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Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

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Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM. Briefing to Secretary of Defense. Who am I?. My experience in the wild. Case Study. Meeting Agenda. Introduction. Advanced Persistent Threat. How did they do that?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Advanced Persistent Threat

&

Effective Counter Actions

By

Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Page 2: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Briefing to Secretary of Defense

Page 3: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Meeting Agenda

Introduction

Effective Counter Measures

Who am I?

Case StudyMy experience in the wild...

Advanced Persistent ThreatHow did they do that?

What has 30 years taught me…

Page 4: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

4

Page 5: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

5

Now lets look at a few problems…

How’s your Calculus?

Page 6: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

My Background

Page 7: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Know the Enemy…

He who knows the enemy and himself will never in a hundred battles be at risk; He who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes win and sometimes lose; He who knows neither the enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle.

-Sun-Tzu

Page 8: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

Page 9: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

MI5 says the Chinese government “represents one of the most significant espionage threats”

Page 10: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

What is it?

Mandiant defines the APT as a group of sophisticated, determined and coordinated attackers that have been systematically compromising U.S. Government and Commercial networks for years. The vast majority of APT activity observed by Mandiant has been linked to China.

APT is a term coined by the U.S. Air Force in 2006

Page 11: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Advanced Persistent Threat

Advanced means the adversary can operate in the full spectrum of computer intrusion. They can use the most pedestrian publicly available exploit against a well-known vulnerability, or they can elevate their game to research new vulnerabilities and develop custom exploits, depending on the target’s posture.

Persistent means the adversary is formally tasked to accomplish a mission. They are not opportunistic intruders. Like an intelligence unit they receive directives and work to satisfy their masters. Persistent does not necessarily mean they need to constantly execute malicious code on victim computers. Rather, they maintain the level of interaction needed to execute their objectives.

Threat means the adversary is not a piece of mindless code. This point is crucial. Some people throw around the term “threat” with reference to malware. If malware had no human attached to it (someone to control the victim, read the stolen data, etc.), then most malware would be of little worry (as long as it didn’t degrade or deny data). Rather, the adversary here is a threat because it is organized and funded and motivated. Some people speak of multiple “groups” consisting of dedicated “crews” with various missions.

Richard Bejtlich’s Blog

Page 12: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Threat Landscape

Page 13: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Targeting and Exploitation Cycle

Page 14: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Example

Page 15: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

APT’s Objectives

Political Includes suppression of their own population for stability

Economic Theft of IP, to gain competitive advantage

Technical Obtain source code for further exploit development

Military Identifying weaknesses that allow inferior military forces

to defeat superior military forces

Page 16: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Recon / Intelligence

Systems, resources, connections (Easier to attack a trusted partner?)

• (E.g., target’s ISP, legal firm, contractor?)

Individuals of interest (Good targets for spear phishing?)

Possible access methods (Attacks on systems, partners, people)

Page 17: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Initial Intrusion

Spear phishing is pretty common (Because it seems to work well enough because we are so

weak. )

Email to one or more targeted individuals

• Spoofed follow-up to conference, meeting, etc.

• Or email “follow-up” to customer complaint …

Malware payload

• Zip file typical (harder to scan for malware)

• Different people may get different attacks

If even one attack works – they’re in

Page 18: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Looks Real Doesn't it?

Page 19: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

What about this one?

Page 20: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

What about my dream Job?

Page 21: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

There is no safe Porn site!!!

Page 22: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Consolidation

Install additional malware Multiple copies (various locations)

Different kinds & configurations

Crack & exfiltrate credentials For re-login from outside (unusual)

Provide for malware updates

Page 23: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Credentials

(To look like a local user/admin) Identify local usernames

Active Directory

Local machine user database

Attack local authentication data Password guessing (Nvidia CUDA GPU)

Brute force decryption

Page 24: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

NVIDIA CUDA GPU

Page 25: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Tools

Backdoor install Password dump Get email List processes (Normal, useful stuff )

(Doesn’t trip AV alarms)

Page 26: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Exfiltration

Disguise via RAR, CAB, encryption (Make it difficult to see what’s leaving)

Multiple hops to final destination (Harder to ID where data is going)

Outgoing connections only, IP tunnel, etc.

Expect discovery of more tricks Piggyback on other traffic? Slow torrent?

Page 27: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Command / Control

Outgoing connections preferred Firewall less of an issue (mistake)

Imitates “normal” traffic Looks like (but isn’t) Windows Update

Looks like chat, actually C/C rendevous

C/C in web comments & image headers

Scan-signatures more difficult to find Random content, multiple encryption

Page 28: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

APT Maintenance

Tries to keep your system infected Multiple copies

“Seeds” to re-infect

Multiple small custom programs

Leverage existing system components

Updates, to change AV signatures

• (Only 20% trip AV alarms – so change ‘em)

Page 29: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

APT Case Study

Page 30: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Night Dragon – Oil Companies

Page 31: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

APT Case Study

Major Defense Contractor – Electronic Systems Attacks consistent with US-CERT CIIN-07-332-01 Attackers been in almost a year before noticed Attacks came from Shandong Providence Exfiltrated 20 GB/360 GB staged and encrypted 8 known variants of malware Corporate PII from HR taken as well

Page 32: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

APT Case Study - Methodology

Poison Ivy Remote Admin

Keystroke logger

Mine Trojan Full Remote Admin

Capture user credentials

Exfiltrates Data

MS Gina Password sniffer

Remote RDP

Page 33: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

Case Study – Process of Attack

This Information is on a Master Target List Search unclassified information using Google operands Use Maltego To target individual – Facebook /Linkedin Get HR Records – Target HR Boss Send SE email to VP he had access to everything Harvest user credentials – Move latterly… Harvest Access Servers – establish test connection Port 53/443 Access Data – Compress/Encrypt Pass out port 53 or 443 done

Page 34: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

SE - Email

Use Maltego/Facebook/Linkedin– find the weak-link someone who is possibly underappreciated /underpaid. Find the person who has porn issue (eastern block owns this), gambling (mostly US organized crime), or is searching for a new job (someone who is frustrated).

Email target and appeal to their pride! “We have conducted an exhaustive nationwide search for someone with these skills and you are in the top 3 of your peers” “We are willing to fly you and your spouse to our Corporate Headquarters for an interview”

Page 35: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

What should we do?

End “Default Permit” mentality – sandbox everything coming in Enable “White Lists” for corporate user groups – kill all default permit! Don’t allow “corporate users (n00bs)”

to install their favorite software – take them

out of local Admin Group on local box Learn how to operate Back-Track 4

– become proficient in Linux Don’t trust anyone…everyone on the inside of the network is a hacker Know what “normal” looks like – data coming in, data going out. Don’t allow port 443 to pass-through firewall without looking at it.

Dave and Muts (Mati Aharoni)

Page 36: Advanced Persistent Threat & Effective Counter Actions By Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM

You want a good job – Then look like you want a good job. Polish your social skills for interviews Customers and Employers like

certifications – Get over it. Don’t be afraid in an interview “What

educational opportunities do you give your employees?” Always keep in mind your continuing

education – you don’t want to be working

for a young snot-nose boss when your 55

What has 30 years taught me?