ABSTRACT. In the field of business ethics, exposi-tions of ethical theory have tended to focus ondeontology and utilitarianism. More inclusive reviewsof ethical theory tend to be historical and unsystem-atic. This paper approaches the task of representingthe variety of ethical theories systematically. It doesso by constructing a schema of possibilities in ethicaltheory which maps out six “voices”, or theoreticalpositions, all of which are relevant and important forunderstanding ethics in business. This approach helpsto account for the continual presence of dilemmas andconflicts in ethics.

As an academic discipline with a significant cur-ricular presence in higher education, the field ofbusiness ethics is only about fifteen or twentyyears old in the United States. Given the youthof this field, there still exists much diversity ofthought and little agreement regarding the mostfundamental approaches to teaching ethics inbusiness. Much of this is appropriate and evenhealthy. The understanding of business behaviorhas improved greatly because of the contributionsof sociologists, psychologists, philosophers,economists, and a wide variety of academics andprofessionals with shared interests.

Ultimately, however, the study of businessethics requires a clear understanding of what ismeant by “ethics” – its possibilities, its limita-

tions, its fundamental concepts. Historically, thisunderstanding has been provided by philoso-phers. During the past one hundred years or sothe dominant philosophical opinion dividedethics into two camps: teleology and deontology.As Robert Nozick has written, “There are twopowerful and intuitively appealing molds intowhich theorists have fitted or poured substan-tive ethics: a deontological one and a teleolog-ical one” (1986, p. 494). (See also Frankena 1973,p. 14.)

In recent years, however, many philosophershave become dissatisfied with this simplebifurcation of ethics. Cavanagh, Moberg andVelasquez (1981) recommended a tripartitedivision of ethical theories along the lines ofutility, rights, and justice. Others have revived aninterest in Aristotelian virtue ethics (MacIntyre,1987; Solomon, 1993); still others have expli-cated an ethics of care and personal relationships(Noddings, 1984; Gilligan, 1982). Although mostwould agree that deontology and teleology arehard to ignore, few philosophers now wouldquestion the legitimacy of including alternativeapproaches to ethics, even at the most basic level.

The purpose of this paper is to show in asystematic and comprehensive way what could bemeant by “ethics.” This seems to be a funda-mental need in the field of business ethics whichhas been too long ignored. Outside the UnitedStates, business ethics is less eclectic and morecritical, and more attention is given to thefoundational issues in business. Lohnert writes,for example,

In Germany business ethicists of all disciplinesconsider it indispensable to first clarify the philo-sophical foundations of the greater economic

A Systematic Approach to Teaching Ethics in Business

F. Neil Brady

Journal of Business Ethics

19: 309–318, 1999.© 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

F. Neil Brady is Professor of Public Management in theMarriott School of Management at Brigham YoungUniversity where he teaches management ethics. He isthe author of Ethical Managing: Rules and Results(Macmillan, 1990) and the editor of Ethical Universalsin International Business (Springer Verlag, 1996). Inaddition, he has published about thirty articles in variousacademic journals.

system (macro level). American business ethicistson the other hand tend to leave this weightyproblem to their colleagues from the departmentsof economics, sociology, political science, ortheology. For their part these “macro theorists”do not count themselves as part of the field ofbusiness ethics and often view the young disciplinein a critical, if not disapproving, light (1996, p. 99).

Out of enthusiasm to be inclusive, tolerant, prac-tical, exploratory, and cooperative, businessethicists of this country have generally put asidesome of the more critical questions that mightdelimit the subject and constrain research inthe field. However, attempting to answer thequestion “What is ethics?” in a systematic waymight actually broaden the scope of ethicalinterest in business while acquiring a degree ofclosure regarding fundamental categories.

This paper proceeds first by constructing aschema of possible “voices” in ethics – “voices”rather than “theories,” because although someof the positions identified below are regarded asfull blown theories in ethics, others seem morelike “casts of mind” or “outlooks,” depending onthe nature of the development and presentationof each voice historically. The schema identifiessome voices which have received considerableattention and others which have been historicallymuted. A few sources are also supplied for eachvoice for those who might want to apply thisschema in an instructional context.

The advantage of this approach includes aclearer realization of the origin of conflicts anddilemmas in ethics. And it plainly recommendsto managers that any dreams of a mechanicaldecision procedure for resolving ethical issues areillusory. It is unlikely that a technique can befound to replace human thoughtfulness.

The schema

There may be many ways to map out the fun-damental possibilities in a field such as businessethics. The way chosen here is to construct amatrix or schema by using two different sets ofconcepts, each set of which cuts comprehensivelythrough ethics from different angles. Theschematic interaction between the two sets of

concepts produces a set of six voices in ethicswhich appears to capture all that is essential.The rows of the schema are defined by thewell known conceptual pair “universals andparticulars.”

Universals and particulars

Historically, ethicists have emphasized universalsover particulars, although all would agree thatboth universals and particulars are essential forthinking satisfactorily about ethics. Any givenway of thinking about ethics usually emphasizesone or the other. An ethic interested in univer-sals identifies rules, principles, laws, virtues,values, or other normative statements that areintended to apply to everyone. The search foruniversals confers stability and unity uponethics. Without universals, ethics runs the riskof degenerating into individualistic subjectivismor cultural relativism. Ethical universals are theglue that prevents ethical discussion from fallingapart into fragments of unrelated conversations.

The search for ethical universals has beenpopular among ethicists. What frustrates thatsearch, however, is ethical reality. Human life isso rich with situational detail and concrete idio-syncracies that it tests the capacity of universalsto deal adequately with experience. There justseem to be exceptions to every rule. Ethicalparticulars represent the second row in thisschema. Without close attention to particulars,ethical theory quickly degenerates into dogmaand ideology. A poem by Gerard ManleyHopkins (1948) called “Pied Beauty” wellexpressed the poetic focus on the particulars ofthe natural world.

Both univerals and particulars are important,then, in ethics. As Iris Murdock has written, “Sofar as goodness is for use in politics and in themarketplace it must combine its increasingintuitions of unity with an increasing grasp ofcomplexity and detail” (1970, p. 96). It is thesimilarities and commonalities in life that makespossible the search for ethical universals, but it’sthe differences that remind one to pay attentionto particulars. As William James once said,“There is very little difference between one man

310 F. Neil Brady

and another, but what differences there are arevery important” (1919, pp. 256–257). A.R.Ammons expresses this balance in the image ofa spider’s web from a poem titled “Identity,”(1986, p. 28) part of which is quoted below:

if the web were perfectly pre-set,the spider could

never finda perfect place to set it in: and

if the web wereperfectly adaptable,if freedom and possibility were without limit,

the web wouldlose its special identity:

Species of spiders can be identified by their webstructures, even though the concrete particularityof where they are found always distorts theuniversal to some extent. Thus, Ammons issuggesting that both the universal and the par-ticular are relevant for the understanding ofspider webs.

By analogy, this paper suggests the same forethics. In ethics as in web-building, people areall somewhat different and yet in many respectsthe same.

Deontology, teleology, and axiology

The columns of the schema are identified byadopting a less well known distinction betweenduty, purpose, and value – or (more esoterically)deontology, teleology, and axiology – ethics ofduty, purpose, and value.

This three-fold division of ethics does notoriginate here. At least two other writers haveemployed similar categories in their own work.Dorothy Emmet (1979) marked out three majordomains in ethical theory, and she added that theexclusion of any of the three led to mistakes:

Moral theories based on only one of these factorsof purpose, principle, and feeling, will be in dangerof becoming unscrupulous, rigorist, or sentimental.These are designedly pejorative terms for the prac-tical attitudes which can come from truncatedmoral views, where there is a separation of purposefrom principle and principle from purpose and

feeling from both. . . . A view of morality should,I think, recognise all these features. . . . (1979, p.11).

Christopher Hodgkinson (1978, p. 111)employed similar categories in laying out a valuemodel for his philosophy of administration. Theterms he used were “principle, consequence,preference” or “transrational, rational, sub-rational.” So, this three-fold division of majorethical positions has a respectable history even ifit is not so well known as the distinction betweenuniversals and particulars.

Helena Flam (1992) developed a nice modelof “emotional man” as one aspect of three-dimensional human beings, which included thenormative, the rational, and the emotional. Suchapproaches resemble David Hume’s classificationof human behavior driven by principle, interest,and affection.

Of course, the theories of these variousscholars are not perfect copies. The thirdcategory especially – emotional, subrational,affection, preference, feeling – displays the loosestfit. Nevertheless, the propensity to subdivideethical theory into three roughly equivalentcategories has significant precedence. . . . Theyare examined more closely below.

A deontological ethic is an ethic of duty. It doesnot look beyond the act itself in assessing itsmoral worth. Results are irrelevant so long as theaction itself conforms to duty. There are manypossible sources of one’s duty. In the case ofreligious duty, Deity specifies human duty.National policy, state and local statutes, and com-munity norms are also examples of dutiesderiving from authorities of various types,although such duties may be political or con-ventional more than ethical.

Strictly ethical duties must be driven by prin-ciples which are universal, such as avoiding harmor respecting autonomy. The cultural expressionof such universal principles might vary somewhatfrom country to country; nevertheless, one canspeak respectfully in many languages. Likewise,dutiful behavior might be expressed in varyingforms around the world while retaining the sub-stance of universal principle.

A teleological ethic is an ethic of purpose or

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goal. Ideally, a teleological ethic should providea vision of an improved human condition. Notall goals or purposes are equally moral. An ethicof revenge, for example, is teleological butmorally inferior, most would agree.

An axiological ethic is an ethic of value. It paysattention to a person’s first-order preferences orvalues. While deontologies are generally retro-spective in that they call to mind existing prece-dent, expectations, rules, and norms; andteleology is prospective by emphasizing futureconsequences or goals; axiology is more imme-diate. It evaluates feeling rather than purpose orduty. It represents forms of care that one mighttake in life.

Of course, the first two components of theconceptual set are better known than the third.But without axiology, modern ethical theory maybe criticized for being excessively detached.Attacking the modern ethical theories of utili-tarianism and deontology, Michael Stockerwrites,

To embody in one’s motives the values of currentethical theories is to treat people externally andto preclude love, friendship, affection, fellowfeeling, and community – both with others andwith oneself. To get these great goods whileholding those current ethical theories requires aschizophrenia between reason and motive (1976,p. 461).

What has been lacking, some say, in modernethical theory is the immediacy of human value.And assuming that Stocker and others are correctin their criticisms, then we can more easily seewhy Emmet and Hodgskinson sense the need fora third category in their own analyses of ethics.In short, we need an axiology – an ethic ofcaring – an ethic that arises from personal attach-ments, values, feelings, cares.

Ethics of caring, of course, have only recentlybeen resurrected in the history of modern ethicaltheory. They are sometimes thought of as a“feminine” approach to ethics and seek to definethe normative nature of human interconnected-ness. Their judgments are as distinctive andinsightful as those provided by deontology andteleology. It may be a philosophical embarrass-ment that they have largely been neglected in thiscentury.

Thus, we end up with a schema constructedin the form of a 2

× 3 matrix yielding sixpossibilities in ethical theory. The paper arguesfor the soundness of the schema and spendsconsiderable time identifying, describing, andillustrating each of the six voices in the schema.Put simply, the schema looks like Figure 1 below.

The “voices” identified in the schema repre-sent the six distinct possibilities for theorydevelopment in ethics. Each category has beennamed in a “synthetic” way, that is by doingmore than merely repeating the defining char-acteristics. As a result, the name may not fullyrepresent the variety contained in the cell, but itdoes call attention to a dominant representativeposition within that cell. The fact that the linebetween universal and particular categories is adotted line indicates the fuzzy nature of thisdistinction.

Six voices of ethical theory

In theory, any significant ethical position shouldfit comfortably into the schema somewhere. Thecontents of each cell or voice are explored below.The interest here is mainly pedagogical, and itshould be kept in mind that the description ofeach voice does not exhaust the possibilities foreach position in the schema.

312 F. Neil Brady

Deontology Teleology Axiology

Universals 1. Universal principles 3. Character/social ethics 5. Ethic of universal care

Particulars 2. Situation ethics 4. Self-actualization 6. Personal relations

Fig. 1. A schema of six ethical voices

1. Ethic of universal principles

This “voice” and the next make differentassumptions about the nature of situations. Itcontains any ethical perspective that mightqualify as a “universalistic deontology.” Manyreligious perspectives are universalistic deontol-ogies, at least in intent. For historical reasons thiscategory focuses on ethics of universal principles.That is a slightly more restrictive focus than thecell represents, but it calls more direct attentionto a major influence on western civilization.

An ethic of universal principles assumes thatsituations human beings encounter are similarenough that rules or principles can be adoptedas ethical guides deserving of our allegiance.Consequently, it is reasonable to act according toprinciple. Thus, all persons have similar obliga-tions: no killing, no stealing, no harming, etc.So, people adopt principles in their lives asobjects of commitment. When a person tries todo what’s right against strong pressures to dootherwise, even though it might be a little thing,one often explains oneself by saying “It’s a matterof principle,” meaning “despite pressures to thecontrary, I can ascertain what is right and do it.”

In the world of business, this ethical voiceunderlies the interest in employee rights,including safety and health. It justifies fairness,equality, and consistency of treatment in organi-zations around the world. International businessethics, conceived as a code or set of principlesthat can or ought to be adopted world-wide, isshaped by this voice.

Immanuel Kant is clearly the classic represen-tative of this point of view. He is perhaps bestknown in ethical theory for two works:Grounding for a Metaphysic of Morals (1993) andCritique of Practical Reason (1956). One piece ofKant’s that seems quite useful is a little knownwriting called “On the Supposed Right to LieBecause of Philanthropic Concerns” (1993, pp.63–67). It consists of Kant’s response to a famouscase of defending an innocent victim against amadman’s pursuit by possibly lying to themadman about the potential victim’s where-abouts. Kant argues that as a matter of moralprinciple one should never lie, not even in thecase where an innocent person’s life is threatened.

Kant’s response is a little extreme for moststudents these days, but it does serve as a vividexample. In the “Euthyphro” Plato discusses thecase of a young man’s willingness to prosecutehis father for murder. This example pits filialrelationships against a dominant value of ethicsof universal duty, viz. impartiality. Other modernexamples can easily be added that help to makethis first “voice” look less extreme and morerelevant.

2. Situation ethics

If an ethic of universal principles relies upon therecognition of significant similarities amonghuman beings, an ethic of particular dutiesfocuses, instead, on the differences among humanbeings from situation to situation. For example,one danger associated with holding to one’sprinciples too tightly is excessive rigidity and aninability to recognize exceptions when theypresent themselves. Such bureaupathologies areavoided by Voice #2, or “situation ethics.”

This “voice” assumes that the nature of situ-ations is uniqueness, preventing persons fromfeeling comfortable with abstracted principles.People who adopt this approach are impressedwith the concrete richness and variety of situa-tions. How could any rule apply universally giventhe variety of possible situations one couldencounter? So, situation ethicists don’t thinkmuch of rules; rather, one is expected to usegood judgment, be intuitive.

Professional ethics often represent this “voice”well. Medical doctors, for example, necessarilydeal with each patient as a unique case. Ofcourse, there are general guidelines and rules ofthumb which a doctor follows in diagnosing andtreating a case; and even though insurers wouldlike to standardize and formalize how patients aretreated, practitioners know that intuition andgood judgment cannot be replaced by mechan-ical decision procedures. Ecclesiastical leaders andpsychoanalytic counselors share similar experi-ences. Each situation is unique, and even thesmallest details can take on major significance.

Closely related to situational thinking in ethicsis a form of case analysis known as “casuistry” –

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where a way of dealing with individual needs isslowly developed on a case-by-case basis. Ethicaldeliberation of current cases is guided not byrules but by their resemblance to previous cases.

The “father” of situation ethics in moderndays is Joseph Fletcher. His book Situation Ethicsis a best seller. Its chief aim is to demonstratethe inability of rules to serve as reliable guidesin ethics.

3. Character/social ethics

This “voice” and the next focus on the goals andpurposes of individuals and societies. They lookto the nature of the self or “selves-together” forethical guidance.

Voice #3 consists of any ethical position thatmight qualify as a “universal teleology,” includingutopian views, but it focuses on character ethicshere because, for one thing, so much has recentlybeen made of character ethics. Examples of suchethics are the Protestant Ethic, Social Darwinism,or Jane Jacobs’ “Guardian Ethic” and“Commercial Ethic” (1992, pp. 23–24). What ismeant by “good character” is largely sociallydefined, and examples are diverse.

Some character ethicists appeal to “humannature” as the source of their knowledge.According to this view, human beings canflourish only by pursuing certain virtues, suchas knowledge, fortitude, forgiveness, humility,and so on. These are virtues that apply to allhuman lives. To fail to pursue such virtues is tofail to achieve full humanity in one’s life.Germain Grisez’s Beyond the New Morality (1988)is a good example of this point of view.

This ethical voice is also an opportunity forinstructors to evaluate the “character ethic”embedded in the assumptions of neoclassicaleconomics. Such character-related assumptionsinclude utility maximization, preference satisfac-tion, insatiable preferences, the moral equalityof preferences, and so on.

Character ethics is relevant for business activityas one inquires into the basic motivations ofpeople in business. Is it greed? competitiveness?prudence? vanity? social responsibility? enthu-siasm for a product? . . . The relationship

between personal character and business successhas intrigued writers for hundreds of years.

In addition to character ethics, this “voice”would include teleologies of larger scope, suchas views regarding the proper role of business insociety, or the proper goals of business. Thecorporate goals of tobacco companies, forexample, are a likely object of criticism whenviewed through a teleological perspective.

4. Ethics of self-actualization

By contrast with the character ethicist, this voiceis more impressed with particular purposes orends than with general human character traits.Actually, any ethical position that could be calleda “particularistic teleology” would be includedhere. Ethics of self-actualization represents thisvoice well.

What impresses the person who holds thispoint of view are the differences in people.Stereotypes don’t work. People are all different.One would not expect another person to acceptone’s goals and aspirations; they are personal. Theuniqueness of the individual is important. Onemust be true to oneself. One’s responsibility isto determine what one’s self is to become andthen strive to achieve that. Lives lived apart fromtheir true selves are sad and frustrating. Thesingle most important ethical determinant is notthe situation, not others, but the self: What is thenature of this unique self and how is that impor-tant for how a situation is handled? Remember:there is no “one best way” to get somethingdone. That is because each person’s self is sodifferent. For one person, a compassionateapproach might be best, while for another a moreintellectual approach might work best, etc.

In a business setting, this ethic endorses theinterest in employee self-actualization as it issought in job enrichment programs, workerparticipation in decision making, and thematching of employee interests and tasks, forexample. Entrepreneurs might feel an affinity forthis ethic in that they each pursue interests andopportunities in their own ways.

One important modern representative of thisview is Abraham Maslow (1993), whose discus-

314 F. Neil Brady

sions of self actualization have permeated textson organization behavior. Various ways ofdescribing personality types and managerial typesare made possible only by assuming people arehighly constrained by their personal natures. Togo one step further and argue that they oughtto nourish those natures is an ethic of self actu-alization.

5. Ethic of universal care

Axiologies are theories of value. A universalaxiology, therefore, is the study of values that allhuman beings could or should hold. Voice #5 islabeled here as an “ethic of universal care.” Thisneed not refer to human beings only; it couldrefer to other objects of value or care, such as thenatural environment or devotion to deity.

Refering to human beings, an ethic ofuniversal care advocates care for all – at leastthose one is in a position to help. What is impor-tant is not one’s own character but simply thewelfare of the Other. It is the presence of theOther and one’s connection to the Other thatmakes us human to begin with; therefore, regardfor the Other – any other – is the starting pointfor this ethical voice.

European philosophers like Emmanuel Levinasand Paul Ricour provide good examples of thismode of thinking. Martin Buber’s “I and Thou”(1970) also takes this position, as well as VictorFrankl’s “Man’s Search for Meaning” (1959).Albert Schweitzer’s concept of “reverence forlife” probably represents this view (1988).

This mode of thinking can also represent acaring (or at least regarding) attitude toward thenatural world. An environmental ethic would bevery comfortable here, because some peoplethink we need to develop that kind of relationto the entire world in which we live. For businessethics instructors interested in environmentalethics, this might be a good place to put it.

6. Ethic of relationships

A particularistic axiology stresses personal caresand interests over shared values. It recognizes that

individuals can (and ought to) have objects ofcare not shared by others, such as one’s spouseor children or one’s land or community. The ideaof the philanthropist who cares about andprovides for numerous distant others but ignoresone’s own family’s needs stands in sharp contrastto what is contained in this point of view.

Recent writers representing this ethic includeCarol Gilligan (1982) and Nel Noddings (1984).They criticize deontology and teleology as beingtoo psychologically distant, too removed fromhuman cares and loves. They advocate personalrelationships as the starting point for ethics.

An ethic of personal relationships is obviouslyimportant for the business world where muchsuccessful activity depends on cooperation andtrust founded in personal relationships. Theextension of trust and cooperation to all thoseinterested in or affected by a firm’s activities con-stitutes the ethical core of what is now knownas stakeholder theory. It would be difficult toaccount for the ethical intuitions some feelregarding stakeholder theory without developingan ethic of personal business relationships.

Implications

This approach to ethics constitutes a rethinkingof the most fundamental concepts in a way thatpromotes potential for insight and relevance. Asshown above, each voice applies in its own wayto business activities, and one’s understanding ofthe ethics of business would be incompletewithout the representation of all voices. So,although this approach is systematic, it tends tocapture more of ethics than most “historicalreviews” of ethics, no matter how eclectic.

What happened to utilitarianism?

How could a comprehensive theory of ethicsleave out the theory which has been of mostimport to the twentieth century? Where doesone put utilitarianism? Traditionally, the mostlikely spot, of course, is voice #3, the ethic ofuniversal teleology. Utilitarianism is said to beteleological; it focuses on the consequences of

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actions. And it seems universal both in scope andin prescription.

Historically, the development of utilitarianphilosophy diverged into two paths. One pathwas blazed by John Stuart Mill, who saw utili-tarianism as providing guidance to human beingsregarding higher and lower preferences. Theother path was taken by Jeremy Bentham, whosehedonistic calculus made no comparative judg-ments about the worth of preferences but simplytook them as a given.

In the United States, utilitarianism took thesecond path. What is now known as welfareeconomics is directly derived from Bentham’swork. Its chief mark is its democratic liberality– in economic terms “utility maximization.” Itadvocates no constraint on preference satisfactionexcept conformity to whatever policies promiseto secure optimal aggregated preference satis-faction. In a sense, this theory bears noindependent prescriptive authority; it delayspronouncements about matters of character andsocial policy until after consulting the relevantpopulace. Utilitarianism, therefore, is just amechanism for detecting and aggregatingwhatever a people hopes for at a given time –not a lot more sophisticated than a simplemajority vote. And the majority vote is notan ethic; it is a social choice technique.Furthermore, a people’s interests can be mis-guided. Witness the current national preoccupa-tion with economic consumption; a simpler lifewould arguably secure greater utility for all.

So, the utilitarianism of the economists is nota good example of a universalistic teleology or ofany other ethic. It offers no guidance to personswho seek to enhance their personal preferencestoward greater human satisfaction. Instead, itsimply tries to reconcile group policy with aggre-gated personal preference.

What is as interesting as what is left out of thisschema is what is brought in. Normally, self-actualization theories are thought of as psycho-logical, but not ethical, theories. The schemadeveloped in this paper strongly recommends thatthe ethical content of such theories not beneglected. For organizations, this means thatin addition to the other ethical aspects of anorganization’s relation to a person it must also

consider the degree to which it promotes orhinders an individual’s personal development. Itrecommends that one of the chief goals ofadministrators is to secure good matches betweenindividuals and their organizational assignments.And this, not just for the sake of organizationalefficiency, but for the purely personal reasons ofthe employee, as well.

Doesn’t the schema promote ethical relativism?

Of course, one might object that presentingmultiple ethical theories is confusing andpromotes student skepticism regarding ethics.This would be so if the theories were describedas competitors. But according to the schema pre-sented above, the theories are complementary.And as a result, one acquires an appreciation forthe multidimensional nature of ethical reasoning.The insightful student can perceive the unitarynature of the overall schema. (After all, this is asystematic approach to ethical theory, not just alist of contesting points of view.) In any case, todo less might be intellectually dishonest. If inorder to prevent skepticism one must oversim-plify or ignore important features of humanexperience, this author would prefer skepticism.Speaking of these different aspects of ethicalthought, Emmet says,

. . . there is, I believe, no overall solution to theconflicts which they can produce on both thetheoretical and the practical level. On both levelspeople will make different emphases which willgive rise to disagreement and argument, but dis-agreements stemming from different emphasesshould be less stultifying than disagreementsbetween people who see morality in terms of asingle factor alone (1979, p. 11).

Ethical belief and commitment must rest onunderstanding, not just conformity or superfi-ciality. And a systematic approach to ethicaltheories can help to produce that understanding.This, of course, implies that there may be nosuch thing as a “moral saint”. That is, there mayexist no single model of personal well-beingtoward which one can strive and reach for moralperfection. Instead, “We must be willing to raise

316 F. Neil Brady

normative questions from a perspective that isunattached to a commitment to any particularwell-ordered system of values” (Wolf, 1982, p.439).

Furthermore, this approach encourages theinstructor to have respect for the moral freedomof the student. People do have different personalethics, even in communities where one mightexpect considerable homogeneity. Being allowedto decide for themselves which perspectives havegreater merit or are more deserving of attentionis more respectful of the student than beingindoctrinated in the instructor’s personal point ofview. One of this author’s personal pedagogicalobjectives in teaching these six “voices” is to doso with equal enthusiasm for the merit of each“voice.” In fact, at the end of the course, I askstudents to choose anonymously which of the sixvoices each finds most convincing. My objectiveis to get something resembling a flat distribution.Having taught this schema twice, I think thatobjective is clearly within reach.

Does this promote an understanding of ethical conflicts and dilemmas?

Finally, although the views are generally com-plementary, the fact that there are multiple facetsto ethics helps to account for the existence ofdifficult dilemmas in ethical deliberations.Indeed, not counting the differences that mightexist among differing approaches within a cell ofthe schema, there are fifteen possible pair-wisecombinations of the six cells of the schema, orfifteen kinds of conflict between cells of theschema. A systematic study of possible ethicaldilemmas would also be an interesting projectbased upon the above schema. It could form thefoundation for a better understanding of how toovercome the alienation and interpersonalconflict that result from disagreements based onpreferences for contrasting points of view.

Tension in ethics represents more, however,than conflict; it also represents possibility. Bycombining various components of this schema,many important human experiences can beshown to be creatures of ethical tension. Forexample, marital love represents a balancing of

voices one and six: it is a love of intimacy andintensity, yet it maintains itself over time at leastpartly because of duty and commitment. Withoutvoice six, marital love is empty; without voiceone, it is insecure. Similarly, the combination ofvoices two and four remind us that personaldevelopment seldom occurs without personaldiscipline. Further, good parenting can beregarded as a combination of voices four and six:parents love their children and would keep themclose and share all one’s interests and dreams,keeping in mind that children ultimately havetheir own interests and dreams and need freedomto pursue them.

Finally, the glorious experience of singing finechoral music can be thought of as a combina-tion of all ethical voices: (1) the duty to honorand express a composer’s wish, (2) the urgencyand felt “rightness” of personal interpretation, (3)the shared attempt to achieve quality perfor-mance through extensive rehearsal, (4) thepersonal pursuit of musical self-development, (5)the love for the choral experience, and (6) theconcrete love of a particular piece of music on agiven occasion. All things considered, “ethics”means something more like “excellence,” wheremultiple facets of human experience combine ina variety of ways to produce the good life.

Such possibilities imply that there may bemore to shoot for in business than “ethics” in thenarrow sense.

Conclusion

There is some similarity between the ethical lifeand the beautiful life. An early lesson for visualartists is the recognition of the necessity tobalance conflicting elements in great art – rhythmand surprise, light and dark, mass and detail,control and chaos, and so on. Art which ignoresthese tensions becomes uninteresting and inferior– even ugly. Likewise, to say that a person livesan ethical life is more like an aesthetic judgmentthan simple approval of another’s behavior. Thisimplies that when one criticizes another’sbehavior, one is usually saying something like“That behavior doesn’t look very pretty in thecontext of what were trying to do around here.”

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People have obligations, goals, and passions;and these are sometimes personal, sometimesshared. The question for business is whether theethical picture for corporations is as multi-facetedas suggested above for individuals. If so, organi-zations can be made beautiful only by attendingto all elements of ethical involvement; they riskblemish and deformity by ignoring any of theseelements. Therefore, management is hardly asingle-minded exercise. Neither profit, nor pro-ductivity, nor stock price, nor size, nor powercan alone serve as the criterion for an organiza-tion well run. The picture is a complicated one.And where organizations come to gain publicrespect and community approval, they haveaccomplished far more than make a return ontheir investment.

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Marriott School of Management,771 TNRB,

Brigham Young University,Provo, Utah 84602,

U.S.A.

318 F. Neil Brady