Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks

74 SCRA 212

FACTS:

Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates.

In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction

HELD:

Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.

Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.

Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.

Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139Facts:

That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angarawon. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the mostnumber of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsuafiled before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election ofthe herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things, that saidrespondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the firstdistrict of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against theelection of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation ofsuch election by resolution of the National Assembly?Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contestsrelating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NationalAssembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remainedoriginally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the ElectoralCommission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the NationalAssembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as anexpress prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed inbehalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings ofthe Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay downthe period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to thecommission would be ineffective.The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei thepower regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted toits cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where ageneral power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessaryfor the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also included. Theincidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of itsexclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and

 Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A.Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit theElectoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance ofthe protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of saidpetitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district ofthe Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the ElectoralCommission.Issue :

WON Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdictionin assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of theherein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election byresolution of the National Assembly?

Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate reithe power regulative in character to limit the time within which protestsintrusted to its cognizance should be filed.It is a settled rule of construction thatwhere a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular powernecessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is alsoconferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). Inthe absence of any further constitutional

provision relating to the procedure to befollowed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, theincidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of itsexclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed bynecessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27 

Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged withseveral others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxeswithout the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution.After appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished forcontempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposinga fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.Issue :

WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.

Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercisethe power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial innature.In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it didnot exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise thepower to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power isinherently judicial in nature. The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer alllaws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear anddecide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with theelections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classifiedas a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, ArticleVIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi- judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law comeunder its jurisdiction.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence isessential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to theenforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, inthe, administration of justice.The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident andattribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariablylimited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of thatpower by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative functionhas been held invalid

Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757 

Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the defunctCourt of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null andvoid its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent SimplicioC. Ibea and instead ordered then

Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan,Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position as policeman of the samemunicipality with back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actualreinstatement.

Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio C.Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission decidedAdministrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of the case.

Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the legalrequirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative case withoutstenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of theproceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Boardof Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for officepersonnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take note of theproceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative andsummary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedureshould be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties inobtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims anddefenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in anadministrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and gven the opportunityto adduce their respective evidence.

Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations

TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Ang Tibay vs CIR, 69 Phil 635

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, CIR)

Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: What is the function of CIR as a special court?

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit evidence in support thereof;(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;(3) The decision must have something to support itself;(4) The evidence must be substantial;(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

Tolentino vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 563

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

(Administrative Law, Contempt Power, Quasi-Judicial Power)

Facts: Private respondent Domingo Cinco filed a verified complaint with the then NLRC charging petitioner Arcadio Tolentino with violating the Constitution of the Batangas Labor Union (BLU) by refusing, as its president, to call for the election of officers. NLRC issued an order directing the BLU to hold its election of officers within 20 days from receipt. BLU filed a petition with the CFI for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction against private respondent Cinco, NLRC and the Sec. Of Labor, seeking to annul and to prohibit NLRC and the Sec. of Labor from enforcing it.

Setting instead the application for heaving, Judge Jaime delos Angeles afterwards reserved his resolution on the matter at issue in view of the intricate legal questions raised therein. Private and judge then was served a copy of a subpoena issued by respondent Inciong requiring them to appear at the NLRC to explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by the commission.

Issue: WON a labor official’s power to hold a person for contempt for refusal to comply with its order can be extended to trial court judges.

Held: No. Courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law, which is the essence of judicial power. Courts like any other governmental agencies, must observe the limits of its jurisdiction, thus said judge reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.

The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it. Citing the judge for contempt is an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules.

Zambales Chromite Mining et al vs Court of Appeals

Due Process – Administrative Due Process

ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloňa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.

HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.

Felicidad Anzaldo vs Jacobo Clave

Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldo’s appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was “inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission”, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave’s recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

American Tobacco Com vs Director of Patents

G.R. No. L-26803 October 14, 1975

ANTONIO, J.:

In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.

Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following opposition, interference and cancellation proceedings in said Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896, 282, 247, 354, 246,332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256, 267, 111, 400, 324, 114, 159, 346, and 404.

Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:

168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceeding. — the Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. In the event that the Patent Office should be provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decision subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00.

The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.. 1

Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the afore-quoted Rule 168 to read as follows:

168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. — The Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, [In the event that the Patent Office is provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be [P25.00.] Such inter partesproceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official designated by the Director, but all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.)

In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.

Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decideinter partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition formandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents under the general law 2 and Republic Acts Nos. 165 3 and 166 3* to sustain the contention of petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).

It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. 4 There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.

The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, 5 decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent, 6 cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165, 7 inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, 8 claims of interference, 9 cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law 10 and other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. 11 For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far too much of the time and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious consideration of the more important issues. the remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail." 12

Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the

decision of the administrative agency will be made. 13

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioners.

AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. et al.vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS et al.

G.R. No. L-26803; Oct. 14, 1975; Antonio. Digest by Ian.

Facts:

This case involves the validity of the amendment made by the Director of Patents to Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademarks. 1. The Trademark Law (RA 166) vested the Director of Patents with

jurisdiction over “inter partes”

proceedings (

i.e.

hearing of opposition of registration of mark or tradename, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trademark, tradename or servicemark, and cancellation of registration of trademark and tradename pending at the Patent Office). 2. The Director of Patents drafted and promulgated the Rules of Practice and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Rule 168 of the Rules embodies the jurisdiction provided under the Trademark Law. Subsequently, the Director with the approval of the Secretary amended Rule 168:

2. Petitioners in this case are parties in

inter partes

proceedings. Due to the amendment, the Director of Patents

delegated the hearing of petitioners’ cases to hearings officers Attys. Marquez, Velasco, C

asia, and Buenaluz. Petitioners claim that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide the cases.

Issue:

WON it is within the powers of the Director of Patents to delegate the hearing of the cases.

Held:

Yes. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his

decisions. 14 It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met.15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 17

In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings.

Moreover, as the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a Member of this Court has correctly pointed out, the repeated appropriations by Congress for hearing officers of the Philippine Patent Office form 1963 to 1968 18 not only confirms the departmental construction of the statute, but also constitutes a ratification of the act of the Director of Patents and the Department Head as agents of Congress in the administration of the law. 19

Petition dismissed.

SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Padilla, J. | June 29, 1957

FACTS:

- In 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubal, father of Alicia Nubal (16 year old minor), filed a complaint against Emilio Suntay. The complained alleged that Suntay took Alicia from her school in St. Paul Pasig, and took her to UP Diliman, and there had carnal knowledge of her.

- In 1955, Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Suntay left the Philippines and went to San Francisco.

- The private prosecutor filed a motion praying that the Court issue and order directing the concerned government agencies (i.e. DFA, NBI) to, essentially, bring the accused back to the Philippines so that he can be made to answer for the charges against him. This motion was granted.

- The Secretary then cabled the Ambassador to the US instructing him to order the Counsel General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines.

- However, this order was not carried out in view of the present petition filed by Suntay. Suntay’s complain alleged that:

o While the court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary’s discretion is abused, the court cannot take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled.

o And while the Secretary had discretion in the cancellation of passports, such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing, because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty protected by the Constitution.

ISSUE and HOLDING:

- WON the court acted within its jurisdiction – YES

- WON hearing is required – NO

RATIO:

- Suntay in this case is charged with seduction. The order of the court directing the DFA to take proper steps in order that Suntay may be brought back to the Philippines is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction.

- When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or juridical officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry in to effect may be employed by such court or officer.

- In issuing the order, the Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.

On the issue on the necessity of a hearing:

- Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful.

- But where the holder of a passport is facing criminal charges in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically in cancelling such passport.

When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, hearing may be dispensed with by such