Advancing Soft Kill Capability Advancing Soft Kill Capability

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  • Advancing Soft Kill CapabilityAdvancing Soft Kill Capability Through Improved Payload

    PositioningPositioning

    Steve KercheySteve KercheySenior Business Manager - Naval

    2011 Chemring Countermeasures Ltd

    The information in this document is the property of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd and may not be copied or communicated to a third party or used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written consent of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd.

    This information is given in good faith based upon the latest information available to Chemring Countermeasures Ltd, no warranty or representation is given concerning such information, which must not be taken as establishing any contractual or other commitment binding upon Chemring Countermeasures Ltd or any of its subsidiary or associated companies.

  • Topics

    Soft Kill Background

    Current IR decoy capabilities

    Advanced IR threats

    Future IR decoy capability

    Optimisation of capability through Trainable LaunchersOptimisation of capability through Trainable Launchers

    ConclusionsConclusions

    Questions

    08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures

  • Requirements of a Passive Countermeasure S tSystem

    1. To provide advice to the Command (launch time, Shipparameters) in order to maximise P (Probability Escaping Hit)parameters) in order to maximise PEH (Probability Escaping Hit).

    2. To provide a payload, which individually, or in combinationi h h l d i l d d d hwith other payloads, gives relevant and adequate, and enough

    representation of the target from the missiles perspective andsufficient life to cover typical engagement duration.

    3. To deploy payloads to a position/pattern such that the allthe payloads are in the Seeker gate, replicate or improve targetrepresentation OR obscure own ship OR confuse the operatorAND result in the missile missing the intended target.

    5. Minimise the Need for Ship Manoeuvre

    4. To minimise contribution to ship signature.

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  • Improvement in EW Capability

    Improved

    Improved Launcher

    Rounds Improved EW C2, SI and Launcher

    System ,

    Algorithms

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    Chemring Countermeasures

  • Ship Layered Defence The ProblemyASM Threats:

    Sea Skimming Mach 1 Mach 1 threat: Ship will have 90 SecReaction Time:

    . Sea Skimming Mach 1

    . Sea Skimming Mach 1-3+

    . High diving

    Mach 1 threat: Ship will have 90 SecMach 2 threat: Ship will have 45 SecMach 3 threat: Ship will have 30 Sec

    Threat Improvements:Threat Improvements:Higher Frequencies

    FasterStealthierStealthier

    Increased ManoeuvrabilityMore Processing Power

    . Target Detection . Manoeuvre for weapon arcsThreat Response:

    . Target Detection

    . Classification

    . ROE AssessmentWeapon Assignment

    . Manoeuvre for weapon arcs

    . Fire

    . Kill assessmentRe-engage/Reseed if needed

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    Chemring Countermeasures

    . Weapon Assignment . Re-engage/Reseed if needed

  • Ship Layered Defence S d ti

    ConfusionChaff

    Jammers

    DistractionChaff

    Active Decoys

    SeductionChaff

    Active DecoysJammers

    Siren ADR

    JammersyJammersIR Materials

    Sea ViperSea Viper

    Seawolf

    Range

    08 September 2011

    Goalkeeper

    Chemring Countermeasures

  • From a Soft Kill Perspective Mk 41 VLS Primarily designed for Cold War hard kill AAW using Standard SM Series missiles. Adapted for anti surface and anti land. Now has 4 pack for ESSM and Soft kill Active

    $Nulka Round (in the order $500,000)

    HMS Daring fires Sea Viper - May 11. The first T45 firing was completed 3 years after the ship commissioned, but this is not unusual with such complex weapon systems.C t ti t 2 5bCost estimate - 2.5bn

    CENTURION Trainable Launcher System has been designed primarily for EW Soft Kill with 130mm countermeasures. Advanced ASMD Passive countermeasure response. Concept to initial firing 15 months. Concept to production 4 years!!

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  • Augmenting Hard Kill - Pec, Peh, Pes Curves PPe

    Prob

    Pec = 1 - ((1-Peh).(1-Pes ) )

    bability off Escaping hit

    Rather than further improve hard kill, hi h ill f l f

    Target Difficulty

    which will reap from law of diminishing returns, work on

    improving soft kill which has had less impro ement o er the last 10 earsTarget Difficultyimprovement over the last 10 years.

    Match Threat Diversity with Defensive Diversity

    08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures

  • CCM 216 Distraction Deploymentp y

  • RF Seduction Changing from Large Single Burst Payload to

    Missile DirectionWind

    Burst Payload to.

    Missile DirectionWind Direction

    Chaff Bloom

    Chaff Payload

    and Drift

    Chaff Payload Deployment

    Payload FlightControllable Firing Parameters

    Payload Flight

    Launcher Azimuth Angle

    Launcher Firing Time

    08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures

  • .to 5+ Variable Range Payloads

    Missile Direction

    Wind Direction DirectionDirection

    Ships

    Chaff Bloom and Drift

    pTrack

    Chaff Payload Deployment

    Controllable Firing Parameters

    Launcher Azimuth Angles

    Sub-munition Flight Flight Time ElectronicLauncher Firing Time

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  • Current Naval IR Decoy CapabilityCurrent naval IR decoys consist of 5 mortar launched sub-munitions containing bursting charge and

    y y

    sub munitions containing bursting charge and phosphorous leaves.

    Fixed firing interval

    Sub-munitions generally use a pre-determined fuze.

    TALOS

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  • Current Naval Decoy LaunchersRounds deployed from fixed angle launchers.

    y

    angle launchers.

    Multiple launchers orientated at different azimuth angles gare required to give coverage around a ship.

    All launchers tubes at one fixed elevation angle typically 45 degrees.yp y g

    To achieve a given azimuth firing angle the ship may

    d t b dneed to be manoeuvred.

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  • Decoy Against Reticle Type Seeker

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  • Advanced IR Threats- Imaging infrared seekers are becoming an increasing threat t l l tfto naval platforms.

    - Advanced image processing capabilities with the ability to discriminate between target ship and decoys.

    - Gated tracking with the use of a guard gate

    - Aspect ratio analysis of objects identified by the seeker.

    I i i ti fi ld f h- Image processing is a very active field of research.

    - Many varied techniques available.

    - Further advances are being made all the time.

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  • Example Of A Decoy Against an IIR Seeker

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  • Future IR Decoy Capability- Future IR naval decoys will need to be placed so that IR seekers see patterns that

    y y

    make it hard to reject with simple techniques.

    - IR decoy rounds fired from fixed angle tubes have very limited ability to form a specific pattern.

    - Chemring Countermeasures is developing a variable range round and a fully trainable launcher to maximise payload placementlauncher to maximise payload placement accuracy.

    The aim is to form decoy patterns that areThe aim is to form decoy patterns that are more ship signature representative against sophisticated threats.

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  • CENTURION CoverageCENTURION Coverage

    800 600800 600

    100

    Ship

    00

    Elevation determined by launcher design

    Range determined by countermeasure

    Range determined by countermeasure

    Azimuth coverage limited by ships structure

    Elevation Azimuth

    08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures

  • Algorithm OptimisationNeed to consider ship speed and heading, wind speed and bearing, threat bearing and closing speed and many other g g g p yparameters to calculate solution.

    Launch parameters need to be calculated very quicklyLaunch parameters need to be calculated very quickly.

    A human operator will not be able to calculate all the parameters quickly enoughparameters quickly enough.

    Complexity of the problem and timing requirements dictate that a fast computer algorithm will be needed.

    This is essentially a multi-dimensional optimisation problem y p pthat the algorithm controlling the deployment of the decoys will have to solve.

    08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures

  • Desired PatternThe pattern should walk the seeker off the ship without triggering the guard gate

    Th tt i ti d h th t th l t d i b i t f llThe pattern is timed such that the last decoy is burning out or falls into the sea (which ever occurs first) when the missile is arriving at the ships position.

    Use decoy as early as possible without allowing the seeker a chance to reacquire.

    Ed f S k FOVEdgeofSeekerFOV

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  • CENTURION Against IIR Seeker

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  • CENTURION - Key Design Features 12 Rounds vertically stored to minimise firing and training forces Target unloaded weight
  • Operational Advantages of CENTURION Area co