A Theory of Spec Ops_2009

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The Australian Special Operations Task Group SOTG) is deployed to Afghanistan on Operation SLIPPER

to conduct special operations in support of US-led Coalition security and reconstruction efforts in the country.

Photo: Australian DoD)

Robert G . Spulak, Jr.

A Theory of Special Operations

The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF

Special operations are missions to

accomplish strategic objectives

where the use of conventional forc -

es would create unacceptable risks

due to Clausewitzian frictio n. Over-

coming these risks requires special

operations forces that directly

address the ultimate sources of

friction through qualities that are

the result of the distribution of the

attributes ofSO personnel.

special Operations Forces (SOF) are small,

specially organised units manned by carefully

selected people using modified equipment and

trained in unconventional applications of tac-

tics against strategic and operational objec-

unit proficiency in specialised skills applied with

adaptabil ity, improvisation, and innovation

against adversaries often unprepared to react.

It has often been stated that the unique

capabilities of SOF complement those of con-

ventional forces. What are the unique capab il-

ities of SOF ? They are almost never named .

And why should SOF oniy complement the

capabilities of conventional forces instead of

having strategic roles of their own?

One expert defines special operations as fol-

lows: Unconven tional actions against enemy

vulnerabilities in a sustained cam paign, under-

taken by specially designated units, to enable

conventional operations and/or resolve eco-

nomically polit ico-military problems at the

operational or strategic level that are difficult or

impossible to accomplish with conventional

forces alone. Unfortunately, even this careful

and thoughtful description is a definition by

conven tional. As the capabilities of conven

tional forces im prove, they may be able to per-

form m issions that once were the respon sibility

of SOF. For examp le, fighting at night vi/as once

a characteristic of SOF. while the use of nigh

vision is now widespread in conventional oper-

ations.

Therefore, special operations {and SOF) can -

not theoretically be defined in terms of specific

and unchanging missions, skills, or capab ilities.

In practice, special operations have been

defined in the context of the contemporary war.

Dr. Robert Spulak received his Ph.D. in Physics from

the University of New Mexico in 1988. His prior de-

grees were in

Physics

Astronomy, and Nuclear Engi-

neering. Dr Spulak is presently manager of the Stra-

tegic Studies Department at Sandia National Labora-

tories.

This article is based on exc erpts from a longer publi-


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During wartime, special men emerge who have

the personal capability to overcome risk and

the skills that allow them t o perform strategical-

ly important tasks (when organised into special

and small units) that conventional forces can-

not.

A theory of special operations m ust therefore

start with an understanding of what conven-

tional forces cannot do and why. Conventional

forces do have limitations, the most prominent

of which is Clausewitzian friction; in fact, mili-

tary forces have been shaped by these limita-

tions. This is not to say that friction does not

apply to SOF aswell,but instead that the origin

of SOF is due to the impact of friction on

mili-

tary forces. The purpose of the present paper is

to generalise this idea to provide a theory of

SOF based on the enduring limitations of con-

ventional forces, based in turn on the immut-

able nature of war itself.

The Limitations

of Military Forces

Military forces have evolved structurally and

have developed the "principles of war" to

accommodate the realities of war through les-

sons learned in blood. In the end. it is the

enemy's fear that once his material or moral

resources are eroded, he will be subject to

destruction in the arena of conflict that removes

his will to continue . The enduring nature of war

is that, within the strategic arena of conflict, we

and our enemy are both striving to be able to

destroy the other.

The requirements of m ilitary forces are deter-

mined by the need to place ourselves in posi-

tion to destroy the enemy while at the same

time avoiding too great a risk of deadly conse-

quences to ourselves. These two fundamental

needs are in direct conflict, and both elements

will always be present. Technology can affect

how we propose to visit destruction upon the

enemy and how we might try to avoid it our-

selves, but it does not eliminate the underlying

conflict of purposes or its effects upon the

humans engaged in war. The current concerns

about asym metrical warfare and terrorism illus-

trate that the enemy will always find a way to

Portuguese Special Forces.

Photo: Portuguese Army)

hurt us. But avoiding all risk at any cost is as

bad as being foolhardy.

The enduring nature of war creates what Carl

von Ciausewitz called friction. Friction is the

"effect of reality on ideas and intentions in war"

- that is, the difference between plans andreal-

ity. The three ultimate sources of friction are:

constraints imposed by human physical and

cognitive limits, informational uncertainties and

unforeseeable differences between perceived

and actual reality, and the structural nonlinear-

ity of combat processes that can give rise to

the long-term unpredictability of results and

emergent phenomena.

Friction will remain the central fact of war,

and as such w ill retain the potential to make the

difference between success and failure. Fric-

tion is the reality that will continue to help deter-

mine the requirements and the limitations of

military forces, due to the enduring nature of

war: the need to place ourselves in position to

destroy the enemy while at the same time

avoiding too great a risk of deadly consequenc -

es to ourselves.

The Relationship between

Conventional Forces and SOF

In general, military forces are large organisa-

tions to accomplish all of the requirements

imposed by the nature and principles of war.

One reason military forces are large is just the

size of the overall task itself, threatening de-

struction against an enemy and guarding

against catastrophe in the environment includ-

ing friction. For both purposes, all else being

equal, more is better. Although large forces are

required,

the characteristics of large forces are

some of the very sources of friction that create

fundamental limitations,

A large curve can represent, schematically,

the distribution of some attribute of individual

military personnel such as physical endurance,

clarity of thought under stress, aptitude for lan-

guage or culture, or performance of a specific

task. The average ability w ould be represented

by the peak of the curve, but many personnel

score both above and beiow the average. The

area under the curve would be the totai number

of personn el. If the tota number of personn el is

enlarged or reduced, the height of the distribu-

tion will change but not the average or the

spread

- if the military pe rsonnel are repres en-

An Iraqi SWAT team member awaits his

next turn to fire during weapons training

with U.S. Army Soldiers from 3rd Battalion

10th Special Forces Group,

at Camp Hit, Iraq, 26 August 2007.

Photo: US Navy)

tative of the same recaiiting pool of the gene

al population and the same military organis

tion and training. A small curve can represe

the distribution of the same attribute amon

members of SOF who are selected out of th

larger military population for superior perfo

mance in this and many other attributes. Th

average performance is much higher and th

spread is smaller because there is a minimu

standard against which these personnel we

selected. Also, since they were selected out

the general military popula tion, the number th

score at any given level are fewer than the num

ber who s core at that level in the overall popu

lation.

This last factor limits the overall numb

of special operators to be a small fraction of th

overall number of military pe rsonnel. In fact,

this schematic representation, the number

SOF is 3.8% of the total military personne

which is the approximate percentage of U

SOF compared with total US active duty mi

tary personnel. The only ways to increase th

area under the SOF curve are to increase th

numbers of personnel recruited into SOF fro

the high end of the conventional distributio

recruit SOF from outside the conventional mi

tary, or lower the selection standards to wide

the distribution.

Obviously not all of the high-perfonning

ind

viduals are recruited into SOF. There are s

many "high performers" in the convention

distribution. In fact, the nature of the conve

tional military organisation and its capabilitie

are determined by the entire distribution of pe

sonnel. But there is a maximum fraction of th

overall military personnel that can meet th

standards and be recruited into SOF. Th

smaller and tighter distribution of personn

with greater average "attributes" is the sourc

of the nature and ca pabilities of SOF.

These distributions help explain how co

ventional forces perform missions that we

once the responsibility of SOF and how th

does not mean that they are becoming mo

"SOF-like." This is often discussed in the co

text of the application of technology, althoug


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characteristics of SOF is the use of technology

that is not widely available to conventional forc-

es for a variety of reasons, including limited

availability, security, cost, extensive or special-

ised training, and risk. The technology may

later become more widely adopted in conven-

tional forces for one of two reasons: the char-

acteristics of the technology may change as it

matures,

(e.g.,

less expensive, easier to oper-

ate), allowing its use by the wider distribution of

conventional personne l: or/and, the distribution

of conventional personnel may. over time, be

purposely moved to a greater capability to use

this technology through widespread training or

recruiting. In either case, the conventional per-

sonnel will still have a wide distribution of capa -

bility, and SOF will still have a smaller tighter

distribution with a greater average. If there is

then a perceived lack of distinction between

SOF and conventional forces, it is likely due to

the lack of adoption by SOF of further technol-

ogy or capability beyond the conventional forc-

es due to the instltutionalisation of the m issions

in SOF that the technology (or other advances

or changes) enabled. It is not the missions that

define special operations but rather the person-

nel.

This is not to say that special operations are

defined simply as what SOF do . Of course it

is the existence of strategic objectives that are

beyond the limitations of conventional forces

that creates the need for SOF to overcome

those limitations and perform missions to

accomplish those objectives. But overtime it is

not specific missions that are designated as

sp ecial or assigned to SOF that define special

operations. The missions will change, but the

ability to overcome the limitations of conven-

tional forces is embodied in the SOF personnel.

If the conventional forces can accomplish the

mission, it is time tor SOF to move on.

Defining SOF

The above is why a special task for con -

ventional forces or a special capability or

technology is not the same thing as special

operations. By the same token , the selection of

personnel with a smaller and tighter distribution

with greater average attributes is necessary

but not sufficient to explain the nature of SOF.

After all, there are many military specialties

requiring specific aptitudes, knowledge, and

training that are not shared by military forces in

general. What is the difference between SOF

and the Judge Advocate General's Corps? Or,

for that matter, what is the difference between

Navy SEALS and Navy divers? Elite forces may

also be selected to have a different distribution

of some attributes than conventional forces,

and they may perform some tasks far better,

but they are not organised into the right kind of

units and the individuals may not have attrib-

utes that allow them to be creative or flexible.

It is the attributes of SOF themselves that

matter, of course - and it is worth noting that

the most important atthbutes may not be phys-

ical capabilities but mental and psychological

attributes. These attributes create three funda -

mental qualities of SOF: SOF are wannors. are

creative, and are flexible. These three qualities

of SOF that arise from the distribution of attrib-

Elite Warriors

SOF directly address the constraints impo-

sed by human physical and cognitive limits by

the smaller and tighter distribution of personnel

with greater abilities to deal with the intense

stresses, pressures, and responses of combat.

This is why SOF must be elite warriors, en-

gaged directly in the fundamental nature of war

and the implementation of strategy: destroying

the enemy or creating his fear that he will be

destroyed.

SOF are specially recruited, assessed, se-

lected, trained, and equipped; have access to

national-level intelligence and cutting-edge

technology; and demonstrate boldness, intel-

lect, and perseverance. Expected personal val-

ues are embodied in the SOF core values of

integrity, courage, a nd creativity.

extra courage; in fact, it is not about taking risks

at all. because objectively that w ould just resul

in more frequent failure.

Performance of a strategically important m is-

sion might justify greater risk, but the value of

the creativity of SOF is that they can lower the

risk associated with accomplishing strategic

goals. At both the individual and organisationa

level.

SOF overcome risks that conventiona

forces cannot by changing the combat pro-

cess,

which is made possible by greater attrib

utes, training, and tech nology.

Conventional forces attempt to change the

combat process as

well.

This is the reason fo

new military technologies, which may be more

effective at destruction without exposing our

forces to as great a risk. However, friction pre-

vents conventional forces from changing the

Colombian Special Forces show counter

insertion tactics to participants of the

75th Joint Civilian Orientation Conference

outside Bogota, Colombia, 22 April 2008.

Photo: USAF)

Creativity

SOF directly address the structural nonline-

arity of combat processes that can give rise to

the long-temi unpredictability of results and

emergent phenom ena by immediately chang-

ing the combat process. As discussed, the re-

quirements and limitations of conventional

forces are determined in part by the need to

place themselves in position to destroy the

enemy while at the same time avoiding too

great a risk of deadly consequences to them-

selves, SOF use all available means to a ccom -

plish mission objectives without unacceptable

risk by using assets in unexpected and crea-

tive

ways. Creativity means the ability to

immediately change the combat process, alter-

ing the way in which the tension is accommo-

dated between threatening or performing

destruction and avoiding it.

At some level this may seem intuitively

obvi-

ous. Sending SOF to hit a target that is beyond

the reach of conventional forces does bring a

combat process immediately during war ex-

cept by applying more of existing capabilities,

so new combat processes must

be institutionalised in new capabilities to be

useful. This difference between SOF and con-

ventional forces is thai immediately changing

the comba t process - that is. creativity - is part

of SOF's operational capabilities, whereas in

conventional forces op erational capabilities are

the result of attempting to change the combat

process.

Flexibility

SOF directly address the infonnational un-

certainties and unforeseeable differences

between perceived and actual reality by hav-

ing a wide range of capabilities to apply to spe -

cific goals in the face of uncertainty. With the

wide spread in the distribution of attributes of

personnel, the challenge for conventional forc-

es is to create units that are both large enough

and can perform specific tasks adequately in

the actual operating environment that includes

friction. Thus conventional warriors must have

a discipline and a restricted set of specific

requirements and capabilities that can be

reli-

ably demonstrated even in the most extreme

conditions of combat. This reduces the uncer-

tainty of whether the units will be able to per-


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SOF are organised differently, however,

made possible by the different distribution of

personnel. Ironically, flexibility means that a

small SOF unit can have a much larger range of

capabilities than even a large conventional unit

as a result of the smaller range of more capable

personnel. This is why modelling conventional

forces on SOF will not work. But the iack of

numbers is also why SOF cannot win the war

by themselves, and why they cannot have the

full range of overall capabilities represented by

the sum of the diverse large units of the much

larger conventional force s.

The range of capabilities does, however,

make SOF more independent of other military

forces in their operations. And flexibility is an-

other reason why SOF have strategic value,

since if the strategy changes, SOF unlike con -

ventional forces) can immediately be redirect-

ed .

Operational Characteristics of SOF

In an attempt to summarise the wide range

of current and future capabilities in war and

operations other than war, the individual attrib-

utes, SOF organisation and capabilities, and

the fundamental qualities of SOF can be inte-

grated as a few characteristics of SOF that dis-

tinguish them from conventional forces. The

definitions of these characteristics are as fol-

lows:

- elativesuperiority heability ofsmallspecial

operations units to gain a temporary decisive

advantage, even over a larger or well-defend-

ed enemy force;

- Certain access: The ability to rapidly and

securely transport, insert, and extract SOF,

typically undetected, allowing operations in

areas where or when conventional military

operations are not possible;

Uncon ventional operations: The ability to di-

rectly alter the way in which the tension

between threatening and avoiding de struction

is managed to conduct operations - for exam-

ple,

operating autonomously and indepen-

dently, establishing and utilising the capabil-

ities offoreignmilitary and paramilitary forces,

sabotage, and subversion;

- Integrated operations: The ability to address

transnational and asym metric threats by inte-

grating elements of national power and oper-

ating with other military forces and non-mili-

tary agencies;

- Strategic ir)itiative:The ability to create an d

maintain initiative against an enemy at the

strategiclevel by anorchestrated campaign of

engaging carefully selected objectives un-

available to co nventional forces.

Strategic A pplications of SOF

Since SOF have fundamentally different limi-

tations than conventional forces, due to the

fundamental qualities of SOF that address the

ultimate sources cf friction. SOF are not mere-

ly complementary to conventional forces but

can make strategic contributions of their own.

What follows is an illustration of how these

applications can be understood using the con-

cepts developed.

To help understand the contribution of SO

to warfare and to national security in operation

other than war, we will look at examples of th

application of SOF to the principles of wa

when used to implement strategy. Once th

war starts and we are executing strateg

plans, and tactics, the misuse of SOF can b

avoided if we ask the question, How does th

SOF mission contribute to applying the princ

ples of war to implement the strategy in way

that conventional forces cannot?

Objective

When people think of special operation

they often think of direct action mission

against high-value targets, especially targe

that cannot be attacked by conventional for

es. This is one of the sources of confusio

about the use of SOF, because technophile

assum e that all targets can eventually) b

attacked through appropriately advancedtec

nology. Thinking about applying SOF to Ob

jective, however, should start w ith the strateg

objectives for which wars are fought. Conve

tional military forces may not provide th

means to acconnplish the political objective

One of the greatest strategic contributions

SOF is that they provide unique or addition

means to address these objectives. Indee

there are some political objectives that ma

only be met by the use of SOF.

For example, since SOF have the characte

istics of certain access, integrated operation

and relative superiority, they are capable

hostage rescue. Note that it is not hostage re

Chilean Special Forces fast-rope on to the flight deck of Canadian ship HM CS Regina FFH 334) while cond ucting visit, board, search and

seizure VBSS) exercises during PANAM AX 2007. PANAMA X 2007 is a joint and multinational training exercise tailored to the defense of th

Panama Canal, involving civil and m ilitary forces from the region.

Photo: US Navy)


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One of two pararescuemen from 38tti Rescue Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, GA, follows an inflatable boat out

the back of an HC-130 during a rescue mission 350 miles nortiieast of the Caribbean island of St. Maarten on 23 July 2008.

Photo: USAF)

cue,

per se, that is the characteristic of SOF;

whether rescuing hostages is strategically

important depends on the political objectives.

As another example, the networit concept is

widely used in modern military thought. Ene-

mies, including terrorists, are conceptualised

as networks to provide a basis to discuss

attacking them. There are at least four ways to

attack a network: ovenwhelm the entire net-

work; interdict critical nodes or links; establish

operational superiority and interdict nodes or

links when necessary or convenient; and, iso-

late and degrade a portion of the network to

reduce its efficiency. SOF can play a strategic

role in each of these potential objectives by e.g.

creating strategic initiative in advance of over-

whelming conventional forces; attacking critical

nodes; using unconventional warfare to estab-

lish a kind of SOF superiority (e.g.,analogous

to air superiority); and, creating friction for the

enemy through direct action and psychological

operations.

With respect to the war on terrorism, ten-or-

ism could be viewed as an intemational prob-

lem to be fought through law enforcement, dip-

lomacy, intemational cooperation, and foreign

assistance. The role of the military is to support

these activities, and SOF can contribute to

most of these in operations other than war.

However the fundamental purpose of the

mili-

tary is to wage and win the nation's wars. A

specific terrorist enemy in war would require all

justified if the threat is not low-level political vio-

lence that could remain in the domain of law

enforcement but is catastrophic terrorism,

especially the use of weapons of mass de struc-

tion (WMD).

The use of WMD by terrorists is likely to

require an identifiable and relatively stable or-

ganisational structure to gamer and maintain

control over necessary resources and the

weapons themselves. Therefore, SOF can con-

tribute to this objective in at least two ways;

create and sustain strategic initiative against

specific ten-orist enemies; and, destroy the ter-

rorist enemies' capability to conduct large-

scale terrorism. The latter may require thepoli-

tics of war - for example, violation of other

states' sovereignty, capturing or killing enemy

personnel,

interception and destruction of for-

eign vessels and aircraft, seizure of foreign

assets, and acceptance of collateral damage

and accidental innocent casualties. There is a

critical role for SOF operatore with strategic

impact at the point of contact to utilise discre-

tion in these actions, managing the balance

between threat and risk at the strategic level.

Offensive

Joint Publication 3-05 says, The lethal

applications [of special operations] are inher-

ently offensive in nature because they seek to

strike or engage an adversary to compel or

deter his actions. Howeve r, it is not whether

matters. This is another great strategic SOF

contribution. SOF can create initiative, even

independently of conventional forces.

Initiative is taking the fight to the enemy

instead of passively waiting for the enemy to

act, making the fight when and where we

choose. Without the initiative, strategists can

make no dec isions of their

own.

Because of the

time gap between strategic cause and effect

we must seize the initiative from the outset

forcing others to react. Seizing, retaining, and

exploiting the initiative allows one to set the

strategic ag enda, shapes the strategic environ-

ment, forces the enemy to react to changing

conditions, and provides freedom of action in

formulating and adapting strategy to the evolv-

ing context. Successful special operations can

seize and retain the initiative at the tactical leve

even when opposed by an enemy force super-

ior in numbers.

In a well-know historical example, after Dun-

kirk and until the landing at Normandy, the Bri-

tish tumed to the use of special means as a

way to establish strategic initiative. It was co n-

sidered an important strategy to fight for the

initiative even though there W IS no chance to

immediately exploit any gains.

With r pect to the war on terrorism, SOF

could be used to establish and maintain strate-

gic initiative against specific terrorist enemies

For example, one of the strategic issues in the

war on terrorism is that transnational terrorist


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resources,plan,a ndtrain.SOF can deny terror-

ists these sanctuaries and would force them to

react to our actions, giving the US freedom to

adjust operations as the situation demands. It

wouid also interfere with the capabilities of the

enemy to perform acts of terror by creating

uncertainty and friction in the enemy as well as

destroying or degrading terrorist capabilities

and resources. Strategic initiative would also

interfere with the iimescale of potential terrorist

attacks and divert terrorist resources away

from planning and executing attacks to

address their organisational security.

Mass

A critical part of succeeding at war is Mass.

Being able to threaten or perform destruction

against the enemy requires placing the appro-

priate mass of military forces {or effects, some

would argue) in an effective position at the

appropriate time. Since SOF are a small frac-

tion of overall military forces, it may seem that

they have no role to play in providing Mass to

accomplish strategic objectives. However, the

great strategic value of SOF in providing Mass

is to provide somebody else's Mass through

enabling partner nations and unconventional

warfare.

One of the strategic elements of the US

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on

Terrorism is to expand foreign partnerships

and partnership capacity to counter terrorism.

For example, In the Philippines, US special

operations helped weaken the radical Isamist

Abu Sayyaf Group through miiitary training,

road building, and medical aid that won popu-

lar support and led to the collection of useful

new intelligence.

The use of unconvention al warfare to prov ide

Mass in defeat of an enemy in war is amply

illustrated by Operation Enduring Freedom

(OEF) in Afghanistan. In early November, 2001

Army Special Forces teams (often reinforced

with Air Force Special Tactics Team members)

infiltrated Afghanistan via SOF aircraft and

linked up with anti-Taliban Afghan forces.

These SOF teams immediately gained the con-

fidence of the Afghans, and between the intelli-

gence they received from the Afghans and

what they were able to determine themselves,

the arrival of the SOF teams produced an im-

mediate and exponential increase in the num-

ber of Taliban targets that could be identified to

conventional strike aircraft. In addition to radi-

cally increasing the effectiveness of US airpow-

er, the unconventional warfare teams also

improved the effectiveness of the Afghan anti-

Taliban forces they joined.

Economy of Force

Applying the principle of economy of force

may lead to the misuse of SOF. thinking that as

more capable elite warriors they are just more

economical conventional forces. But there are

many cases where one of the strategic objec-

tives is to minimise the presence of US forces.

Then the use of SOF may make some military

operations possible that otherwise would be

counter-productive.

Economy of force can also refer to accom-

plishing strategic objectives without resorting

to the use of force at ail, preventing the com-

mitment or use of large numbers of conven-

tional forces to resolve a conflict. Many SOF

activities in operations other than war fall into

this category. However, recall that the value of

SOF in peac etime is derived from their

unique roles in war. And another way in which

SOF can contribute to economy of force is

operations against critical links or nodes, if

they exist, in an enemy's networked strategic

capabilities.

Manoeuvre

SOF can contribute to M anoeuvre by strate-

gic initiative to create the conditions that allow

the movement of conventional forces to

posi-

tions of advantage(e.g..by creating friction for

the enemy) and by strategic reconnaissance

(using certain access and unconventional

operations) to reduce friction for own forces.

Unity of Command

Since SOF have the characteristics of inte-

grated and unconventional operations, they

can play a strategic role in Unity of Command

of US, allied, and coaiition forces. SOF can in-

tegrate the elements of national power with

other US government agencies for both unilat-

eral US and coalition operations. And for appli-

cations of the military element cf national

power when the US still prefers discernment.

but is willing to participate in multinational o

coalition operations. SOF achieves strateg

utility as a tool of US foreign policy. In this la

ter role, SOF contributes to keeping conflict a

the low end of the spectrum.

A more visible role in achieving unity of com

mand is in coalition operations where SOF ca

perform liaison functions because of their cu

tural and language capabilities. In Operatio

Desert Storm , most of the US Special Force

personnel were assigned to the vital task o

accompanying allied Arab units to ensur

smooth coordination with other allied uni

(Arab and non-Arab).

Security

In some cases, SO F can contribute

security of the overall military effort by not pu

ting the conventional forces at risk to accom

plish a strategic objective. In other cases, SO

can perform operations specifically to provid

strategic security for the overall force. Tw

examples of the latter are the elimination o

Hitler's atomic bomb project in WW2 an

SOUD hunting in Desert Storm .

Surprise

Another way in which SOF can make a stra

tegic contribution is to contribute to surprise i

the operations of the overall military cam paign

A widely cited example of deception opera

tions during Desert Storm was the potenti

amphibious landing in Kuwait to hold Iraq

forces in place while US and allied groun

forces prepared for the end run to the wes

The most suitable beach for an amphibiou

landing was apparently also heavily defende

by the Iraqis. The night of the start of the ove

ali ground offensive. 15 US Navy SEALs eac

placed 20 pounds of C4 explosives along th

beach to simulate demolition charges tha

would be used to clear obstacles for an amph

bious landing, and also anchored two rows

blue-and-white buoys to simulate markin

lanes for Marine landing craft. When the charg

es detonated, elements of two Iraqi division

reacted and moved to face the perceive

imminent landing.

Simplicity

The use of SOF may be the simplest way t

accomplish a strategic objective. Thus for in

stance the case with combat search and res

cue (CSAR) missions to recover downed pilo

from enemy-held or hostile territory, which

increasingly regarded as a major politic

objective.

Synthesis

A theory of special operations can be state

concisely: special operations are missions

accomplish strategic objectives where the us

of conventional forces would create unaccep

able risks due to Olausewitzian friction. Ove

coming these risks requires speciai operation

forces that directly address the ultimate sour

es of friction through qualities that are th

result of the distribution of the attributes

SOF personnel. . . 7m


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Documents

A Theory of Spec Ops_2009