A theory of the nature and criteria of truth

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A theory of the nature andcriteria of truthA. Campbell GarnettPublished online: 17 Jan 2008.

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A THEORY OF THE NATURE A N D CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 1

By A. CAMPBELL GARNETT.

I x a t tempt ing to define the condit ions of the experience of t r u th i t is not my purpose to examine cr i t ical ly a number of a l te rnat ive theories, but simply to state one theory and seek to show tha t i t fits the re levant facts. I begin by emphasising tha t t ru th is a value-experience, for the theory I wish to put fo rward is a par t icu la r i sa t ion of a more general theory of value which may be s ta ted thus : T h a t value experience arises when, in the complex agency of the self, the nearer or immedia te end of an act iv i ty works in ha rmony with a remoter or more general end. The acceptance of a cer ta in end by an individuaI creates a disposit ion or mental set which act ively affects and tends to di rect subsequent menta l process even when tha t end is not expl ic i t ly present to consciousness. These ends range from those of the immediate aim of the t rans i to ry present ac t to the la rger directive factors in life rooted in the essential na ture of mind and developed in the his tory of the race and of the individual . Every mind thus contains a h ie rarchy of nearer and remoter ends, and i t is when the menta l set established by the immediate end of present act ivi ty operates in harmony with tha t of a remoter end also operative ( though not necessari ly expl ici t ly present to consciousness) t ha t the value experience arises. Value is thus a qual i ty of rea l i ty experienced in those more complex menta l activit ies where two or more ends co-operate. My purpose here is to apply this general theory of value to the case of truth-value. The first question, therefore, is: With what ends is the act ivi ty of truth-seeking concerned? And this quest ion will involve us in some degree of analysis of the cognitive processes involved in the apprehension of t ru th .

]qow cognition involves, in the first place, the apprehension of objects. Bu t the mere presence of one or more of these objects to the knowing subject does not cons t i tu te the complete cognitive act. No cognitive object is ever merely present to the subject. As Prof . S tou t says, "Our t r ans ien t experiences as they come and go can never be complete objects of thought. In thinking of them we think something about

A p a p e r r e a d a t M e l b o u r n e U n i v e r s i t y on J a n u a r y 21, 1935, to S e c t i o n J of t h e A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e A d v a n c e m e n t of Sc ience .

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A THEORY OF THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 67

them, ' tha t they exist ' , or are felt or are of such a nature" . 1 In brief, every complete act of cognition involves a judgment . Bu t even a judgment does not s tand alone as an isolated cognitive act. The cognitive process is a cont inuous act ivi ty and every judgment is a pa r t of a cont inuous accret ion of knowledge; i.e., the new judgment needs to be accepted with belief as an addi t ion to a growing whole of knowledge. Thus the complete ac t of cognition involves three dist inguishable phases: (a) the simple experience of the object, (b) the forma- t ion of a judgment in which this object is a term, (c) the acceptance of this judgment (or its re ject ion) as a cons t i tuent element of a whole of knowledge, i.e., its acceptance as true.

Not every judgment , of course, can be accepted as an addit ion to the growing whole of knowledge. Two judgments tha t are seen to be cont rad ic tory cannot, while the contradic- t ion is recognised, both be accepted as elements in a single whole of knowledge. To do so is simply a psychological impossibi l i ty; and in this sense the logical principle of non- contradict ion must be accepted as a "law of thought" , tha t is, as a regulative pr inciple expressive of the relat ions necessari ly holding between events. If , then, the new judgment is observed to be contradic ted by a judgment a l ready held, then one of the two must be rejected. I f the new judgment is not accepted, then i ts con t rad ic to ry is accepted; and perhaps also some reformula ted va r ian t of the new judgment , which is not seen to contradic t any judgment a l ready held, is also accepted.

This cognitive activity, more or less complete, is con- t inuous with the waking consciousness. I t may be variously directed by different conative factors, such as the s t imulat ion of a special cur ios i ty ; but it is not dependent upon any specific urge. I t is a general and permanent fea ture of consciousness tha t the subject should be cognitively related to its object in this active way, elicit ing explici t awareness of one new element af ter another in its world of objects, formula t ing and accepting or re ject ing new judgments, and thus cont inuously expanding its cognitive grasp of t ha t objective world with which it, the subject, finds itself confronted.

The span of its explici t consciousness being relat ively small the subject endeavours (with more or less success) to keep past experience available to explici t re-cognition in the form of acquired meaning and memory. The future , lying beyond the span of present consciousness, i t seeks to br ing within tha t content in the form of expectat ions or anticipa-

G, F. S t o u t : Manual o] Psychology, F o u r t h Edi t ion , p a g e 101,

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68 A THEORY OF THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH.

t ions of its own, or other people's, or some hypothet ical being's, experience. The pas t tha t has never entered its own consciousness i t seeks to recons t ruc t hypothet ica l ly as an imagined scheme of experiences tha t some other subjects have had, or t ha t i t might itself have had in certain conditions, had it been then present. Even tha t which lies beyond all possibili ty of experience by any such subject as i tself (such as the inner s t ruc ture of the atom, or the process of format ion of the solar system) i t seeks to bring within its cognitive content in a form interpretable (because only thus intell igible) in terms of an imaginary s t ruc tu re yielding cer ta in experiences to an imaginary subject under certain imaginary conditions. Thus does the cognitive act iv i ty of the human subject seek to gather within its cognitive grasp or content all the present, past and fu tu re actual i t ies and even all the mere possibilities and potent ial i t ies of its objective world. I t builds up and fills out cont inuously its body of judgments which we call knowledge, going far beyond all t ha t might minis ter to any ul ter ior end, so tha t one is driven to the conclusion that , for the human subject, the increase of knowledge is an end in itself. And, though this end is not so s t rongly manifes t in some human beings as in others, and in many is pursued much less than are the pract ical ends, ye t it may be said with some confid- ence to be manifested in some degree by all. At least i t is so widely manifes t as to jus t i fy us in finding in i t the basis of the equally widespread valuat ion of t ru th .

This, then, is the remote, the ul t imate, end operative in our cognitive activity. I t is the operat ion of this end tha t gives to the acquisi t ion or maintenance of any item of appa ren t knowledge or t ru th its character of a vaIue experience. The more clear ly and intensely this u l t imate end of cognition is present to consciousness, or has been effective in the shaping of habi tual mental a t t i tudes, and the more impor t an t appears to be the bearing of the par t icu la r item of knowledge concerned upon this u l t imate unders tanding of real i ty, the more vividly is the value of t ru th appreciated. The immediate or p r imary end in any cognitive act is confined to the elucidat ion of the pa r t i cu la r object or problem before the mind. Some judgment about i t must be formed and accepted, and for this a cer ta in analysis and synthesis is required. There is a certain pleasure and satisfaction in all such intel lectual ac t iv i ty ; and if the judgments serve some pract ical end, as they usual ly do, there is a fu r the r sense of value (pract ical value) due to this ha rmony of ends. Bu t whether there is any pract ical value in the judgment or not, if, by reason of i ts harmony with other judgments, i t can be accepted as a

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contr ibut ion to knowledge, there is a t t ached to it t ha t fu r the r sense of value which we call t ru th . The immedia te end of the fo rmat ion of a pa r t i cu l a r judgment , the elucidat ion of a pa r t i cu l a r fact , has operated in ha rm ony wi th the remote end (probably not expl ici t ly thought of in connection with i t) of the fur ther cognit ive grasp of the real world. And this ha rmony of nea re r and remoter ends gives i ts pecul iar value quale to the experience.

Now the value experience we call en joyment of t r u th does not necessari ly indica te tha t the judgment thus believed to be t rue real ly is t rue, i.e., const i tu tes a genuine cognit ive grasp of reali ty. The value is a qual i ty t h a t is experienced because cer ta in of the ends operat ive in men ta l ac t iv i ty have co-oper- a ted in a cer tain way. Because of this qua l i ty the judgment concerned is fe l t as true. And men have laid down their lives for tile value they experienced in believing errors which they fel t as true. W h a t the individual then has is a pr ivate view of t ruth-value. Bu t th is pr iva te view is seen through the perspect ive of a set of judgments accepted a f te r insufficient test ing, some of which are not a genuine cognitive grasp of real i ty.

The pr iva te view of t ru th-value m a y be called the subjective criterion of t r u t h - - t h e cr i ter ion of immedia te personal experience being a lways subjective. But when we speak to each other of the t ru th of cer ta in proposi t ions we mean, not mere ly tha t we have a cer ta in pr iva te value-experience in contempla t ing those proposi t ions, bu t t ha t they express a genuine cognit ive grasp of real i ty . This we may call the objective standard of t ru th . As this objective s tandard is the only s t anda rd t h a t can be in dispute, or be communicated. between two different persons, i t is a lways this s t a n d a r d t h a t we refer to when we say a proposi t ion is t rue. The re la t ion between the objective s t andard and the ac tual experience of t ru th-value is th is : t ha t when we have experience of t ru th-value we a lways believe the proposi t ion concerned is in accord with the objective s t a n d a r d ; and a proposi t ion tha t is in accord with the objective s t anda rd of t ru th is, we a lways believe, one which, p roper ly understood, mus t possess the charac te r of t ru th -va lue for every mind in which sufficient re levant judgments are present and a re also in accord with the objective s t a n d a r d ; and we believe t ha t this mus t continue to be the case however the volume of relevant , objectively valid knowledge grows.

Tr~tth, then, may be provis ional ly defined as t ha t cha rac te r of a judgment which const i tu tes it, when accepted, a contribu- tion to our cognit ive grasp of our world. The experience of

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truth.value occurs when the immedia te end of cognitive ac t iv i ty , the acceptance of a pa r t i cu la r judgment , works in h a r m o n y with the u l t ima te end of all cognition, the cognitive g rasp of our world. This is our criterion of t ru th . I t is immedia te ly experienced. But it is a subject ive cr i ter ion in the sense t ha t i t is descr ibable only in t e rms of the way in w h i c h objects appea r to a pa r t i cu la r subject. The ultimate aim of truth-seeking is the cognitive grasp of our world. This is the standard of t r u t h - - t h a t which t ru th m u s t measure up to to be true. I t is an ideal s tandard , not something immedi- a te ly experienced, and so cannot ac t as a cr i ter ion. Bu t i t is objective, in the sense t ha t i t is describable in t e rms of rela- t ions between real events, open, under ce r ta in conditions, to the experience of all.

Now let us proceed with the analysis . As stated, the u l t ima te end of the cognit ive effort is to build up a la rger and la rger body of j udgmen t s about te rms given in the objective world, tending to ga ther the whole of tha t world, including all i ts impl ica t ions and potent ia l i t ies , in some form, into the cognit ive content. B u t this end is pursued under the guidance of two checks, one posi t ive and one negative. The negative check we have a l ready ment ioned. I t is tha t of the impossi- b i l i ty of the subject ' s accept ing two con t rad ic to ry judgments while the cont rad ic t ion between them is expl ic i t ly known. I t is t rue t ha t we can th ink two con t rad ic to ry judgments a t the same t ime and know the con t rad ic t ion ; bu t we cannot accept t hem both. I t is also t rue tha t we can accept them wi thout observing the eontradiet ion, though the more often they are thought of together the more likely is the cont rad ic t ion to be noticed and thus one of them rejected. And i t is t rue t ha t we can accept one a t one t ime and another a t ano ther time, a l though they are known to be cont radic tory . B u t the more sys temat ica l ly we compare one judgment wi th another and th ink our judgments together the more l ikely are we to reject pe rmanen t ly one or the other. This check therefore operates to exclude cer ta in judgments f rom our s t ruc tu re of knowledge, and the more indus t r ious we are in ga the r ing new judgments into our s t ruc tu re and fo rming judgments of cr i t ical comparison between our j udgmen t s the more effectively does the check operate .

The other and posi t ive check lies in the f ac t tha t the te rms of our p resen t awareness are la rge ly t h ru s t upon us and we cannot escape f rom them, while, a t the same time, pas t experience, for the mos t pa r t , de termines the mean ing given to p resen t experience. Thus a large propor t ion of the judgments we make is forced upon us by experience. Our making and

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our accept ing them and our inabi l i ty (often) to re jec t them is due to force of c i rcumstances and to the psychological laws of our nature . Even a psychopath cannot ent i re ly ignore all fac t s in bui lding up his fanci fu l world. Much less can a normal mind. Here, then, we have a posi t ive fac tor guiding and act ing as a check upon the process of our bui lding up of tha t body of judgments we call our knowledge. Many of those judgments we are forced to make and we cannot reject. I f , therefore, they are found to conflict wi th any previously fo rmed judgment , or if any la te r j udgmen t is found to conflict wi th them, then, so long as these forced judgments a re thought of and their opposi t ion to the other judgments is noticed, those other judgments cannot be accepted. I t is in these judgments forced upon us by experience, therefore, t h a t a r igid founda t ion is la id for the s t ruc tu re we call knowledge. Any judgment which is not seen to be contradic ted by any judgmen t in the s t ruc tu re may be accepted. B u t when two judgments a re found to be in conflict, then, if the decision is left to processes of thought , the impl ica t ions of all the judgments concerned are worked out unt i l one is found to imply the re jec t ion of one of our inescap- able judgments a r i s ing f rom experience. I t is then rejected. And if no such resul t can be reached then each judgmen t is held in abeyance, pe rhaps t en ta t ive ly applied, but not confidently accepted. I n brief, no two judgments can both be accepted as sa t i s fy ing the u l t ima te end of cognition, the cognitive grasp of real i ty , the end which dominates the experience of t ruth-value, if those two judgmen t s are seen to be cont radic tory .

I t is, of course, only a very small p a r t of our world t h a t can be ac tua l ly experienced a t any one time, or, indeed, in any human lifetime. B u t i t is the func t ion of thought to t rans- cend these l imits . This it does in the f o r m a t i o n of expecta t ions of experience, and these expecta t ions a re a lways more or less conditional. The judgmen t " I t moves", for example, m a y be a s imple fo rmula t ion in thought of an ac tua l experience. I t may, however, re fe r to an object or a movement which is not now exper i ence~ bu t which will, in due course, necessar i ly be experienced. Or i t may refer to a movement which m a y be experienced only under cer ta in condit ions. Or i t may refer to a movement which cannot be ac tua l ly experienced a t all. In the first ins tance i t is not immedia te ly obvious t ha t any element of expecta t ion is necessar i ly involved, and we mus t r e tu rn shor t ly to the discussion of th is case. In the second instance the j udgmen t expresses an expecta t ion of ac tua l experience unde r the sole condit ion of the cont inued existence

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of the individual and the world order in which he finds himself. In the third instance there may be no expectation of any actual experience of movement on the par t of the individual making the judgment; yet the judgment does express an expectation that under certaiu conditions a movement may be experienced. In the last instance we are still fur ther from any expectation of actual experience of movement, as when a physicist speaks of movements within the atom. But the assertion of movement is still only intelligible as expressing the expectation that under certain unrealisable, hypothetical conditions, movement would be experienced.

In the last three cases, therefore, the form in which the cognitive act grasps its object is, quite evidently, that of an expectation of experience. In these cases, to say that the proposition is true is to say that, under the stated or implied conditions, the expectations expressed by the judgment would be realised. Truth is the agreement of the expectation of experience expressed or implied in the judgment with the actual or possible realisation of such experience under the conditions expressed or implied in the judgment.

But what of the t ruth of judgments of the first type ? Here the judgment does not seem, at first sight, to express an expectation of experience, but simply to perform upon the lived experience certain acts of analysis and synthesis. I t formu- lates in thought an experience actually present. But closer inspection of this process will show that all formulation of experience in thought includes the formulation of expectations regarding that experience. I t is this that is involved in the fact that we never simply think an object, but always think something about it. Every meaning involves expectations. This will become clear if, instead of the judgment " I t moves", we take the judgment " I t falls", and suppose that the judg- merit refers to a heavy column overhead. That this simple formulation in thought of an experience actually present is f raught with expectations becomes immediately apparent in the behaviour which follows upon this mental grasp of the situation. So, too, with the judgment " I t moves". I t has no meaning at all apart from the expectations of continuation and variation of experience involved in it. And the judgment thus formulated can be accepted with belief, i.e., accepted as an addition to the stock of knowledge, only so long as it is not fQund to conflict with other accepted judgments. And this means that the expectations involved in or necessarily aroused by the formation of the judgment must be in agreement with all judgments imposed npon the mind by experience. So here again the truth of the judgment consists in the agree-

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ment of the expec ta t ions of exper ience expressed or implied in the judgmen t wi th the actual or possible rea l isa t ion of such experience under the condit ions expressed or implied in the judgment .

I n all types of judgment abou t m a t t e r s of present fact , then, t ru th consists in this sor t of agreement between expecta- t ion and real isa t ion. The same will readi ly enough be seen to be the case wi th judgments about the future . Wi th r ega rd to judgments abou t the past , however, the posi t ion is not quite so clear. B u t the difficulty here is only paral le l wi th t h a t regard ing s t a t emen t s about m a t t e r s which i t is impossible to experience. The expecta t ions involved in such s ta tements a re hypothet ica l and conditional. When I say tha t Wi l l i am the Conqueror won the ba t t le of H a s t i n g s in 1066, I express the belief or expecta t ion t ha t a person present a t a cer ta in place near Has t i ngs on a cer ta in day in 1066 would have been able to observe cer ta in events. The s t a t emen t is t rue if, under the implied conditions, the implied exper ience would have been realised. Thus, here too, t ru th means the same kind of agreement of expecta t ion with real isa t ion, and the cognitive a im is seen in every case to be the ga ther ing within i ts content, in the form of experience and expecta t ion, of ever more and more of i ts objective world. The objective s tandard of t ru th m a y therefore be more closely defined as the agreement of the ac tua l and condi t ional expecta t ions of experience implied in a judgment wi th the rea l isa t ion of tha t experience under the condit ions implied.

Now if this be wha t is mean t when we say tha t a judgment is true, then we are able to po in t to a cer ta in posit ive basis for tha t body of judgments we call our knowledge. The t r u t h of a judgment can be known when i ts expecta t ions are ac tua l ly realised in experience. We ac tua l ly do have the experience of knowing t r u th s when and as our judgments are demonst ra ted , our expecta t ions realised. This is not to say t h a t the judg~ ment is self-evidently true. I t is not. I t is proved by experience. Though the judgment a lways involves an expectat ion, and though i ts fulf i lment mus t a lways lie t empora r i ly beyond it, yet, because we live in a specious present , a durat ion, and not in an inf ini tes imal ins tant , expec ta t ion and rea l isa t ion can be experienced in the one l iving moment . We ac tua l ly have experience of the rea l i sa t ion of p resen t expectat ions. Indeed, mos t of our experience is of this character . I t does not come as a surprise, bu t as expected. The judgment and i ts proof can thus be cognised together. And in so cognising them we m a y have an experience of indubi table t ruth . Where this proof by experience is possible we have an objective

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criterion of t r u t h in the sense tha t i t is descr ibable in te rms of objective, or real, events, open, under ce r ta in conditions, to the experience of all. B u t this type of t ru th-exper ience is a very fleeting one. I t canno t l as t for more t han a p a r t of one pulse of experience, one specious present . I t las ts only while the j udgmen t passes f rom "not now, but stil l p resen t" to "not present , but past" . No such judgmen t can be taken and made the basis (while stil l r e t a in ing i ts ce r ta in ty ) of a fu r the r series of judgments of any considerable extent . For while the fu r t he r series based upon it is being fo rmu la t ed i t fades in to the past , and as i t becomes pas t i t loses i ts cer ta inty . Even though the demons t ra t ion may be repeated we can never be quite sure t h a t the judgmen t and the demons t ra t ion we have in experience now are quite the same as those we had before and on which this series of inferences was based. Cer ta in ty , therefore, in m a t t e r s of c~ncrete fact , can be obta ined only for pa r t i cu l a r judgments of the l iving present .

What , then, of the vaun ted ce r ta in ty of such abs t r ac t genera l pr inciples as we find in Logic and Mathema t i c s? Are they, too, proved by exper ience? And is the i r ce r t a in ty also l imi ted to the p resen t? Our answer is t ha t objects of pure t hough t are none the less objects of experience for being abs t rac t . As abs t rac t ions , however, t ime and change form no p a r t of their meaning. They are known as unpar t icu la r i sed , independent of time, as universals . So the ce r t a in ty of any propos i t ion made about them is not l imited to the present . Bu t the meaning of such propos i t ions still consists in the expecta- t ions they arouse. Such proposi t ions, a p a r t f rom expec- t a t ions about concrete objects, also a rouse expec ta t ions abou t abs t r ac t objects of thought . The proposi t ion, 2 + 2 = 4, a rouses the expecta t ion t h a t the menta l opera t ion of addi t ion pe r fo rmed with the integers 2 and 2 will br ing me to cognit ion of the integer 4; and this expecta t ion being real ised in experience I find the propos i t ion true. Ancl as the objects of experience in this case are non- temporal .abstractions. the j udgmen t is not bound to any pa r t i cu la r case or event. I t is a universal . All judgments about pure objects of thought are of this type. I t includes judgments abou t adequate ly defined hypothet ica l enti t ies, for these, too, m a y express expecta t ion of consequences for thought which may be experienced by real isa t ion in thought. And even such judgments as these are added to our stock of t ru ths , for, since even hypothe t ica l ent i t ies a re composed of e lements abs t rac ted f rom experience, judgments abou t enti t ies so cons t ruc ted have a bear ing upon knowledge of the potent ia l i t ies of the real world.

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J u d g m e n t s of this class, then, are proved by experience, as are judgments regard ing concrete pa r t i cu l a r facts . They are self-evident only because, to prove them by experience, we need examine no other experiences than those involved in con templa t ing the judgments themselves. Bu t the fac t t ha t these judgments m a y concern universa ls gives them a distinc- tive importance . Fo r when we take the cases of concrete f ac t as instances of the universals dea l t wi th in our ab s t r ac t judgments we are able to ca r ry our conclusions as to concrete m a t t e r s of f ac t f a r beyond the range of experience. Yet such reasoning is a lways obsessed by three sources of u n c e r t a i n t y : (a) t ha t the concrete cases reasoned abou t may not be ful ly and accura te ly defined in the abs t r ac t concepts which are employed; (b) t h a t a fa i lure of thought m a y have resul ted in an assumpt ion of self-evident connect ion a t some poin t in the a rgumen t where none such exis ted; (c) the point ment ioned above, tha t a t r a in of a rgumen t a lways involves re l iance upon the uncer ta in f ac to r of memory. The re l iabi l i ty of the conclusion of such a t r a in of reasoning is, of course, enormously s t rengthened when we can work back aga in f rom the judgmen t abou t universa ls to a judgment express ing some p a r t i c u l a r expecta t ion and t h a t expecta t ion can be s imul taneous ly real ised in experience, as is done when we test an hypothesis by experiment . Bu t even then absolute ce r ta in ty is confined to the judgments of the present momen t verified in present experience.

Bu t though the objective cr i ter ion of t ru th ( real isa t ion in experience) can only give ce r t a in ty to this very l imited range of judgments , yet i t does give us the assurance tha t there is objective t ru th , even though i t be only the moment- to-moment t ru th of our real ised expectat ions. Men's search for t ru th , however, as we have seen, goes f a r beyond this. I t assumes tha t there is t r u th to be found f a r beyond the range of p resen t experience, t r u t h about the pas t and fu tu re and about the present which is beyond experience, and even t ru ths which can never be brought in any way to the t es t of the objective cr i ter ion of p resen t real isat ion. And we cer ta in ly have the experience of t ru th-va lue ar is ing f rom such judgments . The demonst rab le t r u th of present (i.e., "specious ly" present ) judgments is an i m p o r t a n t cont r ibut ion to our search for t ru th , but i t is a bare beginning. I f we had no other cr i ter ion for our t ru th-value than this the search for t ru th would p lay a p a r t of l i t t le impor tance in human life. Bu t the search for t ru th goes on beyond any th ing t ha t this s t anda rd can guarantee . And i t is a search for objective t r u t h - - t h e agree- men t of expecta t ion with a cer ta in fo rm of real i ty. The search

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is carried on in the fai th tha t objective real i ty makes our judgments either true or false, and tha t t ru th according to this objective s tandard can be found. This fai th is implicit in the s t ructure of the disposition or mental set which determines the working of the ul t imate end of cognition. But the cri terion of this search for t ru th beyond present experience is neither the self-evidence of the judgments nor their present realisation. These t ru ths are sought and such judgments are believed, but they are not, in the s tr ict sense of the term, known to be true. They are only known to have the appearance of truth-value. This appearance is determined by subjective criteria. Yet these subjective cri teria are believed to lead to objective t ruth. To see how this comes about we mus t re turn to an examinat ion of the processes whereby judgments are accepted and rejected in the building of tha t s t ruc ture we call knowledge.

When a judgment is formed and accepted (and thus valued as true) what is there about it tha t makes it appear to be an element in our cognitive grasp of our wor ld ; i.e., what is the subjective cri terion of t ru th? Even though we are able to formulate the objective s tandard of t ru th as the cognitive grasp of our world tha t does not help us, for our very problem is to know when (apar t from present experience) we have cognitively grasped our world and when our cognitions are mistaken. Yet in this dilemma the essential drive of our natures to cognitive activi ty compels us to go on forming judgments about the objects presented in experience. But, as has been said before, we cannot hold two contradic tory judgments if we see the contradict ion between them. No judgment , therefore, can be added to our stock if it be seen to be inconsistent with other judgments tha t are allowed to remain in tha t stock. Each new judgment we are able to form we gladly accept if we can, for if it can be accepted it has value, i t bears the appearance of an addit ion to our cognitive grasp of our world. Sometimes, therefore, we accept new judgments with but little comparison of them with other judgments, especially if such judgments have a value in addit ion to their mere t ru th value, i . e , are the sort of thing we want, on other grounds, to believe. Bu t a lways i t is the consistency of the new judgment with other judgments already held, whereby it is accepted or knit ted into the growing structure, tha t gives i t its appearance of truth-value, i.e., of being an item in our cognitive grasp of our wor ld; for none but judgments which appear consistent can be added to our stock of judgments about the world. The law of non- contradict ion, or the internal interconsistency of our judg-

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ments, becomes therefore our subject ive cr i ter ion of t ruth- value. The act of judgment which is consis tent wi th our other judgments appea r s to be true, to have value, because i t appears to be consis tent wi th the u l t ima te end of cognit ive act ivi ty, the cognitive grasp of our world. Other acts of judgment a p p e a r not to be true, to have the disvalue of falsehood.

This subject ive cr i ter ion then (the in terconsis tency of our judgments ) is our only cr i ter ion of t ru th beyond tha t of the t ru th real ised in the specious present . Yet i ts objective val id i ty depends upon the in te rcons is tency of the knowable world. Unless the pr inciple t ha t a th ing cannot both be and not be, both have a p rope r ty and not have it, holds good in the world of knowable objects, the Law of Non-contradic t ion can be no cr i ter ion of t ru th in our thoughts of those objects. Bu t as we c a n only think according to the Law of Non- contradic t ion, we mus t assume t h a t this law holds good in the world of our objects if we are to t h i n k about them a t all. We may recognise tha t i t is ju s t a vast assumpt ion to believe tha t Rea l i ty conforms to the na tu re of our thought . B u t wi thout tha t assumpt ion , though the pure ly prac t ica l and empir ical g rounds for cognitive ac t iv i ty would stil l remain , thought , in so fa r as i t t r anscends the judgment tha t is verified in the specious present , would lose i ts t ru th-va lue ; i t would not appea r as an ac t iv i ty wherein we extend our cognitive g rasp of our world. B u t fl~is fu r the r pu r su i t of the t ru th-va lue (the effort to engage in cognitive ac t iv i ty of a kind tha t cont inua l ly extends our cognit ive grasp of our world) is an essent ia l charac ter i s t ic of the human mind. So in all our th inking we assume the Law of Non-contradic t ion to hold among the objects of our knowledge, and we adop t i t as the cr i ter ion of the t ru th of our judgments . And, long before the individual has expl ic i t ly thought of the na ture of his cri terion, he experiences and rccognises the t ru th-value and the e r r o r -

disvalue of his var ious judgments . But the in terconsis tency of our judgments is a pure ly

subjective cri ter ion. As we only too often discover, f rom the objective cr i ter ion of rea l i sa t ion in experience, a j udgmen t may be per fec t ly consis tent with all our previous judgments and ye t be false. The fac t tha t a new judgment is quite consistent wi th all our present knowledge, therefore, is not a guaran tee t h a t i t is a fu r the r i tem in our cognitive grasp of our wor ld ; and if i t is not then i ts appea rance of t ru th-value is i l lusory. B u t though false, the individual , in such cases, has no means of knowing it is false. I t is inconsis tent with the u l t imate end of his cognitive ac t iv i ty ; but for him i t has

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the appea rance of being in ha rm ony with t ha t end because i t is consis tent with his exis t ing body of judgments . Conse- quently, to him i t appea r s to be true. B u t suppose la ter experience, e.g., fu r the r experiments , force h im to fo rm judgmen t s which are inconsis tent with this judgment or with some deduct ions f rom it. Then, if he cannot doubt the judgments fo rmed on the basis of this new experience, the earl ier , contra- d ic tory judgment begins to appea r false and is rejected. Fu r the r , he has formed a mass of j udgmen t s with regard to other selves. He believes in the essential s imi la r i ty of thei r experiences to his, and in the t rus twor th iness of cer ta in of the i r repor t s of their experience. Consequent ly one of the mass of judgments , wi th which a judgment of his own mus t be in h a r m o n y if i t is to a p p e a r true, is t h i s - - t h a t the facts set fo r th in the judgment m u s t be consis tent wi th other people 's experience. So when he learns t ha t someone else has per- formed an exper iment and found resul ts incons is ten t with his j udgmen t he is led by that , too, to doubt his fo rmer judgment .

Bu t in all this cr i t ical examina t ion of his j udgmen t the m a n ' s cr i ter ion is still the pure ly subjective one of the inter- consis tency of his own judgments for, once his thought passes beyond p re sen t experience, he has no other cri ter ion. Bu t be has learned f rom experience tha t wha t is consis tent with th is cr i ter ion today m a y not remain consis tent wi th fu ture j udgmen t s based on a l a rger experience. Yet these judgments , being in tercons is ten t now, all seem to be t rue. I f he were satisfied to cling to these judgments , and not enlarge his exper ience in any way tha t might force the acceptance of incons is ten t judgments which would force the reject ion of some now held, then we would have to say t ha t t ruth-value, for him, consisted in the possession of a body of consis tent judgments , and tha t the only cr i ter ion of t ru th , for him, is the in tercons is tency of his judgments . Bu t the only occasions on which human beings (lo this are when they value some- th ing dependent on the accep tance of cer ta in judgments more than they value t ru th itself. In so fa r as t r u th is sought the effort is made to tes t the in tercons is tency of judgments and to discover the grounds for new judgmen t s wi th which ¢o tes t the old. In this is revealed, once again, the na ture of the t ruth-value. I t is found, not in the mere bui lding up of a body of in te rcons is ten t judgments , but in the bui lding of a body of judgments so marked by in tercons is tency tha t they a p p e a r to be a cognit ive g rasp of the objective w o r l d - - a n a p p e a r a n c e tha t they have on account of the impl ic i t assump- t ion t h a t the mind 's incapac i ty to accept two cont rad ic to ry judgments (if i t sees the cont radic t ion) implies t ha t there are

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no cont rad ic t ions among the world of its objects-- i .e . , tha t the Law of Non-contradic t ion holds among them.

Thus we see tha t the subjective cr i ter ion of t ru th accepted in our thought , though the only cr i ter ion tha t can take us beyond presen t experience, is not necessar i ly the u l t imate s tandard , but tha t , used in conjunct ion with the objective cr i ter ion of m o m e n t a r y real isa t ion in p resen t experience, i t is accepted as ind ica t ing ha rmony with another s t a n d a r d - - t h a t the judgment in question should be an i tem in the subject ' s progressive cognit ive grasp of i ts world. And this s t anda rd (on the view t h a t i t is the same wor ld t h a t is grasped by different i n d i v i d u a l s - - a view which we m u s t hold if we are to believe in the in te rcommunica t ion of selves) we mus t describe as objective. Thus i t is that , pass ing out beyond the t r ans i to ry assurances of the objective cri terion, the indi- v idual strives, by means of his subject ive cri terion, to obtain a wider t ru th t h a t shall yet be objective, i.e., valid for all. And this he does in fa i th for, not only has he no grounds for the assumpt ion t h a t his objective world contains no incon- sistencies, but, even g ran t ing this, his subjective cr i ter ion of consistency only assures him tha t of two cont rad ic to ry judgments he mus t re ject one. I t never tells h im which one to reject. He decides tha t (if hq decides a t all, and in eases where he cannot pu t i t to the tes t of present experience) by choosing the lesser evil and holding to t h a t j udgmen t which is most pe rs i s ten t or which is l inked with the grea te r body of his judgments . And this cr i ter ion never completely assures him tha t even the mos t thoroughly consis tent body of judgments is u l t ima te ly or objectively true. I t merely a p p e a r s t rue because i t appea r s consis tent ; and the more the points of consistency to be found in his body of judgments the more cer ta in ly t rue do they appear .

This consis tent body of judgments has i ts roots in t e rms given in experience. Some of i t s cons t i tuen t judgments , so fa r as memory can assure the individual , have been ac tua l ly verified in experience. One or two of them may be held wi th the absolute ce r t a in ty of t.hat which is in present process of verification. As I sit here, e.g., I cont inuous ly hold, in my specious present , the judgments t h a t I exis t and t ha t I see black and whi te objects before me; and these judgments are in a cont inuous process of verification. But , a p a r t f rom such small range of ce r t a in ty the indiv idual ' s convictions mus t res t on the consis tency of his judgments wi th each o ther ; and his pursu i t of t ru th m u s t base i tself on the assumpt ion t ha t the objective world is as consis tent a whole as his subjective cr i ter ion of t r u t h demands t ha t his body of knowledge should be. Only thus can man, in the mids t of ignorance and error,

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and with a merely subject ive cri terion, ca r ry on his search for t r u th beyond the n a r r o w l imits of his present grasp, q?hat this effort does sometimes yield t ru th we cont inuous ly discover as our expecta t ions are verified in experience. I n the fa i th that , r igorous ly pursued, it will continue to yield much more t ru th we go on with it. Fo r the t ru th-va lue we thus obtain and enjoy is among the mos t precious experiences t ha t life offers. And now, in order to c lar i fy somewhat fu r the r the posi t ion here adopted and to br ing out the significance of this discussion, I would like to compare what has been said here wi th two recent s t a t emen t s of the na ture of t r u t h : (1) tha t of Sir Wil l iam Mitchell in "The Place of Minds in the World" , and (2) tha t of Professor A. C. Ewing in " Idea l i sm : A Cri t ical Survey".

Sir Wi l l i am wri tes (pp. 42, 43) : "When the members of a club speak of i ts rules, i t lies wi th their thoughts to conform wi th the rules; and the rules do not care whether the thoughts a re t rue or false, ful l or meagre. There we have the two condi t ions required of a thought t ha t i t may be true. One is t ha t its object can be compared with the real or other object t ha t i t takes for s tandard . The second is t h a t the s t anda rd one is unaffected by the though t of i t ; we m u s t be able to use the s t anda rd whatever i ts rea l character , and however d i s t an t in t ime or space. To use i t we have to grasp it, and our grasp has to let i t speak for i t s e l f . . . When a though t questions whether it is true, i t compares itself with noth ing ; i t compares the object in i ts g rasp with the object that i t wants to grasp, and has made s t andard . "

I have used very s imi lar language in descr ibing the u l t ima te a im of t ruth-seeking as " the cognit ive grasp of our world". Bu t the word "g ra sp" is a me taphor and needs for i ts e lucidat ion an analys is of the menta l processes for which i t s tands. This I have a t t emp ted to supply, and the key to t ha t e lucidat ion is found in the recogni t ion tha t the meaning conten t of t ha t cognitive grasp consists of expecta t ions . When I th ink " I t moves" the object " in the g ra sp" of the thought includes this body of expec ta t ions or meaning. The "object t h a t i t ( the thought) wan t s to grasp" , and wi th which it compares tha t which i t does grasp, is such a body of expecta- t ions (or meaning) as is real isable under the conditions conta ined within them. This s t andard body of meaning or expecta t ions does not exis t as a menta l process, still less as a physical fact . I t s being is pure ly ideal, like tha t of the t rue s t r a igh t l ine or the t rue circle. Yet i t fulfils the two condit ions named by Sir Wi l l i am as requi r ing to be fulfilled by the s t anda rd which determines whether a thought is t rue : (a) This ideal or theore t ica l s t anda rd body of expecta t ions is

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A THEORY OF THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 8[

unaffected by the actual thinking of it. I ts nature or content is determined, quite independently of its ever being thought of, by the real conditions of the objective world. (b) I t is the kind of object with which the actual object grasped by thought (the body of meaning or expectations) can be compared. The thinker may sometimes know that his thought is true because the expectations held in hi~ thought as realisable are actually realised. This is the ease of proof by experience. Or, in the ease of that which lies beyond present experience, he may be persuaded that his thought is true, i.e., that the meaning grasped by his thought is the same as that ideal body of meaning which is actually realisable under the conditions implied within it, when that thought appears consistent with the whole body of his thought, founded as that is on expectations actually realised.

Turning now to Professor Ewing's discussion, we may note that the theory here developed is in agreement with his (a) in rejecting the older forms of the correspondence theory of the nature of truth, (b) in rejecting correspondence as the criterion of truth, (c) in finding the nature of t ruth to consist in some kind of correspondence, (d) in recognising consistency or coherence as the criterion of truth. What has been here done, however, is (a) to subject the type of correspondence in which truth consists to some fur ther analysis, finding it ultimately to depend upon the relation between expectation and realisation, and (b) to analyse further the kind of consistency or coherence that constitutes the criterion of truth, finding that this criterion involves not only the interconsistency of thoughts, including the thoughts about present experience, but, within that present experience, the consistency or coherence of expectation and realisation, thus discovering the essential link between the experience of the truth-value of our thoughts and the experience of the world of objects about which we think.

Summing up, then, our conclusion is tha t the standard of t ruth is objective, that its criterion is also objective as to its foundation in the demonstrations of immediate present experience but subjective in so far as the search for t ruth goes bey.ond present experience. Yet, in spite of this tremendous element of subjectivity in our criteria of truth, we find that, the more we use those criteria, objectiye and subjective, the larger grows the body of knowledge which we can mutually accept as tr~m. And this fact surely indicates not only a certain common constitution of the human mind and a common objective spatio-temporal-sensory world with which we are dealing, but also that we are dealing with a common objective world in the realm of values.

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A theory of the nature and criteria of truth