Affordable Care Act Opinion

8/2/2019 Affordable Care Act Opinion

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Commerce Clause Decision

In the case at hand, the government argues that the refusal to purchase health care

insurance has a profound impact on interstate commerce because those individuals, who

by will inevitably use health care services, will necessarily shift their costs to others who

have insurance. 42 U.S.C. 18091(F) (Congress found that [t]his cost-shifting increases

family premiums by on average over $1,000 a year). The government further agues that

this provision is crucial to the regulatory scheme set forth in the Affordable Care Act, as

the Act relies on achieving near-universal insurance coverage of the population in order

to broaden the risk-pool and achieve other objectives.

While these arguments may be valid, they still cannot justify the constitutionality

of Minimum Essential Care Provision because the regulation ofinactivity, regardless of

its inferred effect on either interstate commerce or a broader regulatory scheme, is not a

legitimate end of the Commerce Clause. Thus, the Necessary and Proper clause does not

provide a constitutionally sound basis either. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at

1956 (2010)(We look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally

related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power).

The governments claim that an individuals refusal to purchase health insurance

constitutes an activity of self-insuring is a hollow, semantic argument. As the 6th

Circuit Court found, Every application of Commerce Clause power found to be

constitutionally sound by the Supreme Court involved some form of action, transaction,

or deed placed in motion by an individual or legal entity. Thomas More Law Center v.

Obama, (2010). None of these circumstances exist. A law that penalizes an individual,

by mere virtue of his or her existence, for not purchasing a good or service not only has


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no legitimate basis in the Commerce Clause but also offends the notion of individual

liberty the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were designed to protect.

It would be preposterous for this Court to permit the regulation ofnoneconomic

intrastateinactivity, as it, on multiple levels, falls outside the scope of the original

meaning of the Commerce Clause and relevant case law. As the Court has stated, The

enumeration [of powers] presupposes something not enumerated. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22

U.S. at 72 (1824). It would also set a dangerous precedent. Because there is an infinite

variety of activities that individuals refrain from engaging in at any given moment that

may be inferred to substantially affect interstate commerce, the concern faced by the

Court inLopezpersists in this case: If we were to accept the Governments arguments,

we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power

to regulate. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (1995). The Court echoed this concern in

Morrison: If granted additional jurisdiction, Congress might use the Commerce Clause

to completely obliterate the Constitutions distinction between national and local

authority. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 15 (2000).Here too, in the interest of

maintaining limits on legislative branch power, and regardless of the merits or intentions

of the law, the Court refuses to further expand the scope of the Commerce Clause and

finds the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision to be unconstitutional.

Virginia Health Care Freedom Act

In light of the conclusion that the minimum coverage provision is an

unconstitutional exercise of Congress power under the Commerce Clause, it is not

necessary to resolve whether the provision conflicts with the Virginia Health Care

Freedom Act.

Documents

Affordable Care Act Opinion