Action sentences

D A V I D W 1 D E R K E R

A C T I O N S E N T E N C E S *

The object of this paper is to provide a critical examination of Davidson's well known thesis that without events it does not seem possible to give an acceptable account of the logical form of action sentences. ~ More specifically, given the fact that Davidson identifies the notion of a theory of logical form with that of a theory of truth, 2 the particular thesis I wish to examine is this:

(DI) By adopting an ontology of events it is possible to give a theory of truth for action sentences which seems superior to those such theories which do not make use of events.

I argue that the logico-ontological thesis advanced by Davidson is basically correct . However , his account of the logical form of action sentences needs to be modified in order to match his account of action individuation. I conclude by indicating what form such a modification might take.

Before starting, let me also emphasize that when discussing the logical form of action sentences, Davidson is actually concerned with only one specific subclass of the latter, roughly characterized by the schema

A ( x l . . . . . x n ) M l ( y l ) M 2 ( y 2 ) . . . Mk(yk)

where 'A ' is a place-holder for action verbs, and 'Mr' , ' M 2 ' , . . . . 'Mk', are place-holders for prepositional modifiers such as 'in', 'at ' , 'with', 'on', ' into', etc. For exariaple, 'Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife in the Forum'. Davidson makes it clear for reasons to be touched upon later that he does not wish to deal with action sentences whose action verb is modified by modifiers like 'slowly', ' intentionally', 'deli- berately' . In what follows, I shall refer to action sentences of the here relevant type simply as "act ion sentences".

E r k e n n m i s 28 (1988) 269-291 �9 1988 by K l u w e r A c a d e m i c Publishers

2 7 0 D A V I D W I D E R K E R

1. A C T I O N S E N T E N C E S

1.1. The Problem

Why exactly is there a difficulty in determining the logical form of action sentences? To see this, let us consider the following set of sentences:

(1) John buttered the toast in the kitchen, with the knife, at midnight.

(2) John buttered the toast in the kitchen, with the knife. (3) John buttered the toast in the kitchen. (4) John buttered the toast.

One standard way of analysing these sentences is to treat 'buttered' in (1) as a five-place predicate (true of John, the toast, the kitchen, etc.), 'buttered' in (2) as a four-place predicate, 'buttered' in (3) as a three-place predicate, etc. That is,

(la) Buttered5 (John, the toast, the knife, the kitchen, midnight), (2a) Buttered4 (John, the toast, the knife, the kitchen), (3a) Buttereda (John, the toast, the knife), (4a) Buttered2 (John, the toast).

However, this analysis, according to Davidson, has the following drawbacks:

(a) it ignores the common syntactic and semantic role played by 'buttered' in (1)-(4).

(b) The analysis in question fails to account for the various entailment relations that hold between (1)-(4). For example, it fails to account for the fact that (2) is entailed by (1), (3) by (2), (4) by (3), etc. 4

A natural move to overcome these difficulties is to try to treat 'buttered' as a five-place predicate, and then to view (4) as being elliptical for 'John buttered the toast somewhere, with something, at some time', i.e.,

(4b) (3p)(3i)(3t)[Buttered (John, the toast, p, i, t)],

(where 'p', ' i ' , and ' t ' , range over places, instruments and times, respectively). The entailments mentioned above do now go through being justified by the rule of existential generalization. For example,

A C T I O N S E N T E N C E S 271

(2b) (3 t)[Buttered (John, the toast, the kitchen, the knife, t)] (3b)/.'. ( : l i)(3t)[Buttered (John, the toast, the kitchen, i, t)].

But Davidson objects that this analysis too is inadequate. Adopting a point made by Anthony Kenny, Davidson contends that one can, in principle, increase the number of argument places involved in 'buttered' indefinitely. For example, one can add to (1) such phrases like 'on the table', 'in front of his mother' , 'by holding the toast in his left hand', etc. 5 This problem has been called by Kenny, "the problem of the variable polyadicity" of action verbs. 6 When seen from the van- tage point o f the general aim of constructing a theory of truth for action sentences, Kenny's problem provides a further indication of the fact that we still do not know how such a theory should deal with 'buttered' . Should it treat the latter as a five-place predicate, a six- place predicate, etc.? Note also that it would be futile to try to settle this question by empirical means, namely, by trying to find out the number of prepositions in English, which seems finite, and then to construe 'buttered' as a predicate each argument-place of which corresponds to a certain preposition. For the very same preposition may, in principle, occur in an action sentence a number of times. To see this, we just have to take a look at the following sentences:

(5) John buttered the toast, in the corner, in the kitchen, in his uncle's house, in Haifa, in Israel.

1.2. Davidson' s Proposal

Davidson's solution to the problem under consideration, is to analyse (1) in terms of:

(1D) (3e)[Buttering (e, John, the toast )^In(e , the ki tchen)^ With(e, the knife) A At(e, midnight)I, 7

read as ' there is an event e such that e is a buttering of the toast by John, and e occurred in the kitchen, and e was with a knife, and e occurred at midnight'.

Two features of this analysis deserve close attention:

(i) its construal of a simple action predicate of degree n as a predicate of degree n + 1, the extra place being filled by a variable ranging over events.


(ii) its treatment of prepositional modifiers as predicates of events.

The proposed account of the logical form of action sentences is not vulnerable to the difficulties mentioned earlier. First of all, adding a new prepositional phrase to (1), say, 'in front of Mary', does not force us to increase the number, of argument-places involved in 'Buttering (e, John, the toast)'. It only creates the need for adding a new conjunct in the form of an event-predicate, i.e., 'In front of (e, Mary)'. Thus 'Buttering ( - , - , - ) ' cannot be said to suffer from the problem of variable polyadicity. Secondly, Davidson's analysis captures the intuitive validity of inferences like (1)/.'.(2), (2)/.'.(3), (3)/.'.(4), etc. For example, by assigning to (2), the logical form

(2D) (3e)[B(e, the toast, John)^ in(e, the ki tchen)^ With(e, the knife)], ( 'B' stands for 'buttering'),

we realize immediately that (2) follows from (1) as a simple matter of first order quantification theory. Similarly, also for the other inferences.

A further merit of the Davidsonian analysis consists in the fact that it enables us to see why action sentences do not permit, in general, substitution of co-extensive predicates salva veritate. For example, it shows us why from assumptions like

(6) John walks with a stick,

and

(7) (x)(x walks = x whistles),

we cannot validly infer

(8) John whistles with a stick,

('with' is taken here in the sense of 'with the aid of'). For by rendering the above inference ~ la Davidson, i.e.,

(6D) (3e)[F(e, John) ^ With(e, his stick)], (TD) (x){(3e)[F(e, x)] = (3e)[G(e, x)]}, (8D)/.'. (3e)[G(e, x) 6 With(e, his stick)],

we see right away that is invalid, as the alleged truth of (TD) does not ensure that 'F(e, x)' and 'G(e, x)' are true of the same events ( ' F ' and ' G ' symbolize respectively 'walking' and 'whistling'.)

A C T I O N S E N T E N C E S 2 7 3

How might someone, who does not wish to posit events, resist Davidson's contention that the relatively best account of the logical form of action sentences requires an ontology of events? He seems to have the following two options:

(a) He might propose an alternative account of the logical form of action sentences that does not commit him to the existence of events, or

(b) he might simply claim that the Davidsonian account of these sentences is defective.

In the following two sections, I would like to explore these options.

2. ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF ANALYSING ACTION SENTENCES

2.1. The Simple-Minded Proposal

One alternative way of analysing action sentences such as

(1) John buttered the toast in the kitchen, with the knife,

is the following:

(l*) Buttered (John, the toast) A Buttered-in (John, the toast, the kitchen) ^ Buttered-with (John, the toast, the knife).

i.e., John buttered the toast, and John buttered the toast in the kitchen, and John buttered the toast with the knife.

Prima facie, this rather simple proposal seems to enjoy all the virtues had by the Davidsonian analysis of (1). For one thing, just as the latter, it is not vulnerable to the problem of variable polyadicity. As we can easily see, the introduction of a new prepositional phrase, like, e.g., 'on the roof ' , does not result in an increasing of number of argument-places involved in 'Buttered ' , 'Buttered-in ' , or 'Buttered- with'. Rather, it only signals the need for the introduction of a new conjunct, in the form of the closed sentence 'But tered-on (John, the toast, the roof). Yet the number of positions involved in 'Buttered ' , 'Buttered-in ' , 'Buttered-with ' remains constantfl

Secondly, we are given a simple explanation of the intuitive validity of inferences like:

(1) John buttered the toast in the kitchen, with the knife. (2)/.'. John buttered the toast in the kitchen.

274 D A V I D W I D E R K E R

(3)/.'. John buttered the toast.

For when analysed, in accordance to the present proposal, (2) and (3) can be shown to follow from (1), by the rule of Simplification. Analogous remarks apply also to all the other virtues of the David- sonian analysis mentioned earlier.

As for Davidson, he is not totally unaware of this alternative way of analysing action sentences. He rejects it, however, since, in his view, (1") fails to bring out the fact conveyed by (1), that one single action has been performed by John on the occasion in question. 9 For example, (1") may have been true, even if John had done all the various butterings mentioned in (1") on different occasions. To provide a remedy for this defect, an opponent of Davidson's might try to amend the analysis suggested in (1") by stipulating that the various butterings cited in (1") have been performed by John at one and the same time. Consequently, he might claim that the logical form of (1), is more adequately captured by

(1W) (3t)[B(t, John, the toast) AB--in(t, John, the toast, the kitchen) A B-(wi th( t , John, the toast, the knife)] ('B' abbreviates 'Buttered').

or, more generally, by a sentence of the form

(W) (3t)[~(t, x l . . . X ~ ) A O - - M 1 ( t , X l . . . x ~ , yl) A ' ' ' A~)

- Mn(t, X l . . . xn, yn)].

However, this way of analysing action sentences will not do either. If it were correct, it would follow that an action can be uniquely characterized by the triple < agent, action verb, the time of the action >, i.e., that an agent cannot perform two actions of the same kind simultaneously. Yet this claim is surely false. It holds (exclusively) only for actions described by intransitive verbs like 'walks', 'faints', 'jumps', 'sleeps', etc. A more important criticism of (W) is the following: Sentences such as (1) and sentences of the form (W) do not have the same truth conditions. To see this, let us consider a situation in which John, while being angry at Sam, stabs him simultaneously in his chest and in his back, performing the first stabbing with a knife, and the second one with a fork. In a situation like that, the sentence

(2) John stabbed Sam with the knife in his back,


would certainly be false. Yet, by analysing it, in accordance with (W), in terms of:

(2w) (3t)[S(t, John, Sam) ^ S-with(t, John, Sam, the knife) A S- in (t, John, Sam, the back)] ('S' stands for 'Stabbed')

one would be committed to treat it as true. t~ In view of these considerations, I conclude that the simple-minded

proposal fails to capture the logical form of action-sentences.

2.2. Prepositional Modifiers as Predicate Operators

Taking stock of a typical action sentence like:

(1) John butters the toast in the kitchen with the knife,

we see that it also lends itself to a different analysis from that suggested by Davidson. Thus, rather than treating terms like 'in', 'with', 'on', etc., as predicates of some kind, one may treat these terms as predicate operators, or more specifically as action predicate operators. That is, as expressions which, when operating upon action predicates, produce new such predicates. For example, 'in' may be viewed as an operator of degree one, which when applied to a two-place predicate like '(~) butters (~)', yields the three-place predicate '(~) butters ~) in (~)'. Similarly also for 'with'. 'With' may of course also operate upon complex predicates like '(!) butters (~) in (~)' (as in (1)), thus yielding more complex predicates, e.g., '(D butters (~) in t~) with @'. In general, we may say that a predicate operator of degree k generates, when applied to an action predicate of degree n, a complex action predicate of degree n + k. On this account, then, the logical form of an action sentence like (1) would be given by

(1X) Withl(lnl(Butters))[Xh X2, X3, X4].

The question which arises now is whether action sentences parsed, in accordance to (IX), can be given an acceptable semantics which does not commit one to the existence of events. In what follows, I wish to consider two proposals as how this might be done. I shall argue that both of them are inferior to the semantics for action sentences suggested by Davidson.


The First Proposal. One way of constructing a semantics for the likes of (IX) might proceed thus:

Let I be an interpretation consisting of a domain D and a value assignment V which assigns to each individual term an individual in D, and to each simple action-predicate of degree n a subset of D n, i.e., a set of n-tuples of individuals in D. By "simple action predicates" I understand action predicates that do not contain predicate operators as parts.

The semantic value of a complex predicate M k P relative to I may be defined as follows: ( ' M k' represents any predicate operator of degree k)

V ( M k p ) = V ( M k ) [ V(P)]

where V ( M k) is a function from subsets of D" to subsets of D n§ i.e., a function which takes extensions of action predicates as arguments, and yields extensions of complex action predicates as values. Moreover, V ( M k) is subject to the constraint to the effect that:

If (tr, . . . . . tr,, a,+l . . . . . Ct.+k) C V ( M k ) [ V(P)] then (al . . . . . et.) e V (P) .

So for example, if M k and P represent respectively, 'with' and 'butters', then V(Butters) may be taken as the set

{(x, Y) I x butters y}.

And V(With) may be said to assign to V(Butters) the set V(With Butters) = {(x, y, z) I x butters y with z}, such that if (x, y, z) e V(With Butters), then (x, y )e V(Butters).

Finally, we may say that an action sentence M k P ( x l . . . . . xn, xn+l . . . . . X,+k) is true under I iff

( V ( x , ) . . . . . V(x ,+k)) e V ( M k p ) = V ( M k ) [ V(P)].

Notice that by constructing the semantic value of M k p as above, we ensure that M k P ( x l . . . . . x~ . . . . . X,+k) logically implies P(x l . . . . . x .) , and this, of course, gives us the required validation of inferences like:

John buttered the toast in the kitchen with the knife. /.'. John buttered the toast in the kitchen. /.'. John buttered the toast.

However, despite the fact that the proposed semantics for action sentences does not involve an ontic commitment to events, it is


nonetheless inferior to the one suggested by Davidson. Unlike the latter, it has as consequence the counterintuitive result that action sentences preserve truth under substitution of co-extensive predicates. So, for example, it commits us to treat as valid such inferences as:

John walks with his stick (xO(xl walks--= xl whistles)

/.'. John whistles with his stick

('with' is taken here in the sense of 'with the aid of'). To see this, we point out that, on the semantics in question, the following is a logical truth

(N) (xl)~Px, = Qx,] ~ (x,)[M~ -- M~

For when assuming that (xO[Px~ =-Qx~] is true under I, we immediately get that V(P) = V(Q) . And now, since V ( M ~ is a function from subsets of D" to subsets of D" , we also have that V ( M ~ [ V ( P ) ] = V(M~ V( Q)], i.e., V ( M ~ = V(M~ And thus, the consequent of (N) is also true under I.

The Second Proposal. Another semantics for action sentences which also treats prepositional modifiers as operators upon action predicates, but which evades the counterintuit ive result mentioned above, has been suggested by Romane Clark. ~2 Assuming, for simplicity, that we deal only with action sentences containing zero degree predicate operators, ~3 (and abbreviating " M ~ to " M " ) Clark's semantics for the likes of (1X) may be described as follows:

(a)

(b)

Let I be an interpretation consisting of a domain D, and an assignment V, that assigns to each individual term an individual in D, and to each simple action predicate P a subset of D". Next, we introduce a supplementary assignment V' which assigns to each simple action predicate P a set of states of affairs S p. As Clark explains, S v is the set of states of affairs which obtain when the predicate P is truly ascribed to certain n-tuples of individuals in D. The set of all these n-tuples is called by Clark " the satisfaction set of P" , and is designated by him as "SS P''. Also, members of SS v are said to be the cons'tituents in the states of affairs which are members of sP, TM


(c) Suppose now that V' has assigned a set of states of affairs to an action predicate P. Then V ' assigns to a complex predicate MP a set of states of affairs S Me, depending upon S P, and the kind of opera tor M is, such that ssMPc_ SS P. Here, SS MP is the set of n-tuples of individuals that are constituents in the states of affairs that are members of sMP. 15 In other words, we may view the semantic value of M relative to V', i.e., V ' ( M ) , as a function from sets of states of affairs to sets of states of affairs, defined by: V'(M)[SP] = S MP, where s S M P c s s P. Notice the crucial difference between Clark 's semantics and what we have called " the first proposal" . The latter, as remembered , treats the semantic value of M as a function f rom subsets o f D " to subsets o f D ~ (or in the case of a non-zero operator , as function from subsets of D " to subsets of Dn+k).

(d) Lastly, we may say that a sentence MP(Xl . . . . . x,) is true under I , i.e., V ( M P ( x l . . . . , x~) = T if[ (V(Xl) . . . . . V ( x , ) ) e s s M P . 16 Tha t is, M P ( x l . . . . . x , ) is true under i, iff (V(xl) . . . . . V ( x , ) ) is a consti tuent in one of the state of affairs contained in S MP.

Let us see now what Clark 's semantics provides. To begin with, we notice that it gives us a systematic account of how the truth-value of each action sentence depends upon the semantic features of its parts, where these parts are drawn from a finite stock. Secondly, it captures the intuitive validity of inferences of the form MP(Xl . . . . . x,)/ . ' .P(x~ . . . . . x , ) , e.g., John butters the toast with the knife /.'. John butters the toast. For, by clause (d), have that V [ M P ( x l . . . . . xn)] = T iff (V(xl ) . . . . . V ( x , ) ) ~ SS MP. And so, given the stipulation made in (c) which says that SSMPC_SS P, we also have that ( V ( x l ) . . . . . V ( x , ) ) c SS P, i.e., v[e(xl . . . . . X n ) ] = T. Thirdly, unlike " the first proposal" , Clark 's semantics does not have the counterintuit ive consequence that action sentences permit substitution of co-extensive predicates saloa oeritate. That is, it enables us to see why the following

(N) ( x , ) [P(x , ) -- O(Xl)] ~ ( x ) [ M P ( x , ) =-- MQ(Xl)]

is not a logical truth. For by assuming that the antecedent of (N) is true under I , we do get that V ( P ) = V ( Q ) , i.e., SS P = SS ~ But from


this, it neither follows that S P = S ~ nor that S Mp = S M~ nor finally that SS MP= SS M~ And thus, there is no guarantee that the consequent of (N) is true under I.

What then is the price one has to pay for subscribing to a semantics for action sentences like Clark's? What is this price when compared to that required by Davidson's semantics? We see immediately that Clark's semantics presupposes a more complex logical grammar than Davidson's. For, apart from the standard sentence forming constructions of predication negation, conjunction, etc., it also admits of predicate yielding constructions. Secondly, and more importantly, it commits us to an ontology of states of affairs. As a result, the following two questions need to be asked: (a) what sort of entities are states of affairs, and (b) to what extent can Clark's semantics be deemed ontologically more parsimonious than that suggested by Davidson? As for Clark, he does not seem to be particularly worried by these questions. Thus, toward the end of his article, he says, for example:

It may seem captious to criticize Davidson's way with Kenny 's Problem. After all, Davidson requires only standard logic although it is based upon an ontology of events. But we have both urged the adoption of non-standard logical resources and a semantics enlarged with a special domain of states of affairs as well. Isn't then Davidson's way the better way out? The short answer is this: the language which a theory of modifiers formalizes needs (for present at least) to contain no references to events, states of affairs, or, for that matter, truth-values. It is the language which the theory formalizes, and not our semantical discourse about it, which houses our ontology. 17 (my emphasis)

The key claim in this quotation is the one that appears at the end of it. Clark, as we can see, argues here that even though his semantics for action sentences makes crucial reference to states of affairs, he, nonetheless, is not commit ted to the existence of such entities. For what counts, in his view, is only the ontological commitment involved in the object language, i.e., the language for which the particular semantics has been stated. And that language, he claims, need not involve any reference to states of affairs.

I find this way out by Clark quite unconvincing. Clark, after all purports to give us a semantics for action sentences, i.e., a systematic account of their truth-conditions. So, if his theory involves reference to states of affairs, (as it obviously does) then he simply is commit ted to the existence of such entities, whether he likes it or not. But perhaps Clark does espouse an instrumentalistic approach to seman-


tics. Perhaps he holds the view that states of affairs are useful fictions to aid us in the understanding of the semantic properties of action sentences. In that case, however, I do not see why one who wishes to analyse action sentences in a Davidsonian manner cannot say the same thing about events. The quite remarkable difference between these two alternatives in case neither "state of affairs" nor "even t " are understood referentially is that the Davidsonian semantics seems much simpler than the Clarkian one.

Note further that it will not do to reduce a state of affairs, as this has recently been suggested by Terence Horgan, 18 to an ordered pair (P*, (al . . . . . a,)), where P* is the extension of the predicate P, and (•1 . . . . . an) is an n-tuple of individuals belonging to this extension. Hence, S e = { ( P * , ( a l . . . . . ~n))l ( a l . . . . . an) ~ P*}. If accepted, such a move would undermine the very motivation for introducing states of affairs to capture the intensional aspect of action sentences, in the sense that they do not permit substitution of co-extensive predicates s a l v a v e r i t a t e . For, given that P and Q are any such two co-extensive predicates, we would immediately have that S P = S ~

and hence also that S Me = S ~ ~ and that S S ~ e = S S ~ ~ And thus, we would again be committed to treat

(N) ( x l ) [ P x ~ =-- Q x ~ ] D ( x l ) [ M P x l - - M Q x ~ ]

as a logical truth. The conclusion which emerges so far is that Clark's semantics for

action sentences, though apparently more complicated, cannot be deemed ontologically more parsimonious than Davidson's. I shall now show that it is also inferior to the latter in regard to explanatory power. Consider thus again an action sentence of the form

(X) M ~ M 2 , . . . , M , - I M , P x l ,

where M~ . . . . . M, are prepositional modifiers. Clark points out, and here I completely agree with him, that an adequate semantics for action sentences should not only account for the validity of the inference from (X) to

(Y) M I M 2 , . . . , M , - l P x l

but also for the validity of the inference from (X) to

(Z) M 1 M z . . . . , M , , M . _ , P x ,


e.g., John buttered the toast in the kitchen with a knife

/.'. John buttered the toast with a knife, in the kitchen.

He says that such an inference is justified by what he calls " the permutat ion principle for operators" . 19 Unfortunately, nothing in Clark's semantics for action sentences seems to guarantee the formal validity of this inference. This is so because on the basis of what Clark has told us, we have no reason to suppose that S M'M2P = S M2M'P, and hence also that SS M,M2P = SS tvt2M~P. Thus M1MzPx may be true under I, without M2MIPx being true under I. Now Davidson, as opposed to Clark, does not have any difficulties in validating the inference under consideration. For, on his analysis, the move from M~MzPx to MzMIPx, i.e., the move from

(3e)[P(e, x) A Ml(e) A Mz(e)]

t o

(::le)[ P( e, x) A Mz( e) ^ Ml(e)]

is justified by the most elementary rules of inference of first order predicate logic.

In view of these considerations, I conclude that Clark's semantics for action sentences, though no doubt preferable to what we have called " the first proposal", is nevertheless significantly inferior to the semantics for action sentences put forward by Davidson. 2~

3. D A V I D S O N ' S A N A L Y S I S O F A C T I O N S E N T E N C E S

U N D E R A T T A C K

Having drawn attention to the difficulties involved in providing an analysis of action sentences which may be deemed as good as that suggested by Davidson, let us focus once more upon this latter analysis and examine it more closely. A central feature of Davidson's analysis which immediately attracts one's attention is its t reatment of prepositional modifiers as predicates of events. This move, together with the idea of construing action verbs as involving an extra-place for an event variable did, as remembered, enable Davidson to give a seemingly attractive account of the logical form of action sentences, and was among his main considerations for adopting an event ontology. In what follows, I wish to consider an important criticism


that one might raise against this way of modifiers.

treating prepositional

3.1. The Redescription Problem

In his article 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences' , Davidson draws a distinction between prepositional modifiers on the one hand, and adverbs of manner like 'slowly', 'fast', etc., on the other hand. The latter, claims Davidson, cannot be treated as predicates of events. 22 And so, a sentence like

(1) John buttered the toast slowly,

even though it entails the sentence

(2) John buttered the toast,

cannot, in his view, be analysed as

(1D) (3e)[B(e, John, the toast) ^ Slow(e)].

Davidson explains his motivation for not wanting to treat the likes of 'slow' as predicates of events as follows:

[Suppose that] Susan says, "I crossed the Channel in fifteen hours," "Good grief, that was slow." . . . But what was slow, what does " that" refer to? . . . . Now Susan adds, "But I swam," "Good grief, that was fast." We do not withdraw the claim that it was a slow crossing; this is consistent with its being a fast swimming. Here we have enough to show, I think, that we cannot construe "I t was a slow crossing" as "it was slow and it was a crossing" since the crossing may also be a swimming that was not slow, in which case we would have "I t was slow and it was a crossing and it was a swimming and it was not slow. The problem is not peculiar to actions, however, it appears equally when we try to explain the logical role of attributive adjectives in "Grundy was a short basketball player, but a tall man. ''2a

As we can see, Davidson's reason for not being willing to treat adverbs of manner in the same way as he treats prepositional modifiers, is that the former apply to an event only under a given description. Thus, what might be true of an event el, when described as a crossing (say, that it was slow), need not be true of it, when that event is redescribed as a swimming. Here "redescr ibed" is taken in the Davidsonian sense, that is,

(ID1) If an agent A does x by doing y, then his doing y may be


redescribed as "his doing x", i.e., A's doing x = A's doing y, 24

where, 'A does x' and 'A does y' may be taken as schematic for action sentences like: 'A crossed the Channel ' , and 'A swam the Channel ' .

However, this partial attitude displayed by Davidson towards adverbs of manner does not seem to be justified. For one can show that prepositional modifiers too apply sometimes to an event only under a given description. To see this, let us consider a situation in which John blows up a house with dynamite, and where, in view of the fact that he does this by pushing a certain button, his action of pushing the button may be redescribed as his blowing up the house. Treating 'with' as a predicate of events, we get, on Davidson's analysis, that

(3D) (:le)(::lf)[Blowing up(e, John, the house) A With(e, dynamite) ^ Pushing([, John, the button) ^ e = f].

However, (3D) entails:

(4D) (: lf)[Pushing(f, John, the button) A With(/ , dynamite)],

That is, John pushed the button with dynamite, which is false. For, obviously, John did not push the button with dynamite. To take another example involving 'with', suppose that John kills Jim with a revolver, by pulling the trigger. Again, by treating 'with' as a predicate of events we obtain

(5D) ( 3 e ) ( 3 f ) [ K i l l i n g ( e , John, Jim) ^ With(e, the revolver) A Pulling(/, John, the trigger) A e = f ] .

But from (5D) it follows that

(6D) (:If)[Pulling(f, John, the trigger) ^ With(f , the revolver)],

that is, John pulled the trigger with the revolver, which, of course, is patently false. 25

Notice that the difficulty here does not only arise in the case of 'with', but applies to other prepositions as well. Thus, e.g., John's writing "idiot" on the wall may sometimes by redescribed as his annoying Jim. But, surely, John did not annoy Jim on the wall. In a similar vein, Idi Amin's act of escaping to Libya, may be redescribed as his saving his life. Yet, it seems nonsensical to say that Idi Amin saved his life to Libya.


3.2. Three Rejoinders to the Redescription Problem

There are a number of ways in which a defender of Davidson might try to evade what we have called "the redescription problem".

(R0 He might argue that the foregoing examples do not prove that Davidson's analysis of action sentences is incorrect. Rather what they do show is only that certain sentences in Davidson's canonical language may not be translated back into English in the way they have been done above. So, for example, a sentence like

(6D) (::If)[Pulling(f, John, the trigger) ^ With(f, the revolver)]

should not be translated back into English as:

(6) John pulled the trigger with the revolver.

In this connection, the defender of Davidson might remind us of a familiar fact about formalization, which is that when moving from a natural language to a formalized language, and then performing certain logical operations on the level of the latter, we cannot always expect each sentence in the formalized language to be translatable back into English in a straightforward manner. This, for example, seems to happen with a sentence like

(3e)[With(e, the knife)]

(which, as we can see, lacks a natural English reading) and the same might also be the case with the likes of (4D) or (6D). 26

Unfortunately, this rejoinder to the redescription problem is inadequate. Ignoring for a moment the question of whether or not we were justified in translating a sentence like (6D) back into English, in terms of (6), let us ask the proponent of (R1) what, in his view, would be a proper Davidsonian analysis of (6)? Here the only plausible reply we could get is that it is (6D). And now, since this false sentence, follows on the Davidsonian analysis, from an allegedly true premiss, namely, (5D), something must be wrong with that analysis.

(R2) Another way of evading the redescription problem would be to try to give an alternative analysis of action sentences which would do justice to the description-relative nature of prepositional modifiers. That is, a defender of Davidson might suggest that prepositional modifiers be construed as


attributive adjectives: a suggestion which is similar to that made by Davidson with respect to the likes of 'slow' and 'fast'.

Of course, if such a proposal is to be taken seriously, then its proponent owes us some semantical account of how attributive adjectives work. An account he might try to appeal to in this connection is one that has been recently suggested by Samuel Wheeler. 27 Ac- cording to Wheeler, the logical form of a sentence like

(7) X is an A ' F ,

('A*' being schematic for an attributive adjective, and 'F ' being schematic for a predicate) is given by

(7RE) A*(x, .fc(Fx)) ̂ Fx,

read informally as "x is A* relative to all F 's and x is an F" . Thus for example, the sentence

(8) x is a tall man,

is rendered, on Wheeler's analysis, as

(8R2) Tall(x, ~(is a man)) ^ x is a man. 28

Analogously, the proponent of (RE) might propose that sentences like

(9) e is a slow buttering of the toast by John, (10) e is a buttering of the toast by John with the knife,

be, respectively, analysed in terms of

(9R2) Slow(e, ~(B(e, John, the toast)))A B(e, John, the toast), ( 'B' abbreviates 'Buttering')

(10RE) With(e, the knife, ~(B(e, John, the toast))) A B(e, John, the toast).

As a result, the complete analysis of an action sentence like

(11) John buttered the toast slowly with the knife,

would, in his view, by the following:

(11R2) (::le)[ B( e, John, the toast)^Slow(e, ~(B(e, John, the toast))) ^ With(e, the knife, ~(B(e, John, the toast)))].

286 D A V I D W 1 D E R K E R

However, the proposed analysis of the likes of (9), (10) and (11) is inadequate. The reason for this is that it commits us to treat as valid as inference-form such as

(X~) All F-ings are G-ings, and conversely. /.'. M - Fx iff M - Gx

(where ' F ' and ' G ' are schematic for action verbs, and 'M ' stands for a prepositional modifier or an adverb of manner).

However, (Xt) seems invalid. For example, even though each hitting might be a punishing and conversely, it need not be true that John hit Jim hard iff he punished him hard. 29 Also, assuming, for a moment, that each pushing of a a button is a blowing up of a house (and conversely), one would have to conclude, if (X1) were valid, that if John blew up the house with dynamite, he also pushed the botton with dynamite. However, it is precisely this latter result that the proponent of (R2) has sought to avoid.

(R3) A final strategy that might be adopted by a defender of Davidson's analysis of action sentences in order to evade the redescription problem is the following: While insisting upon treating prepositional phrases as predicates of events, he might claim that he does not concur with Davidson's method of redescribing actions as it is expressed in (1D1).

So, for example, the proponent of (R3) need not grant the assumption (made by the objector) that John's action of pushing a button may sometimes be redescribed as his blowing up of a house, or that John's action of pulling the trigger may be sometimes redescribed as his killing Jim. As a result, when elaborating, e.g., upon the "pulling the trigger example" mentioned earlier, the proponent of (R3) might claim that it is simply not correct to describe the latter, as this has been done above, in terms of

(SD) (3e)(3f)[Killing(e, John, Jim) ^ With(e, revolver) ^ Pulling(f, John, the trigger) ^ e = f] ,

Rather, what one can say is only something like

(5D') (3e)[Killing(e, John, Jim) n With(e, the revolver] ^ (=lf)[Pulling(f, John the trigger)]

which, as opposed to (5D), does not imply the problematic sentence

, A C T I O N S E N T E N C E S 287

(6D) (3f) [Pul l ing(f , John, the trigger) ^ With(f , the revolver)],

that is, John pulled the tr igger with the revolver. This rejoinder seems, indeed, to fend off the redescription problem.

It has however one drawback, which is that it is incompatible with some of Davidson 's views concerning action individuation. It is, for instance, hard to see how the proponent of (R3) can stick to what he says, and yet at the same time be able to make sense of quotations like:

"'l didn' t know it was loaded" belongs to one standard pattern of excuse. I do not deny that I pointed the gun and pulled the trigger, nor that I shot the victim. My ignorance explains how it happened that I pointed the gun and pulled the trigger intentionally, but did not shoot the victim intentionally. That the bullet pierced the victim was a consequence of my pointing the gun and pulling the trigger. It is clear that these are two different events, since one began slightly after the other. But what is the relation between my pointing the gun and pulling the trigger, and my shooting the victim? The natural and, I think, correct answer is that the relation is that of identity. 3~ (My emphasis) I flip the switch, turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknowst to me I also alert a prowler to the fact that I am home. Here I do not do four things, but only one, of which [our descriptions have been gioen. 3~ (My emphasis)

However , the proponent of (R3) need not be troubled by this objection. He might, indeed, concede that when proposing a theory of logical form of action sentences which involves quantification over actions, one must sooner or later come to grips with the question of action-individuation. But this issue, he might contend, need not be dealt with necessarily in a Davidsonian manner . The relation, he might say, between John 's action of pulling the trigger and John 's killing Jim, need not be viewed (as it is by Davidson) as that of identity. It can, as Alvin Goldman proposes, be construed as that of causal generat ion. Or, as suggested by Judith Jarvis Thomson , it can be viewed as a par t -whole relation. 32 Thus, unless one can show that Davidson ' s view as to the relation between the two actions in question is the only plausible one, the redescription problem cannot be deemed a fatal object ion to Davidson 's analysis of action sentences.

3.3. A Suggestion for an Alternative Way of Analysing Action Sentences

The ideal way of resolving the redescription problem, f rom a strictly Davidsonian point of view would, of course, consist in suggesting an


analysis of action sentences which, while compatible with Davidson's thesis (ID1), would not be vulnerable to the objection from redescription. In my opinion, such an analysis can be given, and in what follows I wish to indicate what form it might take:

The main elements of the kind of solution I have in mind have already been presented earlier (see p. 274) when we elaborated upon the possibility of giving an analysis of action sentences which does not involve quantification over events. Among the various proposals we have considered, in this connection, was one which said that action sentences like

(1) John buttered the toast in the kitchen with the knife,

should be treated as existential quantifications over times with prepositional modifiers functioning, not as predicates of events, but as unanalysed parts of action verbs. That is,

(1W) (3t)[B(t , John, the toast) A B - l n ( t , John, the toast, the kitchen)^ B-wi th ( t , John, the toast, the knife)] ( 'B' abbreviates 'Buttered').

Now, though finally we came to reject this analysis for the reason that it did not capture the fact conveyed by (1) that one single action has been performed by the agent on the occasion in question, it was clear that in all the other respects (IW) was not inferior to the analysis proposed by Davidson. That being so, my proposal for an alternative analysis of action sentences which is compatible with Davidson's thesis (1D1) is tile following: Simply replace the time variable 't ' featuring (1W) by one which ranges over events (actions) and leave every- thing else as it is. The analysis we then end up with is the following:

(1WD) (3e)[B(e, John, the toast)A B - i n ( e , John, the toast, the kitchen) A B-wi th (e , John, the toast, the knife)] ( 'B' abbreviates 'Buttering'),

or, more generally,

(WD) (=le)[l~(e, xl . . . . . x,) A ~-- Ml(e, Xl . . . . . x,,, YO,. . . , A - - M , , ( e , Xl . . . . . x , , , yn)],

where 'gt' is schematic for gerundive nominalizations of action verbs, e.g., 'Buttering', and ' M / , . . . . 'M, ' , represent prepositional modifiers.

What remains to be shown is that the above analysis enables us,


indeed, to subscribe to Davidson's thesis (1D0, without committing us to such absurd consequences as:

(6) John pulled the trigger with the revolver.

To see this, consider again the situation where John kills Jim with his revolver by pulling the trigger. Describing this situation in terms of our new proposal, we get that

(5WD) (3e)(3f)[Killing(e, John, Jim)6 Kill ing-with(e, John, Jim, the revolver) n Pulling(f, John, the trigger) 6 e = f]

that is,

(7WD)

that is,

(3e)(3f)[e is a killing of Jim by John n e is a killing of Jim by John with the revolver n f is a pulling of the trigger by John A e = f].

And now we see that (5WD), rather than entailing the problematic sentence (6), i.e.,

(6WD) (::lf)[Pulling(f, John, the trigger) A Pull ing-with(f , John, the trigger, the revolver)],

only entails a sentence like

(3f)[Pulling(f, John, the trigger)A Killing(f, John, Jim)A Kil l ing- with(John, Jim, the revolver)],

( 3 f ) [ f is a pulling of the trigger by John ^ f is a killing of Jim by John n f is a killing of Jim by John, with the revolver].

And, given the truth of (ID1), this sentence does not sound problematic at all. 33

N O T E S

* I would like to thank Eddy Zemach , Jonathan Stavi, Julius Moravcsik and Dov Gabbay for some very good discussions on the logical form of action sentences. Also, I am indebted to an anonymous referee of Erkenntnis for some very helpful commen t s on an earlier draft of this paper. t See his 0 9 6 7 ) 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences ' , in N. Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, Pittsburgh Universi ty Press, Pit tsburgh, pp. 81-95,


reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1980), pp. 105-22. 2 See his (1973) 'Action and Reaction', Inquiry 13, 144--46, and (1973) 'Radical Interpretation', Dielectica 27, 320, reprinted in his Inquiries into Truth and Inter- pretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1984), pp. 125-39. 3 Davidson, 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', p. 82. 4 Ibid., p. 83. 5 Ibid., p. 83. Kenny discusses this problem in his book Action, Emotion and Will, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, (1963, chap. VII). 6 See Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, p. 156. 7 Davidson, 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', p. 92. 8 Note also that, in view of the fact that in English the number of simple action verbs and prepositions is finite, the number of action predicates of the form ' M - O ' (where 'M' represents a preposition, and '~' represents a simple action verb) is finite too. 9 Davidson, 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', p. 83. io Here I am indebted to Jonathan Stavi. 11 This proof can be easily generalized to predicates and predicate operators of any desired degree. 12 Romane Clark: 1970, 'Concerning the Logic of Predicate Modifiers', Nous 4, 311-35. 13 As an example of a zero degree modifier we may, pace Davidson, use a term like 'slowly', or 'rapidly'. 14 Ibid., p. 331. A state of affairs according to Clark, is an entity designated by the expression ' t h a t - i" e P/ , meaning that i n exemplifies some attribute the extension of which is pj, where i n is an n~-tuple of individuals, and pj is a set of such n-tuples. 15 Ibid., p. 331. 16 Ibid., p. 332. 17 Ibid., p. 335. 18 Terence Horgan: 1978, 'The Case Against Events', The Philosophical Review 87, 45-47. 19 See Clark, 'Concerning the Logic of Predicate Modifiers', p. 322. 2o In this paper, I did not contrast Davidson's account of action sentences with a Montague-type treatment of the latter, as suggested by R. Thomason and R. C Stalnaker: 1973, 'A Semantic Theory of Adverbs', Linguistic Inquiry 4, 195-220. However, a close look at the Thomason-Stalnaker proposal reveals that it presupposes a more complex logical grammar than Davidson's. And because of its commitment to possible words, it also cannot be deemed ontologicaUy more parsimonious than David- son's proposal. 21 For an account of the logical form of action sentences which elegantly combines the operator approach to prepositional modifiers with Davidson's event approach to action sentences, see Terence Parson's 1980, 'Modifiers and Quantifiers in Natural Language', Canadian Journal of Philosophy supplement Vol. 6, pp. 29-60. 22 Davidson, 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', p. 82. 23 Ibid., p. 82. 24 For Davidson's defense of this thesis see his (1971) article 'Agency', in R. Binkley et al. (ed.), Agent Action and Reason, Toronto University Press, Toronto, pp. 18-25, reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events op. eit., pp. 43-61).


25 Cf., Michael Cohen: 1969-70, 'The Same Action', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, p. 78. For similar counterexamples to Davidson's analysis, see also Alvin Goldman: 1971, 'The lndividuation of Action', The Journal of Philosophy 68, 763, and J. J. Thomson, 'Individuating Actions', ibid., pp. 774-79. To my knowledge, the first one to raise the redescription problem was John Wallace in his unpublished article 'On What's Happening'. 26 This way of trying to meet the redescription objection has been brought to my attention by Eddy Zemach. 27 Samuel C. Wheeler III: 1973, 'Attributives and Their Modifiers', NoR 6, 310-24. 28 /bid., pp. 315-16. 29 Needless to say, all these counterexamples to (X1) presuppose the truth of (1D1). 3o Davidson, 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', p. 84. 3~ Donald Davidson: 1963, 'Action, Reasons and Causes', The Journal of Philosophy 60, 686. 32 Alvin Goldman: 1970, A Theory of Human Action, Prentice Hall, pp. 20-24: Judith Jarvis Thomson: 1971, 'The Time of a Killing', The Journal of Philosophy 68, 115-32. 33 For Davidson's most recent attempt to deal with the redescription problem, see his "Adverbs of Action," in Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka, eds. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985), pp. 237-240. In this paper, Davidson also comes to the conclusion that to avoid the redescription problem, he would have to modify his original analysis of action sentences.

Manuscript submitted 9 April 1986 Final version received 13 May 1987

Department of Philosophy University of Notre Dame and Bar-Ilan University Ramat-Gan Israel

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Action sentences