Accountability and Human Rights:

The Political Impact of National Human Rights Institutions in New

Democracies

Dr Thomas PegramUniversity College London

29 April 2014

Global Diffusion of NHRIs

19601965

19701975

19801985

19901995

20002008

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

AfricaAmericasAsia-PacificArab groupEurope

Year

Nu

mb

er

of

NH

RIs

A Typology of Human Rights Ombudsmen

CountryYear

created Nomenclature

Guatemala 1985 National Human Rights Prosecutor

Mexico 1990 National Commission of Human Rights

Honduras 1990National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights

Colombia 1991 National Human Rights Ombudsman

El Salvador 1991 National Human Rights Prosecutor

Costa Rica 1992 National Human Rights Ombudsman

Paraguay 1992 National Human Rights Ombudsman

Argentina 1993 National Human Rights Ombudsman

Peru 1993 National Human Rights Ombudsman

Bolivia 1994 National Human Rights Ombudsman

Nicaragua 1995National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights

Ecuador 1996 National Human Rights Ombudsman

Panama 1996 National Human Rights Ombudsman

Venezuela 1999 National Human Rights Ombudsman

Chile 2009 National Human Rights Institute

Accountability functionAccountability actors

Hypotheses on the effectiveness of accountability agencies

General hypotheses:

Accountability actors are more likely to be effective when:

Legal status Established in legislation or the constitution

IndependenceFormal guarantees of de jure independence to safeguards de facto autonomy in performance of functions

Capabilities (incl. funding)

Equipped with protective and promotive capabilities to achieve their goals through direct or indirect governance modes

FocalityThey are focal within the relevant issue-area

EntrepreneurshipLeadership and organizational structure encourages policy entrepreneurship

Venezuela

Peru

Paraguay

Panama

Nicaragua

Mexico

Honduras

Guatemala

El Salvador

Ecuador

Costa Rica

Colombia

Bolivia

Argentina

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

$36.9

$15.6

$2.3

$3.8

$1.4

$85.5

$2.9

$13.5

$8.6

$7

$9

$121.9

$4.8

$20.9

Budget (U.S. $ millions)

Formal design: independence and capabilities of HROs in Latin America

CA

PAB

ILIT

IES

INDEPENDENCE

Four Modes of Governance(Abbott & Snidal 2014)

Orchestrator → Intermediary → Target

Four Modes of Human Rights Governance

(O) Human Rights → Intermediary → (T) Government Ombudsman

Principal-Agent Theory (and its limitations)

Limitations:

• International actors (additional principals)

• Principal “moral hazard” (Miller 2005)

• Collective principals (goal divergence)

• Selection effects as ex post control

• Feedback effects & “virtuous” agency slack

Hypotheses on the effectiveness of accountability agencies

HRO-specific hypotheses

HROs are more likely to be effective when:

Goal divergenceThere is divergence of goals among government actors

State oversightGovernment principals have weak institutional control mechanisms

Engagement with International bodies

Cooperation is developed, formalized and maintained with international organisations

Intermediary availability

Intermediaries with correlated goals and complementary capabilities are available

Local salience of issue-area norms

Global norms resonate in local context and are responsive to specificities

Supportive background norms

Legal traditions; presence of credible, routinized and stable rule of law frameworks

A Typology of Human Rights Ombudsmen

Human rights defender

Institutional bridge

Façade Regime proxy