Accompanying document final final edit rev - Wählen Sie …ec.europa.eu/.../files/accompanying-document-evaluation-insc-2007... · Evaluation of the implementation of the INSC Regulation

Evaluation of the implementation of the INSC Regulation in the period 2007 - 2013

Page 1 of 58

Accompanying document to the

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION

TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL,

ON THE EVALUATION

OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE COUNCIL REGULATION (EURATOM) No 300/2007

(INSTRUMENT FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY COOPERATION)

IN THE PERIOD 2007 - 2013

Prepared by:

Jan VRIJEN , Neale KELLY, Maurice LEROY, Isidro LOPEZ ARCOS

March 2014

C&T

The contents of the present report do not necessarily reflect the official views, opinions or policies of DG Aidco

of the European Commission. The opinions and conclusions contained within the report represent the views of

the individual authors only.


Page 2 of 58


Page 3 of 58

Table of Contents

1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 7

2 INSC PROGRAMME AND IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY ....................................... 7

2.1 INSC purpose and objectives .................................................................................................. 7

2.2 INSC Strategy .......................................................................................................................... 8

2.3 Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes ..................................................................................... 9

2.4 Annual Action Programmes .................................................................................................. 10

2.5 Programme management ....................................................................................................... 10

3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA .................................................................................................. 10

4 DEVELOPMENTS BY SECTOR ................................................................................................ 13

4.1 Strengthening Regulatory Authorities and their Technical Support Organisations .............. 13

4.1.1 Objectives and priorities ................................................................................................ 13

4.1.2 Evaluation of programme scope and content against objectives and priorities ............. 14

4.1.3 Coordination with activities undertaken under the Instrument for Stability ................. 18

4.1.4 Programme management in the Regulatory Area .......................................................... 19

4.2 Support to increase safety of nuclear facilities ...................................................................... 19

4.2.1 Russian Federation ........................................................................................................ 20

4.2.2 Armenia ......................................................................................................................... 20

4.2.3 Ukraine .......................................................................................................................... 21

4.2.4 Latin America ................................................................................................................ 21

4.2.5 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 22

4.3 Safety of nuclear material and radioactive waste management ............................................. 22


4.3.2 Evaluation of the development of the programme against its criteria and priorities ..... 22

4.4 Accounting and control of fissile materials ........................................................................... 26

4.5 Off-site emergency preparedness .......................................................................................... 27


4.5.2 Evaluation of programme scope and content against objectives and priorities ............. 27

4.6 Participation in international funds ....................................................................................... 27

4.7 Promoting international cooperation to achieve a high level nuclear safety culture ............. 28

4.7.1 IAEA ............................................................................................................................. 28

4.7.2 G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group ......................................................................... 30

5 DEVELOPMENTS BY REGION ................................................................................................. 30

5.1 ENP East and Central Asia .................................................................................................... 32

5.1.1 ENP East ........................................................................................................................ 32

5.1.2 Central Asia ................................................................................................................... 33

5.2 ENP South and Middle East .................................................................................................. 34

5.2.1 Middle East .................................................................................................................... 34

5.2.2 ENP South ..................................................................................................................... 35

5.3 Latin America ........................................................................................................................ 36

5.4 South East Asia ..................................................................................................................... 37

5.5 Mongolia and China .............................................................................................................. 39

5.6 Africa ..................................................................................................................................... 40

6 EVALUATION OF THE INSC PROGRAMME FOR 2007 - 2013 ............................................ 40

6.1 Comprehensiveness of the INSC Programme in terms of thematic and geographical scope 40

6.2 Balance between neighbourhood and third countries ............................................................ 43


Page 4 of 58

6.3 Duration of implementation .................................................................................................. 43

6.4 Major achievements .............................................................................................................. 44

6.5 Impact .................................................................................................................................... 45

6.6 Sustainability ......................................................................................................................... 45

6.7 Implementation difficulties; lessons learned ......................................................................... 46

7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 47

Annexes Annex A – Details on (Lots of) projects as approved in the various AAPs of the INSC

programme 2007 – 2013

Annex B – INSC highlights:

* Training and Tutoring of Nuclear Regulators and their TSOs

* Support to Regulatory Authorities in Belarus

* Stress Tests and Extreme Events

* Integrated EIA and FS of high priority uranium legacy sites in Uzbekistan

Abbreviations

AAP Annual Action Programme

ABACC The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

AFCONE African Commission on Nuclear Energy

ANPP Armenian Nuclear Power Reactor

ANSN Asian Nuclear Safety Network

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

ASEANTOM Asian Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CFE The operator of the Laguna Verde NPP in Mexico

CoC Code of Conduct

CGULS Coordination Group on Uranium Legacy Support

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CNSNS The nuclear regulator of Mexico

CSF Chernobyl Shelter Fund

CSN Nuclear regulator of Spain

DEVCO Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation EuropeAid

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EC European Commission

EEAS European External Action Service

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy countries

ENSREG European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group

EP&R Emergency Preparedness and Response

EU European Union

EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community

FA Financing Agreement

FAFA Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement

FSU Former Soviet Union

GNSSN Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network

GW GigaWatt

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IfS Instrument for Stability

ININ The institute responsible for the management of radioactive waste in Mexico

INSC Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation

IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession

ISSC International Seismic Safety Centre


Page 5 of 58

JMU Joint Management Unit

JNRC Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission

JSO Joint Support Office

KWU Kraft Werk Union

LILW Low and Intermediate Level Waste

MIP Multi-annual Indicative Programme

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MW MegaWatt

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

NSA Nuclear Safety Account

NNSA Chinese Nuclear Safety Administration

NSSG Nuclear Safety and Security Group

OSA On-Site Assistance

OSART Operational Safety Review Team (IAEA)

PHARE Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Reconstruction their Economics

PHWR Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor

PIP Plant Improvement Project

RAMG Regulatory Authorities Management Group

RCF Regulatory Cooperation Forum

RELEX (Directorate-General for) External Relations

SARS Safety Assessment of Radioactive Waste Disposal Sites

SEA South-East Asia

SMRC Site Monitoring and Reporting Contractor

TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth Independent States

ToR Terms of Reference

TS Technical Specifications

TSO Technical Support Organisation

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

Unicef United Nations Children’s Fund

US(A) United States (of America)

USSR Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

VVER/WWER Voda Vodjanoi Energetitsjeski Reactor (Russian PWR)


Page 6 of 58


Page 7 of 58

1 INTRODUCTION

The Nuclear Safety component of the TACIS programme1 started in 1991 as a priority area for

assistance to the nuclear facilities in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries. It was followed in

2007 by a new Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) with global coverage. This INSC

was established in Council Regulation No. 300/20072 for the period 2007 – 2013.

During the TACIS Nuclear Safety Programme (1991 – 2006), 857 MEuro was spent on hundreds of

projects in various technical and administrative areas to improve nuclear safety in the FSU (mainly the

Russian Federation and Ukraine).

In implementing the INSC programme (2007 – 2013), 492 MEuro was approved for more than 100

different cooperation projects in 21 different countries to improve nuclear safety.

This report summarises an evaluation by external experts of the implementation of the INSC

Regulation, of its evolution in the years 2007 – 2013 and of its impact on nuclear safety and safety

culture in the cooperating countries.

2 INSC PROGRAMME AND IMPLEMENTATION

METHODOLOGY

2.1 INSC purpose and objectives In 2006, a nuclear “renaissance” was underway, with several countries (e.g. Morocco, Jordan, Egypt,

Chile, Venezuela, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.) planning to include nuclear in their energy mix. Many of

these countries lacked sufficient nuclear infrastructure and their nuclear safety culture was not

sufficiently developed. This represented a big challenge for the International Community. Taking into

account the experience acquired under TACIS and other developments, the European Commission,

following discussions with the EU Member States and international organisations, proposed to include

‘third countries’ (non-EU Member States or accession countries) in a new Nuclear Safety Programme,

the INSC. This recognised that the EU’s accumulated experience in providing specific nuclear safety

assistance, as applied within the Phare3 programme to the former Eastern-European countries and

within the TACIS programme to the countries of the FSU, could be instrumental and beneficial in

assisting other countries. Accordingly, the Council Regulation No 30/2007, the Nuclear Safety

Strategy COM (2008) 312, and the Council Conclusions of 9 December 2008 widened the scope of

nuclear safety cooperation to include all third countries, with some exceptions (i.e. countries covered

by the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and developed countries).

The main objectives of the INSC Regulation were:

1. Promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture at all levels, in particular through:

(i) continuous support for regulatory bodies, technical support organisations, and the

reinforcement of the regulatory framework, notably concerning licensing activities,

(ii) drawing notably on the experience of the operators, on site and external assistance

programmes as well as consulting and related activities aiming at safety improvements

of the design, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants that are currently

licensed and other existing nuclear installations so that high safety levels can be

achieved,

1 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) is the European Commission programme to assist 12

countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) and Mongolia in their transition to democratic market-oriented economies. 2 Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 300/2007. 3 The Phare programme was created in 1989 by the EU as the Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring of their Economics.

Later it was expanded to a pre-accession instrument for ten Central and Eastern European countries. This instrument covered also

assistance to these countries concerning nuclear safety and environmental issues associated with radiation protection for the

general public.


Page 8 of 58

(iii) support for the safe transport, treatment and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and

radioactive waste, and

(iv) the development and implementation of strategies for decommissioning existing

installations and the remediation of former nuclear sites;

2. Promotion of effective regulatory frameworks, procedures and systems to ensure adequate

protection against ionising radiation from radioactive materials, in particular from highly active

radioactive sources, and their safe disposal;

3. Establishment of the necessary regulatory framework and methodologies for the implementation

of nuclear safeguards, including the proper accounting and control of fissile materials at State and

operators level;

4. Establishment of effective arrangements for the prevention of accidents with radiological

consequences, as well as the mitigation of such consequences should they occur, and for

emergency-planning, preparedness and response, civil protection and rehabilitation measures;

5. Measures to promote international cooperation (including in the framework of relevant

international organisations, notably IAEA) in the above fields, including the implementation and

monitoring of international Conventions and Treaties, exchange of information and training and

research.

2.2 INSC Strategy The activities of INSC were implemented by the European Commission Services (DEVCO) by

centralised management. The Commission Services developed a Multi-annual Strategy4 for the period

2007 – 2013 for implementing the INSC Regulation compliant with its objectives.

This Strategy Document covered the Community cooperation objectives, policy response and priority

fields of cooperation. It was initially based on a thorough assessment of the policy agenda and

situation with regard to nuclear safety in the CIS, with the aim of extending it to other countries during

the period 2007 – 2013.

Priority areas were:

1. Promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture at all levels.

2. Improvement of the design, operation and maintenance of nuclear installations.

3. Nuclear waste management, decommissioning and remediation of former nuclear sites.

4. Safety and accountability of nuclear materials.

5. Emergency preparedness.

6. Contributing to relevant EU-supported international initiatives

Additionally, the programme should make provisions for measures to promote international

cooperation in the above fields with relevant organisations, notably the IAEA.

For the period 2010 – 2013, the Strategy was revised5, based on the Commission’s Communication on

addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security6 and subsequent discussions and

conclusions of the Council, as well as exploratory missions conducted during 2008 and 2009 to

identify priority geographical areas for intervention. In its conclusions of 9 December 2008 on

assistance to third countries in the field of nuclear safety and security, the Council considered that the

granting of Community assistance should be based on fulfilment of certain criteria, including:

- an interested third country should send the Commission a formal request, committing its

Government, in order to obtain EU assistance in the field of nuclear safety and security;

4 Commission Decision C(2007)3758 of 1 August 2007. 5 Commission Decision C(2009)9822 of 8 December 2009. 6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Addressing the international challenge of

nuclear safety and security”, COM (2008) 312 final, Brussels, 22.5.2008.


Page 9 of 58

- the geographical proximity to the EU is an important, but non-exclusive, criterion;

- third countries wishing to benefit from Community assistance should fully subscribe to

the principles of non-proliferation; they should also be parties to the relevant conventions,

within the framework of the IAEA, on nuclear safety and security or have taken steps

demonstrating a firm undertaking to accede to them;

- in the case of countries which wish to develop nuclear generating capacity and for which

the issue arises of intervention at the appropriate moment to ensure that a nuclear safety

and security culture is fostered in parallel with the development of the nuclear generating

programme, especially as regards strengthening the regulatory authorities and technical

support organisations. For such countries the credibility of the nuclear development

programme and the drawing up a preliminary road map were key criteria.

The revised Strategy for the period 2010 – 2013 defined the following priority thematic areas for

assistance:

1. support to nuclear regulators;

2. support to nuclear operators;

3. safety improvement in design, operation and maintenance of nuclear installations;

4. safety of nuclear material and radioactive waste management;

5. accounting and control of fissile materials;

6. off-site emergency preparedness;

7. participation in international funds, and

8. measures to promote international cooperation.

The projects were prioritised on the basis of need and degree of urgency. The establishment and

strengthening of regulatory bodies in countries which had decided to develop nuclear generating

capacity and which had a credible nuclear programme gained increased relevance.

Co-financing by the beneficiaries was encouraged.

The revised Strategy outlined the following priority geographical areas:

- countries of the CIS which received assistance under the TACIS Programme. Countries

considering starting nuclear power programmes in the southern part of the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and possibly Middle East regions;

- countries with established nuclear power programmes in Latin America, which may

benefit from EU nuclear safety culture while modernizing institutions and infrastructure

and coming out from a period of relative lack of investment and isolation;

- countries considering starting nuclear power programmes, particularly in South-East Asia,

to ensure that nuclear safety and security culture is fostered in parallel with the

development of the nuclear generating programme, and

- other third countries having established nuclear power programmes and expanding them

in Asia, to help ensure that safety culture remains a priority, as well as African countries

may benefit from cooperation under INSC.

2.3 Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes Based on the multi-annual strategy for 2007-2013, the Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) for

the period 2007 -2009 was developed, including indicative amounts for these three years to the priority

thematic areas.

The revised Strategy of 2009 was used as the basis for the development of the MIP 2010-2011. This

MIP not only included indicative amounts for the priority thematic areas of support but also for the

priority geographical areas.


Page 10 of 58

The same revised Strategy was used to develop the MIP 2012 – 2013. This also included an indicative

earmarking of amounts of the available budget for these two years to the priority thematic and

geographical areas.

2.4 Annual Action Programmes Detailed programming was performed on an annual basis through Annual Action Programmes (AAPs)

containing the projects defined jointly by the cooperating countries' organisations and the Commission

Services.

The content of the AAPs 2007 – 2009 followed the orientations given in the Nuclear Safety Strategy

for Community Cooperation Programmes 2007 – 2013 and the MIP for 2007 – 2009, previously

adopted by the Commission, after consultation of the EU Member States in the INSC Committee.

The content of the AAPs 2010 – 2013 was developed in accordance with the revised Strategy for

2010-2013 and the subsequent MIPs for 2010 – 2011 and 2012 – 2013.

2.5 Programme management The awarding of contracts on projects or sub-projects, contained in the approved AAPs, followed the

rules and procedures laid down in the European Commission Financial Regulations.

Procurement followed four different procedures:

- without a Financing Agreement and as the result of negotiations;

- without a Financing Agreement and based on the result of tendering;

- with a Financing Agreement and as the result of negotiations, and

- with a Financing Agreement and based on the result of tendering.

Most of the contracts were concluded after tendering and on the basis of a Financing Agreement

signed by the recipient country and regulating the financial aspects of the cooperation and its

conditions. In a few cases it was concluded that tendering was not possible and that a negotiated

procedure had to be followed. For some projects it was concluded that the signing of a Financing

Agreement was not possible. For those projects the procurement had to be completed within a shorter

period of time.

The Joint Research Centre Institutes7 provided technical support to the Commission External Services

in the definition and implementation of the projects.

3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This evaluation report provides a brief description of the INSC Programme and the methods used for

its implementation (section 2). An overview of approved AAPs in the period 2007 – 2013 is provided

in Annex A. It includes each project, its foreseen budget, and the status of its implementation by

autumn 2013. Changes in the status of implementation of projects after autumn 2013 are not covered

in this evaluation.

Section 4 below sets out an evaluation of the evolution of the INSC Programme (in terms of the

projects approved in relation to the criteria and priorities of the Strategy and its mid-term revision) for

each of the following sectors:

- regulatory authorities and their Technical Support Organisations (TSO);

- safety of nuclear facilities;

- responsible management of nuclear material and radioactive waste;

- accounting of fissile materials;

7 Institute for Energy, Petten (NL); Institute for Transuranium Elements Institute, Karlsruhe (DE); Institute for the Protection and

the Security of the Citizens, Ispra (IT).


Page 11 of 58

- off-site emergency preparedness;

- participation in international funds, and

- international cooperation.

The distribution of the total budget of the INSC programme 2007 – 2013 amongst these sectors is

shown in figure 3.1 and the evolution of the budget allocated yearly to each of these sectors is shown

in table 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Allocation of the budget of the INSC programme 2007-2013 to the various sectors

Sector: AAP INSC 2007 -

2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Regulatory Authorities 4.6 7.2 10.7 13.0 10.7 12.5 15.5 74.2

Safety of nuclear facilities 30.9 13.9 21.3 18.9 1.0 3.0 - 89.0

Radioactive waste, etc 3.0 12.0 7.0 15.1 18.3 15.0 4.5 74.9

Safeguards - 3.7 - - 2.0 - - 5.7

Off-site emergency

preparedness

- 1.0 - - - - 0.5 1.5

International Funds 10.0 15.0 24.7 17.0 36.0 35.3 25.1 163.1

International cooperation - - 6.5 4.0 - 9.3 - 19.8

Management support - 8.0 3.5 1.3 6.5 1.0 4.8 25.1

Subtotal 48.5 60.8 73.7 69.3 74.5 76.1 50.4 453.3

RF projects cancelled 28.3 10.5 - - - - - 38.8

Total AAP 76.8 71.3 73.7 69.3 74.5 76.1 50.4 492.1

Table 3.1. Evolution of the budgets allocated to the various sectors in the AAPs 2007 – 2013

(figures in MEuro)

Section 5 sets out an evaluation of the evolution of the geographical extent of the INSC Programme

2007 – 2013.


Page 12 of 58

The distribution of the total budget of the INSC programme 2007 – 2013 amongst regions is shown in

figure 3.2, and the evolution of the budget allocated yearly to each of these regions is shown in table

3.2.

Figure 3.2. Allocation of the budget of the INSC programme 2007 - 2013 to the various regions

(excluding projects concerning the RF, approved in the AAPs 2007 and 2008 but cancelled by lack of signing the FA)

Geographic region: AAP INSC 2007 -

2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 1013

I. ENP-EAST

Russian Federation* 3.0 - 2.0 1.0 - - - 6.0

Ukraine

- Cooperation measures to increase nuclear safety

- EU contributions to CSF and NSA

25.8

10.0

21.6

15.0

13.8

24.7

24.1

17.0

14.2

36.0

12.5

35.3

-

25.1

112.0

163.1

II. OTHER COUNTRIES

Other ENP-East (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia) 7.2 9.5 13.7 3.4 1.8 - 5.5 41.1

Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) - - - 1.5 3.0 1.5 - 6.0

ENP-South and Middle East(Morocco, Egypt,

Jordan, Iraq)

- 2.0 1.0 2.7 2.0 4.0 2.0 13.7

Latin America (Brazil, Mexico) - - 5.0 6.3 - 4.5 - 15.8

South-East Asia(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,

Thailand, Vietnam)

- - 3.5 - - 2.0 5.0 10.5

Asia (Mongolia, China) - - - 2.0 6.0 3.0 - 11.0

Multi-Country and Regional 2.5 4.7 - 6.0 5.0 3.0 8.0 29.2

III. International cooperation - - 6.5 4.0 - 9.3 - 19.8

IV. Management support - 8.0 3.5 1.3 6.5 1.0 4.8 25.1

TOTAL 48.5 60.8 73.7 69.3 74.5 76.1 50.4 453.3

*Excluding projects concerning the RF, approved in the AAPs 2007 and 2008 but cancelled by lack of signing the FA

Table 3.2. Evolution of the budgets allocated to the various regions in the AAPs 2007 – 2013

(figures in MEuro)


Page 13 of 58

The evaluation of the INSC Programme 2007 – 2013 in terms of its comprehensiveness, the balance

between neighbourhood and third countries, and its major achievements is described in section 6.

4 DEVELOPMENTS BY SECTOR

This section provides an evaluation of the development of the INSC Programme worldwide over the

period 2007 – 2013, in particular in relation to the criteria and priorities outlined in the Nuclear

Strategy and its mid-term revision, for each of the sectors identified in section 3.

Some overlap in these sector-wise descriptions has been unavoidable because some projects are

relevant to more than one sector, e.g. regulatory authorities, emergency preparedness and response,

radioactive waste, etc. Also projects implemented by IAEA can have activities relevant to several

different sectors. In allocating projects to sectors for the purpose of this evaluation, the attribution

adopted by the Commission Services in formulating the AAP has been assumed (e.g. regulatory

sector, waste management, multi-country project, regional projects, etc.).

4.1 Strengthening Regulatory Authorities and their Technical Support Organisations

4.1.1 Objectives and priorities One of the main priorities identified in the Strategy for the INSC Programme, 2007-2013, was to

strengthen regulatory authorities and their technical support organisations (TSOs). This was further

endorsed in the mid-term revision of the Strategy in 2009. Supporting regulatory authorities was

judged to be very cost effective, i.e., potentially making a significant impact on nuclear safety while

requiring only modest levels of funding. This strengthening was foreseen to be achieved through

various means including: promoting an effective safety culture; transferring best European and

international regulatory methods and practice; developing effective, sustainable and independent

regulatory frameworks, not only for nuclear installations but to ensure protection against ionising

radiation more generally, irrespective of its origin; capacity building and training; the safe

management of radioactive materials and waste; use of the so called “2+2” approach8 when making

improvements in operational safety; etc.

The Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) for 2007-2009 foresaw the continuation (from the

TACIS programme) of cooperation with regulatory bodies and their TSO in the Former Soviet Union,

in particular in Armenia, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, with broadening to other

countries as and when appropriate. This cooperation was to be directed towards:

• the provision of training services, including longer-term training in the EU of beneficiary

country experts observing inspection activities and emergency exercises, as a possible way

for effective transfer of knowledge and experience

• sustained co-operation in actual licensing processes or in the establishment of regulations or

guides which are genuinely needed by the regulator, and

• the long-term stay of European experts in the beneficiary countries to work in a team with

the local regulators.

The nature or focus of cooperation remained much the same in the MIP for 2009 – 2011, albeit with

broader geographical coverage; in the MIP for 2011 – 2013, the transfer of experience and know-how

on the performance of ‘stress tests’9 of nuclear installations

10was introduced, following the Fukushima

accident, as an additional item to those listed above.

8 This comprised the issue of two related and appropriately coordinated contracts concerned, respectively, with a project supporting

the implementation of a safety improvement at a nuclear power plant and a project supporting its licensing process. A contracted

EU nuclear utility cooperated with the owner and/or operator of a NPP in implementing the safety improvement (e.g., preparing

technical specifications, providing support during the licensing process, procuring equipment, and following up fabrication,

installation and commissioning of the equipment). In parallel, a contracted EU TSO co-operated with the regulatory authority of

the country in performing the technical safety assessments of the proposed safety improvement. 9 ‘Stress tests’ are targeted re-assessments of the safety margins of nuclear installations in the light of the Fukushima Daiichi

accident. Natural hazards, the loss of safety systems and severe accident management were the main topics.


Page 14 of 58

In the mid-term revision of the Strategy there were a number of changes. Cooperation with countries

in the FSU was to continue but it was extended to regulatory bodies in other third countries which had

decided to develop nuclear energy, particularly those where a credible programme or ‘road map’ had

been developed11

. The large number of countries then contemplating the use of nuclear energy in the

first decade of the 21st century, and the relatively short timescales foreseen for its introduction and use,

posed a major challenge to the establishment of competent regulatory bodies.

Two other aspects were to be given increased emphasis: firstly, enhanced co-ordination with the

IAEA, in particular, to avoid duplication, exploit synergies and make best use of existing structures

and mechanisms; and secondly, greater coordination, where appropriate, with activities being carried

out under the Instrument for Stability.

The extent to which the programme in the regulatory sector was in conformity with these objectives

and priorities is evaluated below.

4.1.2 Evaluation of programme scope and content against objectives and priorities Some 48 projects (with INSC financial support of about 102 MEuro) have been, or are in the process

of being, implemented in the regulatory sector. Forty one of these involve direct cooperation with the

regulatory body or its TSO in one or another third country; four of these involve cooperation at a

regional level, three involving cooperation with countries mainly in the FSU and the other involving

six countries in South East Asia (SEA). The remaining seven projects involve cooperation with

multiple countries in two different guises: firstly, those concerned solely with ‘training and tutoring’,

which are open to participants from all countries eligible to benefit from INSC cooperation; and,

secondly, projects that have been implemented by IAEA in cooperation with INSC, where, in some

cases, a large number of countries have been involved in some activities (see Section 4.8.1).

4.1.2.1 Geographical distribution The number and geographical distribution of projects that have been implemented, or are in the

process of being implemented, over the duration of the INSC programme are illustrated in Figures

4.1.1 and 4.1.2, firstly on a regional and then on a country basis.

Within the period of the first MIP (2007 – 2009), the main focus was the continuation of cooperation

with countries in the Former Soviet Union (ENP – East and Central Asia); eleven projects were

approved during this period, with projects in Armenia (2), Belarus (2), Georgia (1), Ukraine (5) and a

regional project involving Armenia and Ukraine.

The geographical extent of the programme was progressively widened during this period; some six

projects were approved with “new” countries including three in the ENP – South and Middle East

region (Egypt, Jordan and Morocco), one in Latin America (Brazil) and two in SEA (Philippines and

Vietnam); in addition, two multi-country projects were approved that were to be implemented by

IAEA. Cooperation with regulatory authorities in five of the “new” countries was in the context of

their planned use of nuclear energy.

Following the mid-term revision of the Strategy, the balance between cooperation with ‘old’ and

“new” countries changed. In the MIPs for 2010 – 2011 and 2012 -2013, eight projects were approved

for cooperation with countries in the Former Soviet Union (ENP – East and Central Asia) whereas

some twenty one were approved for cooperation elsewhere or as multi-country projects. Follow-on

projects were approved for continued cooperation with the “new” countries identified above (i.e.,

Egypt (1), Jordan (2), Brazil (1), and Vietnam (1)).

10 According to the Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009, ‘nuclear installation’means:

(a) an enrichment plant, nuclear fuel fabrication plant, nuclear power plant, reprocessing plant, research reactor facility, spent

nuclear fuel storage facility; and

(b) storage facilities for radioactive wastes that are on the same site and that are directly related to the nuclear installations listed

under point (a). 11 In accordance with criteria established by the EU Council on 9 December 2008 on assistance to third countries in the field of

nuclear safety and security


Page 15 of 58

Figure 4.1.1. Regional distribution of cooperation projects with regulatory authorities

In addition, cooperation began with regulatory authorities in further “new” countries, namely Mexico

(2), China (3), Mongolia (2), Indonesia (1), Malaysia (1) and Thailand (1). Apart from Mexico and

China, which already used nuclear energy, cooperation with the others was again in the context of

their planned use of nuclear energy and/or extraction of uranium.

Of the multi-country projects, two were to be implemented by IAEA (see Section 4.7.1) and three

were concerned solely with training and tutoring.

The focus and geographical extent of the programme was fully in accord with the Strategy and its mid-

term revision, i.e., an initial focus on continuation of cooperation with regulatory authorities in

countries that participated in the TACIS programme but increasing cooperation over time with “new”

countries planning to embark on the use of nuclear energy (see Figure 4.1.2 for the evolution over time

of the number of projects concerning cooperation with regulatory authorities in the various countries).

4.1.2.2 The scope, nature and efficacy of cooperation The distribution of the different types of activity on which cooperation has been established (or is

being established) is illustrated in figure 4.1.3 for the 48 projects in the regulatory sector. The figure

largely speaks for itself but a number of matters are noteworthy. Training features as a dedicated

activity in about 70% of projects and has taken various forms, including the elaboration of human

resources development plans, development and implementation of knowledge management systems,

training courses on specific technical topics, and three projects dedicated solely to training and

tutoring. About 60% of the projects have had (or will have) dedicated activities related to the further

development of regulatory frameworks and enhancing capabilities for carrying out regulatory reviews

of safety assessments. Regulatory aspects of waste management and decommissioning have been

included as an activity in about 40% of projects, while licensing and inspection activities and the

further development of management systems in regulatory bodies have each featured in about 30% of

projects. Some fifteen projects have included activities concerned with the safety of radioactive

sources or various aspects of radiation safety (including occupational exposure, naturally occurring

radioactive material (NORM) and radon); some eleven projects have included cooperation on

emergency preparedness and response.


Page 16 of 58

Figure 4.1.2. Country distribution of cooperation projects with regulatory authorities

Almost half of the projects included an initial task concerned with the development of a strategy for

cooperation and an Action Plan for its implementation; these were to be kept under continuing review

and updated periodically as cooperation progressed. The development of strategies and Action Plans

was introduced from the outset of the INSC programme, in light of experience with implementation of

the TACIS programme, where the need for a more strategic approach to cooperation with regulatory

authorities was identified – in particular, to ensure that cooperation remained focused and responsive

to real needs, as well as to provide a more informed basis for determining when the goals of the

cooperation had been achieved. This practice has, however, been discontinued more recently, due to

concerns over potential conflicts of interest for contractors implementing projects. Other mechanisms

have since been used to achieve the same ends (i.e., by maintaining a clear separation between the

programming and implementation phases, with strategic aspects being addressed solely during the

former).

Not enough projects are at a sufficient stage of development to reach an informed view on the quality

of the strategies (and action plans for their implementation) that have been developed, and on the

influence these are having on the nature and scope of future cooperation under INSC. The potential

importance of these strategies for effective cooperation and programming is such that they should be

critically reviewed at the earliest opportunity (e.g., within one or two years, when many projects will

be more advanced) and lessons learned where appropriate.

Three projects, dedicated solely to ‘training and tutoring’, have been, or are in the process of being,

implemented (see Annex A). This was a new initiative within the INSC programme as a response to

an important and increasing need identified by many beneficiaries. More specialised training and

tutoring would continue to be provided through individual projects; but training and tutoring across a


Page 17 of 58

broader range of defined subjects was considered to be potentially more effectively provided through a

centralised mechanism. Initial feedback on this initiative appeared very positive and augurs well for its

continuing success in the longer term.

Much less use has been made of the “2+2” approach compared with the TACIS programme, and only

four INSC projects have included activities implemented through this mechanism, mainly in Armenia

and Ukraine. These activities comprised support for the licensing of various safety improvements in

NPP and the commissioning of new waste management facilities; the safety improvements and waste

management facilities were being made or developed with support from parallel projects within the

INSC (and/or the former TACIS) programme (i.e., support for nuclear operators - see Section 4.2).

The much reduced use of this mechanism is due to the lower priority being given in INSC to

cooperation with nuclear operators and a marked shift in the nature of cooperation in this area from

‘hard’ (i.e., provision of hardware as part of safety improvements) to ‘soft’ (i.e., provision of

methodologies, transfer of safety culture, etc) activities (see Section 4.2); the latter does not require

parallel support for licensing activities. This trend is expected to continue and “2+2” projects are

expected to have an ever diminishing role in the programme.

The efficacy of the ‘2+2’ approach in INSC continued to be mixed and was similar to experience with

such projects in the TACIS programme: much depends on the attitude and commitment of the main

actors to cooperation between the two linked projects, and on the ability to effectively synchronise

contracting and start dates.

Following the Fukushima accident, five projects have been approved that include activities related to

assessing safety in response to more extreme accident scenarios and to implementation of the stress

tests.

In the latter stages of the TACIS programme, quasi-continuous, in situ support was provided to senior

regulators/management in some countries and proved to be a highly effective means of cooperation.

This approach has been continued, where deemed appropriate, in the INSC programme and has been

foreseen in six projects in five countries, namely, Armenia, Belarus, Jordan, Mongolia and Ukraine. It

is too early to reach informed judgements on the efficacy of extending this approach to other countries,

in particular on the availability of appropriately qualified experts (i.e., with the necessary technical and

personal skills) to fulfil this role, and the ability of senior management in the beneficiary countries to

use this resource effectively. The efficacy of support provided in this manner should be carefully

monitored over the next few years, in particular as it will influence decisions on whether the approach

should be used more extensively or adapted in light of experience.

The scope and nature of the programme in the regulatory sector is broadly in accordance with the

objectives of the INSC Regulation and the criteria and priorities of the Nuclear Strategy and its mid-

term revision.

Best European and international regulatory methods and practice are being transferred; support is

being given to the establishment and/or enhancement of sustainable and independent regulatory

frameworks (including the development and implementation of quality management systems) in many

countries – in particular those planning to embark on the use of nuclear energy; extensive training and

tutoring are being provided across a wide range of areas (including the elaboration of human resources

development plans); and support is being provided in regulating the safe management of radioactive

materials and waste. The aim of achieving longer term training in the EU of experts from beneficiary

countries is being achieved through two avenues: firstly, through dedicated projects on training and

tutoring which are available to participants from all countries eligible for support from INSC; and,

secondly, by more prescriptive requirements within the Terms of Reference (ToR) for longer term

periods of training/tutoring in specified technical areas. Likewise, the longer term stay of European

experts in beneficiary countries is being achieved through quasi-continuous, in situ, support to senior

regulators/management in some projects, and more prescriptive requirements in ToR as to the amount

of time European experts must spend in a beneficiary country. The latter are not yet a feature of all

ToR, but consideration should be given to this becoming best practice – thereby ensuring that the

programme goal is met by most, if not all, projects.


Page 18 of 58

Figure 4.1.3. Distribution of types of activity carried out in cooperation projects with regulatory

authorities

The programme has also shown that it can be responsive to emerging developments, not least in the

timely introduction of cooperation on ‘stress tests’ and more extreme events, following the Fukushima

accident (see Annex B3). Similarly, adjustments have been made, where necessary, in priorities and

in the scheduling of projects to take account of delays in some countries, post Fukushima, in their

planned use of nuclear energy.

4.1.3 Coordination with activities undertaken under the Instrument for Stability The INSC strategy and its mid-term revision foresaw increased coordination with activities carried out

under the Instrument for Stability (IfS), in particular in relation to the Safety, Security and Safeguards

(‘3S’) approaches then under development. The three areas are inextricably linked and often inter-

dependent, with many of the actors – recipients as well as donors – having an interest in or

responsibility for more than one area. Against this background the need for, and potential benefits of,

closer cooperation between the two Instruments were self-evident.

Regional Centres of Excellence have been, or are in the process of being, established under IfS for the

mitigation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risks. The intention was to use

these Centres, or networks, to support the development and/or implementation of INSC regional

projects, in particular in areas complimentary to IfS activities – for example, emergency preparedness

and response, uranium mining and transport, etc. However, delays in the establishment of these

Centres has constrained the extent to which INSC has been able to make use of them. Once

established, INSC should aim to fully exploit the potential of these Centres in supporting the


Page 19 of 58

development of its regional activities, especially in the topical areas previously indicated where there

is much potential synergy with IfS.

4.1.4 Programme management in the Regulatory Area Some significant changes have taken place in the management of this area of the programme during

the implementation of the INSC; these changes are being further consolidated and refined prior to the

start of the second INSC in light of experience gained. Three considerations influenced the nature and

scope of these changes: maintaining and/or enhancing the quality of the support to regulatory

authorities in third countries; avoiding potential conflicts of interest; and enhancing the efficacy of the

process, given the decreasing human resources available within DEVCO to manage the programme.

The disbanding of the Regulatory Authorities Management Group (RAMG) was the main change.

RAMG had been in existence for almost two decades and played a key role in advising the

Commission on various matters related to the development and implementation of the TACIS and

PHARE programmes. This input was critical in the early stages of these programmes and, without it,

both programmes would have been far less effective and focused; its importance, however, diminished

over time, as regulatory capabilities were enhanced in third countries and decision making within the

Commission became better informed by a wider range of sources. The functions performed by RAMG

have largely been taken over by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and the

INSC Committee. ENSREG, or more specifically its Working Group 4 on International Cooperation,

advises the Commission on strategic aspects of international cooperation in the regulatory area; the

INSC Committee undertakes reviews of and provides advice on the scope and content of proposed

projects. Improved mechanisms are also being developed to further enhance the efficacy of the whole

project and programme management cycle, in particular obtaining timely and reliable feedback from

the implementation of projects that may better inform the future development or revision of strategies

and programmes.

The final substantive change concerned the contracting of regulatory projects. Almost all projects in

the regulatory sector had previously been implemented by Riskaudit via a negotiated procedure, rather

than by open tendering. This approach was optimal at the outset of the TACIS programme, in

particular in ensuring continuity of support and making effective use of the limited resources available

within EU regulatory bodies and their Technical Support Organisations. However, this procedure had

become administratively demanding (i.e., requiring derogation from open tendering on a case by case

basis) and was becoming increasingly difficult to justify. Enlargement of the EU, with the accession of

several countries from Central and Eastern Europe that operated nuclear installations, had also

significantly increased the number of organisations that could provide regulatory support, thereby

making open tendering more practicable. In future, regulatory projects will be implemented through

restricted calls for tender.

These changes have the potential to enhance the quality and independence of the advice available to

the Commission in its implementation of the INSC programme, to clarify and lessen the administrative

burden of contracting, to circumvent concerns regarding conflicts of interest, and to further enhance

the quality of regulatory projects through competitive tendering. As ever, the efficacy of these

changes should be kept under review as part of the process of continual improvement. In this context,

the merits of extending the role of ENSREG to include scrutinising and advising on strategies of third

countries for enhancing their regulatory capabilities is worthy of consideration – in particular, as these

strategies will largely underpin the nature and scope of INSC cooperation and ultimately its efficacy.

4.2 Support to increase safety of nuclear facilities Support for increasing the safety of nuclear facilities was identified as one of the priority areas in the

Nuclear Safety Strategy and its mid-term revision. This was to be achieved through:

- providing support to nuclear operators to increase operational safety, and

- safety improvements in design, operation and maintenance of nuclear installations.


Page 20 of 58

In the initial years of the INSC Programme the focus was continued cooperation with nuclear

operators, in particular in areas of operational safety, nuclear safety training programmes, capacity

building, etc., and involved countries that were already included in the TACIS Programme.

Support to nuclear operators was confirmed in the INSC revised strategy for the period 2010-2013,

however with a lower priority than before.

Nevertheless, the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant highlighted the importance for

nuclear operators to develop operating and maintenance procedures that put safety as the highest

priority, and severe accident management guidelines that supported an effective and timely response in

the event of an accident. Consequently, cooperation with nuclear operators remains important in

particular circumstances, e.g. in the performance of stress tests in response to more extreme events.

4.2.1 Russian Federation Cooperation with the Russian Federation, under the auspices of INSC, was discontinued due to lack of

formal agreement with the Russian Federation (the required Financing Agreement was not signed by

Russia). Despite this, projects contracted during the TACIS programme have been implemented to

completion, in some cases with further support from INSC (continuation of the on-site assistance

support). By 2010, the TACIS Plant Improvement Projects (PIP) at Balakovo and Kalinin NPPs had

been completed, but others remained ongoing at the Beloyarsk, Kola and Smolensk NPPs. In the AAP

2010, further support for the Novovoronezh NPP was included for a maximum period of two years.

All these PIPs have now been completed. In fact all cooperation with Russia in the years 2007-2012

was completing projects approved and contracted within the TACIS Programme.

4.2.2 Armenia The Soviet-designed VVER/44/270, Units 1 & 2 of the Armenian NPP (ANPP) began operation in

1976 and 1980, respectively. They were shut down after the 1988 Spitak earthquake. In 1993 the

country experienced a severe energy crisis. Unit 2 was restarted in 1995 after being re-commissioned.

It currently provides roughly half of the country’s electricity.

In line with its general policy regarding the first generation of Soviet-designed NPPs, the EU

instigated a dialogue with Armenia seeking the definitive closure of the NPP. However, in the interests

of ensuring the continuing safe operation of the power plant, the TACIS programme contributed to

providing on-site assistance (OSA) to implementing the most urgently required safety modifications as

identified by IAEA12

.

In 2005 the European Commission participated in a donors’ conference organised at the initiative of

IAEA in exchange for a commitment by Armenia to establish a closure date for the NPP. Armenia

proposed a shutdown of the NPP in 2016.

In 2007, to ensure the safe operation of the reactor prior to the foreseen closure, INSC started

providing support for the supply and installation of equipment for resolving all category III and IV

safety deficiencies of the Armenian NPP13

. This support was coordinated with other donors through

the working group on Armenia created by the IAEA in 2005 with the main roles played by the EC, the

USA and other partners.

Since 2007 several OSA actions have been implemented and completed with INSC support, including

supply and installation of equipment and improvement of NPP safety culture and nuclear safety

through the transfer of knowledge to the operators of ANPP.

Following the Fukushima accident, the European Council decided that the safety of all EU nuclear

plants should be reviewed (stress tests) in particular in response to more extreme events. Potential EC

support with such reviews was opened to neighbouring countries and the Armenian government asked

12 IAEA TECDOC 640: Ranking of safety issues for WWER-440 model 230 nuclear power plants, February 1992. 13 Safety deficiencies of category III and IV in nuclear power plants are the most serious safety deficiencies as defined by the

IAEA. Continuing operation of a nuclear power plant with safety deficiencies of category III and IVis absolutely unacceptable

and such deficiencies need to be resolved immediately.

Safety deficiencies of category III and IV for the Armenian NPP were identified and specified in detail in IAEA TECDOC-640 .


Page 21 of 58

for support from the EU to undertake the stress tests for ANPP. INSC provided support for this

purpose.

In the AAPs 2008 – 2011, the INSC continued its support to solve the safety category III and IV

requirements of IAEA. Besides the support in the form of OSA itself, six projects funded by the INSC

are still on-going in ANPP from AAP 2008 to 2011, including pipe integrity designs, neutron flux

monitoring systems, enhancement of operators’ training, and support to the operator for the

implementation of the “stress tests”.

Recent OSART missions concluded that nuclear safety had considerably improved in ANPP and no

IAEA Category III and IV deficiencies were left to be resolved. However, several other important

safety deficiencies (categories I and II) were still open.

The Armenian Government has decided to continue operation of ANPP for ten more years. The

Commission policy for Armenia after 2013 is that all assistance shall cease until the Armenian

Government has taken a firm decision to shut down ANPP. The controversy is still unresolved.

Further support from INSC to the nuclear operator in Armenia will be subject of broader political

considerations.

4.2.3 Ukraine Support to Ukraine, as a continuation of the assessment of necessary safety improvements in their

VVER reactors, which began within the TACIS Programme, continued in all INSC AAPs from 2007

to 2012.

In 2010, a study was undertaken to evaluate the safety of the Ukrainian NPPs in the context of

supporting the implementation of the Road Map for Nuclear Safety of the Memorandum of

Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy between EU and Ukraine. The study was funded

by INSC (AAP 2007) and it was coordinated by the IAEA and the EC. It concluded that the overall

safety of the NPPs had improved since a similar evaluation in the 1990s. Nevertheless, further

improvements were still considered necessary.

On site assistance to Rovno NPP and Zaporozhe NPP was continued (AAP 2010), involving the

implementation of two Plant Improvement Projects (PIPs). All PIPs at Ukrainian NPPs have been

completed.

The completion of the National Training and Management Centre was supported by the INSC as a

continuation of another TACIS project. The project began in 2009 and was implemented in several

parts. Implementation of the first three parts has been completed. The fourth part started in 2010 and

includes ageing management, training of personnel and a programme to disseminate the results. A fifth

part consists of improvements in operational and maintenance procedures.

The Joint Support Office (JSO)14

in Kiev appears to have provided a very useful role, in particular

during the years 2007 – 2013 in facilitating effective contacts between the Ukrainian authorities, the

operator, the regulatory authority, the contractors, the EU Delegation in Kiev and the Commission in

Brussels. A system of multiple video conferences has been put in place, allowing streamlining of all

aspects of cooperation with Ukraine.

4.2.4 Latin America Projects were included in AAP 2009 to 2012 to cooperate with the Brazilian and Mexican operators.

Cooperation with Eletronuclear, the operator of Angra dos reis NPP in Brazil, was intended to cover a

diverse range of safety topics. However, this project was never implemented because of problems on

the Brazilian side in concluding the Financing Agreement. Cooperation with the Mexican operator is

concerned with implementation of the stress tests.

14 A Joint Support Office (JSO) has been operational in Kiev since January 2005 to facilitate the project management cycle of the

EC programmes in the field of Nuclear Safety in Ukraine.


Page 22 of 58

4.2.5 Summary All projects in this sector appear to be in accordance of the objectives of the INSC Programme and

with the criteria and priorities as outlined in the Multiannual Strategy for the implementation of the

INSC Programme 2007 - 2013 and its mid-term revision.

4.3 Safety of nuclear material and radioactive waste management

4.3.1 Objectives and priorities Nuclear waste management, decommissioning and remediation of former nuclear sites were identified

as priority sectors for support in the Strategy for the INSC Programme 2007 – 2013. The measures

mentioned in the INSC Regulation to meet the objectives for these priority sectors were those:

• addressing the problems posed by decommissioning of nuclear installations which were not

covered by commercial obligations;

• addressing, as appropriate, the problems related to radioactive wastes of all types originating

from the operation of nuclear power plants, legacies in the North-West and Far-East of Russia,

Semipalatinsk and Siberia, including environmental remediation of former uranium mines,

and

• related to assessing and evaluating the situation and the possible needs for support in other

third countries where nuclear waste was managed and stored in unsafe and potentially

dangerous conditions. Appropriate actions and activities needed to be defined and

implemented in close collaboration with the beneficiary countries and international

organisations concerned and other donors active in the area.

In the mid-term revision of the Strategy, these priorities were actualised and measures were

reformulated as follows:

“Support to the safety of nuclear material and radioactive waste management will aim to address

problems posed by the decommissioning of nuclear installations not covered by commercial

obligations, and problems related to the safe management of radioactive waste of all types and of

nuclear material, including environmental remediation of former uranium mines.”

Regarding possible support in relation to environmental remediation of uranium mines and radioactive

waste disposal, and taking into account the scope of the challenge posed by this, the mid-term revision

of the Strategy explicitly states that ”EC assistance should be complementary to involvement of other

stakeholders”.

4.3.2 Evaluation of the development of the programme against its criteria and priorities Between 2007 and 2013, there were 47 projects concerning this sector. Some 36 projects (with INSC

financial support of 92.3 MEuro) have been, or are in the process of being, implemented in the sector

decommissioning of nuclear installations, safe management of radioactive waste and environmental

remediation of former uranium mines. In addition some 11 projects have been approved providing

support to regulatory authorities, including activities related to waste management, decommissioning

or environmental remediation. 44 out of the 47 projects involved direct cooperation with partners in

one or another third country; two of these 44 involved cooperation at a regional level, involving two or

more countries sharing similar problems and where INSC support would harmonise potential solutions

(INSC support amounts 4 MEuro); the remaining three projects (with INSC support of 5 MEuro) were

multi-country projects.

Four of these projects involved direct cooperation on decommissioning of nuclear facilities; 32

projects involved direct cooperation on the safe management of radioactive waste and 15 projects

involved direct cooperation on the environmental remediation of former uranium mines, disposal sites

and related issues.


Page 23 of 58

4.3.2.1 Geographical distribution The number and geographical distribution of (lots of) projects that have been implemented or are in

the process of being implemented within the INSC Programme 2007 - 2013 are illustrated in tables

3.4.1 and 3.4.2, on a regional and on a country basis respectively.

The main focus in the first years (2007 – 2009) of the INSC programme was continuing the

cooperation with countries that already were beneficiaries in the former TACIS programme (ENP –

East and Central Asia).

Fourteen projects were approved in this period (2007 – 2009) involving four countries. These included

one project in Armenia, two in Georgia, ten in Ukraine and one regional project involving Ukraine and

Belarus.

Number of projects per region and per year*

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

ENP-East 1 8 4 4 5 1 23

Central Asia 1 3 1 5

ENP-South & Middle East 1 1 2

Latin America 1 1

Asia 1 1

South-East Asia 0

Regional 1 1 2

Multi-Country 2 2

Total 2 8 4 7 10 3 2 36

* Not including the cooperation projects with regulatory authorities supporting the regulation of decommissioning, radioactive waste and

environmental remediation

Table 4.3.1. Regional distribution of cooperation projects regarding decommissioning,

radioactive waste and environmental remediation

Number of projects per country and per year*

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total

Armenia 1 1

China 1 1

Georgia 1 1 2

Iraq 1 1 2

Kyrgyzstan 1 1 2

Mexico 1 1

Tajikistan 2 2

Ukraine 1 7 2 4 5 1 20

Uzbekistan 1 1

Regional 1 1 2

Multi-Country 2 2

Total 2 8 4 7 10 3 2 36

* Not including the cooperation projects with regulatory authorities supporting the regulation of decommissioning, radioactive waste and

environmental remediation

Table 4.3.2. Country-wise distribution of cooperation projects regarding decommissioning,

radioactive waste and environmental remediation

Simultaneously, expansion of the geographical extent of the programme was initiated. This resulted in

twenty-four projects that were approved in the second part (2010 – 2013) of the INSC programme.


Page 24 of 58

These comprised nineteen projects in nine countries, one regional project and two multi-country

projects. Continuation of cooperation with Ukraine (10 projects) still remained substantial, but the

cooperation has been expanded geographically to include ENP-South and Middle-East (2 projects),

Asia (1 project), Central Asia (5 projects), Latin America (1 project), as well as one regional project

involving several countries in Central Asia and two multi-country projects.

The development of the cooperation with “new” countries has followed a systematic process:

identifying the needs of a country in the area of radioactive waste management, decommissioning or

environmental remediation; and assessing the country’s own planning, its maturity, its status

concerning legislation and regulatory aspects, and the absorption capacity of its institutions.

The INSC support to the sector decommissioning, radioactive waste and environmental remediation

(including related projects in the regulatory authorities area) has been rather comprehensive and

coherent. For instance, there is a multi-country project solely concerned with training and tutoring of

the experts and supporting organisations of regulatory authorities in the area of radioactive waste

management, decommissioning and environmental remediation of areas contaminated with radioactive

materials.

The geographical extent of the programme and its development in the later years is fully compliant

with the Strategy of the INSC programme and its mid-term revision and so is the focus of the

programme.

4.3.2.2 The scope, nature and efficacy of cooperation The 47 cooperation projects (the 36 cooperation projects in the area of decommissioning, radioactive

waste and environmental remediation, and the 11 cooperation projects supporting regulatory

authorities in their involvement in those activities) that were approved in the INSC programme

involved many different activities. These activities sometimes were so diverse that various different

lots of several of these projects were or were being contracted separately. The variety and relative

frequency of the most important of the different activities in these 47 different projects are indicated in

table 4.3.3.

Regarding decommissioning the following three different kinds of activities were addressed within

different projects:

- supporting the planning of decommissioning;

- detailing and implementing a pilot project for the decommissioning of a complete system

within a NPP, and

- supporting regulatory authorities in developing the legal framework and the regulatory

system for decommissioning nuclear facilities.

Support in the area of radioactive waste involved thirty-four different activities. These activities

covered the whole range of concern, from the development of a national radioactive waste

management policy and strategy, to the development of disposal sites. Most frequently, cooperation

was requested for the development of a national radioactive waste policy, for the best suitable strategy

for its implementation, and occasionally also for the development of a national radioactive waste

management organisation.

Most of this cooperation has been or will be provided as soft assistance, in the form of expertise and

experience based on the practices developed, properly regulated and well matured over the last 40

years in many of the EU Member States. In a few cases cooperation has been provided as hard

assistance in the form of the supply of equipment or installations.

Support concerning environmental remediation has been or will be provided through twelve different

activities, mainly in the area of uranium mining and milling.


Page 25 of 58

Activity Relative

frequency

Decommissioning:

Regulatory support for the development of decommissioning of nuclear facilities 1

Development of decommissioning planning 2

Pilot for decommissioning a complete system at a NPP 1

Radioactive waste management:

Development of national radwaste management policy and strategy 5

Developing a national radwaste management organisation 4

Regulatory support for the development of radwaste management 1

Regulatory support for the development of a spent fuel policy and strategy 2

Inventorying radwaste 1

Development of a methodology for radwaste characterisation 1

Radwaste acceptance criteria 1

Regulatory aspects regarding waste acceptance criteria 1

Conceptual design of radwaste management facilities 1

Conceptual design of radwaste infrastructure 1

Pilot for radwaste infrastructure at a NPP 1

Design of equipment for radwaste management facility 4

Supply of equipment for radwaste management facility 3

Support with hot testing of equipment for radwaste management facility 1

Volume reduction optimisation 3

Support in licensing radwaste facilities 1

Development of facility for the monitoring of exempt waste 1

Design of radwaste transport containers 1

Design of a laboratory for radwaste characterisation 1

Supply of a laboratory for radwaste characterisation 1

Design and supply of a mobile radiochemical laboratory 2

Refurbishing a radiochemical laboratory 1

Design review of radwaste storage facilities 1

Safety evaluation of radwaste storage at a NPP 1

Supporting regulatory aspects licensing radwaste storage facilities 2

Survey and assessment of radwaste storage sites 1

Conceptual design interim storage of HLW and spent nuclear fuel 1

Conceptual design for retrieving and reconditioning of disposed radwaste 1

Safety requirements concerning radwaste disposal 1

Conceptual design of radwaste disposal facility 3

Safety assessment reports concerning radwaste disposal sites (SARS) 3

Development of a national training system for radwaste management 1

Capacity building regarding radwaste management 3

Training and tutoring regarding radwaste management 1

Environmental remediation (and also public protection against irradiation exposure):

National strategy for the remediation of uranium mining and milling liabilities 1

Regulatory framework for uranium mining and processing 1

Regulations for uranium mining and processing 1

Monitoring uranium mining and processing 1

Developing a watershed monitoring system 1

Integrated EIA and feasibility study concerning uranium liability remediation 5

Legislation and regulatory aspects concerning uranium liability remediation 1

Minimisation of the impact of radiation from uranium liabilities to the public 2

Improvement of radiation protection of workers and general public 1

Improvement of stakeholder involvement in uranium liability remediation 1

Improvement of public involvement and public awareness 3

Organising a cross-border information exchange system 1

Table 4.3.3. Indication of the different types of activities carried out in cooperation projects in

the area of decommissioning, radioactive waste and environmental remediation

Several of the projects approved concerned more specific follow-up of previous projects, often of a

more generic nature. This has the advantage that the partner country can more easily adjust the

expertise and capacity of its involved institutions. It has the disadvantage that actual progress in many


Page 26 of 58

cases can be slower than initially expected by the partner country, which in itself might lead to lower

efficacy. In addition the actual implementation of many of the projects, once approved, appears to

have been very slow (see section 6.3 for further details). Furthermore, the duration of such contracts

has usually been two to three years, or sometimes even more. The efficacy of the strategy of the INSC

programme or its mid-term revision can only be fully assessed once the projects have reached tangible

achievements and clear milestones.

Due to the slow pace of project implementation, it will take quite a number of years before sufficient

projects of the INSC Programme 2007 – 2013 have reached that stage.

The INSC Programme 2007 – 2013 was quite ambitious in its scope and objectives. The range of

concerns was very wide, whereas the available budget, though substantial, remained limited. The

INSC Strategy, and especially its mid-term revision, had clear priorities, restrictions and conditions.

One of the priorities was that of proximity. One of the restrictions was to focus on soft assistance

projects. One of the conditions for financial support to environmental remediation projects was that

other stakeholders also have to contribute.

The priority of proximity was clearly met in the sector of decommissioning, radioactive waste and

environmental remediation. Most of the INSC budget of 2007 – 2013 concerning decommissioning,

radioactive waste and environmental remediation was allocated to projects concerning ENP-East, with

emphasis on Ukraine and Armenia. Also the restriction to focus on soft assistance was clearly met for

projects in this sector. Most of the available budget by far has been and will be used for soft

assistance.

Within AAP 2010, the EC had ensured the technical coordination of uranium remediation activities in

Central Asia within the frame of an on-going project with the IAEA and its Member States. This

project addresses the technical consistency of uranium remediation projects funded by different donors

and ensures the appropriate contacts with the partner countries in Central Asia.

The condition of involving other stakeholders in financing environmental remediation projects has

also been met. This was achieved by the initiative of the EC to harmonise the plans of international

organisations and potential donor countries to support Central Asian countries with the remediation of

the most urgent of their uranium liabilities. The need for much closer coordination became evident as

several remediation project proposals were being developed in parallel by the international community

on the request of the affected States. At a coordination meeting in 201215

, the creation of a new

Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites (CGULS) was agreed among the affected states in

Central Asia and the main national/international organisations involved in the management,

remediation or regulatory oversight of uranium legacy sites. The CGULS secretariat is under the

technical lead of the IAEA, and the coordination group will provide an important forum for

information exchange and provision of technical advice, as well as coordinating the actions of the

members to maximise synergies and avoid duplication of effort. The European Commission strongly

supports the objectives and the scope of the CGULS and foresees using it as a coordination platform

and clearing house for future remediation activities in the target countries.

Throughout the above process of international initiatives, the European Commission has encouraged a

regional approach, actively contributed to the technical discussion, and supported the long-term

commitment of the national authorities of the countries concerned to pursue a roadmap to the

resolution of the problems.

4.4 Accounting and control of fissile materials The INSC Nuclear Safety Strategy 2007 – 2013 (and its mid-term revision) included establishing the

regulatory framework and methodologies necessary for implementing nuclear safeguards for the

proper accounting and control of fissile materials at State level and at the level of the nuclear

operators. The Council also requested16

that safeguards activities should also be addressed by the IfS.

15 "Regional Meeting on Safe Management of Uranium Production Legacy Sites" held in Vienna from 12 – 15 June 2012 16 2798th Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting Brussels 8 May 2007


Page 27 of 58

This created an unclear situation concerning the distribution of responsibilities regarding nuclear

safeguards between INSC and IfS, in particular which activities belonged to which Instrument.

Very few activities for the sector nuclear safeguards have developed within the INSC Programme

2007 – 2013, namely:

• a project for the transfer of safeguards technology to Brazil and Argentina, using the

Argentine-Brazil Agency for accounting and control of Nuclear Materials, ABACC, as

beneficiary, and

• a project concerning nuclear safeguards for Armenia and the Russian Federation.

Concerning nuclear safeguards in the Russian Federation, a project financed within the TACIS

programme was still ongoing.

4.5 Off-site emergency preparedness

4.5.1 Objectives and priorities Emergency preparedness is identified as one of the priorities in the INSC Strategy and its mid-term

revision. Cooperation in this area aimed to establish effective arrangements for emergency planning,

preparedness and response (EP&R), civil protection and rehabilitation measures, with provisions being

made to promote international cooperation in this area, notably with the IAEA.

4.5.2 Evaluation of programme scope and content against objectives and priorities Eleven projects included one or more activities on EP&R. Of these, eight comprised cooperation with

regulatory authorities in one or other third country (Armenia (3), Belarus, Brazil, China, Malaysia17

and Ukraine), and one with regulatory authorities in six countries in SEA. The remaining two projects

were multi-country projects being implemented by IAEA; the first is focusing on countries in ENP –

East and Central Asia and ENP – South and Middle East, while the second is focusing on countries in

Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

The scope of cooperation on EP&R was very wide with much variability between countries. Bilateral

cooperation included: the installation or refinement of decision support systems for EP&R (e.g.,

RODOS, ARGOS); cooperation on the planning and execution of emergency exercises; feasibility

studies for the installation of decision support systems; enhancing capabilities in various areas of

EP&R (standards, aerial monitoring, identification and treatment of over-exposed people, etc); reviews

of emergency arrangements and assessments of needs; road map for establishing a national emergency

organisation. Multi-country cooperation was focused on: the promotion and development of regional

approaches to EP&R; the development and testing of national emergency plans; and the strengthening

and harmonising of national and regional EP&R arrangements in accordance with international

standards.

These activities are fully in accord with the objectives and priorities of the INSC Strategy and will

contribute to enhanced arrangements and capabilities for EP&R in many countries, thereby satisfying

a need that was more widely recognised post Fukushima.

4.6 Participation in international funds The Commission has taken an active role in several special Accounts of the EBRD since their

creation, in particular in the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) and in the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF).

Both funds are managed by the EBRD. Prior to 2007 the Commission contributed 226.1 MEuro to

these Chernobyl funds. Within the first years of the INSC Programme, the Commission contributed

77.4 MEuro through the Annual Action Programmes 2007-2010.

Further to the conclusions of the Court of Auditors at the end of 2008 on the “Use of EU Funds in

making the Chernobyl Site Environmentally Safe”, the Commission took an active role in creating, in

October 2009, the Chernobyl G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (G8 NSSG) – EBRD Chernobyl

17 The Malaysian project was eventually cancelled as the respective Financing Agreement could not be signed on time.


Page 28 of 58

Contact Group. The purpose of the Contact Group is to follow and monitor, in practically real time,

the major developments in the projects, and to ensure an efficient, more detailed and continuous

exchange of information to achieve a common understanding, among donors and the EBRD, on the

technical issues, corresponding cost implications and associated risks, so that the major donors may

take well informed decisions.

At the Assembly of Contributors in July 2010, it appeared that the financial shortfall to complete the

projects amounted to some 740 MEuro in total. At the Pledging Conference in Kiev on 19 April 2011,

the Commission, on behalf of the EU, pledged 122 MEuro to solve the underfunding of the Chernobyl

projects in accordance with the G8 commitment.

The EU made its 2011 pledge conditional upon even further increased and fully independent

monitoring of the projects. This is being achieved through a Site Monitoring and Reporting Contractor

(SMRC), to follow the cost and schedule during crucial construction phases and to provide

independent reports. The SMRC is funded by the EU, US and the UK under an account (fund)

managed by the EBRD.

The Commission contributed 96.4 MEuro through the Annual Action Programmes 2011 – 2013.

The total contribution of the Commission financed from the INSC Programme 2007 – 2013 therefore

amounts to 173.8 MEuro. This brings the total contribution of the Commission, including the

contributions during the TACIS period, to some 400 MEuro.

The possible creation of another special Account at the EBRD is currently under investigation for an

international Fund to solve the most urgent uranium mining and milling liabilities in Central Asian

countries.

These activities are compliant with the INSC objectives and with the criteria and priorities as outlined

in the Nuclear Strategy 2007 – 2013 and its mid-term revision.

4.7 Promoting international cooperation to achieve a high level nuclear safety culture The role and importance of coordination among organisations pursuing similar objectives to the INSC

programme was fully recognised in the Strategy and its mid-term revision, in particular to make best

use of limited resources, avoid unnecessary duplication and take advantage of potential synergies.

Mechanisms have been put in place to achieve such coordination, in particular with potential donor

countries (especially with members of the G8) and international organisations, especially the IAEA.

The nature and scope of these arrangements are summarised below.

4.7.1 IAEA Cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations, relating to the financing and

implementation of projects, falls under the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement

(FAFA) signed in April 2003; specific cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) falls under a Framework Agreement signed in September 2004. A Joint Statement by the EU

and IAEA, issued in May 2008, identifies areas of cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety, nuclear

security and nuclear energy and this has been further developed and reinforced in a MoU signed in

September 201318

. This MoU defines specific areas of nuclear safety cooperation and establishes a

working mechanism based on that adopted for cooperation in the area of nuclear safeguards that has

proved effective and practicable.

The advent of the INSC programme marked a major increase in the nature and scope of cooperation

between the EU and IAEA in relation to enhancing nuclear safety in third countries, in particular in the

extent to which the IAEA is now involved in contributing to the definition and implementation of

some projects. Several factors have contributed to this change. Firstly, INSC is now a global

instrument (as opposed to the much narrower scope of its predecessor, TACIS, which was limited to

cooperation with countries in the FSU); in this context, it would have been remiss not to have

exploited IAEA’s extensive knowledge of global needs in the area of nuclear safety, and experience of

18 Commission Decision of 5.9.2013 on the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding for a partnership between the European

Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safety cooperation [C(2013) 5641].


Page 29 of 58

how these could be best satisfied, when broadening the scope and content of the INSC programme.

Secondly, given its long established networks and experience with technical cooperation globally, it

was recognised that IAEA may be best placed to effectively implement projects of a particular type or

scope (e.g., providing support of a limited scale to numerous countries on one or other specific topic

(e.g., application of the Code of Conduct on sealed radioactive sources), where the administrative cost

of implementing many such small projects would be prohibitive using INSC mechanisms), or in

particular geographic areas (e.g., in further promoting regional cooperation in areas where networks

had already been established with support from IAEA, addressing issues that were priority themes in

their Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Safety programmes and key to enhancing nuclear safety, etc).

Thirdly, the opportunity to exploit existing (IAEA) knowledge, structures and mechanisms (rather than

inventing new ones) offered obvious advantages, especially at the outset of implementing the new

INSC programme.

Activity Country or Region

Establish/strengthen national systems for EP&R FSU, Egypt and Jordan

Enhancing safety culture in NPP Latin America

Enhancing operational safety of a research reactor Uzbekistan

Support for the International Seismic Safety Centre (ISSC) Global

System for regional capacity building in Asia (via ANSN) Asia

Benchmarking liquid and solid waste generated by WWER FSU and Eastern Europe

Strengthening GNSSN and RegNet Global

Expert advice for, and regional cooperation on, uranium legacy sites Central Asia

Transfer of experience on occupational radiation protection Unspecified

Application of CoC on the Safety of Research Reactors Africa

Application of CoC on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Mediterranean region

Drafting secondary legislation in accordance with international standards FSU

Enhancing design and operational safety review services for NPP Global

Improving safety for spent fuel, radioactive waste and decommissioning Global

Lessons learned from Fukushima for the regulators, etc Global

Emergency Preparedness and Response Africa, Asia, Pacific, Latin Am, Caribbean

Addressing nuclear and radioactive waste management Africa, Latin America, Caribbean +

Strengthening regulatory bodies and implementation of safety standards Africa, Asia, Pacific, Latin America

Table 4.7.1. Nature and location of activities carried out in projects implemented under joint

management by IAEA

Mechanisms and procedures have been established between the EC and IAEA to review needs for

cooperation, and to identify projects that could be considered for funding by INSC (partially or

wholly) and how they might best be implemented (i.e., under joint EC/IAEA management or directly

by INSC). The actual selection of projects for INSC support, however, follows the same procedures

and management arrangements as for any other cooperation project (see Section 2.4). The active

participation of the EC within the Regulatory Cooperation Forum (RCF), established under the IAEA,

has also proved very effective. The RCF provides a valuable mechanism for coordinating INSC

activities with those of other international actors, in particular in supporting the development of

effective regulatory frameworks in those countries planning to use nuclear energy for electricity

production and/or other peaceful uses.


Page 30 of 58

INSC projects that are being, or are about to be, implemented by IAEA (via co-financing or joint

management) are focusing on one or other of the following areas: developing a nuclear safety culture

and the required capacities and expertise at global level; supporting the adherence of third countries to

international Conventions and Treaties and the implementation of international codes, standards,

instruments and mechanisms, thereby strengthening the ‘Global Nuclear Safety Regime’; and

networking on regional and global scales (e.g., ANSN, FORO, WWER).

Four projects have been approved for implementation by IAEA and are at various stages of

development; about 21 MEuro has been provided by INSC in support of their implementation. The

nature or main foci of the cooperation activities undertaken, or to be undertaken, within these four

projects are summarised in table 4.7.1, together with the countries or regions involved.

The increased cooperation with IAEA in the development and implementation of projects is fully in

accord with the INSC Strategy and is to be welcomed. Some, however, believe that implementation

through open and competitive tendering would have better outcomes and be more cost-effective.

Greater clarity and transparency on the criteria or process used in deciding which INSC projects are

judged likely to be more effectively implemented by IAEA, rather than through open tendering, might

allay some of these reservations.

4.7.2 G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group The Commission has taken an active role in the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group, G8NSSG,

since its creation as a continuation of the G7 Nuclear Safety Working Group, including also the

Russian Federation. Participation of the Commission in this Group has been instrumental for the

implementation of the Chernobyl projects and in collectively defining strategies regarding nuclear

safety issues.

This activity is in accordance with the INSC objectives and the Nuclear Strategy 2007 – 2013 and its

mid-term revision.

5 DEVELOPMENTS BY REGION

The INSC Strategy foresaw, at least initially, cooperation continuing with the beneficiaries of the

TACIS programme, i.e., countries in the FSU, and then expanding to other countries, in particular

those planning to embark on the use of nuclear energy. Figure 5.1 displays the regional extent of the

INSC cooperation with other countries at the onset of the INSC programme in 2007, whereas figure

5.2 displays the widening of the regional extent of the INSC cooperation as reached in 2013.

The scope and content of the programme are broadly in accord with this strategy.

Many factors influenced decisions on the detailed geographic evolution of the programme and on

priorities accorded to particular countries or geographic regions, not least the criteria established by

the European Council. These included proximity to the EU, and the contribution of INSC to the EU

Neighbourhood Policy, but were not the sole or exclusive considerations; others included input from

the European External Action Service (EEAS) and, prior to its establishment, the External Relations

Directorate General, DG RELEX, requests for cooperation from individual countries including an

evaluation of their merits, advice from various sources (i.e., RAMG, ENSREG, INSC Committee),

and the credibility and/or existence of road maps in those countries intending to use nuclear energy.


Page 31 of 58

Figure 5.1 Overview of the cooperation within INSC with various countries worldwide in 2007 (countries are: Armenia, Ukraine and the Russian Federation, with the restriction that cooperation on new projects

with the RF was discontinued in 2007 by failure to reach an agreement between the EC and the Russian government )

Figure 5.2 Overview of the cooperation within INSC with various countries worldwide in 2013 (countries are: Armenia, Belarus, Brazil, China, Egypt, Georgia. Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia,

Morocco, Mexico, Mongolia, Philippines, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam)


Page 32 of 58

The evolution and development of INSC cooperation in particular regions or countries, as a

consequence of these considerations, is summarised below.

5.1 ENP East and Central Asia Within the period 2007 – 2013 cooperation projects for the improvement of nuclear safety have been

developed and implemented in the following countries of ENP East and Central Asia: Armenia ,

Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan

Cooperation projects were also developed in 2007 and 2008 with the Russian Federation but, due to

failure to conclude the necessary Financing Agreements for AP 2007 and AP 2008, their

implementation had to be cancelled by the Commission. Since then no new proposals for cooperation

within INSC have been developed with the Russian Federation, but the situation remained under

continuing review. Implementation of several soft and hard assistance projects initiated within the

TACIS Programme was ongoing when the INSC Programme began. In order to complete them, soft

on-site assistance contracts with EU utilities were renewed within the INSC Programme 2007 - 2013.

For similar reasons the contract for the Joint Management Unit (JMU)19

in Moscow was also renewed.

No further cooperation with the Russian Federation is foreseen in the future. The Russian stakeholders

have been invited several times to take part in meetings with the Commission to investigate the

possibility of further cooperation, but they have chosen not to take up the offer. Although the IAEA

considers that no major safety issues remain in the Russian NPPs and that further assistance is not

needed, the EU still considers that the first generation Russian nuclear power plants are not at the same

level of safety as later generations and therefore should be closed and dismantled as soon as possible.

The Joint Management Unit in Moscow was closed November 2013.

5.1.1 ENP East

Armenia Within the period 2007 – 2013 of the INSC Programme, ten cooperation projects with a total budget of

27.5 MEuro have been approved for Armenia. Three of these projects involved hard and soft support

to the operator of ANPP. These cooperation projects for improvement of nuclear safety and safety

culture at ANPP have been successfully implemented and completed. They contributed also to ANPP

complying with the internationally recognised nuclear safety standards. Five other projects have been

approved to strengthen the regulatory authority. In line with the Joint Convention on the safety of

spent fuel and on the safety of radioactive waste management20

(IAEA), one project has been approved

aimed at anticipating the future decommissioning and dismantling of the ANPP. This dismantling will

generate a significant volume of waste, and there is a need for a strategy and policy for the

management of all radioactive waste in Armenia. Most waste is currently stored safely at ANPP, but

there is no provision for the treatment and conditioning that would be needed to allow its long-term

storage or disposal. Following the Fukushima accident, another project for implementing stress tests at

ANPP was approved. In addition to the ten INSC projects, support was also provided by INSC to

continue a contract with an EU utility for on-site assistance with implementing soft and hard safety

improvement projects at ANPP.

In summary: Cooperation in the first years of the INSC Programme consisted mainly of soft and hard support to the

nuclear operator of ANPP, whereas the focus of cooperation in the later years has shifted towards soft

support regarding regulatory aspects, radioactive waste management and decommissioning.

Belarus Three projects (8.9 MEuro) have been approved for Belarus in the AAPs 2008, 2009 and 2013. All

projects are concerned with strengthening the nuclear regulator in Belarus for the on-going

19 To facilitate the project management cycle of the EC programme in the field of Nuclear Safety in Russia, a Joint Management

Unit (JMU) has been operational in Moscow for several years (the first JMU contract was signed already in 2000). 20 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; International

Registration No: 1729 Atomic Energy


Page 33 of 58

construction of the first NPP in Belarus. The scope, nature and objectives of this cooperation are

summarised in Annex B2.

Ukraine Ukraine has been by far the largest recipient of assistance from the INSC Programme 2007 – 2013.

Apart from the financial contributions to the CSF and the NSA concerning Chernobyl (163.1 MEuro),

twenty-two projects (about 106 MEuro) have been approved for Ukraine in the AAPs for 2007 - 2012.

As for Armenia, in the initial years of the INSC Programme this cooperation consisted mainly of soft

and hard assistance (seven projects) to the nuclear operator of the Ukrainian NPPs, whereas, in the

later years, cooperation increasingly focused on soft assistance as envisaged in the INSC Strategy and

its mid-term revision. Seven projects for regulatory support and eight projects concerning support in

the development of a responsible policy for the management of radioactive waste in Ukraine (and for

Chernobyl in particular) as well as for environmental remediation of contaminated sites were approved

in the period 2007 – 2012. In addition, two projects (6 MEuro) were approved for contracts with EU

utilities for providing on-site assistance to complete safety improvement projects that had begun

during the TACIS programme. The Joint Support Office (JSO) in Kiev continued guiding and

monitoring all these projects during the period 2007 – 2013.

Georgia Two projects ( 1.5 MEuro) were approved for Georgia under the AAPs for 2008 and 2009. Both

projects concerned the Georgian radioactive waste disposal and interim storage sites. One was

dedicated to a survey and strategic assessment of the current sites; the other project will provide

support to Georgia with the preparation of safety assessment reports for the two interim storage sites.

Regional and multi-country activities Two regional projects ( 6.7 MEuro) were approved in the AAPs 2008 and 2012 and one multi-country

project ( 1.5 MEuro) was approved in the AAP 2013. The first regional project concerned nuclear

safeguards in Armenia. Initially it was part of a larger project concerning nuclear safeguards in the

Russian Federation and Armenia. Cancelling of all new cooperation projects with the Russian

Federation also reduced the scope of this project accordingly. The second regional project aimed to

strengthen the regulatory authorities in Ukraine and Armenia. The multi-country project was to

support a feasibility study and the preparation of an action plan for the safe and secure

management/disposal of sunken radioactive objects in the Arctic Sea.

In summary: All projects developed for ENP East within the INSC Programme 2007 – 2013 are fully compliant

with the criteria and priorities as outlined in the INSC Strategy and its mid-term revision. Continuing

cooperation with regulatory authorities in this region will be important, in particular in those countries

intending to use nuclear energy in their energy supply system. Cooperation with nuclear operators will

also continue to be important, albeit focusing almost exclusively on ‘soft’ assistance.

5.1.2 Central Asia The problem of legacy uranium mining and processing sites in Central Asia has been recognised as a

regional one, given the potential cross-boundary environmental, social/political and health impact of

failure of containment in any one of the sites. The United Nations (UN), the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community at large have long recognised this regional

dimension of the problem and established that an orderly remediation of uranium legacy sites in

Central Asia, in agreement with international standards, recommendations and best practices, is

necessary. The IAEA, supported by the EC, has prepared a baseline document on the current situation

in Central Asia. An initial inventory of all uranium legacies has been compiled, resulting in a

preliminary classification of these legacies in different categories of urgency. The category of highest

priority legacies, that is those needing remediation urgently, has been used as the basis for planning

INSC cooperation projects in Central Asia. These projects involved thorough site characterisations, as

part of an integrated environmental impact assessment (EIA) for each involved site, and feasibility

studies concerning the most likely remediation options. Full scale remediation works will require co-


Page 34 of 58

funding from different donors. The European Commission is developing initiatives to establish a

special Fund at the EBRD for financing dedicated remediation works in Central Asia (see section 4.6).

Kyrgyzstan Two projects (2.1 MEuro) were approved for Kyrgyzstan in the AAPs 2011 and 2012. Both projects

supported the preparation of an integrated EIA with feasibility studies for the most likely remediation

options for each of the two sites (Min Kush and Shekaftar) with high priority uranium liabilities in

Kyrgyzstan that urgently need remediation.

Tajikistan Two projects (2.4 MEuro) were approved for Tajikistan in the AAP 2011. These projects concerned

support for the preparation of an integrated EIA with feasibility studies for the most likely

remediation options for each of the two sites (Taboshar and Degmay) with high priority uranium

liabilities in Tajikistan that urgently need remediation, comparable with the ones in Kyrgyzstan.

Uzbekistan One project (1.5 MEuro) was approved for Uzbekistan in the AAP 2010 concerning a project to

support the preparation of an integrated EIA and feasibility studies for the most likely remediation

option for the two highest priority sites (Charkesar and Yangiabad) with uranium liabilities in

Uzbekistan that urgently need remediation, similar to those in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan mentioned

above. Implementation of this project started in autumn 2013. A summary description of the project

for these high priority sites in Uzbekistan is provided in Annex B4 to this report.

Regional and Multi-Country activities One regional project (2.5 MEuro) was approved in the AAP 2010 and one multi-country project (3

MEuro) was approved in the AAP 2013. The regional project addressed the need to harmonise

legislation and regulations and to establish appropriate monitoring of the watershed in Central Asia,

thereby involving several countries, concerning the quality of the surface waters, potentially

contaminated by various uranium mining and milling liabilities in Central Asia. It is expected that the

implementation of this project will start in 2014. The multi-country project concerns the development

and implementation of urgent measures for the management and remediation of high risk uranium

legacy sites in Central Asia.

In summary: The projects developed for Central Asia are fully compliant with the criteria and priorities as outlined

in the INSC Strategy 2007 – 2013 and its mid-term revision. The regional nature and scale of uranium

legacy issues are such that cooperation in this area will need to be further intensified and even greater

use made of mechanisms recently put in place to foster and achieve effective international

collaboration.

5.2 ENP South and Middle East

5.2.1 Middle East

Iraq There are ten nuclear sites in Iraq that are no longer in operation and that require decommissioning;

most of them have been heavily damaged during the turmoil.

Since 2009 the EU has been supporting the Iraq decommissioning programme in the framework of the

Instrument of Stability (IfS) in building capacity in decommissioning nuclear facilities and in waste

management. Excellent results have been achieved in the training of Iraqi scientists and engineers.

Considering the support of many governments to Iraqi national organisations and the actions

implemented by IAEA, a complementary action of the EC, in the frame of INSC, was started recently

(two projects approved; 6MEuro). This action is complementary to the capacity building activities

implemented in the framework of IfS.


Page 35 of 58

The first INSC funded project is aimed at preparing the realisation of a Low and Intermediate Level

Waste (LILW) disposal facility to be built on the main nuclear site, Tuwaitha.

This project involves the development of an inventory of the LILW already existing, and to be

produced in the decommissioning of the Iraqi nuclear sites, a site characterisation and a design,

together with a safety assessment of the new facility. This project is part of the overall programme of

decommissioning of all Iraqi nuclear installations, and is being implemented in coordination with the

national and international actors dealing with this programme.

For the safe decommissioning of the Iraqi nuclear sites, the LILW disposal facility needs to be

equipped with a radiological laboratory for the identification of the radioelements present in the waste.

A mobile radiochemical laboratory will allow the characterisation of wastes and orphan sources at

others sites before their transfer to the Tuwaitha site. This equipment, provided within the second

INSC project, will ensure decommissioning operations are in accordance with IAEA safety standards

and guidance.

The design of the laboratory is being elaborated in cooperation with the USA. The project will

strengthen the Iraqi regulatory authority and the safe and secure handling and management of

radioactive waste.

Jordan Cooperation in the frame of INSC was initiated with Jordan in 2008. This country needs a nuclear

regulatory infrastructure, with an independent regulatory authority, prior to the development of its

nuclear power programme. In view of its almost complete dependence on foreign resources for the

production of electricity, and the availability of uranium ore in the country, Jordan has launched a

programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This programme aims at uranium mining and at the

construction of a research reactor and of a nuclear power plant. The NPP would provide electricity

(30% of the national consumption) and would also be used for water desalination.

Authorisation has been granted to begin the construction of Jordan's first research nuclear reactor. Due

to begin operating in 2016, the reactor (5 MWth) should become a focal point for the country's nuclear

education and training. Projects in the frame of INSC take into account the existing IAEA and

international cooperation in this field with Jordan.

These projects are aimed at: updating the strategy and the action plan for enhancing the national

regulatory authority; assisting in the development of a regulatory framework; and providing on-site

support to JNRC and to its independent technical support organisation (TSO). Training and

qualification of JNRC staff will be provided. Three cooperation projects were approved in the AAPs

2008, 2010 and 2013 (4.2 MEuro).

5.2.2 ENP South Both Egypt and Morocco have expressed intentions to use nuclear energy as a contributor to their

energy needs. These two countries need a nuclear regulatory infrastructure, with an independent

regulatory authority, prior to the development of a nuclear energy programme. In this context,

cooperation with the EU within the INSC programme started in 2008 – 2009.

Egypt

Within the AAPs 2008 and 2010 two cooperation projects were approved (2.5 MEuro) for the

development and strengthening of the capabilities of the Egypt Atomic Energy Authority (EAEA).

For Egypt, the projects have been postponed following the recent political developments and the civil

disorder.

Morocco With 94% of its electricity produced by thermal plants, the Kingdom of Morocco is the largest

importer of oil and gas in northern Africa. To meet the demand for energy and for water of a growing

population, Morocco is developing the infrastructure to launch a nuclear power programme. Several

actions by the two national regulatory bodies have been undertaken, and in 2001 a government


Page 36 of 58

agreement with United States led to the construction of a 2 MW research reactor. Its operating license

was issued in 2009, and it will be a major support to acquiring knowledge and expertise in nuclear

safety.

A first project (1 MEuro) in the frame of INSC was approved in 2009 and is being implemented. This

project aims at supporting the establishment of an independent regulatory body, strengthening and

enhancing its professional knowledge and that of its TSO, and establishing and implementing a public

information policy.

In summary: The cooperation with beneficiary countries in ENP South and in the Middle East is fully compliant

with the criteria and priorities as outlined in the INSC Strategy and its mid-term revision. Continued

cooperation is particularly important should the countries concerned remain committed to the use of

nuclear energy.

5.3 Latin America In Latin America, three countries, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, operate NPPs. These countries were

considered to be eligible recipients of assistance from the INSC Programme, taking into account their

cultural affinity and the fact that two of them operated European designed reactors. Several missions

took place in 2009-2011 to explore cooperation with these countries.

Exploratory missions to Chile and Venezuela were also foreseen, as they were considering the

possible use of nuclear energy for part of their power production. However, following the Fukushima

accident in 2011, both countries froze the development of their nuclear programmes.

Brazil In Brazil, exploratory meetings took place in 2009, followed by additional meetings in 2010 and 2011

during which several projects were identified and agreed. Both the operator of the Angra dos Reis

plant and the nuclear regulator were keen to start the cooperation with the EU in the framework of the

INSC. Several operational safety projects were approved as well as projects to support the nuclear

regulator and to develop a strategy for nuclear waste.

In the AAP 2009 two projects were approved (5 MEuro). One of these projects concerned support to

the nuclear operator, Eletronuclear, and the other project concerned support to the nuclear regulator.

While in 2009 the Brazilian authorities had no problem in signing a Financing Agreement (FA), in

2010 they failed to sign such a FA, so the project foreseen for the nuclear operator in this year had to

be cancelled. In 2012, in contrast, they signed the FA concerning a project included in AAP 2012 to

extend the support to the nuclear regulator (2 MEuro).

Mexico In Mexico, exploratory meetings took place in 2010. Conversations were opened with CFE, the

Laguna Verde NPP operator, with CNSNS, the nuclear regulator, and with ININ, the Institute

responsible for nuclear waste. No agreement on projects was reached with CFE, but a project to assist

with the development of a strategy on radioactive waste was agreed with ININ. Several projects were

also agreed with CNSNS.

This resulted in two projects approved in AAP 2010 (3.3 MEuro). One project aimed to support the

capabilities and capacity of the nuclear regulator CNSNS; the other aimed to support the development

of a national policy, and a strategy for its implementation, concerning the management of spent

nuclear fuel (including provisions for its safe interim storage) and radioactive waste in Mexico.

In 2012 another project was approved (2.5 MEuro) to support the regulatory authorities of Mexico

with implementing the “stress tests”, severe accident analysis for NPPs, and quality assurance

management according to European experience.


Page 37 of 58

Argentina In Argentina, exploratory meetings took place in 2010. The Argentinean NPP in operation at Atucha is

a PHWR, a Siemens KWU design. The plant was commissioned in the 1970’s, so it is reaching its

originally intended 40 years’ design life. The construction of a second unit of the Atucha plant was

stopped in 1986 with 95% of the works completed. The Argentinean government decided to restart the

construction in 2008, with the aim of commissioning the plant in 2011 under the sole responsibility of

the Argentineans, without any international assistance.

The Argentinean regulator was in principle seeking assistance to license the start-up of Unit 2.

Notwithstanding the considerable potential of cooperation with Argentina on nuclear safety, and the

mutual benefits this would bring, the discussions with the Argentinean authorities have not resulted in

agreements on projects to be supported from the INSC programme, neither with the nuclear operator

nor with the nuclear regulator in Argentina.

Multi-country Within the AAP 2011 a multi-country project (2 MEuro) was approved concerning support with the

transfer of technology for safeguards inspection that affects Brazil and Argentina. This support

agreement was signed with the Brazilian-Argentinean Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear

Materials, ABACC.

In summary: Whereas it is too early to analyse the mutual benefits of the assistance within INSC to the Latin

American countries from the point of view of improving the nuclear safety, the cooperation is fully

compliant with the INSC Strategy and its priorities. Cooperation with the regulatory authorities in

Brazil and Mexico is progressing satisfactorily and augurs well for the future. Cooperation in the area

of waste management is currently limited to Mexico and could usefully be extended elsewhere, subject

to an interest from the countries involved. The failure to cooperate with nuclear operators in Latin

America is to be regretted, in particular given their key role in achieving nuclear safety in practice and

the potential for safety improvements. Likewise the failure to cooperate with Argentina under the

auspices of INSC is also regrettable, given its undoubted potential to enhance nuclear safety and

national capabilities and experience. Further attempts to achieve effective cooperation with nuclear

operators in Latin America, and with Argentina more generally, would be effort well spent in further

enhancing nuclear safety globally.

5.4 South East Asia South East Asia (SEA), and in particular ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), was

recognised as a potentially important region for cooperation at the outset of the INSC programme.

Several countries in the region (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) had

expressed an intent to use nuclear energy and were pursuing this actively during the first decade of the

21st century, with a view to commissioning their first reactors in or around 2015 – 2020; other

countries in the region, such as Singapore, had not precluded the use of nuclear energy as an option.

Most of these countries also had long experience in the use of nuclear technologies, in particular in the

operation of research reactors, not only for research purposes but also for radioisotope production,

especially for medical use. Against this background the opportunities for effective cooperation were

considerable, in particular with regulatory authorities. These authorities were facing not only the

considerable challenge of having to rapidly establish the necessary competence and capabilities to

properly regulate the safety of new NPP, but also the emerging challenges of ageing research reactors

and ancillary facilities, in particular regulating proposed safety improvements to extend operational

life, decommissioning, waste management and the possible construction of new or replacement

installations.

Opportunities for cooperation were identified during an INSC sponsored workshop in SEA in 2008.

Based on the outcomes of this workshop, a more detailed assessment was made of needs and potential

areas for cooperation in the region through meetings with operators and regulatory authorities in

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Several potential areas for cooperation were


Page 38 of 58

identified and priorities established in accordance with the criteria established by the Commission and

the Council. Cooperation with regulatory authorities in Vietnam and the Philippines were identified as

the initial priorities. Vietnam had taken a decision at political level to proceed with the construction of

NPP; the Philippines needed urgently to re-establish the necessary regulatory competence to actively

and effectively participate in decisions on whether to proceed with the possible refurbishment of the

Bataan NPP, that had been fully constructed, but ‘moth-balled’, more than two decades earlier. A

third priority was to promote regional cooperation on emergency preparedness and response in the

context of the anticipated wider use of nuclear energy in the region. The main focus of cooperation in

both Vietnam and the Philippines was the development of sustainable regulatory frameworks and

capacity building.

Cooperation has since been established with regulatory authorities in Indonesia, Malaysia and

Thailand, who were accorded lower priority in the initial assessment of needs – essentially because

their plans to use nuclear energy were less mature at the time than those elsewhere in the region.

Notwithstanding the financial crisis and the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, Malaysia is now

well advanced in its planning for the introduction of nuclear energy, having established an

implementing organisation, the Malaysian Nuclear Power Corporation, for this purpose. Indonesia has

yet to take a political decision to proceed, but is actively engaged in identifying potential sites in areas

with very low seismic and tsunami risk. Thailand is less advanced than the others, but the use of

nuclear energy is still being actively pursued, as is the development of a new/replacement research

reactor.

Cooperation within SEA and with INSC on emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) was

strongly supported at a technical level but, prior to the Fukushima accident, was not seen as a political

priority within the region. Following the Fukushima accident, there has been increased political

interest in fostering such cooperation, and it is opportune to take advantage of this changed situation21

.

With support from INSC, regional cooperation on EP&R will be established in SEA, initially within

six countries but with a view to its extension to the whole of ASEAN in due course. Best European

practice and experience gained in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident will be transferred and built

upon. The adoption of a regional approach will enable more timely and effective responses to any

future nuclear or radiological emergency that may in future affect the region; moreover, this will be

achieved at a lower overall cost and unnecessary duplication will be avoided.

In addition to its undoubted benefits in enhancing the capabilities of regulatory bodies in each country,

INSC cooperation is having wider benefits for nuclear safety in the region. Initiatives taken with

regard to a regional approach to EP&R have fostered enhanced interaction between regulatory bodies

in the respective countries – these would probably not have occurred otherwise, or at least would have

occurred much later in the process. More generally, following the Fukushima accident and in the

context of the establishment of an ASEAN economic area in 2015, an ASEANTOM association has

been established to better coordinate nuclear safety in the region. It is being loosely modelled on the

more relevant features of EURATOM to which many of the countries aspire; continued cooperation

under the auspices of INSC will facilitate and strengthen this process.

In summary Cooperation with countries in SEA and the region as a whole is fully compliant with the criteria and

priorities of the INSC Strategy and its mid-term revision. Experience in this region exemplifies the

major added value the programme can bring when needs are systematically and reliably evaluated, and

projects are developed to effectively address them with the active and committed involvement of the

beneficiaries. Indeed, the approach followed in SEA could be used as an example of good practice

when commencing INSC cooperation in other “new” regions or countries.

21

ENSREG representatives participated in the exploratory mission to Thailand and, more recently, on the missions concerning the

Feasibility Study on regional cooperation on EP&R. This participation was intended to show the experience of the EU regulators

in the relevant areas and allow ENSREG to observe the implementation of the INSC in practice.


Page 39 of 58

5.5 Mongolia and China Mongolia requested cooperation with INSC in three distinct contexts: firstly, as a result of the major

expansion in uranium exploration on its territory; secondly, with consideration being given to the use

of nuclear energy within the country; and, thirdly, to improve radiological safety in a number of

important areas.

Mongolia is already a beneficiary of a regional project concerned with remediation of uranium legacy

sites in Central Asia; the scale and nature of the legacy issues in Mongolia are, however, far less than

elsewhere, as ore was exported to the FSU and not processed locally. Cooperation is about to begin on

the establishment of a ‘state of the art’ regulatory framework for uranium mining and milling that will

be applicable to all forms of extraction (in situ leaching, open pit, underground mines) – this is timely

and important as several applications to extract and process uranium are expected in the next few years

from international mining companies. Cooperation on the establishment of a regulatory framework for

nuclear reactors (NPP and research reactors) is under development; but its exact scope will depend on

governmental decisions on the timing and nature of the programme, in particular the construction of a

research reactor and related establishment of a nuclear research institute. Cooperation on various

aspects of radiation safety (control of radioactive sources, waste management arrangements, NORM,

radon) and nuclear safeguards is under development.

Cooperation on nuclear safety with China is being implemented through four projects, each having a

different focus, both in terms of its technical content and the cooperating organisations. These

comprise: enhancing the capacity and capabilities of the regulatory authority and its TSO; enhancing

the capabilities of organisations providing technical support on nuclear safety to industrial

organisations or governmental bodies with responsibility for industrial activities; enhancing

capabilities among governmental organisations with responsibility at a national level for emergency

preparedness and response (EP&R); and developing a strategy for the management of radioactive

waste. Cooperation with the regulatory authority and its TSO is focusing on the review of safety

submissions, safety culture and management, operational feedback and severe events (floods).

Cooperation with organisations providing technical support to industry is focusing on non-destructive

testing, standards for equipment qualification and instrumentation and control, waste management, fire

protection and severe accident management. Cooperation on EP&R is focusing on a review of current

arrangements in China compared with best international practice, aerial monitoring, identification and

treatment of exposed people and the installation of a ‘state of the art’ decision support system in the

national emergency centre.

In summary: The projects in both Mongolia and China have yet to begin and it is, therefore, premature to reach

judgements on their efficacy or outcome. However, the cooperation is fully in accordance with the

criteria and priorities as outlined in the INSC Strategy and its mid-term revision and can be expected

to contribute significantly to fulfilling the INSC objectives, especially that aimed at enhancing the

capabilities of regulatory bodies and arrangements for EP&R.

Some have questioned the merits of cooperation with China, in particular given the nature, extent and

diversity of its nuclear industry and the size of its installed and foreseen nuclear capacity (currently

fourteen NPP in operation, 25 under construction and installed capacity expected to increase to about

80 - 100 GW by 2020). Such views are understandable, in particular regarding cooperation with

nuclear operators and their support organisations who, as a result, may gain (inadvertently or

otherwise) competitive advantage. Cooperation with regulatory authorities is, however, different and

this needs to be more fully recognised. The Chinese National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA)

is a relatively new organisation and appears to be still in the process of developing its expertise and

fully exercising its authority. Enhancing its capabilities and bringing them in accord with best

international practice and standards can only be beneficial – not only in terms of enhancing its

competence and authority (thereby ensuring the highest levels of nuclear safety), but also promoting a

more level playing field in the regulation of different reactor designs.


Page 40 of 58

Nuclear safety remains a global issue and an accident anywhere will have major impacts elsewhere, as

best exemplified by experience post Fukushima. Based on present expectations, China might in the

coming decades become, by far, the largest producer of nuclear energy in the world – given this, it

would be remiss of Europe not to engage fully with China in ensuring that the highest levels of safety

are adopted in future reactor design, construction and operation; the need to do so has been further

enhanced by ambitions to construct and/or operate NPP of Chinese design in Europe in the near to

medium term. In the short term, such engagement would be most effectively achieved through

continued cooperation with the regulatory body, under the auspices of INSC, aimed at enhancing its

capabilities.

5.6 Africa Africa (except the countries involved in ENP South and those benefiting directly from projects

implemented by IAEA under the auspices of INSC) has not yet benefited from the experience in

nuclear safety as developed in the EU. The potential for cooperation on nuclear safety in Africa is

considerable, in particular given the extensive uranium mining and processing activities in several

countries, other mining operations involving the creation of NORM waste, the use of research reactors

in several countries, non-nuclear radioactive waste from use of irradiation in health care and industry,

and nuclear power plants, both existing and envisaged.

Discussions between DEVCO and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) are

scheduled for 2014 in order to investigate in what manner AFCONE or African countries on a regional

basis (as per SEA) could benefit from extensive EU knowledge and experiences in the areas of nuclear

safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management.

6 EVALUATION OF THE INSC PROGRAMME FOR 2007 - 2013

6.1 Comprehensiveness of the INSC Programme in terms of thematic and

geographical scope The INSC Regulation sets out its objectives as well as measures that could be taken to meet them.

Thereafter the Nuclear Safety Strategy for Community Cooperation Programmes 2007 – 2013 together

with the Multi-annual Indicative Programme for the period 2007 – 2009 were developed and approved

by the European Commission. The Strategy sets out the criteria and priorities that should have been

respected in elaborating the subsequent AAPs and their annexed projects. The MIP 2007 – 2009

described an indicative budget available for the period 2007 – 2009 as well as an indicative allocation

of the available budget between countries: about one third each for measures in Russia and in Ukraine,

with the remaining third available for needs in the other FSU countries and other third countries

identified for support. For Ukraine, this included a provision for a potential new contribution to the

Chernobyl Shelter Fund and the Nuclear Safety Account projects in Chernobyl over the years 2007 –

2008. In the mid-term revision of the Nuclear Safety Strategy of 2009, the criteria and priorities were

further elaborated, and the subsequently formulated MIPS 2010 – 2011 and 2012 – 2013 reflected this.

Thematic scope The evaluation of the projects in the previous sections for each sector revealed that the INSC

Programme was implemented in accordance with the criteria and priorities as outlined in the INSC

Strategy and its mid-term revision. The decision to cancel the INSC support to the RF had a large

impact on the budget allocation to several sectors. The projects cancelled in the AAPs 2007 and 2008

for the RF amounted, in total, to more than 38 MEuro22

.

The budgetary allocations to the various sectors foreseen in the three MIPs are compared in table 6.1.1

with those of the detailed yearly planning as outlined in the AAPs 2007 – 2013.

22 The 2007 funds returned to the general Commission budget but those for 2008 were re-allocated within the INSC.


Page 41 of 58

SECTOR: 2007 - 2009 2010 - 2011 2012 - 2013

MIP AAPs* MIP AAPs MIP AAPs

Regulatory authorities 21.7 22.5 41.0 23.7 32.0 28.0

Operator support 32.6 63.6 29.5 19.9 6.0 3.0

Safety improvements: design, management, maintenance 23.9 2.5 - -

Radioactive waste, etc. 43.4 22.0 12.0 33.4 35.2 19.5

Safeguards 17.3 3.7 2.5 2.0 2.0 -

Research reactors, radioactive sources 13.0 - - -

Off-site emergency preparedness 8.7 1.0 2.0 - 1.0 0.5

Contributions to funds 43.4 49.7 40.0 53.0 63.0 60.4

International cooperation 6.5 10.0 4.0 10.0 9.3

Management support 13.0 11.5 6.0 7.8 3.8 5.8

TOTAL: 217 183 143 143.8 153 126.5 *Excluding projects concerning the RF, approved in the AAPs 2007 and 2008 but cancelled by lack of signing the FA

Table 6.1.1. Indicative planning (MIPS) as compared with the annual allocation (AAPs) of

INSC budget to the various sectors (figures in MEuro)

The gradual changes in the budgetary allocation are evident. Of particular note is the gradual phasing

out of operator support and the support for safety improvements in design, management and

maintenance.

Cooperation in the areas of supporting regulatory authorities and decommissioning, radioactive waste

and environmental remediation continued throughout the programme at substantial levels reflecting

the highest priority attributed to them.

Cooperation in the areas of safeguards, research reactors, illicit trafficking of radioactive materials,

radioactive sources, and off-site emergency preparedness have been supported far less in practice than

envisaged in the three MIPs. For the sector nuclear safeguards, this might have been caused at least

partially by the lack of clarity in the distribution of responsibilities between INSC and IfS.

Cooperation in the area of safety improvements in design, management and maintenance was also

supported much less than envisaged in the MIPs, though it was a priority area for support within INSC

in the INSC Strategy and its mid-term revision. This sector is more important for nuclear safety than

usually envisaged. When taking a retrospective view of the three most recent large nuclear safety

accidents worldwide - the Three Miles Island accident in Harrisburg, USA, the Chernobyl accident in

Ukraine and the Fukushima accident in Japan - it can be concluded that these extremely serious

accidents were caused by design failures, maintenance failures, or failures in operation, or by

combinations of these three.

Therefore the major decline over time in the scale of cooperation with nuclear operators and the

cessation of support for safety improvements warrants careful reflection for the future. Nuclear safety

is, in practice, achieved by those who design, construct, operate and decommission nuclear

installations. Failure to fully recognise this reality is likely to result in the sub-optimal allocation of

future INSC resources in enhancing global nuclear safety. While the importance of transferring

European knowledge and experience in supporting the establishment of competent and independent

nuclear regulators elsewhere is not in question, the transfer of European experience in the safe design,

construction and operation of nuclear installations is likely to be even more effective in enhancing

global nuclear safety. This aspect warrants careful consideration in optimising the scope and content

of further INSC activities.


Page 42 of 58

Geographical scope The MIP 2007 – 2009 mentioned an indicative budget of 217 MEuro for the 2007 – 2009 period, of

which about one third each was envisaged to be allocated for measures in each of Russia and Ukraine,

while the remaining third was envisaged to cover the needs in the other FSU countries and other third

countries identified for support. For Ukraine this included a provision for a potential new contribution

to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund and the Nuclear Safety Account projects in Chernobyl over the years

2007 – 2008.

This indicative regional allocation of the INSC budget was not met as a result of the decision to cancel

all cooperation within the INSC Programme with the Russian Federation, and of the decision of the

Council to continue the EU contributions to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund beyond 2008, in order to

mitigate the increased costs for the construction of this shelter and the related installations processing

the Chernobyl radioactive waste.

The allocation of the INSC budget to the various regions and countries in the AAPs 2007 – 2013 is

compared in table 6.1.2 with the indicative allocations in the three MIPs to measures for these

regions/countries.

The development in the supporting measures to the various regions and countries involved is

compliant with the criteria and priorities as outlined in the INSC strategy and its mid-term revision.

INSC support for Ukraine and Armenia has decreased significantly over the period of the current

INSC Programme. For Ukraine this is even more apparent when separating the EU contributions for

the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF) and the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) from the cooperation

measures that have been approved to increase the level of nuclear safety in Ukraine. This reduction

was possible because the most urgent hardware improvements at the nuclear power plants in these

countries had been agreed in the TACIS programme and in the first years of the INSC programme

2007 – 2013, and had been or were being implemented. In the later years of the INSC programme, the

level of nuclear safety in these countries therefore had or would be improved substantially, and led to

the strategic policy decision to move away from hardware support.

GEOGRAPHIC REGION: 2007 - 2009 2010 - 2011 2012 - 2013

MIP AAPs* MIP AAPs MIP AAPs

I. ENP-EAST 136.0 115.9 80.0 92.3 88.2 75.9

Russian Federation 68.0 5.0 - 1.0 - -

Ukraine

- Cooperation measures to increase nuclear safety

- EU contributions to CSF and NSA

24.6

43.4

61.2

49.7

40.0

40.0

38.3

53.0

25.2

63.0

15.5

60.4

II. OTHER COUNTRIES 68.0 49.1 47.0 39.2 51.0 38.5

Other ENP-East (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia) 30.4 11.0 5.2 7.0 5.5

Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) - 4.5 18.0 1.5

ENP-South and Middle East(Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq) 3.0 8.0 4.7 7.0 6.0

Latin America (Brazil, Mexico) 5.0 10.0 6.3 7.0 4.5

South-East Asia(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand,

Vietnam)

3.5 6.0 - 5.0 7.0

Asia (Mongolia, China) - 12.0 8.0 7.0 3.0

Multi-Country and Regional 7.2 10.5 11.0

III. International cooperation 6.5 10.0 4.5 10.0 9.3

IV. Management support 13.0 11.5 6.0 7.8 3.8 5.8

TOTAL: 217 183 143 143.8 153 126.5

*Excluding projects concerning the RF, approved in the AAPs 2007 and 2008 but cancelled by lack of signing the FA

Table 6.1.2. Indicative planning (MIPS) as compared with the annual allocation (AAPs) of

INSC budget to the various countries/regions (figures in MEuro)

The involvement of other third countries eligible for INSC support has increased over the years.


Page 43 of 58

There has also been a shift of focus in INSC support from single country projects to more regional and

multi-country projects. This development began in 2008/2009 and has steadily increased since. In

view of the lengthy time between the approval of a project in an AAP and its actual contractual start

(see section 6.3), and the greater complexity of implementing multi-country and regional projects

compared with single-country projects, this development needs careful monitoring of its effectiveness

and results.

6.2 Balance between neighbourhood and third countries The MIP 2007-2009 had an indicative allocation of the available budget between countries of about

one third each to the Russian Federation and Ukraine, with the remaining one third to the other FSU

countries and other third countries eligible for INSC support.

Identifying needs in these other third countries and developing cooperation aimed at improving their

nuclear safety was challenging and time consuming. It is, therefore, understandable that projects

approved in the AAPs 2007 – 2009 amounted to only 49.1 MEuro compared with 68 MEuro foreseen

in the MIP for that period. Approximately 60 percent of those 49.1 MEuro had been allocated to

projects in the FSU countries in the neighbourhood such as Armenia, Belarus and Georgia, whereas

only 40 percent was allocated to projects in “new” third countries.

The balance between the budgets allocated to cooperation projects in neighbourhood countries and in

other third countries in the period 2007 – 2009 was approximately 7 to 1. This has decreased with time

during the implementation of the INSC programme. During the last two years, this balance changed

from 7:1 to 2:1. Excluding the EU contributions to the CSF and NSA, the balance reduces further to

1:2.

From this perspective, the evolution of the INSC programme over the first seven years is in line with

the priorities and criteria as outlined in the Strategy and its mid-term revision.

6.3 Duration of implementation The period between approval of a project (i.e., annexed to an AAP approved by the Commission) and

its contracting remains a matter of concern. Analysis of most of the projects of the AAPs 2007 – 2013

reveals that this period varies greatly between projects, ranging from as short as 3 months to more than

four years, as shown in figure 6.3.1.

Figure 6.3.1. Status of contracting of (lots of) projects approved in the AAPs 2007 – 2013 and the

duration of the period between approval of their AAP and their contracting


Page 44 of 58

Many factors contribute to delays in implementation, not all of which are within the control of the

INSC programme. The analysis reveals no significant evolution of this period over the years from

2007 till 2013, and also no significant differences in the length of this period between projects

allocated to sectors accorded greater priority, such as regulatory authorities, operator assistance and

radioactive waste . Also no significant difference is observed in the length of this period between

contracts awarded following tendering or following a negotiated procedure.

The only significant difference is observed for projects contracted with or without a financing

agreement, as illustrated in figure 6.3.2.

Long delays between project conception and implementation can be a serious impediment to effective

cooperation; priorities inevitably change for regulatory authorities and/or nuclear operators in the

intervening period, with a risk that the agreed scope of the cooperation is no longer optimal or, in the

worst case, relevant. For countries committed to establishing an effective regulatory regime within a

prescribed timescale (i.e., in parallel with a defined schedule for commissioning NPP), such delays can

be very problematic and they may need to revert to other mechanisms to enable them to acquire the

requisite regulatory skills and competence in a timely manner.

Figure 6.3.2. Length of the period for all (lots of) projects of the INSC programme 2007 – 2013

(with or without a Financing Agreement) between their AAP approval and their

contracting

Several of the projects approved concerned more specific follow-up of initial, more generic, projects.

This approach has the advantage that the partner country can more easily adjust its institutional

expertise and capacity. The disadvantage is that progress is in many cases slower than expected by the

partner country and this may lead to cooperation being less effective.

To the extent practicable, greater realism should be adopted regarding the time between project

conception and implementation when defining the nature and scope of cooperation – otherwise its

efficacy and relevance may be greatly diminished.

6.4 Major achievements Major achievements of the INSC Programme 2007 – 2013 are:


Page 45 of 58

- the development of programmes for training and tutoring of experts of nuclear

regulatory authorities and their TSOs;

- the widening of the thematic scope from support to operator to the promotion of the

safety culture to establish a sustainable indigenous nuclear safety capacity;

- the widening of the cooperation concerning the improvement of nuclear safety

within the INSC programme from 3 countries in 2007 to 20 countries in 2013;

- the increasing globalisation of the programme with a change in balance of support to

neighbourhood relative to other third countries from 7:1 in the period 2007 - 2009 to

2:1 in the period 2012 – 2013;

- the flexibility to quickly adjust programming of cooperation in response to

unforeseen events such as the Fukushima accident;

- the increased use of regional and multi-country projects, and

- the increased cooperation with international organisations.

6.5 Impact The projects in the first years of the INSC Programme focused on the improvement of nuclear safety

by providing hard and soft assistance to nuclear operators, enhancing the capabilities of nuclear

regulators and their technical support organisations and improving the management of radioactive

waste. These activities were strongly focused on countries in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU.

In the course of the INSC Programme, cooperation with nuclear operators has shifted increasingly

from hard to soft support, and the geographic extent has been expanded greatly through cooperation

with many new third countries. In this way knowledge and experience regarding nuclear safety

developed over many decades in the EU is now being applied globally to support countries in their

safe use of nuclear energy and of radiation and radioactive materials in industry and health care. This

will have a significant impact on the level of nuclear safety in many countries worldwide.

The efficacy of the Strategy for the INSC Programme and its mid-term revision and its impact on

nuclear safety can only be assessed once a sufficient number of projects have reached tangible

achievements and clear milestones.

The time between project approval (in an AAP) and start of implementation appears unduly long for

many projects, often exceeding two or more years.

Such delays were already observed in the TACIS programme and in particular for PIPs. For instance,

the last of these PIPs for the Russian Federation were contracted following approval decisions dating

back to AAP 2006 and earlier and were not completed until 2013..

6.6 Sustainability Improving nuclear safety or enhancing the nuclear safety culture in third countries is an intervention

that needs time to achieve sustainable results. At this stage of the INSC programme, it has not been

possible to assess the sustainability of results achieved because too few projects have currently

reached completion.

Continuity in attention and focus are other aspects influencing sustainability of results. Once effective

cooperation has been established between representatives of the EC and the government of an

envisaged beneficiary country in a first cooperation project, such cooperation needs to be maintained

throughout the project implementation period to ensure effective and sustainable results.

Continuity achieved by means of follow-on projects is an efficient means of achieving sustainable

results. Maintaining regular contacts between the EC and a country by using, ideally, the same

competent representatives on both sides over a longer period of time facilitates good relations and

benefits sustainability of project impact and achievements.


Page 46 of 58

6.7 Implementation difficulties; lessons learned In implementing the INSC Programme the following difficulties have been encountered:

- Identification of the most appropriate counterparts in new “third” countries;

- Understanding of EC administrative procedures by new “third countries”;

- Limitations in absorption capacity of many regulatory bodies and their TSOs, and

- Signing of a Financing Agreement by new “third countries”.

Identification of the most appropriate counterparts in “new” beneficiary countries with the mandate to

take or prepare formal decisions on behalf of the government has often been problematic. Some

governments are more transparent in this respect than others. In some other countries the management

structure regarding nuclear energy and related issues has changed frequently. And the institutional

responsibilities are not always well defined and allocated. In many countries, the EEAS, through the

EU Embassies or delegations, has been very helpful in identifying the responsible institutions and key

persons. The active involvement of the EEAS in the process of engaging with “new” countries is

crucial, as is their continuous interaction with the main players at a political level throughout the

development and implementation of a cooperation project. Such involvement needs to be recognised

and started at the earliest possible opportunity when establishing contacts with “new” third countries.

Administrative procedures of the EC are not always that well understood by “new” third countries.

This easily can lead to misunderstandings, causing delays in the preparation of the procurement of a

project. Timely explanation of these procedures in detail, in discussions between the representatives of

the EC and the beneficiary country, can save a lot of time and frustration.

Another difficulty in implementation has been the limited absorption capacity and capability of

regulatory bodies and their TSOs in some countries. The scope and content of projects must take due

account of the absorption capacity of the beneficiary, otherwise the cooperation will be less than

optimal and, at worst, ineffective or counter-productive.

All this requires a proper preparation of knowledge of the local structures and organisations and a

good planning of envisaged missions.

Signing of a Financing Agreement with a “new” third country appears to be not always that easy.

Some countries needed significant time to understand and discuss concepts before a decision was

taken. In some cases it was not clear which Ministry would be responsible for signing the FA. And for

some countries the FA represented an international Treaty requiring approval by the national

parliament. Implementing projects under the auspices of a FA has the undoubted advantage of

providing more flexibility in programming. However, failure to, or delays in, signing the FA within

the prescribed timescale has resulted in cancellation of the envisaged cooperation in several cases.

Starting the procedure for signing the FA at the earliest opportunity might prevent significant delays in

the procurement and/or avoid the need for cancellation of some projects.

The appropriateness of using Financing Agreements for relatively small projects is also questionable.

The criteria for cooperation already require a letter committing the respective national authorities to

the conditions for such cooperation. Given the considerable administrative burden (for both the EC

and the beneficiary country), the complexity associated with establishing a FA, and the problems

observed in the period 2007 - 2013, consideration should be given to the merits of its continued use, in

particular for projects of modest size.

The impact on the procurement process of having to sign a FA is illustrated in figure 6.3.2. On

average, projects requiring signature of a FA took 1.5 years longer to contract than those that did not.


Page 47 of 58

7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation of the INSC programme as implemented along the criteria and priorities as set out in

the Nuclear Strategy and its mid-term revision has resulted in the following conclusions and

recommendations.

The scope and nature of the INSC programme 2007 - 2013 in the regulatory sector are broadly in

accordance with the objectives of the INSC Regulation and the criteria and priorities of the Nuclear

Strategy and its mid-term revision.

• Best European and international regulatory methods and practice are being transferred; support

is being given to the establishment and/or enhancement of sustainable and independent

regulatory frameworks (including the development and implementation of quality

management systems) in many countries – in particular those planning to embark on the use of

nuclear energy; extensive training and tutoring are being provided across a wide range of areas

(including the elaboration of human resources development plans); and support is being

provided in regulating the safe management of radioactive materials and waste.

• In situ support to senior regulators/management in some countries appeared to be a highly

effective means of cooperation within TACIS. This approach is being continued in the INSC

programme in five countries, namely, Armenia, Belarus, Jordan, Mongolia and Ukraine. It is

too early to reach informed judgements on the efficacy of extending this approach to other

countries, in particular on the sufficiency of appropriately qualified experts (i.e., with the

necessary technical and personal skills) to fulfil this role, and the ability of senior management

in the beneficiary countries to use this resource effectively. The efficacy of support provided

in this manner should be carefully monitored over the next few years, in particular as it will

influence decisions on whether the approach should be used more extensively, or adapted in

light of experience.

• A mechanism should be established to ensure that cooperation with any regulatory authority is

fully in accordance with its strategy and/or action plan/s for enhancing its capabilities and

capacity for regulating nuclear safety; in the absence of a strategy and/or action plan, these

should be developed at the outset of any cooperation, and be used to guide future cooperation

and determine when its objectives have been achieved.

• The revised arrangements for programme and project management in the regulatory sector

should be kept under continuing review to ensure that the expected benefits of these changes

are realised in practice.

• Consideration should be given to whether more prescriptive requirements should be included

in ToR to ensure that European experts spend sufficient time in a beneficiary country to

effectively achieve the project goals.

The scope and nature of the INSC Programme 2007 - 2013 concerned with improving the safety of

nuclear facilities through supporting nuclear operators and making safety improvements in the design,

operation and maintenance of nuclear installations are broadly in accordance with the objectives of the

INSC Regulation and the criteria and priorities of the Nuclear Strategy and its mid-term revision.

• Support in this area has changed greatly, both in its volume and nature, in response to the

revision of the nuclear safety Strategy. Support to operators has shifted from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’

assistance measures and support for safety improvements in design, operation and

maintenance has been greatly reduced.

• Given that nuclear safety, in practice, is achieved by those responsible for design,

construction, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear installations, this

reduction in support for cooperation between designers/operators may not be in the best

interests of enhancing global nuclear safety.

• The balance of cooperation with regulatory authorities and with designers/operators should be

given careful consideration in optimising the scope and content of further INSC activities.


Page 48 of 58

The scope and nature of the INSC Programme 2007 - 2013 in the sector concerned with

decommissioning, radioactive waste and environmental remediation are broadly in accordance with

the objectives of the INSC Regulation and the criteria and priorities of the Nuclear Strategy and its

mid-term revision. In particular:

• The priority of proximity has been met with most of the budget allocated to projects in ENP-

East, with an emphasis on Ukraine and Armenia.

• The requirement to focus on ‘soft’ assistance has been met with by far the majority of the

available budget being used for this purpose.

• The requirement to involve other stakeholders in financing environmental remediation projects

has been met by the Commission’s initiative to harmonise the plans of international

organisations and potential donor countries to support Central Asian countries with the

remediation of the most urgent of their uranium liabilities, resulting in the establishment of a

dedicated Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites (CGULS).

• Actual remediation works will require substantial funds, including support from external

donors. It is strongly recommended that the EC continues its initiative to have a Fund

established at the EBRD to be used by various donors to jointly support remediation in Central

Asia.

International cooperation has been enhanced during the INSC programme, especially with IAEA. This

increased cooperation with IAEA in the development and implementation of projects is fully in accord

with the INSC Strategy and is to be welcomed. Greater clarity and transparency is, however,

recommended on the criteria or process used in deciding which INSC projects are judged likely to be

more effectively implemented by IAEA, rather than through open tendering.

Allocation of the available budget of INSC to the various AAPs has generally been in accord with the

criteria and priorities as outlined in the Nuclear Strategy and its mid-term revision, both among the

technical sectors and regions/countries. In particular:

• The allocation of funds for cooperation with neighbouring countries was about 7 times greater

than that with other third countries in the initial years of the INSC Programme; this decreased

subsequently to about 2 times greater in the latter stages of the programme.

The extension of the geographic coverage of cooperation, from 3 countries at the beginning of the

INSC programme in 2007 to 20 countries in 2013, is impressive, in particular given the time and effort

required to integrate “new” countries within the administrative complexity of the Commission’s

programming and contracting system. While this broad coverage is to be welcomed, the resources

available are limited; even greater consideration will be required in future to ensure resources are

allocated to those areas where improvements in nuclear safety are most needed and where cooperation

would be most effective. Broader geo-political considerations will inevitably influence decisions on

this allocation, and the development of a more transparent and systematic approach/mechanism for

establishing priorities for cooperation will therefore be even more important.

Regional Centres of Excellence have been, or are in the process of being, established under IfS for the

mitigation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risks. Delays in the

establishment of these Centres has constrained the extent to which INSC has been able to use these

Centres, or networks, to support the development and/or implementation of INSC regional projects, in

particular in areas complimentary to IfS activities – for example, emergency preparedness and

response, uranium mining and transport, etc.

• It is recommended to fully exploit the potential of these Centres, once they are established, in

supporting the development of regional INSC activities, especially in the topical areas

indicated above where there is much potential synergy with IfS.

• It is also recommended to clarify which of these two Instruments will be responsible in future

for safeguards, training of inspectors, and materials control in order to prevent confusion,


Page 49 of 58

avoid duplication and wasting resources, and enable the implementation of support measures

in this sector with greater efficiency.

The appropriateness of conducting Financing Agreements for relatively small projects is questionable.

The criteria for cooperation already require a letter committing the respective national authorities to

the conditions for such cooperation. Establishing a Financing Agreement between the EC and the

beneficiary country creates a considerable administrative burden (for both the EC and the beneficiary

country). The country-specific procedures of having the FA signed are rather diverse and can be quite

complex and unpredictable. This has resulted, in several cases in the period 2007 – 2013, in the

unwanted cancelling of projects already approved in AAPs.

• It is recommended to reconsider the merits of and the need for establishing Financing

Agreements between the EC and beneficiary countries, in particular for projects of modest

size.

One aspect of programme/project implementation and management remains a matter of concern – this

is the time between formal project approval by the Commission and its contracting. This period varies

greatly between projects, ranging from as short as 3 months to more than four years; on average the

period is about 2.5 years. The lengths of these periods and their variability are similar for projects in

all sectors, and irrespective of whether contracts were awarded by open tendering or negotiated

procedure. In general, the period was greater for those projects requiring a signed Financing

Agreement. These delays are substantial and can have a deleterious effect on programming and the

efficacy of project implementation, both in practice and in the perception of beneficiaries.

• Therefore, it is strongly recommended that a detailed investigation be carried out of the root

causes of these delays, with a view to identifying how they can be reduced, where practicable.


Page 50 of 58

Annex A: Details on (Lots of) projects as approved in the various AAPs of the INSC

programme 2007 – 2013 (status per October 2013)

AAP – Annual Action Programme

FA – Financing Agreement

NA – Contract based on a negotiated agreement

O/R T – Contract based on open/restricted tendering

PLANNING IMPLEMENTING

No. AAP (Lot of) Project AAP

Budget

FA NA O/R

T

Contract(s)

signing

date(s)

Summary description (M€) YES/

NO

YES/

NO

YES/

NO

AAP 2007

Part I

18.0 Spring 2007

(05-2007)

1 OSA bridging within RF 3.0 N Y N 13/01/2008

1/08/2008

2 OSA bridging within Ukraine 3.0 N Y N 11/11/2008

24/06/2008

3 Assessment of safety improvements in VVER type NPPs in Ukraine

(IAEA)

2.0 N Y N 29/11/2007

4 CSF 2007.I Contribution Chernobyl shelter 10.0 N Y N 30/11/2007

AAP 2007

Part II

58.772 Autumn

(10) 2007

5 A 1.01/07 Safety management in the NPP of Armenia 6.4 Y N Y 7/08/2008

15/08/2008

29/11/2008

3/03/2009

8/06/2009

18/06/2009

14/06/2011

6 A 3.01/07 Support to the Nuclear Safety Authority of Armenia: institution

building.

0.8

7 R 1.09/07 Continuation OSA Kursk and LNPP 2.0 Cancelled

8 R 1.10/07 Continuation OSA Balakovo, Volgodonsk and Bilibino 2.0 Cancelled

9 R 1.11/07 Safety management in the NPPs of the RF 4.972 Cancelled

10 R 2.01/07 Strength and residual life of VVER-1000 internals and upper blocks

under long-term integrity and the operational safety of the NPPs.

3.5 Cancelled

11 R 2.02/07 Optimisation of in-service inspection, NDT and hydrotests of the

VVER-1000 primary circuit components.

2.0 Cancelled

12 R 2.03/07 Improvement of stress analysis standards for plant pressure

boundary components of VVER reactors.

1.0 Cancelled

13 R 3.01/07 Institutional and technical co-operation with Rostechnadzor and its

TSOs to develop their capabilities on the basis of transferred

Western European safety principles and practices.

2.8 Cancelled

14 R 4.01/07 Co-operation on radioactive waste, decommissioning and

remediation activities with the Russian Federation.

10.0 Cancelled

15 U 1.05/07

A/B/C

Completion of the national Maintenance and Management Training

Centre for NNEGC Energoatom personnel at Zaporozhye NPP.

14.0 Y N Y 25/08/2009

2/12/2011

5/12/2011

16 U 2.01/07 Sector assistance for the development of a strategy for the long-term

Ukrainian safety management.

2.5 Y N Y 18/11/2010

17 U 3.01/07 Institutional and technical co-operation with SNRCU to develop

their capabilities on the basis of transferred European safety

principles and practices.

2.8 Y Y N 20/12/2010

18 U 4.02/07 Additional equipment for ICSRM project in Chernobyl. 1.5 Y Y N 09/12/2008

18/01/2010

11/11/20111

9/01/2012

19 REG 01/07 Provision of policy and technical advice related to the co-operation

with National Regulatory Authorities and their TSO for

strengthening their managerial and technical capabilities.

1.0 N Y N 16/11/2009

20 REG 02/07 Children of Chernobyl: people to people exchange programmes for

Chernobyl children and continued support in Ukraine and Belarus

for health programmes to help the victims of the accident with the

Chernobyl NPP.

1.5 N Y N 16/06/2009

10/06/2009

Total

2007:

17 actions in 3 different countries

+ 2 multi-country actions

76.772

AAP 2008 23.0 Spring 2008


Page 51 of 58



Budget

FA NA O/R

T

Contract(s)

signing

date(s)

Part I 05-08

21 R 7.01/08 Management of INSC in Russia (JMU) 3.5 N Y N 12/11/2008

18/11/2009

22 U 7.01/08 Management of INSC in Ukraine (JSO) 3.5 N N Y 5/12/2008


24 XXX Additional measures INSC management (global) 1.0

AAP 2008

Part II

48.255 Autumn

10-2008

25 A 1.01/08

T3/T4

Support to Nuclear Operator of Armenia – ANPP. 5.5 Y N Y 3/12/2010

26 BY 3.01/08 Institutional and technical co-operation with GOSATOMNADZOR

to develop its capabilities on the basis of transferred European

principles and practices.

2.2 Y Y N 29/03/2011

1/12/2012

27 EG 3.01/08 Provision of assistance related to the first co-operation steps for

developing and strengthening the capabilities of Egypt Atomic

Energy Authority (EAEA) and its National2Centre for Nuclear

Safety and Radiation Control (NCNSRC)

1.0

28 GE 3.01/08 Support to Nuclear Safety Authorities (NRSS) of Georgia in the

field of regulations, norms and radwaste management licensing

activities.

0.8

29 GE 4.01/08 Survey and strategic assessment of Georgian radwaste disposal and

interim storage sites.

1.0 Y N Y 10/05/2012

30 JO 3.01/08 Provision of assistance related to the first co-operation steps for

developing and strengthening the capabilities of Jordan Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (JNRC).

1.0 Y Y N 18/03/2010

31 R 1.11/08 Support to improved operational and maintenance procedures of

Rosenergoatom NPPs.

0.5 Cancelled

32 R 3.01/08 Institutional and technical co-operation with Rostechnadzor and its

TSOs to develop their capabilities on the basis of transferred

Western European safety principles and practices.

2.0 Cancelled

33 R 4.01/08 Co-operation on Radioactive Waste, Decommissioning and

Remediation activities with the Russian Federation.

8.0 Cancelled

34 U 1.05/08 Support to improved operational and maintenance procedures and

safety management of Energoatom NPPs.

8.355 Y N Y 17/01/2011

22/11/2010

08/02/2011

24/12/2012

10/01/2011

35 U 3.01/08 Co-operation with SNRCU for the licensing of radioactive waste

management facilities and for the validation of soft on-site

assistance (NPP level).

1.7 Y Y N 28/11/2011

36 U 3.02/08 Support to SNRCU to implement RODOS in the Information and

Emergency Centre of Ukraine.

0.5 Y N Y 25/10/2011

37 U 4.01/08

A/B/C/D

Improvement of radwaste classification and management in Ukraine 8.0 Y N Y 12/04/2011

21/09/2011

14/03/2011

24/12/2012

38 U 4.01/08

Ph 1

Improvement of the infrastructure of the waste management in the

Chernobyl Exclusion Zone

Phase 1- Safety Assessment

Incl.

39 U 4.02/08 Feasibility study and preliminary design for a near-surface facility

for the LT storage of LLHLW on site of the complex Vektor in the

Chez.

3.0 Y N Y 13/12/2010

40 MC

2.01/08

Enhancing national and regional preparedness for responding to

radiation incidents and emergencies in some non-EU countries.

1.0 N N Y 13/12/2010

41 REG

5.01/08A

Nuclear safeguards – Russian Federation and Armenia. 3.7 Y Y N 13/01/2012

Total

2008:



71.255

AAP 2009

Part I

30.2 Spring

05-2009

42 OSA bridging in RF 2.0 N Y N 2/11/2009

12/10/2009

43 INSC management in RF (see 2008) 2.5 N Y N 12/11/2009



46 CSF 2009.2 Contribution Nuclear Safety Account 15.0 N Y N 9/12/2009

47 Additional contribution Chernobyl Shelter N Y N 18/12/2009

AAP 2009

Part II

43.5 Autumn

10-2009


Page 52 of 58



Budget

FA NA O/R

T

Contract(s)

signing

date(s)

48 A1.01.09A Enhancement of main control room operators training (simulator) 0.9 Y N Y 27/10/2011

49 A 1.01/09

T2

Support to the operator of ANPP 0.7 Y N Y 22/02/2010

50 A 1.01/09

T3+4


51 A 1.01/09

T5

Support to the operator of ANPP 1.7

52 A 1.01/09

T6


53 A 3.01/09 Enhancement of the safety assessment capabilities of the Armenian

Nuclear regulatory Authority (ANRA) for licensing of Medzamor 2

safety improvements and of decommissioning activities.

2.0 Y Y N 7/06/2013

54 A 4.01/09 Development of Radioactive Waste Management Strategy for

Armenia.

1.5 Y N Y 27/09/2013

55 BR 1.01/09

T1/T2/T3

Nuclear safety co-operation with the operator of the NPP in Brazil

(Electronuclear).

3.0 Y N Y 22/03/2011

8/03/2011

1/04/2011

56 BR 3.01/09 Nuclear safety co-operation with the Regulatory Authorities of

Brazil.

2.0 Y Y N 18/12/2011

57 BY 3.01/09 Development of technical co-operation in nuclear safety in the field

of assistance to Regulatory Authorities (Belarus).

2.2 Y Y N 31/05/2013

58 GE 4.01/09 Support to the operators in the preparation of Safety Assessment

Reports for Georgian radwaste disposal and interim storage sites.

0.5 N N Y 12/07/2013

59 MO

3.01/09

Provision of assistance related to the first cooperation steps for

developing and strengthening the capabilities of Moroccan Nuclear

Regulatory Authority and its Technical Safety Organisation.

1.0 Y Y N 27/04/2011

60 PH 3.01/09 Technical assistance for improving the legal framework for nuclear

safety and strengthening the capabilities of the Regulatory Authority

of the Philippines and its Technical Safety Organisation.

1.5

61 U 1.05/09 Co-operative safety programme to enhance the cultural, procedural

and technical capability and effectiveness of NNEGC and its NPPs.

8.8 Y N Y 10/09/2012

62 U 1.05/09

T1

Co-operative safety programme to enhance the cultural, procedural


Incl.

(2.0)

63 U 1.05/09

T4



Incl.

(0.9)

Y N Y 26/09/2013

64 U 1.05/09

T5



Incl.

65 U 1.05/09

T6A

RODOS Ukraine/services Incl. Y Y N 8/11/2012

66 U 1.05/09

T6B

RODOS Ukraine/Supply Incl. Incl.

67 U 3.03/09 Support to SNRCU (UK/TS/41-44) - Y Y N 10/09/2012

68 U 3.04/09 Support to SNRCU (UK/TS/45) - Y Y N 17/12/2012

69 U 4.01/09A Support of the establishment of a national waste management

organisation and the improvement of the radioactive waste

management infrastructure in Ukraine.

5.0 Y N Y 30/03/2012

26/10/2012

70 U 4.01/09B Support of the establishment of a national waste management

organisation and the improvement of the radioactive waste

management infrastructure in Ukraine.

Incl. Y N Y 14/01/2013

71 VN 3.01/09 Technical assistance for improving the legal framework for nuclear

safety and strengthening the capabilities of the Regulatory Authority

of Vietnam (VARANS) and its Technical Safety Organisation.

2.0 Y Y N 18/05/2012

72 MC.01/09 Contributions to IAEA’s TC and NIS projects in non-EU countries 6.5 N Y N 2/10/2010

1/08/2010

Total

2009:


+ 1 multi-country action

73.7

AAP 2010

Part I

7.7 Spring

05-2010

73 R 1.07/10 OSA bridging in RF 1.0 N Y N 31/08/2010

74 U 1.01/10 OSA bridging in Ukraine 3.0 N Y N 6/08/2010

22/11/2010

75 A 1.01/10 OSA bridging in Armenia 2.4 N Y N 27/09/2010

28/02/2011


AAP 2010

Part II

61.628 Autumn

10-2010

77 A 3.01/10 Institutional building of Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority

(ANRA).

1.0

78 BR 1.01/10 Nuclear Safety Cooperation with the Nuclear Operator of Brazil 3.0


Page 53 of 58



Budget

FA NA O/R

T

Contract(s)

signing

date(s)

(Electronuclear).

79 CH 3.01/10 Upgrading Nuclear Safety and Management Technical Capabilities

of National Nuclear Safety Authority (NNSA) and other Institutions

and Centres Providing Technical Backstopping to NNSA.

2.0

80 EG 3.01/10 Provision of assistance related to developing and strengthening the

capabilities of the Egyptian Nuclear Regulatory Authority.

1.5

81 JO 3.01/10 Provision of assistance related to developing and strengthening the

capabilities of the Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC).

1.2 Y Y N 5/07/2012

82 MX3.01/10 Nuclear safety co-operation with the Regulatory Authorities of

Mexico (CNSNS).

1.8 Y Y N 13/04/2012

83 MX4.01/10 Co-operation in the development of a policy and strategy for the

management of spent nuclear fuel (including provisions for its safe

interim storage) and radioactive waste in Mexico.

1.5 Y N Y 29/02/2012

84 U 1.05/10 Co-operative safety programme to enhance the Operational

Effectiveness, Safety Performance and Human Resources’

effectiveness of NNEGC Energoatom and its nuclear power plants.

9.0 Y N Y 1/09/2013

85 U 3.01/10 Assistance to State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine

(SNRCU) in regulation of priority issues on safe radioactive waste

management and harmonisation of regulatory requirements on

nuclear and radiation safety with reference levels Western European

Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA).

2.5

86 U4.01/10/A 9.628

87 U 4.01/10

B/E

Support for Radioactive Waste Management in Ukraine. Incl

(1.585)

88 U 4.01/10

C/D/F

Support for Radioactive Waste Management in Ukraine. Incl

(4.845)

89 U4.01/10/G Support for Radioactive Waste Management in Ukraine. Incl

(0.9)

90 UZ 4.01/10 Integrated environmental impact assessment and feasibility study

for the management and remediation of uranium production legacy

sites of Charkesar and Yangiabad.

1.5 Y N Y 2/09/2013

91 MC.01/10 Contributions to IAEA’s TC and NIS projects in non-EU countries. 4.0 N Y N 18/11/2011

92 MC.02/10 Support to establishing CONNECT: Connecting the Network of

Networks for Enhanced Communication and Training in

Radioactive Waste Management, Decommissioning and

Environmental Remediation.

0.5 N N Y 18/12/2011

93 MC.03/10 Training and Tutoring for experts of the nuclear regulatory

authorities and their technical support organisations for developing

or strengthening their regulatory and technical capabilities.

3.0 N Y N 28/12/2011

29/12/2011

94 REG

4.01/10

Establishment of a legislative and regulatory framework for the

remediation of uranium mining legacy sites in Central Asia,

establishment of a regional watershed monitoring system and

capacity building in analytical techniques, training and education

and information exchange.

2.5

95 CSF 2010.I Contribution Chernobyl shelter 17 N Y N 9/12/2010

Total

2010:



69.328

AAP 2011

Part I

38.7 17-08-2011

96 R 7.01/11 INSC management in RF 0.75 N Y N 18/11/2011

97 U 7.01/11 INSC management in Ukraine 2.75


99 U 6.01/11

B/C/D/E

Health and ecological programmes Chernobyl 4.2 N

N

N

Y

Y

N

31/12/2012

31/12/2012

31/12/2012

1/04/2013

100 AA.01/11 Technical support for the project cycle management of nuclear

safety projects.

2.5 N Y N 19/12/2012


AAP 2011

Part II

35.8 Autumn

08-2011

102 A 1.01/11 Contributions to the Armenian nuclear power plant (ANPP) operator

for the implementation of the "Stress Tests" at ANPP.

1.0 Y Y N 9/07/2012

103 A 3.01/11 Enhancement of the safety assessment capabilities of the Armenian

Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ANRA), for nuclear

decommissioning and for the regulatory assessment of execution of

the “stress tests”.

0.8

104 CH 3.01/11 Enhancing the capacity and regulatory capabilities of the Chinese 2.0


Page 54 of 58



Budget

FA NA O/R

T

Contract(s)

signing

date(s)

National Nuclear Regulatory Authority and its Technical Support

Organisations.

105 CH 3.02/11

A

Enhancing capabilities in the areas of Emergency Management and

in the Management of Severe Accidents.

1.35

106 CH 3.02/11

B

Enhancing capabilities in the areas of Emergency Management and

in the Management of Severe Accidents.

0.15

107 CH 4.01/11 Cooperation in the development of a policy and strategy for the

management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in China.

1.5

108 CSF2011.II Contribution Chernobyl shelter 8.0 N Y N 19/12/2011

2/08/2012

109 IQ 4.01/11 Feasibility study, basic design and engineering design of an

engineered radioactive waste disposal facility.

2.0

110 KG 4.01/11 Integrated Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Feasibility

Study (FS) for the management and remediation of the Min-Kush

uranium production legacy site.

0.6

111 MC

3.01/11

Training and Tutoring for experts of the National Regulatory

Authorities and their Technical Support Organisations for

developing or strengthening their regulatory and technical

capabilities.

3.0 N Y N 1/06/2013

1/06/2013

112 MC5.01/11 Nuclear Safeguards - Brazil and Argentina. 2.0 N Y N 27/09/2012

113 MN3.01/11 Establishment of a Regulatory Framework for Uranium Mines and

Milling Operations in Mongolia.

1.0

114 TJ 4.01/11 Integrated Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Feasibility

Study (FS) of the remediation of the uranium tailings management

facility of Degmay.

1.1

115 TJ 4.02/11 Integrated Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Feasibility

Study (FS) of the remediation of the uranium mining and processing

facility of Taboshar.

1.3

116 U 3.01/11 Co-operation with SNRIU in regulatory activities connected with

the implementation of the Joint Safety Improvement Program at

Ukrainian NPPs and "soft" EU industrial projects.

2.4 Y Y N 13/06/2012

117 U 4.01/11 Support to radioactive waste management in Ukraine. 7.6

Total

2011:



74.5

AAP 2012 76.055 06-08-2012

118 BR 3.01/12 Support to the Nuclear safety Regulator of Brazil. 2.0

119 IQ 4.01/12 Equipment of a radiochemical laboratory and establishment of a

mobile radiochemical laboratory.

4.0

120 KG 4.01/12 Integrated environmental impact assessment (EIA) and feasibility

study (FS) for the management and remediation of the Shekaftar

uranium mining legacy site in Kyrgyzstan.

1.5

121 MN3.01/12 Regulatory regime for nuclear energy, enhancing radiation safety

and nuclear safeguards in Mongolia.

3.0

122 MX3.01/12 Support to Mexico in the implementation of the “stress test” and

severe accident for Nuclear Power Plants according to EU

experience.

2.5

123 MY3.01/12 Enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of the regulatory body of

Malaysia and developing its national waste management strategy.

2.0

124 U1.05/12 Co-operative safety programme to enhance safety and endurance of

NNEGC Energoatom’s nuclear power plants in case of extreme

external impacts.

3.0

125 U 4.01/12 Infrastructure improvement for radioactive waste management,

remediation of contaminated sites and decommissioning in Ukraine.

9.5 Y Y N 17/11/2012

126 CIS3.01/12 Support to the Armenian and Ukrainian Regulatory Authorities. 3.0 N Y N 14/11/2012

127 MC

3.01/12

Co-operation with the IAEA’s Department of Technical Co-

operation and Department of Nuclear Safety and Security – Division

of Nuclear Installation Safety.

9.255 N Y N 21/06/2013

128 CSF 2012.I Contribution Chernobyl shelter 35.3 n y n 8/10/2012


Total

2012:



76.055

AAP 2013 50.44 30-08-2013

130 A 3.01/13 Enhancement of ANRA and NRSC capabilities for safety review

and assessment of radioactive waste management facilities and

activities.

1.0

131 BY 3.01/13 Support and assistance to strengthen the capabilities of the

Belarusian Nuclear Regulatory Authority MES/Gosatomnadzor in

the field of licensing and supervision of construction of the

4.5


Page 55 of 58



Budget

FA NA O/R

T

Contract(s)

signing

date(s)

Belarusian NPP.

132 ID 3.01/13 Enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of the regulatory body and

developing a national waste management strategy.

1.5

133 JO 3.01/13 Provision of assistance related to developing and strengthening the

capabilities of Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC) and

the radioactive waste management in Jordan.

2.0

134 TH 3.01/13 Enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of the regulatory body and

developing a national waste management strategy.

1.5

135 VN 3.01/13 Enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of the Vietnam Agency

for Radiation and Nuclear Safety and its Technical Support

Organisation/s.

2.0

136 MC.03/13 Multinational and regional Training and Tutoring for experts of the

National Regulatory Authorities and their Technical Support

Organisations for developing or strengthening their regulatory and

technical capabilities.

3.0

137 MC 4/13 Feasibility study and preparation for the implementation of an

action plan concerning the safe and secure management / disposal of

sunken radioactive objects in the Arctic Sea.

1.5

138 MC

4.02/13

Urgent measures for the management and remediation of high risk

uranium legacy sites in Central Asia.

3.0

139 MC. 05/13 Regional Cooperation on Emergency Preparedness and Response in

South East Asia - Feasibility Study.

0.5

140 U7.1/13 INSC management in Ukraine 3.0


142 CSF 2013.I Contribution Chernobyl shelter 25.105

Total

2013:

7 actions in 7 countries

+4 multi-country actions

50.44

Total

2007–

2013:

Development of 107 actions in 21 different countries


Cancelled: 13 actions in 3 countries

492.05


Page 56 of 58

Annex B: INSC highlights

B1. Training and Tutoring of Nuclear Regulators and their TSO

Training, in one or other guise, is an integral part of most INSC projects, and its scope, content and

implementation are optimised to effectively achieve the particular objectives of a given project. While

training within projects will continue to be a key element of most INSC projects, the need for a more

integrated and holistic approach to the training of nuclear regulators and their TSO, in particular in

countries planning to embark on the use of nuclear energy, has been recognised – both in terms of

meeting an identified and increasing demand and making best use of limited European resources in

providing the requested training.

In response to this increasing need, support has been given, through three projects (9 M€), for the

provision of focused training and tutoring within a more integrated and broadly conceived framework.

Training and tutoring are being provided in four distinct but linked areas: the legal basis and

regulatory processes; basic, applied and advanced technologies; regulatory practices (e.g., assessment,

inspection, investigation, audit); and human factors. Self-contained, but complementary (i.e.,

conceived within a broader framework) courses on specific topics are being offered to applicants from

INSC countries, often in regional settings; likewise, opportunities for longer duration tutoring (i.e., ‘on

the job’ training) on specific topics are also available under the mentorship of European nuclear

regulators or their TSO.

This initiative is in its formative stages, but experience so far is highly promising. Demand for training

and tutoring is high, with fourteen countries and three regional associations of nuclear regulators

(Arab, Asian and Latin American) already participating in the programme. Numerous courses have

been held and many placements for ‘on the job’ training have been made with European regulators or

their TSO. Improvements in both the scope and content of the programme and its mode of

implementation can be expected as further experience is gathered – but the indications are that this

initiative will become one of the major successes of the INSC programme.

B2. Support to Regulatory Authorities in Belarus

Cooperation with the nuclear regulator in Belarus began under the TACIS programme in 2005, but has

intensified and become more focused during the INSC programme. Cooperation initially addressed a

diverse range of radiation and nuclear safety issues, in particular the development of key elements of a

regulatory framework and responding to the continuing consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

Following the decision of the Belarusian Government in 2008 to construct two NPP close the EU

border (i.e., 20 km from Lithuania), the nature and scale of cooperation have increased and become

more focused. Cooperation is now largely directed towards supporting the development of a fully

independent and competent regulatory body, in particular one that is capable of regulating the safety of

the planned NPP in accordance with best international practice and on a timescale commensurate with

that foreseen for their construction. About 9 M€ has so far been allocated from the INSC programme,

through three sequential projects, for this purpose.

Priorities for cooperation have been established in a strategy (and action plan for its implementation),

prepared by Belarus, with support from INSC, for establishing an independent and competent

regulatory body. Key elements include the development of a regulatory framework, a quality

management system for regulatory activities, a human resources development plan, an independent

TSO, capabilities for reviewing safety analysis reports and supervising safety related structures and

components during design, manufacture and installation, emergency preparedness and response and

environmental impact assessments, etc. To enhance the efficacy of this knowledge transfer, EU

experts will work locally on a ‘quasi-continuous’ basis with senior regulators in Belarus. In addition,

Belarus will be supported by the regulatory authority of Ukraine, whose capabilities have been

enhanced considerably over the past two decades with support from the TACIS and INSC programmes

- its transition from being a recipient of support to providing it exemplifies the success of the

TACIS/INSC programmes.


Page 57 of 58

The rapid escalation and more focused nature of cooperation with Belarus have demonstrated that the

INSC programme can be responsive to emerging and changing needs. Given the proximity of the new

reactors to the borders of the EU, the importance of continued and effective cooperation in this area

cannot be overstated.

B3. Stress Tests and Extreme Events

Following the Fukushima accident, the European Council requested that reviews be made of the safety

of all NPP in the EU, based on comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessments (the so

called ‘stress tests’), in particular of how NPP could withstand the consequences of more extreme

triggering events such as earthquakes, floods, etc that could lead to multiple loss of safety functions

and require severe accident management. The successful completion of these ‘stress tests’ in Europe,

and their regulatory follow up, has led to much interest and requests to transfer this knowledge and

experience elsewhere.

The INSC programme, unlike IAEA, was receptive to this need and has included, where requested,

cooperation on this or related topics within four projects. Lessons learned from application of the

‘stress tests’ in Europe will be transferred to Mexico, who will also be supported in performing its own

‘stress tests’ in accordance with the ENSREG specifications; support will also be given in the analysis

of the results. Knowledge and experience will be exchanged with China on the response to

earthquakes and floods in excess of the design basis, and a common understanding sought on threats

from extreme events and the development of common standards and safety provisions. Experience

from, and methods adopted in, the ‘stress tests’ will be shared with Ukraine and will be integrated

within a regulatory assessment of analyses of the seismic resistance of Ukrainian NPP. Under the

auspices of a multi-country INSC project being implemented by IAEA, support will be given to

various facets of assessing the impact of extreme events and its implications for the safety of NPP (i.e.,

methodologies and guidelines for systematic peer reviews, regulatory guidance, self-evaluation, etc).

The receptiveness of INSC and its timely response to requests for cooperation in this area have

demonstrated its ability to respond effectively to emerging and important safety issues. Supporting

other INSC countries in performing the ‘stress tests’ and follow-up measures (e.g. peer reviews) in

future will make an important contribution to enhancing global nuclear safety.

B4. Integrated EIA and FS of high priority uranium legacy sites in Uzbekistan

Uranium production in Central Asian countries between 1944 and 1995 has left behind a huge legacy

of uranium mining and processing wastes and abandoned conventional uranium mines. After 1995,

most of the conventional uranium mines were closed. In 1995, within the frame of the TACIS Nuclear

Safety programme, the European Commission initiated a study into the problem of the legacies of

uranium mining and processing in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the Russian Federation and

Ukraine. Other international studies followed. As a result of these studies, and based upon a

preliminary qualitative risk assessment of the legacy sites by IAEA, supported by the EC, it was

possible to identify the priority sites urgently requiring remediation. The legacy sites of Charkesar and

Yangiabad in the Republic of Uzbekistan are among the identified priority sites of Central Asia. The

government of Uzbekistan has requested support from the EC for proper management and remediation

of these sites.

Charkesar site

At Charkesar-1, there are five waste rock dumps, none of which have been rehabilitated and there are

no plans for remediation at the current time. There are six waste rock dumps at Charkesar-2. The total

volume of radioactive wastes is estimated to be approximately 482,000 m3 and this is spread over an

area of about 20.6 ha.

Partial remediation of the site was attempted some time ago and the low-grade ore and waste rock

piles were partially covered. However, the slopes of the piles were too steep, the covering works were

not prepared well and the cover shows erosion/slippage. Irradiation dose rates and radon exhalation

rates measured in 2007 indicate that the cover is not adequate.


Page 58 of 58

Because the shafts of the abandoned mine were not sealed at the time of mine closure, they present a

permanent safety hazard for the people and animals frequenting the site. The ventilation shaft is

located on a small hill, and now discharges contaminated mine water (about 3-5 litres per second)

under artesian pressure. The measured uranium concentrations in the discharged water are in the range

of 26-40 Bq/l, and radium concentrations are in the range 1-3 Bq/l. The gross alpha activity in the river

water was estimated (by one sample only) to be 2.5 Bq/l upstream of the drainage water outfall and 4.7

Bq/l downstream.

Very high irradiation exposure rates have been recorded for the local population, particularly

attributable to the use of tailings as building materials: an indoor radon concentration between 1,000

Bq/m3 and 1,200 Bq/m

3 has been recorded, with relatively high gamma exposure rates also being

measured. Depending on the scenario of exposure, the maximal possible dose to the public is expected

to be in the range of 2.9 mSv/a to 28.0 mSv/a.

Yangiabad site

The low grade ore and waste rock piles were left around the mines, and at the surface of some of them

a gamma-dose rate of 3.5 µSv/h has been recorded. The ore storage yard is located in the central part

of Yangiabad village and seepage from the former mine shaft is released directly to the storage yard.

Gamma exposure rates in the range of 1.4 µSv/h to 7.5 µSv/h have been recorded in the storage yard.

The shaft gallery is filled by mine water with relatively high uranium content (up to 30 Bq/l). Other

trace metals are also present in this water, which is flowing directly into the river that is one of the

main sources of water at the valley site. Some local citizens living downstream use the water for

irrigation and/or drinking. It appears that no groundwater and surface water monitoring has been

undertaken.

The purpose of this INSC project is to conduct an integral environmental impact assessment and

feasibility study of the Charkesar and Yangiabad sites. The environmental impact assessment and the

feasibility study will be the basis for subsequent decision making regarding remediation of the sites.

The project consists of an initial analysis of existing data, identification of data gaps, recommended

site characterisation activities to fill those data gaps, proposed remediation concepts and alternatives,

establishment of site-specific monitoring systems for initial characterisations and long-term

surveillance, as well as time schedule and cost estimates.

This project will support the long-term objective of the Uzbek government which is the safe

management and remediation of the uranium production legacy sites of Charkesar and Yangiabad.

Implementation of this project started in Autumn 2013. This project will contribute to a much better

environmental situation and an improvement of human protection against irradiation in Yangiabad and

Charkesar in Uzbekistan.

Documents

Accompanying document final final edit rev - Wählen Sie …ec.europa.eu/.../files/accompanying-document-evaluation-insc-2007... · Evaluation of the implementation of the INSC Regulation