Imagine Yourself in the Product: Mental Simulation, Narrative Transportation, and PersuasionAuthor(s): Jennifer Edson EscalasReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Advertising, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer, 2004), pp. 37-48Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4189256 .Accessed: 04/09/2012 06:48

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IMAGINE YOURSELF IN THE PRODUCT

Mental Simulation, Narrative Transportation, and Persuasion

Jennifer Edson Escalas

ABSTRACT: Mental simulation has been defined as the cognitive construction of hypothetical scenarios, which are usually in the form of stories or narratives. The experiment in this paper examines the favorable effect of ad-encouraged mental simulation on ad attitudes and brand evaluations. A model is developed wherein mental simulation persuades via narrative

transportation, defined as immersion into a story (Gerrig 1994; Green and Brock 2000). Transportation includes strong affective responses and low levels of critical thought, which, in turn, affect ad attitudes and brand evaluations.

A recent television ad for a Lexus? automobile was filmed

from the driver's seat. The car is stopped at an intersection

with a car next to it. The announcer says, "Imagine this is

your only chance to make an impression. What type of im-

pression would you like to leave?" Lottery ads encourage con-

sumers to "dream a little dream" of how they would spend their millions, were they to win. Mercury? automobile ads

invite viewers to "imagine yourself in a Mercury." A recent

Whirlpool? ad campaign asks viewers to "imagine treating clothes so well they look new longer." In these ads and others, marketers use the advertising tactic of encouraging viewers

to imagine positive scenarios involving themselves and the

products advertised. The main question addressed by this paper

is, By what mechanism(s) does mental simulation enhance

persuasion? Mental simulation can be thought of as the cognitive con-

struction of hypothetical scenarios (Taylor and Schneider

1989), which are usually in the form of stories or narratives

(Fiske 1993). When we simulate events, we frequently think

about our own actual or potential behaviors, creating behav-

ioral scenarios, similar to stories, in which we are the main

character. Therefore, we propose that the mechanism through which mental simulation persuades is the same as the mecha-

nism through which stories persuade. Green and Brock (2000) have shown that stories persuade via transportation, which is

defined as "immersion into a text," that is, the extent to which

individuals become "lost" in a story (Gerrig 1994; Green and

Brock 2000, p. 702). Transportation leads to persuasion

through reduced negative cognitive responding, realism of

experience, and strong affective responses (Green and Brock

2000).

Jennifer Edson Escalas (Ph.D. in business administration, Duke

University) is an assistant professor of marketing in the Eller School of Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona.

First, we review the relevant literature on mental simula-

tion and narrative transportation; then we develop hypoth- eses. Next, an experiment examines the effects of mental

simulation in a print advertising context. The paper ends with

conclusions, managerial implications, and directions for fu-

ture research.

MENTAL SIMULATION

Mental simulation is the imitative mental representation of

some event or series of events (Taylor and Schneider 1989). It

can be thought of as the cognitive construction of hypotheti- cal scenarios, including rehearsals of likely future events, fan-

tasizing about less likely future events, realistically

reexperiencing past events, or reconstructing past events,

mixing in hypothetical elements. Mental simulations are usu-

ally in the form of stories or narratives (Fiske 1993;

Polkinghorne 1991). When we simulate events, we frequently think about our own actual or potential behaviors, creating behavioral episodes (i.e., stories) in which we are the main

character. Taylor and Schneider's (1989) definition of mental

simulation subsumes autobiographical memories, which have

been defined as the recollection of earlier events from one s

life (Baddeley 1990). The capacity to simulate events may be

one of the most distinctive and important features of cogni- tion (Taylor and Schneider 1989). It enables people to rerun

past events, possibly altering them, and to project multiple versions of future events. Consequently, mental simulation is

important for preparing for future events and interpreting

past events.

Social psychologists have examined the consequences of

mental simulation. To summarize, this stream of research has

demonstrated that mental simulation can lead to higher as-

sessed probability estimates of simulated events and positive

changes in attitudes, brand evaluations, and actual behavior,

particularly if the simulation is self-relevant and repeated (e.g.,

Journal cf Advertising, vol. 33, no. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 37-48. O 2004 American Academy of Advertising. All rights reserved.

ISSN0091-3367 / 2004 $950 ? 0.00.

38 ? he Journal of Advertising

Anderson 1983; Carroll 1978; Gregory, Cialdini, and Car-

penter 1982). The predominant explanation for these effects

is based on Tversky and Kahneman's (1982) availability heu-

ristic: To the extent that an idea or event is cognitively avail-

able, it will be perceived as likely (see also Kahnemann and

Tversky 1982 for a discussion of the simulation heuristic).

The process by which availability affects attitudes and behav-

ior has not been empirically tested, however. In this paper, we

argue that the narrative structure of mental simulation pro- vides a potential explanation for its effects on attitudes and

intentions.

Narrative Transportation

As mentioned above, mental simulations are usually in the

form of stories or narratives (Fiske 1993; Polkinghorne 1991).

People tend to simulate events, focusing on goals, behaviors,

and outcomes, and therefore creating stories. The narrative

structure of stories consists of two important elements: chro-

nology and causality. First, narrative thought organizes events

in terms of a temporal dimension: things occur over time

(Bruner 1990; Fiske 1993). Time is configured in narratives

as episodes, each with a beginning, middle, and end. Second,

narrative thought structures story elements into an organized framework that establishes relationships between the elements

and allows for causal inferencing (Bruner 1990). Narrative

story organization incorporates general knowledge about hu-

man goal-oriented action episodes that consist of a goal, ac-

tion, and an outcome (Pennington and Hastie 1986; Stein

and Albro 1997).

Green and Brock (2000) find that stories persuade via trans-

portation, which is defined as "immersion into a text," that

is, the extent to which individuals become "lost" in a story (p.

702). Transportation is contrasted with analytical processing

traditionally studied in dual-process models of persuasion (e.g., Elaboration Likelihood Model {ELM], Petty, Cacioppo, and

Schumann 1983). Analytical "elaboration leads to attitude

change via logical consideration and evaluation of arguments," whereas transportation leads to persuasion through reduced

negative cognitive responding, realism of experience, and

strong affective responses (Green and Brock 2000, p. 702).

Mental simulation has narrative structure; therefore, people

engaged in simulating may be transported by their self-

generated stories. This should result in less critical analysis of

ad arguments, fewer negative thoughts, and strong affective

responses, which in turn, should enhance persuasion (when

the emotions are positive). (It may also be the case that nega- tive emotions could enhance persuasion, if the negative events

being simulated could be lessened or resolved by the product or brand being advertised. We do not address these types of

scenarios in this research.) Thus, the objective of this paper is

to examine the cognitive and affective mechanisms that me-

diate the effects of mental simulation on persuasion, based on

transportation theory.

Related Consumer Research

While there is a long history of mental simulation research in

psychology, consumer research has recently begun to examine

some related concepts, such as imagery in advertising and

ease of imagining in consumer decision making. Maclnnis

and Price (1987) define imagery as "a process (not a struc-

ture) by which sensory information is represented in working

memory" (p. 473). Instructions to imagine (similar to what

psychologists have studied as mental simulation) are just one

possible antecedent of imagery. Bone and Ellen (1992) find

that imagery increases when radio advertisements encourage

participants to imagine themselves using a product (versus

imagining someone else) and that imagery affects attitude

toward the ad (measured with emotion terms), but not atti-

tude toward the brand or purchase intentions. Our article does

not consider everything that falls under the rubric of imag-

ery, but restricts itself to ads that evoke mental simulation,

which, by definition, has narrative structure and thus can lead

to narrative transportation (see Table 1 for a clarification of

terms).

While one can mentally simulate an episode involving other

people, mental simulation typically involves the self.

Krishnamurthy and Sujan (1999) have studied self-focused

mental simulation (which they label "anticipatory self-refer-

encing"). These authors find that the persuasive effects of

mental simulation are facilitated by ads with high degrees of

contextual detail. Contextual detail helps create the setting for the forward-looking simulation, as opposed to the case of

autobiographical memory retrieval (which they label "retro-

spective self-referencing"), which is more persuasive with low

degrees of contextual detail because memories already have

detailed information associated with them. While our studies

examine self-focused mental simulation, we do not believe that

self-referencing is necessary for narrative transportation to oc-

cur in the context of advertising. For example, Escalas, Moore,

and Edell (2003) find that the degree to which a television ad

tells a well-developed story affects the degree to which the ad

"hooks" the viewer. These authors compare their "being hooked" concept to that of narrative transportation, since both

reflect being drawn in by, or lost in, a story or dramatic tele-

vision advertisement.

In terms of consumer decision making, Phillips, Olson,

and Baumgartner (1995) assert that "consumption visions,"

that is, self-constructed mental simulations of future consump-

tion situations, motivate consumption behavior because these

visions involve the self-enacting, detailed, product-related

behaviors. In some sense, consumption visions are a subset of

possible mental simulation stories and are those most relevant

Summer 2004 39

TABLE I

Definitional Issues

Narrative processing Analytical processing

Imagery* Discursive Imagery Discursive

Self-referencing

Post Autobiographical memory retrieval with vivid

images.6

Autobiographical memory retrieval without much visualization.0

Thinking about the self in the past without goal- action-outcome

sequences (e.g., remembering oneself lying on the beach on a

previous vacation, without much action occurring).

Evaluating past behavior or situations without

goal-action-outcome sequences or vivid images (e.g., deciding that in the

past your approach to an analytical problem was

incorrect).

Present On-line imposition of

story structure to

interpret lived experience with vivid images.

On-line imposition of

story structure to

interpret lived experience without much visual

input

Evaluating alternatives and attributes in relation to the self with vivid images (e.g., visualizing oneself in a

house, but not doing anything there).

Evaluating alternatives and attributes in relation to the self without any visualization (e.g., I can use the functions of a

calculator).

Future Mental simulation with vivid images.

Mental simulation without much visualization.

Non-seK-referencing/ other focus

Past

Present

Future

Recalling a story, movie, etc., about others with vivid images.

Reading a story, watching a movie, etc., about others with vivid images.

Imagining a story about others in the future with vivid images.

Recalling a story, movie, etc., about others without much visualization.

Reading a story, watching a movie, etc., about others without much visualization.

Imagining a story about others without much visualization.

Evaluating a future decision option without

goal-action-outcome sequences (e.g., imagining oneself in a house, but not

doing anything there).

Recall of places or objects with vivid images.

Forming a mental image of a place or object.

Evaluating a future decision

option without goal- action-outcome sequences for someone else (e.g., imagining a friend in a

house, but not doing anything there).

Planning for the future, but without goal-action- outcome sequences or visualization (e.g., creating a list for the grocery store).

Recall of memory for facts.

Many types of mental

operations (e.g., categorization, mathematical

operations).

Planning for the future for someone else, but without behavior or visualization

(e.g., creating a list for a friend for the grocery store).

' Under conditions of narrative processing, degree of imagery processing depends on stimulus factors and individual differences (e.g., visualizer versus

verbalizer, etc.). b Can also include mental simulation as one redoes past events, mixing in hypothetical elements.

40 The Journal of Advertising

to an advertising setting, where marketers hope consumers

will imagine themselves using their product. Although one

could argue that ad-evoked mental simulation is not en-

tirely "self-constructed," depending on how much detail is

provided by the ad, much of the thought process will be

self-generated. Keller and McGill (1994) and McGill and Anand (1989)

find that more easily imagined attributes have a dispropor- tionate influence on consumer decision making when partici-

pants are encouraged to use imagery in their evaluation.

Instructions to imagine also lead to more processing by alter-

native. Keller and McGill (1994) hypothesize an "imagery heuristic" wherein consumers imagine the actual experience with an alternative and then assess that alternative s desir-

ability based on the affective response to imagining. They don't examine affective reactions in their studies, however.

(See also Shiv and Huber [2000], who examine mental simu-

lation in the context of imagining satisfaction.) Keller and Block (1997) examine a related imagery con-

cept, vividness, from a resource-matching perspective: Ini-

tially, vividness increases elaboration, which helps persuasion, but eventually, too much elaboration hurts persuasion, thus

leading to an inverted U relationship between elaboration and

persuasion. These results are different from the generally fa-

vorable effects of mental simulation found by research in psy-

chology. Similarly, Meyers-Levy and Peracchio (1996) find an

inverted U relationship for self-referencing, which is also rel-

evant here, since ad-evoked mental simulation typically in-

volves the self. However, narrative transportation findings show no such inverted U relationship (Green and Brock

2000). It appears, therefore, that high levels of vividness

and self-referencing in the context of a narrative do not harm

persuasion. For this reason, we do not hypothesize an in-

verted U relationship when we develop our hypotheses in

the next section.

DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

In both social psychology and consumer research, mental simu-

lation leads to improved ad attitudes and brand evaluations.

Based on narrative transportation theory, we propose that the

underlying reason for this improvement is that when con-

sumers are engaged in mental simulations that are in the form

of a story, they become lost in or absorbed by their thoughts. This distracts them from thinking critically about the adver-

tisement and its arguments, and also evokes positive feelings

(if the simulation is favorable) that may be associated with

the brand being advertised.

The transportation process has implications for how con-

sumers will respond to strong versus weak ad arguments. Spe-

cifically, when consumers are transported by their simulations,

they will not notice differences in whether the ad presents

FIGURE 1

Mental Simulation Moderation Framework

Argument

Strength

Hl ??-?

Ad Attitudes

Brand Evaluations

Mental

Simulation

strong or weak rationale for buying the product. When indi-

viduals are not engaged in narrative transportation, however,

analytical cognitive processes should dominate (Green and

Brock 2000), creating an environment where strong arguments are likely to be more persuasive than weak arguments (con-

tingent, of course, on the level of involvement; see Petty,

Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983). This moderation relation-

ship is shown in Figure 1.

HI: Ad argument strength will not have a differential effect on ad attitudes and brand evaluations under conditions of mental simulation, but will have such effects when mental

simulation is absent.

The distraction effect proposed in HI is based on the idea

that consumers engaged in mental simulations, which are in

the form of a narrative, become transported by their simula-

tions. Hypotheses 2 through 4 examine this underlying trans-

portation process in more detail. Specifically, we test whether

transportation distracts consumers from thinking critically about the advertisement and whether it evokes positive feel-

ings. This process is shown in Figure 2. The first step in the

process is that of transportation, where consumers become

absorbed in their simulations. We propose that transporta- tion is the mechanism through which mental simulation af-

fects ad attitudes and brand evaluations.

H2: Narrative transportation will mediate the favorable effect

of mental simulation on ad attitudes and brand evaluations.

By encouraging participants to mentally simulate using a

product via an advertisement, we hope to encourage the strong affective responses associated with narrative transportation. Mental simulation of episodes involving the self has been

shown to evoke strong responses in feelings (Taylor and

Schneider 1989). In the context of our studies, positive feel-

ings should arise when participants simulate positive usage scenarios. We do not make any predictions for what would

happen were a subject to mentally simulate negative product

usage outcomes, thereby generating negative affect, because

previous mental simulation research has shown a positivity

Summer 2004 41

FIGURE 2

Mental Simulation, Narrative Transportation Mediation Framework

bias (i.e., people tend to imagine favorable outcomes; see

Maclnnis and Price 1987). If the ad is able to generate a simu-

lation about using the brand being advertised, positive feel-

ings may become linked to the ad and brand. That is, the

positive affect generated through narrative transportation may affect ad and brand attitudes when the good feelings from the

simulation become associated with the brand being advertised

(Green and Brock 2000; Sujan, Bettman, and Baumgartner 1993). This assertion is consistent with Keller and McGill's

(1994) "imagery heuristic" as well.

H3: An increase in positive affective responses will mediate the

favorable effect of narrative transportation on ad attitudes

and brand evaluations.

As participants imagine themselves using a product, they think about themselves in future scenarios, linking personal

experience and the product, and are "transported" by these

thoughts. This process precludes them from critically evalu-

ating the ad. On the other hand, when not engaged in mental

simulation, participants' thought processes tend to be more

critical in nature. Green and Brock (2000) demonstrate that

analytical cognitive responses dominate when one is not en-

gaged in narrative transportation in the context of written sto-

ries. In terms of advertising research, Wright (1973) finds that

cognitive responses mediate message acceptance: counterarguing and source derogations are important mediators of attitudinal

acceptance. Thus, narrative transportation should reduce criti-

cal thoughts when consumers are captivated by their simula-

tions, which should enhance attitudes and intentions.

H4: A reduction in critical thoughts will mediate the favorable

effect of narrative transportation on ad attitudes and brand

evaluations.

We test these four hypotheses in a print advertising study described next.

PRINT ADVERTISING EXPERIMENT

In this study, we manipulate two levels of mental simulation

within the text of a print ad for running shoes (simulation

encouraged versus simulation not encouraged). We also ma-

nipulate two levels of argument strength (strong versus weak)

to examine the potential effects of narrative transportation across contexts where we would expect to find differing levels

of negative cognitive ad responses. The result is a 2 X 2 be-

tween-subjects design.

Method

Subjects

Forty-two undergraduate introductory marketing students

from a private Northeastern university and 126 undergradu- ate introductory marketing students from a public Southwest-

ern university participated in this study in exchange for

experimental credit toward the fulfillment of a course require-

ment, for a total of 168 participants. There were no signifi- cant differences between the two groups on any of the variables

of interest, so the data were merged into one set for analysis.

Stimuli

Our stimulus ad consisted of a one-page, color ad for a run-

ning shoe. The picture of the running shoe had been altered

via computer so that it appeared to be an unknown brand.

The ad showed a slightly out of focus picture of a man jog-

ging through a park. A close-up of the shoes and the ficti-

tious brand name, Westerly, were superimposed on top of the

trees. The text of the ad, placed at the bottom, either pre- sented shoe attributes (either strong or weak) or encouraged

participants to imagine themselves running in the shoes

through the park (while mentioning the same attributes de-

scribed in the shoe attribute condition; see the Appendix). We selected running shoes as the product for the stimulus ad

because running shoes lend themselves to mental simulation?

they are used in a repeated fashion and worn on the body.

Running shoes are also a relevant and well-used product cat-

egory for college student participants.

Procedure

This experiment is based on the presentation of stimuli and the

collection of questionnaire responses via computer. Student

participants complete the study by going to the university com-

puter lab, where an experimental program written in Visual

Basic? has been installed on the network. The program pre- sents participants with a study introduction, followed by the

print ad stimulus on the computer screen. There are four ver-

sions of ad text, manipulating mental simulation and argu- ment strength (see the Appendix). The ad is followed by a series

of scale questions answered on a sliding scale ranging from 1 to

100. These questions include the study's manipulation checks,

42 The Journal of Advertising

dependent variables, and potential covariates, including demo-

graphic information. The study ends with a debriefing state-

ment. The entire study takes approximately one-half hour.

Dependent Variables

After viewing the print ad, participants were first asked to

type in what they were thinking about while they were look-

ing at the ad. Participants then filled out a reduced set of the

Goodstein, Edell, and Moore (1990) feelings scale to measure

upbeat feelings that may arise in response to simulating us-

ing running shoes (participants were instructed to indicate

how well the following words describe how they felt while

looking at the ad, on 1 to 100 scales, anchored by extremely well/not well at all; active, alive, cheerful, delighted, ener-

getic, happy, pleased, stimulated; a = .95). Next, respondents answered two scale items ranging from 1 to 100 assessing their attitude toward the print ad, anchored by very favor-

able/very unfavorable and very good/very bad (A^, a = .95). Two scale items ranging from 1 to 100 assessed brand atti-

tudes, again anchored by very favorable/very unfavorable and

very good/very bad, while two additional scale items ranging from 1 to 100 measured behavioral intentions toward the brand

(measured by willingness to try on the shoe in a store and

likelihood of purchase). These four brand-related items were

averaged to form one brand evaluation measure (BE, a = .87); as the stimulus ad was for a fictitious brand, it is unlikely that brand attitudes and behavioral intentions truly measure

distinct constructs. (All analyses presented in the paper have

also been run on brand attitudes and behavioral intentions as

distinct constructs. The results are virtually identical in ev-

ery case.) Finally, participants completed three scale items

ranging from 1 to 100 measuring the degree to which the

participant felt transported by the ad ("I was mentally in-

volved in the ad," "while thinking about the ad, I could easily

picture the events in it taking place," and "I could picture

myself in the scene shown in the ad," a = .82, adapted from

Green and Brock 2000).

Thought-Coding

The thought listings were coded by an independent coder

blind to the experimental hypotheses into the following cat-

egories: counterarguments, support arguments, source dero-

gations, source support arguments, and "other," according to

Wright's (1973) advertising response taxonomy (source sup-

port arguments are an addition to this coding scheme). An

index of negative responses was created for the proportion of

critical thoughts to be used in the analyses. The thought protocols were also coded by a different inde-

pendent coder (also blind to the hypotheses), using a six-item

scale developed to measure the degree to which an advertise-

ment or thought protocols have the structural elements identi-

fied above as being indicative of narratives (Escalas, 2003; see

Table 2). Two items appraise the causal relationships explored

by narratives (items 1 and 4). One item captures the chronol-

ogy of narrative; that is, whether the ad has a beginning, middle, and end (item 5). Another important element of narratives is

character development (item 3). Narratives are higher quality when viewers/readers are made aware of the psychological state

of the protagonist, that is, what he or she is thinking and feel-

ing (item 2). Finally, one item addresses the characteristic focus

of narrative thought on particular events rather than generali- ties or abstractions (item 6). The six items, measured on scales

ranging from 1 to 5, were averaged to form one narrative struc-

ture score for each respondent {a = 79).

Manipulation Checks

To check the argument strength manipulation, two scale items

ranging from 1 to 100 assessed the perceived strength of the

reasons given in the ad for why one should buy the shoes (as a

set). These scales were anchored by weak/strong and not at all

convincing/very convincing {a = .88). Two scale items rang-

ing from 1 to 100 measured participants' self-assessed degree of mental simulation ("While viewing the ad, I simulated

running in the shoes" and "while looking at the ad, I imag- ined myself running in the shoes," a = .84).

Covariates

A series of questions concerned potential covariates: attitude

toward running, attitude toward running shoes, amount run

(times per week, miles per week), how often participants buy

running shoes, how much they typically pay for running shoes, a measure of brand loyalty, and demographic information (gen-

der, ethnicity, and year in school). Only running shoe atti-

tude proved to be significant in any of the models and is

therefore used as a covariate throughout all subsequent analy- ses of covariance (ANCOVA) (the average of two scale items

ranging from 1 to 100, anchored by very unfavorable/very favorable and very negative/very positive, a - .95).

Results

This study is a 2 X 2 between-subjects design, crossing men-

tal simulation (encouraged, not encouraged) and argument

strength (strong versus weak). We test our hypotheses with

either ANCOVA models that include the running shoe atti-

tude covariate, simulation condition, argument strength con-

dition, and the interaction of simulation and argument

strength, or with regression models in those cases where the

model only contains continuous variables. We report stan-

dardized regression coefficients throughout.

Summer 2004 43

TABLE 2

Narrative Structure Thought-Coding Scale Items

i. To what extent do these thoughts consist of actors engaged in actions to achieve goals?

2. To what extent do these thoughts let you know what the actors are thinking and feeling?

1 To what extent do these thoughts provide you with insight about the personal evolution or change in the life of a character?

4 To what extent do these thoughts explain why things happen, that

is, what caused things to happen? 5 To what extent do these thoughts have a well-delineated beginning

(initial event), middle (crisis or turning point), and ending (conclusion)?

6t To what extent do these thoughts focus on specific, particular events rather than on generalizations or abstractions?

Source: Escalas (2003).

Note: These items are measured on five-point scales, anchored by not at all (1), and very much so (5). The participant is considered to be an actor if the thoughts are in the first person.

Manipulation Checks

Participants in the mental simulation (MS) encouraged con-

dition reported having significantly more simulation thoughts than those in the not-encouraged condition, MS not encour-

aged = 35.16, MS encouraged = 44.88, F(l, 163) = 3.82,

p = .05. The argument strength manipulation check shows a

marginally significant interaction of simulation by argument

strength, MS not encouraged: strong = 44.99, weak = 41.21; MS

encouraged: strong = 49.94, weak = 52.25; F(l, 163) = 2.19,

p = .07, one-tailed. Consistent with our hypotheses, only the

participants in the simulation not-encouraged condition recog- nized a difference in the strength of the arguments, contrast:

F(l, 163) = 4.07,/> < .05.

Hypothesis I

This hypothesis predicts an interaction, such that argument

strength will only have an effect on ad attitudes and brand

evaluations under the simulation not-encouraged condition

(and no effect under the simulation-encouraged condition). This interaction is marginally significant in the model for

A^, F(l, 163) = 3.15,p = .08; see Figure 3. The interaction

results are driven by the simple main effect of argument

strength within the simulation not-encouraged condition, where strong arguments lead to significantly more favorable

A^ than weak arguments, F(l, 163) = 3.93,/> < .05. In addi-

tion, there is a significant simple main effect of mental simu-

lation within weak arguments, where the simulation condition

is significantly more favorable than the simulation not-

encouraged condition, F(l, 163) = 9.93,p < .01. Thus, we find

mental simulation significantly enhances A^ in the weak ar-

FIGURE 3

Ad Attitude and Brand Evaluation (1-100) Interaction Results (Hl)

Ad Attitudes

55

50

45

40

35-i

30 Mental Simulation Not

Encouraged Mental Simulation

Encouraged

??-Weak Arguments *?Strong Arguments

Brand Evaluations

55

50

45

40

35

30

-Weak Arguments -Strong Arguments

Mental Simulation Not Encouraged

Mental Simulation Encouraged

gument condition, which is consistent with the idea that nar-

rative transportation is occurring, suppressing critical thoughts about ad arguments. We find no interaction effect in the model

of BE (see Figure 2). However, examination of the pattern of

the means reveals that simulation has a favorable effect on

brand evaluations, and there is no difference whether argu- ments are weak or strong, which supports HI. The lack of

interaction effect is due to the fact that respondents in the

simulation not-encouraged condition universally did not like

the Westerly running shoe, even when ad arguments were

strong.

Hypothesis 2

This hypothesis states that narrative transportation will me-

diate the effect of mental simulation on ad attitudes and brand

evaluations. To demonstrate mediation, four relationships must hold (Baron and Kenny 1986). First, mental simulation

must have a significant positive effect on A^ and BE. We find

this to be the case for both A^, MS not encouraged = 37.26, MS

encouraged = 46.90, F(l, 63) = lAl,p < .01, and BE, MS not

encouraged = 40.84, MS encouraged = 51.42,F(1,163) = 5.12,

p < .05. Next, mental simulation must have a significant posi- tive effect on transportation. Because consumers cannot be

transported by their storied simulations if their thoughts are

not in the form of a story, we have two measures of narrative

44 The Journal of Advertising

transportation: the three-item transportation scale and the

thought coding for narrative structure. There is a significant effect of mental simulation on both measures of narrative trans-

portation: the three-item scale, MS not encouraged = 44.52,

MS encouraged = 53.82, F(l, 163) = 534, p < .05, and the

narrative thought coding, MS not encouraged = 1.29, MS

encouraged = 1.37, F(l, 163) = 6.89,/> < .01. (The narrative

structure scores are low, which works against our hypotheses, in part because this scale was developed for narrative televi-

sion commercials as well as thought protocols; see Escalas

1998.)

Third, it must be established that narrative transportation

significantly affects A^ and BE. To test this, we estimated a

series of regression models on the effect of transportation and

narrative thought structure on A^ and BE. In all four models,

narrative transportation and/or structure has a significant

positive effect on Aad and BE (see Table 3). Finally, when the

transportation scale is included in the ad attitude and brand

evaluation models, the formerly significant effect of mental

simulation on A^ and BE becomes insignificant in both mod-

els, A^. F(l, 162) = 2.70, p = .10; BE: F(l, 162) = 2.24,

p = .14. The three-item narrative transportation scale remains

significant in each model, Agd: F(l, 162) = 94.35, p < .001,

? = .57; BE: F(l, 162) = 13.61,/> < .001,? = .45. Similarly, when the narrative structure thought-coding variable is added

to the ad attitude and brand evaluation models, the formerly

significant effect of mental simulation on BE becomes insig-

nificant, BE: F(l, 160) = 2.24,/? = .14, and in the case of A^ is significantly reduced, Aad: F(l, 60) = 6.43, p = .01,

? = 2.12, p < .05 (Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger 1998), while

the effect of narrative structure remains significant in each

model, Aad: F(l, 160) = 9.87, p < .001, ? = 19.04; BE:

F(l, 160) = 13.61,/? < .001,0 = 20.51. Thus, H2 is supported

by the data.

Hypothesis 3

This hypothesis proposes that positive feelings will mediate

the effect of narrative transportation on ad attitudes and brand

evaluations. We saw in H2 above that narrative transporta-

tion has a significant effect on Agd and BE, whether measured

with the three-item scale or the narrative structure thought

coding. Next, it must be established that narrative transpor-

tation significantly affects upbeat feelings. Both narrative

transportation and narrative structure have a significant posi-

tive effect on upbeat feelings, three-item transportation scale:

F(l, 165) = 156.20, p < .001, ? = .70; narrative structure

coding: F(l, 165) = 27.34,/> < .001, ? = .38. Upbeat feel-

ings, in turn, have a significant positive effect on both Aad, F(l, 165) = 263.07,/? < .001,0 = .78,andBE,F(l, 165) = 98.56,

? < .001,0 = .61.

Finally, when upbeat feelings are included in the ad atti-

TABLE 3

Hypothesis 2 Mediation Results

Dependent variable

Mediating variable

Ad attitudes

Brand evaluations

Transportation scale

Narrative structure

thought-coding

? = .62

F(I,I65) = 102.89

fX.001

? = .28

F(l, 163)= 13.94

p<.00l

? = .54

F(l, 165) = 69.38

p < .001

? = .30

F(l, 163)= 16.16

p< .001

tude and brand evaluation models, the effect of the three-

item narrative transportation scale on Aad and BE remains

significant in both the model for A^FQ, 164) = 4.54,/? < .05;

? = .14, and BE, F(l, 164) = 7.37, p < .01, ? = .23. How-

ever, in each case the effect is significantly reduced, Aad: ? = 9.41,/? < .001; BE: ? = 7.38,/? < .001. Upbeat feelings remain significant in each model, Aad: F(l, 164) = 105.32,

p < .001,? = .68; BE: F(l, 164) = 28*.71,/? < .001,? = .45.

In the case of narrative structure thought coding, the results

are more encouraging. The formerly significant effect of nar-

rative structure on A and BE becomes insignificant when

upbeat feelings are added to the ad attitude and brand evalu-

ation models, Aad: F(l, 162) < 1.0, p = .70; BE:

F(l, 162) = 1.45,/? = .23, while the effects of feelings remain

significant, Aad: F(l, 162) = 228.42, ? < .001, ? = .79; BE:

F(l, 162) = 74.82,/? < .001,? = .58. Thus, H3 is supported

by the data, with partial mediation in the case of the narra-

tive transportation scale results and full mediation in the case

of the narrative structure thought coding.

Hypothesis 4

This hypothesis states that reduced negative cognitive re-

sponses will mediate the effect of narrative transportation on

ad attitudes and brand evaluations. We coded participants'

thought protocols for critical thoughts and used the propor- tion over overall thoughts in our analyses. First, we saw in

?2 that the narrative transportation scale and the narrative

structure thought coding have a significant and positive ef-

fect on Aad and BE. Next, it must be established that narra-

tive transportation/structure affects critical thoughts. The

narrative transportation scale has a significant negative effect

on critical thoughts, F(l, 163) = 6.97,/? < .01,? = ? .21 y as

does narrative structure thought coding, F(l, 163) = 6.97,

/? < .01,/? = ?.20. Critical thoughts, in turn, have a signifi-

cant negative effect on both Aad, F(l, 163) = 16.03,/> < .001,

? = -.30, and BE, F(l, 163) = 30.15,/? < .001,? = -.39.

Summer 2004 45

When critical thought responses are included in the ad

attitude and brand evaluation models, the significant effect

of the narrative transportation scale on Aad and BE does not

become insignificant, Aad: F(l, 162) =* 92.83, p < .001,

0 = .59;BE:F(1,162) = 57*.89,/? < .001,0 = .48. In each case,

however, the indirect effect is significant, A^: ? = 2.52,

p < .05; BE: ? = 2.82,/? < .05. In the model for A^, critical

thoughts remain significant, F(l, 162) = 8.42,/? < .01,0 = ? .18. Similarly, in the model for BE, critical thoughts re-

main significant, F(l, 162) = 21.75,/? < .001,0 = -.30. In

the models that include the narrative structure of thoughts, when critical thoughts are added to the ad and brand evalua-

tion models, the significant effect of narrative structure on

A^ and BE also remains significant, A^: F(l, 162) = 9.52,

/? < .01,0 = .23; BE: F(l, 162) = 10.34,/? < .01,0 = .23. As

was the case with the narrative transportation scale analysis, the

significance levels of the indirect effects are encouraging, A^: ? = 2.07,/? < .05; BE: ? = 2.24,/? < .05. Finally, the effects of

cognitive responses remain significant in each model, A^: F(l, 162) = 11.54,/? < .001,0 = -.25; BE: F(l, 162) = 23.80,

/? < .001,0 = ?.35. Together, these results indicate that there

is both a direct effect of narrative transportation and struc-

ture on A^ and BE, as well as an indirect effect through re-

duced critical thoughts, providing some support for H4.

Discussion of Experimental Results

The favorable results for our hypotheses provide support for

the moderation and mediation models proposed in this paper.

First, our results indicate that ad viewers ignore argument

strength when they are simulating (HI). When not simulat-

ing, our participants only consider argument strength when

determining their attitudes toward the ad, but not their brand

evaluations. It may be that participants were not involved in

the task, and therefore paid attention to peripheral cues in

the ad, such as the appearance of the photograph of the stimu-

lus shoe, which would be consistent with the Elaboration Like-

lihood Model of persuasion (Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann

1983). Regardless of why the nonstimulators did not like the

shoe, ad text that encouraged mental simulation was able to

overcome this negative tendency toward the stimulus brand,

contributing to a much more persuasive ad appeal. Next, we explore the mechanisms underlying the positive

effect of mental simulation. We find that simulation leads to

narrative thought structure and narrative transportation, which, in turn, have a positive effect on ad attitudes and brand

evaluations (H2). Examining the effect of narrative transpor- tation on ad attitudes and brand evaluations in even greater detail, it appears that transportation affects ad attitudes and

brand evaluations by evoking positive feelings (H3) and re-

ducing critical cognitive responses, although it continues

to have a direct effect on ad attitudes and brand evaluations

over and above its effect through the reduction in critical

thinking (H4).

Thus, the results of this experiment support our proposed

framework, with the addition of a direct effect of narrative

transportation on ad attitudes and brand evaluations, over and

above the indirect effect of narrative transportation on A^ and BE through upbeat feelings and reduced critical thoughts. The empirical results are consistent with the premise that as

a form of narrative processing, mental simulation persuades via transportation. To examine the model in Figure 2 further, we ran one final series of mediation tests, here with narrative

transportation/structure, upbeat feelings, and critical thoughts all included as mediators of the effect of mental simulation

on Aad and BE. In the model of Agd that includes upbeat feel-

ings, critical thoughts, and the three-item narrative transpor- tation scale, the effect of mental simulation becomes

insignificant, F(l, 158) < 1.0,/? = .52, while all three media-

tors remain significant, marginal in the case of critical

thoughts, narrative transportation: F(l, 158) = 4.36,/? < .05,

? = .13; upbeat feelings: F(l, 158) = 99.47,/? < .001,? = .77; critical thoughts: F(l, 158) = 3.29,/> = .07,? = -.09. Simi-

larly, in the model for BE, the effect of mental simulation

becomes insignificant, F(l, 158) = 1.87, p = .17, while the

effects of the three mediators remain significant, narrative

transportation: F(l, 158) = 6.62,/? < .01,? - .18; upbeat feel-

ings: F(l, 158) = 21.95,p < .001,/J = .41; critical thoughts:

F(l,158)= 15.55,p< .001,0= -.23. We are able to repli- cate these findings using the narrative structure of thought-

coding variable, where in both the model for A^ and BE, the

effect of narrative structure becomes insignificant, Aftd: F(l, 158) = 1.36,/? = .24;BE:F(1, 158) < 1.0,/? = .46,asdoes the effect of mental simulation, A^, F(l, 158) < 1.0,/? = .41;

BE:F(1, 158) = 2.03, p = .16, while the effects of upbeat feel-

ings and critical thoughts remain significant, A^ upbeat: F(l, 158) = 218.30, /? < .001, ? = .90; A^ critical thoughts: F(l, 158) = 3.90,/? < .05,0 = -10;BEupbeat:F(l, 158) = 60.61,

? < .001, ? = .55; BE critical thoughts: F(l, 158) = 14.90,

/?<.001,0= -.23.

These final narrative structure mediation tests give an in-

dication of the sequence in which the constructs occur. Men-

tal simulation appears to evoke narrative processing, as

predicted by many scholars (e.g., Fiske 1993; Polkinghorne 1991). Next, narrative transportation occurs. Whether narra-

tive transportation evokes positive feelings and reduced criti-

cal thinking or whether they all act simultaneously is still

unclear at this point, but what we do know is that these are

three highly correlated constructs in our experimental con-

text, which is consistent with narrative transportation theory (Green and Brock 2000). The three narrative transportation

processes result in a more persuasive ad appeal than one based

primarily on analytical processing, as evidenced by ad atti-

tudes and brand evaluations in our study. Thus, we present

46 ? he Journal of Advertising

Figure 2 as a conceptual model that is consistent with our

empirical results. However, an obvious limitation of this re-

search is the correlational nature of our data. Although our

empirical results are consistent with the model in Figure 2,

they do not prove that this is the definitive causal sequence of

events.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, mental simulation involving a target product leads to a higher evaluation of that product, as well as the

advertisement that elicits the simulation. The contribution

of this research is that our study demonstrates that this result

occurs due to the engagement of different types of processing

by participants. Participants who engage in mental simula-

tion engage in narrative processing, which transports atten-

tion away from critical thoughts and generates positive affect,

resulting in more favorable ad attitudes and brand evalua-

tions. The series of mediation tests is supportive of the asser-

tion that mental simulation evokes narrative transportation, which persuades via positive feelings and reduced critical

thinking (Green and Brock 2000). Both mediators are consis-

tent with transportation theory, although Green and Brock

(2000) do not measure these variables separately from the

transportation concept in their studies. Thus, another contri-

bution of our research is the inclusion of the components of

transportation theory in our empirical analyses. On the other hand, we find that participants who do not

simulate tend to engage in analytical thought processes rather

than narrative thought processes. Analytical processing re-

sults in more critical thoughts and fewer positive emotions.

The end result of this type of processing is less favorable ad

attitudes and brand evaluations, compared with the narrative

processing evoked via mental simulation.

Managerial Implications

This paper provides insight into the underlying mechanisms

mediating the effect of mental simulation on ad attitudes and

brand evaluations. As an advertising strategy, the findings in

this paper indicate that putting the consumer "in the driver's

seat" and asking her to "feel the driving experience" may be

an effective way to advertise an automobile. People who imag- ine winning the lottery in response to an ad may feel luckier

and may buy more lottery tickets. In essence, by imagining themselves using a product with favorable consequences, con-

sumers may generate positive emotions and fewer critical

thoughts consistent with narrative transportation, which may

potentially result in their liking the product more than if

they were to evaluate it in a more analytical manner.

The two mediators that occur along with narrative trans-

portation also have managerial implications. For example, a

simulation-based ad campaign should almost always be mind-

ful of affective responses. The positivity bias (Maclnnis and

Price 1987) implies that consumers will generally simulate

favorable scenarios, which is good news for marketers em-

barking on this type of advertising strategy. Nevertheless, it

is theoretically possible for consumers to generate negative affect when they are transported by their simulations. If this

is likely for a given product class, then advertisers should make

certain that their advertisement provides a clear resolution

that can guide consumers in their simulations. The second

mediator, reduced critical thinking, is especially important in the context of weak arguments. We consider argument

strength to be one way to operationalize the degree to which

an advertised product is relevant to the target audience. If

one considers argument strength as a proxy for a wider range of ad appropriateness variables, then a simulation-based ad

campaign may be especially well suited for products where

the target market is doubtful or critical of the relevance of the

product.

Directions for Future Research

This paper has explored how mental simulation persuades, based on narrative transportation theory. This theory also has

implications for many other types of narrative advertising

beyond those that evoke mental simulation. Many types of

advertising, including drama ads (Deighton, Romer, and

McQueen 1989; Stern 1994), transformational ads (Puto and

Wells 1984), and slice-of-life ads (Mick 1987), elicit narra-

tive thought and are therefore likely to persuade via narrative

transportation. For example, autobiographical memories are

often narratives (Fiske 1993). The findings of Sujan, Bettman,

and Baumgartner (1993) and Baumgartner, Sujan, and

Bettman (1992) that ads that evoke autobiographical memo-

ries enhance positive feelings and reduce the impact of weak

ad arguments, thus leading to the enhancement of brand atti-

tudes, is consistent with the narrative transportation model

developed in this paper. Across the many different types of

ads that may evoke narrative thought, there may be differ-

ences in the degree to which they elicit narrative thought and/or transportation and their subsequent effects. In addi-

tion, further research could examine the degree to which dif-

ferent advertising media can elicit transportation. The print ad used in this study is perhaps the least likely medium to

evoke transportation, with both audio and video advertising

media much better suited to absorbing the consumer into the

story in the ad. Hence, further investigation of narrative trans-

portation and its effects is warranted in order to understand

its potentially varied role in a number of different types of

advertising.

Finally, while the studies in this paper reveal that the nar-

rative structure of mental simulation is important to persua-

Summer 2004 47

sion, the content of simulation is also of interest. Recent so-

cial psychological research demonstrates that the content of

mental simulation affects the degree to which simulations are

useful for helping individuals reach the future they envision

(e.g., Taylor et al. 1998). More specifically, Taylor's research

indicates that the most successful simulations focus on the

process of reaching a goal rather than on the outcomes or attain-

ment of the goal. The mental simulation instructions we use

in this paper focus on the process of using the running shoe.

One could also imagine an ad that focused on the outcome of

using running shoes (e.g., being fit, thin, strong, etc.). One

idea for future research would be to examine differences that

emerge from a focus on process versus a focus on outcome

when simulating in response to an advertisement. Extend-

ing Taylor et al.'s (1998) findings, a process-focused ad con-

dition may be more persuasive than an outcome-focused ad

condition.

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APPENDIX

Ad Text

Simulation Not Encouraged, Strong Arguments Ad Text

Introducing Westerly running shoes. These shoes are remarkably light. They weigh only 10 oz. Westerly running shoes put a spring in one's step. They also provide strong support, with their advanced stability system. Westerly's cushioning system spreads shock,

reducing injury. Westerly running shoes improve the comfort and quality of a morning run. . . .

Simulation Not Encouraged, Weak Arguments Ad Text

Introducing Westerly running shoes. These shoes are remarkably secure. They have advanced, reinforced shoelaces. Westerly running shoes have water-resistant uppers that keep one's feet dry, even in the rain. And Westerly running shoes have never been tested on

laboratory animals. Westerly running shoes improve the comfort and quality of a morning run. . . .

Simulation Encouraged, Strong Arguments Ad Text

Imagine yourself running through this park. Your feet feel remarkably light. You look down and see a pair of Westerly running shoes

on your feet. They weigh only 10 oz. You notice a spring in your step. Westerly running shoes provide strong support with their

advanced stability system. Westerly's cushioning system spreads shock, reducing injury. Imagine yourself in Westerly running shoes

to improve the comfort and quality of your morning run. . . .

Simulation Encouraged, Weak Arguments Ad Text

Imagine yourself running through this park. Your feet feel remarkably secure. You look down and see a pair of Westerly running shoes

on your feet. They have advanced, reinforced shoelaces. You notice your feet are dry. Westerly running shoes have water-resistant

uppers to keep your feet dry, even in the rain. And Westerly running shoes have never been tested on laboratory animals. Imagine

yourself in Westerly running shoes to improve the comfort and quality of your morning run. . . .