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A Secure Multicast Model for Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity Protocol Zueyong Zhu and J. William Atwood Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Multicasting IEEE CCNC 2007 University of Science and Technology of China Concordia University, Montreal, Canada

A Secure Multicast Model for Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity Protocol

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Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Multicasting IEEE CCNC 2007. A Secure Multicast Model for Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity Protocol. Zueyong Zhu † and J. William Atwood ‡. Contents. Introduction Motivation HIP Architecture Multicast Architectures Group Identification - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: A Secure Multicast Model for Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity Protocol

A Secure Multicast Model forPeer-to-Peer and Access NetworksUsing the Host Identity Protocol

Zueyong Zhu† and J. William Atwood‡

Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Multicasting IEEE CCNC 2007

†University of Scienceand Technology of China

‡Concordia University, Montreal, Canada

Page 2: A Secure Multicast Model for Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity Protocol

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Contents

Introduction

Motivation

HIP Architecture

Multicast Architectures

Group Identification

System Operation

Validation

Conclusion

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Introduction

Transmit Data

Sender

Receiver

Receiver

IGMP MessageKeep

Membership Information

Determine Best Path to

Forward Data

Multicast Routing

Messages

Figure 1: Present IP Multicast Architecture

ARAR

AR

CR

CR

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Motivation

Some applications need per-instance charging

Not enough demand for multicast yet, to do this in native

multicast

Application Layer Multicast, Overlay Multicast

Although general solutions may come, it is worthwhile to

look at specific cases

Two examples xDSL

Collaboration

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xDSL

DSLAN <-> user is on a separate physical path

Unicast gives same performance

We gain: Authentication

Secure access

Potential for accounting (revenue generation)

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Wide Area Collaboration

Strong need for authentication and authorization No need for accounting No revenue generation No benefit from multicast data transmission Overlay (p2p) multicasting is appropriate

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No native multicast support

When there is no native multicast support, we must use overlay or p2p

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Host Identity Protocol

Internet has two name spaces (Fully Qualified) Domain Name IP Address

• Role as locator• Role as end-point identifier

HIP separates these two roles Host Identifier (public key, end-point id) Host Identity Tag (128-bit hash, fixed-size end-point

id) 32-bit version exists for IPv4 environments IP address continues to serve as locator

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Host Identity Protocol ..2

Host Identity Protocol Authenticate participant hosts Establish limited relationship of trust

Four-packet Exchange Initial packet (I1) 3-packet Diffie-Hellman exchange (I2, R1, R2)

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Multicast Architectures

Overlay Multicast Among participants Independent of topology All at application layer

Native Multicast Routers do it all Source-based tree Shared tree

Agents Packet duplication Tree Management Key Management Authenticate group members Collect accounting information

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Our Cases

P2P HIP allows establishment of trust (security

association) between the two unicast-linked nodes Use any convenient tree-construction algorithm

DSLAN Unicast path Host is initiator Multicast Agent is on the DSLAN Authentication via HIP

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Advantages

The security provided by HIP is just what we need

Use of a Multicast Agent improves control in DSLAN

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New Architecture

Two-layer architecture (or n-layer) New interactions

No need for IGMP or PIM-SM

Absolute control of membership

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New Architecture

HIP

Forward protocol

Forward protocol

Forward protocol

Forward protocol

Group Receivers R

HIP

HIP

Source Local Server

Receiver Local Server

Group Source S

Multicast AgentGroup’s Root

HIP Responder

HIP Initiator to S

Multicast AgentHIP Responder to R

Receiver Local ServerHIP Initiator to S

Multicast AgentHIP Responder to R

host

host host host host host host

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Identifying the Group

Need a Group Identifier

Structured identically to the Host Identifier and

Host Identifier Tag: Group Identifier and Group

Identifier Tag

Extend I1 and R2 to carry the GIT

I2 and R1 do not need to be changed

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System Operation

Join Start HIP with your initiator (group receiver or MA) Initiators join tree and receive multicast traffic Responder joins tree or forwards to source

Leave Add “leaving request” parameter to HIP exchange

Create Add “create request” parameter to HIP exchange

Two levels are independent

Page 17: A Secure Multicast Model for Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity Protocol

An example of application

R15

ISP 2

Local ServerLocal Server

Local ServerGroup1 Receiver R16Local Server

ISP 1

Group1 Receiver R11

R12

R13

R21R23

Group2 Receiver R22

R14

ISP AISP B

R26

R25Group2 Receiver R24

Group2 Source S22

S21

S12Group1 Source S11

Internet

Local network

Local network

Local network

Local network

Multicast Agent

Group2’s Root

HIP Responder

Multicast Agent

Group1’s Root

HIP Responder

HIP Initiator to S

Multicast AgentHIP Responder to R

HIP Initiator to S

Multicast Agent

HIP Responder to R

host

hosthost host

host hosthost

host

host

host

host

host

host

host

host

host

17

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Constructing MulticastDistribution Trees xDSL: One level of HIP-based control---MA joins

the “native” multicast tree It is “trusted”, or native tree must be secure

multicast Two-layer needs multiple unicast transmissions,

or “snooping” in the network Can be extended to n-layer in the total absence

of network support for multicast

Page 19: A Secure Multicast Model for Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity Protocol

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Validation of the Model

PROMELA + SPIN + Embeded C-code 32 receivers (Initiators) Some Intruders 2 Downstream MAs 1 Upstream MA 2 Senders Some routers

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Results

No assertion violation No invalid end-state No unreachable state No real, valid or successful attack Embeded C-code to test file transfer and simple

encryption Load not too great Transfer is delayed, but not invalidated

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Conclusion and future work

Two new specialized architectures for multicast access control One for peer-to-peer networks

One for xDSL environments Formal validation of its operation Future goals:

Incorporate into the global system that we are building

Page 22: A Secure Multicast Model for Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity Protocol

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For more information

High Speed Protocols Laboratory of Concordia University is doing extensive research on IP multicast,

http://users.encs.concordia.ca/~bill/hspl/

For questions and comments: [email protected]

[email protected]