Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 81356 February 26, 1990

REYNOSO B. FLOREZA, petitioner, vs.HON. JAIME ONGPIN in his capacity as Secretary of Finance and HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondents.

G.R. No. 86156 February 26, 1990

REYNOSO B. FLOREZA, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondents.

Dela Cuesta, Delas Alas & Callanta for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The Court is confronted once again with issues stemming from the reorganization of the government following the issuance on February 25, 1986 of Presidential Proclamation No. 1 calling on "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations."

Petitioner Reynoso B. Floreza joined the government service in May, 1955 as a clerk (action attorney) in the Administrative Division of the Department of Finance. In December, 1959, he transferred to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) where he was appointed Senior Revenue Examiner. In recognition of his competence and perseverance, he received regular promotions in the BIR over the years.

In September, 1980, while based in Davao City as Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 11-B, he was informed by then Acting BIR Commissioner Ruben B. Ancheta of the latter's intention to designate him to the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal). 1 The designation was necessary to avoid "a possible conflict of interest situation" arising from the fact that the incumbent Service Chief was Atty. Imelda L. Reyes, the wife of the then newly-appointed Judge of the Court of Tax Appeals, Alex Z. Reyes, 2 who would have to appear before her husband in BIR cases.

Floreza accepted the designation and Acting Commissioner Ancheta issued Travel Assignment Order No. 213-80 dated October 2, 1980 directing Floreza to report to his new assignment as Revenue Service Chief (Legal) and naming Imelda L. Reyes as Revenue Service Chief (Planning and Policy) 3 Two years later or on October 6, 1982, Floreza was given a regular appointment as Revenue Service Chief. 4

He was thus Revenue Service Chief (Legal) when, on April 4, 1986, pursuant to the reorganization program, BIR Commissioner Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. issued a memorandum exhorting all Revenue Service Chiefs and their Assistants, and all Revenue Regional Directors and their Assistants to "tender their resignations to give the authorities concerned the widest latitude in effecting a reorganization of the Bureau." 5 Petitioner refused to tender his resignation. 6

On April 28, 1986, Commissioner Tan issued Travel Assignment Order No. 11-86 assigning Floreza to the Office of the Commissioner as Consultant due to "the exigencies of the service." 7 The same order directed Jaime M. Maza to report to the Legal Office as its acting chief. Under Travel Assignment Order No. 270-86 dated November 11, 1986, Maza and Rizalina S. Magalona were respectively designated Service Chiefs for the Legal Office and the Management and Policy Service. 8

On January 30, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 127 reorganizing the Ministry of Finance. 9 Three days later, or on February 2, 1987, the new Constitution was ratified. Section 3 of the transitory provisions provides that all existing executive orders and issuances not inconsistent with the constitution "shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."

Thereafter, the committee constituted to effect the reorganization of the Bureau submitted a staffing pattern and structure to the Commissioner and the Secretary ofFinance. 10

Feeling that he had been placed in a "freezer" 11 and having been confidentially advised that he would be removed from the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) as he was not among those recommended for reappointment, 12 Floreza filed in the Court of Appeals on June 4, 1987 a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

He alleged in the petition that he had served the government with distinction having been credited, among other things, with authoring various innovations in the Tax Code; that he was highly rated by former Commissioners of the BIR; that he was the "rightful contender in points of experience and competence" to the position of Deputy Commissioner, and that he failed to get said position because he incurred the ire of respondents Secretary Jaime Ongpin and Commissioner Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., after he appeared before the Tanodbayan and executed sworn statements therein regarding a multi-billion tax case involving said officials and multinational gas companies. 13

He averred that he was not putting in issue "the wisdom of the administration's desire to reorganize the executive arm of the government" but he was challenging the constitutionality of his "removal without cause, from an office which has not been abolished nor reorganized." 14 He contended that Executive Order No. 127 violated the constitutional guaranty on security of tenure and that the Freedom Constitution having been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, he "cannot be removed or dismissed without just cause, much less, without formal charge or prior notice." 15 He prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement and implementation of Executive Order No. 127 and, after hearing, for a judgment declaring his "contemplated removal" as violative of the Constitution and the civil service law. 16

In their answer, respondents alleged that Floreza's appointment as Revenue Service Chief was authorized under then Item No. SB-1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 80 for the Planning and Policy Service and not for the Legal Service; that Floreza was not required "but merely encouraged" to tender his resignation to give the authorities concerned the widest latitude in effecting the reorganization; that Floreza was relieved of his duties in the Legal Office on April 28, 1986 after his designation as consultant in the Office of the Commissioner, and that Jaime M. Maza, who was designated as acting chief of the Legal Office, became the "duly appointed and qualified Revenue Service Chief, Legal Office", on November 11, 1986.

Respondents asserted that the petition for prohibition was improper and that it failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as petitioner had "in fact been removed effectively from the position of Revenue Service Chief, Legal Office that assuming Floreza's "threatened removal" referred to his position as consultant, the Court of Appeals had "no jurisdiction over the nature of the subject of the suit on the ground of prematurity and failure to satisfy the requirement of Sec. 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner must allege the facts with certainty"; that said court had no jurisdiction over the action insofar as it pertained to Floreza's removal as Revenue Service Chief since the matter fell under the provisions of Executive Order No. 17; and that the petition stated no cause of action on the ground that any removal pursuant to a bona fide reorganization under Executive Order No. 127 was valid. 17

In reply to said answer, Floreza maintained that he had always been performing the duties and responsibilities of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) and that was shown by Travel Assignment Order No. 11-86 dated April 28,1986 which directed him to report from said office or position to the Office of the Commissioner as consultant therein. He stated that the memorandum exhorting employees and officials to tender their resignation was not merely meant to "encourage" such resignation because it set the date for resigning and attached a suggested form for resignation. He added that in a dialogue with Commissioner Tan regarding the observance of due process in the acceptance of resignation, he acted as the spokesman of the BIR top echelon although he chose not to resign.

Floreza further averred that Jaime M. Maza was not the duly appointed and qualified Revenue Service Chief of, the Legal Office because Maza's latest appointment was only that of head revenue assistant. On the other hand, Floreza still held the position of Revenue Service Chief and continued to receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant thereto and hence, his designation as a consultant did not amount to his removal from the position of Revenue Service Chief.

Floreza explained that in the BIR, it was not uncommon for an official or employee to perform the functions of a position other than the position item indicated in his appointment papers because the overriding considerations were the interests and exigencies of the service. Hence, of the nine Revenue Service Chiefs, only two were working in the specific services where their items belonged. Assuming arguendo that his item was that of Revenue Service Chief (Planning and Policy), still, there was no need for him to be reappointed to said position because Executive Order No. 127 retained all the nine Services and therefore, he was covered by the constitutional protection on security of tenure. No item had been abolished. There was no reduction in force.

On the jurisdictional issues raised by the respondents, Floreza insisted that he had satisfied the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 65 because while he was stin the Revenue Service Chief (Legal) even after his designation as consultant, Jaime M. Maza was merely designated as acting Revenue Service Chief (Legal). Furthermore, there was a clear indication that he was "about to be removed from the BIR" since in the list of top officials of the Bureau which was published in the August 1, 1987 Anniversary Issue of the Philippine Revenue Journal his name did not appear either a Revenue Service Chief or as Consultant.

Floreza also claimed that his removal from the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) did not fall under Executive Order No. 17 on account of the rulings of the Review Committee set up under said executive order and the Supreme Court, respectively, in Appeal No. 672, "Gimarino v. Secretary of Justice" (May 18,1987) and in G.R. No. 77918, "Lecaroz v. Ferrer" (July 27, 1987). 18 He also disputed respondents' averment that the petition stated no cause of action because the one-year period from February 25,1986 had elapsed and as ruled in De la Llana v. Alba, 19 removal pursuant to a bona fide reorganization refers to removal by reason of non-reappointment, which kind of removal must be for cause. 20

On September 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 21 dismissing the petition for prohibition for lack of merit. It ruled that Executive Order No. 127 was issued pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Freedom Constitution mandating that "(a)ll elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986." It stated that Floreza's non-reappointment as Revenue Service Chief (Legal) did not violate his constitutional right to security of tenure for it merely confirmed his earlier separation from the post. It explained that through Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 which took effect on January 30, 1987 or within the one-year period prescribed by the Freedom Constitution, personnel of the Ministry of Finance, including Floreza, were considered removed on said date.

The appellate court cited the resolution of this Court in Jose v. Arroyo 22 which states that the provisions of Section 16, Art. XVIII of the Constitution explicitly "authorize the removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution.'"

Floreza filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. On December 23, 1987, the motion was denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals said:

With respect to petitioner's arguments, and as We held in Our decision, upon the effectivity of Executive Order No. 27 (sic), all personnel of the Ministry of Finance (now Department of Finance) continued in their functions only in hold over capacities. And Executive Order No. 27 (sic) was validly issued pursuant to Section II of Article III of Proclamation No. 3 which authorized removals without cause if exercised within one (1) year from February 25, 1986.

Further, Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution explicitly authorizes the removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a 'result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3,' clearly recognizing the legality of the continuation of reorganization even beyond February 26,1987. The terms of the said constitutional provision is much too clear, making it unnecessary for Us to discuss further whether it was really applied to the case of Jose v. Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 78485).

Neither may it comfort petitioner that his alleged position has not been abolished. Whether his position is abolished or not is not important since removal can be effected not for cause but pursuant to a reorganization. Nor may he invoke the Civil Service Law which is merely a statute and which must give way when it collides with the Constitution. And with respect to the October 2, 1987 Guidelines, the same does not preclude removal without cause included.

Hence, Floreza filed before this Court a "petition for review ad cautelam." As capsulized by petitioner, this case focuses on the validity of the removal or separation from the civil service even without cause of an incumbent whose position has not been abolished under the government reorganization to achieve harmony, prevent duplication of functions, promote efficiency, and eradicate graft and corruption. 23

On March 7, 1988, President Aquino issued appointment for Jaime M. Maza and Rizalina Magalona to the positions of Assistant Commissioners for Legal Service and Planning and Research Service, respectively. 24 It is not shown why Commissioner Tan had to secure Presidential appointments for these two items since persons appointed to these positions are not and have never been presidential appointees at least, not under the law. Under Executive Order No. 127, only the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners are presidential appointees. No law indicating a change in the mode of appointment has been presented. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals had not issued either a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction and, apprehensive that he might be removed without cause, Floreza appealed on March 12, 1988 to both the Department of Finance and the Civil Service Commission his non-reappointment as Revenue Service Chief and the appointment of Maza and Magalona to said position. The Department of Finance referred the letter to the Civil Service Commission.

On September 5, 1988, the Civil Service Commission rendered a decision directing the BIR to appoint Floreza "to a position in the new staffing pattern equivalent or comparable to the rank of Revenue Service Chief with a salary correspondingly adjusted to the levels which comparable positions have been adjusted to after the reorganization." The Commission ruled:

The issue to resolve is whether the appointment of Mr. Maza and Mrs. Magalona as Assistant Commissioners for Legal and Planning and Research, respectively, violated Floreza's security of tenure and whether he was deprived of due process during the reorganization.

xxx xxx xxx

On the basis of the above findings, the Civil Service Commission finds no violation of Floreza's right to security of tenure nor was there an infringement of his right to due process.

Where a position is abolished, contenders for a similar or equivalent position must be ranked and rated according to their merits. There is no showing that the post of Assistant Commissioner is equivalent to the post of Revenue Service Chief Assuming however that such is the case, there is no showing either that Floreza is more qualified than either Maza or Magalona to move up to the contested Assistant Commissioner post. In the absence of such a showing, the Commission assumes regularity and the exercise of prudence and good judgment relative to the appointments of Maza and Magalona by the President.

As to due process, the presidential guidelines of October 2, 1987 directed that employees affected by reorganization must either be informed of their reappointment, offered another position in the same department/agency or informed of their termination. In Floreza's case, he was not terminated but offered another position in which he subsequently declined. His salaries emoluments were not stopped. He did not avail of his right to appeal said decision to the BIR-RAB and instead went to the DOF and the CSC. From this, it would appear that substantial due process has been accorded him.

It is also the finding of this Commission however that the BIR did not controvert that Floreza's 32 years of service to the government have been unblemished by any administrative or disciplinary complaint. There was no showing either that his competence or integrity was ever in question. While, in the eyes of the present Commissioner of BIR, he may not have met the qualifications for the post of assistant Commissioner as to be recommended for presidential appointment, there is no showing either that he deserved to be demoted in rank even if he is allowed to retain his former pay.

In compliance with the directive of the Civil Service Commission, BIR Commissioner Tan requested authority from the Department of Budget and Management to allow the BIR to assign to Floreza the position of Assistant to the Commissioner, the only "equivalent or comparable position" to Floreza's previous position of Revenue Service Chief, in view of the fact that for lack of funds, the position of Assistant to the Commissioner had been proposed for abolition under the "OP pay plan". 25 Commissioner Tan also informed the Civil Service Commission of the proposal to appoint Floreza to the position of Assistant to the Commissioner. 26

On December 28, 1988, Floreza filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Civil Service Commission which was docketed as G.R. No. 86156. He prays therein that said decision be modified by "restoring" him to the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) 'retitled Assistant Commissioner (Legal)."

On January 2, 1989, the Department of Budget and Management approved the "creation" of the position of Assistant to the Commissioner "effective upon implementation of Executive Order No. 127," and ordered the abolition of three positions in the BIR to provide the necessary funding for the "created" position. 27 Thereafter, Floreza received his permanent appointment as Assistant to the Commissioner with compensation at the rate of P 120,000 per annum effective November 1, 1987. 28 Floreza accepted the position subject to the decision of this Court in these two petitions.

G.R. No. 81356 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing Floreza's petition for prohibition. G.R. No. 86156 is also labelled a petition for review on certiorari but, for purposes of resolving the issues raised therein, the petition shall be considered a special civil action of certiorari inasmuch as judgments of the Civil Service Commission may be brought to this Court only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 29

The petition in G.R. No. 81356 revolves around the issue of whether or not by virtue of Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, Floreza was removed from the service as of the issuance of said executive order on January 30, 1987, Section 59 states:

SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. — Upon approval of this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article Ill of Freedom Constitution.

The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be separated from the service. Those separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to which they may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary for every year of service, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received, but in no case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.

No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin the separation/replacement of any officer or employee effected under this Executive Order. 30

A careful reading of Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 shows that it is a device intended to overcome the lapse of the power to reorganize under the interim or "Freedom Constitution" with the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. 31 Thus, an incumbent retained in a hold-over capacity is not yet formally terminated in his government employment. At the same time, he has lost his right to security of tenure because if he is not reappointed when his former item is filled, then he is deemed separated.

The same paragraph, however, mandates that separation under Executive Order No. 127 should follow the provisions of Article III of the interim Constitution and the procedure under Executive Order No. 17. This means that separation or replacement of officers or employees should be "only for justifiable reasons" 32 or for any of the grounds enumerated in Section 3 33 of the latter executive order.

None of these justifiable reasons or grounds exists in this case of Floreza. As stated in the decision of the Civil Service Commission, there is no controversion of the fact that Floreza's 32 (now 34) years of service are unblemished by any administrative or disciplinary complaint. There is no showing that his competence or integrity was ever in question. He went up gradually in the ladder of promotions at the BIR under different Commissioners throughout those 32 years. The only reasons he can find for his non- reappointment are the sworn statements he filed as Chief of the BIR Legal Office with the Tanodbayan regarding a multi-billion peso tax case involving multinational gas companies with which the Secretary and Commissioner were earlier connected before their appointments to top government positions.

The number of the item to which Floreza was appointed belongs to the Policy and Planning Service. However, from the time he was appointed Revenue Service Chief, he served as head of the Legal Service. Under the authority given to the Commissioner, he switches the Service Chiefs from one service to another in the best interests of their agency especially in order to maximize BIR collections. Moreover, the appointments extended to heads of services at the time were as "Revenue Service Chiefs" with no indication of what particular service they were going to administer.

Moreover, Floreza's assignment as consultant in the Office of the Commissioner was undertaken through the usual issuance of a travel assignment order as dictated by the "exigencies of the service." Floreza's movement may not be considered as a transfer within the contemplation of Section 27(c) of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree) for it was more of the detail under Section 24(f) than a transfer. Had it been a transfer, Floreza would have been issued an appointment as consultant. 34

Floreza continued holding the position of Revenue Service Chief until Commissioner Tan went to the President for the appointments of Jaime M. Masa as Assistant Commissioner for the Legal Service and Rizalina S. Magalona as Assistant Commissioner for the Planning and Research Service on March 7, 1988. 35 Since both the Planning and Policy (or Research) Service and the Legal Service were given new Chiefs, Floreza was in effect terminated in his employment even as he was offered a demotion in rank to replace it. It should be emphasized that by that time, the 1987 Constitution had long been in full force and effect.

In the much-awaited decision in Dario v. Mison and its companion cases, 36 this Court ruled that government reorganization may still continue under the 1987 Constitution provided that the bona fide rule is followed. The same decision upheld the application of Republic Act No. 6656, Section 13 of which gives retroactive effect as of June 30, 1987 to the rights and benefits provided therein. Section 12 thereof provides:

SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when pursuant to a bonafide reorganization, a position had been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;

(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;

(c) Where incumbents are replaced by less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;

(d) Where there is a reclassification of officers in the department of agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;

(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.

We apply the ruling in Dario v. Mison and Section 2 of Republic Act 6656 to this petition. We hold that Floreza was deprived of his right to security of tenure by his non-reappointment to the position of Revenue Service Chief or its new title under the reorganized Bureau of Internal Revenue. It should be remembered that after February 2, 1987, any reorganization undertaken by the government is circumscribed by the provisions and safeguards of the new Constitution. Hence, when Floreza was not reappointed as Revenue Service Chief or as Assistant Commissioner either in the Legal Service or in the Planning and Research Service, and other persons were appointed to the positions, he was, in effect, dismissed from the service in violation not only of his right to security of tenure but to due process as well.

Floreza has in his favor recent jurisprudence and the provisions of Section 2, Republic Act 6656, specially paragraph (d). However, there has been a reclassification of the various services in the BIR. Executive Order No. 127 particularly states that the Legal Service of the BIR shall be headed by a Service Chief The same provision is embodied in Section 20 of Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987." 37

The BIR, however, after its reorganization adopted the realignment of position classes prescribed by Executive Order No. 1042 38 which was issued by former President Marcos on July 30, 1985. The position of Revenue Service Chief has been renamed Assistant Commissioner. Accordingly, the position of Assistant Commissioner has become part of the Career Executive Service. These acts of the BIR form the basis for presidential appointments to positions which, under the law, do not require the President's own attention.

We shall not delve further into Floreza's allegations about the respondent Commissioner's bias against him and the circumstances which led Floreza to conclude that inasmuch as he could not be eased out of government service without doing violence to his legal rights as a public official, respondent

Commissioner was actually effecting his dismissal behind the cloak of reorganization. Floreza's allegations are, strictly speaking, factual matters although they are unrebutted. We see no need to rule upon these matters.

One factual circumstance, however, cannot escape the Court's notice. On March 14, 1988, the respondent Commissioner informed Floreza through a letter that in the reorganization of the BIR, Floreza had been "allocated to the item of Chief Revenue Officer III authorized in the Legal Branch, Revenue Region No. 5, Legazpi City", that there would be no reduction of his present salary and that he would be temporarily assigned to the Advisory Council under the Office of the Commissioner. 39 The records also show that up to April, 1988, Floreza was being paid the salary of an Assistant Commissioner. However, from May, 1988, he received the same salary under the item of Chief Revenue Officer III notwithstanding the fact that he had manifested that he was not accepting said position. 40 He was, therefore, demoted.

Demotion in office by assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has a lower rate of compensation is tantamount to removal, 41 if no cause is shown for it. More so, if it is not part of any disciplinary action. While Floreza was allowed to receive the salary of Revenue Service Chief, his demotion to a position without justifiable cause smacks of arbitrariness which has no place in a government that nurtures the constitutional mandates of security of tenure and due process, Moreover, the position of Chief Revenue Officer III being three grades lower than that of Revenue Service Chief, the respondent Commissioner violated Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6656 which provides that "officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank." Under Executive Order No. 1042, the position next in-rank to that of Assistant Commissioner is Head Revenue Executive Assistant after which follow Chief Revenue Officer IV and Chief Revenue Officer III in that order.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 entitles a victim of a removal in violation of the bona fide rule to a reinstatement or reappointment to the position from which he was removed. The fact that there is now an appointee to the position he claims, holding an appointment signed by the President, is of no moment. There was no vacancy in the office to which Jaime M. Maza was appointed and, therefore, his promotion was not valid.

We again apply the rule in Dario v. Mison where we stated:

The Commissioner is admonished, specifically, for failure to reinstate promptly the separated employees to their former positions or equivalent ones, if the former had been abolished, and to pay backwages arising from their long lay-off.

The Court indeed, has reliable information-(1) that not a few reinstated personnel have been detailed, without their consent, to far-flung offices of the Bureau; (2) actual demotions thereof, and (3) that their backpays have been withheld by reason of nebulous queries as to who foots the bill, the Government or the Commissioner in his personal capacity. The Court strongly reiterates its order decreeing the separation of replacements and the restoration of the dismissed employees in question. We have spoken and we can not anymore be clearer. (G.R. No. 81954 and other companion cases, December 19, 1989, p. 2; Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 81356, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 86156, the decision of the Civil Service Commission is MODIFIED. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is ORDERED to REAPPOINT petitioner REYNOSO B. FLOREZA to his former item of REVENUE SERVICE CHIEF assigned to the Legal Service or ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, Legal Service as the position is now called.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., took no part

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139043. September 10, 1999]

MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Director, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), ALAN FRANCISCO S. GARCIANO, in his capacity as Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), and JESUS RODRIGO T. TAGAAN, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

The present controversy involves the preventive suspension order issued on June 25, 1999, by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452, against petitioner Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia and eight other city officials. Under the said order, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension without pay for the maximum period of six months and told to cease and desist from holding office immediately.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.

Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1]

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation.

In a memorandum dated June 22, 1999, respondent Allan Francisco S. Garciano, the graft investigating officer to whom the case was raffled for investigation, recommended the preventive suspension of petitioner and the others. Two days later, or on June 24, 1999, the affidavit-complaint against petitioner was filed. The following day, on June 25, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension order. On June 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, which motion was denied in an order dated July 5, 1999.

Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the validity of the said order. He pleads for immediate relief through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner contends that:

I

THE RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452 AND ISSUING THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER, THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN BEING WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, CONSIDERING THAT THE ALLEGED ACT CONSTITUTING THE CHARGE AGAINST PETITIONER HEREIN WAS COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM, AND PETITIONER HAVING BEEN REELECTED TO THE SAME POSITION.

II

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452, THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION FOR SIX MONTHS WAS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AND IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 63 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WHICH MANDATES THAT THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS BE ORDERED ONLY AFTER THE ISSUES HAVE BEEN JOINED, AND ONLY FOR A PERIOD NOT IN EXCESS OF SIXTY (60) DAYS.

III

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452, THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AND IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SECTION 26(2) OF THE OMBUDSMAN LAW.

IV

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION, THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST PETITIONER WAS “STRONG”, THE LITTLE EVIDENCE ON RECORD CONSISTING SOLELY OF A HEARSAY AFFIDAVIT, AND INADMISSIBLE NEWSPAPER REPORTS.

On July 19, 1999, we directed the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court. It appears that on the same day, petitioner issued a memorandum informing employees and officials of the Office of the City Mayor that he was assuming the post of mayor effective immediately. On July 23, 1999, respondents filed a motion seeking clarification of our status quo order. Respondents claimed that the status quo referred to in the order should be that where petitioner is already suspended and vice mayor Renato Osmeña is the acting city mayor.

Petitioner, in reply, argued that the status quo refers to “the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”[2] Thus, the status quo could not be that where petitioner is preventively suspended since the suspension did not precede the present controversy; it is the controversy.

We agree with petitioner in this regard. As explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority on remedial law:

“There have been instances when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo order which, as the very term connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy. This was resorted to when the projected proceedings in the case made the conservation of the status quo desirable or essential, but the affected party neither sought such relief or the allegations in his pleading did not sufficiently make out a case for a temporary restraining order. The status quo order was thus issued motu proprio on equitable considerations. Also, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. The further distinction is provided by the present amendment in the sense that, unlike the amended rule on restraining orders, a status quo order does not require the posting of a bond.”[3]

On July 28, 1999, we heard the parties’ oral arguments on the following issues:

1. What is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the investigation of acts done before his reelection? Did the Ombudsman for the Visayas gravely abuse his discretion in conducting the investigation of petitioner and ordering his preventive suspension?

2. Assuming that the Ombudsman properly took cognizance of the case, what law should apply to the investigation being conducted by him, the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) or the Ombudsman Law (R.A. 6770)? Was the procedure in the law properly observed?

3. Assuming further that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction, is the preventive suspension of petitioner based on “strong evidence” as required by law?

We will now address these issues together, for the proper resolution on the merits of the present controversy.

Petitioner contends that, per our ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos,[4] his reelection has rendered the administrative case filed against him moot and academic. This is because reelection operates as a condonation by the electorate of the misconduct committed by an elective official during his previous term. Petitioner further cites the ruling of this Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,[5] that

“. . . When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.”

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that while the contract in question was signed during the previous term of petitioner, it was to commence or be effective only on September 1998 or during his current term. It is the respondents’ submission that petitioner “went beyond the protective confines”[6] of jurisprudence when he “agreed to extend his act to his current term of office.”[7] Aguinaldo cannot apply, according to respondents, because what is involved in this case is a misconduct committed during a previous term but to be effective during the current term.

Respondents maintain that,

“...petitioner performed two acts with respect to the contract: he provided for a suspensive period making the supply contract commence or be effective during his succeeding or current term and during his current term of office he acceded to the suspensive period making the contract effective during his current term by causing the implementation of the contract.”[8]

Hence, petitioner cannot take refuge in the fact of his reelection, according to respondents.

Further, respondents point out that the contract in question was signed just four days before the date of the 1998 election and so it could not be presumed that when the people of Cebu City voted petitioner to office, they did so with full knowledge of petitioner’s character.

On this point, petitioner responds that knowledge of an official’s previous acts is presumed and the court need not inquire whether, in reelecting him, the electorate was actually aware of his prior misdeeds.

Petitioner cites our ruling in Salalima v. Guingona,[9] wherein we absolved Albay governor Romeo R. Salalima of his administrative liability as regards a retainer agreement he signed in favor of a law firm during his previous term, although disbursements of public funds to cover payments under the agreement were still being done during his subsequent term. Petitioner argues that, following Salalima, the doctrine in Aguinaldo applies even where the effects of the act complained of are still evident during the subsequent term of the reelected official. The implementation of the contract is a mere incident of its execution. Besides, according to petitioner, the “sole act” for which he has been administratively charged is the signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig. The charge, in his view, excludes the contract’s execution or implementation, or any act subsequent to the perfection of the contract.

In Salalima, we recall that the Solicitor General maintained that Aguinaldo did not apply to that case because the administrative case against Governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo of Cagayan was already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection bid. Nevertheless, in Salalima, the Court applied the Aguinaldo doctrine, even if the administrative case against Governor Salalima was filed after his reelection.

Worth stressing, to resolve the present controversy, we must recall that the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Under Article XI, Section 13[1], the Ombudsman has the power to:

“investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.”

R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations. Thus, Section 19 of said law provides:

“SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. – The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.”

Section 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority:

“SEC. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.”(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave misconduct and dishonesty.[10] That the Office of the Ombudsman may conduct an administrative investigation into the acts complained of, appears clear from the foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770.

However, the question of whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over a particular act or omission, is different from the question of whether or not petitioner, after investigation, may be held administratively liable. This distinction ought here to be kept in mind, even as we must also take note that the power to investigate is distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring public officer.

Likewise worthy of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official subject to its administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770 –

“SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. – The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.” (Underscoring supplied.)

We have previously interpreted the phrase “under his authority” to mean that the Ombudsman can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government in which they are employed,[11] excepting of course those removable by impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary.

The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. This is the clear import of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 abovecited.

There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like the petitioner, to prevent that official from using his office to intimidate or influence witnesses[12] or to tamper with records that might be vital to the prosecution of the case against him.[13] In our view, the present controversy simply boils down to this pivotal question: Given the purpose of preventive suspension and the circumstances of this case, did respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave abuse of discretion when he set the period of preventive suspension at six months?

Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, to repeat, may be imposed when, among other factors, the evidence of guilt is strong. The period for which an official may be preventively suspended must not exceed six months. In this case, petitioner was preventively suspended and ordered to cease and desist from holding office for the entire period of six months, which is the maximum provided by law.

“SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. –

x x x

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.” (Underscoring supplied.)

The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong as to warrant preventive suspension rests with the Ombudsman.[14] The discretion as regards the period of such suspension also necessarily belongs to the Ombudsman, except that he cannot extend the period of suspension beyond that provided by law.[15] But, in our view, both the strength of the evidence to warrant said suspension and the propriety of the length or period of suspension imposed on petitioner are properly raised in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. These equitable remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court precisely exist to provide prompt relief where an “officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted...with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” (See Rule 65, Sec. 1).

It is pertinent to note here that the inquiry that preceded the filing of an administrative case against petitioner was prompted by newspaper reports regarding the allegedly anomalous contract entered into by petitioner, on behalf of Cebu City, with F.E. Zuellig.[16] In the memorandum to respondent Mojica,[17] respondent Garciano recommended that petitioner be preventively suspended, based on an initial investigation purportedly showing: (1) the contract for supply of asphalt to Cebu City was designed to favor F.E. Zuellig, (2) the amount quoted in the contract was too expensive compared to the amount for which asphalt may be bought from local suppliers such as Shell and Petron, particularly considering that the amount was fixed in dollars and was payable in pesos, thus exposing the city government to the risks attendant to a fluctuating exchange rate, and (3) the interest of the city under the contract is not protected by adequate security. These findings were based on the contract itself and on letters from Bitumex and Credit Lyonnais. There

were also letters from Shell and Petron that were replies to the Office of the Ombudsman’s (Visayas) inquiry on whether or not they could supply Cebu City with asphalt and on what terms.

Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of preventive suspension against petitioner. But considering its purpose and the circumstances in the case brought before us, it does appear to us that the imposition of the maximum period of six months is unwarranted.

On behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General stated during his oral argument at the hearing that the documents mentioned in respondents’ comment (such as purchase orders, purchase requests, and disbursement vouchers), documents that show petitioner’s guilt, were obtained after petitioner had been suspended. Even if an afterthought, he claimed they strengthen the evidence of respondents against petitioner. If the purpose of the preventive suspension was to enable the investigating authority to gather documents without intervention from petitioner, then, from respondents’ submission, we can only conclude that this purpose was already achieved, during the nearly month-long suspension of petitioner from June 25 to July 19, 1999. Granting that now the evidence against petitioner is already strong, even without conceding that initially it was weak, it is clear to us that the maximum six-month period is excessive and definitely longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case against petitioner. We must conclude that the period during which petitioner was already preventively suspended, has been sufficient for the lawful purpose of preventing petitioner from hiding and destroying needed documents, or harassing and preventing witnesses who wish to appear against him.

We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to petitioner’s claim that the Local Government Code, which he averred should apply to this case of an elective local official, has been violated. True, under said Code, preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues are joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to refute first the charges against him, and for the maximum period of six months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code. Respondents point out that the shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension.

Respondents base their argument on the deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 155, which became the Local Government Code. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., commenting on the preservation in the proposed Code of the power of the Office of the President to suspend local officials, said:

“Senator Pimentel. Now, as far as we are concerned, the Senate Committee is ready to adopt a more stringent rule regarding the power of removal and suspension by the Office of the President over local government officials, Mr. President. We would only wish to point out that in a subsequent section, we have provided for the power of suspension of local government officials to be limited only to 60 days and not more than 90 days in any one year, regardless of the number of administrative charges that may be filed against a local government official. We, in fact, had in mind the case of Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo where the Secretary of Local Government sort of serialized the filing of charges against him so that he can be continuously suspended when one case is filed right after the other, Mr. President.”[18]

Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter period of preventive suspension imposable under the Local Government Code. Political color could taint the exercise of the power to suspend local officials by the mayor, governor, or President’s office. In contrast the Ombudsman, considering the constitutional origin of his Office, always ought to be insulated from the vagaries of politics, as respondents would have us believe.

In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,[19] on the matter of whether or not the Ombudsman has been stripped of his power to investigate local elective officials by virtue of the Local Government Code, we said:

“Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other.”[20]

It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension under the Ombudsman Law is “much too repugnant” to the 60-day period that may be imposed under the Local Government Code. But per J. Vitug, “the two provisions govern differently.” [21]

However, petitioner now contends that Hagad did not settle the question of whether a local elective official may be preventively suspended even before the issues could be joined. Indeed it did not, but we have held in other cases that there could be preventive suspension even before the charges against the official are heard, or before the official is given an opportunity to prove his innocence.[22] Preventive suspension is merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and is not in any way the final determination of the guilt of the official concerned.

Petitioner also avers that the suspension order against him was issued in violation of Section 26(2) of the Ombudsman Law, which provides:

“SEC. 26. Inquiries. – xxx

(2) The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from receipt thereof…”

Petitioner argues that before an inquiry may be converted into a full-blown administrative investigation, the official concerned must be given 72 hours to answer the charges against him. In his case, petitioner says the inquiry was converted into an administrative investigation without him being given the required number of hours to answer.

Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner was given the requisite 72 hours to submit a written answer to the complaint against him. This, however, does not make invalid the preventive suspension order issued against him. As we have earlier stated, a preventive suspension order may be issued even before the charges against the official concerned is heard.

Moreover, respondents state that petitioner was given 10 days to submit his counter-affidavit to the complaint filed by respondent Tagaan. We find this 10-day period is in keeping with Section 5(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,[23] which provides:

“Sec. 5. Administrative adjudication; How conducted.—

(a) If the complaint is not dismissed for any of the causes enumerated in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, the respondent shall be furnished with copy of the affidavits and other evidences submitted by the complainant, and shall be ordered to file his counter-affidavits and other evidences in support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, together with proof of service of the same on the complainant who may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the counter-affidavits of the respondent.”

We now come to the concluding inquiry. Granting that the Office of the Ombudsman may investigate, for purposes provided for by law, the acts of petitioner committed prior to his present term of office; and that it may preventively suspend him for a reasonable period, can that office hold him administratively liable for said acts?

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office.[24] The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.

However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character.

For his part, petitioner contends that “the only conclusive determining factor”[25] as regards the people’s thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the official’s reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.

As held in Salalima,

“The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an official’s reelection expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term. We may add that sound policy dictates it. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed during his previous term. His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service...” (Emphasis added.)[26]

The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig.

The assailed retainer agreement in Salalima was executed sometime in 1990. Governor Salalima was reelected in 1992 and payments for the retainer continued to be made during his succeeding term. This situation is no different from the one in the present case, wherein deliveries of the asphalt under the contract with F.E. Zuellig and the payments therefor were supposed to have commenced on September 1998, during petitioner’s second term.

However, respondents argue that the contract, although signed on May 7, 1998, during petitioner’s prior term, is to be made effective only during his present term.

We fail to see any difference to justify a valid distinction in the result. The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioner’s prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.

While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED insofar as it seeks to declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting an inquiry on complaints against petitioner, and ordering their investigation pursuant to respondents’ mandate under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Law. But the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as it seeks to declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion concerning the period of preventive suspension imposed on petitioner, which is the maximum of six months, it appearing that 24 days – the number of days from the date petitioner was suspended on June 25, 1999, to the date of our status quo order on July 19, 1999 – were sufficient for the purpose. Accordingly, petitioner’s preventive suspension, embodied in the order of respondent Deputy Ombudsman, dated June 25, 1999, should now be, as it is hereby, LIFTED immediately.

SO ORDERED.