AFCEA Nova 2010Future of the AFNET

Art “Wally” Wachdorf24 AF/CA

1

21 Oct 2010

Endstate

• Fully integrated air, space, and cyberspace operations in support of the Joint warfighter

• A secure cyberspace domain• A secure cyberspace domain that enables effective Defensive Counter-Cyber operationsoperations

• Cyberspace superiority that enables "Freedom of Action" in support of the Joint Fight

2

Two Pronged Approach

Architecture Enables Operations

Secure cyberspace architecture

Robust Dynamic Defensivearchitecture

based on operational

strategy

Defensive Operations in support of the

mission

3

Operational Requirements Drive Architecture

Unclassified Mission Assurance vs. Network Assurance

Mission Assurance Network Assurance• Operational focus (A3) • Service provider focus (A6)• Assure mission • Assure the network• Focuses on operational need

• Focuses on service availability

P i iti d f b d Att t t d f d ti• Prioritize defense basedon critical asset lists

• Attempts to defend entire network

• Proactive based on • Reactive based on• Proactive based on intelligence preparation

• Reactive based on observed enemy activity

• Fight through the attack • Disconnect if attacked

4Unclassified

Fight through the attack Disconnect if attacked

Changing Direction

Rapid Tech Inserts Enterprise or Msn

specific

Operational Inputs UONs – adjust legacy

ff t

specific Virtual technology Random network On-Network tech

efforts Joint Orders OPORDs Mission Orders TTPs

Strategy Based Network“Mission Assurance”

Ongoing Legacy EffortsOngoing Legacy Efforts ADX Migration Gateway Consolidation 2nd Gen Wireless 624 OC SA

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624 OC SA TTS (Remedy) AFNet Increment 2 Improved Legacy Network

Unclassified Case for a Strategy Based Architecture

• Defense of the AF Network is essential to success of all Air Force operationsall Air Force operations

• Operational imperatives must drive all future technical and systems decisionstechnical and systems decisions

• Overall strategy drives all operational planning and serves as the foundationserves as the foundation

• The operational warfighter must be able to configure the battlespace to support his operational scheme p pp pand defensive strategies

6Unclassified

Unclassified

Assumptions

• The AFNet will remain a contested domain• The threat will continue to evolve and they will• The threat will continue to evolve and they will

continue to leverage the newest technologies. • Intent behind threat activity is difficult or impossibleIntent behind threat activity is difficult or impossible

to ascertain • Nation and non-nation state actors will use cyber

operations to support a larger strategy • The AFNet is a vastly complicated, heterogeneous

t i th t t b b l t l denterprise that cannot be absolutely secured • The AFNet will continue to have dependencies and

interconnections with DoD industry and other

7Unclassified

interconnections with DoD, industry, and other organizations

Unclassified

Operational Strategies

• Layered defenseO• Secure Enclaves

• Trust Management

Operational Imperatives Mission Assurance Operate Through an

• Trusted systems

• Stealth

p gAttack

Defend Priority Targets (Defended Asset List)Stealth

• Simplicity Resilience – “Last

Known Good” Positive Command and

• Cyber Maneuver Control

8Unclassified

New Paradigm -- Strategy Drives the Architecture

Acquisition Process

• Increasingly dynamic environment• Streamline acquisition processes

• Rapid capability deliveryOps&

Innovation • Meet warfighter needsInnovation

CurrentCurrent Rapid

(UON/JUON)

Foundational

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Unclassified

QUESTIONS?10Unclassified

QUESTIONS?