Aesthetic, Plays and Cultural Memory

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Aesthetics, Play, and Cultural Memory: Giddens and Habermas on the Postmodern ChallengeAuthor(s): Kenneth H. TuckerSource: Sociological Theory, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jul., 1993), pp. 194-211Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/202142.

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Aesthetics, Play, and CulturalMemory:Giddens andHabermas on the Postmodern Challenge*KENNETHH. TUCKER R.Mount Holyoke College

This essay examinesthe response of Habermas and Giddens topostmoderncriticismsof modernity.AlthoughGiddensand Habermasrecognizethat the totalizingcritiqueof poststructuralism acks a convincing analysis of social interaction,neitherof theirperspectives adequately addresses the postmodern themes of aesthetics, play, andcultural memory.Giddensand Habermas believe that these dimensionsof social lifeare important; et theyremainunderdevelopedn theirapproaches.Thisessay exploresthe theoretical consequences of aesthetics, play, and cultural traditions or socialtheory, drawing on the pragmatists, the psychoanalystWinnicott,and early criticaltheory. The aesthetic and playful momentsof experiencemust be recast in terms ofsocial theoryto avoid thesolipsismso oftencharacteristicof postmodernism.Theessayends by suggesting how the theories of Habermas and Giddens could benefit by acloser considerationof these issues.

Postmodernismhas not been universallywell receivedwithinsociology. Its receptionhasbeen markedvariously by enthusiasticacceptance Lemert1992;Seidman1992), mockingand hostilerejection(Collins 1992), and morereasoneddismissal(Antonio1991;D'Amico1992). Yet the ways in which postmodernismand sociological theory might enrich oneanother have rarelybeen examined. In this essay I address this topic by examining thesophisticatedcritiquesof postmodernismadvancedby Giddens and Habermas. I demon-stratehow theirapproaches o cultural nnovationcan be improvedby taking postmodern-ism seriously but refashioningit as social theory. Giddensand Habermasrecognize thatpoststructuralisthemes are important; et they do not theorize themwell, largelybecauseof theirrespectiverationalizationmodels.This essay begins with a summaryof Giddens's understanding f modernityand post-modernity,followed by an evaluationof his theoreticalproject. Giddens's criticisms ofpostmodernismpointto his own relativelyweak theoryof intersubjectivity.Then I discussHabermas'scritiqueof postmodernism.Habermasratherhastily rejects postmodernism;he does not incorporate ome of its valuableinsightsinto his perspective.The essay turnsnext to an examinationof Habermas'sandGiddens's limitedanalysesof aesthetics, play,and culturalmemory.Here I explore some alternativeapproaches, ncludingthose of thepragmatists, hatof thepsychoanalystWinnicott,and theearlycriticaltheoryof Benjamin.I conclude by reconsideringthe theories of Giddens and Habermasin light of thesecriticisms, and discuss how theirconceptionsof culturalcreativitymight be enriched.Thecontemporary ostmodernemperowes much,at leastindirectly, o Derrida's 1987)use of the metaphorof play; this is tied to his masterfuldemonstration f the inevitabilityof temporalityand othernesswithin consciousnessthata logocentricculturetries to deny.

* Earlierversions of this paper were presentedat the meetings of the Society for the Study of SymbolicInteractionism,Cincinnati, August 1991, and of the AmericanSociological Association, Pittsburgh, August1992. I wish to thank SherryS. Tucker,Stanley Aronowitz, KarenRemmler,and severalSociological Theoryreviewers for their comments. I would like to especially thank Ron Lembo. Our conversationshelped meformulatemany of the ideas of this essay.SociologicalTheory 11:2July1993? AmericanSociological Association. 1722 N StreetNW, Washington,DC 20036


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AESTHETICS,PLAY, AND CULTURALMEMORYAccording to Derrida, there can be no transcendental ubject, no conceptualessences.Onlythe play of difference betweenwordsin the processof significationcreatesmeaning.Yet Derrida'sanalysisremainsfixed, or fixated,on the text-it is necessaryto move fromthe play of signifiersto the significanceof play. By following Huizinga's (1955) lead inhis seminal work Homo Ludens and analyzing play as a culturalactivity,one can free itfrom its literary prison. In the process, not only play but otherpoststructuralisthemes,such as undecidability,antifoundationalism,and the like, can be grounded in socialinteraction,and their concreteimplicationsfor social life can be illuminated.GIDDENS: MODERNITYAND POSTMODERNITYAccordingto Giddens, the sociological traditionoften has misconstrued he social actorpositivistically.This impoverishedview of the subjectis reinforcedby static theoriesofsocial structure and history. Therefore this tradition cannot account for the creativityinherent n social life. Given this critiqueof sociological theory, Giddens is sympatheticto many postmodernthemes. He realizes that poststructuralistriticisms of the subjectnecessitate a reformulationof agency in social theory (thoughhe does not dispense withthe subject). Giddens also sees that understandingdependson context because differentforms of social life may not be able to translateeasily into one another.The Parsonianquestion of order should be rethoughtin terms of time-spacedistanciation Giddens1990, pp. 14-15), because this dimensionshapesthe very natureof modem institutions.Finally,Giddens, like Foucault,believes that anactiveandcreativepowerfacilitatessocialactionrather hanrepressing t (Giddens 1979, 1987).

Giddens also accepts postmodernclaims that the foundationsof knowledgeare unreli-able, that there is no inherentprogress in history, and that new social movements areraising qualitativelynovel issues about social life (1990, pp. 45-46). He believes thatpostmodem criticisms of modernist rationalityare largely accurate. A providentialconcept of rationalitydeveloped in the wake of the Enlightenment,but this reason onlymirrors he divine Providenceof absolutism that the Enlightenment riticized. The foun-dations of this providentialrationalityhave been deconstructedconvincingly by manythinkerssince Nietzsche (Giddens 1990, pp. 48-49).Despite his favorablecomments, however, Giddensbelieves thatpostmodernist heorycannoteffectively explainthe social world. The poststructuralismf DerridaandFoucaulthas not been able to hermeneuticallygrasp the intersubjectivityof everyday life. Byemphasizingthe centralityof text and linguisticconventions, postmodernistscannot ac-count for the complexity of social practiceor comprehend he centralityof reflexivityinthis practice(Giddens 1979).In Giddens's view, the contemporaryubiquityof reflexivitymakesuseless the distinc-tions between modem and postmoderneras. The deconstructive mpulse so prevalentinpostmodernistapproaches s the logical extension of the reflexivityof a radicalizedmod-ernity, whereinreflexivityis inseparable rom the reproduction f social relations. Socialpractices are examined constantlyand are reformed in light of new informationaboutthem (Giddens 1990, pp. 38-39). In modernity,the rapidpace and scope of change andthe separationand recombination of time and space in social life are bound to thisreflexivity.Because of the juggernaut hat is modernity,social relationsare in flux;they mustbereembeddedconstantlyin new contexts. Despite continualchange, individualsattempt ocreate a stableidentity.Thus the controlof timebecomes a centralproblem n the modernworld. As the future s severed fromthe past, the futuremust be directedor, in Giddens'sphrase, colonized (1991, p. 111). Yet the reflexivity of modernitymakes this task

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difficultbecause criteriaexternal to moder institutions,suchas tradition,areincreasinglyirrelevant n the formationof identity.Accordingto Giddens, change is inherent n modernity.The flexible subjectis alwaysincorporatingnew cultural and social experiences into his or her identity through thereflexivemonitoringand rationalizationof action, whereinpeople maintaina continuing'theoreticalunderstanding' f the groundsof theiractivity (Giddens1985, p. 5). Culturalcreativitythus is a partof the moder humancondition. Yet in order to engage in suchcreative iving , the modem subjectneeds a secure emotional and cognitive basis fromwhich to operate(Giddens 1991, pp. 41-42).The constantchange and instabilityof modernitygeneratea sense of anxiety. Drawingon Goffman,theethnomethodologists,Erikson,andHeidegger,Giddensarguesthatpeoplemustdevelop trustif social relationsare to exist acrosstime and space. Trust is tied to asense of ontological security, which is a belief in the continuityof self-identityand thereliabilityof social life. This sense of stability,rooted in the infant's relationship o hisor her caregivers, is originally emotional ratherthan cognitive, and is groundedin theunconscious(Giddens1990, pp. 92-97). Feelingsof ontologicalsecurityare madeconcretethroughsocial routines, which integrate reflexively monitoredsocial life with patternedinteractionacross time and space. In this context Giddensexaminesopening and closingrituals,turntakingin conversation,tact, andbodyposition.Such activitiessustainroutinesover time and space, allowing the creationandrecreationof rulesand resources. Culturalinnovationscan emerge only from such a social psychologicalfoundation Giddens1985,pp. 72-73).Despite Giddens's insightfulanalysisof social life, his theoryhas several flaws. Manyof these problemsare tied to his reliance on Heidegger'sphilosophyfor an explanationof the problemof time in social theory (Joas 1987). This approachundercutsGiddens'sattemptto bind the creationof meaning to the concrete situationof the agent. Giddensdevelops his theory of ontological security in tandem with Heidegger's view that thefinitude of human existence and the embeddednessof individualsin a changing timegenerateanxiety,which must be confronted.Ironically,however,Giddens'sincorporationof themes of time and context results in an essentialistsubject. He posits an ahistoricalcategoryof subjectivity,basedon universalpsychologicalneeds(security).Thisessentialistsubjectivityalso is demonstrated n Giddens's concept of agency: he assumes that aninherentlycreative agent produces and reproducessocial structure. All action radiatesfrom, and must be explainedin termsof, this noble, almostPromethean ubject-center(Bryant1992, p. 146). In postmodern erminology,Giddens has reintroduced he typicalWesternphilosophicalsearch for a firmfoundation,for a home, on which to build aconstitutive subject (Boyne 1991; Connolly 1988). Further,such an agent, searchingfranticallyfor a secure identity, does not act aestheticallyand playfully, for he or shefinds indeterminacy rightening.Giddenspossibly could answer this critiquewith a strong theoryof the intersubjectiveand normativeconstitution of the subject. As critics state, however, he separatessubjectfrom object, action from structure, hus opening a gap between the social world and theagent(J. Alexander1992, p. 2; Habermas1982, p. 268). The creativityof such a subjectoften translates nto instrumental ction. Because the individualencountersan alien worldand an uncertain uture,which generateexistentialanxiety, meaningsdevelop in responseto his or her needs rather han from an intersubjectively stablishedand self-reproducinglinguistic realm. Giddens believes that language controls a chaotic reality, making itconformto ourneeds. Dews's criticismsof Adorno'stheoryof language husareapplicable

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AESTHETICS,PLAY, AND CULTURALMEMORYto Giddens;both thinkersregard languageas directlydissecting and deforming reality,rather han as being the meanswhereby subjectscommunicate o each otherabout a realitywhich is neverthelesspreserved n its non-identity Dews 1987, pp. 227-28).

Thus Giddens undercutspossibilities for collective cultural innovation. He does notexamine how differentculturalorientations,developed in diverse contexts, can promoteor deny capacitiesfor creative social action. When he does attempt o account for culturalchange, he turns to social movements. Giddensviews new social movements as majorforces for utopian ocial change, which advocate normative deals about the good life.Yet because he neglects intersubjectivity ndculturalcontext, his analysisof these move-ments has an ad hoc quality. He believes that truly innovativesocial movements mustoffer the possibilityof changingthefabricandtextureof humanrelationships.Overcominginequality is not liberation;such an emancipatory olitics must be linked with lifepolitics, or a politics of self-actualisation 1990, p. 156). YetGiddensdoesnotadequatelytheorize how and why this politics might arise. As critics argue, such a perspectiverequiresa strong, socially groundednormative heoryof interacting ubjects(J. Alexander1992;Bryant1992). Giddens'sseveranceof thepresent rom thepastalsomakesnormativeinnovationproblematicbecauseit leaves no placefor an elaboration f collectivememoriesthatcouldprovideculturalresourcesandideals for life politics. Further,his self-conscious,cognitively oriented agent seems unlikely to experiment playfully with new forms ofsociability. This subject, it seems, might find a politics of self-actualizationanxiety-producingrather hanfulfillingor liberating.HABERMAS:MODERNITYAND POSTMODERNITYIn manyways, Habermaspresentsa moreinsightful critiqueof postmodernity nd a morecompelling theoreticalalternative han does Giddens. ThoughGiddens stresses the cen-tralityof reflexivity and intersubjectivity,he does not analyze how rational conciliationbetween agents occurs within interaction. In Giddens's later work, he is absorbed sodeeply by the flux of modem life that intersubjective onsensus becomes almost impos-sible. Accordingto Habermas 1989a), a differentiated ationalitydevelops in the contextof public spheres and informs contemporary nteraction.Habermas'stheory of socialactioncan account for disturbancesof intersubjective onsensus.Nevertheless, Habermassharesmany of Giddens'sreflections on modernityand post-modernity. Like Giddens, he regards modernity as an unfinished project. Modernistassumptionshave not exhaustedthemselves;they still sustaincontemporary ocial prac-tices. Also, both thinkersarguethat a type of rationalreflexivity replacestraditionas themain form of coordinatingaction in the contemporaryworld. Finally, for Habermasasfor Giddens, theorists must return to quotidiansocial practices to correct the textualorientationof poststructuralist hought. Habermasbelieves that the rationalist core ofeveryday language can yield universalinsights. Communicative ationality,grounded nthe lifeworld, promotesinnovative social action andculturalcreativity.Habermasplaces postmodernism n a grandnarrative eachingback to the eighteenthcentury, in which poststructuralistsare cloaking their complicity with the venerabletraditionof counter-Enlightenmentn the garbof post-Enlightenment Habermas1987a,p. 5). He pursues this strategyby returning o Hegel, Kant and the origins of modernconsciousness, and the earliestcriticisms of modernistrationality, ound in Nietzsche.Habermas s especially interested n Nietzsche as a figurewhose radicalcriticismsofEnlightenment ationality oreshadowmany contemporary ostmodernists.Nietzsche sees

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the sovereignrationalityof the transcendentalubjectas a form of control, manifestingawill to power. He does not believe that modernistscan rationallygroundsocial life andorganization; uch an attemptmisconstrues he natureof reason. Accordingto Nietzsche,reason can only exclude; it cannot reconcile. A more promisinganswer to the humanpredicament,he believes, lies in the insights of aesthetics. Art provides a gateway toDionysus, the otherof reason,outside all cognitionandmorality.ForNietzsche, embracingaesthetics breaks the strangleholdof reasonon modernity Habermas1987a, pp. 94-96).Habermas sees several of these Nietzschean strands continuedin contemporarypost-structuralist riticismsof modernistrationality.He is not satisfiedwith what he views asthese totalizing dismissalsof modernity;he arguesthatHeideggerand Derridaremovethe critiqueof reason from history and society, and place it in the realm of Being andtexts. Their devaluationof social processespromotesmystificationbecausethe critiqueofrationalityis not tied to societal changes that create social problems. Like Giddens,Habermas states that poststructuralisms not groundedin the experience of people; itignores the pragmaticand consensual dimensions of everyday interaction(Habermas1987a, p. 197).Habermasargues that Foucault, despite his sensitivityto history, also explains socialorderand socializationas effects of power, and thathe reducesthe ambivalentcharacterof modernityto a single dimension. This perspective contains no possibility for self-determinationand solidarity. For Foucault, history has no continuity, and rupturesindiscourse make the past of littleuse for the present.Thuspeople can learnlittle from theirexperience (Habermas1987a, pp. 287, 319).According to Habermas, the deconstructionistshave not distanced themselves suffi-cientlyfromthe philosophyof consciousness, thecentralityof the transcendentalubject,that they criticize so passionately.They return o an ultimateposition that groundstheirphilosophy, whether it be power, Dasein, or archewriting.They conceive of Westernrationalityas an instrumental rientation hatcan only objectify anddominatethe world.Insofar as the deconstructionistsdiscuss alternatives o domination,they tend to locatethem in aestheticexperience.The real politicaldangersof such an irrationalaestheticturnare exemplified in Heidegger's Nazism. In Habermas'sview, neitherthe philosophy ofconsciousness that characterizesmuch of the Western philosophical traditionnor thedeconstructionist ritiqueis adequate o theorizethe natureof modem life or accountforits dynamism.He believes thata new paradigm s needed, which posits the centralityofmutualunderstandingn generating nteractionandties this process to culturalcreativity.Habermas ees himself in the traditionsof the youngHegel, Marx,and Schillerbecausethey provide a clearerunderstanding f the historicallysituatednatureof rationalityandcommunitythan do Nietzsche and the poststructuralists.Like Habermas,they agree thatthe social bond-that is, the communityforming and solidaritybuilding force of un-alienatedcooperationandliving together-ultimately decideswhetherreasonembodiedinsocial practices s in touch with historyandnature Habermas1987a, p. 304). Habermasrethinks his approach n the light of a theoryof social actiontied to pragmatic inguistics.He believes that the use of rationality n social life involves confrontingproblemsthatareposed by the world. We learn that some solutions are betterthanothers;such solutionsarethematized n traditionsembodiedin thetransmissionof cultureandscientificprogress,and are used in forming collective solidarity and individual identity. These processescoincide with the differentiationof the system practicesof politics and economics fromtheiroriginallifeworldcontext. The rationalization f these realmsmakesthe creationofsolidarityand identity dependenton the raisingandresolutionof validityclaims throughargument Habermas1984, 1987b).Habermasrejects the postmodernistview of a logocentricrationality, regardingit as



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AESTHETICS,PLAY, AND CULTURALMEMORYresponsiblefor the pathologiesof modem life. For Habermas,many social problemsarisefrom the extensionof a one-dimensional, nstrumentalypeof reasoning ntoeverydaylife. This illegitimatehegemonyof administrativeationalityresults in the colonizationofthe lifeworld. Possibilities for the noninstrumentalenerationof new solidarities hroughcommunicative action are threatened,as is the protectionof old identities. Habermasarguesthat the colonization of the lifeworld resultsin a damaged otality hat is respon-sible for modem social andpsychologicalproblemsand for undemocratic orms of sociallife. Yet communicativeaction never can be extinguished; ts claim to universalityandcommonunderstanding oints towarddemocratic nteractionandsolidaritybuilding.Newsocial movementsplay an importantpartin continuallyrevitalizingcommunicativeactionbecausethey are vehicles by whichnew cultural deals enterpublicdiscourse. An enrichedpublic discourse in turn promotesnew debates about validity claims, which encouragesocial andcultural nnovation(Habermas1987b).AESTHETICS,CULTURALTRADITIONS,AND SOCIAL CHANGEHabermasand Giddens rightly criticize the postmodernists or an inadequate heory ofintersubjectivity nd an overliteraryapproach o social life. Habermas'sunderstanding fintersubjectivity, owever, is too one-sidedlyrational,while Giddens'sinsufficientlysocialtheoryof agency tends towardinstrumentalaction. Neither thinkeremphasizesundecid-ability in interaction; urther,they have difficultyin graspingthe affective and aestheticaspects of social solidarityand the role of cultural traditionsand collective memory increatingsocial and cultural dentity.

Habermas(1986) is sensitive to these issues; yet he cannot reconcile them with hisevolutionaryapproach.He recognizesthattheerasureof historicalcontinuity,as embodiedin symbols and monuments,carriesheavy costs. Speculating hat a discourse ethic whichlacks the power of memory could result in a meaningless emancipation, Habermassympatheticallydiscusses aspectsof Benjamin'swork in severalcontexts(Habermas1983,p. 158; 1987a). In his famous interventionn the Germanhistorians'debate,he implicitlyrecognizesthe tie of collective memoryto the formationof social identity.In his criticismsof conservativehistorians'attemptto rehabilitate he legacy of NationalSocialism, Hab-ermas(1989b) calls for a kind of Benjaminiananamnesticrememberingwith the victimsof Nazism. Yet such culturallyspecific and affectivecomponents,althoughcentralto thisnotionof collective memory,remainoutside the purviewof his theory.Habermasrefusesto question his rational, evolutionaryapproach.He arguesconsistentlyfor a discursivemodel of social action, so that evenif natural igns lack authorswho give themmeaning,still they only have meaningfor interpreterswho aremastersof language 1992, p. 108).This position has consequences for Habermas'sconceptualization f social change. Inparticular,his discussion of Durkheimshows the limits of his rationalhistoricism. Ac-cordingto Habermas 1987b), Durkheim mplicitlyrecognizesthe linguistification f thesacred, which transforms he aurasurrounding acredplaces and symbols into the mun-dane practicesof argumentabout validity claims. Yet he does not addressDurkheim's(1965) analysisof collective effervescence as a source of new ideals and social change.Thisexperienceof intensecollective life is clearlyextrarational;t has aestheticandplayfulconnotations.Such negligence is by no means accidental: akingcollective effervescenceseriouslywould problematizeHabermas'srational,evolutionary heoryof social change,forcinghim to view it as crucially involving new forms of sociabilityand symbolism.Yet Habermas 1987b, p. 392) implicitlyrecognizesthis centralrole of sociabilityandof grammars f social life in his explorationof new social movements,as does Giddensin analyzingthe concern of such movements with self-actualization.Yet because neither

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thinkergroundsa theoryof aestheticsor playfulnessin social life, or theorizes a complexnotion of collective memory, they cannot grasp the extent of the potentialfor culturalcreativityembodiedin these movements.As this discussion of new social movementsshows, Habermasand Giddensbelieve thatsocial solidarityand social change involve more than rational nteraction.In fact, Haber-mas, despitehis reservationsaboutart, turnsto aesthetics as a majorsource of new socialmeanings. Similarly, Giddens's analysisof the return f the repressed n everydaylifedemonstrates hat an extrarational raspof socialprocessesis necessary.Yetneitherauthorcan accountadequatelyfor this dimension in his theory.These problemscan be seen in Habermas'sconcept of communicativeaction. As Seel(1991) emphasizes,Habermashas not explainedadequatelyhow the differentiated alidityspheres of modernitycan be interrelated n practice. According to Seel, people mustdistinguishtypes of rationalitybefore rationaldiscourse is possible. Further, hey mustbeable to change perspectives from one rational sphere to another. Such a capacity forflexible, interrelationaludgment,Habermasadmits, is anchored n a practicewhich pre-datesargumentation. Habermas tates that communicativeheorycannot account for sucha practice;it cannot grasp whethera given form of life allows more or less space fortrends towards an undamaged,correctly spent life to this facultyof judgment,even if wecannotconceptualizesuch in termsof a theoryof argumentation Habermas1991, p. 226).In light of these criticisms, not only does interaction nvolve a fundamentalundecid-abilitythat precedes argument; n addition,theremay be a nonlinguisticcomponentthatallows us to engage creativelyin social action. Insofaras Habermasdiscusses such issues,he employs aesthetics,which represent he realm where truecreativitycan takeplace. Yetthis seeminglycentralarena or innovativeculturalchangeis underdevelopedn his theory.Ever fearful of a postmoderndedifferentiation f modernity o aesthetics,Habermasviewsart as a sphere of rationalitydistinct from moral and scientific reasoning. Aestheticinnovationandcreativityoccurthrough thedecenteringandunboundingof subjectivity,which make the artist awareof what has been lost and repressed n modernity.The artistfreely constructs new conceptionsof experience, differentways of opening ourselves toourspeechless contact with reality (Habermas1985, p. 201). If art is to contribute oculturalinnovation, it must be incorporatednto individual and collective life. At leastpotentially,then, aestheticscan provide utopiancriteria or the critical udgmentof a wayof life (Habermas1985).

Yet Habermasdoes not explainhow such activity mightoccur.Art, as the realmof theexperimental, s the locus of creativity;yet it can enterindividualand social identity onlyfrom the outside. Aesthetics remainsan exceptionalaspectof humanexperiencebecauseHabermasdoes not show how it mightbe grounded n everyday ife. Like that of Giddens,his view of modernitymarginalizesplayful andexpressive aspectsof interaction hat arecentral to culturalcreativity.Both Habermasand Giddensdistinguishradicallybetweenthe prosaic tasks of coordinatingsocial action and the literaryor aestheticsensibilityofpoststructuralism;he latter often is castigatedas the remnantof an avant-garde eparatedfromeverydaylife. Yet such a chasm between the mundaneand the artisticblinds theseauthors o ways in which nonrationalor extrarational esthetic and/orplayful activitycanemergefromquotidiansocial action.This marginalizingof artisticexperienceas extraordinarys all the morepuzzlingwhenwe consider that the expansionof mass mediaandconsumerismhas broughtavant-gardeimagesand styles into everydaylife in the West. This aestheticization f everydaylife,whetherviewed positively or negatively, is an integralpartof the contemporary ulturaland social terrain Bell 1976; Featherstone1992). Such a mass-mediated ulturalcontextmakes problematicthe clear and simple distinctionsbetween rationalityand aesthetics,

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AESTHETICS,PLAY, AND CULTURALMEMORYand reinforces claims that all judgments involve an expressive moment. Further,hadHabermasand Giddens analyzed modem mass culturein depth, they might have takenmore seriouslythe complexityof modem experiencethat defies rationalcategories.

For example, the idea that mass culture creates a dreamlikesubtextfor modem expe-rience has been a recurring heme from Benjamin'searly criticaltheoryto Baudrillard'spoststructuralismBaudrillard1983;Benjamin1969). In order o adequately onceptualizethe role of aesthetics in interaction,one must see aesthetics as somethingother than aninadequatelyformed language. To groundaesthetics in everydaylife and socialization,one must develop its ties to play and emotion. Some contemporary ociologists recentlyhave turnedto pragmatism or a fuller appreciationof the social, yet indeterminateandaffective, constructionof intersubjectivityAntonio1989;Shalin1992). Pragmatist otionsof self and society, particularlyDewey's (1934) concept of art as experience, can becomplementedby Winnicott's(1971) analysisof infantplay andby Benjamin's approachto collective memory.These perspectivesnot only can highlightthe theoreticalshortcom-ings of GiddensandHabermas,but also can lead us in some directionsworthpursuing.Althoughin this essay I do not presentan overall alternative heoretical ramework,Ipoint to important ssues that Habermasand Giddensmust confront. A theory of socialactionthat wishes to account for culturalcreativitymustrecognizethe role of the temporal,the indeterminate,and the affective in all interaction. The aesthetic moment in thecoordinationof social actioncapturesthis dynamic qualitymorefully than does a modelbased primarilyon the rationalizationof action. This expressive sensibility developsthroughinteraction; t arises largely from our childhood experience of play. Play, likeaesthetics,is embedded n cultural raditionsand collective memoriesthat bindthepresentto thepastandprovidethe culturalnarrativeswhich inform udgmentsof social life. Thesejudgmentsare expressed not only in argument,but also in style, dress, sociability, andthe like. Any adequateconception of culturalchange must take these dimensions intoaccount;the aesthetic, the playful, and the rationalare not separated igidly.THEPRAGMATISTCRITIQUEOF HABERMASSeveral sociologists look to pragmatism o counter what they regardas the overrationalorientationof criticaltheorists,andof Habermas n particular.These critiquesemphasizethe importanceof undecidability n all interaction,the novel and emergentcharacterofsocial life, and the importanceof understandinghe affective componentsof solidarity.Accordingto these authors,pragmatist hemes can complementHabermas'soften sterilerationalism Antonio 1989; Shalin 1992).Like many poststructuralists, he pragmatistsemphasize the temporaldimension ofexperience. There exists no universal, stable presentfrom which to judge activity. Theflux of experience has emotionally charged, dramaticqualitiesthatescape rational cate-gories. Dewey's (1934) discussionof art is especially apthere becauseaestheticsprovidesa sense of form for this rhythmic quality of life. Aesthetic experience is an ongoingdiscoveryandrecoveryof integrationand harmony hroughparticipationn a life contextcharacterizedby resistance and tension. Aesthetics thus is the struggle to overcomeobstacles and reach shared fulfillment-after which a new process of creation begins(T. Alexander 1987). In view of this interplaybetween harmonyand tension, aestheticscaptures he indeterminacyof the coordinationof social action. Turner ummarizesDeweywell:

Because the actualworld, thatin which we live, is a combination f movementandculmination,of breaksandreunions,the experienceof a living creature s capableof

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aestheticquality.The live beingrecurrentlyoses andreestablishesquilibriumwithhissurroundings. he momentof passagefromdisturbanceo harmonys that of intensestlife (1986, p. 38).We learn to integratethis dramaticand temporalqualityinto wholes that make sense ofsituations,often in subtly new ways.This aesthetic sensibility is not innate. We are educatedin our culturalcapacities forexperiencethrough nteraction; he pragmatists, ike HabermasandGiddens, believe thatwe find ourselves in the world and must solve problemswhile coordinatingaction. Yetthe pragmatists ee an importantaesthetic moment n this process. Because ourexperienceis shapedand sharedcommunally,our aesthetic sensibilityis elicited by others throughinteraction.Dewey (1934) argues that this process requires sensitivity and empathy aswell as rationality.Through nteraction,cognitionbecomes infused with meaning;thoughtinvariablycalls forth imaginationand feeling because it is an active encounterwith thesocial and naturalworlds.The sociologists' rediscovery of pragmatism n the context of critical theory has notextendedthe implicationsof thesecritical nsightsinto socializationandcollective memory;such areascould furtherproblematize,yet also enrich, Habermas'sperspective. Sociolo-gists often retain a hostile attitudetowardpoststructuralism, nd thus do not develop thesocial component of the postmodernmetaphorof play and its critique of evolutionaryhistory.Such themes can both add to pragmatist houghtandprovidefurther nsights intothe advantagesandproblemsof Habermas'sapproach.

SOCIALIZATIONAND PLAYAn aestheticsensibilitythatdevelops through nteractionhas affinitieswithplay. Huizinganotes similaritiesbetween art andplay, as follows:

The profound affinity between play and order is perhapsthe reason why play . . . seemsto lie to such a large extentin the field of aesthetics . . It maybe thatthis aestheticfactor s identicalwith the impulse o createorderly orm,which animatesplayin all itsaspects . . . play is invested with the noblest qualities we are capable of perceiving inthings:rhythmandharmony1955, p. 10).Art andplay providea dynamicorderingof experiencedifferent from the resolutionofvalidityclaims throughargument.Yet they must be grounded n adultlife and childhoodif they are to be importantdimensions of human experience. Habermas and Giddensoverlookthe developmentof an aestheticand playfulculturalcreativitybecause they seesocialization n termsof the evolutionof rationalcapacities.Habermas n particular lightsthis crucialaspect of individualandsocial identity by relyingon the cognitive theoriesofPiagetandKohlberg.Habermas's nterpretation f Mead demonstrateshis rationalistbias. When examiningMeadian socialization theory, he (1987b, p. 34) states that the child experiences his or

herparents'expectationsas simplyan empiricalregularity. ThusHabermasreduces thecomplex interplayof early child/parentrelationships o the complementarityof interest.In his view, any sense of playfulnessor indeterminacys absent in socialization,becausethe child comes to differentiatebetween the externaland the inner world as his or hercognitive capacities mature(Habermas1987b, p. 42). Play is simply a stage precedingthis cognitive development.This view neglects the ambiguityandundecidability hatareso important o Mead's view of humaninteraction.Mead's notion of sociality, of simul-



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AESTHETICS,PLAY, AND CULTURALMEMORYtaneousbeing and not-being, of existing in severalpsychologicaland cultural places atonce, ties human nteraction o perpetualculturalnovelty (1980, p. 47; also see Aboulafia1986, pp. 19-26). Habermasunderplays his moment of emergencein Mead.

Giddens sees little use in Meadiansocial psychology. Like Habermas,he views the Ias primarilyan effect of language.Following Winnicott,he recognizesthat socializationis a process of learningto live creatively. Giddens, however, immediatelyassimilatesWinnicott'sconcernsaboutcultural nnovation and the social psychological space neces-saryfor such novelty to the subject'sdesire for security(Giddens1991, pp. 41-42).Yet Winnicott's theory of infant socialization can help ground a theory of culturalcreativityin humaninteraction,thus giving Mead's notionsof play and sociality a psy-choanalytictwist. The potentialfor creativity,Winnicottargues,emergesfrom the child'sdeveloping sense of self, especially in the context of play. His theory of socializationcomplementsthe pragmatistapproach,offeringa theoryof intersubjectivityhat does notprivilege the rational over the playful, but sees them as developing together. As Flax(1990, p. 111) points out, Winnicott's approach posits no essentialist, need-centeredconceptof humannature.Winnicott(1971, 1989) writes that infant symbolization represents he excitement ofdiscovery, whereby the baby half creates and half discovers the world, and imaginationhas not been underminedby the strict separationof innerexperiencefrom outer reality.Winnicottargues, as do others in the object relationstradition,that humanssatisfy theirdesireswhen they establishreal relationswith otherpeople and with objects. The child'sseparation rom the caregiverneed not be solely hurtful; hrough he child-rearingphase,parentand child learn sensitivity to one another'sneeds. If the caregiveris adequatelyempathicto the child's wants (Winnicottcalls this good enoughmothering ),a self canarise which is different from, but related to, others. The child learns to adapt to theenvironmentwhile growing away from, but maintaininga stable relationshipwith, thecaregiver.The child realizes his or her capacities not only because of the sensitivity of thecaregiver'sresponses; the infant also creates a transitional pace where he or she canlearn to innovate, distinguishand relate innerself and outerreality,and grasp reality assomethingshared with others. The child develops separateness hroughthis transitionalspace. Further,a transitionalobject, such as a teddy bear, allows the child to lessen thestrainof integrating nner with outerreality,and thus of learningto symbolizeand begincreativeliving. Throughplaying with objects, the child can transformhis or her sense ofself and can develop the creativepossibilitiesembedded n a sharedreality.It is preciselythe differencebetween self and other, inner and outerreality,that allows fantasizingandimagination o develop and creates the potentialfor constantlyrediscovering he self.Thus what is distinctlyhuman is not abstractrationality,but the capacityto relate toobjectsandothers n a sensitiveandplayful way. Winnicottbelieves thatthechild, throughinteractionwith his or her caregiver,learnsto relate to objects and people. This devel-opmental process does not follow the logic of language; its logic is capturedmoreaccuratelyby play. Both mind and body are involved. To reduce it to cognitive terms isto misunderstandt.

According to Winnicott, transitionalspace is the prototypefor all cultural space -and play is the forerunner of later cultural activity. Culturalcreativity and aestheticsensibilityare thus grounded n humandevelopment.Winnicott'stheoryof socializationemphasizesthe playfulandjoyful aspectsof interactionhat have littleplace in therationalreflexiveapproachesof Habermasand Giddens.1I Flax (1990) and Lembo (1989) develop some interesting applicationsof Winnicott's ideas. Flax (1990)

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COLLECTIVEMEMORYAlthough Winnicott recognizes the social dimension of play, he tends to assume thatculturalcreativityoccurs in a psychologically privilegedhistorical andsocial vacuum. Hedoes not analyze how cultural traditions structureour social sensibility and influencesocializationpatterns.Moreover,as Weinstein(1990, p. 117) points out, Winnicottdoesnot investigate the effects of differences in class, race, and sexual orientation on thedevelopmentof transitionalspace and objects. He also fails to examine how particularculturalhistoriesshapesocial identity,andto explorethe importanceof collective memoryin keeping culturaltraditionsvital. Under these varioussocial influences, culturalinno-vation can take many differentforms. Finally,Winnicottdoes not examinethe conditionscontributing o the harmful use of play and art, such as the Nazi aestheticization fpolitics.Some of these problemscan be addressedby turning o membersof the early Frankfurtschool. Winnicott's discussion of play has some interestingaffinitieswith Adorno's andBenjamin'sdiscussionof mimesis, which can help illuminate he criticalsocial dimensionof play. In the work of these authors,mimesisrefers to the child's playfulnessandjoy inimitation,which ostensibly is expunged as he or she becomes a rationaladult. Yet thisdesire for playfulmimesisnever can be extinguishedentirely; t lives anoften subterraneanexistence, providingalternativedefinitions of happiness n an increasinglybureaucratizedsociety (Adorno 1979, pp. 14-15; Benjamin 1969, p. 159; Dallmayr 1991, p. 93).Benjamin(1969, p. 242), in his discussion of the fascist aestheticizationof politics, alsorealizes that such wishes can be used for destructiveends when not tied to openness andparticipation.Especiallyin Benjamin'sview, playfulmimesis intersectswith collective memoriesthatshapeidentityformation. Childhoodexperiencesoften areshapedand informedby sharedurbanpublic spaces and a collective sociohistoricalpast; history lives on in the objectsandimages of modem life (Benjamin1969, p. 158, pp. 261-62; Lass 1988). A commonculturalstyle, an aesthetic constructionof self and culture,are central to this process ofidentityformation.From the cultures of African-Americanso the nationalist dentitiesofEast Europeans,a shared culturalhistory, akin to what Bellah et al. (1985, pp. 152-55)call a communityof memory, often ties people together.In his most radicalformulation,Benjamin regardsa kind of anamnesticrememberingas a sparkfor revolutionaryactionredeemingthe hopes of a forgotten generation Benjamin1969, p. 262). Yet this memoryis not alwaysjoyful; frequently he collective memories of sharedsufferingbind a people.According to Benjamin, this mode of remembranceentails rethinkingthe rationalfoundationsof understanding, eeing the world in the context of intuitionssparked n partby childhoodexperiencesand a knowledgeof what has been lost in the past. These imagesand intuitions can be deepened by using an enriched mimetic capacity. Stories anddialectical mages capture his processmoresuccessfullythandoes discursiveargument.Thus, Benjaminbelieves, traditionsof learningbased on high ultureshouldbe displacedby theutopiantraditionof fairy tales, which instructwithoutdominating Buck-Morssbelieves thatWinnicottoffers some fruitful theoreticalavenuesfor feministthought.She arguesthatWinnicott'sapproachavoids Habermas's hyperrationalismas well as the poststructuralistdenunciation of reason. Thisempathicand multidimensional ubjectcan inform criticisms of patriarchy. n the area of mass media, Lembo's(1989; Lembo and Tucker 1990) research shows that many television watchersengage in image play ;oftenthey do not closely follow the narrativeof TV shows, but ratherplay with the colors, textures, and images oftelevision and reconstruct hem imaginatively.These images may sparka shortimaginativeexcursion into theirinner world and memories of past experience. Memory and the present, the rational and the playful are notclearly differentiated; hrough image play, a psychic space is created, which interminglesthese categories. Arationalmodel along the lines of Habermasand Giddens cannottapthe playfuland multidimensional spectsofthis experience.



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AESTHETICS,PLAY, AND CULTURALMEMORY1991, p. 337). A criticalunderstanding f meaninginvolves recoveringthe lost hopes ofthe past, exploringthe playful dimension of childhood,andexplodingthe reifiedimagesof the present.

In moreprosaicform, this sense of a shared ate and of culturalbelonging providestheresourcescrucial for holdingthe presentto criticalstandards,as embodiedmetaphoricallyin heroes, heroines, and stories that do not merely replicatethe existing culture's self-understanding.Certainly such memories can be manipulatedselectively by groups tojustify particularistic ndinstrumental nds. Yet, as recentstudiesshow, collectivememorycan providesome continuitywith models of acting, and heroesor heroines from the pasthave a facticitythat makes them more thansimplyraw data for a cynical andnarcissisticpresent(Schudson 1991; Schwartz1991).This notion of collective memoryproblematizesbothsociologicalconceptionsof historyandpoststructuralistriticisms of historicaldiscourse.Historyis more than the establish-ment of processes of learningthat embody pragmatic ruthclaims, as Habermasargues;it is more than the unimportant reludeto the whirlingdervishof modernity,as Giddenswould have it; it is not simply anothermetanarrative hat can be plunderedat will, asmany poststructuralistsrgue.History,when embodied n collectiveremembrance, reatesa sense of sharedsolidarity,and providesthe symbolicand affective resources that bindcommunities of memory. Yet these communaltraditionscannot simply be applauded nthe abstract,because the particularsolidaritycreated by collective memory is alwayshistoricallycontingent. A reified notion of collective memoryshould not be contrastedmechanicallywith a totalizing ationality.Cultural raditions hat arefetishized, and thatare not open to dialoguewith other belief systems, can be very destructive.Forexample,reifiednationalist and ethnic visions of communitycan harden nto myth, promotinganaestheticizedpoliticsthatin turnexacerbatesgeopoliticalconflicts(Griswold1992;Harvey1989, pp. 209-10).SOCIALMOVEMENTSIn light of the importanceof play and culturalmemory,areas of social inquiry neglectedor oversimplified by Habermasand Giddens can be illuminated. For example, the newsocial movements that Giddens and Habermasview as so importantn generatingsocialchange must not be regardedsimply as carriersof discursive culturaltraditions.Rather,in Benjaminian ashion, new social movements are explosivemixturesof aesthetic andpolitical imagination Wellmer1991, p. 33), providing spaces for new forms of culturalexpression.This ludic dimensionalways has been a partof collective behavior. The festive aspectsof many social upheavals, from strikes to demonstrations,are and have been centralaspects of social movements' culturalidentity (Hunt 1989). Bakhtin(1984) reveals thecarnivalesquenatureof Europeanpopularcultureatthe time of Rabelais.Frenchhistorianshave discovered the importanceof festivals and symbolic practices from the FrenchRevolution (Hunt 1984; Ozouf 1988) to the reunionspubliques of the Paris Commune(Dalotel, Faure, and Freiermuth1980) and the revelry among striking workers in thenineteenth and twentiethcenturies (Colton 1969; Perrot 1987). Further,recent researchshows that the working-classmovements most stronglyopposed to capitalismwere at-temptingto preserveand extend their communal ties in the face of capitalistdestruction(Calhoun1982; Reddy 1987). The memoriesof a sharedpast, whetherexpressedin therights of the free-bornEnglishmen or in the traditionsof journeymen'sassociations,helped provide the vantagepoint for a criticalanalysisof capitalism(Jones 1983; Joyce1991; Sewell 1980; Thompson 1963). Such historical remembrance alled for a deeper

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understanding f the past, andfor a reconstruction f the idealsburiedby modernization;they representeda critique of facile theories of industrialprogress (Lasch 1991). ThatHabermasviews such movements as inevitablydoomed victims of progressbased on aself-reproducing ystem only demonstrates he one-dimensionalityof his theoryof socialchange (Habermas1987b, p. 377).Social movementsalso providefree spaceswhere new ideas, symbols, andexperimentalways of living can be discovered and elaborated Arendt1965; Evans and Boyte 1986).New social movements, like gay and lesbianmovements,areas much aboutplayingwithnew forms of sociabilityandsymbolismas aboutdevelopingrationalprograms o stop theillegitimaterationalizationof the lifeworld or to colonize the future. Like workers' andpopulist movements of the past, they offer the possibility of breakinginto history withsomethingnew and turning he world upside down (Hill 1961). In sum, social move-mentsmay be understoodas arenas or the formationandenactmentof social identities(Fraser 1992, p. 125). Again, the historicalcontingencyand variabilityof this identityformationmustbe stressedandits concretecontextmust be specified,becausemovementsdrawingon the past can be reactionary.For example, the Nazis used Germansymbolsandtraditions o reinforce a particularistic, acistnationalism Mosse 1975).

THE PUBLIC SPHEREThe concepts of play and collective memoryalso can complementHabermas'stheoryofthepublicsphere.Play satisfiesa criticaldemand orequality hat s functionallyequivalentto the claim of justice which Habermassees as inherent n communicativeaction. Playrequiresan autonomous pace, like a publicsphere,whereaction cantakeplacevoluntarilyamong equals (Aronowitz 1973).Thus the public sphere is more than a space for rationaldebate. The politicizationoflifeworld traditions,which Habermas(1975) regardsas a componentof its colonizationthat frees up potentials for communicative action, also may promote new forms ofsociability and playfulness. In view of the aestheticizationof everyday life in our massmedia-dominatedworld, patternsof speech, dress, sexuality,and music now are playfularenasof culturethatare not merelytangentialbut central dentity-confirmingxperiencesfor many people. In fact, popular culture may provide the most fruitful terrain foralternativeconstructionsof social identity(Hooks 1990, p. 31).Much of the work that is influencedby culturalstudies has taken up these themes(Johnson 1987). Hebdige (1984) pointsout thatwhite youthculturessymbolicallyappro-priateaspects of black culturethrough style andmusic. He views the punkaestheticas awhite translationof black ethnicity. Gaines, (1991) for contemporarysuburbanU.S.youths, and Willis (1978), for British hippies and bike boys, demonstrate hat musicprovidescommon symbolic meaningsandhelpedcreatea rhythmof life and an aestheticof living for these subgroups.Because these culturesare permeable,they are constantlyinnovatingas groupscome into symboliccontactwith one another. Style has become asymboliccode thatexpressesthesenew identities.Marcus 1989) shows how punks'musicand appearancecontributed o an alternativepublic space for white youths, defined bystyle as muchas by discourse;further,punkswerepartof a surreptitious, narchist ulturaltradition hat has exploded into public consciousness on occasion, from the festivals ofthe ParisCommune o surrealism.Much the samecould be saidof rapand its relationshipto African-American oung people. Rap is a form of common iteracy or manyyoungblackmales, whichhas helpedreawaken hem to theirAfrocentric raditions Hooks 1990,



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AESTHETICS,PLAY, AND CULTURALMEMORYp. 27). African-Americans re more self-consciousthanthepunks; heirculturalmemories,fromMalcolm X to slavery, furnisha critical sense of culturalalternatives.In sum, the lifestyle experimentation hat is so central to the new social movementsindicatedby Giddens and Habermasdevelopsin partwithin thecontextof popularculture'saestheticappreciationof self and other. Rethinkingthe dimensionsof the public sphereas more than a place where rational interactionoccurs, and as more than a place that isthreatenedprogressivelyby mass culture,can help introduce he culturalstudiesperspec-tive into criticaltheory.2

CONCLUSIONIn addition to rethinkingthe contours of the public sphere and social movements, thisdiscussion of play, aesthetics, and collective memory suggests a reconsideration f otheraspects of Habermas's and Giddens's sociology. Takingthese issues seriouslycan movethese theorists toward a self-conscious reevaluationof their ostensible rejectionof foun-dationalism.Specifically, they must rethinkthe totalizing mplicationsof their ration-alizationmodels in terms of a morepluralisticapproach.These criticisms do not repudiatesome of their central insights. Postmodernism sinadequaten its conceptionof social interaction,as GiddensandHabermas rgue.Further,rationalreflexivity is undoubtedlyan importantcomponentof modernity; n particular,Habermashas captureda central distinctionwith his analysisof instrumental,strategic,andcommunicativerationality.His concernabout the participatory imensionof interac-tionpromotesa sensitivityto the democraticpotentialandcapacityforrenewal andchangeof different culturaltraditions.

Habermas,however,mustexpandhis theoryof social action. Instrumental ndstrategicrationalityshould be viewed not only as lacking the reconcilingdimension of rationalityso importanto communicativeaction, but also as expressinga reifiedrationality hornofits affective and aestheticmoments. Communicative ationalitycan be enrichedby incor-poratingthese moments into its very structure.Thus it is possible to retainHabermas'svaluable heoryof thecolonizationof thelifeworldby instrumental ndstrategicrationality,and of the blockage of participation n the public sphereby these forms of rationality.The nature of the opposition generated by this process must be rethought,however.Habermas'ssensitivityto the possibly irrational onsequencesof aesthetics has led him tovirtuallydismiss this realm of experience. Yet new forms of sociability and affectivesolidaritymust be considered vital aspectsof culturalresistance.This type of oppositionis cruciallydependenton collective memories of communalheroes and heroines and onstories derived from the sharedexperience of a people; often it intersectswith the re-membranceof childhood.Collective memorythusplaysa centralrole in structuringocialidentity,and can providecritical standardsby which the presentcan be judged;it cannotbe understood n terms of evolutionaryrationalism.Habermas'sandGiddens'sinterpretationf modernityas the searchforcoherenceoftenobscuresthe indeterminate ndpotentiallycreativedimensionof interaction.To graspthiscreativemoment, one must incorporatento theiranalysesan aestheticsensibilityakin toDewey's. Speech acts and rationalreflexivity are given meaning by such an aesthetic

2 The cultural studies perspective has several theoreticalproblems, however. It tends to romanticize thepossibilities of change in the present. In addition,this approach acks a strongconcept of collective memory,and does not sufficientlyexamine the links betweenpsychologicaland social development.

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capacity. Sensitivity to context precedes the formulation and implementationof moralrules. This pragmaticcritiqueintersects with what Habermascalls his neo-Aristoteliancritics, who argue that theories inevitably are embedded in particular ulturaltraditions(Habermas1991, p. 222). Habermasshouldrecognizethe legitimacyof these criticisms,and shouldabandonhis strongclaims for linguisticevolution(Taylor1991).Process and undecidabilitymust be given an equal place with coherence in analyzinginteraction.Any evolutionarymodel of history or socialization must be regardedwithcaution because the new is always possible in social life. Given these criteria,Habermasand Giddens should consider a capacity for creativeplayfulnessas an indicator of psy-chological maturity, in tandem with the ability to think abstractly.This view wouldintroduce a tactile dimension into their theories;Dewey, Winnicott, and Benjamin alldiscuss the centralityof sensuality,emotion, and the object world in the developmentofhumancapacities.

Thus, althoughrationalcommunication s integralto cross-cultural onsensus, the verydefinitionof rationality hould be expanded o includerespectandappreciation f differentculturalstyles, the richness of innerlife, and the inevitableaesthetic momentin intersub-jectivity. Again, neo-Aristotelianthemes are importanthere because communication n-volves sharingand graspingthe meaningof stories and metaphors hatmay be culturallyalien and always are somewhat opaque. Any rationaldiscussion must proceed on thisrather ragilebasis of culturalnegotiation.Finally, much of the hermeneuticprocessof understandinghat HabermasandGiddensregardas underpinning ociety should not be reduced to rationalinteraction,but shouldbe viewed as a search for innovative forms of social life as well. Taking into accountthese considerationscan allow Habermas and Giddens to rethink how to make ouremotions intelligentand our intellectemotionallysane (Shalin 1992, pp. 274-75) whiledevelopinga rich ntersubjectivity asedon compassionate nderstandingf difference(Antonio 1989, p. 743).

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