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1| ABRC2015.SCD2014.Political Law(revised with insertions/for reviwees)/EVSA/crys SURVEY OF 2014 SC DECISIONS IN POLITICAL LAW Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO IMMUNITY OF STATE FROM SUIT Principle of immunity of state from suit; applicability to public officers and other States. In Most Rev. Pedro D. Abrigo, et al. v. Scott Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, Villarama, J, petitioner claims that the grounding, salvaging and post‐salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi‐Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also sought a directive from the Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. They cited the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non‐payment of conservation fees (Section 21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Is this a suit against the US government? Explain. Answer: Yes. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. Immunity of State from suit; a generally accepted principle of international law. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non‐suability of the State, is expressly provided in Sec.3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states that the State may not be sued without its consent. In United States of America v. Judge Guinto, the principle of state immunity from suit was discussed, as follows: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that “there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.”[Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, “unduly vex the peace of nations.” [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171] While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 445 Phil. 250 [2003], it was further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:

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  • 1|ABRC2015.SCD2014.PoliticalLaw(revisedwithinsertions/forreviwees)/EVSA/crys

    SURVEYOF2014SCDECISIONSINPOLITICALLAW

    DeanEDVINCENTS.ALBANO

    IMMUNITYOFSTATEFROMSUITPrincipleofimmunityofstatefromsuit;applicabilitytopublicofficersandotherStates. InMostRev. PedroD.Abrigo, et al. v. Scott Swift, et al.,G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, Villarama, J,petitionerclaimsthatthegrounding,salvagingandpostsalvagingoperationsoftheUSSGuardiancauseandcontinuetocauseenvironmentaldamageofsuchmagnitudeastoaffecttheprovincesofPalawan,Antique,Aklan,Guimaras,Iloilo,Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and TawiTawi, which events violate theirconstitutionalrightstoabalancedandhealthfulecology.TheyalsosoughtadirectivefromtheCourtfortheinstitutionof civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations inconnectionwiththegroundingincident. They cited the followingviolationscommittedbyUSrespondentsunderR.A.No.10067:unauthorizedentry(Section 19); nonpayment of conservation fees (Section 21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30);damages to the reef (Section20); anddestroying anddisturbing resources (Section26[g]).Furthermore, petitionersassail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for beingunconstitutional. TheUSrespondentsweresuedintheirofficialcapacityascommandingofficersoftheUSNavywhohadcontrolandsupervisionovertheUSSGuardiananditscrew.Theallegedactoromissionresultingintheunfortunategroundingof theUSS Guardianon the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Is this a suitagainsttheUSgovernment?Explain.Answer: Yes. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officialswill require remedial actions andappropriationoffundsbytheUSgovernment,thesuitisdeemedtobeoneagainsttheUSitself.TheprincipleofStateimmunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice andRobling.ImmunityofStatefromsuit;agenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallaw.

    TheimmunityoftheStatefromsuit,knownalsoasthedoctrineofsovereignimmunityornonsuabilityoftheState,isexpresslyprovided inSec.3,ArticleXVIof the1987Constitutionwhichstates that theStatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent.

    InUnitedStatesofAmericav.JudgeGuinto,theprincipleofstateimmunityfromsuitwasdiscussed,asfollows:

    Therulethatastatemaynotbesuedwithoutitsconsent,nowexpressedinArticleXVI,Section3,ofthe1987Constitution,isoneofthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawthatwehaveadoptedaspartofthelawofourlandunderArticleII,Section2.xxx.

    Evenwithoutsuchaffirmation,wewouldstillbeboundbythegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawunderthedoctrineofincorporation.Underthisdoctrine,asacceptedbythemajorityofstates, suchprinciples aredeemed incorporated in the lawof every civilized state as a condition andconsequenceofitsmembershipinthesocietyofnations.Uponitsadmissiontosuchsociety,thestateisautomaticallyobligatedtocomplywiththeseprinciplesinitsrelationswithotherstates.

    Asappliedtothelocalstate,thedoctrineofstateimmunityisbasedonthejustificationgivenbyJusticeHolmesthattherecanbenolegalrightagainsttheauthoritywhichmakesthelawonwhichtheright depends.[Kawanakoa v. Polybank,205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for theenforcement of the doctrine.In the caseof the foreign state sought tobe impleaded in the localjurisdiction,theadded inhibition isexpressed inthemaximpar inparem,nonhabet imperium.All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrarydispositionwould, in the languageofa celebrated case, undulyvex thepeaceofnations.[DeHaberv.QueenofPortugal,17Q.B.171]

    Whilethedoctrineappearstoprohibitonlysuitsagainstthestatewithoutitsconsent,itisalsoapplicabletocomplaintsfiledagainstofficialsofthestateforactsallegedlyperformedbytheminthedischargeoftheirduties.Theruleisthatifthejudgmentagainstsuchofficialswillrequirethestateitselftoperformanaffirmativeacttosatisfythesame,suchastheappropriationoftheamountneededtopaythedamagesawardedagainstthem,thesuitmustberegardedasagainstthestateitselfalthoughithasnotbeenformallyimpleaded.[Garciav.ChiefofStaff,16SCRA120]Insuchasituation,thestatemaymovetodismissthecomplaintonthegroundthatithasbeenfiledwithoutitsconsent.

    UndertheAmericanConstitution,thedoctrineisexpressedintheEleventhAmendmentwhichreads:

    The Judicialpowerof theUnitedStatesshallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuit in laworequity, commencedorprosecutedagainstoneof theUnitedStatesbyCitizensof anotherState, orbyCitizensorSubjectsofanyForeignState.

    InthecaseofMinucherv.CourtofAppeals,445Phil.250[2003],itwasfurtherexpoundedontheimmunityof

    foreignstatesfromthejurisdictionoflocalcourts,asfollows:

  • 2|ABRC2015.SCD2014.PoliticalLaw(revisedwithinsertionsforreviewees)/EVSA/crys

    ThepreceptthataStatecannotbesuedinthecourtsofaforeignstateisalongstandingruleofcustomary international lawthenclosely identifiedwith thepersonal immunityofa foreignsovereignfromsuitand,withtheemergenceofdemocraticstates,madetoattachnotjusttothepersonoftheheadofstate,orhisrepresentative,butalsodistinctlytothestateitself initssovereigncapacity.Iftheactsgiving rise toa suitare thoseofa foreigngovernmentdoneby its foreignagent,althoughnotnecessarily a diplomaticpersonage, but acting inhis official capacity, the complaint could bebarred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent.Suing arepresentativeofastateisbelievedtobe,ineffect,suingthestateitself.TheproscriptionisnotaccordedforthebenefitofanindividualbutfortheState,inwhoseserviceheis,underthemaximparinparem,non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over oneanother.The implication, inbroad terms, is that if the judgmentagainst anofficialwould require thestate itselftoperformanaffirmativeacttosatisfytheaward,suchastheappropriationoftheamountneeded topay thedamagesdecreedagainsthim, thesuitmustberegardedasbeingagainst thestateitself,althoughithasnotbeenformallyimpleaded.

    Diplomaticimmunityisimmunityfromexerciseofterritorialjurisdiction;notfromobservanceoflaw.

    In the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the lawof theterritorialsovereignorfromensuinglegalliability;itis,rather,animmunityfromtheexerciseofterritorialjurisdiction.(citingJ.L.Brierly,TheLawofNations,OxfordUniversityPress,6thEdition,1963,p.244).

    InUnited States ofAmerica v. JudgeGuinto, supra.,one of the consolidated cases therein involved a FilipinoemployedatClarkAirBasewhowasarrestedfollowingabuybustoperationconductedbytwoofficersoftheUSAirForce,andwaseventuallydismissedfromhisemploymentwhenhewaschargedincourtforviolationofR.A.No.6425.Inacomplaintfordamagesfiledbythesaidemployeeagainstthemilitaryofficers,thelattermovedtodismissthecaseonthegroundthatthesuitwasagainsttheUSGovernmentwhichhadnotgivenitsconsent.TheRTCdeniedthemotionbut on a petition forcertiorariand prohibition filed before the Court, the SC reversed the RTC and dismissed thecomplaint,whereitwasheldthatpetitionersUSmilitaryofficerswereactingintheexerciseoftheirofficialfunctionswhentheyconductedthebuybustoperationagainstthecomplainantandthereaftertestifiedagainsthimathistrial.Itfollows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for actsimputabletotheirprincipal,whichhasnotgivenitsconsenttobesued.

    ThistraditionalruleofState immunitywhichexemptsaStatefrombeingsuedinthecourtsofanotherStatewithout the formers consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign andgovernmental acts(jure imperii)fromprivate, commercial andproprietary acts (juregestionis).Under the restrictiveruleofStateimmunity,Stateimmunityextendsonlytoactsjureimperii.TherestrictiveapplicationofStateimmunityisproper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercialactivitiesoreconomicaffairs.(UnitedStatesofAmericav.Ruiz,221Phil.179,182183&184(1985)).

    InShaufv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.90314,November27,1990,191SCRA713,itwasdiscussedthelimitationsoftheStateimmunityprinciple,thus:

    Itisadifferentmatterwherethepublicofficialismadetoaccountinhiscapacityassuchforactscontrary to lawand injurious to therightsofplaintiff.Aswas clearly set forthby JusticeZaldivarinDirectoroftheBureauofTelecommunications,etal.vs.Aligaen,etc.,etal.:InasmuchastheStateauthorizesonlylegalactsbyitsofficers,unauthorizedactsofgovernmentofficialsorofficersarenotactsoftheState,andanactionagainsttheofficialsorofficersbyonewhoserightshavebeeninvadedorviolatedbysuchacts,fortheprotectionofhisrights,isnotasuitagainsttheStatewithintheruleofimmunityoftheStatefromsuit.Inthesametenor,ithasbeensaidthatanactionatlaworsuitinequityagainstaStateofficerorthedirectorofaStatedepartmentonthegroundthat,whileclaimingtoactforthe State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under anunconstitutionalactorunderanassumptionofauthoritywhichhedoesnothave,isnotasuitagainsttheState within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. Therationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument forperpetratinganinjustice.

    xxxx

    Q Petitioners argue that there is awaiverof immunity from suit found in theVFA.Likewise, they invokefederalstatutesintheUSunderwhichagenciesoftheUShavestatutorilywaivedtheirimmunitytoanyaction.Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners asseverate that the US respondents are liable fornegligence,trespassandnuisance.Arethecontentionscorrect?Why?Held: No. The VFA is an agreementwhich defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting thePhilippinestopromotecommonsecurityinterestsbetweentheUSandthePhilippinesintheregion.Itprovidesfortheguidelines togovernsuchvisitsofmilitarypersonnel,and furtherdefines therightsof theUnitedStatesandthePhilippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation andexportationofequipment,materialsandsupplies.TheinvocationofUSfederaltortlawsandevencommonlawisthusimproper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigatingPhilippinewatersinpursuanceoftheobjectivesoftheagreement.

    As it is, thewaiverofState immunityunder theVFApertainsonly tocriminal jurisdictionandnottospecialcivilactionssuchasthepresentpetitionforissuanceofawritofKalikasan.Infact,itcanbeinferredfromSection17,Rule7oftheRulesthatacriminalcaseagainstapersonchargedwithaviolationofanenvironmentallawistobefiledseparately.

    Arulingontheapplicationornonapplicationofcriminal jurisdictionprovisionsof theVFAtoUSpersonnelwhomaybefoundresponsibleforthegroundingoftheUSSGuardian,wouldbeprematureandbeyondtheprovinceof

  • 3|ABRC2015.SCD2014.PoliticalLaw(revisedwithinsertionsforreviewees)/EVSA/crys

    apetitionforawritofKalikasan.WealsofinditunnecessaryatthispointtodeterminewhethersuchwaiverofStateimmunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein,we cannot grant damageswhichhave resulted from the violation ofenvironmental laws.TheRulesallowstherecoveryofdamages, includingthecollectionofadministrative finesunderR.A.No.10067,inaseparatecivilsuitorthatdeemedinstitutedwiththecriminalactionchargingthesameviolationofanenvironmentallaw.(Rule10,RulesofProcedureforEnvironmentalCases).

    LEGISLATIVEDEPARTMENT

    Noviolationofonetitle,onesubjectrule.QR.A.No.9646entitledAnActRegulatingthePracticeofRealEstateServiceinthePhilippines,CreatingforthePurpose aProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofRealEstate Service,Appropriating FundsTherefor and ForOtherPurposes,establishesaregulatorysystemfortheprofessionalizationoftherealestateservicesector.Itextends its coverage to real estatedeveloperswith respect to theirownproperties.Henceforth, real estatedevelopers are prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real estate service practicewithout first complyingwith registration and licensing requirements for theirbusiness,brokers or agents,appraisers,consultantsandsalespersons.

    Inquestioning thevalidityof the law,petitionerscontended that sincepartnershipsorcorporationsengagedinmarketingorsellinganyrealestatedevelopmentprojectintheregularcourseofbusinessarenowrequired tobeheadedby fulltime,registeredand licensedrealestatebrokers, thisrequirementconstituteslimitationonthepropertyrightsandbusinessprerogativesofrealestatedeveloperswhicharenotallreflectedinthetitleofR.A.No.9646.Neitherarerealestatedevelopers,whoarealreadyregulatedunderadifferentlaw,P.D.No.957,includedinthedefinitionofrealestateservicepractitioners.Isthecontentioncorrect?Explain.Answer: No.R.A.No.9646doesnotviolate theonetitle,onesubject rule.TheprimaryobjectiveofR.A.No.9646 isexpressedasfollows:

    SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the vital role of real estate servicepractitioners in thesocial,political, economicdevelopmentandprogressof thecountrybypromotingthe real estate market, stimulating economic activity and enhancing government income from realpropertybasedtransactions.Hence,itshalldevelopandnurturethroughproperandeffectiveregulationand supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estateservice practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and willpromotethegrowthoftherealestateindustry.

    The inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the laws primary goal of developing "a corps of

    technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards ofpracticeandserviceshallbegloballycompetitiveandwillpromote thegrowthof therealestate industry."Since themarketingaspectofrealestatedevelopmentprojectsentailstheperformanceofthoseactsandtransactionsdefinedasreal estate service practices under Section 3(g) ofR.A.No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme toprofessionalizetheentirerealestateservicesector.(RemmanEnt.Inc.,etal.v.ProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofRealEstateService,etal.,G.R.No.197676,February4,2014).QExplainthebasisandreasonfortheonetitle,onesubjectruleofabill.Answer:Section26(1),ArticleVIof theConstitutionstatesthateverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthetitlethereof.

    In Farias v. The Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179 [2003],the Court ruled that the proscription is aimedagainsttheevilsofthesocalledomnibusbillsandlogrollinglegislationaswellassurreptitiousand/orunconsideredencroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.(RemmanEnt. Inc., etal. v.ProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofRealEstateService, et al.,G.R.No.197676,February4,2014).

    QStatetheruleindeterminingwhethertherehasbeencompliancewiththeconstitutionalrequirementthatthesubjectofanactshallbeexpressedinitstitle.Explain.Answer: Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowlyconstruedastocrippleorimpedethepoweroflegislation.Therequirementthatthesubjectofanactshallbeexpressedin its title should receive a reasonable andnot a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensiveenoughreasonablytoincludethegeneralobjectwhichastatuteseekstoeffect,withoutexpressingeachandeveryendandmeansnecessaryorconvenient for theaccomplishingof thatobject.Meredetailsneednotbeset forth.Thetitleneednotbeanabstractor indexof theAct. (RemmanEnt. Inc.,etal.v.ProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofRealEstateService,etal.,G.R.No.197676,February4,2014).QWhenistheonesubjectrequirementofabillsatisfied?Explain.Answer:TheonesubjectrequirementundertheConstitutionissatisfiedifallthepartsofthestatutearerelated,andaregermanetothesubjectmatterexpressedinthetitle,oraslongastheyarenotinconsistentwithorforeigntothegeneral subject and title.An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number ofprovisions, nomatter how diverse theymay be, so long as they are not inconsistentwith or foreign to the generalsubject,andmaybeconsideredinfurtheranceofsuchsubjectbyprovidingforthemethodandmeansofcarryingoutthegeneralobject.(Tiov.VideogramRegulatoryBoard,235Phil.198,204[1987]).

    Itisalsowellsettledthatthe"onetitleonesubject"ruledoesnotrequiretheCongresstoemployinthetitleoftheenactmentlanguageofsuchprecisionastomirror,fullyindexorcatalogueallthecontentsandtheminutedetails

  • 4|ABRC2015.SCD2014.PoliticalLaw(revisedwithinsertionsforreviewees)/EVSA/crys

    therein.Theruleissufficientlycompliedwithifthetitleiscomprehensiveenoughastoincludethegeneralobjectwhichthestatuteseekstoeffect.(RemmanEnt.Inc.,etal.v.ProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofRealEstateService,etal.,G.R.No.197676,February4,2014).Powertoabolishpublicofficeislodgedinthelegislature. Petitionersquestioned thevalidityofRA9497 creating theCivilAviationAuthoritywhich abolished theAirTransportAuthority(RA6656).ItwascontendedthattherealintentionofRA9497wasmerelyareorganizationoftheagency, not its entire abolition. They contended that an abolition of an office cannot have the effect of removing anofficerholdingitiftheofficeisrestoredunderanothername.TheyalsocontendedthattheincumbentATOemployeesconstitutionalrighttosecurityoftenurewasimpaired.Finallytheycontendedthattherewasgraveabuseofdiscretionwhen Sec. 60 of the IRR provided for a holdover status of ATO employeeswhichwas not expressly provided forunderRA9497.Arethecontentionscorrect?Why?Held:No.Wellentrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that thepower toabolishapublicoffice is lodgedwith thelegislature.Thisproceedsfromthelegalpreceptthatthepowertocreateincludesthepowertodestroy.ApublicofficeiscreatedeitherbytheConstitution,bystatute,orbyauthorityoflaw.Thus,exceptwheretheofficewascreatedbytheConstitutionitself, itmaybeabolishedbythesamelegislaturethatbroughtit intoexistence.(MalariaEmployeesandWorkersAssociationofthePhilippines,Inc.(MEWAP)v.Romulo,555Phil.629,637(2007),citingBuklodngKawaningEIIBv.Zamora,id.at291;AirTransportationOfficev.Ramos,G.R.No.159402,February23,2011,644SCRA36,4749).Securityoftenureimpaired;purposeofabolition.

    FortheATOemployeessecurityoftenuretobeimpaired,theabolitionoftheATOmustbedoneinbadfaith.InKapisananngmgaKawaningEnergyRegulatoryBoardv.Barin,553Phil.1,7(2007),itwassaid:

    A validorderof abolitionmustnotonly come from a legitimatebody, itmust alsobemade in good faith. An abolition ismade in good faith when it is notmade for political orpersonal reasons,orwhen itdoesnot circumvent the constitutional securityof tenureof civilservice employees.Abolitionof anofficemaybebrought aboutby reasonsof economy,or toremove redundancy of functions, or a clear and explicit constitutional mandate for suchterminationofemployment.Where one office is abolished and replacedwith another office vestedwithsimilar functions, theabolition isa legalnullity.When there isavoidabolition, the incumbent isdeemedtohaveneverceasedholdingoffice.

    Italsobeenheldthat,otherthanreasonsofeconomy,makingthebureaucracymoreefficientisalsoindicative

    oftheexerciseofgoodfaithin,andavalidpurposefor,theabolitionofanoffice.The purpose for the abolition of the ATO is clearly manifested in Section 2 of R.A. No. 9497 that it is the

    declaredpolicyoftheStatetoprovidesafeandefficientairtransportandregulatoryservicesinthePhilippinesinorderto address the problems that go alongwith the fast emerging developments in the field of the globallycompetitiveaviation industry. (Civil AviationAuthority of the Phils. EmployeesUnion v. Civil AviationAuthority, et al., G.R.No.190120,November11,2014).

    QPetitionerpositedthatabolitionofanofficecannothavetheeffectofremovinganofficerholdingitiftheofficeisrestoredunderanothername.Isthecontentioncorrect?Explain.Answer:No. The CAAP, indeed assumed the functions of the ATO.However, the overlap in their functions does notmean there was no valid abolition of the ATO.The CAAP has new and expanded features and functions which areintended to meet the growing needs of a globally competitive civil aviation industry, adherent to internationallyrecognizedstandards.Thus, inNationalLandTitlesandDeedsRegistrationAdministrationv.CivilServiceCommission,G.R.No.84301,April7,1993,221SCRA145,150itwasheldthat:

    If the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties orpowers,sothatitmaybesaidinfacttocreateanofficedifferentfromtheoneabolished,eventhoughitembracesallorsomeofthedutiesoftheoldofficeitwillbeconsideredasanabolitionofoneofficeandthe creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties, forreasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office. (Civil Aviation Authority of the Phils.EmployeesUnionv.CivilAviationAuthority,etal.,G.R.No.190120,November11,2014).

    EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT

    PowerofcontroloftheOfficeofthePresident;notabsolute. InMoran, Jr. v.Office of the President, et al.,G.R. No. 192957, September 29, 2014, Villarama, J, there wascomplaintagainstPGACars, Inc.pursuanttoRA7394,otherwiseknownastheConsumerActofthePhils.seekingtohold the latter liable for damages due to the imperfections of the BMW car it sold to complainant. The ConsumerArbitrationOfficerruledinfavorofthecomplainant,buttheDTIdismissedtheappeal,hence,appealwasmadetotheOfficeofthePresidentwhichreversedtheDTIanddismissedthecomplaint.ComplainantfiledaPetitionforCertiorariwith the SC alleging that the OP has no jurisdiction to rule on violations involving RA 7394. The CA dismissed thepetitiononthegroundthatitwasawrongmodeofappeal.Isthedismissalofthepetitionforcertiorarionthegroundthatpetitionerresortedtothewrongmodeofappealcorrect?Explain.Held:No, because complainant availed of the proper remedy. The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed byAdministrativeOrderNo.18,Seriesof1987.Section1thereofprovides:

    SECTION 1.Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of thePresident shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of thedecision/resolution/ordercomplainedoforappealedfrom

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    InPhillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments, 597 Phil. 649, 662 [2009],the SC

    interpretedtheaboveprovisionanddeclaredthatadecisionororderissuedbyadepartmentoragencyneednotbeappealedtotheOfficeofthePresidentwhenthereisaspeciallawthatprovidesforadifferentmodeofappeal.QPetitionerfurthercontendsthatfromthedecisionofrespondentBOI,appealtotheOfficeofthePresidentshould be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of the President to review acts of departmentsecretarieswillberenderedillusorybymererulesofprocedure.Isthecontentioncorrect?Why?Answer:No.TheexecutivepowerofcontrolovertheactsofdepartmentsecretariesislaiddowninSection17,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution.Thepowerofcontrolhasbeendefinedasthepowerofanofficertoalterormodifyornullifyorsetasidewhatasubordinateofficerhaddoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethejudgmentoftheformerforthatofthelatter.

    Such executive control is not absolute.The definition of the structure of the executive branch ofgovernment,andthecorrespondingdegreesofadministrativecontrolandsupervisionisnottheexclusivepreserveoftheexecutive.ItmaybeeffectivelylimitedbytheConstitution,bylaw,orbyjudicialdecisions.Allthemoreinthematterofappellateprocedureas in the instantcase.Appeals are remedial innature;hence, constitutionallysubjecttothisCourtsrulemakingpower.TheRulesofProcedurewasissuedbytheCourtpursuanttoSection5,Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning theprocedureinallcourts.

    Parenthetically,AdministrativeOrder(A.O.)No.18expresslyrecognizesanexceptiontotheremedyofappealto theOffice of the President from thedecisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, adecisionororderissuedbyadepartmentoragencyneednotbeappealedtotheOfficeofthePresidentwhenthereisaspecial lawthatprovides foradifferentmodeofappeal.Inthe instantcase,theenabling lawofrespondentBOI,E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI involvingpetitionersapplicationforanITH.E.O.No.226isalawofspecialnatureandshouldprevailoverA.O.No.18.

    Inthiscase,aspeciallaw,RA7394,likewiseexpresslyprovidedforimmediatejudicialrelieffromdecisionsofthe DTI Secretary by filing a petition forcertiorariwith the proper court. Hence, private respondent should haveelevatedthecasedirectlytotheCAthroughapetitionforcertiorari.

    In filing a petition forcertioraribefore the CA raising the issue of the OPs lack of jurisdiction, complainantMoran,Jr.thusavailedoftheproperremedy.

    AugmentationoffundsbytheCOMELEC;noneedforspecificlegislation. InGohv.Bayron,etal.,G.R.No.212584,November25,2014,Carpio, J, therewasapetition for the recallofMayorBayronofPuertoPrincesa,Palawan,buttheCOMELECsuspendedallproceedingsontherecallbecauseitdidnothaveappropriationintheGAAof2014andtheGAAdidnotprovidetheCOMELECwithlegalauthoritytocommitpublicfunds for the recallprocess.This is inspiteof theadmission that ithas savings.Hence, apetition for the issuanceofpreliminarymandatoryinjunctionwasfiled.Isthepetitionproper?Why?Held:Yes,becausethereisnoneedforalineitemappropriatingfundsandauthorizingtheaugmentationoffundsfromsavings.The1987Constitutionexpresslyprovides theCOMELECwith thepower to enforceandadministerall lawsand regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. The 1987ConstitutionnotonlyguaranteedtheCOMELECs fiscalautonomy,butalsogranted itshead,asauthorizedby law, toaugment items in its appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELECChairman. The line itemappropriation for the ConductandSupervisionofxxx recallvotesxxx in the2014GAA issufficient to fund recall elections. There is no constitutional requirement that the budgetary appropriationmust beloaded in contingent funds. The Congress has plenary power to lodge such appropriation in current operatingexpenditures.

    DISBURSEMENTACCELERATIONPROGRAM(DAP)

    QStatetheeffect/siftheheadsofofficesareallowedtotransferfundswithintheirrespectiveoffices.Explain.Answer: By allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices, theConstitutionitselfensuresthefiscalautonomyoftheiroffices,andatthesametimemaintainstheseparationofpowersamongthethreemainbranchesoftheGovernment.InBengzonv.Drilon,G.R.No.103524,April15,1992,208SCRA133,150,itwassaidthattheJudiciary,theConstitutionalCommissions,andtheOmbudsmanmusthavetheindependenceandflexibilityneededinthedischargeoftheirconstitutionalduties.Theimpositionofrestrictionsandconstraintsonthemanner the independent constitutional offices allocate andutilize the funds appropriated for their operations isanathematofiscalautonomyandviolativenotonlyoftheexpressmandateoftheConstitutionbutespeciallyasregardstheSupremeCourt,of the independenceandseparationofpowersuponwhichtheentire fabricofourconstitutionalsystemisbased.

    InthecaseofthePresident,thepowertotransferfundsfromoneitemtoanotherwithintheExecutivehasnotbeen themere offshoot of established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of theAmericanGovernorsGeneral.ActNo.1902(AnActauthorizingtheGovernorGeneraltodirectanyunexpendedbalancesofappropriationsbereturnedtothegeneralfundoftheInsularTreasuryandtotransferfromthegeneralfundmoneyswhichhavebeenreturnedthereto),passedonMay18,1909bytheFirstPhilippineLegislature,wasthefirstenablinglawthatgrantedstatutoryauthoritytothePresidenttotransferfunds.Theauthoritywaswithoutanylimitation, forthe Act explicitly empowered the GovernorGeneral to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for anybureauorofficetoanother,andtospendsuchbalanceasifithadoriginallybeenappropriatedforthatbureauoroffice.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.)

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    QOnJuly30,1977,PresidentMarcosissuedPDNo.1177,providinginitsSection44thatthePresidentshallhave the authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices andagenciesoftheExecutiveDepartmentwhichareincludedintheGeneralAppropriationsAct,toanyprogram,project,oractivityofanydepartment,bureauorofficeincludedintheGeneralAppropriationsActorapprovedafteritsenactment.

    The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the ExecutiveDepartment in theGeneralAppropriationsAct, from savings in the appropriations of another department,bureau,officeoragencywithintheExecutiveBranch,pursuanttotheprovisionsofArticleVIII,Section16(5)oftheConstitution.TheconstitutionalityoftheDecreewasquestioned.Isthesamevalid?Explain.Answer:No.InDemetriav.Alba,No.L71977,February27,1987,148SCRA208,theSCdeclaredthefirstparagraphofSection44 forcontraveningSection16(5)of the1973Constitution,as itundulyoverextended theprivilegegrantedunder saidSection16. It empowered thePresident to indiscriminately transfer funds fromonedepartment, bureau,officeoragencyof theExecutiveDepartment toanyprogram,projectoractivityofanydepartment,bureauorofficeincludedintheGeneralAppropriationsActorapprovedafteritsenactment,withoutregardastowhetherornotthefundstobetransferredareactuallysavingsintheitemfromwhichthesamearetobetaken,orwhetherornotthe transfer is for thepurpose of augmenting the item towhich said transfer is tobemade.It did not onlycompletelydisregardthestandardssetinthefundamentallaw,therebyamountingtoanunduedelegationoflegislativepowers,butlikewisewentbeyondthetenorthereof.Indeed,suchconstitutionalinfirmitiesrenderedtheprovisioninquestionnullandvoid.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).Constitutionalauthoritytotransferfunds.

    It is significant thatDemetriawas promulgated 25 days after the ratification by the people of the 1987Constitution,whoseSection25(5)ofArticleVIisidenticaltoSection16(5),ArticleVIIIofthe1973Constitution,towit:

    Section25.xxxxxxx5)Nolawshallbepassedauthorizinganytransferofappropriations;however,thePresident,thePresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,andtheheadsofConstitutionalCommissionsmay,bylaw,beauthorizedtoaugmentanyiteminthegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespectiveappropriations.xxxx

    The foregoinghistorymakes it evident that theConstitutionalCommission includedSection25(5), supra, to

    keepatightreinontheexerciseofthepowertotransferfundsappropriatedbyCongressbythePresidentandtheotherhighofficialsoftheGovernmentnamedtherein.TheCourtstatedinNazarethv.Villar:

    Inthefundingofcurrentactivities,projects,andprograms,thegeneralruleshouldstillbethatthe budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine assufficientforthebudgetaryallocationfortheproponentagency.TheonlyexceptionisfoundinSection25(5),ArticleVIoftheConstitution,bywhichthePresident,thePresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives, theChief Justiceof the SupremeCourt, and theheadsofConstitutionalCommissions are authorized to transfer appropriationsto augmentany item in the GAA for theirrespectiveofficesfromthesavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespectiveappropriations.Theplainlanguageof the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioners posture, which we should nowdisposeofasuntenable.

    Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987ConstitutionQStatetherequisitesforthevalidtransferofappropriatedfunds.Explain.Answer:Thetransferofappropriatedfunds,tobevalidunderArt.VI,Section25(5)oftheConstitutionmustbemadeuponaconcurrenceofthefollowingrequisites,namely:

    (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, theChief Justiceof theSupremeCourt,and theheadsof theConstitutionalCommissions totransferfundswithintheirrespectiveoffices;

    (2) Thefundstobetransferredaresavingsgeneratedfromtheappropriationsfortheirrespectiveoffices;and(3) Thepurposeofthetransferistoaugmentaniteminthegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveoffices.

    (Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).FirstRequisiteGAAsof2011and2012lackedvalidprovisionstoauthorizetransfersoffundsundertheDAP;hence,transfersundertheDAPwereunconstitutionalQThe2011and2012GAAs,providethatthePresidentofthePhilippines,theSenatePresident,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,theHeadsofConstitutionalCommissionsenjoying fiscal autonomy, and theOmbudsman arehereby authorized to augmentany item in thisActfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespectiveappropriations. Aretheprovisionsvalid?Why?Answer:No, they are textually unfaithful to theConstitution for not carrying thephrase for their respectiveofficescontained in Section 25(5). The impact of the phrase for their respectiveofficeswas to authorize only transfers of

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    fundswithin their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transferwas to an item of appropriationwithin theExecutive).Theprovisions carriedadifferentphrase (toaugmentany item in thisAct), and theeffectwas that the2011and2012GAAstherebyliterallyallowedthetransferoffundsfromsavingstoaugmentanyitemintheGAAsevenif the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012GAAs contravene theConstitution.Attheveryleast,theaforequotedprovisionscannotbeusedtoclaimauthoritytotransferappropriationsfromtheExecutivetoanotherbranch,ortoaconstitutionalcommission.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).QGivetheconceptofsavings.Explain.Answer:SavingsrefertoportionsorbalancesofanyprogrammedappropriationintheGAAfreefromanyobligationorencumbrancewhich are: (i)still available after the completionor final discontinuanceor abandonmentof thework,activity or purpose forwhich the appropriation is authorized;(ii)from appropriations balances arising from unpaidcompensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) fromappropriationsbalancesrealizedfromtheimplementationofmeasuresresultinginimprovedsystemsandefficienciesandthusenabledagenciestomeetanddelivertherequiredorplannedtargets,programsandservicesapprovedinthisActatalessercost.

    The three instances are a sure indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of theappropriationbeingfulfilled,orupontheneedfortheappropriationbeingnolongerexistent.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,G.R.No.209135&companioncases,July11,2014,Bersamin,J).Crossbroadertransferoffunds,unconstitutional.Q Itwas admitted during the deliberations of the case that funds from the Executive DepartmentweretransferredtotheCongress,COMELECandCOAinordertocompletetheirownprojects.

    In defending the disbursements, theOSG contended that the Executive enjoyed sound discretion inimplementingthebudgetgiventhegeneralityinthelanguageandthebroadpolicyobjectivesidentifiedundertheGAAs;and that thePresident enjoyedunlimited authority to spend the initial appropriationsunderhisauthoritytodeclareandutilizesavings,andinkeepingwithhisdutytofaithfullyexecutethelaws.Isthecrossboardertransferconstitutional?Why?

    Answer:No.AlthoughtheExecutivewasauthorizedtospendinlinewithitsmandatetofaithfullyexecutethelaws(whichincludedtheGAAs),suchauthoritydidnottranslatetounfettereddiscretionthatallowedthePresidenttosubstitutehisownwillforthatofCongress.HewasstillrequiredtoremainfaithfultotheprovisionsoftheGAAs,giventhathispowertospendpursuanttotheGAAswasbutadelegationtohimfromCongress.Verily,thepowertospendthepublic wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive.Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executiveunrestrictedwouldthreatentoundotheprincipleofseparationofpowers.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,G.R.No.209135&companioncases,July11,2014,Bersamin,J).

    Congressactsastheguardianofthepublictreasuryinfaithfuldischargeofitspowerofthepursewheneveritdeliberatesandactsonthebudgetproposalsubmittedby theExecutive.Itspowerof thepurse is toutedas theveryfoundation of its institutional strength, (Wander and Herbert (Ed.), Congressional Budgeting: Politics, Process andPower(1984),p.3)andunderpinsallotherlegislativedecisionsandregulatingthebalanceofinfluencebetweenthelegislative and executive branches of government. (Wander and Herbert (Ed.), Congressional Budgeting: Politics,Process and Power (1984), at 133).Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for theGovernment,toappropriatepublicfunds,andtospendthemoney.Pertinently,whenitexercisesitspowerofthepurse,CongresswieldscontrolbyspecifyingthePAPsforwhichpublicmoneyshouldbespent.

    It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters ofappropriations.Forthispurpose,appropriationinvolvestwogoverningprinciples,namely:(1)aPrincipleofthePublicFisc,assertingthatallmoniesreceivedfromwhateversourcebyanypartofthegovernmentarepublicfunds;and(2)a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislativeauthorization.Toconformwiththegoverningprinciples,theExecutivecannotcircumventtheprohibitionbyCongressofanexpenditureforaPAPbyresortingtoeitherpublicorprivatefunds.NorcouldtheExecutivetransferappropriatedfunds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP isnecessarilydecreased.Thetermsofbothappropriationswilltherebybeviolated.QWhatdoesitmeanwhentheConstitutionprovidesthatthePresident,etc.maybeauthorizedtoaugmentanytimeintheGAAfortheirrespectiveoffices.Explain.Answer:ByprovidingthatthePresident,thePresidentoftheSenate,theSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,theChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,andtheHeadsoftheConstitutionalCommissionsmaybeauthorizedtoaugmentanyitem in theGAA for their respective offices, Section25(5),hasdelineatedborders between their offices, such thatfundsappropriatedforoneofficeareprohibitedfromcrossingovertoanotherofficeevenintheguiseofaugmentationof a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of fundscrossborder transfers or crossborderaugmentations.

    Tobesure,thephraserespectiveofficesusedinSection25(5),referstotheentireExecutive,withrespecttothe President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to theSpeaker;theJudiciary,withrespecttotheChiefJustice;theConstitutionalCommissions,withrespecttotheirrespectiveChairpersons.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).

    Applicationofthedoctrineofoperativefacts.QTheDAPanditsimplementingruleshavebeendeclaredunconstitutional.Itisarulethatunconstitutionalactsarevoidandcannotgiverisetoanyrightorobligation.Istheruleabsolute?Why?

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    Answer:Theruleisnotabsolute,becausethereisaneedtorecognizeanexceptiontotheruleespeciallyininstanceswherevoidlaworactproducedanalmostirreversibleresult.AnexampleistheimplementationoftheDAPtoprogramsofthegovernmentwhichcannotjustbeignored.Andthisisthedoctrineofoperativefacts.

    Thedoctrineofoperativefactrecognizestheexistenceofthelaworexecutiveactpriortothedeterminationofits unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored ordisregarded. Inshort, itnullifies thevoid laworexecutiveactbutsustains itseffects. Itprovidesanexceptiontothegeneral rule that a voidorunconstitutional lawproducesno effect. (Yapv.Thenamaris ShipsManagement,G.R.No.179532,May302011,649SCRA369,381).Butitsusemustbesubjectedtogreatscrutinyandcircumspection,anditcannotbeinvokedtovalidateanunconstitutionallaworexecutiveact,butisresortedtoonlyasamatterofequityandfairplay.(LeagueofCitiesPhilippinesv.COMELEC,G.R.No.176951,August24,2010,628SCRA819,833).Itappliesonlytocaseswhereextraordinarycircumstancesexist,andonlywhentheextraordinarycircumstanceshavemetthestringentconditionsthatwillpermititsapplication.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).QIsthedoctrineofoperativefactsapplicabletotheDAP?Explain.Answer:Yes.ThedoctrineofoperativefactsisapplicabletotheadoptionandimplementationoftheDAP.ItsapplicationtotheDAPproceedsfromequityandfairplay.TheconsequencesresultingfromtheDAPanditsrelatedissuancescouldnotbeignoredorcouldnolongerbeundone.

    To be clear, the doctrine of operative facts extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The termexecutiveactisbroadenoughtoincludeanyandallactsoftheExecutive,includingthosethatarequasilegislativeandquasijudicialinnature.InHaciendaLuisita,Inc.v.PresidentialAgrarianReformCouncil,G.R.No.171101,November22,2011,660SCRA525,545548,itwassaidthatexecutiveactisbroadenoughthatitshouldbelimitedtostatutesandrulesandregulationsissuedbytheexecutivedepartmentthatareaccordedthesamestatusasthatofastatuteorthosewhicharequasilegislativeinnature.

    For one, neither theDeAgbayanicase nor theMunicipality ofMalabangcase elaborateswhat executive actmean. Moreover, while orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have fixeddefinitionsandmeaning intheAdministrativeCodeand jurisprudence, thephrase executiveactdoesnothavesuchspecificdefinitionunder existing laws. It shouldbenoted that in the cases citedby theminority, nowhere can it befoundthatthetermexecutiveactisconfinedtotheforegoing.Contrarily,thetermexecutiveactisbroadenoughto encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive departmentwhich aresubsequently revokedby the agency inquestionornullifiedby the Court. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al.,supra.).QTheimplementationoftheDAPresultedintotheuseofsavingspooledbytheExecutivetofinancethePAPsthatwerenotcoveredintheGAA,orthatdidnothaveproperappropriationcovers,aswellastoaugmentitemspertainingtootherdepartmentsoftheGovernment inclearviolationoftheConstitution.Whatwouldbetheeffect if therewould be no recognition of the consequences of the implementation in declaring the sameunconstitutional?Explain.Answer:TodeclaretheimplementationoftheDAPunconstitutionalwithoutrecognizingthatitspriorimplementationconstitutedanoperativefactthatproducedconsequencesintherealaswellasjuristicworldsoftheGovernmentandtheNationistobeimpracticalandunfair.Unlessthedoctrineisheldtoapply,theExecutiveasthedisburserandtheofficesunder it andelsewhereas the recipients couldbe required toundoeverything that theyhad implemented ingoodfaithundertheDAP.ThatscenariowouldbeenormouslyburdensomefortheGovernment.Equityalleviatessuchburden.

    TheimplementationoftheDAPyieldedundeniablypositiveresultsthatenhancedtheeconomicwelfareofthecountry.Likepublic infrastructure,couldeasily includeroads,bridges,homesforthehomeless,hospitals,classroomsandthe like.Nottoapplythedoctrineofoperative fact totheDAPcould literallycausethephysicalundoingofsuchworthyresultsbydestruction,andwouldresultinmostundesirablewastefulness. ThedoctrineofoperativefactcanapplyonlytothePAPsthatcannolongerbeundone,andwhosebeneficiariesrelied ingood faithonthevalidityof theDAP,butcannotapply totheauthors,proponentsand implementorsof theDAP,unlessthereareconcretefindingsofgoodfaithintheirfavorbythepropertribunalsdeterminingtheircriminal,civil,administrativeandotherliabilities.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).

    Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,G.R.No.209287&companioncases,

    February3,2015,Bersamin,JQ IntheirMotion forReconsideration,therespondentsarguedthattheExecutivehasnotviolatedtheGAAbecausesavingsasaconceptisanordinaryspeciesofinterpretationthatcallsforlegislative,insteadofjudicial,determination.Ruleonthecontention.Explain.Answer:Theargumentisnotcorrect ThepetitionsraisedthequestionoftheconstitutionalityoftheactsandpracticesundertheDAP,particularlytheirnonconformitywithSection25(5),ArticleVIof theConstitutionandtheprinciplesofseparationofpowerandequal protection. Hence, the matter is still entirely within the Courts competence, and its determination does notpertaintoCongresstotheexclusionoftheCourt.Indeed,theinterpretationoftheGAAanditsdefinitionofsavingsisaforemostjudicialfunction.ThisisbecausethepowerofjudicialreviewvestedintheCourtisexclusive.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,G.R.No.209287&companioncases,February3,2015,Bersamin,J).AsclarifiedinEndenciaandJugov.David:

    Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned thepowertomakeandenactlaws.TheExecutivedepartmentischargedwiththeexecutionofcarryingout

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    of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belongexclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the lawsextendstotheConstitution.Beforethecourtscandeterminewhetheralawisconstitutionalornot, itwillhave to interpretandascertain themeaningnotonlyof said law,butalsoof thepertinentportionoftheConstitutioninordertodecidewhetherthereisaconflictbetweenthetwo,becauseifthereis,thenthelawwillhavetogivewayandhastobedeclaredinvalidandunconstitutional.

    WehavealreadysaidthattheLegislatureunderourformofgovernmentisassignedthetaskandthepowertomakeandenactlaws,butnottointerpretthem.Thisismoretruewithregardtotheinterpretationofthebasiclaw,theConstitution,whichisnotwithinthesphereoftheLegislativedepartment.IftheLegislaturemaydeclarewhatalawmeans,orwhataspecificportionoftheConstitutionmeans,especiallyafterthecourtshaveinactualcaseascertaineditsmeaningby interpretationandapplieditinadecision,thiswouldsurelycauseconfusionandinstability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final courtdeterminationofacasebasedonajudicialinterpretationofthelawoftheConstitutionmaybeunderminedorevenannulledbyasubsequentanddifferentinterpretationofthelaworoftheConstitutionbytheLegislativedepartment.Thatwouldbeneitherwisenordesirable,besidesbeing clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional system ofgovernment,particularlythosegoverningtheseparationofpowers.

    Itcannotbeignoredthatthepetitionsprimarilyandsignificantlyallegedgraveabuseofdiscretiononthepart

    oftheExecutiveintheimplementationoftheDAP.TheresolutionofthepetitionsthusdemandedtheexercisebytheCourtofitsaforedescribedpowerofjudicialreviewasmandatedbytheConstitution.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,G.R.No.209287&companioncases,February3,2015,Bersamin,J).Strictconstructionontheaccumulationandutilizationofsavings.Q The decision of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the power to augment shall be strictlyconstruedbyvirtueofitsbeinganexceptiontothegeneralrulethatthefundingofPAPsshallbelimitedtotheamount fixedbyCongress for thepurpose.Necessarily, savings, theirutilizationand theirmanagementwillalsobestrictlyconstruedagainstexpanding thescopeof thepower toaugment.State thereason forsuchastrictinterpretationoftherule.Explain.Answer:SuchastrictinterpretationisessentialinordertokeeptheExecutiveandotherbudgetimplementerswithinthe limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congresspowerofthepurse.Hence,regardlessoftheperceivedbeneficialpurposesoftheDAP,andregardlessofwhethertheDAP isviewedasaneffective toolofstimulating thenationaleconomy, theactsandpracticesunder theDAPshouldremain illegal andunconstitutional as long as the fundsused to finance theprojectsmentioned therein are sourcedfromsavingsthatdeviatedfromtherelevantprovisionsoftheGAA,aswellasthelimitationonthepowertoaugmentunderSection25(5),ArticleVIoftheConstitution.Inasocietygovernedbylaws,eventhebestintentionsmustcomewithintheparametersdefinedandsetbytheConstitutionandthelaw.Laudablepurposesmustbecarriedoutthroughlegalmethods.(Brillantes,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.163193,June15,2004,432SCRA269,307;Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).QRespondentscontended,however,thatwithdrawnunobligatedallotmentsandunreleasedappropriationsunder the DAP are savings that may be used for augmentation, and that the withdrawal of unobligatedallotmentsweremadepursuanttoSection38Chapter5,BookVIoftheAdministrativeCode;thatSection38andSection39,Chapter5,BookVIoftheAdministrativeCodeareconsistentwithSection25(5),ArticleVIoftheConstitution,which, taken together,constitutea framework forwhicheconomicmanagersof thenationmaypullvariousleversintheformofauthorizationfromCongresstoefficientlysteertheeconomytowardsthespecific and general purposes of the GAA; and that the Presidents augmentation of deficient items is inaccordancewiththestandingauthorityissuedbyCongressthroughSection39.Ruleonthecontention.Explain.Answer:Thecontentionisnotcorrect. Section25(5),ArticleVIoftheConstitutionstates:

    No lawshallbepassedauthorizingany transferof appropriations;however, thePresident,the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of theSupremeCourt,andtheheadsofConstitutionalCommissionsmay,bylaw,beauthorizedtoaugmentanyiteminthegeneralappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveofficesfromsavingsinotheritemsoftheirrespectiveappropriations.

    Section38andSection39,Chapter5,BookVIoftheAdministrativeCodeprovide:

    Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in hisjudgmentthepublicinterestsorequires,thePresident,uponnoticetotheheadofofficeconcerned,isauthorizedtosuspendorotherwisestopfurtherexpenditureoffundsallottedforanyagency,oranyother expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal servicesappropriationsusedforpermanentofficialsandemployees.

    ExceptasotherwiseprovidedintheGeneralAppropriationsAct,anysavingsintheregularappropriationsauthorizedintheGeneralAppropriationsActforprogramsandprojectsofanydepartment,officeoragency,may,withtheapprovalofthePresident,beusedtocoveradeficitinanyotheritemoftheregularappropriations.

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    IntheDecision,itwassaidthat:

    Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of thedefinitionofsavingsintheGAA,thatis,asportionsorbalancesofanyprogrammedappropriationinthis Act free from any obligation or encumbrance. But the first part of the definition was furtherqualifiedbythethreeenumeratedinstancesofwhensavingswouldberealized.Assuch,unobligatedallotmentscouldnotbeindiscriminatelydeclaredassavingswithoutfirstdeterminingwhetheranyofthe three instances existed. This signified that theDBMswithdrawal of unobligated allotments haddisregardedthedefinitionofsavingsundertheGAAs.

    TherespondentsrelyonSection38,Chapter5,BookVIoftheAdministrativeCodeof1987tojustifythewithdrawalofunobligatedallotments.Buttheprovisionauthorizedonlythesuspensionorstoppageoffurtherexpenditures,notthewithdrawalofunobligatedallotments,towit:

    Moreover, theDBMdidnotsuspendorstopfurtherexpenditures inaccordancewithSection38,supra,butinsteadtransferredthefundstootherPAPs.

    Section38referstotheauthorityofthePresidenttosuspendorotherwisestopfurtherexpenditureoffunds

    allottedforanyagency,oranyotherexpenditureauthorized intheGeneralAppropriationsAct.WhenthePresidentsuspendsorstopsexpenditureoffunds,savingsarenotautomaticallygenerateduntilithasbeenestablishedthatsuchfundsorappropriationsarefreefromanyobligationorencumbrance,andthatthework,activityorpurposeforwhichthe appropriation is authorized has been completed, discontinued or abandoned. (Araullo, et al. v. Aquino III, et al.,supra.).

    AlthoughthewithdrawalofunobligatedallotmentsmayhaveeffectivelyresultedinthesuspensionorstoppageofexpendituresthroughtheissuanceofnegativeSpecialAllotmentReleaseOrders(SARO),thereissuanceofwithdrawnallotments to the original programs and projects is a clear indication that the program or project from which theallotmentswerewithdrawnhasnotbeendiscontinuedorabandoned.Consequently,theCourthavepointedoutintheDecision,thepurposeforwhichthewithdrawnfundshadbeenappropriatedwasnotyetfulfilled,ordidnotyetceasetoexist, rendering thedeclarationof the fundsassavings impossible. In thisregard, thewithdrawalandtransferofunobligated allotments remain unconstitutional. But then, whether the withdrawn allotments have actually beenreissuedtotheiroriginalprogramsorprojectsisafactualmatterdeterminablebythepropertribunal.

    Also, withdrawals of unobligated allotments pursuant to NBC No. 541 which shortened the availability ofappropriationsforMOOEandcapitaloutlays,andthosewhichweretransferredtoPAPsthatwerenotdeterminedtobedeficient,arestillconstitutionallyinfirmandinvalid.Q Sec. 39 of the Administrative Code provides for the power to augment savings in any item in theappropriationslaw.Isthelawvalid?Why?Answer:No.Section39isevidentlyinconflictwiththeplaintextofSection25(5),ArticleVIoftheConstitutionbecauseit allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA forprograms and projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regularappropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits theauthorityof thePresident toaugmentan item in theGAAtoonly those inhisownDepartmentoutof thesavings inotheritemsofhisownDepartmentsappropriations.Accordingly,Section39cannotserveasavalidauthoritytojustifycrossborder transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within itsdepartmentshall,however,remainvalidsolongastherequisitesunderSection25(5)arecompliedwith.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).QShouldtherebeaugmentationofsavings,isitrequiredthatthereshouldbeanitemintheprojecttowhichthesavingsmaybetransferred?Explain.Answer:Yes.InNazarethv.Villar,G.R.No.188635,January29,2013,689SCRA385,itwasruledthattheremustbeanexisting item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savingsmay betransferredforthepurposeofaugmentation.Accordingly,solongasthereisanitemintheGAAforwhichCongresshadset aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. ThisinterpretationisconsistentnotonlywiththeConstitutionandtheGAAs,butalsowiththedegreeofflexibilityallowedtotheExecutiveduringbudgetexecutioninrespondingtounforeseeablecontingencies.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra).Crossbordertransfersareconstitutionallyimpermissible.QTherespondentsassailedthepronouncementofunconstitutionalityofcrossbordertransfersmadebythePresident. They submitted that Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits only the transfer ofappropriation,notsavings.Theyrelate thatcrossborder transfershavebeen thepractice in thepast,beingconsistentwiththePresidentsroleastheChiefExecutive.Ruleonthecontention?Explain.Answer:The contention isnot correct. Crossboarder transferof funds is in violationof Sec. 25(5),ArticleVI of theConstitution.Infact,Sec.39oftheAdministrativeCodewhichwasusedto justifysuchtransferis inconflictwiththeConstution,hence,itisunconstitutional.(Araullo,etal.v.AquinoIII,etal.,supra.).

    PARDONINGPOWER

    QFormerPresidentJosephEstradafiledhiscertificateofcandidacyforMayorofManilainthe2013elections.Atty.RisoVidalfiledapetitionforhisdisqualificationcontendingthatEstradahasbeenconvictedofthecrime

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    ofplunderandtheSBimposedthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuawithperpetualabsolutedisqualification.Shebased her petition under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Codewhich provides for the disqualification ofpersonswhohavebeensentencedbyfinaljudgmentforanoffenseinvolvingmoralturpitudeorforanoffensepunishablebyone(1)yearormoreofimprisonment.Furthermore,shecitedSec.12oftheOmnibusElectionCodewhichdisqualifiesapersonwhohasbeenconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitudefromrunningforpublic office. Estrada contended that he is qualified because he was granted absolute pardon by formerPresidentArroyo.TheCOMELECdecided inhis favorruling that thepardongranted tohimwasanabsolutepardonand thathewasrestored tohiscivilandpoliticalrights.RisosVidalargued that thepardonwasnotabsoluteasevidencedbytheacceptanceofEstradawiththeconditioninthethirdWhereasClausethathehaspubliclycommittedtonolongerseekanelectivepositionoroffice.Shecontendedthattheexecutiveclemencywouldnothavebeengrantedwithout such condition,hence,whenhe ran forpublicoffice,he committedabreach of the pardon. She contended that even with the pardon, Estrada could not run because of therequirements under Articles 36 & 41 of the Revised Penal Code, the disqualifications must be expresslyremitted in the pardon. The pardon granted did not expressly remit the accessory penalty of perpetualabsolutedisqualificationtoholdpublicoffice.Shearguedthatitisnotenoughthatthepardonmakesageneralstatement that thepardon carrierswith it the restorationof civilandpolitical rights. Sheargued that suchconstraintsaremandatorythatshunageneralorimpliedrestorationofcivilandpoliticalrightsinpardons. ShecitedMonsantov.Factoran,Jr.,252Phil.192,207[1989],whereitwassaidthat[t]herestorationofthe right toholdpublicoffice toonewhohas lost such rightby reasonofconviction inacriminalcase,butsubsequentlypardoned,cannotbe leftto inference,nomatterhow intenselyarguable,butmustbestated inexpress,explicit,positiveandspecific language.Shefurtherarguedthatsuchexpressrestoration isfurtherdemandedbytheexistenceofthecondition inthe[third][W]hereas[C]lauseofthepardonxxx indubitablyindicatingthattheprivilegetoholdpublicofficewasnotrestoredtohim.

    The OSG contended that [w]hile at first glance, it is apparent that [former President Estradas]conviction forplunderdisqualifieshim from runningasmayorofManilaunderSection40of the [LGC], thesubsequentgrantofpardon tohim,however,effectivelyrestoredhisright torun foranypublicoffice.TherestorationofhisrighttorunforanypublicofficeistheexceptiontotheprohibitionunderSection40oftheLGC, asprovidedunder Section12of theOEC.As to the seeming requirement ofArticles36 and41 of theRevisedPenalCode,i.e.,theexpressrestoration/remissionofaparticularrighttobestatedinthepardon,theOSGassertedthatanairtightandrigidinterpretationofArticle36andArticle41ofthe[RPC]xxxwouldbestretchingtoomuchtheclearandplainmeaningoftheaforesaidprovisions.Lastly,contendedthattheWhereasClauseofthepardonisnotanintegralpartofthedecreeofthepardonandcannotthereforeservetorestrictitseffectivity.Isthepetitionproper?Why?Answer:No.Thepetitionforcertiorarilacksmerit.FormerPresidentEstradawasgrantedanabsolutepardonthatfullyrestoredallhiscivilandpoliticalrights,whichnaturallyincludestherighttoseekpublicelectiveoffice.ThewordingofthepardonextendedtoformerPresidentEstradaiscomplete,unambiguous,andunqualified.ItislikewiseunfetteredbyArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode.Theonlyreasonable,objective,andconstitutionalinterpretationofthelanguageofthepardonisthatthesameinfactconformstoArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode.(Atty.AliciaRisosVidlv.COMELEC,etal.,G.R.No.206666,January21,2015,LeonardodeCastro,J).ThepardoningpowerofthePresidentcannotbelimitedbylegislativeaction.QMayCongressprovideforalawthatmaylimitthepardoningpowerofthePresident?explain.Answer:No.The1987Constitution,specificallySection19ofArticleVIIandSection5ofArticleIXC,providesthatthePresidentofthePhilippinespossessesthepowertograntpardons,alongwithotheractsofexecutiveclemency,towit:

    Section19.Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,thePresident may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, afterconvictionbyfinaljudgment.

    Heshallalsohave thepower tograntamnestywith theconcurrenceofamajorityofall theMembersoftheCongress.

    xxxxSection5.Nopardon,amnesty,parole,orsuspensionofsentenceforviolationofelectionlaws,

    rules,andregulationsshallbegrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendationoftheCommission.

    TheonlyinstancesinwhichthePresidentmaynotextendpardonremaintobein:(1)impeachmentcases;(2)

    cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules andregulationsinwhichtherewasnofavorablerecommendationcomingfromtheCOMELEC.Therefore,itcanbearguedthatanyactofCongressbywayofstatutecannotoperatetodelimitthepardoningpowerofthePresident.

    InCristobalv.Labrador,71Phil.34,38[1940]andPelobellov.Palatino,72Phil.441,442[1941]theSCdeclared

    thatsubjecttothelimitationsimposedbytheConstitution,thepardoningpowercannotberestrictedorcontrolledbylegislativeaction.InMonsantov.Factoran,Jr.itwasalsosaidthatapardon,beingapresidentialprerogative,shouldnotbecircumscribedbylegislativeaction.TheexerciseofthepardoningpowerisdiscretionaryinthePresidentandmaynotbeinterferedwithbyCongressortheCourt,exceptonlywhenitexceedsthelimitsprovidedforbytheConstitution.

    Thisdoctrineofnondiminutionornonimpairmentof thePresidentspowerofpardonbyactsofCongress,specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987ConstitutionwhentheyflatlyrejectedaproposaltocarveoutanexceptionfromthepardoningpowerofthePresident

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    intheformofoffensesinvolvinggraftandcorruptionthatwouldbeenumeratedanddefinedbyCongressthroughtheenactmentofalaw.(Atty.RisosVidalv.COMELEC,etl.,supra.).TheproperinterpretationofArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode.QRisosVidalcontended thatArticles36&41of theRPCcontainspecial textualcommandswhichmustbestrictly followed inorder to free thebeneficiaryofpresidentialgrace from thedisqualifications specificallyprescribedbythem. Article36,providesthatapardonshallnotworktherestorationoftherighttoholdpublicoffice,ortherighttosuffrage,unlesssuchrightsbeexpresslyrestoredbythetermsofthepardon. Apardonshall innocaseexempttheculprit fromthepaymentofthecivil indemnitys imposeduponhimbythesentenced. Article41provides thatpenaltiesofreclusionperpetuaandreclusion temporalshallcarrywith themthatofcivilinterdictionforlifeorduringtheperiodofthesentenceasthecasemaybe,andthatofperpetualabsolutedisqualificationwhich the offender shall suffer even thoughpardoned as to theprincipalpenalty,unlessthesameshallhavebeenexpresslyremittedinthepardon.Isthecontentioncorrect?Explain.Answer:No.Articles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCodecannot,inanyway,servetoabridgeordiminishtheexclusivepowerandprerogativeofthePresidenttopardonpersonsconvictedofviolatingpenalstatutes. Arigidand inflexiblereadingoftheaboveprovisionsof law, isunwarranted,especiallyso if itwilldefeatorundulyrestrictthepowerofthePresidenttograntexecutiveclemency.

    It is wellentrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free fromambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non estrecedendum.Fromthewordsofastatutethereshouldbenodeparture.(Republicv.Camacho,G.R.No.185604,June13,2013,698SCRA380,398).ThephraseinthepresidentialpardonatissuewhichdeclaresthatformerPresidentEstradaisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrightssubstantiallycomplieswiththerequirementofexpressrestoration.(Atty.RisosVidalv.COMELEC,etal.,supra.).QInhisDissentJusticeMarvicM.V.F.Leonenarguedthattherewasnoexpressremissionand/orrestorationof the rightsof suffrageand/or toholdpublicoffice in thepardon granted to formerPresidentEstrada, asrequiredbyArticles36and41of theRevisedPenalCode.Hepointedout that thecodalprovisionsmustbefollowedby thePresident,as theydonotabridgeordiminish thePresidentspower toextendclemency.Heopined that theydonot reduce the coverageof thePresidentspardoningpower. Ishis contention correct?Why?Answer:No.TheoverbroadstatementthatCongressmaydictateastohowthePresidentmayexercisehis/herpowerofexecutive clemency is not correct. The formormanner bywhich the President, or Congress for thatmatter, shouldexercisetheirrespectiveConstitutionalpowersorprerogativescannotbeinterferedwithunlessitissoprovidedintheConstitution.Thisistheessenceoftheprincipleofseparationofpowersdeeplyingrainedinoursystemofgovernmentwhich ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme inmattersfallingwithinitsownconstitutionallyallocatedsphere.(BureauofCustomsEmployeesAssociation(BOCEA)v.Teves,G.R.No.181704,December6,2011,661SCRA589,604).Moreso,thisfundamentalprinciplemustbeobservedifnoncompliance with the form imposed by one branch on a coequal and coordinate branch will result into thediminutionofanexclusiveConstitutionalprerogative.

    Forthisreason,Articles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCodeshouldbeconstruedinawaythatwillgivefulleffect to theexecutiveclemencygrantedby thePresident, insteadof indulging inanoverly strict interpretation thatmayserveto impairordiminishthe importofthepardonwhichemanatedfromtheOfficeofthePresidentanddulysignedbytheChiefExecutivehimself/herself.ThesaidcodalprovisionsmustbeconstruedtoharmonizethepowerofCongresstodefinecrimesandprescribethepenaltiesforsuchcrimesandthepowerofthePresidenttograntexecutiveclemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carrywith it theremissionoftheaccessorypenaltiesunlessthePresidentexpresslyincludessaidaccessorypenaltiesinthepardon.Itstill recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon theprincipalpenaltywhileexcluding itsaccessorypenaltiesor topardonboth.Thus,Articles36and41onlyclarify theeffectofthepardonsodecideduponbythePresidentonthepenalties imposedinaccordancewithlaw.(Atty.RisosVidalv.COMELEC,etal.,supra.).QDidthetextofthepardonincludetheprincipalandaccessorypenalty?Explain.Answer: Yes. The pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusionperpetuaand its accessorypenalties are included in thepardon.The first sentence refers to the executive clemencyextendedtoformerPresidentEstradawhowasconvictedbytheSandiganbayanofplunderandimposedapenaltyofreclusionperpetua.Thelatteristheprincipalpenaltypardonedwhichrelievedhimofimprisonment.Thesentencethatfollowed,which states that (h)e ishereby restored tohis civil andpolitical rights, expressly remitted theaccessorypenaltiesthatattachedtotheprincipalpenaltyofreclusionperpetua.Hence,evenifweapplyArticles36and41oftheRevisedPenalCode, it is indubitablefromthetextofthepardonthattheaccessorypenaltiesofcivil interdictionandperpetualabsolutedisqualificationwereexpresslyremittedtogetherwiththeprincipalpenaltyofreclusionperpetua.(Atty.RisosVidalv.COMELEC,etal.,supra.).Thethirdpreambularclauseofthepardondidnotoperatetomakethepardonconditional.

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    Q Atty. RisosVidal contended that the third preambular clause of the pardon that Estrada publiclyacknowledged that he will not seek another public office made the pardon conditional. Is the contentioncorrect?Why?Answer:No.Thethirdpreambularclauseofthepardon,i.e.,[w]hereas,JosephEjercitoEstradahaspubliclycommittedtonolongerseekanyelectivepositionoroffice,neithermadethepardonconditional,normilitateagainsttheconclusionthatformerPresidentEstradasrightstosuffrageandtoseekpublicelectiveofficehavebeenrestored.Thisisespeciallytrueasthepardonitselfdoesnotexplicitlyimposeaconditionorlimitation,consideringtheunqualifieduseofthetermcivilandpoliticalrightsasbeingrestored.

    Jurisprudenceeducatesthatapreambleisnotanessentialpartofanactasitisanintroductoryorpreparatoryclausethatexplainsthereasonsfortheenactment,usually introducedbythewordwhereas.(Peoplev.Balasa,356Phil.362,396[1998]).Whereasclausesdonotformpartofastatutebecause,strictlyspeaking,theyarenotpartoftheoperative languageofthestatute.(Llamadov.CourtofAppeals,256Phil.328,339[1989]). In thiscase, thewhereasclauseisnotanintegralpartofthedecreeofthepardon,andtherefore,doesnotbyitselfaloneoperatetomakethepardonconditionalortomakeitseffectivitycontingentuponthefulfilmentoftheaforementionedcommitmentnortolimitthescopeofthepardon.(Atty.RisosVidalv.COMELEC,etal.,supra.).QInhisdissentJusticeLeonenemphasizedthatthepardoninquestionisnotabsolutenorplenaryinscopedespitethestatementthatformerPresidentEstradaisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights,thatis,theforegoingstatementrestoredtoformerPresidentEstradaallhiscivilandpoliticalrightsexcepttherightsdeniedtohimbytheunremittedpenaltyofperpetualabsolutedisqualificationmadeupof,amongothers,therightsofsuffrageand toholdpublicoffice.Headded thathad thePresidentchosen tobesoexpansiveas toincludetherightsofsuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice,sheshouldhavebeenmoreclearonherintentions.Isthecontentioncorrect?Why?Answer:No.Thestatement[h]eisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights,iscrystalclearthepardongrantedto former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope,complete and plenary in character, as the term political rights adverted to has a settled meaning in law andjurisprudence.

    Theomissionofthequalifyingwordfullcanbeconstruedasexcludingtherestorationoftherightsofsuffrageandtoholdpublicoffice.Thereappearstobenodistinctionastothecoverageofthetermfullpoliticalrightsandthetermpoliticalrightsusedalonewithoutanyqualification.Howtoascribetothelattertermthemeaningthatit ispartialandnotfulldefiesonesunderstanding.Moreso, itwillbeextremelydifficulttoidentifywhichofthepoliticalrightsarerestoredbythepardon,whenthetextofthelatterissilentonthismatter.ExceptionstothegrantofpardoncannotbepresumedfromtheabsenceofthequalifyingwordfullwhenthepardonrestoredthepoliticalrightsofformerPresidentEstradawithoutanyexclusionorreservation.

    Therefore,therecanbenootherconclusionbuttosaythatthepardongrantedtoformerPresidentEstradawasabsolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support thePresidentialintenttograntalimitedpardon.(Atty.RisosVidalv.COMELEC,etal.,supra.).

    ARTICLEVIIIJUDICIARYDEPARTMENTRequisiteofthepowerofjudicialreview. Onceagain,theSCinFunav.TheChaiman,CSCFranciscoDuqueIII,etal.,G.R.No.191672,November25,2014,Bersamin, J, the SC thepowerof judicial review is subject to limitations, towit: (1) theremustbe anactual caseorcontroversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the actmust have the standing toquestionthevalidityofthesubjectactorissuance;otherwisestated,hemusthaveapersonalandsubstantialinterestinthe case such that he has sustained, orwill sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question ofconstitutionalitymustberaisedattheearliestopportunity;and(4)theissueofconstitutionalitymustbetheverylismotaofthecase.(LawyersAgainstMonopolyandPoverty(LAMP)v.TheSecretaryofBudgetandManagement,G.R.No.164987,April24,2012,670SCRA373,382).Politicalquestion InthecaseofTheDioceseofBaccolod,etc.v.COMELEC,etal.,G.R.No.205728,January21,2015,Leonen,J,therespondentscontendedthatthesizeofthetarpaulinanditsreasonablenessisapoliticalquestion,hence,notwithintheambitoftheSCspowerofreview.Isthecontentioncorrect?Why?Held:No.InTaadav.Cuenco,103Phil.1051[1957],PerJ.Concepcion,EnBanc,thecourtpreviouslyelaboratedontheconceptofwhatconstitutesapoliticalquestion:

    Whatisgenerallymeant,whenitissaidthataquestionispolitical,andnotjudicial,isthatitisamatterwhich is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has beenspecifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, withdiscretionarypowertoact.

    Thecasedoesnotcallfortheexerciseofprudenceormodesty.Thereisnopoliticalquestion.Itcanbeacted

    upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of theConstitution.

    Apoliticalquestionarises inconstitutional issuesrelatingtothepowersorcompetenceofdifferentagenciesanddepartmentsoftheexecutiveorthoseofthelegislature.Thepoliticalquestiondoctrineisusedasadefensewhenthe petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of their respectivecompetencies,asprovidedbytheConstitutionorthelaw.Insuchsituation,presumptively,thiscourtshouldactwith

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    deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that powerwas so capricious and arbitrary so as toamounttograveabuseofdiscretion.Politicalquestiondoesnotprecludejudicialreview.

    Theconceptofapoliticalquestion,however,neverprecludesjudicialreviewwhentheactofaconstitutionalorganinfringesuponafundamentalindividualorcollectiveright.EvenassumingarguendothattheCOMELECdidhavethe discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging thefundamentalrighttoexpression.

    Marcos v.Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479 [1989], Per J. Cortes, En Banc, limited the use of the political questiondoctrine:

    Whenpoliticalquestionsareinvolved,theConstitutionlimitsthedeterminationtowhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthepartofthe official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will notsubstituteitsjudgmentforthatoftheofficialconcernedanddecideamatterwhichbyitsnatureorbylawisforthelatteralonetodecide.

    Howthiscourthaschosentoaddressthepoliticalquestiondoctrinehasundergoneanevolutionsincethetime

    thatithadbeenfirstinvokedinMarcosv.Manglapus.Increasingly,thiscourthastakenthehistoricalandsocialcontextofthecaseandtherelevanceofpronouncementsofcarefullyandnarrowlytailoredconstitutionaldoctrines.ThistrendwasfollowedincasessuchasDazav.Singson,259Phil.980[1989] andCosetengv.Mitra Jr.,G.R.No.86649, July12,1990,1987SCRA377.

    DazaandCosetenginvolvedaquestionastotheapplicationofArticleVI,Section18ofthe1987Constitution

    involvingtheremovalofpetitionersfromtheCommissiononAppointments.Intimespast,thiswouldhaveinvolvedaquintessentially political question as it related to the dominance of political parties in Congress. However, in thesecases, the court exercised itspowerof judicial reviewnoting that the requirementof interpreting the constitutionalprovisioninvolvedthelegalityandnotthewisdomofamannerbywhichaconstitutionaldutyorpowerwasexercised.ThisapproachwasagainreiteratedinDefensorSantiagov.Guingona,Jr.,359Phil.276[1998].

    InIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesv.Zamora,392Phil.618[2000],thecourtdeclaredagainthatthepossibleexistenceofapoliticalquestiondidnotbaranexaminationofwhethertheexerciseofdiscretionwasdonewithgraveabuseofdiscretion.Inthatcase,thiscourtruledonthequestionofwhethertherewasgraveabuseofdiscretioninthePresidentsuseofhispowertocalloutthearmedforcestopreventandsuppresslawlessviolence.

    In Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1 [2001], the court ruled that the legal question as to whether a formerPresidentresignedwasnotapoliticalquestioneveniftheconsequenceswouldbetoascertainthepoliticallegitimacyofasuccessorPresident.

    Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such crises may use the resolution of

    constitutionalissuesasleverage.Buttheexpandedjurisdictionofthiscourtnowmandatesadutyforittoexerciseitspowerofjudicialreviewexpandingonprinciplesthatmayavertcatastropheorresolvesocialconflict.

    Decisionsofthecourtonpoliticalquestionhasnotbeenstaticorunbending.InLlamasv.ExecutiveSecretaryOscarOrbos,279Phil.920[1991],thecourtheld:

    While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President'sdiscretionarypowersareexercisedor intothewisdomfor itsexercise, it isalsoasettledrulethatwhentheissueinvolvedconcernsthevalidityofsuchdiscretionarypowersorwhethersaidpowersarewithinthelimitsprescribedbytheConstitution,Wewillnotdeclinetoexerciseourpowerof judicial review.Andsuchreviewdoesnotconstituteamodificationor correctionoftheactofthePresident,nordoesitconstituteinterferencewiththefunctionsofthePresident.

    Theconceptofjudicialpowerinrelationtotheconceptofthepoliticalquestionwasdiscussedmostextensively

    inFranciscov.HRET.(460Phil.830[2003]).Inthiscase,theHouseofRepresentativesarguedthatthequestionofthevalidityofthesecondimpeachmentcomplaintthatwasfiledagainstformerChiefJusticeHilarioDavidewasapoliticalquestionbeyondtheambitofthecourt.FormerChiefJusticeReynatoPunoelaboratedonthisconceptinhisconcurringanddissentingopinion:

    Tobesure,theforcetoimpugnthejurisdictionofthisCourtbecomesmorefeebleinlightofthenewConstitutionwhichexpandedthedefinitionofjudicialpowerasincludingthedutyofthecourtsofjusticetosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableandenforceable,andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. As well observed byretired Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded definition of judicial power considerably constricted thescopeofpoliticalquestion.Heopinedthatthelanguageluminouslysuggeststhatthisduty(andpower)is available even against the executive and legislative departments including the President and theCongress,intheexerciseoftheirdiscretionarypowers.

    Franciscoalsoprovidesthecaseswhichshowtheevolutionofthepoliticalquestion,asappliedinthefollowing

    cases:InMarcosv.Manglapus,thisCourt,speakingthroughMadameJusticeIreneCortes,held:

    The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine andbroadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previousconstitutions,wouldhavenormallylefttothepoliticaldepartmentstodecide.xxx

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    In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court

    declared:The allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task that this Court must

    perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, (t)he politicalquestion doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rivalclaims.The jurisdictiontodelimitconstitutionalboundarieshasbeengiventothisCourt. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,althoughsaidprovisionbynomeansdoesawaywiththeapplicabilityoftheprincipleinappropriatecases.(Emphasisanditalicssupplied)

    AndinDazav.Singson,speakingthroughJusticeIsaganiCruz,theCourtruled:

    In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even lesstenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issuepresentedbeforeuswaspoliticalinnature,wewouldstillnotbeprecludedfromresolvingitunder theexpanded jurisdictionconferreduponus thatnowcovers, inpropercases,eventhepoliticalquestion.xxx(Emphasisanditalicssupplied.)....

    Inourjurisdiction,thedeterminationofwhetheranissueinvolvesatrulypoliticaland

    nonjusticiablequestionliesintheanswertothequestionofwhetherthereareconstitutionallyimposed limits onpowersor functions conferreduponpolitical bodies. If there are, thenourcourts are dutybound to examinewhether the branch or instrumentality of the governmentproperlyactedwithinsuchlimits.(Citationsomitted)

    As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

    constitutionallyimposedlimitsonpowersorfunctionsconferreduponpoliticalbodies.Hence,theexistenceofconstitutionallyimposedlimitsjustifiessubjectingtheofficialactionsofthebodytothescrutinyandreviewofthiscourt.

    Inthiscase,theBillofRightsgivestheutmostdeferencetotherighttofreespeech.Anyinstancethatthis rightmay be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a politicalquestionbrings.

    POLICEPOWERNoviolationofdueprocess;lawanexerciseofpolicepower.Q Petitioners assailed the validity of the provisions of R.A. No. 9646 contending that they are undulyoppressive and infringe the constitutional rule againstdeprivationofpropertywithoutdueprocessof law.Theystressedthatrealestatedevelopersarenowburdenedbylawtoemploylicensedrealestatebrokerstosell,marketanddisposeoftheirproperties.Despitehavinginvestedalotofmoney,timeandresourcesintheirprojects,petitionersaverredthatrealestatedeveloperswillstillhavelesscontrolinmanagingtheirbusinessandwillbeburdenedwithadditionalexpenses.Isthecontentioncorrect?Why?Answer:Thecontentionisnotcorrect.ThereisnodeprivationofpropertyasnorestrictionontheiruseandenjoymentofpropertyiscausedbytheimplementationofR.A.No.9646.Ifpetitionersaspropertyownersfeelburdenedbythenewrequirementofengagingtheservicesofonlylicensedrealestateprofessionalsinthesaleandmarketingoftheirproperties,suchisanunavoidableconsequenceofareasonableregulatorymeasure.

    Indeed,no right is absolute, and theproper regulationof aprofession, calling,businessor tradehasalwaysbeenupheldasalegitimatesubjectofavalidexerciseofthepolicepoweroftheStateparticularlywhentheirconductaffectstheexecutionoflegitimategovernmentalfunctions,thepreservationoftheState,publichealthandwelfareandpublicmorals.Inanycase,wherethe libertycurtailedaffectsatmosttherightsofproperty,thepermissiblescopeofregulatorymeasuresiscertainlymuchwider.Topretendthatlicensingoraccreditationrequirementsviolatethedueprocessclauseistoignorethesettledpractice,underthemantleofpolicepower,ofregulatingentrytothepracticeofvarioustradesorprofessions.(RemmanEnt. Inc.,etal.v.ProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofRealEstateService,etal.,G.R.No.197676,February4,2014citingJMMPromotionandManagement,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,329Phil.87,100[1996]).QWhatcouldbetheintentionofCongressinenactingRA9646?Explain.Answer:It isanexerciseofpolicepower.Thelegislaturerecognizedtheimportanceofprofessionalizingtheranksofrealestatepractitionersbyincreasingtheircompetenceandraisingethicalstandardsasrealpropertytransactionsare"susceptibletomanipulationandcorruption,especiallyiftheyareinthehandsofunqualifiedpersonsworkingunderan ineffective regulatory system."Thenew regulatory regime aimed to fully tap the vast potential of the real estatesector for greater contribution to our gross domestic income, and real estate practitioners "serve a vital role inspearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting overall nationalprogress." (RemmanEnt. Inc., et al. v. ProfessionalRegulatoryBoard ofReal Estate Service, et al., G.R.No. 197676,February4,2014citingCarlosSuperdrugCorp.v.DepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopment,553Phil.120,1321332007]).

  • 16|ABRC2015.SCD2014.PoliticalLaw(revisedwithinsertionsforreviewees)/EVSA/crys

    SimilaritywithSeniorCitizensLaw.R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the States police power. As said in another case challenging the

    constitutionalityofalawgrantingdiscountstoseniorcitizens:Thelawisalegitimateexerciseofpolicepowerwhich,similartothepowerofeminentdomain,

    has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has beenpurposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies andprovide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thusassuringthegreatestbenefits.Accordingly,ithasbeendescribedas"themostessential,insistentandtheleastlimitableofpowers,extendingasitdoestoallthegreatpublicneeds."Itis"[t]hepowervestedinthe legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome andreasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to theconstitution,astheyshalljudgetobeforthegoodandwelfareofthecommonwealth,andofthesubjectsofthesame."

    For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, propertyrights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by dueprocess,mustyieldtogeneralwelfare.

    Policepowerasanattributetopromotethecommongoodwouldbedilutedconsiderablyifonthemerepleaofpetitionersthattheywillsufferlossofearningsandcapital,thequestionedprovisionisinvalidated.Moreover, in theabsenceofevidencedemonstrating theallegedconfiscatoryeffectof theprovisioninquestion,thereisnobasisforitsnullificationinviewofthepresumptionofvaliditywhichevery law has in its favor. (Remman Ent. Inc., et al. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real EstateService,etal.,G.R.No.197676,February4,2014citingCarlosSuperdrugCorp.v.DepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopment,553Phil.120,1321332007]).

    BILLOFRIGHTS

    DUEPROCESSandEQUALPROTECTIONNoViolationofEqualProtectionClauseQSection28ofR.A.No.9646exemptsfromitscoveragenaturalandjuridicalpersonsdealingwiththeirownproperty,andotherpersonssuchasreceivers,trusteesorassigneesininsolvencyorbankruptcyproceedingsfromhavinglicensedrealestatebrokersindealingwiththeirproperties.However,realestatedevelopersarespecificallymentionedasanexceptionfromthoseenumeratedtherein.Petitionersarguedthatthisprovisionviolatestheequalprotectionclausebecauseitunjustifiablytreatsrealestatedevelopersdifferentlyfromthoseexempted persons who also own properties and desire to sell them. They insisted that no substantialdistinctionsexistbetweenordinarypropertyownersandrealestatedevelopersasthelatter,infact,aremorecapable of entering into real estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed real estatebrokers.TheyassailedtheRTCdecisionincitingthereportedfraudulentpracticesasbasisfortheexclusionofreal estate developers from the exempted group of persons under Section 28(a). Is the trial courts rulingcorrect?Why?Answer:Yes.ThetrialcourtsrulingthatR.A.No.9646doesnotviolatetheequalprotectionclauseiscorrect.

    R.A.No.9646wasintendedtoprovideinstitutionalizedgovernmentsupportforthedevelopmentof"acorpsofhighly respected, technically competent, and disciplined real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable ofinternationallyacceptedstandardsandpracticeoftheprofession."Realestatedevelopersatpresentconstituteasectorthathiresoremploysthelargestnumberofbrokers,salespersons,appraisersandconsultantsduetothesheernumberofproducts(lots,housesandcondominiumunits)theyadvertiseandsellnationwide.Asearlyasinthe70s,therehasbeen a proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers who have reneged on their representation andobligations to comply with government regulations such as the provision and maintenance of subdivision roads,drainage,sewerage,watersystemandotherbasicrequirements.Toprotecttheinterestofhomeandlotbuyersfromfraudulent acts and manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers andoperators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate development projects. Hence, inapprovingR.A.No.9646,thelegislaturerightfullyrecognizedthenecessityofimposingthenewlicensurerequirementstoallrealestateservicepractitioners,includingandmoreimportantly,thoserealestateservicepractitionersworkingfor real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, realestatedevelopersselllots,housesandcondominiumunitsintheordinarycourseofbusiness,abusinesswhichishighlyregulatedbytheStatetoensurethehealthandsafetyofhomeandlotbuyers.(RemmanEnt.Inc.,etal.v.ProfessionalRegulatory Board of Real Estate Service, et al., G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014 citing Carlos Superdrug Corp. v.DepartmentofSocialWelfareandDevelopment,553Phil.120,1321332007]).QTheequalprotectionclauseallowsclassification.Statetherequirementsofvalidclassification.Explain.Answer:AlthoughtheequalprotectionclauseoftheConstitutiondoesnotforbidclassification,itisimperativethattheclassification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of theparticularlegislation.(MayorVillegasv.HiuChiongTsaiPaoHo,175Phil.443,448[1978]).Ifclassificationisgermanetothepurposeofthelaw,concernsallmembersoftheclass,andappliesequallytopresentandfutureconditions,theclassificationdoesnotviolatetheequalprotectionguarantee.(RemmanEnt.Inc.,etal.v.ProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofRealEstateService,etal.,G.R.No.197676,February4,2014).

    TheforegoingshowsthatsubstantialdistinctionsdoexistbetweenordinarypropertyownersexemptedunderSection28(a)andrealestatedeveloperslikepetitioners,andtheclassificationenshrinedinR.A.No.9646isreasonableandrelevanttoitslegitimatepurpose,R.A.No.9646isvalidandconstitutional.(RemmanEnt.Inc.,etal.v.ProfessionalRegulatoryBoardofRealEstateService,etal.,G.R.No.197676,February4,2014).

  • 17|ABRC2015.SCD2014.PoliticalLaw(revisedwithinsertionsforreviewees)/EVSA/crys

    TemporaryprotectionorderunderRA9262canbeissuedexparte;timeisoftheessence.Q The issuanceofaTemporaryProtectionOrderby theCourtunderRA9262 expartewas challengedasviolativeoftherighttodueprocess.Isthecontentioncorrect?Why?Answer:No.Aprotectionorderisanorderissuedtopreventfurtheractsofviolenceagainstwomenandtheirchildren,theirfamilyorhouseholdmembers,andtograntothernecessaryreliefs.Itspurposeistosafeguardtheoffendedpartiesfromfurtherharm,minimizeanydisruptionintheirdailylifeandfacilitatetheopportunityandabilitytoregaincontroloftheirlife. Thescopeofreliefsinprotectionordersisbroadenedtoensurethatthevictimoroffendedpartyisaffordedalltheremediesnecessarytocurtailaccessbyaperpetratortothevictim;toaccordthevictimandanydesignatedfamilyor household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts thatjeopardizetheemploymentandsupportofthevictim.Italsoenablesthecourttoawardtemporarycustodyofminorchildren to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure theirfinancialsupport. ThegrantofaTPOexpartecannot,therefore,bechallengedasviolativeoftherighttodueprocess.Justlikeawritofpreliminaryattachmentwhi


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