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131

It is a hallmark of intractable conflicts thatthe distance between the status quo andthe conflict’s inevitable resolution can appear

unbridgeable. Such is the case with today’sAfghanistan.

For the first time since 2001, when the US-ledintervention in Afghanistan began, a serious pros-pect exists for political dialogue among the vari-ous combatants, aimed at the cessation of armedconflict. Over the past few months, and high-lighted by a conference on Afghanistan held inLondon on January 28, 2010, signs have emergedof a concerted and comprehensive effort to engageelements of the insurgency in negotiations, recon-ciliation, and reintegration.

In London, Afghan President Hamid Karzairepeated a previous offer to negotiate with, andreintegrate, not only low-level foot soldiersand commanders of the Afghan insurgency, butalso its leadership, including the Taliban chief Mullah Muhammad Omar. Karzai went further byannouncing that he would in the spring convenea national peace jirga, a traditional Afghan assem-bly, to facilitate high-level talks with the insur-gency. Karzai expressed hope that Saudi Arabiawould play a key role in this process.

Eight and a half years after the invasion, amidrising insecurity across Afghanistan and witha continuously expanding international trooppresence in the country, the prospect of a negoti-ated settlement with some or all elements of theinsurgency is enticing. However, a successful pathtoward sustainable peace in Afghanistan remainsfar from obvious. Fundamental questions persistabout the willingness and capability of key actors,inside and outside Afghanistan, to reach agree-

ments and uphold them. Further, the contentof an agreement or series of agreements, as wellas the process by which any accord would beestablished, is uncertain. And even if all essentialparties are interested in a negotiated settlement,getting to yes is no sure thing.

Peace—who wants it?Winston Churchill said “to jaw-jaw is always

better than to war-war,” but jaw-jaw is not alwayseasier. In Afghanistan, the process is not off toa promising start. Already, US Secretary of StateHillary Clinton has all but ruled out negotiat-ing with the Taliban’s senior leadership. She toldNational Public Radio in January that the UnitedStates is “not going to talk to the really bad guysbecause the really bad guys are not ever going torenounce Al Qaeda and renounce violence andagree to re-enter society. That is not going to hap-pen with people like Mullah Omar and the like.”

Meanwhile, President Barack Obama took fullownership of the war in a December 1, 2009,speech at the US Military Academy. The president,after having sent 21,000 additional troops toAfghanistan in the first months of his presidency,ordered another 30,000 soldiers into the theater—a place he called the “epicenter of violent extrem-ism,” where “our national security is at stake.” Bythe summer of 2010, the international presencewill amount to about 135,000 troops, with theUnited States contributing 100,000 of them.

Obama’s announcement came nine days beforehe accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, but itwas no peacemaker’s gambit. Rather, he sent thetroops to undergird a robust new strategy aimedat displacing the insurgency from key populationcenters. While this surge of forces may eventuallycreate more propitious conditions for a negoti-

ated settlement, it may in the near term have theopposite effect.

J AlexAnder Thier is the director for Afghanistan and Paki-stan at the US Institute of Peace. He is the editor and coauthor of The Future of Afghanistan (USIP, 2009).

Afghanistan’s Rocky Path to PeaceJ AlexAnder Thier

current History

April 2010

“Even if all essential parties are interested in a negotiated settlement, getting to yes is no sure thing.”



132 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2010

Even so, it is time to take seriously the idea of political reconciliation in Afghanistan, to weigh theprospects for arriving at such an outcome, and toconsider the obstacles in the way. If we cannot evenimagine how reconciliation might be achieved, itwill be impossible either to prepare the way or todetermine whether the path is worth traveling inthe first place.

Is the conflict in Afghanistan ripe for resolu-tion? In a conflict, after all, reaching a settlementcan be very difficult even when the key playershave decided that they want it. Every war has itsown logic—and its own economy.

Peace in Afghanistan will require the stars toalign. Several constellations of actors will haveto participate to secure a lasting peace. Theseinclude the “progovernment Afghans”—that is,along with the government itself, those opposi-tion groups that are not fighting the government;the insurgents (themselves composed of at leastthree major groupings); the United States and itspartners in the International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF); and regional powers like Pakistan,Iran, India, and China. Also in the mix are severalspoilers—groups that likely will never want sta-bility. These include Al Qaeda, Pakistani radicalgroups in solidarity with the Afghan insurgents,and the drug traffickers who move 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium.

In any case, do the progovernment forces wantto reconcile with the Taliban? Karzai, who sees hisfuture and his legacy hinging on a political settle-ment, has been a strong advocate for such efforts,and he is using his executive power and personalprestige in support of them. He is backed by largesegments of an Afghan society that is bone-tiredof war and is likely willing to accept significantcompromises in exchange for stability.

Many, however, including some close toKarzai, may be much more ambivalent. Assume

for a moment that a deal means conceding tothe Taliban control over some part of southernAfghanistan. The people around Karzai who gov-ern these provinces, who operate constructionand road-building enterprises, and who profitfrom the drug trade would under such a settle-ment lose their power and their cash cows.

Two of the enterprises that generate the mostprofit are transport—essential for supplyinginternational forces—and private security, in theform of companies that guard convoys, bases,

and reconstruction projects. These multibillion-dollar industries would wither rapidly if stabil-

ity were established and international forceswithdrew. Other Karzai allies—such as his twowarlord-cum vice presidents from the NorthernAlliance, Muhammad Fahim and Karim Khalili—represent constituencies that have fought theTaliban since 1994 and are not keen to see themgain any power.

Other potential opponents of a peace dealinclude civil society organizations that havepushed for human and especially women’s rightsin the post-Taliban period. Allowing the return of Taliban-style gender apartheid policies, even inlimited sections of the country, would be anath-ema to these groups and the vocal internationalconstituency that supports them.

Men with gunsAnd what about the insurgents? The three

major groupings—Mullah Omar’s Taliban, directedfrom sites in Pakistan; the Haqqani network; andGulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami—are not amonolith, and may treat the prospect of negotia-tions differently. This differentiation is often seen asa good thing, because parts of the insurgency mightsplit off from the rest. But recalcitrant actors mightalso try to sabotage the process. Also, even a suc-cessful settlement with one group will not underthese circumstances end the insurgency.

The harder question, though, is why the insur-gency would sue for peace if it believes it is win-ning and the Americans are preparing to leave.Considering the Karzai government’s continuedloss of moral authority, the insurgency’s still large-ly safe haven in Pakistan, and an ongoing declinein public support for the war in NATO countries,the insurgents might easily decide to wait out thenext few years, meanwhile waging a very effectiveguerrilla campaign.

But several factors could conspire to changetheir calculus. The first is the war itself. Obama’s

deployment decisions will essentially double thenumber of forces in the country this year. TheAfghan security forces are also growing—andsome are getting better at their jobs. The biggerforce numbers, moreover, are accompanied by anew counterinsurgency strategy, one that lookslikely to produce effects more lasting than thosegenerated by the Bush administration’s “economyof force” strategy, which involved too few troopsto secure territory won through battle.

NATO also seems finally to have figured out

how to reduce Afghan civilian casualties, depriv-ing the insurgency of a key propaganda asset at a







Afghanistan’s Rocky Path to Peace • 135

Each of the three primary parties—the Afghangovernment, the Taliban, and the United States—would enter negotiations with their political sur-vival depending on one condition. For Kabul,the condition for survival is just that—survival.In other words, the Karzai government will notmake a deal requiring it to step down or hand overpower. Such a prospect appears to Kabul far worsethan the status quo; in addition, the likelihood of the government’s catastrophic collapse seems dis-tant enough to ignore.

For the Taliban leadership, the condition isthe withdrawal of foreign forces. The Taliban’ssuccess today relies not on ideology, but ratheron resistance to foreign occupation and Karzai’scorrupt puppet regime. It would be hard for theTaliban, perhaps impossible, to accept some sortof accommodation with Karzai—but it is nearlyunimaginable that the Taliban would accept anyagreement that does not include the fairly quickwithdrawal of foreign forces from the Talibanheartland, and their timeline-based withdrawalfrom the entire country. Between this Talibandemand and the US desire to withdraw, a pleas-ing symmetry exists. But Afghanistan’s fragilityand that of neighboring Pakistan—a country that

to the United States represents an even greaternational security concern—will make pulling outentirely a risky endeavor.

For the Obama administration, the one com-pletely sacrosanct condition for a peace dealwith insurgents is a firm, verifiable break with AlQaeda. Al Qaeda was the reason for going intoAfghanistan to begin with, and this issue willprevent US withdrawal until it is addressed. Butcan the Taliban break with Al Qaeda? The twoentities grew up together, and so did their lead-ers—fighting the Soviets, ruling Afghanistan from1996 to 2001, and since 2001 returning to thefight, against the Americans. They have sharedfoxholes, and reportedly have established familyties through marriages.

The Taliban have made an effort to suggestthey would rule without Al Qaeda. In November2009, they released a statement claiming that the“Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan wants to take con-structive measures together with all countries formutual cooperation, economic development, and[a] good future on the basis of mutual respect.”But would a ban on Al Qaeda in Taliban-controlledterritory be verifiable? After all, international ter-rorist cells continue to operate in Pakistan, where

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136 • CURRENT HISTORY • April 2010

the United States has resorted to an all-but-officialdrone war because of the lack of local cooperationand the inaccessibility of the territory.

uP for discussionAside from these core conditions, everything

is to some extent negotiable. Some groups inthe “progovernment” camp have for years sup-ported changes to the 2004 constitution and toAfghan law that would increase power sharing,decentralization, and strengthening of Islamicstrictures. Many conservative political leaders,mostly former mujahideen figures, would love tosee an increased role for Islamic law, or sharia. Apolitical and legal map that allows for regionalvariation might make sense in such an ethnicallyand geographically segmented country.

Meanwhile, a process of political reconciliationwith the Taliban could be used not only to mol-lify the insurgents, but also to address tensionsstill lingering from the civil war, as well as per-ceived inequities among Afghanistan’s regions andethnicities, which continueto cause conflict. Addressingthese tensions and inequitiesshould be a key focus of theupcoming peace jirga.

The United States, itsWestern allies, and the UN would come under seriouspolitical fire if a deal withthe Taliban meant abandoning Afghan women—whose privations under the Taliban have servedto rally international support for the interventionsince 2001. But any legal changes that threatenedAfghanistan’s gains in human rights would likelybe limited and subtle, at least on paper. Since weare not talking about a deal that would put theTaliban in charge of the national government—inthe near term, at any rate—little danger exists that

the constitution would be changed to ban outrightgirls’ education or women’s access to employment.

To be sure, an accommodation with the Talibanmight accelerate the steady erosion of rights thatAfghan women have experienced in recent years.Indeed, the democratically elected parliamentpassed a family law last year—signed by PresidentKarzai—that sanctioned, among other things,marital rape under certain circumstances. And if,after the ink dried on an agreement, the Talibanimposed an unofficial ban on female employment

in provinces that they controlled, no ISAF offen-sive would likely be triggered, even if such a ban

were in contravention of the constitution or theterms of the peace agreement.

There is also a real possibility that combatantson all sides of the conflict who have committedwar crimes and atrocities will not be brought tojustice. Evidence from many conflicts suggests asustainable peace is unlikely without such reck-oning.

Even so, the real issue in negotiations is not like-ly to be the rules themselves, but rather who makesand enforces them. Power sharing is the firmamentof all peace processes, and changing the Afghanpolitical system will have to involve sharing power.What exactly would a power sharing arrangementlook like? Would the Taliban (and other groups) begiven control over certain provinces? Would theyhelp fill out the ranks of the Afghan national secu-rity forces? Would they be guaranteed a numberof ministries or seats in the parliament? Or wouldthey simply be allowed to compete for such thingsin a (quasi) democratic process?

Peace accords that have been reached in Bosnia,Burundi, and NorthernIreland, to name a few exam-ples, spell out such arrange-ments in great detail. In theend, it is even more difficultto implement such complexprovisions than to agree onthem.

Neighboring coun-tries will also be looking for certain guarantees.Pakistan wants its allies to succeed, and wants tobe a key player in the peace process itself. Afghans,including perhaps the Taliban, will resent a strongPakistani role in the process, but no process willtake place without Pakistan. And unless Pakistannudges the Taliban to the table by denying themsanctuary, the insurgents can always, if the pres-sure gets too high in Afghanistan, retreat into

Pakistan, where they can go to ground and waitout the United States for a few more years.

Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian states fortheir part will want guarantees that the Taliban andother groups will not harbor or export militancy.All the neighbors are likely to agree on one thing—that Afghanistan should be neutral, eschewing alli-ances with any of the regional powers.

can it haPPen here?Even if all the parties are willing to negotiate,

and sufficient space exists to reach a viable agree-ment despite all the red lines, achieving resolution

Most Afghans have had little

incentive to risk their necks for

a government widely viewed

as corrupt and ineffective.



Afghanistan’s Rocky Path to Peace • 137

will still be enormously challenging. Between andamong the various actors there is a fundamentallack of trust, and talks this year will occur amid anintense military campaign. It is unclear whethereither the Karzai government or the insurgentleaders have the wherewithal to discipline theirown constituencies. Strong leadership will beneeded on all sides both to craft an agreement andto achieve buy-in for unpopular concessions.

The profusion of players, motivations, condi-tions, and potential spoilers seems to cast seriousdoubt on prospects for a negotiated peace. But thestatus quo cannot hold either. Obama has alreadysignaled that the Afghan mission has the full sup-port of his government until July 2011. At thatpoint, if the trajectory of the war has not changedappreciably, US strategy will. Nobody knows whatthat means. It could mean abandonment of thecounterinsurgency strategy, with increased focusgiven instead to the sort of counterterrorism strat-egy reportedly advocated by Vice President JosephBiden in 2009, with few troops on the groundand heavy reliance on drones and special forcesto strike at terrorist targets. A new strategy couldentail the replacement of the Karzai government.

Perhaps the most important issue affectingchances for a negotiated outcome is whether, tothe various players, such an outcome looks moreattractive than the alternatives. If the Talibanthink they can run out the American clock with-out losing the war, they will do so. If the Karzaigovernment and the Americans think they canbeat the Taliban and stabilize Afghanistan withouta deal, they will try. If the Pakistanis think that aweak, unstable Afghanistan that brings billionsinto their coffers is better, they will undermine adeal. So will the Iranians, if they decide the bet-ter alternative is a weak and unstable Afghanistanthat pins down American forces.

But all of these factors might cut in more than

one direction. Paradoxically, it is conceivable thatthe prospect of a US surge and departure couldmake a negotiated outcome more attractive to allparties—that is, negotiations might appear prefer-able to the risk of collapse and failure.

Do the Afghan people get a say? After 30 yearsof war they are among the poorest and most trau-matized people on earth. But they are possessedof endurance and an indomitable spirit. If theindigenous, neutral leadership that supports a justpeace could find its voice, that might spur a move-

ment that presses the parties to reconcile. ■

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