlying areas in the southern and central regions.


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Moreover, such attacks may focus on Galgadud and other central regions as the

militants appear to be attempting to flee northwards from the South and Southeast,

where they were largely based in the past. Given the loss of infrastructure and stable

bases from which to operate, the group’s ability to coordinate sophisticated and well-

planned attacks will likely be heavily impeded. Additionally, AMISOM and government

forces will likely persist in their offensives into areas where al-Shabaab fighters are

operating, forcing them into a constant retaliate mode.

The recent deployment of more than 400 additional Ugandan troops to safeguard

Mogadishu has worked to significantly decrease the instances of militant attacks in the

capital. That said, following heavy losses to AMISOM and SNA forces in outlying

southern and central regions over the last month, al-Shabaab is likely seeking to

demonstrate its residual strength in the capital. As a result, since the beginning of April

there has been a slight resurgence of attacks in the capital, including IEDs targeting

various prominent individuals, including clerics, professors, and politicians as well as the

rocket attack against the construction site of the Turkish Embassy on April 10. Thus, we

assess that in spite of significant setbacks over the past month, al-Shabaab still retains

limited ability to carry out operations and stage attacks in the capital, mainly due to

their previous entrenchment in Mogadishu and its surrounding environs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We advise against all travel to Mogadishu at this time. If travel to Mogadishu is

necessary, we advise against travel outside of the Mogadishu International Airport

(Aden Adde International Airport – MGQ).

2. We advise against all travel to Somalia, at this time with the exception of the Puntland

and Somaliland regions, which is for essential purposes only, due to the volatile security

situation in the country.



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EXTREME RISK

South Sudan

Intermittent hostilities between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and rebel

forces allied under former vice president Riek Machar have continued in Jonglei and

Upper Nile States amidst defections from the army, indicating likely continued attrition

warfare over the coming weeks.

Reported aerial bombardments by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in Unity State

underscore the government's pursuit of new allies to defeat the rebellion.

Negotiations in Addis Ababa have been postponed until April 22, while the U.S. has

approved sanctions against South Sudanese leaders; indicative of international

community's attempt to pressure the two sides to make progress in talks.

It is advised to restrict travel to the country to Juba at this time given persistent

insecurity in outlying areas due to residual volatility from the recent internal conflict.


ASSESSMENTS

Rebels score successes, army faces defections as fighting poised to continue in coming

weeks

Rebels claimed to have killed 35 soldiers from the SPLA and the Ugandan People’s

Defense Force (UPDF) on March 29 when they attempted to attack positions in Obel and

Dolieb Hills in Panyikang County south of Malakal, and near the cities of Aleleo (Lele) and

Werjuok, in Upper Nile State. Reports further indicate that 36 civilians were killed and 31

sustained injuries in rebel attacks on Padiet village in Duk County, Jonglei State in late

March. Furthermore, on April 9, rebels attacked army positions near Malakal, in Kaka

and Wodikana in Manyo County, near the state's Paloich oil fields, routing the army

from the area and killing a commanding officer.

This series of rebel successes come in the midst of confirmed defections of several high

ranking security officers in Western Bahr el Ghazal to the rebels and allegations that the

paramount chief of Acholi corridor in Eastern Equatoria's Magwi County is mobilizing

tens of thousands to join the rebellion. Furthermore, army spokesperson Philip Aguer

has stated that the rebels have started organizing in Jonglei State and are planning on

attacking the state capital of Bor; additionally, Machar continues to reiterate his goal of

targeting and controlling oil installations so as to stem the government's main source of

finance.

The SPLA's loss of strategically significant territory in oil-rich Upper Nile State is a critical

setback while also serving as a demoralizing factor to government soldiers. We assess

that the SPLA is increasingly concerned of new defections to the rebels, particularly as

these defections have occurred in areas which have mostly been removed from the

country's internal conflict since December.

We further assess that some of the defections have likely been caused by widespread

lack of pay and allegedly poor conditions in the army camps, including insufficient

supplies. Meanwhile, another contributing factor in defections may be that ethnic


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groups that are not from or strongly allied with the Dinka-majority government perceive

themselves to be less compelled to fight a war that has becoming increasingly a power

struggle between the Dinka and Nuer populations.

By contrast, the vast majority of the rebel forces are comprised of the Nuer tribe, many

of whom view the rebellion as a struggle for greater recognition and power for their

ethnic group. Thus, the rebels are relatively united behind a shared and strongly emotive

cause. We assess that the rebels' continued ability to defeat government troops has also

boosted morale and strengthened their belief that they stand a credible chance of

withstanding this attrition warfare in order to eventually pressure the government for

territorial or power concessions.

SAF aerial bombardments

On April 7, the Sudanese Air Force (SAF) carried out a series of aerial bombardments in

Unity State, targeting Nem Boma and Panyang Payam in Pariang County, as well as

Mayom and Koch County. Following the bombardments, Juba warned that Khartoum's

military action was viewed as "unusual movement" and could jeopardize relations

between the countries. Sudan responded by denying the SAF's engagement in hostilities

or movements over South Sudanese territory.

The disputed aerial bombardments followed a meeting in Khartoum between Sudanese

President Omar al-Bashir and his southern counterpart, Salva Kiir, in which the two

discussed improving joint border controls and protecting oilfields. Kiir also allegedly

asked Bashir to support his stance against the participation of seven formerly detained

rebel leaders in peace negotiations.

In spite of both Juba and Khartoum's subsequent statements concerning the SAF

bombing, we assess it as likely that the governments orchestrated the military operation

in mutual cooperation. This assessment is based on the shared objectives discussed

during the meeting two days prior to the attack as well as the fact that Juba's

condemnation of the SAF operation was relatively toned down in comparison to

previous instances in which South Sudan very strongly decried Khartoum's military

operations inside its borders. Both governments have strong incentives to dislodge

rebels from the oil-producing areas of Upper Nile and Unity States as their economies

are almost entirely dependent on normalized oil flows.

Thus, we assess that Juba's public condemnation of the SAF's bombardments and

Khartoum's denial of these operations were staged performances to deflect criticism

from their respective populations against their cooperation, given the decades long

belligerent relations between the Sudans. Altogether, there is potential for further,

limited Sudanese military operations against the rebels at Juba's request, particularly

given Kiir's growing realization that the rebels appear to be too strong to conclusively

defeat using the SPLA alone.

That said, Khartoum's involvement will likely need to be fairly covert as the international

community is unlikely to support its exacerbation of the country's internal conflict.

Furthermore, Kiir could face popular discontent with his willingness to accept support

from the regime in Khartoum. Additionally, it should be noted that any strengthening of

ties between the Sudans could jeopardize Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's strong


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support for Kiir, given the long history of power play between Kampala and Khartoum,

with each supporting rebel movements against the other's regime.

Stalled negotiations, U.S. attempts to pressure with sanctions unlikely to be successful

While negotiations in Addis Ababa have been postponed repeatedly due to the two

sides' failure to compromise on several mutually exclusive demands, the U.S. President

Barack Obama signed an executive order on April 3, authorizing U.S. banks to freeze the

assets of specific South Sudanese leaders, regardless of their allegiance in the conflict.

The individuals were selected as they are deemed responsible for human rights abuses,

attacks against U.N. peacekeepers, or for obstructing the peace process. Although the

U.S. likely approved these sanctions out of an attempt to pressure for a breakthrough in

the diplomatic deadlock, we assess that neither side will be dissuaded by the economic

pressure in the coming weeks. As each side retains allies, we assess that they will be able

to circumvent sanctions in order to continue to be able to procure funding and weapons

to continue their military operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is advised to restrict travel to the country to Juba given increased security risks in

outlying areas at this time due to residual volatility from the recent internal conflict.

2. We advise against all travel to the northeastern states of Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile

in light of potential for unrest in these areas in relation to the internal conflict.

3. We advise against travel to the country's northern border regions with Sudan, including

the Abyei region, given persistent rebel and criminal activities in these areas.



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HIGH RISK

Mali

A new PM and cabinet named by President IBK indicative of importance of reconciliation

talks despite ongoing deadlock, likely motivated by persistent militancy in northern

regions.

We continue to advise against nonessential travel to Mali at this time. If essential, it is

advised to limit travel to Bamako.


ASSESSMENTS

Cabinet reshuffling indicative of renewed emphasis on national reconciliation

On April 5, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) named Moussa Mara as the new

Prime Minister, as Oumar Tatam Ly reportedly resigned. Sources differ on the reasons

that caused the appointment of Mara with some reports indicating that Tatam Ly was

fired by IBK due to differing opinions. Moussa Mara, a young politician who is

understood to be a close ally of IBK, has already deemed national reconciliation as his

main priority. We assess that the change in Prime Minister is unlikely to have broad

effects on Mali’s political arena, with IBK remaining largely in charge of government

decisions, which has been reported as being one of the reasons for Tatam Ly's

resignation.

Additionally, a cabinet reshuffling was conducted, with slight changes being announced,

including the designation of a new Minister for National Reconciliation, Zahabi Ould Sidi

Mohamed. Mohamed is a former rebel originally from Timbuktu, who served as Minister

of Foreign Affairs before the reshuffling. We assess that IBK’s decision to assign

Mohamed to the reconciliation ministry highlights renewed efforts to resume

negotiations with the northern rebel movements and yield concrete developments.

While intermittent U.N. led negotiation summits have been held in Bamako in recent

weeks, not all the involved players were present, most notably the Movement for the

National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was not represented. Moreover, the MNLA has

gone abroad in search of additional support from foreign partners, including Russia and

Italy, underscoring their search for international backing. That said, we assess that

Mohamed’s rebel past, and ties to Timbuktu, are likely to render him more legitimate

and thus will potentially help lead into talks with the participation of all Tuareg rebel

groups.

The government’s renewed emphasis on the need for national reconciliation is likely to

due to the continued instability in the northern region due to the resurgence of militant

groups. Reports on April 11 indicate that ongoing French and African counter-militancy

operations, particularly in the regions of Timbuktu and Kidal, are specifically aimed at

halting this resurgence, and have resulted in the seizing of a significant weapons depot

and dozens of arrests.

That said, militant groups continue to successfully carry out attacks, including rocket

attacks in Kidal on April 7. According to Malian and French military sources, the rockets


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targeted a French and a Malian military base, as well as a school. The attacks did not

cause any damage or casualties. According to reports, the rockets were launched by

members of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), a splinter

group of Al -Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), who have taken responsibility for

past attacks in the area. The last rocket attack on Kidal occurred on January 24, and thus,

this latest incident further underscores ongoing militancy in northern Mali, highlighting a

resurgence of Islamic jihadist groups in the country.

We assess that governmental efforts to advance reconciliation talks are likely motivated

by the desire to reach an agreement with the Tuareg rebels which may result in a partial

return of stability to the north. Moreover, an agreement would provide the government

greater international backing, and support in the ongoing fight against militancy. That

said, numerous challenges remain ahead of a negotiated settlement with Tuareg rebels,

and thus northern instability, particularly caused by ongoing militancy, is likely to

continue in the coming months.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We continue to advise against nonessential travel to Mali due to the volatile security

situation at this time.

2. If travel is necessary, refrain from leaving Bamako due to the increased security risks.

Practice heightened vigilance at all times.

3. If in Mali, avoid all political demonstrations and large gatherings as a general security

precaution, given the possibility of potentially violent unrest erupting.

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

April 21, 2014

Easter Monday

National public holiday meaning that

Government services, public schools

and offices will be closed. Those

operating or residing in Mali are advised

to anticipate interruptions to business

continuity given the expected closures.

Allot for traffic congestions and travel

delays in urban centers, given the

likelihood of celebrations taking place in

the streets and throughout other public

areas.



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HIGH RISK

Nigeria

Despite the Nigerian military's claims of significant defeats of Boko Haram cells and

recovery of weapons caches, the militant group has shown an ability to evolve by

increasing operations in a wider geographical range and choosing weak targets to

maximize casualty count.

Despite a signed ceasefire between rival ethnic communities, mass casualty attacks in

the Middle Belt have continued; meanwhile, harsh crackdown by Nigerian military

personnel could increasingly frequent and deadly violence.

Almost 200 locals were killed in two separate attacks in Zamfara state by unknown

assailants dressed in military uniforms and riding motorbikes, prompting sharp

conjecture as to the identity and motives of the attackers.

Travel to Lagos and Abuja may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and

following general security protocols.


ASSESSMENTS

Boko Haram's evolution underscores unlikelihood of group's defeat in coming months

Between mid-February to mid-March, the Nigerian Military claimed to kill over 300 Boko

Haram militants while recovering several heavy weapons caches and routing the group

from many of its traditional strongholds in Borno State. Yet, in the first two weeks of

April, the group has carried out several attacks, which are notable due to both the

sophistication of strategy and the geographical span of the group's operating area.

On April 1, alleged Boko Haram militants attempted to stage a suicide bombing at a fuel

station of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in Maiduguri, with the

military immobilizing three explosive laden vehicles, before one exploded at a

checkpoint. The explosion killed fifteen civilians and six militants, with 17 others

reported injured. This attack, which was the only attempted assault on Maiduguri during

this period, was only partially successful. Yet the fact that the group was able to produce

such a large amount of explosives materials, with the intention of detonating them at a

major fuel station, which would have maximized the casualties, underscores the sharp

strategic aptitude of the group's leadership.

Boko Haram's leaders have shown an ability throughout the state of emergency since

May 2013 to continue to plan high profile attacks that send psychological shockwaves

through both the population and, likely, the ranks of the soldiers. We assess that the

impact of these attacks, whether foiled or not, is significant on the population in the

north and causes many to be too intimidated to cooperate with security forces, thus

hindering counterinsurgency operations.

In addition to this Maiduguri operation, the group's other notable attacks in Borno

included four near-simultaneous assaults on four locales in Borno on April 10-11 in

which 135 people died. The locations of the attacks, including three outlying villages and


Pag

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a road ambush of a student convoy, underscore Boko Haram's common modus operandi

to choose particularly vulnerable targets, which do not have protection of security

forces. In this way, the militants can ensure that the attacks will be successful and also

result in high casualties so as to create an exaggerated impression of their strength and

conceal the likelihood that they are somewhat weakened by the military's recent

offensives.

The rest of Boko Haram's activities in April have indicated a concerted effort to expand

their territory of operations outside of the group's traditional stronghold of Borno State.

On April 5, the group killed 20 worshippers at a mosque in Buni Gari, 100 km south of

Damaturu, Yobe State. On April 10, a reported 200 militant blew up a police station in

Gwaram town, Jigawa State. The attacks in these states were notable as Boko Haram's

activities in 2014 have been almost entirely restricted to Borno State, and, to a lesser

extent, Adamawa State.

Furthermore, in April, Cameroonian security forces announced the discovery of a large

Boko Haram rear base in Abugasse, Cameroon, near the border with Chad, in which 280

rifles, 35 RPGs and several IEDs were recovered as well as men arrested in possession of

over 50 Cameroonian passports and suspected of supplying weapons to Boko Haram.

This raid was followed by reports that Boko Haram has increased its recruitment of

Cameroonian youths over recent months, with 200 being recruited since February.

These incidents indicate the group's serious efforts to secure weapons supply channels

as well as entrench itself in Cameroon from where it will be more easily able to either

launch cross-border attacks against Nigeria or increase militancy in the Extreme North

region of Cameroon.

Thus, as the military employs more intensive measures to rout Boko Haram from Borno

State, we assess that the group, rather than being defeated, will establish operations in

surrounding regions of Nigeria and across the borders of Niger and Cameroon. Similarly,

increased counterinsurgency measures in northeastern Nigeria may lead to the

expansion of the Boko Haram theater of operations into other areas of Nigeria,

particularly the volatile Middle Belt region. We assess that the efforts of Nigerian

security forces may mitigate the occurrence of mass-casualty, high profile attacks in

northeastern Nigeria in the short term. However, Boko Haram has proven itself to be a

highly adaptable organization, thus Nigerian counterinsurgency forces will likely

continue to struggle to combat the group’s rapidly shifting tactics.

The coming days and weeks will be a critical test of the extent to which Boko Haram’s

capabilities have been weakened by the recent intensification of counterinsurgency

measures. Thus, if the military has achieved significant gains against the Islamist group,

we assess that Boko Haram may revert to its previous tactics of limited attacks in

outlying regions while regrouping for continued high profile attacks.

Middle Belt violence continues

The Nigerian military launched a major offensive against criminal gangs in the Middle

Belt states of Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau on March 31. While the stated aim of this

operation is to put an end to criminal and gang related violence, we assess that the

security forces are in fact referring to ethnic violence between Fulani herdsmen and


Pag

e08

local farmers that has increased in recent weeks in the Middle Belt region and resulted

in hundreds of deaths. This assessment is supported by the reports that on April 3, 30

Fulani villagers were killed in an attack by government forces in the vicinity of Keana

Town in Nasarawa State. The soldiers allegedly opened fire indiscriminately, killing many

elderly people who were unable flee.

Although the government's involvement in the Middle Belt is positive given the general

lack of interference in this region's common intercommunal violence, we assess that

such heavy-handed tactics, reportedly against non-combatants, is likely to further

exacerbate the already raised tensions in the area. This may result in attacks against

security forces and government installations in the Middle Belt in addition to allegations

that the government is unfairly targeting certain ethnic communities more than others.

Given the fact that the aforementioned massacre of villagers occurred in a Fulani

settlement, there is potential for Nigerian Muslims to claim that the government is

persecuting the Muslim Fulani population rather than also bringing the Fulani's largely

Christian rival farming communities to justice.

Elsewhere in the Middle Belt, leaders of Tiv, Fulani, Jukun and Hausa communities in

Taraba State signed a peace agreement on April 5 in a bid to prevent further inter-

communal violence. However, on April 8, Jukun gunmen attacked a village in Wukari

Local Government Area (LGA), killing 10 and burning 20 houses, and Fulani herdsmen

attacked three Tiv farming communities in Logo LGA on April 11. Thus, these two attacks

involving signatory communities to the peace agreement indicate that not all members

of the aforementioned ethnic groups were in agreement on the signing of the peace

accord. Given this, we assess segments of these groups will continue to attack rival

communities, thus sparking likely reprisal attacks. These ongoing tit-for-tat clashes are

likely to jeopardize the peace agreement. Furthermore, they indicate the persistent

difficulties in establishing long-lasting peace amongst the communities in the Middle

Belt.

Mysterious attacks in Zamfara

The two attacks by heavily armed assailants in separate villages in Zamfara State on April

3 and 5, allegedly resulted in 26 and more than 150 deaths respectively. In the first

attack witnesses claimed that the attackers wore Nigerian military uniforms, and in both

attacks the assailants rode motorbikes.

Violence in Zamfara State typically results from ethnic rivalries and competition over

scarce land and resources. However, use of heavy weaponry and motorbikes by

assailants in this most recent attack is not compatible with previous instances of inter-

communal violence. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the attack was carried out by

members of a militant insurgency, possibly Boko Haram or Ansaru. Alternatively, the

possession of weapons may indicate the entrenchment of arms trading routes across

northern and western Africa and the increasing ease and low cost of the acquisition of

weapons by tribal groups in northern Nigeria. That said, it cannot be ruled out that the

attack was carried out by, or in cooperation with members of a militant insurgency,

possibly Boko Haram or Ansaru, who are known to have significant weapons stockpiles.

Meanwhile, another interpretation of the attacks has been presented by local Zamfara


Pag

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leaders where the attacks occurred. The village leader of the site of the second attack

claims that the assailants are part of criminal rings in the area that steal livestock and

demand communities to pay them in order to prevent attacks. The Zamfara leader has

alleged that government officials are aware of the criminals' activities but do nothing to

prevent them. While these allegations remain uncorroborated, given the high

sophistication of Nigerian criminal networks coupled with frequently reported instances

of corruption in various levels of the government and collusion with criminals, we assess

that these claims could be credible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Lagos and Abuja may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and

following general security protocols.

2. We continue to advise against all travel to the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno,

and Yobe, given the ongoing Islamist insurgency and extreme insecurity in the region.

3. We advise against all nonessential travel to outlying regions of northern Nigeria and the

Middle Belt region, given the high level of insecurity in these areas.

4. Avoid the vicinity of large demonstrations or public gatherings in Nigeria due to the

increased potential for unrest.



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MEDIUM RISK

Burkina Faso

A successful rally by the new opposition, the Movement of People for Progress (MPP),

and a large gathering by government supporters in favor of a referendum providing

President Compaore an additional mandate highlight ongoing political tensions.

Travel to Burkina Faso may continue at this time while adhering to basic security

precautions and avoiding nonessential travel outside of the capital, Ouagadougou.


ASSESSMENTS

Government and opposition supporters mobilize, highlighting ongoing political tensions

The newly formed opposition party, the Movement of People for Progress (MPP),

concluded its founding congress on April 6 with a large event at Ouagadougou's

Municipal Stadium. The event was deemed a success, having been attended by over

25,000 people, indicating the MPP's growing popularity and mobilization. The MPP,

which was created by 75 recently resigned members of President Compaore's ruling

party, the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP), reiterated its opposition to a

revision of the constitution as well as an additional mandate by the current president.

Meanwhile, supporters and members of the ruling coalition held a large gathering at

Wobi stadium on April 12 in the country's second largest city, Bobo Dioulasso. The event

was reportedly attended by over 50,000 people, who stated their support for a

referendum dealing with whether President Compaore should be able to run for an

additional mandate.

Political tensions were at their highest following President Compaore's statements in the

city of Dori in December 2013, regarding the holding of a referendum should the

congress not agree to a revision of the constitution extending presidential mandates.

Tensions have remained elevated since then particularly in the wake of large opposition

protests on January 18 in several major urban centers in the country, as well as the

creation of the MPP. That said, while political rhetoric has remained centered on the

issue, there seems to have been a slight lull in actions related to the upcoming 2015

elections by the pro-Compaore camp, particularly with a lack of further comments by

the president. That said, the April 12 rally serves as a reminder that Compaore continues

to enjoy broad public and political support, indicating that the calls for his replacement

by the opposition will continue to result in societal and political divides. Furthermore,

with efforts by mediators for national dialogue having failed several weeks ago, these

large rallies serve as a reminder that political divisions have remained salient.

Finally, we assess that additional political rallies are likely to be held in the coming

weeks, with societal and political divisions unlikely to result in unrest at this time,

despite the fact that tensions will remain significant. That said, as elections grow closer,

the government and President Compaore will be obligated to decide which course to

choose, whether to force through with a referendum or whether to find another

politically negotiated settlement. That said, at this time, there remain no other options


Pag

e20

for Compaore to obtain an additional mandate but the referendum as political and social

institutions remain mobilized against the revision of the constitution.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Burkina Faso may continue at this time while adhering to basic security

precautions and avoiding nonessential travel outside of the capital, Ouagadougou.

2. We advise against non-essential overland travel in outlying areas of the country due to

elevated criminal activity.

3. Those operating or residing in Burkina Faso are advised to avoid the vicinity of any large

gatherings and protests, given the potential for unrest.


April 21, 2014

Easter Monday

National public holiday, meaning that

government services, public schools and

offices will be closed. Those operating

or residing in Burkina Faso are advised



Allot for traffic congestion and travel




areas.



Pag

e22

MEDIUM RISK

Burundi

On April 8, the U.N. expressed its belief in reports that the ruling CNDD-FDD has been

arming and training Hutu youth militias, or Imbonerakure, affiliated with its party over

recent months. The worrying implications of Burundi's highly elevated political and

ethnic tensions were further underscored by the U.S. urging of President Nkurunziza to

abandon his attempts to change the constitution or risk a return to "the dark days of its

past."

Travel to Bujumbura can continue while adhering to increased security protocols

regarding criminality.


ASSESSMENTS

Growing international concern amidst reports of armament of Hutu militias

The U.N. supported its public statements about armament of the Hutu Imbonerakure

militias with reports that weapons stocks and 500 police uniforms have disappeared and

been redistributed in several provinces. The U.N. also cited radio transmissions from

popular stations that the Hutu population should make itself “ready.” U.N. Secretary

General Ban Ki-moon has reportedly called President Nkurunziza to discuss these

developments. Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Samantha Power, has publicly

called for international intervention in Burundi, stating that the U.S. will provide $7.5

million to help Burundi organize presidential elections in 2015.

The president of the CNDD-FDD has denied the party’s involvement in distributing arms

to the Imbonerakure, and he asserted that the generals of the army are responsible for

supervising arms and uniform distribution. Furthermore, the party elaborated that the

party "denies once again that there are no preparations for genocide in Burundi." The

dominant Tutsi political faction, Uprona, has called on the international community to

launch independent investigations of the reported armament of the Imbonerakure.

We assess that the U.N. would not have drawn public attention to the reports of missing

arms and uniforms if it did not have credible proof that these items have been

distributed to youth militias of the CNDD-FDD. Thus, these developments are significant

as they indicate militant preparations by the ruling party at a time when political

tensions in the country are particularly raised due to Nkurunziza’s plans to unilaterally

run for a third term. By arming the Imbonerakure, the CNDD-FDD is likely preparing for

armed confrontations with separate political factions. Given the deep ethnic divide

between the Hutu and Tutsi populations, we assess that any clashes are likely to assume

ethnically motivated dimensions.

Ethnic tensions between the minority Tutsi (15%) and majority Hutu (85%) have been

raised following the rift between the CNDD-FDD and the dominant Tutsi party, Uprona,

due to the latter's outspoken stance against Nkurunziza's seeking of a third mandate.

Additionally, Nkurunziza has further alienated the Tutsi population at large by his plans

to change the country's adherence to the Arusha Accords agreed to after the 12 year


Pag

e23

civil war in 2005. The agreement stipulates power sharing with the Tutsi by assuring

quotas for their representation in the government and national assembly. These actions

have likely served to make the Tutsi population feel that it is being increasingly

marginalized by the government.

Although the CNDD-FDD is one of several strong Hutu parties, many in the Tutsi

population may not distinguish between the various Hutu parties; thus, Tutsis may

assume that the Hutu population at large is turning against them. Furthermore, the

armament of the Imbonerakure is likely to stoke concern about Hutu power ambitions

and violence against Tutsis.

Uprona's head, Charles Nditije, has expressed his belief that the CNDD-FDD plans on

using the Imbonerakure to suppress opposition to the ruling party. Nditije stated that

the Hutu militias have received machetes and other weapons and military training.

Nditije further stated that there is potential for collaboration between the Imbonerakure

with Rwandan Hutu militias, or Interahamwe, who carried out the 1994 Rwandan

Genocide and now largely reside in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Given

these allegations of the Imbonerakure's genocidal intentions coupled with their

presumed aid by Rwanda's former "genocidaires", Tutsi communities may also seek to

arm themselves in preparation for open conflict. The armament of both communities

would be poised to set off a cycle of inter-ethnic violence. In the event of a return to

large scale clashes between Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi communities, we assess that this

would carry potential to enflame underlying tensions between Hutus and Tutsis in

Rwanda as well as eastern DRC.

In spite of the government's denial of the Imbonerakure's armament and training,

incidents in outlying areas over recent months indicate that the militias are increasingly

active and coming into conflict with opposing factions of both Hutus and Tutsis in the

population. There are reports of Tutsi populations in outlying areas of Kirundo Province

fleeing to Rwanda due to increasing harassment by Imbonerakure. Tutsis claim that the

harassment has increased in tandem with rising political friction in Bujumbura, with the

Imbonerakure accusing them of harboring prominent political dissidents.

However, the Imbonerakure have reportedly not restricted their activities to targeting

Tutsis, as there are indications of rising friction with other Hutu factions as well. On April

1, Imbonerakure and youth militias of a separate Hutu party, the Front for Democracy in

Burundi (Frodebu) clashed in Rugero, Kirundo Province, with six injured and nine

arrested. Meanwhile, in the eastern province of Ruyigi the opposition Hutu Movement

for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD) has alleged that the Imbonerakure attacks and

intimidates its members.

The Imbonerakure's conflicts with separate Hutu factions are likely motivated by a

desire to suppress these rival parties that could attempt to challenge the CNDD-FDD for

the support of the Hutu population in the 2015 elections. Given Nkurunziza's unabashed

plans for reelection in the face of widespread opposition by an array of political parties,

we assess that it is credible that he would use these loyal militias to attempt to

marginalize Hutu opponents. However, as various Hutu parties also possess their own

militia structures, we assess that any open conflict between the competing militias could

set off a protracted violent power struggle within the Hutu population.


Pag

e24

Although the international community has issued rhetoric against the aforementioned

strong indications of rising ethnic tensions and armament of paramilitary forces, we

assess that these warnings are unlikely to force the government to alter its current

unilateral focus on maintaining its hold on power at any cost. Given the international

community's preoccupation with other security and humanitarian crises on the

continent, such as the internal conflicts in Central African Republic and South Sudan, we

assess that there will be little coordinated attempt to interfere in Burundi's growing

political crisis or affect changes in the regime's actions. Thus, we continue to assess that

Burundi faces increasing destabilization in the coming months due to mounting political

tensions amongst rival Hutu factions and between the Hutu and Tutsi populations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Bujumbura can continue while adhering to increased security protocols

regarding criminality.

2. We advise against travel to outlying areas including overland travel due to general

security threats and low security infrastructure in such regions.

3. If traveling in Burundi, it is advised to avoid discussing politics or asserting opinions that

could be interpreted as critical of the government.

4. It is advised to properly vet and hire sufficient facility security personnel. At-risk persons

are advised to retain security personnel when conducting all overland travel in Burundi.

5. For the duration of the rainy season until May, it is advised to monitor local weather and

minimize travel during periods of heavy rains. As a precaution, those operating or

residing in Bujumbura are advised to take the necessary steps to ensure business

continuity. This includes procuring flashlights and spare batteries, as well as checking

back-up generators if available due to the reported power outages.



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MEDIUM RISK

Kenya

Following a March 31 militant attack in Nairobi's Eastleigh area, more than 6,000

security officers have been part of a wide scale security operation to rid the area of

militants, while apprehending undocumented Somali refugees residing in Kenya.

Increased threat of militancy in Mombasa and frequent instances of sectarian unrest

prompted the U.S. Embassy to suspended official travel to the city, and it strongly

advises U.S. citizens to avoid travel to the city and its surrounding areas.

Travel to Nairobi may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security protocol

due to the threat of militancy and high levels of criminality. Essential travel to Mombasa

can continue while practicing heightened vigilance against possible militancy and

religiously motivated unrest.


ASSESSMENTS

Security operations in Eastleigh targeting Somali population

Three blasts in Nairobi's predominantly Somali neighborhood of Eastleigh on March 31,

which killed six people, prompted a large scale operation to rid the area of militants

affiliated to al-Shabaab or its Kenyan ally, al-Hijra. More than 6,000 security officers

from different units of both the police and military have taken part in the operation,

which has resulted in the detention of more than 4,000 suspected militants, although

most of the detained are refugees without proper documentation. The detainees have

been held at Nairobi's Kasarani Sport Stadium for further investigation. The police

operation against illegal immigrants has drawn severe criticism from local Muslim

communities and international human right organizations, which accuse authorities of

unfairly targeting Somalis and violating the rights of those detained. The majority of

those arrested were held temporarily before being released, however at least 200

detainees will appear in court on various charges. Kenyan police have said that

suspected illegal immigrants, or those without legal documentation, will not be

repatriated to Somalia until the due processes have been followed. Thus far, only 83 of

the arrested have been deported back to Somalia.

The security operation comes in wake of increasing reports of al-Shabaab militants

from Somalia migrating into Kenya over the past six months. Nairobi’s Eastleigh area is

host to tens of thousands of Somali refugees, making it a natural shelter for al-Shabaab

militants, who comfortably blend in with the local population. As security forces’

operations against militant networks have significantly increased over recent weeks, the

government ordered all Somali refugees living in urban centers to report to refugee

camps. We assess that the increased signs by the government to implement this move in

accordance of the ongoing security operation, may instead serve to radicalize the

increasingly disenfranchised Muslim youth of Nairobi and Mombasa, subsequently

elevating the threat of militant attacks over the coming weeks.


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The Islamist militants' ability to conduct major as well as low-level attacks in Nairobi has

been impeded by the security operation, however, this effect is likely to remain

temporary while the operation is ongoing. Therefore, we assess that the anti-terror

operations are unlikely to effectively stem militancy in Kenya's urban centers, and thus

the security threat is likely to persist over the coming months.

Mombasa unrest and threat of militancy

The perceived increased threat of militancy in Mombasa and throughout the Coastal

Region, coupled with frequent instances of religiously motivated unrest, prompted the

U.S. Embassy on April 4 to suspended official travel to the city, and to strongly advise

U.S. citizens to avoid travel to the city and its surrounding areas. The latest round of

unrest in Mombasa began on April 1, when clashes between Muslim youth and police

were reported in the Majengo area of Mombasa, particularly in the vicinity of the

Masjid Musa (Musa Mosque), following the death of radical Islamist cleric Abubakar

Shariff (also known as Makaburi). Sharif was one of two victims shot dead by unknown

assailants near the Shanzu Law Courts, located 15 kilometers north of Mombasa.

Additional violence was recorded following Friday prayers on April 4, when police and

approximately 100 Muslim youth clashed near the Musa Mosque. The youth threw rocks

at security forces, who responded with tear gas, subsequently dispersing the crowd.

Heavy security measures were implemented throughout potential friction points on

April 4 in anticipation of mass Muslim protests, however, such demonstrations did not

materialize.

Religious tensions have reached alarming levels in Mombasa following the city's latest

militant attack, which occurred on March 23 targeting the Joy in Jesus Church in the

Likoni area and left six people dead, in addition to the assassination of Makaburi on April

1. Makaburi is the latest in a string of radical clerics killed in Mombasa, most of who

have been affiliated to al-Shabaab’s Kenyan ally, al-Hijra. The Muslim community in the

city is highly organized and able to rally together hundreds of individuals to take part in

protests or riots, as evident by the many instances of sectarian unrest transpiring in the

city. Additionally, Makaburi was reportedly a mentor to the well-known Islamist militant,

Samantha Lewthwaite (also known as the White Widow), who is suspected of having

planned the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi in September 2013, which led to 67 deaths.

Sources state that Lewthwaite is believed to be planning a spate of revenge attacks

against Westerners in Kenya in light of her teacher’s death. Given Lewthwaite’s and al-

Hijra’s close cooperation with al-Shabaab militans in Somalia and Kenya, in addition to

the ongoing security operation against Somalis in Nairobi, we assess that there remains

a high probability for militant attacks in Mombasa over the coming weeks, as highlighted

by the U.S. Embassy warning. Such attacks may be conducted through the use of

grenades, IEDs, vehicle laden bombs and machine gunfire. Attractive targets for such

assaults include government or security installation and personnel, Christian places of

worship as well as locales frequented by foreigners.


Pag

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Nairobi may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security protocol

due to the threat of militancy and high levels of criminality. Essential travel to Mombasa

can continue while practicing heightened vigilance against possible militancy and

religiously motivated unrest.

2. Be aware of suspicious persons and unattended bags and packages.

3. Travelers in Kenya are advised to avoid all nonessential travel to outlying areas,

particularly to the northeastern region and border areas with Somalia, due to the high

level of insecurity.

4. Maintain heightened vigilance in the vicinity of government and security related

installations, Christian places of worship, as well as venues frequented by foreigners,

such as shopping malls, entertainment venues.

5. We advise against all nonessential travel to the vicinity of the Kenyan border with

Somalia, including Garissa, Wajir and Mandera Counties, given the reported militant

presence in the area. It is further advised to avoid all nonessential travel to the vicinity

of the Majengo area in Mombasa and Diani, Kwale County, given the potential for

religiously motivated violence and militancy.

6. Foreign nationals in Nairobi are advised to practice increased vigilance against possible

crime in light of elevated frequency of attacks in Nairobi's affluent neighborhoods by

criminal networks within the capital.

7. If traveling or residing in Kenya, it is advised to properly vet and hire sufficient facility

security personnel. At-risk persons are advised to retain security personnel when

conducting all overland travel within Nairobi due to the persistently high levels of

criminal activity throughout the city.

8. Travelers are advised to keep a low profile when traveling and to refrain from divulging

travel itinerary information to strangers.



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MEDIUM RISK

Mozambique

Attacks and abductions of foreign nationals have increased over recent weeks,

highlighting the persistent threat posed to foreigners in Mozambique.

Clashes between Renamo, government soldiers in Tete Province and attack on cargo

train in Sofala Province, while Renamo presses for talks.

Travel to Maputo may continue under stringent security protocols due to the persistent

threat of kidnapping and high level of criminal activity.


ASSESSMENTS

Attacks and abductions of foreign nationals continue, highlights threats to foreigners

Incidents of violence and abductions of foreign nationals in Mozambique have increased

in recent weeks. According to local sources, a Portuguese national was kidnapped by

armed men in Matola, a satellite city of the capital of Maputo, during the evening hours

of April 10. The kidnapping of a Portuguese national was precipitated by the abduction

of a man of unspecified East Asian descent, who was kidnapped on the centrally located

Olof Palme Avenue in downtown Maputo during the daylight hours of April 9. Lastly, on

March 29, a Belgian tourist was severely wounded in a machete attack in a village

outside of Pemba, a port city and capital of Cabo Delgado province in the north of

Mozambique.

The recent incidents highlight a growing trend of attacks and kidnappings of high-profile

persons and foreigners in Maputo and other areas of Mozambique over the past couple

of months, which underscores broader criminal activity in the country. The assailants in

the recent attacks appear to have had prior knowledge of the movement of their

victims. For example, the machete attack on the Belgian woman outside of Pemba

occurred at a remote coastal property she was residing in at the time, further

highlighting the weak security situation outside of major urban areas. However, the

kidnappings of the Portuguese and East Asian national also underline the persistent

threat of kidnappings in urban centers, as they both occurred within major urban

centers. The recent uptick in kidnappings further show the apparent weakness as well as

high levels of corruption of local security forces, as they have consistently reiterated

their commitment to cracking down on such activity numerous times in the past,

although security officers continues to be accused of being complicit in previous

abduction cases. In light of this, we assess that attacks and abductions against foreigners

are likely to continue relatively unabated in the weeks and months ahead.

Clashes in Tete Province, attack on cargo train in Sofala Province

Reports released on April 2 indicate that suspected Renamo gunmen killed at least 17

government soldiers in Gorongosa, Sofala Province on March 31. The deadly raid comes

amid an alleged attack of a cargo train belonging to the coal mining company Vale

Global, resulting in the injury of the train conductor.


Pag

e29

The majority of Renamo activities since it resumed its insurgency in October 2013 have

been concentrated to their stronghold province of Sofala, in addition to isolated

incidents in Nampula and Zambezia. However, the recent attack on government soldiers

in Tete Province, which allegedly resulted in 30 deaths, highlights Renamo's expansion of

operations northwest. Moreover, we assess that Renamo's increasing presence and

activity in Tete is a strategic calculation, as it continues to faces a heavy government

military presence in the central provinces, while security has remained weak in Tete,

allowing Renamo to operate with greater freedom there.

In addition, Renamo's incursion into Tete Province provides the armed group with direct

access to the coal mining operations of major international companies. This proximity

allows Renamo to the opportunity to derail the transport of coal on the country's main

rail line, effectively giving the group greater leverage over the government. In light of

this and the recent attack on the train of coal shipments in Sofala Province on April 2, it

is likely that investor confidence will be damaged as financial speculators continue to

express concern about the persistent threats posed by the armed group.

Thus, the recent Renamo attack in Tete Province will likely place greater pressure on the

government to both provide greater political concessions to the group while

simultaneously ramping up military operations to prevent further incidents in Tete,

which could threaten the business continuity of the coal mining sector. That said, we

further assess that there remains the potential for further Renamo attacks against

government and military targets as well as business operations along the Sena Railway in

the coming weeks, given Renamo's desire to expand outside of its traditional central

regions.

The attacks in Tete and Sofala Provinces have since prompted an increased frequency of

meeting between the Frelimo government and Renamo's delegation, as peace talks

continue to be held. According to sources, the Minister of the Interior will receive a

Renamo delegation, who requested the meeting to discuss the escalation of violence in

the center of the country, while President Guebuza called on Renamo to commit to a

ceasefire.

Given that Renamo requested the extraordinary meeting with the Mozambican

government, and that this occurs after successive attacks in Sofala and Tete Provinces by

Renamo gunmen, we assess that the meeting will be used by the armed group to press

the government for greater political concessions. It is likely that the government may

yield in certain areas given that the recent attack on the cargo train carrying coal

shipments has exacerbated concern among international investors. This is particularly

likely given that the government has agreed to several concessions to appease Renamo

over recent weeks, including the composition of the electoral commission, which was for

many months a deeply contested issue.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Maputo may continue under stringent security protocols due to the persistent

threat of kidnapping and high level of criminal activity.


Pag

e31

2. We advise avoiding nonessential travel to outlying areas, particularly in Sofala, Nampula,

Tete and Zambezia Provinces, given the potential for sporadic attacks by Renamo

militants.

3. Those operating or residing in Maputo and other large urban centers are advised to

practice increased vigilance against possible kidnappings.



Pag

e30

MEDIUM RISK

South Africa

Platinum mining companies Lonmin and Amplats issued force majeure notice to

suppliers; underscores growing impact of ongoing platinum strike.

The South Gauteng High Court dismissed an application from ruling ANC to force the

opposition D.A. to apologize for a SMS labeling President Zuma a thief.

A High Court ruling found the suspension of COSATU General Secretary Vavi

unconstitutional, possible split in union federation suspended by intervention of ruling

party leaders.

Travel to Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town can continue as normal while adhering

to heightened vigilance against possible criminality


ASSESSMENTS

AMPLATS, LONMIN issue force majeure notices

Anglo American Platinum (Amplats) and London Mining (Lonmin) have issued their

suppliers with force majeure notices, exempting themselves from contractual

obligations, due to circumstances that are beyond their control. These notices come as a

result of the ongoing prolonged platinum strike by the Association of Mineworkers and

Construction Union (AMCU). At this time both companies believe that they will be able

to fulfill their contractual responsibilities to their client by continuing to supply platinum,

and so no force majeure letters have been sent to customers.

There remain few indications that the prolonged months-long work stoppage will end,

with the parties unable to agree on a solution. The lack of progress in negotiations

suggests that there is potential for the company to declare force majeure with its

customers as well in the event that its reserves are depleted and it will be unable to

fulfill contracts.

The ongoing strikes at platinum mines in South Africa have thus far reportedly curbed

40% of global production. With the issuance of these notices, the economic impact of

the strike is set to further increase as secondary parties become affected by the work

stoppage at the mines.

South Gauteng High Court dismisses ruling party’s application to force apology from

opposition

The ruling African National Congress (ANC) applied to the High Court to force the

opposition Democratic Alliance (D.A.) to apologize for a text message campaign sent to

1.5 million people, which labeled President Zuma a thief. The court ruled against the

application, claiming that that the messages amounted to fair comment as protected

under the right to freedom of speech enshrined in the constitution. The judge further

stated that it was important that political parties restrict the use of legal and technical

terms so as to be understood by their audiences.


Pag

e32

ANC officials have indicated that they will fight the ruling at a higher court, stating that

the judge applied an incorrect principle in his findings. The ANC has been battling against

a tide of negative sentiment created by the publication of a report by the Public

Protector which found that the President should refund some of the cost of the

upgrades made to his compound, for which public money was incorrectly allocated. We

thus assess that the ANC decision to continue with this legal battle is likely an attempt to

improve its image, which has been further damaged by this court ruling.

This court decision represents a major victory for the D.A. ahead of the May 7 general

elections and places further pressure on the ruling ANC and President Zuma to account

for the “unconscionable” spending during the construction of the presidential

compound at Nkandla, KwaZulu Natal.

High Court ruling found the suspension of COSATU General Secretary Vavi

unconstitutional, possible split in union federation suspended by intervention of ruling

party leaders.

The suspension of secretary general of the Congress of South African Trade Unions

(COSATU), Zwelinzima Vavi, has been overturned by the South Gauteng High Court on

April 4. COSATU is a powerful federation of trade unions allied to the

ruling African National Congress (ANC). Vavi was suspended from his position after it

came to light that he had conducted an extra-marital affair with a junior member of

staff. The court found that the decision to suspend Vavi occurred outside of the realms

of the constitution of COSATU and thus set aside this suspension.

COSATU held a special meeting of its central executive committee on April 8 in order to

discuss the position of Vavi within the federation, as well as the future of National Union

of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). NUMSA and Vavi have been vocal opponents

of the ANC and are expected to leave COSATU and start their own political body.

The meeting was mediated by ANC Vice President Cyril Ramaphosa and Deputy

Secretary General Jessie Duarte, who managed to convince COSATU leadership to

postpone taking a decision regarding the status of Vavi and NUMSA until after the

national general elections on May 7.

The mediation by Ramaphosa and Duarte represents the direct involvement of the ANC

in the affairs of its alliance partner in order to avert a potentially damaging situation in

the lead up to elections. COSATU is considered to be the “vanguard” of the workers and

is a powerful and influential body. A split within this federation would be potentially

damaging for the ANC, which stands to lose influence among the working class

in South Africa.

Following this meeting NUMSA issued a statement warning Vavi not to campaign on

behalf of the ANC, possibly indicating its dissatisfaction with the results of the meeting.

We assess that Vavi and NUMSA remain likely to leave COSATU in the period following

the elections. That said it is unclear why the two sides have agreed to what appears to

be a suspension of hostilities despite the clear cleavages that remain.


Pag

e33

Recommendations

1. Travel to South Africa may continue, while adhering to standard security protocols

against crime.

2. Continue to avoid nonessential travel in the vicinity of informal settlements and low

income areas in South Africa, due to the potential for violent service delivery protests at

these locales.

3. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel in the vicinity of Marikana in the North West

Province.

4. Maintain heightened vigilance for sign of protests and violence in and around mining

sites throughout South Africa, and particularly in the Rustenburg area, due to increased

potential for unrest at these locales.

5. As a general security precaution it is advised to avoid all large gatherings and political

rallies in South Africa.


April 18, 2014

April 21, 2014

April 27, 2014

April 28, 2014

Good Friday

Easter Monday

Family Day

Freedom Day

Public Holiday




operating or residing in South Africa are

advised to anticipate interruptions to

business continuity given the expected

closures. Allot for traffic congestions

and travel delays in urban centers, given

the likelihood of celebrations taking

place in the streets and throughout

other public areas.



offices will be closed for the duration of

April 27-28. Celebratory events mat

cause traffic congestion and travel

delays in the vicinity, as they are likely

to draw large crowds and will be

accompanied. Those operating or

residing in South Africa are advised to

anticipate interruptions to business

continuity given the expected closures

on April 27-28. It is advised to allot for

traffic congestion and travel delays in

urban centers, given the likelihood of

celebrations taking place in the streets

and throughout other public areas. As a


Pag

e34

general security precaution it is advised

to avoid all mass gatherings throughout

Africa due to security threats related to

such events.



Pag

e35

LOW RISK

Sierra Leone

Fears of Ebola outbreak in neighboring Guinea prompt public health response in Sierra

Leone. For analysis of Ebola outbreak click here.

Police crackdown on networks of fuel dealers, black market in Makeni as President

Koroma reiterates commitment to anti-graft campaign.

Travel to Freetown may continue at this time, while adhering to stringent security

protocols.


ASSESSMENTS

Police crackdown on networks of fuel dealers, black market individuals in Makeni as

government commits to anti-graft campaign.

Police are currently making efforts to arrest and prosecute various networks of fuel

distributors and black market criminals who have been attempting to create an artificial

fuel scarcity in Makeni, northeastern Sierra Leone. The individuals in question have

attempted this by hoarding the commodity in order to increase prices. Subsequently,

police in Makeni have imposed regulations that individuals seeking to buy more than a

set amount of fuel must obtain police clearance.

In light of this, we assess that the reported increase in fuel scarcity scams in Makeni

highlights the persistent evolution in criminal methods to exploit lack of regulations and

structural weaknesses in the country. That said, the recent crackdown by security forces

on these black market hoarders indicates their ability to track some criminal activity.

Given that increases in prices of basic goods such as fuel can lead to violent civil unrest,

we assess that police have been pressured by local government officials to crackdown

on the fuel hoarders in an effort to prevent the possibility of the destabilizing effects of

fuel increases in Makeni.

The crackdown on black marketers and fuel herders comes amid increasing rhetoric by

Sierra Leone's Preisdent Ernest Bai Koroma, who has declared on numerous occasions

that the new government's anti-graft campaign will "spare no one". President Koroma

has rejected claims by the opposition that the anti-corruption claim is merely a publicity

stunt. According to Transparency International, Sierra Leone currently has the highest

incidence of bribery in Sub-Saharan Africa, something that has hampered the country's

ability to attract investors in recent years. Moreover, the country continues to face high

unemployment rates, most notably among youths.

Therefore, in light of the high unemployment rate and corruption, we assess that the

anti-graft campaign is an attempt by the Koroma administration to improve Sierra

Leone's investment image in the world in order to prompt greater job creation.

However, it is likely that the campaign will have minimal effects, given the entrenched

nature of corruption in Sierra Leone.


Pag

e36

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Freetown may continue at this time, while adhering to stringent security

precautions.

2. Those operating or residing in Sierra Leone are advised to avoid the vicinity of all large

gatherings or protests due to the associated security risks.


April 27, 2014

Independence Day

As Sierra Leone's Independence Day

falls on a Sunday, it is likely that the

government will announce a public

holiday on Monday April 28. In light of

this, we asses that public offices,

businesses and embassies are likely to

be closed on April 28. We advise those

operating or residing in Sierra Leone to

take precautions in order to ensure

business continuity for April 28.



Pag

e37

LOW RISK

Zambia

An attack by PF youth cadres on a radio station forced opposition leader Hakainde

Hichilema to escape on the roof of the radio station; underscores continued use of

intimidation by ruling party.

Government issues warning to KCM alleging misuse of funds; highlights ongoing tensions

between company and officials.

Former President Rupiah Banda is on trial for suspected graft during an oil deal which

occurred during his regime.

Travel to Lusaka can continue, while practicing heightened vigilance against possible

unrest and violent protests.


ASSESSMENTS

Clashes between PF, UPND youth; underscores continued use of intimidation by ruling

party

Hakainde Hichilema, leader of the opposition United Party for National Development

(UPND) was giving a live interview on SUN FM radio station on April 12, when youth

cadres of the ruling Patriotic Front gathered at the radio station and threw stones at the

building. Reports indicate that the cadres were armed with knives and machetes, forcing

Hichilema to escape over the roof of the building. Reports indicate that some members

of Hichilema's entourage who were outside of the station were assaulted by the PF

youths.

A video showing the escape of Hichilema was posted on social media sites and has gone

viral in the country, leading to increased anti-PF rhetoric. Opposition leaders continue to

claim that the PF under the leadership of President Michael Sata has become

increasingly militarized. The incident demonstrates continued incidents of political

violence in Zambia as well as the persistent use of alleged intimidation tactics by the

ruling PF.

Government issues warning to KCM alleging misuse of funds; highlights ongoing tensions

between company and officials

The Zambian government has performed an evaluation of Konkola Copper Mines' (KCM)

activity and has warned the company that it will continue to keep a close eye on its

activities, accusing KCM of a misuse of funds and unusual performance. This follows

recent statements by Vice-President Guy Scott in Parliament, revealing that the mining

company had liabilities of over 1.5 billion USD and failed to pay its creditors, while

having taken loans from banks.

Tensions between the government and KCM have been witnessed in the past few

months, particularly in relation to the company’s recent restructuring which is likely to

result in hundreds of job losses. Therefore, the government’s recent statements are

likely an effort to increase pressure on KCM, by threatening to revoke the company’s


Pag

e38

mining license. We assess that tensions are likely to persist over the coming weeks as

KCM has thus far refused to comply with government requirements to renege on its

retrenchment plans.

Former President Rupiah Banda in court over alleged corruption in regard to oil deal with

Nigeria

The case against Former President Banda is especially noteworthy as Banda had his

diplomatic immunity removed by the current PF regime in order that he may stand trial.

This was widely seen as a move by the ruling party to take action against corruption,

however despite this it appears that the case is aimed at cracking down on members of

the Banda regime. Banda is accused of having procured a 2.5 million USD government to

government deal that was intended to benefit himself and his family.

The Lusaka Magistrates Court has heard unexpected testimony from a state witness,

Charles Mulenga, the acting director at the Ministry of Energy and Water development,

who has exonerated Banda by claiming that the government did not procure any oil

from Nigeria, nor was any money paid to Nigeria. This testimony appears to have come

as a shock to the state's prosecuting team. Mulenga is thus added to a growing number

of witnesses that have exonerated Banda, including a powerful Nigerian businessman

Akpan Ekpene. Despite this evidence, Banda may yet be found guilty of abuse of office

on the charges that he involved his son in this oil deal.

Should Banda be exonerated it could be a major blow to the image of the PF

government, especially in light of the criticism it received for its removal of Banda's

immunity. The possible innocence of Banda lends credence to the belief that his trial is

an attempt to crack down on members of the previous regime in Zambia.

Recommendations

1. Travel to Lusaka can continue, while practicing heightened vigilance against possible

unrest and violent protests.

2. It is advised to refrain from openly expressing any political opinions or preferences in

Zambia

3. Necessary travel to outlying and rural areas can continue while practicing heightened

vigilance against violence and crime.

4. Avoid all mass gatherings and political protests throughout Zambia, as these may

degenerate into violence and unrest.

April 18 – 21 2014

Good Friday, Holy

Saturday, Easter

Monday




operating or residing in Zambia are







Pag

e39


other public areas.



Pag

e41

LOW RISK

Zimbabwe

The import of agricultural produce, including fresh fruit and vegetables has been

banned; likely to lead to worsening of food insecurity in country.

It appears as though President Robert Mugabe is losing control over the faction within

his ruling Zanu-PF party, as opposition continues to fracture.

Travel to Harare and Bulawayo can continue while adhering to basic security precautions

against common criminality.


ASSESSMENTS

Zimbabwe bans agricultural imports despite growing food insecurity in country

The government has banned the import of all agricultural produce on April 2, stating

that the country's improved output is enough to meet domestic demand. This appears

to be contrary to a U.N. statement claiming that the international body was approaching

donors to help alleviate the worsening food crisis in the country which has placed an

estimated 2 million people at risk.

Zimbabwe faces a large trade deficit and has liquidity problems due to the poor

performance of its economy. It is possible that the ban on agricultural imports has been

implemented as a protectionist policy to support the local agriculture sector, supporting

its growth against competition from foreign markets. However, this move appears to be

shortsighted given the food insecurity faced at this time.

The policies are contrary to the principles of a Southern African Development

Community (SADC) agreement, and it is unlikely that local farmers will be able to make

up the almost 50% shortfall that will be experienced due to the loss of imports. The

cessation of imports is likely to lead to a rise in the cost of food as the supply is curtailed.

We thus assess that food insecurity is likely to increase in Zimbabwe in the coming

weeks and months.

Growing factional conflict within ruling Zanu-PF as opposition continues to fracture

The ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) continues to

witness factional power battles as potential incumbents to the presidency maneuver to

gain power and influence. This battle has become increasingly public and dirty as

prominent politicians accuse each other of graft.

The first faction within the Zanu-PF is lead by Emmerson Mnangagwa, who is currently

the Minister of Defense and has served as Mugabe’s long term intelligence chief,

heading the formidable Central Intelligence Organization. Mnangagwa, known

colloquially as the “crocodile,” is widely feared and is believed to be the mastermind

behind the infamous Gukurahundi events in the 1980s in which an estimated 20,000 of

supporters of Mugabe’s rival, Joshua Nkomo, were killed. As the chief of the security


Pag

e40

apparatus, Mnangagwa has been able to use force and intimidation against perceived

dissident forces, essentially maintaining the longstanding Mugabe regime.

The second faction is led by Vice President Joice Mujuru. Mujuru is considered to be the

most powerful woman in the country and is the widow of Solomon Mujuru, a former

general of guerilla forces in the bush war, which ultimately lead to independence in the

country. In Zimbabwe “war veterans” are the demographic that have benefited most

from Mugabe’s policies during the course of his regime. Mujuru is herself a veteran of

the liberation war and maintains significant political influence as well as notable

business interests. It is highly likely that these business ventures have benefited from

her political position as well as graft practices. Altogether, we assess that the Mujuru

faction is more moderate than Mnangagwa’s faction given the fact that the latter is

backed by the state intelligence forces and state military. That said, Majuru possesses a

significant amount of power due to her sheer amount of wealth, stature, history as a

war veteran, legitimacy as the widow of the influential Solomon Majuru, and her known

influence with Mugabe.

Additionally, party insiders have revealed that there is growing concern that Mugabe

may be grooming former Reserve bank of Zimbabwe governor Gideon Gono as his

successor, following a statement by Mugabe that neither Mujuru nor Mnangagwa have

an "automatic ticket to the presidency." Gono is considered to be one of Mugabe's

closest confidantes, does not belong to any faction within the party, and has been

recorded openly arguing with Mugabe demonstrating that he is not afraid to tell the

president what he thinks. The belief that Gono may become a front runner in the

succession battle may cause Mujuru and Mnangagwa to increase their efforts to shore

up their position.

This occurs as the opposition in the country is at its weakest following a comprehensive

loss in disputed 2013 elections as well as continued infighting and fracturing. Morgan

Tsvangirai, leader of the main opposition party the Movement for democratic Change –

Tsvangirai (MDC-T), has battled a growing group within the party who seek to replace

him at the helm. Reports indicate that four senior officials, among them party deputy

treasurer-general Elton Mangoma, have been expelled from the MDC-T. Allegations of

insubordination and violating the party’s constitution, as well as being vocal in calling for

leadership renewal, have been mentioned as prominent reasons for the expulsion.

A clause in the revised constitution allows for the ruling party to appoint a president in

the event of a sitting president retiring or dying. Furthermore, due to the increasingly

factious nature of the opposition, there appears to be a dwindling potential for a

candidate from outside of the Zanu-PF to rise as a potential successor for Mugabe.

Therefore, despite the growing factional conflict within the Zanu-PF, the future leader of

the country is likely to emerge from within the power battle currently underway in the

ruling party.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Travel to Harare and Bulawayo can continue while adhering to basic security precautions

against common criminality.


Pag

e42

2. Those operating or residing in Zimbabwe are advised to practice heightened vigilance

against crime when conducting overland travel in rural and outlying areas.

3. It is advised to refrain from openly expressing any political opinions or preferences in

Zimbabwe.

4. As a general security precaution it is advised to avoid all mass gatherings and

demonstrations in Zimbabwe.



Pag

e43

Notable Dates for the Period of April 16 – April 30, 2014 Burkina Faso


April 21, 2014

Easter Monday

National public holiday, meaning that


offices will be closed. Those operating

or residing in Burkina Faso are advised



Allot for traffic congestion and travel




areas.

Cameroon


April 18, 2014

Good Friday

National Public Holiday, meaning that



operating or residing in Cameroon are



closures. Allot for traffic congestion and

travel delays in urban centers, given the



areas.

Ethiopia


April 26, 2014

Anti-LGBT rally

The Anti-LGBT demonstration is slated

to be held in Addis Ababa and will likely

be well attended given the

government's approval of the rally. The

event further carries the potential to

witness isolated incidents of

harassments and attacks against

perceived homosexuals, and should be

avoided give the potential for violence.


Pag

e44

Ivory Coast


April 21, 2014

Easter Monday




operating or residing in Ivory Coast are







other public areas.

Mali


April 21, 2014

Easter Monday




operating or residing in Mali are advised



Allot for traffic congestions and travel




areas.

Niger


April 21, 2014

Easter Monday




operating or residing in Niger are







other public areas.


Pag

e45

Sierra Leone


April 27, 2014

Independence Day

As Sierra Leone's Independence Day

falls on a Sunday, it is likely that the

government will announce a public

holiday on Monday April 28. In light of

this, we asses that public offices,

businesses and embassies are likely to

be closed on April 28. We advise those

operating or residing in Sierra Leone to

take precautions in order to ensure

business continuity for April 28.

South Africa


April 18, 2014

April 21, 2014

April 27, 2014

April 28, 2014

Good Friday

Easter Monday

Family Day

Freedom Day

Public Holiday




operating or residing in South Africa are







other public areas.



offices will be closed for the duration of

April 27-28. Celebratory events mat

cause traffic congestion and travel

delays in the vicinity, as they are likely

to draw large crowds and will be

accompanied. Those operating or

residing in South Africa are advised to

anticipate interruptions to business

continuity given the expected closures

on April 27-28. It is advised to allot for

traffic congestion and travel delays in

urban centers, given the likelihood of

celebrations taking place in the streets

and throughout other public areas. As a


Pag

e46

general security precaution it is advised

to avoid all mass gatherings throughout

Africa due to security threats related to

such events.

Tanzania


April 26, 2014

Union Day

Celebrates the unification of Zanzibar

and Tanganyika in 1964. Given the

national importance attributed to this

day, we advise those operating in

Tanzania to plan accordingly for

disruptions to business continuity given

the slated public holiday and likely

closure of government offices and local

businesses.

Zambia


April 18 – 21 2014

Good Friday, Holy

Saturday, Easter, Easter

Monday




operating or residing in Zambia are







other public areas. DISCLAIMER: Please note that any views and/or opinions and/or assessment and/or recommendations presented in this text are solely those of Max Security. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this text. If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited. Max Security Solutions accepts no liability for (i) the contents of this text/report being correct, complete or up to date; (ii) consequences of any actions taken or not taken as a result and/or on the basis of such contents. Copyright - 2014 Max Security

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