FERNANDEZ VS. STO. TOMASG.R. No. 116418, MARCH 7, 1995

FACTS:In this Petition forCertiorari, Prohibition andMandamuswith Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, public respondent Sto. Tomas as Chairman of then Civil Service Commission issued an order to the effect of merging some departments which has led to the transfer of petitioners to different region.ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and(2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure.HELD:(1) The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public.We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 hasnotabolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved thetermination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority hadexpresslyauthorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization,"as the need [for such changes] arises."Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court isnotsaying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service Commissionas the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish acareer service, adopt measures to promote efficiency [and]responsiveness. . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel functions shall bedecentralized, delegating the corresponding authorityto thedepartments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed. (Emphasis supplied)(2) We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was breached by the respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V. Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution declared that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed from their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position ofDirector IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.

MORFE VS. MUTUCG.R. NO. L-20387, January 31, 1968

FACTS:

This petition assailed constitutionality of one of the Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 which states that every public officer either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . . ."

The periodical submission "within the month of January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the decision appealed from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause.

HELD:

The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed one upon assumption of office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly without the challenged provision, a public officer would be free from such a requirement. To the extent then that there is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however that under the Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.

LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONG.R. L-69137, AUGUST 5, 1986

FACTS:

The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked." The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now before us to question that order and the private respondent's title.

ISSUE:

Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD:

No, the appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment it sell and what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

CITY OF MANILA VS. SUBIDO

FACTS:

This is an appeal by petitioner Antonio Villegas from the decision of the lower court dismissing a special civil action for prohibition, quo warranto and mandamus. Respondent Eduardo Romualdez, Secretary of Finance, authorized respondent Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective June 1, 1968. Petitioner Villegas directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the function of Assistant City Treasurer, on the ground that respondent Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation. Instead petitioner appointed Manuel D. Lapid, chief of the cash division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila, as Assistant City Treasurer. It was not until the filing of the petition that respondent Jose R. Gloria was nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position of Assistant City treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed.Respondent Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved the appointment of Lapid, basing his action, on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 19, 1968 to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Section 4 of the Decentralization Law, Republic Act No. 5185."

ISSUE:

What is the applicable law in issue

HELD:

Charter of the City of Manila, enacted in 1949, in express terms did confer on the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the power to appoint the Assistant City Treasurer. On the other hand, support for the petition is premised on the expansive interpretation that would be accorded the general provisions found in the Decentralization Act of 1967 to the effect that it is a city mayor who has the power to appoint all other employees paid out of city or local funds subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. What has been so clearly ordained in the Charter is controlling. It survives in the face of the assertion that the additional power granted local officials to appoint employees paid out of local funds would suffice to transfer such authority to petitioner Mayor. A perusal of the words of the statute, even if far from searching would not justify such an interpretation. This is all more evident, considering the fidelity manifested by this Court to the doctrine that looks with less than favor on implied appeals. The decision now on appeal, to repeat, must be affirmed.The inherent weakness of the contention of petitioner Mayor that would seize upon the vesting of the appointing power of all other "employees" except teachers paid out of local funds to justify his choice of petitioner Manuel D. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer is readily disclosed. The Revised Administrative Code distinguishes one in that category from an "officer" to designate those "whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the function of government, whether such duties are precisely defined by law or not." 9 Clearly, the Assistant and City Treasurer is an officer, not an employee. Then, too, Section 4 of the Decentralization Act relied upon by petitioner City Mayor specifically enumerates, the officials and their assistants whom he can appoint, specifically excluding therefrom city treasurers. 10 The expansive interpretation contended for is thus unwarranted.

MALALUAN VS. COMELECMarch 6, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992.Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato.petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office. Such exercise was not for long, the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality.Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 1995 as a consequence.Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists. However, the question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for attorneys fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en mUsse denominated as actual damages, default in payment by petitioner of which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his motion for execution pending appeal in the trial court. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforecited damages in favor of private respondent.

HELD:

The Omnibus Election Code provides that actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law. COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide that in all election contests the Court may adjudicate damages and attorneys fees as it may deem just and as established by the evidence if the aggrieved party has included such claims in his pleadings.Considering that actual or compensatory damages are appropriate only in breaches of obligations in cases of contracts and quasi-contracts and on the - occasion of crimes and quasi-delicts where the defendant may be held liable for all damages the proximate cause of which is the act or omission complained of, the monetary claim of a party in an election case must necessarily be hinged on either a contract or a quasi-contract or a tortious act or omission or a crime, in order to effectively recover actual or compensatory damages. In the absence of any or all of these, the claimant must be able to point out a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party. For instance, the claimant may cite any of the following provisions of the Civil Code under the chapter on human relations, which provisions create obligations not by contract, crime or negligence, but directly by law.The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the performance of the duties of that office, is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally provided for the position.We have painstakingly gone over the records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner no breach of contract or quasi-contract; or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable for actual damages. Neither has private respondent been able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party.We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidates right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a de facto officer who, in good faith, has haa possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.To recapitulate, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election cases of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The victorious party in an election case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly attributable to the losing party. Evidently, if any damage had been suffered by private respondent due to the execution ofjudgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is, damage without injury, or damage or injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy.

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRESS VS. COURT OF APPEALSJanuary 16, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent Augusto Antonio was the elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres Catandaunes in March 1989, who was also the president of Association of Barangay Councils. In that capacity and pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres.Meanwhile, then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of the same province, in which private respondent was a voting member, void for want of a quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial council became necessary. Conformably, the DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15, 1990.In view of his designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He tendered his resignation dated June 14, 1990 to Mayor Lydia T. Romano of San Andres, Catanduanes, with copies furnished to the provincial governor, the DILG and the municipal treasurer.Subsequently, the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the Supreme Court. In the same case, the appointment of Private Respondent Antonio as sectoral representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void, because he did not possess the basic qualification that he should be president of the federation of barangay councils.On March 31, 1992, private respondent wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres advising them of his re-assumption of his original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral representative therein. In response thereto, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 6, Series of 1992, declaring that Antonio had no legal basis to resume office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres, Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate his official relation thereto.

HELD:

Resignation as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.The records are bereft of any evidence that private respondents resignation was accepted by the proper authority. From the time that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned as a member of Sangguniang Bayan, the governing law was B.P. 337 or the Local Government Code of 1983. While said law was silent as to who specifically should accept the resignation of an appointive member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sec. 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing rules states that the [r]esignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned, and a copy of the action taken shall be furnished the official responsible for appointing a replacement and the Ministry of Local Government. The position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of the resignation.

Second ISSUE: Abandonment of office

Private Respondent Antonio has effectively relinquished his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary abandonment of said post.Abandonment of an office has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. Indeed, abandonment of office is a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. Nonuser refers to a neglect to use a privilege or a right.Clear intention to abandon should be manifested by the officer concerned. Such intention may be express or inferred from his own conduct. Thus, the failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with the officers actual or imputed intention to abandon and relinquish the office. Abandonment of an office is not wholly a matter of intention; it results from a complete abandonment of duties of such a continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. Therefore, there are two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect.Private respondent, however, did not simultaneously discharge the duties and obligations of both positions. Neither did he, at that time, express an intention to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. His overt acts, silence, inaction and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to his original position, show that Antonio had abandoned the contested office. His immediate and natural reaction upon Aquinos appointment should have been to object or, failing to do that, to file appropriate legal action or proceeding. But he did neither. It is significant that he expressed his intention to resume office only on March 31, 1992, after Aquino had been deemed resigned on March 23, 1992, and months after this Court had nullified his designation on August 12, 1991. From his passivity, he is deemed to have recognized the validity of Aquinos appointment and the latters discharge of his duties as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

In all, private respondents failure to promptly assert his alleged right implies his loss of interest in the position. His overt acts plainly show that he really meant his resignation and understood its effects.

GLORIA VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 131012, APRIL 21, 1999

FACTS:This case arose out of the unfortunate strikes and walk-outs staged by public school teachers on different dates in September and October 1990. The illegality of the strikes was declared in 1991 decision of the Supreme Court inManila Public School Teachers Association v.Laguio,Jr.,but many incidents of those strikes are still to be resolved. At issue in this case is the right to back salaries of teachers who were either dismissed or suspended because they did not report for work but who were eventually ordered reinstated because they had not been shown to have taken part in the strike, although reprimanded for being absent without leave.ISSUE:Whether or not those suspended teachers are entitled to back wages.HELD:There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigations and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated.Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.It is a measure intended to enable to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. As already stated, the Court of Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private respondents their salaries, allowances, and other benefits "beyond the ninety (90) day suspension." In other words, no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending investigationbut only for the period of preventive suspensionpending appealin the event the employee is exonerated.

DELA CRUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALSMarch 25, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariio of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).That the petitioners participated in the mass action/illegal strike on Sept. 19-20, 1990. and subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990 issued by this Office, which acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.Wherefore, after a careful evaluation of the records, this Office finds the respondents guilty as charged.The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petitioners were guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service2. That petitioners be awarded back wages for the period when they were not allowed to work The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented.

HELD:

First issue:

Yes, The petitions must be denied in view of previous rulings of this Court already settling all the issues raised by petitioners. It is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.

As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio Jr. and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon. Isidro Cario that the mass actions of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons -- to protest and pressure the Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-payment or delay in payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they were entitled, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours." They committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time - recess, after classes, weekends or holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court - could have held them liable for their participation in the mass actions.We held in Bagana that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the CSC resolutions finding the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing penalties of six (6) months' suspension without pay. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals[24] we added that the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic grievances. We again stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible. But herein petitioners contend that classes were not actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately appointed by Secretary Cario. Besides being a purely factual assertion which this Court cannot take cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the prompt remedial action taken by Secretary Cario might have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary.Considering the foregoing, we find that respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the CSC resolutions finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Second issue: Payment of backwages

The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario were commuted by the CSC to six (6) months' suspension is already settled.In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals[25] we resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in administrative disciplinary cases. As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners, the same is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Order No. 292, thus: "The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decision shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

And since it was already the final dismissal orders of Secretary Cario which were being carried out, immediate implementation even pending appeal was clearly sanctioned by the aforequoted provision of the Administrative Code of 1987. Hence, being legal, the immediate execution of the dismissal orders could not be considered unjustified.

HERNANDEZ VS. VILLEGASJune 30, 1965

FACTS:

Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs, with compensation at P6,000, effective November 1, 1955. n 1956, he was sent to the United States to study enforcement techniques and customs practices under the technical assistance program of the National Economic Council and the International Cooperation Administration.Villegas returned to the Philippines in June, 1957. Shortly thereafter, he was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin and, in his stead, James Keefe was designated Acting Director for Security. While he was acting Arrastre Superintendent, however, Villegas continued receiving his salary as Director for Security.On January 9, 1958, Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre Superintendent, stating in his letter that "this (the proposed appointment) involves a change of designation and status from Director for Security which is confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a classified position." A few days later, the appointment of James Keefe to the position of Director for Security was likewise proposed.This proposal was subsequently approved by the President. It appears that Villegas did not know of his appointment and that of Keefe until February 28, 1958. On this day, he learned that Keefe was being paid the salary for Director for Security and, on further inquiry, found that he had been appointed Arrastre Superintendent.He served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as Director for Security. When all else fails, Villegas filed this action for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of Manila.ISSUE:

HELD:

The only authority who, by constitutional and, legal provisions, is competent to classify a position into primary confidential is the President. The heads of departments and the Commissioner of Civil Service can only recommend or make comments. The fact that a proposal to appoint to a certain position, that of arrastre superintendent, has been favorably recommended and endorsed by the department heads and the chiefs of offices and approved by the Office of the President does not go to show that an entirely different position, that of Director for Security has been classified into category of primarily confidential.The evidence of the defendants-appellants yield no indication that the position of Director for Security has ever been classified into primarily confidential according to the procedure laid down by the law and the Constitution. It results that the removal of the plaintiff from the said position without justifiable cause and his transfer to the position of arrastre superintendent are illegal ... . Consequently the appointment of defendant Keefe to the position of Director for Security, the effect of which is to exclude and remove the plaintiff from the said position, is also illegal.For our purpose, we do not need to consider the position involved in this case is primarily confidential, because, even assuming the position to be, it is nevertheless subject to the Constitutional provision that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause."It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.We therefore hold that Villegas' removal from the office of Director for Security is without cause and is therefore illegal.

LARIN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYOctober 16, 1997

FACTS:

Challenge in this petition is the validity of petitioners removal from service as Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Incidentally, he questions Memorandum order no. 164 issued by the Office of the President, which provides for the creation of A Committee to Investigate the Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue as well as the investigation made in pursuance thereto and Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993 which found him guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from office.

Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the legality of Executive Order No. 132, issued by President Ramos on October 26, 1993, which provides for the Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and of its implementing rules issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, namely: a) Administrative Order No. 4-93, which provides for the Organizational Structure and Statement of General Functions of Offices in the National Office and b) Administrative Order No. 5-93, which provides for Redefining the Areas of Jurisdiction and Renumbering of Regional And District Offices. Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service, of which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished by said executive order.Petitioner was convicted of the crimes for violation of Section 268 (4) of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as a consequence of his act of favorably recommending the grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery, Inc..Consequently, the president, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993, found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the government service.Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on December 13, 1993 to question basically his alleged unlawful removal from office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed from office

HELD:

Yes, At the outset, it is worthy to note that the position of the Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service.[2] Under the law,[3] Career Executive Service officers, namely Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are all appointed by the President.Concededly, petitioner was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct diciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President. This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law.We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission, the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability.[6] However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and clear findings that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given every chance to present his side. The rule is well settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

BRIONES vs OSMEASeptember 24, 1958

FACTS:

Petitioner Concepcion G. Briones she was appointed Clerk-Stenographer in the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu and on August 5, 1937, she was transferred to the Office of the City Mayor, in the same capacity as Clerk-Stenographer, but with permanent status.Petitioner Faustino O. Rosagaran on the other hand, is a second grade civil service eligible. He was employed in the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu since July, 1940, and promoted to Administrative Officer. In 1955, he was publicly declared and adjudged "Model Employee.Respondent city mayor passed Resolution No. 21, series of 1956 creating 35 positions in the City Mayors office, and appropriating therefor the necessary amount for salaries for six months, the amounts of P28,000 for office equipment, P2,000 for office supplies and an additional amount of P10,000 for the City Mayors discretionary fund.On February 14, 1956, the Municipal Board in its Resolution No. 187, series of 1956, approved Ordinance No. 192, abolishing 15 positions in the City Mayors office and 17 positions in the Office of the Municipal Board, or a total of 32 positions in both offices. Among the positions abolished in the Office of the City Mayor were those occupied by petitioners.Pursuant to said Ordinance No. 192, the City Mayor wrote separate letters to petitioners notifying them of the abolition of their positions and advising them of the termination of their services "effective at the close of business hours on March 15, 1956."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the abolition of petitioners position is void

HELD:

Yes, The reasons given for the abolition of the positions of the appellees (alleged to be economy and efficiency) are untrue, and constitute a mere subterfuge for the removal without cause of the said appellees, in violation of the security of Civil Service tenures as provided by the Constitution.Considering that the appellees have served in the office of the Mayor of Cebu, since Commonwealth days, before the war; that their efficiency and merit has been attested by repeated and constant promotions and increases in salary; that petitioner Rosagaran was even proclaimed "Model Employee" as recently as 1955; and that just a short time before the abolition of their positions, the respondents had created for the same office of the City Mayor no less than 35 new positions calling for an outlay of P68,100 per annum, almost P6,000 a month, the excuse of promoting efficiency and economy is most transparent and unimpressive. A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles, like petitioners herein who have rendered long and honorable service, should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given positions of recent creation, nor should they be left at the mercy of political changes.It is evident that the mayor could not legally remove the petitioner without cause, for being a member of the Civil Service, his tenure of office is protected by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution, which says:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.This Court has always upheld these salutary principles. In our recent decision in Gacho, Et. Al. v. Osmea, etc. Et. Al., 94 Phil., 208, we ruled that while abolition of the office does not imply removal of the incumbent, the rule is true only where the abolition is made in good faith; that the right to abolish can not be used to discharge employees in violation of the civil service law nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons. That ruling is conclusive on the case now before us.

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS VS. LAGUIOG.R. No. 95445, AUGUST 6, 1991

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers have joined mass action leaving behind their public duty to dramatize and highlight the teachers plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again brought to the latters attention. On his part, the Secretary of Education issued an order commanding the striking teachers to immediately return to their work and threatening them to face dismissal proceedings if they dont follow the order. However, the teachers did not heed to the order and the mass action continued. Thus the Secretary of Education formed a Committee for purposes of investigating the striking teachers and complaints were filed. The Secretary of Education found them liable for abandonment of work and grave misconduct. Some of them were dismissed while some were suspended and others were exonerated. Instead of appealing the decision of the Secretary to the Civil Service Commission, petitioners went immediately to the Supreme Court and filed a petition for certiorari to declare their dismissal null and void as they were just exercising their right to redress their grievances as provided for under the Constitution. They argued that their right to due process was violated because they were not accorded the opportunity to defend themselves but instead immediately dismissed without giving them notice.

ISSUE: Whether or not immediate recourse to the Supreme Court was the proper remedy taken by the dismissed teachers.HELD:This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court, especially when numerous parties desperately situated as far as the facts are concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization of what should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because the respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions were acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to the Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting corrective relief.Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse through the judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at the peril of their own causes.23This Court is a court oflast resort. Its review jurisdiction is limited to resolving questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or the facts have already been determined by lower tribunals, except only in criminal actions where capital penalties have been imposed.

ROQUE VS. ERICTAG.R. No. L-30244, SEPTEMBER 28, 1973

FACTS:

Petitioners were the Special Counsels in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur since 1964. However, in 1968 the Provincial Board issued a resolution abolishing their position and their corresponding items were eliminated from the budget of the Province. Thus petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC of Zamboanga, the trial court rendered a decision against the petitioners for failure of the latter to p rove that there funds available for their salaries; and failure to show that the abolishment of their position was done in bad faith. ISSUE:Whether the action of the respondent Board, in abolishing the positions of petitioners as special counsels, and in failing to provide appropriations for their salaries in accordance with existing laws, had the effect of unlawfully excluding the petitioners from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which they are entitled under the law.HELD:We start from the premise that while abolition of an office does not imply removal of the incumbent,such rule holds true only where the abolition is made (1) in good faith,(2) not for personal or political reasons,and (3) not in violation of the law.Thus, evidence of bad faith is shown when the purpose of the abolition of office is to discharge the incumbent in violation of the civil service law.Thus:As well settled as the rule that the abolition of an office dates not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees, it is null and void.The principal reasons advanced by respondent Board for the abolition of the positions of the two special counsels, are: (1) the positions are unnecessary "as the duties of the Provincial Fiscal as legal officer of the province had been removed from his office and vested upon the Provincial Attorney"and "the prosecution of crimes in a court of justice is purely a state affair (sic) therefore eliminating the necessity for the employment of Special Counsels to act for and in behalf of and to protect the interest of the provincial government ...;"and (2) economy "the province is laboring under heavy stress financial adversities (sic) ..."These purported justifications after a review of the record appear unimpressive. Circumstances there are which indicate them to be but a mere artifice to conceal the unlawful removal of permanent civil service employees, in violation of their security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution.

FABELLA VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 110379, NOVEMBER 28, 1997

FACTS:On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cario issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cario filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations.At the same time, Secretary Cario ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive suspension. On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial court that Cario had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion. The hearing of the case was thereafter conductedex partewith only the teachers allowed to present their evidence.ISSUE:These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single question: whether private respondents were denied due process of law.HELD:The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of law. In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the question of due process of law, not on the right of government workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must first be observed.In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3)a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.13

BITONIO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDITG.R. No. 147392, MARCH 12, 2004

FACTS:In 1994, petitioner Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. The Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the Department of Labor and Employment designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA.As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving aper diemfor every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment ofper diemsto the petitioner.ISSUE:The issue in this case is whether or not the COA correctly disallowed theper diemsreceived by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.HELD:The petitioners case stands on all fours with the case ofDela Cruz v. Commission on Audit.Here, the Court upheld the COA in disallowing the payment of honoraria andper diemsto the officers concerned who sat as members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority. The officers concerned sat as alternates of their superiors in anex officiocapacity. Citing also theCivil Liberties Unioncase, the Court explained thus:"Theex-officioposition being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as anex-officiomember thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of aper diemor anhonorariumor an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution."

LEYSON VS. OMBUDSMANG.R. No. 134990, APRIL 27, 2000

FACTS:

The International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the CIIF. Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the other party. However, in August 1996, or prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, respondent Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite advance notice. The CIIF companies engaged the services of another vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation.On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba. On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its finding that the case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular court. This Office has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC. Besides the entities involved are private corporations (over) which this Office has no jurisdiction. ISSUE:Whether or not these companies fall within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.HELD:But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,i.e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations.1wphi1The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT.Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.