Upload
christos-anthoulakis
View
242
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
7/29/2019 A test of seamanship
1/8
The report provides a useful insight into the
decision making process of the Master and
where it failed. As in many such cases the
consequences of anchor dragging were
catastrophic but fortunately, on this occasion,
only in financial terms and not in terms ofloss of life, personal injury or pollution.
The UK Marine Accident Investigation
Branch (MAIB) report into the fouling of the
vessels anchor on the Central Area
Transmission System (CATS) Everest gas
pipe line criticised the shore-side
authorities and government departments
roles in relation to nomination of the
anchorage areas, communications and
response to the incident.The reportidentifies few failings on the part of the
ship owner.Nevertheless it was ultimately
the Masters seamanship which was lacking
and in this respect the report makes
valuable reading for navigators.
Regulatory update7 US Authorities reminded to show
respect to seafarers
7 Declaration of defective navigation
equipment: US Port State Control
issue a clarification
Navigationand Seamanship
1 A test of seamanship
5 Risk management on the bridge
5 MAIB publishes report on MSC Napoli
Miscellaneous8 53ft containers: suitable for
carriage by sea?
8 Publications
Volume 15: Number 2
May 2008
The Britannia Steam Ship
Insurance Association LimitedRISK WATCH
A test ofseamanship
Following the last edition of Risk Watch, in which we
considered the growing number of grounding claims
arising from anchor dragging, we now highlight the
circumstances of another vessel dragging anchor as
described in an official government report.
Containers and Cargoes6 Canola
6 Richards Bay high value ores
6 Revised guidelines for container securing
manuals and compulsory training ashore
7/29/2019 A test of seamanship
2/8
A test of seamanship continuedThe vessel, an aframax tanker, arrived in ballast
off the mouth of the River Tees and let go her
port anchor at 22:00 hours on the 24 June.
The Master had previously contacted Tees
Ports VTS requesting a designated anchorage
and was advised that there was no
designated anchorage in Tees Bay but that
ships of similar size normally anchored in the
vicinity of two spoil ground areas to the east
of the entrance.The VTS advised the Master to
keep well clear of the pipelines in an area
adjacent to the spoil ground. After anchoring
the Master received confirmation from Tees
Ports VTS that his positionwas fine. The vessel
anchored with seven shackles on deck, the
windlass was taken out of gear and the
manual compressor bar left over the cable but
not secured in position.
By midday the following morning wind
speeds were in excess of 30 knots.The Master
had previously received forecasts of this as
well as a recent forecast that wind forces
would be increasing.The Master subsequentlyslackened the anchor cable so that there were
8 shackles on deck.
Shortly after 20:00 hours the wind speed
increased to 40 knots, gusting to 48 knots.
The Third Officer, on watch, had been diligent
and was checking his position by several
methods. At 22:00 hours the Third Officer
noted that the vessel was lying outside her
swinging circle and informed the Master.The
main engine was ready for use relatively
quickly - at 22:16 - but by that time the vessel
had dragged a distance of 0.8 nautical miles
at a rate of 3 knots towards the Everest gas
pipeline. At the same time the Chief Officer
and two seaman had commenced heaving
the port anchor cable.
At this time the vessel was pitching heavily
under a northerly swell estimated to be in
excess of 5 metres and was yawing in excess
of 70 from north-west to north-east.
Predictably the Chief Officer reported that
heaving was very slow because of the weight
on the cable.
The first engine movement,dead slow ahead,was recorded at 22:23, at which time the ships
head was recorded as swinging between 068
and 320 and seas were breaking over the
forecastle.The vessel continued to drag in a
southerly direction. At 22:28 hours the engine
was put to slow ahead and shortly thereafter
the vessel started moving over the ground in
a northerly direction. It should be noted that
at this stage the Master was reluctant to use
greater engine power as he feared the vessel
might run over the anchor cable. By 22:40
hours the drift had been arrested but the
vessel had now dragged a total of 1.3 nautical
miles and lay only 2 cables north of the
charted Everest gas pipeline.
At 22:50, with the main engine set at half
aheadand three shackles in the water, the
Chief Officer decided that there was too
much weight on the cable and to apply the
brake and hold on. As the brake was being
applied, whilst still in gear but with the
control lever in a neutral position, the
hydraulic motor unit suffered a catastrophic
failure.The cable ran out immediately and the
brake lining disintegrated, giving off smoke
and sparks, and high pressure hydraulic oilsprayed over the forecastle.
2 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 15: Number 2: May 2008
Above Profile of CATS pipeline in relation to sea bed.
Left Position of anchor and its location with reference
to harbour limits,spoilt ground areas and pipelines.
Navigation and Seamanship
7/29/2019 A test of seamanship
3/8
3
The Master was aware of the Admiralty Sailing
Direction and of the deteriorating weather
conditions. Nevertheless he chose to remain
at the anchorage. He was unaware that the
quality of the holding grounding was at best
moderate.The Master elected to use seven
shackles on deck though he later increased
this to 8 shackles.There are two commonly
used formulae for calculating the number of
shackles required.
1) Number of shackles of cable =1.5 x Depth in metres, or;
2) Length of cable in metres =
6 to 10 x the depth in metres.
As the depth was approximately 36m the
formulae required the Master to utilise 9
shackles or 8-13 shackles respectively. He
underestimated the length of cable necessary
in the weather conditions. If, as in this case,
less cable is used, the effects of yawing caused
by the wind and the effect of pitching caused
by the swell greatly increase the risk of snatchloads being applied to the anchor and that
the cable will be lifted off the seabed with a
As the port cable paid out to the bitter end, a
total of 12 shackles, the vessel drifted quickly
south, over the gas pipeline. The drift was
stopped only when the anchor fouled the
pipeline.The vessel was still yawing in excess
of 100 degrees and at the extremity of one
yaw the anchor freed itself from the pipeline,
10 minutes after being fouled. She then
began to drag towards the lee shore.
Luckily as the vessel passed over a shoal area
the anchor held in a position 2n.m. off the lee
shore at 23:28 hours.The Master attempted to
slip the anchor but, because of the weight on
the cable, could not do so until the damaged
windlass hydraulic motor had been replaced.
It took in excess of 12 hours to slip the anchor.
Choice of Anchorage/Seamanship
The Admiralty Sailing Direction for this area
(NP57) advised against anchoring in north or
easterly gales and prohibited anchoring
within 2.5 cables of the Everest pipeline. BA
chart 2567 reiterated this message.Thecharted depth at the anchorage was 32m and
the height of tide was 4.5m.
resultant pull causing the anchor to trip.
The fact that the vessel was in ballast condition
and had a considerable windage resulted in
the sailingeffect being significant.
The report states that ultimately the most
seaman-like approach was to weigh anchor
and ride out the storm at sea (this was the
approach followed earlier that evening by
other vessels in the anchorage).The report
further states that the Master had failed to use
the main engine in a positive and committed
fashion. It was 29 minutes after dragging was
first identified and 16 minutes after the main
engine was available to him before the first
positive,slow ahead, main engine movement
was ordered.When the Master usedhalf
ahead, the AIS recordings indicated that the
rate of drift was reduced considerably.
In the circumstances, since the windlass was
clearly struggling, the more seaman-like
option would have been to secure the anchor
at the time 3 shackles were in the water andthen attempt to dredge the anchor
northwards using the main engine.
Anchor shank
Anchor head (1.63m)
Anchorfluke(2.0
7m)
Cats pipeline
Cats pipelineAnchorfluke(2.07m
)
Anchor shank (3.345m)
36
0.9
14m
Plan view and elavation diagrams representing
vessels anchor snagging the CATS pipeline.
7/29/2019 A test of seamanship
4/8
Navigation and Seamanship
At that time however, the Master continued to
manoeuvre with massive loads on the
windlass machinery.With 3 shackles in the
water there was no catenary (curvature) on
the cable to absorb those massive loads and
ultimately the hydraulic motor suffered
catastrophic failure and the cable ran out to
the bitter end.
Windlass Operating System
The vessel was fitted with KAHC-14 stockless
Bower anchors of 8.7 tonnes each.This
anchor has 2.5 to 3 times the holding power
of a standard stockless anchor of equal
weight. Each windlass was rated at 34.5
tonnes at 9m per minute (the hydraulic
system was fitted with two-in-line relief
valves but there was no relief valve fitted to
the hydraulic motor itself). Prior to the
incident the windlass and the break linings
were all in good condition.The report
stressed the importance of the Classification
rules in respect of anchoring equipment
which states:The equipment required is theminimum considered necessary for
temporary mooring of a vessel in moderate
sea conditions when the vessel is awaiting
berth and tide etc. The equipment is
12
14
10
8
6
4
2
0 5
Angle of Scope(degrees)
10 15 20
HoldingPullRatio=
HoldingPull
AnchorWeight
A test of seamanship continuedtherefore not designed to hold a vessel off
fully exposed coasts in rough weather or for
frequent anchoring operations in open sea.
In such conditions the loads on the anchoring
equipment will increase to such a degree
that its components may be damaged or lost
owing to the high energy forces generated.
Classification requirements are based on
current speeds of 2.5m per second, wind
speed of 25m per second and a scope of
chain (the ratio between length of chain paid
out and water depth) of between 6 and 10.
Anchoring equipment,as required by the
rules,is designed to hold a vessel in good
holding ground.Inspection of the vessels
windlass showed that it suffered massive
shock loading in the region of 800 bar, nearly
4 times the normal operating pressure.
The report found that the Master had failed
to adequately address the risk of windlass
failure, noting that the provision to the Master
of meaningful ship-specific data for theanchoring equipment might have helped
him recognise earlier that the weather
conditions were becoming marginal for the
design limitations of the equipment.
The report went on to draw attention to the
OCIMF guide, Anchoring Systems and
Procedures for Large Tankers, which provides
excellent guidance to Masters of larger
vessels. The report encourages Owners and
Masters to develop a contingency plan that
allows the cable to be slipped safely whilst
the bitter end is under tension.
It is recommended that navigating officers
read the full report of the MAIB into this
incident;it can be found at: www.maib.gov.uk
(Report Young Lady)
4 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 15: Number 2: May 2008
The effect of scope angle on an anchors holding power.
Damage to the port windlass hydraulic motor unit.
Angle of scope
Seabed
Anchor
AC14 Bower anchor trial number 1*
AC14 Bower anchor trial number 2*
*Trials conducted in two locations which show the
relationship between loss of holding power and the
angle of scope.
7/29/2019 A test of seamanship
5/8
The incidence of casualties where a pilot is
onboard is attracting ever increasing attention
and a recently released report by the USCG
provides useful insight into one such casualty.
In February 2008, whilst under pilotage,
departing from Baltimore, the bulk carrier
MONTROSE ran aground in the Chesapeake
Bay.The USCG report of investigationconcluded that the main reasons for the
grounding were inattention and fatigue on
the part of the pilot, and failure to follow good
Resource Management by the ships
navigators.What was of more concern was
the observation that the pilot refused to sign
the pilot card because of his apparent
extensive experience of the local area, and
that the duty officer was subsequently
hesitant in challenging the pilots actions prior
to the grounding because of the latters
strong personality.
This, unfortunately,is not an uncommon
problem, as mariners around the world are
only too well aware. A pilot is supposed to be
on board to provide navigational guidance,
subject to the Masters overall command, but
this directive is often ignored by pilots and
the bridge team. Watch keepers, especially
junior officers, are not always confident
enough in their own abilities to be able to
challenge an order made by the pilot. Even an
experienced officer can be slow to challenge
a pilot if unsure of the planned route, or if the
pilot responds negatively or aggressively to
any queries.
As it happens, the Master of the MONTROSE
had been on the bridge until about 45
minutes prior to the grounding, and although
the duty officer suspected that the ships
course and position were doubtful, he did not
question the pilot or notify the Master.
The pilots communication with the bridge
team had been restricted to issuing helm andcourse orders.
All went well until the pilot sat down in the
pilots chair, and is believed to have lost
attention.
The vessel was supposed to alter course to
starboard after passing the CR buoy, at about
0548, but the pilot gave no order to do so.
The duty o fficer then went to the chart tableto plot the position, but the vessel ran
aground at about 0600.
It should have been obvious that an alteration
of course was required after passing the buoy,
and the duty officer should have been aware
of this fact without having to refer to a
charted position.
Accidents are expensive. A seemingly minor
problem in communication can lead to a
vessel hitting a dock or running aground.
Apart from the time lost whilst freeing and
repairing the vessel, an accident can give rise
to claims for pollution, criminal liability, repair
bills, loss of hire, cargo transhipment, salvage
and wreck removal.
A responsible vessel operator will have
effective policies in place to man and operate
a vessel efficiently. All too often however,
simply having and implementing policy is not
enough. A Master needs to know that his
genuine efforts and actions are going to be
backed by his shipowner. A bridge watch
keeper needs to know that he can, if in any
doubt, question a pilots actions, with his
managers full support.This is where effective
bridge team management comes in.
One of Britannias Members has specifically
instructed and trained ship staff to challenge
pilots if they feel that the ship is being put
into danger.This is positive action (and can
only be applauded), however in order for this
to work, all ship staff must be given adequate
training by means of role play and practicaltraining ashore. It is not easy for a second or
third officer to countermand the pilots
actions, but if he has to wait for the Master
to get on the bridge before questioning the
pilot, it may well be too late.
Risk Management is a process of analysing
events that may disrupt a business and
determining how best to handle these risks,
whilst still achieving targeted goals. In otherwords, ANALYSE MINIMISE REALISE.
Risk assessment in bridge team management
should include:
the duty officer verifying that the berth to
berth passage plan remains relevant to the
voyage, with current hazards identified and
the potential danger minimised;
a bridge team pre-arrival and pre-departure
meeting, where all participants are made fully
aware of the likely deployment of pilots, route,
lines, tugs, and weather conditions.
Every day brings a different combination of
challenges, so each new or routine task needs
to be adequately risk assessed.
MAIB publishes report onMSC Napoli
The UKs Marine Accident Investigation Branch
(MAIB), has just published its report on the
investigation of the structural failure of the
container vessel MSC NAPOLI in the English
Channel in January 2007.The report highlights
problems in the design and construction of
the vessel and the overloading of containers
which contributed to the casualty. The full
report can be found at:
www.maib.gov.uk/publications/index.cfm
Risk management on the bridge
5
7/29/2019 A test of seamanship
6/8
Canola (Canadian Oil Low Acid) is a variety of
rape distinguished by the lower acidic content
of its oil. Canola is becoming an increasingly
important cash crop in North America,
especially Canada.There is nothing especially
unusual about Canola, except perhaps some
unfamiliarity with the name, and how it should
be carried. It is, however, worth noting that
Canola is not in the BC Code.
While Canola seed is not specifically listed in
the BC Code as a dangerous cargo,expellers,
rapeseed cake and pellets,which also have a
tendency to spontaneously heat,are listed in
the Code. It is advisable to refer to the relevant
section of the BC code for all these cargoes
before carrying Canola seed as a cargo.
Canola cargo is particularly susceptible to
excessive moisture content: the risks involved
are two-fold;
Should the moisture content of the Canola
seed cargo be excessively high there is a risk
that over the duration of the voyage the seed
could develop mould and be rejected on
quality grounds at the receiving port; and
There is a potential risk of spontaneous
heating: at a temperature level of just 15C,
with a seed moisture level of 12% or above,
the cargo can become very unstable, leading
to spontaneous heating.Excessive waste or
trash, (as waste material in grain cargoes are
often called) contained within the cargo andthe presence of live insects, can exacerbate
the problem. Should the cargo sit on top of
heated fuel tanks,there is a real risk of any
potential overheating problem becoming
greatly enhanced.
Members operating bulk carriers will be familiar
with Richards Bay as one of the leading coal
export ports.The port is, however, increasingly
used for the export of higher value ores such as
chrome and copper concentrate. Similarly, there
is an increase in export of mineral sand such as
Rutile and Zircon. We have been reminded by
Captain G A Chettle & Associates, Richards Bay,
that all products should not be treated in the
same manner as coal or iron ore with regard topre-loading hull cleanliness.These specialist
ores are very sensitive to contamination,
especially by rust scale,and standards of de-
scaling which would satisfy many bulk coal and
iron ore cargoes would not be acceptable to
shippers of such specialist ores. Even higher
standards may apply to some of the mineral
sands, especially Zircon sand, where it even may
be necessary for areas of rust to be wire brushed.
Captain G A Chettle & Associates has drawn up
a brief guide to highlight the standards of hull
cleanliness required for the carriage of the ores
and mineral sands exported from Richards Bay.
The guide is available from the Association.
Containers and cargoes
6 Britannia RISK WATCH Volume 15: Number 2: May 2008
Ideally the moisture content of the cargo
should be kept between approximately
7.5% and 8%, and the temperature of the
Canola seed cargo be kept at around 20C, to
ensure no risk of quality deterioration or
spontaneous heating.
It is recommended that the moisture levels of
cargo upon loading are checked to ensure
that these are below 8%.The cargo should
also be ventilated on the trip, especially when
the cargo is being transported from a
temperate climate, for example Canada, to a
more tropical climate,for example Pakistan. It
should be remembered that the principal
origins of the cargo are Canada and the
United States,and the principal destinations
of the cargo are Japan,China, Pakistan and
Mexico. It is therefore probable that in most
instances the cargo is being transported from
a temperate zone to a more tropical zone.
Slip Hazard
The Canola seed is very small, between
approximately 1 and 2 millimetres in diameter,
and is extremely hard; indeed the Canola seed
can be considered as being similar to a ball
bearing.Should a seaman inadvertently walk
over some loose seeds on the deck, there is a
risk of slipping,which could result in a serious
injury,especially if the vessel is at sea.
It is suggested that any spillage on deck,
irrespective of amount, be swept clean at the
earliest convenient time.
Canola Richards Bay high value ores
Revised guidelines for container securing
manuals and compulsory training ashore
Members and their crews will recall a previous
article in Risk Watch (Volume 14 : Number 4
October 2007) which featured the loss of
containers from the ANNABELLA and the
subsequent UK Marine Accident InvestigationBranch (MAIB) investigation. A draft IMO
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) circular
giving Revised Guidelines for the preparation
of the Cargo Securing Manual was agreed by
the IMO Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods,
Solid Cargoes and Containers (DSC) at its
meeting in Autumn 2007.
At the same meeting the reducing incidence
of deficiencies in cargo transport units (CTUs)
carrying dangerous goods in the 2007
consolidated report on container inspection
programmes, compared to the previous years
consolidated report, was noted.The DSC agreedthat the mandatory training of shore-side
personnel and future work on revision of the
International Convention for Safe Containers
(CSC) in the context of container examination
programmes were both positive measures that
would further improve the situation.
7/29/2019 A test of seamanship
7/8
Regulatory update
Declaration of defective navigation
equipment: US Port State Control
issue a clarification
Port State Control Branch USCG Sector
Houston Galveston has issued clarification
concerning the requirement to report
inoperative navigation equipment by vessels
arriving in Houston. Some vessels have been
placing a statement on their Electronic Notice
of Arrivals (ENOAs) to the effect that certain
navigation equipment is not functioning.
Whilst this is a requirement under 33 CFR
164.53 it is not sufficient to meet the
requirements of the USCG. Under the terms
of 33 CFR 164.55 a written request
(application) for an approveddeviation
effectively permission to enter the port
without fully functioning navigationequipment must also be made.Vessels
found in port with a navigation equipment
deficiency and without a Captain of the Port
approved deviation, are liable to civil penalty
action by the Coast Guard.
Most seafarers are familiar with the heavy
handed approach of some coastguard and
other authorities when boarding vessels.The
increased vigilance of the US Coastguard
since 9/11 has perhaps resulted in an attitude
towards seafarers by US Coastguards which is
inappropriate.This has been recognised by
the US Coastguard Commandant Admiral
Thad Allen in a circular dated 29 February toall US Coastguard offices and unit
commanders.The circular reads as follows:
Subject: Commandants expectations for
interaction with maritime industry
USCG activities involving US and foreign
professional mariners and maritime
organizations will be conducted with utmost
professionalism and respect. Licensed and
documented mariners are professionals who
share our interests in a safe, secure, and
environmentally compliant industry. Alexander
Hamiltons charge - to keep in mind that our
countrymen are free men, and as such,are
impatient of everything that bears the least
mark of a domineering spirit - applies as much
today as it did in 1790 and equally to
international mariners and our trading partners.
Unfortunately I have received reports from
highly respected professionals recounting
Coast Guard boardings, inspections, and
investigations not displaying professionalism.
Additionally, some have said they lost the
complete trust they once had in the Coast
Guard and are fearful of retribution if they
challenge the Coast Guards conduct.
We must change this perception. Americas
position in the global economy,public and
environmental safety, and post 9/11 security
are at stake. The need for maritime industry-
government cooperation and partnership has
never been more important.The Coast
Guards obligation to the safety and security
of America is shared by the maritime industry
and enhanced by working cooperatively withindustry at all levels.Openness and
transparency will be the hallmarks of our
maritime interaction.
Boarding team members, marine inspectors,
port state control examiners, facility examiners
and their supervisors shall encourage open
communication with mariners and other
members of industry.
Disruption in the normal flow of commerce
impacts many parties in the supply chain. We
have clearly established appeal procedures
when we make a decision that could have
negative impacts on a licensed mariner or onthe maritime industry.The exercise of appeal
is a right we strongly support. Questions,
differences of professional opinion, and
appeals are normal and improve the conduct
of business. We must be as accepting of these
as praise. Attempt to resolve problems at the
lowest level possible and be resourceful in
doing so.
In instances when decisions are appealed, unit
commanders and supervisors must act with a
neutral common sense attitude; timely
resolution is of utmost importance to
facilitating legitimate commerce.
As commandant, I actively engage the Captains
of the maritime industry in round table
discussions to uncover what is good and bad
with our current practices so improvements
can be made. I expect similar maritime industry
engagement at every level of the Coast Guard
followed by aggressive action to address
problem areas. Follow ethics, rules and
standards of conduct in your interactions.
As soon as possible, USCG sector commanders
shall solicit candid feedback from the individual
mariners, industry association reps, and facility
operators who have a significant stake in
marine safety, security, and stewardship. This
feedback shall identify pending issues needing
action,best practices, and recommendations
that can be acted upon. Districts shall hold a
sector conference to include COTP/OCMI,
prevention and response reps to discuss the
feedback, determine a course of action for
those that merit action and then close the loopwith industry on actions taken. National level
recommendations shall be vetted through area
commanders and forwarded to the assistant
commandant for marine safety, security and
stewardship (CG-5) by 1 June 2008 for
consideration in the Coast Guards marine
safety improvement efforts.My goal is to purge
the past and reset for the future.Open
communication, critical self-examination, and a
willing transparency are hallmarks of great
organizations, including the Coast Guard.
I also expect USCG sector commanders and cutter
commanding officers to ensure boarding teams,
inspectors, and examiners provide the units seniorleader contact information, if asked, to vessel
Masters, port engineers, and facility operators.
Effective immediately, Coast Guard requirements
that limit vessel movement (such as no sail
orders, major CGg-835s, actions that would delay
arrivals and departures) are to be affirmed by
the sector CID and reported to the prevention
chief, as many already do. At a minimum, a Coast
Guard supervisor shall engage, by phone, radio,
or in person with the Master, port engineer,or
facility manager to discuss the requirements
and expectations for resolution.As soon as
practicable, USCG sector commanders, MSU
commanding officers, and cutter commanding
officers shall be informed of all such discussions.
7
US Authorities reminded to show respect to seafarers
7/29/2019 A test of seamanship
8/8
53ft Containers: suitable forcarriage by sea?
Earlier this year, whilst conducting a routine
inspection of the containers on deck during
heavy weather,the Master of a Members
vessel observed that there were apparent
signs of distortion and structural failure to
some 53containers.
The 53 containers in question were
stacked on top of 40units, in a manner not
recommended by the manufacturer, and this
had resulted in excessive stresses on the
unsupported ends.The 53 containers were
clearly marked Type Domestic Container
which would indicate that they are not
constructed for the carriage of cargo on
ocean transit.The 53 unit is commonly used
on USA rail and road transport networks.
There are no conventional container vessels
currently specifically designed for the carriage
of 53 units, and there are many container
vessels which could not accommodate the 53
units. Allowable stacking is three units high,
but on this vessel many units were stowed
four high on top of two 40 containers. These
containers are also over width at 8.5 wide,
which means that additional adjustments
have to be made to stow them. Lashing bars
have to be fitted to the corner castings to
counteract additional racking stresses,
particularly in heavy weather.
Editors message We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articleswithin Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: [email protected]
8 Britannia RISK WATCH RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia Steam
Ship Insurance Association Limited, and can be
found at www.britanniapandi.com/publications
The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association
Limited is happy for any of the material in Risk
Watch to be reproduced but would ask that
written permission is obtained in advance from
the Editor.
Tindall Riley (Britannia) Limited
New City Court
20 St Thomas Street
London SE1 9RR
Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588
Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942
www.britanniapandi.com
Miscellaneous
PublicationsNew environmental compliance guidance
This new publication from the ICS and ISF is
a response to the continuing incidence of
prosecutions for MARPOL violations especiallyin the USA.Entitled, Shipping Industry
Guidance on Environmental Compliance,
the guide acts as a template for ensuring
adherence to the IMO MARPOL Convention,
in accordance with ISM Code requirements.
The Industry Guidance has been designed
to link with the US Coast Guards new
Voluntary Disclosure Policy. Under this policy
if environmental incidents are reported by
a company which can demonstrate a fully
documented environmental compliance
system such as set out in the guidance
this will be taken into consideration.
The Industry Guidance is being distributed
free of charge by ISC/ICF national associations
but can also be downloaded from
http://www.marisec.org/environmental-
compliance/index.htm
IMO publishes new GMDSS manual
The new manual, published by the IMO, is
a complete revision of its comprehensive
handbook on the global maritime distress
and safety system (GMDSS).The intent of the
new GMDSS Manual is to provide a single
comprehensive publication containing an
explanation of the principles on which
GMDSS is based, the operational performance
standards and technical specifications to be
met by GMDSS equipment and the procedures
and method of operation of that equipment.
The manual is available from most authorised
distributors of IMO publications and the IMOs
on-line bookshop www.imo.org
The vessel in question had encountered
heavy weather conditions enroute, and the
stresses from the weight on the overhanging
ends of the 53 units coupled with the racking
stresses from the lashing bars and the heavy
weather, had resulted in considerable
structural damage to a number of the units.
The fact that the containers were loaded with
considerable weight at the overhanging ends
certainly contributed to the damages.The
Master and Chief Officer acted in a prudent
manner, adjusting speed and course to
alleviate the vessels rolling and pitching.
As conventional container vessels are unable
to accommodate 53 units under deck, the only
stowage possible is on deck, and there are a
limited number of vessels capable of stowing
them on deck.The safest stowage position
would be directly on top of the
hatch covers so the full length of the container
is supported, but the construction of many
container vessels would not accommodate
this stowage as the ends of the containers
would invariably overlap adjacent bays.
Members are reminded of the importance of
checking containers being loaded on their
vessels, and in particular, out of gauge or
oversize units. Another relevant stability issue
is that the onboard stability computer is not
configured for these special containers, which
means that the calculated stresses are, at best,
a good guess.