AD-RI56 829 THE HELICOPTER TO FIXED WING CONVERSION PROGRAM - A 1/1CRITICAL REVIEW(U) AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELLAFB RL L T MASSEY APR 85 ACSC-85-1750

UNCLASSIFIED F/G 5/9 ML

1I.0 III~jjj211111 ~ _111131 2

jj1.25 .11 4 Ill .6

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NN, INALH~ J 0 TNA(

QS

0

CL%

0

AIR COMMANDSTAFF AND EG

STUDENT REPORTTHE HELICOPTER TO FIXED WING CONVERSION

PROGRAM -- ACRITICAL REVIEW

BMAJOR LEE T. MASSEY 85-1750%-"insights into tomorrow"~

1.7 r? o n - i p o ~

DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions expressed in thisdocument are those of the author. They arenot intended and should not be thought torepresent official ideas, attitudes, orpolicies of any agency of the United StatesGovernment. The author has not had specialaccess to official information or ideas andhas employed only open-source materialavailable to any writer on this subject.

This document is the property of the UnitedStates Government. It is available fordistribution to the general public. A loancopy of the document may be obtained from theAir University Interlibrary Loan Service(AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112) or theDefense Technical Information Center. Requestmust include the author's name and completetitle of the study.

This document may be reproduced for use inother research reports or educational pursuitscontingent upon the following stipulations:

-- Reproduction rights do not extend toany copyrighted material that may be containedin the research report.

-- All reproduced copies must contain thefollowing credit line: "Reprinted bypermission of the Air Command and StaffCollege."

-- All reproduced copies must contain thename(s) of the report's author(s).

-- If format modification is necessary tobetter serve the user's needs, adjustments maybe made to this report--this authorizationdoes not extend to copyrighted information orIaterial. fhe following statement must

* ficcompany the modified document: "Adaptedfrom Air Command and Staff Research Report

n numberj entit led _ titI e) byatU thor

-- This notice must be included with any'roduced or adapted port ions of this

_r++,uP /C

*p) ' -

REPORT NUMBER 85-1 750

TITLE THE HELICOPTER TO FIXED WING CONVERSION PROGRAM -- ACRITICAL REVIEW

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR LEE T. MASSEY, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR DANIEL M. RIMKUS, ACSC/EDOWD

SPONSOR LT COL ROBERT A. MAGUIRE, AFMPC/MPCROR

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

0

UN CLASS ILFIEDSECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEis REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS

UNCLASSIFIED2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT

2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

85-1 750 _______ ______________________6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION

6c. ADDRESS (CON, State and ZIP' Code) 7b.o~icbt ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP' Code)

Maxwell AFB AL 36112

So- NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERORGANIZATION I(If applicabiel

Bc ADDRESS IC01N. State and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NOS.

PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK UNITELEMENT NO. NO NO. NO

1 1 TI TLE (include Security Cloafication)

THE HELICOPTER TO FIXED WING CONVERSION ______

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Massey, Lee T., Major, USAF13e. TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14DATE OF REPORT IVI-. Mo.. Day) 15.PAGE COUNT

FROM __ __TO ____ 18 Anl3716. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

ITEM 11: PROGRAM4 -- A CRITICAL REVIEW

17 COSATI CODES 118 SUBJECT TERMS e(ontinue on rev~erse if ncessorv and identify by blocknubr

FIELD GROUP SUB GR.

19 ABST RACT iCui., nue an tL'erse if necesam, and iden tify by block nlirbe ,,

USAF helicopter pilots are initially trained by the U S. Army through their undergraduate helicopterDilot training program Four to seven years later, some of these pioc nave tne opporturlty toconvert to fixed wing aircraft via the fixed wing conversion program~ Cur'rently conducted by sendingiselected helicopter pilots through Air Force undergraduate pilot tralninO T1his study reviews theseprograms and assesses the impact this training philosophy has on career oppcirturi!;Ps . jr

Ielicopter pilots- -both for tho-se who convert to fixed wing -systems ws we]) as for t0ose whr, remain,irn helicopters Two a'ternatives are presented which wouid resove the problems 1dertif~ed -he

*t y concludes l*hat Ine 'UCI:AF could provide better career opotnto o e!,,copter c.cawell as imp~rove exoerience levels in the helicopter force, by enactinq change-s to curreinl Iraining

20 DISTRIBUTION-A VAILA8ILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UNLIMITED 12 SAME AS RPT ... DIC USERS IUNCLASSIFIED

22 ,AEOF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 2hTLPiN.NME 2 FIESMO

ACC/T-JJCC Maxwell AF'B AL 36112 (205) 293 -24 8)

DO FORM 1473, 83 APR EDITION OF 1 JAN 73 I' OBSOLETE UNCLASSIFIED __-

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

PREFACE

The thing is, helicopters are different from planes. An airplane by its nature wants to!1y, and i! not interfered with too strongly by unusual events or by a deliberatelyincompetent pilot, it will fly. A helicopter does not want to fly. It is maintained in the,,ir by a var iety-of-lorces and controls working in opposition to each other, and it thereis any disturbance in this delicate balance, the helicopter stops flying, immediately anddisastrously. There is no such thing as a gliding helicopter.

This is why a helicopter pilot is so different from being an airplane pilot and why, ingenerality, airplane pilots are open, clear-eyed buoyant extroverts, and helicopterpilots are brooders, introspective anticipators of trouble. They know If something badhas not happened, it is about to.

HARRY REASONER, 16 February 197 1.

in the United States Air Force today, helicopter pilots are dIfferentWhy? First, they are trained by the United States Army to fly USAFhelicopters. Then four-to-seven years later, if they have the opportunity toconvert to fixed wing aircraft, and not all do, they must first complete theentire USAF undergraduate pilot training program. If they do not convert tofixed wing aircraft, they remain a helicopter pilot in a fixed wing orientedAir Force with little hope of progressing to senior staff or commandpositions in the USAF This study reviews the impact of current training andrated management philosophy on "career opportunities" for Air Forcehelicopter pilots and recommends alternative training methods to improve

" s.. for th part of the USAF rated force.

M any thanks to Majors Terry Hart, Skip Mills and Jerry Cruit at AFMPC fortheir assistance in providing the statistics for this study. In addition,special thnanks to my faculty advisor, Major Danny Rimkus, and my sponsor,Lieutenant Colonel Bob MaGuire, for their motivational support throughoutthis project

Iii

.~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~ .. ... . .:.. ,_ .: - - . ... - . ,:: .. 1. . . .-.. •..:: - :, . :... : . .:: ,

i____ _ ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Lee T. Massey graduated from the University of Dubuque in !971 andentered Officer Training School that same year He received his wingsthrough the US Army's undergraduate helicopter pilot training program 1n

1972. Major Massey had flying assignments in Wyoming, Thailand and NewMexico prior to being assigned to Headquarters Aerospace Rescue andRecovery Service at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, in 1978 For the past fiveyears, Mlajor Massey has been involved in helicopter rated management andpilot assignments with tours at Headquarters Military Airlift Commrand andthe Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, TexasMajor Massey is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and nas completed Alr

Command and Staff College by seminar He received a masters eqre trorWebster Unlvers~ty in 1982

___ ___ ___TABLE OF CONTENTS _ _ _ _ _ _ _

P re(?d,( e -- -- - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - -

i st of H1 ustrat jons -- - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - - viExecutive Summary - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - --vii

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION--------------------------IStatement of the Problem---------------------------- 2Objective of the Study------------------------------- 3Limitation---------------------------------------- 3Organization of the Study---------------------------- 3

CHAPTER TWO - BACKGROUND--------------------------- 5Summary ----------------------------------------- 1)0

CHAPTER THREE - CAREER OPPORTUNITIES----------------- 11Summary --------------------------------- 15

CHAPTER FOUR - REQUIREMENTS------------------------- 16Summary ----------------------------------------- 17

CHAPTER F IVE - COURSES OF ACTION--------------------- 19Option 1 ---------------------------------------- -19Option 2 ----------------------------------------- 21

CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS -------- 23Conclusions--------------------------------------- 23Recommendations -------------------------------- -24

BIBLIOGRAPHY -------------------------------------- 25

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

FIGURE 1 - Yearly UPT-H Production -------------------- 7

FIGURE 2 - Fixed Wing Conversion Training --------------- 8

FIGURE 3 - Fixed Wing Qualification Timing --------------- 13

FIGURE 4 - Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training -------- 20

V1

I ~ I I I !1 ,I I i .,1!I ! , 'iiI! _. I I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY APart of our College mission is distribution of the Astudents' problem solving products to DoD

// ~ sponsors and other interested agencies toenhance insight into contemporary, defenserelated issues. While the College has accepted thisproduct as meeting academic requirements for

t graduation, the views and opinions expressed orIND implied are solely those of the author and should

not be construed as carrying official sanction.

,sights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER 85-1750

AUTHOR MAJOR LEE T. MASSEY, USAF

TITLE THE HELICOPTER TO FIXED WING CONVERSION PROGRAM -- A CRITICALREVIEW

I rpi ose: To examine the USAF undergraduate helicopter pilot training(UPT-H) and the fixed wing qualification conversion (FWQ) programs todetermine what impact the method and sequence of training has on careeropportunities for helicopter pilots.

II Problem Since 1970, USAF helicopter pilots have been trained throughthe US Army's undergraduate helicopter pilot training program at FortRucker, Alabama This training produces pilots operationally restricted tohelicopters until they complete the fixed wing conversion program. Thecurrent fixed wing conversion program involves sending volunteers withfour-to-seven years rated service in helicopters, to one of the five ATC baseslo Complete the entire UPT program, This results In the pilot beingpipeline training for approximately one and one-half years prior to becoming a

VIi

CONTINUED_______________

co-pilot in a fixed wing aircraft. The impact of this long training pipeline,coupled with a new guy/co-pilot OER, may not be a true indication of thepotential of these officers for a critical two and one-half year period. Thosepilots who remain in helicopters, either because they do not volunteer forconversion or are not selected for conversion by an annual selection board,are operationally restricted to helicopters for the remainder of their careerSince the helicopter force represents only 4.7% of the USAF pilot force, theoperational need for a helicopter pilot, especially one with just helicopterexperience, in senior command or staff positions is extremely limitedElimination of this restriction is the very reason the Air Force has theconversion program. This study focuses on two issues associated with thistraining philosophy: (I) Is the USAF providing realistic career opportunitiesfor helicopter pilots who attend FWQ as well as those who remain inhKIicopters? (2) Can the USAF provide better career opportunities forhelicopter pilots by enacting changes to current training programs whilecontinuing to meet experience requirements in the helicopter force'?

Ill Discussion. The rated management decisions which brought about UPT-Hand the FWQ programs have their roots in a Conqr-ssional desire toconsolidate helicopter training and reduce train!ng costs in general ThIsstudy explores the resultant problems concerning career opportunities andsurveys the future operational needs of the helicopter force to determine ifalternative training methods would resolve the issues presented above Theauthor's analysis of these problems is based, in part, on an understandorq ofthe assignment/career development system gained the past five years atAFMPC and Hq MAC and supported with the opinions of Senior commranoers !r)rne helicopter force Two options are suggested to resolve the iscue-, The11rst alternative entails a conversion program which would eorro1,)ate FW w

trairing via UPT and accomplish training throuqh a two or three month rlo,itourse sylabus Alonq with this change, the four to sevn year window

would be el irnonated and, as a rec-it, exprand the -rrnicf low opportunity t ar-,v

V I'!*

blo

__________ CONTINUED .....

time in an officer's career. The second alternative suggests the USAF adopt atr-track specialized undergraduate pilot training program, in lieu of the dualtrack program which is programmed to begin in 1988. In effect, qualify thehelicopter pilot in fixed wing aircraft by providing all required training upfront The study details how both options improve career opportunities forhelicopter pilots and increases the experience levels in the helicopter force.

IV Conclusions The USAF can provide better career opportunities forhelicopter pilots as well as improve operational experience levels in thehelicopter force by enacting changes to these training programs. While thisconclusion is based on a subjective analysis of career opportunities by theauthor, and supported with the opinions of the senior leadership in thehelicopter force, nevertheless, that assessment is based on the real worldlessons of personnel management in the Air Force today. Program changesare required now to preclude a closed-loop helicopter force which does notoffer helicopter pilots the opportunity to progress to senior staff andcommand positions in the USAF.

V Recommendations: The USAF should accomplish fixed wing conversiontraining with short course training and eliminate the four-to-seven yearwindow for this training By adopting this recommendation, helicopter pilotshave the opportunity to crossf low to other weapon systems any time in theircareers However, the author also suggests Hq. USAF/MP/XO study thepossibility of incorporating helicopter training into the specialized pilottraining program to provide a long term solution to the issue.

Ix

Criapter One

NTRODUCT ION

The USAF helicopter training programs and rated management policieswhich influence career opportunities in the helicopter career field are uniquewithin the rated force Since 1970, Air Force helicopter pilots have receivedtheir wings by attending the United States Army's undergraduate helicopterpilot training (UPT-H) at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Then, four-to-seven yearsafter graduation from UPT-H, selected volunteers are converted to fixed wingsystems through the fixed wing qualification conversion program (FWO) viaundergraduate pilot training UPT-H, which produces limited dutyhelicopter-only pilots, was the result of a 1969 Congressional mandate. Therationale for the fixed wing conversion program, an Air Force decision, isbased upon the philosophy expressed in the USAF Personnel Plan. ThePersonnel Plan, Vol 11, states. "There is no action planned or required thatwould reorganize the Air Force into a corps structure with the resultantnarrow specialization of its officer force into particular functions" (3:1-2).

Until July 1976, all officers augmented into the helicopter force werequaranteed the opportunity to attend fixed wing conversion training. ByFY1983, the Air Force had satisied its guarantee with these pilots, although,rot all elected to ronvert to fixed wing systems Those officers who begantraining after July 1976 were advised the fixed wing opportunity may or maynot be available--based on the needs of the Air Force Today, that program,ends the 10 most qualified volunteers, identified through an annualAFMPC/MAJCOM board, to undergraduate pilot training (UPT)

t . ) tra ror e r thc te l 1 r)g a cfrv V ,~jr. r ( 2 PQr'r w $re a v,, c orc er-meC o T aru I ios CC

~~r~r i-'c e W u r qa has on) exper )enc e eve 1,3nteCoki K

os 9 h'r)j !,, uaVa ptlotc fromr th ou osever' yeargruwas 0c>y C' t tQ the rcited experienc)(e W~thir thpir' W'rq Hwee

~+yuI~eut t eact approac', toe Air For,e CshCU ta o resolvt-'r~'''.j , wn'tely felt aChaniqe s~hould be made (I Ito -, 9) -

SUNMAR.Y

t'j rr-, -r, yhpCre are problems inherent in the method and sequence by"'-P'> th 5AF rirs iheicqpter pilots. While these problems evolvec'o~ a erie K rted management dec~sions made since the early 1970s.

nhAF iQC and theP sento leadership r the helicopter force agree, the totalr'>)Pihecopter pilots iess competitive for both promotion and rated-r wPI rcompa-rej to th~eir fixed wing counterpart. hsps o

-<;toc ?y toe Air Force: represettv whe he testified before

_ '>7 owever, the. 'career opportunity' 1,ssue is, not~eoy suw ''" us t b e considered n the next chapter, the author w I

~OiIO k <"': a' nqtheh 9 ~ cote'K~r)i the next tw year5 Thpr>

t.; ON 'rc th!: r-view c cverat i (al emrs, the autnor will suggestr,,i pt v j K' atej at bo th rodiviclual as weli as operati onaI ned

10

ore-ralf years, and possibly one two rrore yrior to the, na'a os",.)w competitive will they be?' T conclusion that tney will h.)

m'rpettive for both promotion, and se Ioction to at -er'd'mC! ~ 9vcchool in rpcsjdenre definitely has Str-org en

Still, th ere are arguments on) thp degree the careerS of these of'icers-ire adversely mpacted But, when) You weigh, the stated ationale frJA

ont rilt 1O if the rWQ proqrar m ariaj the ans~wers(- to the qetir~*pr~ a -io n1p ~s Ina ) rwi It y PeucatYnte ), vrqP! Q~

%c, the Air- )rce sim-prcv'nq areer opportunities' for !.l'ese(~~oeve ~. t e l heic)nl~7~y counterparts, a, Prec'se assec'Slrerxtj, cr

(fnlv be r-ace after prornotlor's ratePs to !.eutjenant c)onel and 7, Or?iIav ae t- Crn)ar-e Because there are arguments on, both' sides of the ', sue,+I'e author fees t irnportant to present thf, u)rnor'c, of Se,.'o'r cor-~arre~cr

-, he'-Coter force and address both this issue, and the hellcmter--<ty"lmitation" issue, from their persp ective

The sermor leadership in the helicopter force generally agrees that up t3the rank of lieutenant colonel, helicopter pilots have excellent opportujnityfor operatio,,nai (om-tand and staf fpotnte wlkr te Command -",AC"' 40wever, ~t er th~at the opport~inltleo are slqnficantly reduced It.'lmportarto rotf, tha--t the grou)ip these leaders refer to Is thle dual r aItedy-oup of c~rior- maurs and lieutterants COioneics w~thi th e for h( Thy

)eo ire difficult fer h)eiopter-only pllot, t be Dacp! 'rtnit ioa I-)e or staf f 1ob 'I) n t he C onrn aro as s' ~7 od~r t e~lally at the colonei level As a qroiteear "' 4 ij

<Cdiff cult to place hellcopter p l~ts 'ne one ' i

T o , k'ader s are r,,- 1ru ) tne , ''.'

'7' r iv I'-''ve - t

D-T~v '~ i] her~V~ I

r jr, 0 '. r / r. ,, '

ot ,o :es wro wero t tie nit ia I secondj lieuten an ts mn the UD I )r ograrnq ) T ,e-,l 7i t r-ane rjot yet 5Cr)! or erijuqi to repf !CC ' oMo

2a t st 1C s K Iw tnis iin'tatior impacts ioh opportunity ari-i nirerYotinrS tr.9n? ro eir'el/coie!(nel, As a result, an ]aCcurate ar,SeSc-en! (-r, only E

-1 e 'r~ vv ft -d 1c 1' ''euteant C (10,P~ arid Jcc e "Y c

aa ahe t c om pare W Ith o thepr f act or, e. Ser-!c:r tatj f /rCrlna,-j"oppcrturvty, etc Nevertheless, desp'te !,le d~ttlculty Cl' acse 'Slq Ca e t,opportunit ies, two f actors ire undeniable I irst, the Air, Force aOI'rowledgeclthis limtat~on when a spokesman testified before Congress ir, April 1980,5statirig. "Transitioning to a fixed wing pilot enhances a heflcopter pilots-ch~anc-e for full career progression through increased opportunities to serve insenior staf f and command positions" (I 1:H-245). Secondly, the fact trialcrossf low, outside the four-to-seven year window, 1s not possible and thatrated opportunities are 'imited to a weapon system which represents lesstnan 576 of the total pilot force ( 17.--).

The f inal group within the helicopter force consist of those young pllotswho still have the fixed wing conversion decision ahead of them. For thesepilots the question is: S"-hould ) volunteer to attend EWO and spend one andone-half years in pipeline training, or do I remain in helicopters and limitmyself to the helicopter career field?" F igure 3 illustrates the dilemma they!ace If they attend [WO, and the average pilot attends at the six andoe-half year point (1.,then the next QEP they will have would be

their ninth year. With this "new guy"/co- oilot OEP, the f Irst QEP in two and

A. kd

opportunity/decision before them As a result of the different background ofeach group, "career opportunities" also differ and will be discussedseparately.

First, the dual-rated group makes up the senior leadership of thehelicopter force--essentially all the senior majors and lieutenant colonels.Pilots in this group do not have "system imposed" restrictions on crossflowbetween weapon systems. Crossflow is, for the most part, at the request ofthe MAJCOM and is into supervisory type positions. As examples of thiscrossf low (1) a below-the-zone lieutenant colonel was recently assignedfrom the Pentagon to be the Commander of a T-39 unit; and (2) a newlieutenant colonel in a helicopter Detachment Commander position wasselected to to be the Ops Officer of a composite H-60/C--130 Squadron and,following C-130 training, was to maintain currency in the C-130 (14---).However, while the opportunity for crossflow is there, the recent trend forthis group to hold operational positions as colonels, within or outside thehelicopter force, has not been encouraging.

In Twenty-Third Air Force (MAC) there are four Wings which have mostof the helicopters in the USAF. In these Wings, there are 12 operationalpositions--Wing/CC, CV, DO--where pilots with helicopter experience couldbe assigned to prepare for further advancement. However, only I of these 12positions is filled with a helicopter pilot (promoted to colonel from thehelicopter ranks) and only I other has had helicopter experience in his careerOn balance, looking at rated opportunities outside helicopters, one colonel hascrossed from helicopters to C-141s and is now Vice Commander of an AirliftWing (18--) From these statistics, any number of possible conclusionsmight be drawn However, the author wants to highlight two factors: (I) theopportunity for crossflow is there, and (2) the statistics may look quitedifferent next year considering the yearly turnover in these key positions

The second group, the majority of the middle managers in the helicopterforce, are helicopter-only qualified These pilots received their wingsthrough the Army UPT-H program and are operationally limited to helicoptersTo debate the impact of this "limitation" is subjective and diff, cut toquantify because the senior officers in this group are 2-year maiors, those

Chapter Three

CAREER OPPORTUNITIES

The USAF does not have a formula by which commanders and thepersonnel system can assess "career opportunities" for pilots within anymajor weapon system Thus, personal interpretations of career opportunitiesand limitations are variea and cover a wide spectrum of opinions As a result,the author's experience in the personnel management and assignments area,along with the opinions of senior commanders in the helicopter force, arecertainly important to this study. In addition, the fact that the USAFcontinues to support the universally assignable pilot concept through thefixed wing conversion program, emphasizes the USAF commitment to continuethe crossflow of helicopter pilots to fixed wing systems. It is within thisframework the author wishes to highlight areas in the current program whichimpact "career opportunities" and which will be used to weigh optioii. inChapter Five.

To begin, the helicopter force has essentially three distinct groupsFirst, a more senior--dual-rated--group which was fixed wing qualifiedbefore being assigned to helicopters in the 1960s Include( n this dual-ratedgroup are those Army trained helicopter pilots who remaine,: in ATC followingFWQ and are now back in helicopters, and a number of ! , st assignmentinstructor pilots (FAIPs) who are assigned to helicopters each year (10 peryear) via the major weapon system selection board (This fixed wing tohelicopter conversion has been conducted concurrently with UPT-H at FortRucker, Alabama since 1971.) The second group of pilots, junior majors andsenior captains, are helicopter-only types who have been trained by the Armysince 1970, and have declined conversion to fixed wing Finally, the thirdgroup are junior captains and lieutenants who still have the fixed wing

11

I,

Then in March 1984, with yearly quotas reduced 10. i() P iol f~t

plas fr ayealy WQboard to select volunteer-_= for CorVer51Cori (frrr- t%nguaran teed group) based on a competitive selection 05~cs E~) y i

li'me, all the FWQ "guaranteed' helicopter pilots had e'ther accepted ordeclined conversion. The first board was held in June 1984 to select the 10volunteers to attend UPT in FY1985 The results of this board, specifica~ly,the average time in service for thos--e selected, wil! 5erve as tosd!scussion in the next chapter

SUMMARY

Since 1969, rated management decisons concerning the hel~cooter forcehave been marked by a desire to comply with the wish of Congres, mneet theoperational requirements within the helicopter force;, and, at the same t~me,st'll keep faith with the Air Force goal of developing and employing "fullyqualified" pilots. The USAF posi tio,, to require all helicopter pilots to convertt1o fixed wing aircraft following their initial tour in helicopters hasdrastically changed since 1970 when the CSAF accepted the recommendat ionscf the working group. The program has evolved from one whiCh would haverequired every helicopter pilot to convert to fixed wing systems--or give uphis wings--to the current program which sends )0 volun,,teers a year toc UJPT

A review of thie rationale behind these rated manageroert decisioris ,ausesthe author to conclude that many decisions were m~adp -is reactions tooroblems outside the helicopter force and did not 'rlude a )onq term a'f51'of impacts on career opportunities- for helicopter Pilot-I A3 a reul, areeropporturit~es for helcopter n!!nts have been af ec0ed ~~enx h~trthe author wili highlight rimpajcts of the Clyrrent pn-mo P

o)Pportunltes fr,r those pilots whO(- attprd ',Xed w"-c :~ cr ol w - rr~ Within hlcp~

vi r, Ie, 1'~ 1 ~ ' r y-:-tt, FW u t n:I,,r

r~n thi pe ,,,wa i) a tut a A Was

2_W( quota of 40 per y ear '5everal factor5 Icor'tr~butecl to tp citijatfln 'rcst

'mall-er UPT-H year qF SWere entering thefu-osvn erFQwn,Tr)i5 smaller year group population, coupled with poor pilot retentior nrhei~copters between 1979-1981, mrade it extremely difficult to assignnellcopter pilots to ;EWO when the helicopter force was short of experienceth)roughout all MAJCOMs Thus, AFi'lfC elected not to fill all th-e training

o I t s

n !()8-, tne nelicopter rated rf-AnjqPnt subcommittee met todsuspro',ected rnanninq levels and experience, requirements of the HH-60D, aI 1O w

'co,,-,pter prigrammiec to enter the Air Fo" rce inventory in 1987. initial -lans,:,)r the D-mdelcaled for a significant increase ir; helicopter pilot

',Pquremrent5_ because no helicopter,_; would be taken out of the active duty-ven!.qr-y tefrttoyrsheH-60D was operational. This resultant

-nrase in operationa! requ~remnents, along with the new intutr

-e,.I!-erYnents at th)e helj(Cnpter m~ss'or t~'ng schno) at Kirt land AFB, NJM-'wouD require an addlitior!si fifty experie-ce,' helicopter pift o f'lI tneseprno;ec ted1 auth-orizat ions (8-)

C. a7 result of this mreeting. AFMOIC raised the su o taro' -<nfer Pjints- Iho, IPT f r ,t The proposa! woui(I have rt-ade I rn-

o~upt er pilot univer,.aily a-sIiqnatie- arnd was oriented towcyl stoppr~cow of experience to! Other weapon 3y-terlis But, AT C rn J_ 'JAF/ PP

~>s~Jptjrsuinq the initia.tive Oecau.se it was cortr,-ry 10 th'e 1 q6

~~res qu!a gudance opposi ng this doibj rainin Ho wever, H(, UWA/MK)r~JCthe f~wof experience to.,, Mheri weapon systemn> r. th)e

r ~r,,1ngq qu o' to) l0per- y ear (9

-- 016100

published in December 1974, the reCommerjdat~on that all roelicoter1 iesnua convert to fixed winq was elimmiated, and secondiy, the reason foreliminating the guarantee for conrio wa .t1ty a 0,St~bto rbewithin the fixed wing force. Although the target date for FWQ was notaffected, the wording of the revised regulat ion--"based on the needs -of theAir Force-- eliminated the guarantee and served as the basis fo furtherchanges in the program.

Fixed wing conversion began in 1976 wito training conducted f .s atWebb AF8 TX and later at Fsheppard AFER, TX Siricp its star, o ver 7()(1helicopter pilots have graduated frorn the proqramn (14 -- ) The yp~l INproduction of FWQ graduates is shown n f lgure 2

WWII

Figure 2. Fixed Wing(,olvers- or Trainin '4 4

1r W an ATC initiatrve ch.-nged tie method Ufacn~5hn 2~om an eithl- month specialized courseC to s3endni~Q r, Ot~ uigt htourse (7 -)ATC defended the change h-asecd on re co

ATC h !d c find anothe)r 'UP7 .ra,'vn( fa~ rr t h e yram

reqv~eer~S1hepr AFE T

trainng program began in FY1970. Through FY1984, approximately 1,250pilots have been trained by the US. Army (17:--) Yearly production figuresare

1,I hoh g !IIi, ,7 - .- - 7 , . -, :._ , ', ,, ', - ', 1 -, ,, C-:

Figure 1. Yearly UPT-H Production (17:--)

(The drastic reduction in training rates in FY1973 was due to thealmost total phase-out of the HH-43 "PEDRO" helicopter whichreduced helicopter requirements by one-third.)

In December 1974 a new regulation, AFR 51-5, directed how theconversion program would be conducted The program objective was "toprovide career oriented rotary wing pilots with the fixed wing qualificationnecessary for full assignment and career progression opportunity within thepilot career field" (2:1). The program was to begin in CY 4/76 However, inDecember 1975, Hq USAF approved a proposal to eliminate the guaranteedportion of the program for those who enter UPT-H after 1 July 1976. Therationale for the change was a result of rated management/distributlonproblems of projected overmannIng and surpluses within the fixed wingworld--a result of the Southeast Asia drawdown (10---) In an attempt toreduce this projected overmannIng, the rated management committeeconcluded that lowering the helicopter Input Into fixed wing systems was onestep which had to be taken However, It is important to highlight twosignificant factors First, between 1970 and the time AFR 51-5 was

: .. , . . ... ,_.-,:. -::.. -..-..

Our total heflcopter pilot force is only 1,100 Now, thiS is a verysmall percentage of our total pilot force if these people arespecialized to such an extent that they can only fly helicopters, weseverely limit the career progression of these individual officers

and we greatly complicate the personnel management system (4 1)

Nevertheless, on 3 December 1969, the House Appropriations Committeepublished a report critical of the Air Force position In essence it

1. Reduced FY1970 undergraduate pilot traininq funds by $10 mi!lio

2. Prohibited fixed wing pilot training prior to helicopter trainirng.

3. Suggested consolidation of helo tra!ning under Army auspices ,4 2)

General John D Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF), decided not toreclama this Congressional guidance and chartered an ad hoc group tocoordinate a program in which the US. Army would provide undergraduatehelicopter training for USAF helicopter pilots This qroup recommended thefollowing for implementation.

1 Initial undergraduate helicopter training and conversion training

conducted by the Army begin in 1971.

2 Conversion training be continued for fixed wing p, lots as neededto meet isolated tour requirements and to maintain operationalexperience in the helicopter force

3 After initial utilization as helicopter pllot5, ali rotary w r,qualified officers who are accepted for caree-r -t.*ltus should b-offered fixed wing training Those not des'onqo Or iyrfJ C0 '

,UC traninq should be released from active .tv e, ,..c Imeet s'pr )rt requirements { *

T-,e recornmen(1lVtons of tjh, .. je were -',;.. . .. .

0

Chapter Two

BACKGROUND

In 1966, the requirement for helicopter pilots in Southeast Asia wasincreasing. Responding to this need, the USAF discontinued training 60helicopter pilots per year through the undergraduate helicopter training (UHT)program and used this training/flying time to increase the conversion of fixedwing pilots to helicopters--from 220 in 1966 to a high of 378 in 1969 (13:8)Concurrent with this training, the Air Force was converting helicopter pilots,trained in helicopters through UHT prior to September 1966, into fixed wingpilots

However, the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives(91 st Congress), in hearings on the Operational and Maintenance portion of theFY1970 Air Force appropriations, questioned the Air Force policy ofcrosstraining helicopter pilots into fixed wing aircraft, As one committeemember stated:

We have had discussions of this in prior years. It was the opinion ofthis Committee and the Congress in adopting the Committee reporton the FY1969 appropriation that this double training bediscontinued in view of the cost, and there was some question withrespect to the necessity The requirement is such that there seemsto be little doubt but that pilots trained for helicopter work willremain in helicopter work and if, in the future, it should be foundthey are no longer needed in helicopters they can be retrained forfixed wing aircraft (4 1).

Air force witnesses stated the subject had been studied many times andthere were cogent reasons for the policy

5

0 - i J .i, i ~ ai~ ii- ~ , iili uu .i i . . . . . " - . .

alternative training programs and weigh eacn option against careeropportunities and operational requirements. Lastly, Chapter Six will presentconclusions and recommendations.

4.I

OBJECT IVES 0 TiJ STUY

T~--study wilfl examine the backqrourid of the UPT-H and FWO pro~ra"-* 1 9c 69 It will analyze these proqramr- and deterrrmne ?f1/huw the *:hanqo..

have _patnd c.irper cpportunitior for-h~cpe pilots it will suggest ariJ'analyze alternatwve tra~nrnq methods or cecluences of t~;arid w!llreComndr'~~ -courses (,f act~on Throuqh tI*is analysis, the author intends t:)providle intormat ion for use within the rated management co r-muinty to ergct

Cnaq _-rihel icopte- tr, r'ng programs

LLITIAT1ION'S

,ever-a! limit,- fonc wil bind this study First, the analysisofcrr0 potiinitie fr n&Itcrper rllots w,11 be discussed in the fram.ework ~

Pers-_onne) arci -Iatad roanaqemert policles within the "Pilot, communtyiSeronc, thie author acknowledges tMat toeC term "providinq better careerOpportunities" is ambiguous and extremely difficult to quantify The authorintentis to draw on his five years experience within the helicopteras'gnments/rated managemnent arena at both AFtIPC and Hq MAC, and alsoinclude the opinions of senior commanders within the helicopter force, toprpsent a realistic assessment of career opportunities Lastly, alternativetra-ining methods will be presented without an in-depth analysis of co'st

* factors associated with this training. The author does not have the availablerpsoQurcp,; to cost new training programs,

ORAIZTO QQF_!,HE SUDY

ne ac ~ru~ ac eou ~n~ PT-Hanu FWQ w 11I e 3resentec.s&aer Two in tn'sD chapter, the ~uhrwif emphasize the ariaclemen~t

Ieis~ov inv\olved r Charges in, heiicopter training programs and bring thee-ader- up to date with current programs Chapter Three wrii contain J

anralysis of how these proqrams impact career opportunities, Then, Chapter--(Or Wiil concentrate ')r fuiture USAF ihelcopter programs, and foc'us on, the-r'tiuence on helicopttr pilot requirements Chapter Five will examirne

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Inherent in the method and sequence of both UPT-H and FWQ training are

two distinct situations which affect career opportunities for helicopterpilots. The first problem concerns those pilots who attend FWQ. The programrequires an Air Force pilot to attend UPT and be in pipeline training for 15 to18 months. When you combine this long training time with a new guy/co-pilotOER following training, the result may not be a true indication of theperformance and potential of that officer for a two and one-half year periodThe second problem involves the career opportunities for those pilots whodecline or are not selected for FWQ training AFR 51-5 refers to these pilotsas "limited" (2:1). As "limited" duty/helicopter-only pilots, these individualsare operationally restricted to helicopters with little hope to progress tosenior staff or command positions. To illustrate this point, in April 1980, anAir Force spokesman responded in these words to a House Committee on whythe Air Force retrains helicopter pilots into fixed wing systems:

Transitloning to a fixed wing pilot enhances a helicopter pilot'schance for full career progression through increased opportunitiesto serve in senior staff/command positions. This fact impacts notonly on recruiting efforts for potential helicopter pilots, butundoubtedly accounts in part for the substantially higher helicopterpilot retention rate compared to the remainder of the pilot force(1 2:H-245).

This study will address these two related, but distinct, issues:

1. Is the Air Force providing realistic career opportunities for those whoaccept FWO as well as for those who either decline conversion or are notselected for conversion?

2 Can the Air Force provide better career opportunities for helicopterpilots by enacting changes to the current fixed wing conversion program

* and/or undergraduate nelicopter pilot training program, while continu nq torneet experience reouirements in the helicopter !orce':'

0 .

Chapter Four

REQUI REMENTS

The USAF has two programs being worked by the Air Staff which wIllimpact pilot requirements in the helicopter force. First, the recentMemorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by the Chiefs of Staff of the UnitedStates Army and Air Force affects the vertical-lift portion of the Air Force'sSpecial Operation Forces and may ultimately reduce helicopter pilotrequirements (1-1; 5:4); and secondly, the programmed buy of the HH-6ODhelicopter, procured to enhance the Search and Rescue mission/capabilities ofthe Air Force, will increase helicopter experience requirements (8I). Theimpact of these ongoing programs must be considered before presentingalternatives in the following chapter.

The MOA, signed in May 1984 by the Chiefs of Staff of both the Air Forceand the Army, would transfer mission responsibility for the vertical-liftportion of Special Operations from the USAF to the Army While the details(and feasibility) of this agreement are still being worked by the twoServices, the possible effect on USAF requirements are significant

First, if the USAF loses the Special Operations mission without losingthe assets dedicated to this mission (specifically HH-53H and UH-INaircraft), then these assets will be redistributed to the Combat Search andRescue mission The result of this type transfer will keep helicopter forcemanning at the same levels while losing approximately 50% of those staffrequirements at MAJCOM level and above (i.e., REDCOM, Hq USAF/XOO), which

* are specific helicopter/Special Operations authorizations (4 j--) To

illustrate this. Presently, the helicopter pilot force represents 47% of thetotal USAF pilot force However, of the plot, as)iqned to operatioral

0o

! -. 16

positions above MAJCOM, helicopter pilots represent just 2 9% of the total if

the Special Operations mission requirements are transferred to the Army,then the USAF Special Operations helicopter expertise will no longer berequired on these staffs As a result, this current 2.9% helicopter presencewould be reduced, making it even more difficult for assignmentopportunities" in the operational world (17 -- )

The second possible scenario would transfer both the mission and theHH-53H helicopters to the Army. If this occurs, then both the helicopter

force and staff manning would be reduced, resulting in an even smallerrequirement for helicopter expertise in the Air Force. When you review theMOA in general, the bottom line is that both options under consideration haveadverse affects on career opportunities for helicopter pilots.

The second major program involves the USAF acquisition of the HH-60DThis helicopter, with it low level/all weather capability, has a proposed

,nitial operational capability (IOC) of 1987(14:--). With the phase-in of thisnighly complex weapon system, experience cockpit requirements willincrease because of the differences in experience definitions between theH-60 and the UH- I /H-3 hei~ copters it is programmed to replace (17:--). Withthis increase in cockpit experience requirements, c.3ntinuing the flow of four-to-seven year helicopter pilots to FWQ will decrease overall experiencelevels at a time when more experience is needed, As a result, this reduced

cockpit experience will put pressure on the personnel system to curtail theloss of experience oy decreasing career broadening assignments forhelicopter pilots (i.e. rated supplement) and may possibly result in the

termination/reduction of the FWQ program during this build-up period. Theseactions will adversely affect promotions throughout the helicopter force.

SUMMARY

in summary, the USAF helicopter force is entering a very critical periodThe decisions inolved in the MOA and the procurement of the HH--60D, thefirst new aircraft in the USAF helicopter inventory since the 1960s, willsignificantly affect career opportunities for helicopter pilots Regardless of

17

0 ,

the eventual outcome of the MOA, with the HH-60 additior, the neec o'tr r'",

experience in the helicopter cockpit is evident Thus, ir, the r"ex* : aa!ternatives wil be suggested which will focus on both the prOber" ,)limited career opportunities for helicopter pilotb and future ere.recuirements in the helicopter force

4

I

Chapter Five

COURSES OF ACTION

Up to this po,nt, the reader has been exposed to the background ofP hi arn the fixed wing conversion programs, the impact these programs

r.ave on career opportunities for helicopter pilots, and a brief review offuture requirements in the helicopter force. While the USAF may continuew'th current training programs, there are options available which wouldimprove career opportunities for helicopter pilots and, at the same time,provide the required experience needed in the helicopter force. Following aretwo options which specifically address these issues.

OPTION I

Since 1980, the USAF has been planning to modify the UPT program. Thespecialized undergraduate pilot training (SUPT) concept involving a dual tracktraining program--either a fighter, attack, recce (FAR) or a tanker, transport,bomber (TTB) training syllabus--was approved by the Air Force Chief of Staffand the Secretary of the Air Force The scheduled implementation date is1988 (20:--). As an adjunct to this program, the first option would be for theUSAF to adopt a tr-track SUPT syllabus instead of the planned dual tracktraining program Figure 4 illustrates the dual track SUPT program with theproposed tri-track option This option would provide all Air Force pilots

identical training up through the primary phase of training. Then, instead ofpilots breaking off into two specific training tracks, the split would involve athird specialized track--helicopters

19

.0 .i

,- r _ ... .. . .. . .. .. . . . .

. .. ... r,

,* '> - - r" ' l I. - -

-i

Figure 4. Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training. (20;--)

As mentioned above, with Option 1 all Air Force pilots would undergo thesame initial primary training phase. (At Fort Rucker, USAF students do notenter the Air Force unique phase of UPT-H, or fly with USAF instructors, untilthe last six weeks of training.) This option would employ the same mnitia!standards/quality control for all Air Force pilots In addition to this, theadvantages to this option are:

1 This option eliminates the need for a fixed wing conversion programAs dual-rated pilots, crossf low to other weapon systems would be possible atany point in an officer's career without spending an inordinate amount of timein UPT pipeline training at a critical time in their career--as is the case nowAs a result, career opportunities would be comparable to the dual-ratedpilots now in the helicopter force

2. The loss to crossflow, specifically from the four-to-seven yeargroup, would be reduced, thus, increasing the experience levels in eachhelicopter system. While crossflow would still be possible, !t would bespread across the entire force/year groups.

On balance, there are two challenges this option surfaces which willrequire further study prior to implementation

20

w!

The proposed training would cost more than current programs Bycomparison, ten UPT slots for FWQ versus some fixed wing training up frontfor all helicopter pilots

? The on-going concern from Congress about dual training As recent asiQ79, Congress was still investigating why the Navy/Marines conducted dualtraining ( 1 -- ) in their original 1969 mandate, the Navy was included in theconsolidation directive (444).

Option 2

As discussed earlier, the Air Force conducts conversion training viaUPT, four-to-seven years following graduation from UPT-H. Option 2 departsfrom this FWO policy by eliminating the four-to-seven year window and bychanging the method of training. Each of these proposed changes will bediscussed separately below:

I. Eliminate the four-to-seven year FWQ window. Doing away with thisrestriction would provide more experience to the helicopter force, like OptionI, by spreading crossflow losses across the entire helicopter forceAttendant with this change would be the opportunity for helicopter pilots tocrossflow at any time in their career. In effect, crossflow would be similarto the dual-rated group now in the helicopter force Additionally, byeliminating the eligibility window, you also eliminate the competitive FWQboard held each year This would go a long way in resolving the negativeaspects of not being selected--the "I'm not good enough for fixed wingattitude'

2 Change to short course conversion training in lieu of training throughUPT. With this option, pilots would receive conversion training through a twoor three-month short course program conducted in one of the following threeways

a Air Training Command provides the training in the T-37/T-46

21

.1

aircraft This training would consist of approximately 30 to 40 hours o!

flying/simulator time in a 2-3 month period

b. Military Airlift Command provides the conversion training withinMAC at the Central Training Facility (CTF) at Scott AFB, IL. The CTF presentlyconducts all mission training in the T-39 aircraft and will be conductingmission training in the C-21 and C-12 aircraft in the near future. Trainingtime/hours would be similar to those discussed above,

c The USAF contracts with the Army for quotas in their helicopterto fixed wing conversion course at Fort Rucker, Al. This course was set up bythe Army to provide pilots for their fixed wing aircraft. This course provides50 flying hours and 21 simulator hours in a 10 week period (16 -- )

The advantages of this option are similar to Option 1. First, it wouldprovide better career opportunities for helicopter pilots by expanding thecrossflow opportunity. It also reduces the negative aspects of conversiontraining through UPT, and finally, it provides increased experience levels inthe helicopter cockpit. In addition, it is the least costly option--whencompared to the way training is conducted now or when compared to Option 1Each of the three alternative training methods would be more economical andreduce the time spent in training.

The major disadvantage of Option 2 is one of perception rather thansubstance. Helicopter pilots may initially see this type of change in anegative manner--a loss of the fixed wing conversion opportunity as the FWQprogram is ended. It will take some crossflow to eliminate this type ofreaction, but if crossflow occurs early, this perception should be short-lived

In summary, both of the suggested options are aimed at improving careeropportunities for helicopter pilots and satisfying the increasing experiencerequirements in the helicopter force. The author contends either optionwould provide better career opportunities and provide more experience in thecockpit than the current method of conducting training

2

Chapter ;lx

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study was to examine two issues First, is the USAFproviding realistic career opportunities for helicopter pilots who attend fixedwing conversion as well as those who remain in helicopters? And secondly,could the USAF provide better opportunities by enacting changes whilecontinuing to meet operational requirements in the helicopter force? Theauthor has attempted to provide an objective analysis of these two issues bypresenting his impressions of "career opportunities" which have been formedthe past five years is the assignments business at MAC and AFMPC. Inaddition, the author wanted to reflect the opinions of the senior leadership ofthe helicopter force, most of whom are experiencing their first tour in thehelicopter world, and interject their analysis of "career opportunities" forhelicopter pilots with a broader perspective.

The answers to these two issues, although subjective, are based on thereal!ties of personnel management in the Air Force today The answer is thatthe USAF can provide better "career opportunities" for helicopter pilots byenacting changes to training programs In doing so, the experience levels inthe helicopter force will be increased--a fact which is totally supported bythe leadership in the helicopter force

The author believes it is important to change the program now, beforeseveral years of lieutenant colonel and colonel promotion statistics supportthe fact that a closed-loop, limited duty helicopter force is not a healthy

23

situation. This paper has identified two options which, if adopted, wouldresolve the issues before they become major problems Seldom do we havethe opportunity to examine a situation and implement changes before aproblem becomes significant and solutions are then labeled reactions.

RECOMMENDAT IONS

The author recommends () that Option 2 be adopted immediately. TheUSAF should accomplish fixed wing conversion through short course trainingand discontinue training through UPT--thereby resolving the two issuespresented in the study. This option would also provide the most expeditiousand least costly method to resolve the situation. But, this option would firstrequire study by the helicopter rated management sub-committee to identifythe best method to conduct conversion training prior to implementation. Inaddition to this recommendation, the author also recommends (2) the AirStaff (USAF/XO/MP) study the possibility of implementing Option 1concurrently with the start of SUPT in 1988. But, study of this option shouldnot prevent the immediate enactment of Option 2. Rather, the study should bewith the intention of arriving at an optimal, long-term solution to the issue

BIBLIOGRAPHY ii

References Cited

Official Documents

1 U S Department of the Air Force. Air Force Policy Letter for CommandersAFRP 190- 1, 22-84, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15November 1984

2 U.S. Department of the Air Force Fixed Wing Qualification Training forRotary Wing Pilots, A.F Regulation 51-5. Washington D.C. 20December 1974

3 US Department of the Air Force United States Air Force Personnel Plan,Volumn I I Washington, DC. 6 June 1975.

4 U S Department of the Air Force Report of Working GrouQ on HelicooterPilot Training and Utilization. Washington D.C.. AFPDC, February1970.

5 1) S Department of the Air Force HO United States Air Force (CSAF).Memorandum of Agreement on US Army - U.S Air Force Joint ForceDevelopment Process. Washington D.C.. 22 May 1984

6 S Department of the Air Force Air Force Manpower and PersonnelCenter (MPCR). "Fixed Wing Qualification Training" letter to MAJCOM5and Helicopter Units Randolph Air Force Base, Texas 1 March 1984

CONTINUED__________

7 U.S. Department of the Air Force. HO Air Training Command (DO)"Relocation of Fixed-Wing Qualification" message (17l1455Z April 81)to HO USAF/XOO/MPP. Randolph Air Force Base, Texas: 17 April 1981

8 U.S Department of the Air Force HO Military Airlift Command (DO)Letter to Assistant DCS/Mnpwr and Pers for Mil Pers. Scott Air ForceBase, Illinois: 6January 1983

9 US Department of the Air Force HO United States Air Force (MIP). Letterto CINCMAC. Washington D.C.: 8April 1983

10. U S Department of the Air Force: HO United States Air Force (XOO)"Revision to AF Regulation 51-5" letter to AF/DPP Washington D C.15 December 1975.

11 U.S Government. Comptroller General of the United States. UndergraduateHelicooter Pilot Training: Consolidation Could Yield SignificantSavings, FPCD-80-37. Washington D C: 3 1 January 1980.

12 US. House of Representatives: House Appropriation Committee HearingAir Force Helicopter Training. Washington D.C.: I April 1980

Unoublished Materials

13 McGhan, 5,A Major, USAF "Management Considerations Associated withDiscontinuing Fixed Wing Training for Helicopter Pilots" Researchstudy prepared at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University,Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama AQri1 1977

I

"-' 5

_____CONTINUED___

Other Sources

14 Cruit, J W, Ma3or, USAF Chief, Heiicopter Assignments Team, Air ForceManpower and Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.Telecons, Oct/ Nov/Dec 1984.

15 Gilbert, D. E., Colonel, USAF. Vice Commander, 5SOth Aircrew Trainingand Test Wing (MAC), Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. Telecon,2 1 December 1984

16 Hansen, H F, (oloneI, USAF. Course Officer, Air War College, Maxwell AirForce Bas_ e, Alabama Telecons, December 1984.

17 Hart, T W, Major, USAF. Chief, Rated Force Analysis, Air Force Manpowerand Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. Telecons,Oct/Nov/Dec 1984

18 Hunt, B L, Captain, USAF. Chief, Rescue and Mission Support ManningSection, HO Military Airlift Command/DP, Scott Air Force Base,Illinois Telecons, November 1984.

I q Kornitzer, W J. Jr ,Colonel, USAF Commander, 2nd Air Division (MAC),Hurlburt Air Force Base, Florida Telecon, 21 December 1984

20 ONei II, M.,Major, USAF Chief, Pilot Forces Programs, HO United StatesAirForce/MP, WashingtonDC. Telecons, January 1985

21 ReiOchert, R A,Colonel, USAF. Commander, 41st Rescue and Weather ReconW!ng(MAC), McClellan Air Force Base, California. Telecon, 21December 1984

27

__________CONTINUED________

22C Sorenson, N., Colonel, USAF. Vice Commander, 39th~ Aerospace Rescue and

Recovery Wing, Eglin Air Force, Florida Telecon, '20 December 1984

FILMED

8-85

DTIC