Adille vs. CA

VOL.157,JANUARY29,1988 455Adille vs. Court of Appeals

No.L44546.January29,1988.*

RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALS,EMETERIAASEJO,TEODORICAASEJO, DOMINGO ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO, andSANTIAGOASEJO,respondents.

Civil Law; Property; Coownership; Redemption; Redemption ofthe whole property by a coowner will not make him of all ofit.The right of repurchasemay be exercised by a coownerwithrespect to his share alone. While the records show that thepetitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering theexpensestherefor, thatdidnotmakehimtheownerofallof it. Inotherwords,itdidnotputtoendtheexistingstateofcoownership.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure of all coowners toredeem the property entitles the vendee a retro to retain it andconsolidate title thereto in his name; Redemption not a mode ofterminating a coownership.The result is that the propertyremains to be in a condition of coownership. While a vendee aretro, under Article 1613 of the Code, may not be compelled toconsent toapartial redemption, the redemptionby one coheir orcoowner of the property in its totality does not vest in himownershipoverit.Failureonthepartofallthecoownerstoredeemitentitlesthevendeearetrotoretainthepropertyandconsolidatetitle thereto in his name. But the provision does not give to theredeeming coowner the right to the entire property. It does notprovideforamodeofterminatingacoownership.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Registration of property not ameans of acquiring ownership.Neither does the fact that thepetitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in hisname terminate theexisting coownership.Whilehishalfbrothersandsistersare,aswesaid, liabletohimforreimbursementasandfor theirshares inredemptionexpenses,hecannotclaimexclusiverighttothepropertyownedincommon.Registrationofproperty isnotameansofacquiringownership.Itoperatesasamerenoticeofexistingtitle,thatis,ifthereisone.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is a trustee of the propertyon behalf of private respondents.Thepetitionermustthenbesaidtobeatrusteeofthepropertyonbehalfoftheprivaterespondents.WeagreewiththerespondentCourtofAppealsthatfraudattendedtheregistra

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*SECONDDIVISION.

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456 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

tionoftheproperty.Thepetitionerspretensionthathewasthesoleheir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement heexecuted preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a cleareffortonhisparttodefraudhisbrothersandsistersandtoexercisesole dominion over the property. It is the view of the respondentCourtthatthepetitioner,intakingovertheproperty,didsoeitheronbehalfofhiscoheirs,inwhichevent,hehadconstitutedhimselfanegotiorumgestorunderArticle2144oftheCivilCode,orforhisexclusivebenefit,inwhichcase,heisguiltyoffraud,andmustactas trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, underthe Article 1456. The evidence, of course, points to the secondalternative, the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusiveownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his coheirs. He cannot therefore be said to have assumed the meremanagement of the property abandoned by his coheirs, thesituationArticle2144oftheCodecontemplates.Inanycase,astherespondent Court itself affirms, the result would be the samewhetheritisoneortheother.Thepetitionerwouldremainliabletotheprivaterespondents,hiscoheirs.

Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Prescription must be precededby repudiation to terminate coownership; Requisites.Prescription,as a mode of terminating a relation of coownership, must havebeen preceded by repudiation (of the coownership). The act ofrepudiation,inturn,issubjecttocertainconditions:(1)acoownerrepudiatesthecoownership;(2)suchanactofrepudiationisclearlymade known to the other coowners; (3) the evidence thereon isclear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession throughopen, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of thepropertyfortheperiodrequiredbylaw.

Same; Same; Land registration; Torrens Title cannot cover upfraud; Registration not equivalent to notice of repudiation.It istrue that registration under the Torrens system is constructivenoticeoftitle,butithaslikewisebeenourholdingthattheTorrenstitledoesnotfurnishashieldforfraud.Itisthereforenoargumentto say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice ofrepudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the longstandingrulethatregistrationoperatesasauniversalnoticeoftitle.

Civil Procedure; Prescription; While actions to enforce aconstructive trust prescribe in ten years from registration of theproperty, private respondents right commenced from actualdiscovery of petitioners act of defraudation.Forthesamereason,we cannot dismiss the private respondents claims commenced in1974overtheestateregistered in1955.Whileactionstoenforceaconstructivetrustprescribesintenyears,reckonedfromthedateoftheregistrationoftheproperty,we,as

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VOL.157,JANUARY29,1988 457

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

we said, arenotprepared to count theperiod fromsuchadate inthiscase.Wenotethepetitionerssubrosaeffortstogetholdoftheproperty exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulentmisrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicialsettlement thathe is the onlyheirand child ofhismotherFelizawith the consequence thathewasable to secure title inhisnamealso.Accordingly,weholdthattherightoftheprivaterespondentscommenced from the time they actually discovered the petitionersactofdefraudation.According to therespondentCourtofAppeals,they came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress ofthelitigation.Hence,prescriptionisnotabar.

Same; Same; Prescriptive as an affirmative defense must bepleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise itis deemed waived.Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is anaffirmative defense that must be pleaded either in a motion todismiss or in theanswer otherwise it is deemedwaived, andhere,the petitioner never raised that defense. There are recognizedexceptions to thisrule,but thepetitionerhasnotshownwhytheyapply.

PETITIONforcertioraritoreviewthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.

SARMIENTO,J.:

Inissuehereinarepropertyandpropertyrights,afamiliarsubjectofcontroversyandawellspringofenormousconflictthathaslednotonlytoprotractedlegalentanglementsbuttoevenmorebitterconsequences,likestrainedrelationshipsandeventheforfeitureoflives.Itisaquestionthatlikewisereflects a tragic commentary on prevailing social andcultural values and institutions, where, as one observernotes, wealth and its accumulation are the basis of selffulfillmentandwherepropertyisheldassacredaslifeitself.It is in the defense of his property, says this modernthinker, that one will mobilize his deepest protectivedevices, and anybody that threatens his possessions willarousehismostpassionateenmity.

1

The task of this Court, however, is not to judge thewisdom of values; the burden of reconstructing the socialorder is shouldered by the political leadershipand thepeoplethemselves.

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1GREENE,FELK,THEENEMY234(1971).

458

458 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDAdille vs. Court of Appeals

The parties have come to this Court for relief and

I.II.III.

accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that reliefpursuanttothedecreeoflaw.

The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision2

appealedfrom:

xxxxxxxxxx x x [Th]e land in questionLot 14694 ofCadastral Survey of

Albay located inLegaspiCitywith an area of some 11,325 sq.m.originallybelongedtooneFelisaAlzulasherownprivateproperty;shemarriedtwiceinherlifetime;thefirst,withoneBernabeAdille,with whom she had as an only child, herein defendant RusticoAdille;inhersecondmarriagewithoneProcopioAsejo,herchildrenwerehereinplaintiffs,now,sometimein1939,saidFelisasoldtheproperty in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period ofrepurchasebeing3years,butshediedin1942withoutbeingabletoredeemandafterherdeath,butduringtheperiodofredemption,hereindefendantrepurchased,byhimselfalone,andafterthat,heexecutedadeedofextrajudicialpartitionrepresentinghimselftobethe onlyheir and child of hismotherFelisawith the consequencethathewasabletosecuretitleinhisnamealonealso,sothatOCT.No.21137inthenameofhismotherwastransferredtohisname,that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromisehad failed, his halfbrothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filedpresent case for partitionwith accounting on the position that hewasonlyatrusteeonanimpliedtrustwhenheredeemed,andthisis the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs,EmeteriaAsejowasoccupyingaportion,defendantcounterclaimedforhertovacatethat,

Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustaineddefendant inhispositionthathewasandbecameabsoluteowner,he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and alsocondemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is because ofthis that plaintiffs have come here and contend that trial courterredin:

...declaringthedefendantabsoluteowneroftheproperty;

...notorderingthepartitionoftheproperty;and

...orderingoneof theplaintiffswho is inpossessionof theportionof theproperty tovacate the land,p.1Appellantsbrief.

whichcanbereducedtosimplequestionofwhetherornotonthebasis

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2Gatmaitan,Magno,ActingPres.J.;Domondon,SixtoandReyes,Samuel,JJ.,Concurring.

459


of evidence and law, judgment appealed from should bemaintained.

3xxxxxxxxx

TherespondentCourtofAppealsreversedthetrialcourt,4

and ruled for the plaintiffsappellants, the private

respondentsherein.Thepetitionernowappeals,bywayofcertiorari,fromtheAppellateCourtsdecision.

We required the private respondents to file a commentand thereafter, having given due course to the petition,directedthepartiestofiletheirbriefs.Onlythepetitioner,however, filedabrief,and theprivaterespondentshavingfailedtofileone,wedeclaredthecasesubmittedfordecision.

Thepetitionraisesapurelylegalissue:Mayacoowneracquire exclusive ownership over the property held incommon?

Essentially, it is the petitioners contention that theproperty subject of dispute devolved upon him upon thefailureofhis coheirs to joinhim in its redemptionwithinthe period required by law.He relies on the provisions ofArticle 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of thepresentCode,givingthevendeearetrotherighttodemandredemptionoftheentireproperty.

Thereisnomeritinthispetition.Therightofrepurchasemaybeexercisedbyacoowner

withrespecttohissharealone.5Whiletherecordsshowthat

the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety,shouldering the expenses therefor, that didnotmakehimtheownerofallofit.Inotherwords,itdidnotputtoendtheexistingstateofcoownership.

Necessary expenses may be incurred by one coowner,subject to his right to collect reimbursement from theremainingcoowners.

6Thereisnodoubtthatredemptionof

propertyentailsanecessaryexpense.UndertheCivilCode:

ART.488.Eachcoownershallhavearighttocompeltheothercoownerstocontributetotheexpensesofpreservationofthethingorrightownedincommonandtothetaxes.Anyoneofthelattermayexempthimselffromthisobligationbyrenouncingsomuchofhis

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3Rollo,1415.4Solidum,Arsenio,PresidingJudge,CourtofFirstInstanceofAlbay,Civil

Caseno.5029.5CIVILCODE,art.1612;CIVILCODE(1889),art.1514.6Supra,art.489.

460


undividedinterestasmaybeequivalenttohisshareoftheexpensesandtaxes.Nosuchwaivershallbemadeifitisprejudicialtothecoownership.

Theresultisthatthepropertyremainstobeinaconditionofcoownership.Whileavendeearetro,underArticle1613of theCode, maynotbecompelledtoconsenttoapartialredemption, the redemptionby one coheir or coowner oftheproperty in itstotalitydoesnotvest inhimownershipoverit.Failureonthepartofallthecoownerstoredeemitentitles the vendee a retro to retain the property andconsolidatetitletheretoinhisname.

7Buttheprovisiondoes

notgive to theredeemingcoownertheright to theentireproperty.Itdoesnotprovideforamodeofterminatingacoownership.

Neitherdoesthefactthatthepetitionerhadsucceededinsecuring title over the parcel in his name terminate theexisting coownership. While his halfbrothers and sistersare,aswesaid,liabletohimforreimbursementasandfortheir shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claimexclusive right to the property owned in common.Registration of property is not a means of acquiringownership.Itoperatesasamerenoticeofexistingtitle,thatis,ifthereisone.

Thepetitionermust thenbe said tobea trustee of theproperty on behalf of the private respondents. The CivilCodestates:

ART. 1456. If property is acquired throughmistake or fraud, theperson obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of animpliedtrust forthebenefitofthepersonfromwhomthepropertycomes.

WeagreewiththerespondentCourtofAppealsthatfraudattended the registration of the property. The petitionerspretension that he was the sole heir to the land in theaffidavitofextrajudicialsettlementheexecutedpreliminarytotheregistrationthereofbetraysacleareffortonhispartto defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise soledominion over the property. The aforequoted provisionthereforeapplies.

ItistheviewoftherespondentCourtthatthepetitioner,intakingovertheproperty,didsoeitheronbehalfofhiscoheirs, in which event, he had constituted himself anegotiorum gestor

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7Supra,art.1607.

461


under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusivebenefit,inwhichcase,heisguiltyoffraud,andmustactastrustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries,undertheArticle1456.Theevidence,ofcourse,pointstothesecondalternativethepetitionerhavingassertedclaimsofexclusiveownershipoverthepropertyandhavingactedinfraud of his coheirs.He cannot therefore be said to haveassume themeremanagement of the property abandonedby his coheirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Codecontemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itselfaffirms, the resultwouldbe thesamewhether it is oneortheother.Thepetitionerwouldremainliabletotheprivaterespondents,hiscoheirs.

This Court is not unaware of the wellestablishedprinciple that prescription bars any demand on property(ownedincommon)heldbyanother(coowner)followingthe

required number of years. In that event, the party inpossessionacquirestitletothepropertyandthestateofcoownership is ended.

8 In the case at bar, the propertywas

registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name,whiletheclaimoftheprivaterespondentswaspresentedin1974.Hasprescriptionthen,setin?

We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode ofterminating a relation of coownership, must have beenpreceded by repudiation (of the coownership). The act ofrepudiation,inturn,issubjecttocertainconditions:(1)acoowner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act ofrepudiation is clearlymadeknown to theother coowners;(3)theevidencethereonisclearandconclusive;and(4)hehasbeeninpossessionthroughopen,continuous,exclusive,and notorious possession of the property for the periodrequiredbylaw.

9

The instant case shows that the petitioner had notcompliedwith these requisites.Wearenot convinced thathehadrepudiatedthecoownership;onthecontrary,hehaddeliberately kept the private respondents in the dark byfeigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. Hecannotthereforebesaidtohave

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8 The modes of terminating a coownership other than byprescription are partition (CIVIL CODE, arts. 494; 1079,1082),mergerorconsolidation,andlossofthething(3Manresa486).

9 Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 3342 (1921); Bargayo v.Camumot,40Phil.857(1920).

462


made known his efforts to deny the coownership.Moreover,oneoftheprivaterespondents,EmeteriaAsejo,isoccupyingaportionof the landupto thepresent,yet, thepetitionerhasnottakenpainstoejecthertherefrom.Asamatter of fact, he sought to recover possession of thatportionEmeteria isoccupyingonlyasacounterclaim,andonlyaftertheprivaterespondentshadfirstsoughtjudicialrelief.

It is true that registrationunder theTorrenssystem isconstructive notice of title,

10 but it has likewise been our

holdingthattheTorrenstitledoesnotfurnishashieldforfraud.

11 It is therefore no argument to say that the act of

registrationisequivalenttonoticeofrepudiation,assumingtherewasone,notwithstandingthelongstandingrulethatregistrationoperatesasauniversalnoticeoftitle.

For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the privaterespondents claims commenced in 1974 over the estateregistered in1955.Whileactions toenforceaconstructivetrustprescribesintenyears,

12reckonedfromthedateofthe

registration of the property,13 we, as we said, are not

preparedtocounttheperiodfromsuchadateinthiscase.Wenote thepetitioners subrosaefforts togetholdof the

property exclusively for himself beginning with hisfraudulentmisrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit ofextrajudicialsettlementthatheistheonlyheirandchildofhismotherFelizawiththeconsequencethathewasabletosecure title in his name also.

14 Accordingly,we hold that

the right of the private respondents commenced from thetime they actually discovered the petitioners act ofdefraudation.

15 According to the respondent Court of

Appeals,theycametoknow[ofit]apparentlyonlyduringtheprogressofthelitigation.

16Hence,prescriptionisnota

bar.Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative

defense

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10Pres.DecreeNo.1529,sec.31.11Amerolv.Bagumbaran,G.R.No.33261,September30,1987.12Supra.13Geronav.DeGuzman,No.L19060,May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153

(1964).14Rollo,id.,14.15Geronav.DeGuzman,supra.16Rollo,id.,18.

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VOL.157,JANUARY29,1988 463Adille vs. Court of Apppeals

thatmustbepleadedeitherinamotiontodismissorintheanswer otherwise it is deemed waived,

17 and here, the

petitionerneverraisedthatdefense.18Therearerecognized

exceptionstothisrule,butthepetitionerhasnotshownwhytheyapply.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible errorcommittedbytherespondentCourtofAppeals,thepetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionsought tobereviewed isherebyAFFIRMEDintoto.Nopronouncementastocosts.

SOORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), MelencioHerrera, Paras and Padilla,JJ., concur.

Petition denied. Decision affirmed.

Notes.After the lapse of redemption period withoutanyredemptionmade,awritofpossessioncanbeissuedinfavorofapurchaser.(Banco Filipino vs. IAC,142SCRA44.)

Policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat right ofredemption.(Tioseco vs. CA,143SCRA705.)

o0o

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17 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 2. A party need not plead thestatute of limitations in a responsive pleading (or motion to dismiss)where the complaint itself shows that the claims have prescribed

[Ferrer v.Ericta,No. L41767, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 705 (1978)].Likewise, it has been held that where the defendant had no way ofknowing that the claim advanced by the plaintiff had prescribed, hisfailure to invoke the statute (inhisanswerormotion todismiss)doesnotconstituteawaiverofsuchadefense [Guanzov.Ramirez,32 Phil.492 (1914)]. In another case, we said that prescription need not bepleaded specifically in an answerwhere the evidence itself shows thatprescription bars the plaintiffs claims [Philippine National Bank v.Perez,No.L 20412, February 28, 1966, 16SCRA270 (1966); see alsoChuaLankov.Dioso,97[Phil.821(1955);PhilippineNationalBankv.PacificCommissionHouse,No.L22675,March28,1969,27SCRA766(1969)].

18Rollo,id.,18.

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Adille vs. CA