A Safe and Smart Border

7/27/2019 A Safe and Smart Border

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A SAFe AndSmArt Border:The Ongoing Quest in

U.S.-Canada Relations

Christopher sands + LaUra dawson

2One Issuetwo voices

I s s u e 15 s e p t e m b e r 1 2


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IntroductIon In the last two decades, theentire system o international trade has changed

rst with the round o ree-trade agreements, then

with the growth o g loba l supply chains, and, ater

September 11, with the ocus on ever-tighter bor-

der security and regu lation. Te Beyond the Border

(BB) and the Regulatory Cooperation Council

(RCC) Action Plans are just the latest steps in the

negotiations between the United States and Canada

to strengthen the worlds largest trading relation-

ship and enhance the security o their people.

he experts writing the essays here set out theirviews o the radically dierent American and

Canadian approaches to the new border strategy. Our

American author, Christopher Sands, senior el low at

the Hudson Institute, argues that the United States

has its own agenda in these talksone that is irmly

rooted in his countrys goals in the global economy

and in the real ity o the political system at home. He

examines six issues that always dominate this agenda:

inclusivity, exclusivity, reciprocity, replicability,

portability, and expediency. No matter who wins the

election in November 2012, Barack Obama or MittRomney, these objectives will not change. In its nego-

tiations with Canada , the United States will continue

to seek a single North American market or goods

and services that can compete with a rising China, a

revived Europe, and other global economies.

Our Canadian author, Laura Dawson, a special-ist in Canada-U.S. economic relations and president

o Dawson Strategic, agrees that the United States

operates rom this international perspective. Canadas

greatest stumbling block in negotiating with the

United States, she says, is its nostalgia or an exclusive

special relationship with its southern neighborone

that never really existed. Canada would be ar smarter

to accept that the United States will extend the dea ls it

makes within North America to other countries and to

prot by being there rst. It should also set out to win

needed riends among the congressional representativesand special interests in the northern states and combine

its goals with theirs or cross-border trade and mutual

support in Washington. Perhaps Canadas greatest

challenge is to manage expectations at home: the sae

and smart border both countries want will come not

through glamorous summits between our leaders but

through diligent work by mid-level ocials in drating

documents and dening strategies.

Te Canada Institute thank s the authors or their

incisive perspective on a critical and complex issue in

the ongoing bilateral dialogue.

stePHANie MLUHAN

Pam cnulan (tn)

canada inu

spm 2012

One Issue Two Voices2


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issue 15 September 12 3

Te decade o the 1990s was a turning point or the U.S.

international trade agenda. Te Canada-U.S. Free rade

Agreement (CUFA, in eect 1989), the North American

Free rade Agreement (NAFA, 1994), and the Uruguay

Round Agreement (1996), which transormed the General

Agreement on aris and rade (GA) into the World

rade Organization (WO), collectively reduced the

importance o taris and investment restrictions as barri-

ers to trade. At roughly the same time, the application o

inormation technology made possible an advanced and

global logistics system that ostered the growth o globalsupply chains or industrial and other production. As a

result, the longstanding model o rms concentrated in a

single country and trading nished products with one an-

other was gradually displaced by a new model, one where

cross-border networks o rms, assisted by transnational

commercial services, produced things together. A growing

proportion o international trade ater the 1990s was com-

posed o intra-industry and even intra-rm trade.

Tis new structure o international co-production

was vulnerable in two ways: transaction costs related to

crossing borders, and regulatory dierences that pre-vented identical components and nished products rom

being sold in multiple markets. Both border security and

national and subnational regulation had existed or cen-

turies, but the removal o taris and investment restric-

tions, combined with the improvement o global logistics,

made these venerable unctions o governments signicant

contributors to costs and competitiveness.

Over time, governments eared that these restrictions

could lead rms to alter their investment strategies and

reallocate productionand with it, jobs and economic

activity. o a certain extent ater the 1990s, the countriesthat oered the most avorable security and regulatory

policies to business were in a position to attract more

investment, jobs, and production. In this sense, countries

were in competition with one another or a share in the

global economy and its benets, and the international

trade agenda ocused on making security and regulatory

approaches supportive o the new model o international

trade. Most oten, but not always, the United States took a

leading role in promoting global norms and standards that

would allow it to remain the worlds leading economy.

It is in this context that the current negotiations on

border security cooperation by the U.S.-Canada Beyond

the Border working group (BB), along with the current

bilateral ta lks on streamlining regulatory processes and

standards by the U.S.-Canada Regulatory Cooperation

Council (RCC), are properly understood. Both the BBand the RCC are simply the most recent iterations o a

conversation among the United States, Canada, and the

other major economies o the world. At stake is the shape

and extent o continuing participation by our two coun-

tries in global economic activity.

Will these talks work to bring the two countries closer

together, and will they advance the national interests o

Canadians and Americans? wenty-three years ater

CUFA and 18 years ater NAFA, the series o attempts

by the United States to engage Canada and Mexico in

security and regulatory cooperation has accomplishedvery little. Yet it is signicant that leaders o these

Christopher Sands

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countries have persisted in such eorts despite diculties

and intervening events. Te importance o this agenda

or the competitiveness o both the U.S. and the North

American economies is accepted on a bipartisan basis in

the United States, despite the critics in both parties who

have been alienated by misperceptions o the various

structures needed to pursue this agenda.

It is thereore probable that whether Barack Obama

is re-elected or replaced by Mitt Romney ater Novem-

ber 2012, this agenda wil l continue to dominate rela-

tions between the United States and its neighbors. Giventhe legacy o past eorts, the ultimate success o the

U.S.-Canada BB and RCC Action Planswhether

they continue and perhaps make progress where previ-

ous eorts have ailedwill depend on how well these

initiatives address six issues that have conronted every

similar attempt to date: inclusivity, exclusivity, reciproc-

ity, replicability, portability, and expediency.

iNcLUsivity

Te Chrtien government in Canada had the right ideawhen, to balance its campaign against implementation o

the Section 110 requirement or entry-exit record keep-

ing contained in the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, it reached out to

stakeholders in boardrooms and nearby towns on both

sides o the border and opened up a dialogue with civil

society groups ranging rom environmentalists to labor

unions. Tis diplomatic eort resulted in several initia-

tives: the Shared Border Accord o 1995 (which set out

mutual commitment to the principles o security coopera-

tion and trade acilitation) was ollowed by the Border

Vision Initiative o 1997 (which added a mutual commit-

ment to inrastructure modernization and new technol-

ogy), the Cross-Border Crime Forum o 1997 (which

introduced the concept o Integrated Border Enorcement

eams, essentially joint law-enorcement task orces othe sort used in the United States to coordinate ederal,

state, and local police orces but now binational), and the

Canada-U.S. Partnership o 1999 and 2000 (which was

intended to rally stakeholders in border communities).

Te resulta new coalition or change and many new

ideas or how to improve border operationsormed the

basis or the U.S.-Canada Smart Border Declaration and

Action Plan signed in December 2001. It allowed Canada

to engage the U.S. government constructively to improve

border security in the atermath o the September 11,

2001, terrorist attacks.Subsequent eorts to address border and regula-

tory cooperation have lacked this oundation. As talks

became urther removed rom border communities and

citizens, their legitimacy in the eyes o many voters ell

and progress became more dicult. Tis dynamic atally


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undermined the Security and Prosperity Partnership

(SPP), introduced by the George W. Bush administration,

which was the primary vehicle or security and regulatory

cooperation in North America rom 2005 to 2009. Over

time, critics charges about the supposed hidden agendas

o the SPP became the accepted views or many citizens.

Regardless, business, civil society, and state govern-

ments repeatedly expressed interest in the SPP and

support or some o its objectives. Te BB and the RCC

have sought to garner this interest through outreach,

soliciting ideas or uture years, and partnering with com-

munities on local pilot projects. Customs port directors

have been instructed to engage with their local communi-

ties, and regulators have been told to reach out to industry

groups and interested NGOs. Although these initiatives

certainly signal an improvement in the BB and RCC

models over previous eorts, this outreach and engage-ment must be sustained i they are to achieve success, and

they will soon need to show tangible results.

excLUsivity

Te Obama administration has ollowed the Bush ad-

ministrations policy during the SPP period, excluding

the Congress rom a ormal role in border and regula-

tory cooperation talks with Canada and other countries.

With the Congress wracked by partisan division, there is

good reason to be pessimistic about the potential or it toparticipate in a constructive manner. Yet this exclusion

weakens the prospects or these talks and could ultimately

undermine them completely.

Te U.S. Congress can aect the BB and the RCC in

three ways: budget, statute, and oversight. First, Congress

approves the budget and determines which projects and

initiatives will receive unding. On a provisional basis,

the engagement o U.S. civil servants in these talks can

be unded out o existing resources, but ocials have

other responsibilities and their time is nite. In addition,

the U.S. scal situation is terrible, marked by repeatedcongressional votes over the past year to raise the debt

limit or the U.S. government and an ongoing debate over

tax cuts. Al l departments and agencies ace the likelihood

o uture budget cuts, which inevitably will orce choices

about which activities can be sustained as resources

shrink. Key to the BB and the RCC are pilot and

demonstration projects to be undertaken on a small-scale,

local basis beore those which prove successul are widely

adopted. Funding or these eorts will become more

dicult to secure, and the unding or extending them

to other localities will be even more dicult i they are

limited to each departments existing resources. Sooner

or later, the Congress will constrain or empower the U.S.

executive branch to pursue the BB and the RCC.

Second, many o the duplicative U.S. regulations and

security policies that most rustrate Canadians have their

origins in Congress, rom Section 110 changes to the

Western Hemisphere ravel Initiative. Congress decides

which border crossings, a irports, and seaports get inra-

structure, personnel, and technology upgrades. When it

comes to regulation, Congress determines whether the

Food and Drug Administration or the Department oAgriculture inspects certa in products, and whether the

Department o Energy or the Environmental Protection

Agency has jurisdiction over renewable energy stan-

dards. I BB and RCC talks make progress, they will

inevitably run into problems that are congressional in

origin and cannot be resolved without Congress. When

the Oce o the United States rade Representative

(USR) was established in 1962 to replace the State

Department as the leading U.S. negotiator or interna-

tional trade agreements, the transer recognized the act

that Congress has constitutional authority over tarisand that no treaty negotiated without congressional

consultation would win Senate ratication. Te USR,

or an entity like it, should now be authorized to pursue

border and regulatory cooperation agreementsbut

until that is done, the BB and the RCC are at risk o

confict with Congress.

reciProcity

In the United States, border security and regulatory re-

orm are domestic policy topics and have been the subjectso presidential initiatives in most recent administrations.

Te policymaking dynamics o these talks are relevant

to the prospects o negotiating changes with a oreign

partner because they make it more dicult or the United

States to oer concessions.


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By constitutional design, the U.S. government is built

on competition. Within the executive branch, this rivalry

is expressed by departments that jockey with one another

over jurisdiction and budget; within each department,

a similar competition occurs among bureaus, oces,

and agencies. o an outsider, this system produces odd

results. Why is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration part o the Department o Commerce

rather than the Department o the Interior? Why is the

Department o Veterans Aairs running a network o

hospitals separate rom the Department o Health and

Human Services? In all such cases, the results stem rom

policy battles won and lost within a previous administra-

tion. Tere are no rm rules against overlap, tur swap-

ping, or encroachment, or even the sudden creation or

dissolution o an entire department o the U.S. govern-

ment. I an oce gives up something, another rival mighttake it upalong with the resources previously associated

with that unction.

Trough a process economists have labeled regulatory

capture, the U.S. government departments and agen-

cies responsible or regulation and inspection both at the

border and across the U.S. economy have developed close

relationships with powerul lobby groups and NGOs that

participate actively in rule making and in shaping govern-

ment enorcement practices. Attempts to alter the way

that something is regulated or inspected requently trigger

countervailing pressures rom these groups.Eventually, the BB and the RCC will run into these

policy dynamics by requesting the United States to

stop doing something that is hurt ing trade. Te agency

responsible or the particular area will have to consider

whether, i it gives up the activity, it will get anything

in return. I nothing, or i it loses something, it would

consider how long it could stall in the hope o being

rescued by a new president or by Congress. In addition,

it would weigh whether the aected interest groups, who

command more campaign donations and votes than or-

eign interests, would work against the change, seeking toreinstate a rule or practiceperhaps by having respon-

sibility or this area reassigned to another department or

agency over which it can have infuence.

In contrast, any concessions oered by Canada through

the BB or the RCC will be graciously accepted. Should

Canada agree to share particular data, or example, the

U.S. department or agency involved stands to gain in the

internal competition over policy within the U.S. govern-

ment because, armed with Canadian data and/or coopera-

tion, it has something its rivals lack. Tis advantage might

secure resources or expanded responsibilities; the particular

department or agency could well be designated as thepolicy lead actor within the U.S. government or a particu-

lar area. It is only when Canada seeks some concession in

return that it will encounter reluctance and excuses rom

the U.S. side. Without greater reciprocity, the BB and the

RCC could become largely one-way processes that lead to

Canadian convergence on extant U.S. standards and prac-

ticesan outcome that may become dicult or Canadian

governments to sustain politically.

rePLicAbiLity

Security ocials are cautious by nature, and U.S. regula-

tors, nervous about the political support or regulatory

changes negotiated with oreign partners, have been sim-

ilarly circumspect since the NAFA ratication debate

and the outcry over the SPP. Tis attitude has shaped the

BB and the RCC in two ways: the ocus o both eorts

on low-hanging ruit agenda items, and the emphasis

on pilot projects as a prerequisite or larger changes.

Low-hanging ruit is a avored Washington metaphor

or gains that can be harvested with little eort. Al-

though such opportunities may be limited, negotiatorshope that early success will build support and momen-

tum or progress on objectives that are more dicult

to reach. Since NAFA, such easy items have lled the

agendas o the serial eorts at border and regulatory

cooperation, refecting the diculty o making gains as

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well a s the limited ambitions o the negotiators, particu-

larly when conronted by public or political resistance.

I momentum or more dicult issues has not been

attained beore the current list is accomplished, the BB

and the RCC could stall.

Te heavy reliance on smal l-scale demonstrations

and pilot projects in the BB and the RCC limits the

impact that either initiative can have without expand-

ing the best practices derived rom these experiments.

In a sense, like low-hanging ruit, these trial changes

can be undertaken with ew la rger consequences until

the point where the experiment is deemed a success

and its innovation becomes a standard practice or is

replicated elsewhere.

For lack o unding or political support, U.S. govern-

ment participants in a pilot project have but two options:

to ask that it be continued to gather more data beoreproceeding, or delayed or scaled back during the imple-

mentation phase. Despite the already limited ambition

expended on these objectives and projects, there is always

the danger that these eorts might succumb even urther

to caution. Tis nervousness is a key vulnerability or both

the BB and the RCC, and, moreover, one that is more

pronounced than in previous negotiations on border and

regulatory cooperation.

PortAbiLity

Notwithstanding the Harper governments preerence

or re-bilateralization, the United States has viewed

negotiations with its neighbors in a global context. Even

NAFA was pursued by the United States in light o the

progress o European integration and the Uruguay Round

o the GA talks. Breakthroughs on energy, investment,

services, and dispute resolution pioneered in CUFA

were used by U.S. negotiators as models or NAFA

and the World rade Organization. Ater September 11,

2001, the U.S. and Canadian governments agreed to pilot

the Container Security Initiativeto inspect shippingcontainers jointly in each others portsand the United

States quickly began talks with other major partners in

Europe and Asia to adopt similar practices. NEXUS, the

U.S.-Canada trusted traveler program, was replicated or

Mexico as SENRI and also gave the impetus to Global

Entry, a program or U.S. citizens and permanent resi-

dents traveling anywhere in the world.

Already the United States has linked its negotiations

with Canada on clean energy, border security, and regula-

tory cooperation with parallel bilateral talks with Mexico.

It has also incorporated these themes in the rans-Pacic

Partnership negotiations, in ransatlantic Partnership talks,

and in the Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas initiative

with several Latin American and Caribbean partners.

o the extent that Canada is seeking not just to resolve

its U.S.-market access problems through the BB and

the RCC but also to gain an advantage over other U.S.

trading partners such as Mexico, the U.S. practice o tak-

ing ideas that work with one partner and applying them

to other partners will undercut the exclusiveness o any

Canadian gains, even as it standardizes U.S. procedures

and practices with as many oreign partners as possible. Atthe same time, the United States will use concessions by

other trading partners to pressure Canada to adopt them

as well. Te bilateral structure o the BB and the RCC

does not provide any protection rom U.S. promiscuity in

pursuit o security and regulatory cooperation globally.

For the United States, these concurrent negotia-

tions compete with one another to provide benets to

the national interest, and the portability o any new

approach is an important consideration. Solving a

unique local problem is less urgent than setting a new

global standard or developing a new concept that cantransorm the handling o a larger volume o inspections

or regulatory transactions. For the U.S. regulators and

security ocials participating in the BB and the RCC

with Canada, then, the stakes are high or any potential

change. Canada is not likely to remain a specia l exemp-

tion or long, and concessions requested by Canada

on the grounds o the unique riendship between the

two countries will not necessarily be viewed as mod-

est changes by the U.S. side. Even where a proposed

change is logical and may seem inevitablesuch as the

development o common orms or a protocol or sharingdata that each country keeps in a similar mannerthe

portability issue wi ll give U.S. ocials a reason to delay,

either to orestall the change or to hope that a more

advantageous arrangement can be achieved with another

partner and used as a model or Canada later.


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exPeDieNcy

An additional challenge or the BB and the RCC in 2012

is that Washington has been preoccupied with the upcom-

ing November elections. Tat has meant waning presiden-tial attention and a closing window o opportunity or

meaningul accomplishment until the election is over.

Ever since the launch o the BB and the RCC,

Canada seems to have assumed that the U.S. governmen-

tal process is undamentally similar to that at home: when

the chie executive and head o government has commit-

ted to change in Canada, the bureaucracy is bound to

ollow, despite any policy objections or institutional reluc-

tance. But the United States does not operate that way:

here, dissenting civil servants must be harried by political

appointees to move orward on issues they object to, andboth time and the electoral cycles o U.S. politics avor

the tenured civil servant who can delay action in numer-

ous ways. When an election approaches, much o the U.S.

presidents time is taken up by campaigning and undrais-

ing, and many o the most talented political appointees

in the administration leave government to join in the

campaign or to take lucrative private sector positions. Tis

distraction makes progress on domestic or international

initiatives increasingly dicult.

In the shadow o the 2012 election, what can the BB

and the RCC hope to accomplish? At best, they will

make limited gains on easy goals, gather data on promis-

ing new ideas being tested in pilot projects, and advance

discussions on trickier issues. Yet they may also prepare

the ground or a burst o accomplishment ollowing the

election i President Obama is re-elected. In the event that

he is not, the bipartisan consensus avoring border and

regulatory cooperation with U.S. oreign partners andto promote the competitiveness o the U.S. and North

American economies will eventua lly bring a Romney

administration to the table. At that point, the BB and

the RCC will likely be renamed and relaunched, but the

substance o the agenda will remain the same. Even tenta-

tive progress achieved by the BB and the RCC will be

the basis or gains ater 2012.

LookiNg ForwArD

Perhaps the greatest potential accomplishment o theBB and the RCC would be to oer the governments o

Canada and the United States urther lessons on how to

structure uture initiatives to promote greater coopera-

tion toward the larger goal o NAFA: a single North

American market or goods and services that can com-

pete with a rising China, a revived Europe, and other

global economies.

Tese two bilateral initiatives ace long odds, but they

are part o a larger agenda o global economic liberaliza-

tion in the 21st century. As such, Canada and the United

States will return to discuss their substance, spread theiraccomplishments as best practices with other partners,

and study why they ailed to achieve morelong ater

most Canadians and Americans have orgotten what BB

and RCC stood or and how they came about.

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Lai Aica a Caibba pas.


9/20


Laura Dawson

tHe cANADA-U.s. borDer ActioN PLAN:tHis tiMe its For reAL, cHArLie browN

It has been a long time since Canada-U.S. watchers have

had a big deal to consider. Te 1989 CanadaUnited

States Free rade Agreement was one. Te 2012 Beyond

the Border Action Plan (BB) may be another, but its a

long shot.1

In January 2012, a joint stakeholders meeting was

hosted by the U.S. Chamber o Commerce in Washington

in the Hall o Flagsthe baronial splendor o the hall was

tting or the gathering o the clans taking place within.

Te standing-room-only crowd represented dozens o eco-

nomic sectors and government departments in both coun-

tries and hundreds o disparate interests, most searching

or a ramework or change.

Te paint is still wet on the border plan, but expecta-

tions are running high. Te agreement could be torpe-

doed by many things: the absence o a clearly dened

legal basis or the agreement, a U.S. domestic crisis that is

provoking instincts to close markets, economic paralysis

in the EU, a xation on Asia and emerging markets that

leave Canada as an aterthought, and a U.S. election thatis ocused exclusively on domestic issues. Despite the

cards stacked against the BB, both sides are starting to

see a aint glimmer o hope. Tis idea just might work.

Te U.S. speakers at the Chamber o Commerce gave

a strong opening to the 250 assembled stakeholders. Cass

Sunstein, until recently the White House wunderkind

and administrator o the Oce o Inormation and

Regulatory Aairs, assured the audience that political

attention was being paid at the highest levels. Alan

Bersin, the assistant secretary o international aairs

at the Department o Homeland Security, likened theborder plan to a reconciliation o the War o 1812. And

David Heyman, the assistant secretary or policy at the

Department o Homeland Security, compared the border

perimeter approach to NORADa big idea with a huge

capacity or transormation.

Te Canadians, as is their nature, were more sanguine

about prospects or a new border security and prosperity

agreement with the United States. Still, many at the

Chamber event were starting to get that Charlie Brown

lookthe one that says they know Lucy is going to pull

the ball away, but the chance o one glorious kick is just

too good not to take a chance.

wHy Do we NeeD it?When our leaders signed the rst U.S.Canada ree

trade agreement more than 20 years ago, they imagined

a hassle-ree border where businesses on both sides could

take advantage o the best available resources, know-how,

and markets and generate cost savings through just-in-

time production. Since then, ramped-up security, eroding

inrastructure, and too much red tape have orced busi-

nesses to shit to just-in-case production. Tey routinely

double order and stockpile expensive inventory to hedge

against border bottlenecks.Border delays between the United States and Canada

add about $800 to the price o every new vehicle manu-

actured in North America. A car manuactured in Korea

or Japan clears customs only once when it arrives at a

U.S. port, but a North American car is subject to ees and

inspections at least seven times as it crosses between the

United States and Canada (and increasingly Mexico) in

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10/20


dierent stages o production. Economists estimate that

up to 10 percent o the cost o a North American product

goes to pay or border and trade ineciencies on the U.S.

border with Canada.2

Te advantage created in 1994 by integrating U.S.,

Mexican, and Canadian manuacturing under the North

American Free rade Agreement (NAFA) has been

lost to layers o regulatory duplication. For many inthe United States, NAFA is old news and Canada is

perceived as a sort o a reliable upper Minnesota. People

know its there, but the absence o crisis means it is out

o mind. All eyes are turned to China,3 but this xation

is premature. Even though U.S. exports to China have

tripled over the past decade, they account or only 7 per-

cent o Americas total exports. Canada buys nearly three

times as many U.S. goods as China does. Canada is the

top export destination or 34 U.S. states,4 and an esti-

mated 8 million American jobs (4.4 percent o total U.S.

employment) depend on trade with Canada.5

wHAt is it?

Te new U.S.-Canada Beyond the Border Action Plan

and the related Regulatory Cooperation Council attempt

to reverse the decline o North American competitiveness

by creating a border that is not only sae but smart. Te

plan, released in December 2011, contains dened actions

tied to specied deadlines, including

pilot programs that will allow cargo to be pre-

screened on the actory foor;

harmonized procedures or data collection andadministration;

single shipping windows in the United States and

Canada which are also smart enough to talk to

each other;

trusted-trader programs that are accessible to small-

business exporters;

aster and more predictable crossings or business

travelers;

easier movement or technicians who provide ater-

sales service;

better trac management approaching, and at, theborder, including road signs with real-time inorma-

tion on border wait times; and

improved inormation-sharing and identity verica-

tion so that people engaged in legitimate trade and

travel reach their destinations sooner.


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Te immediate prospects or the initiative look good.

Te initial work plan captures irritants that Canadian

and American ocials have been complaining about or

years but have lacked the political attention to x. Te

real challenge is whether the agreement can move beyond

short-term political deliverables to provide a ramework

or long-term change. o do so, the two governments will

have to create new instruments or legal, institutional, and

political cooperation which have historically been out o

reach in CanadaU.S. relations because o their potential

eects on policy, sovereignty, and domestic control.

Lessons learned rom past history can improve pros-

pects or success as long as we avoid alling into the same

traps. But as with any close relationship, the sources o

our strength can also be the qualities that undermine us.

Tese double-edged dynamics, discussed below, include

the legacy o the special relationship, an uneven view heldby Canadians and Americans o the importance o the

agreement, and the linkage with U.S. allies who are most

likely to share Canadian interests.

tHe PitFALLs oF tHe sPeciALreLAtioNsHiP

For Canada, the concept o the special bilateral relation-

ship between two like-minded allies is a dening charac-

teristic o our engagement with the United States. It is a

dynamic that Canada seeks to replicate whenever possible.Te trilateralism o NAFA was only grudgingly accepted

as an alternative to being shut out o U.S. bilateral talks

with Mexico.6 Nostalgia or this relationship undermines

Canadian interests whenever Canadas desire to be special

competes with pragmatism and recognition that, as the

worlds largest economy, the United States oten gets what

it wants at the bargaining table.

Trough the BB, Canada gets the one-on-one atten-

tion it craves. It is also true that Canada can oten prog-

ress aster with the United States alone than with Mexico

in the room, when dierent levels o development anddierent border priorities change the tenor o the discus-

sions. Without the weight Mexico can provide, however,

Canada lacks the infuence to counter American propos-

als it does not agree with. Returning to the dynamics

o Charlie Brown and Lucy, Canada cares ar too much

about the special relationship. It gives away the leverage

that its importance to United States should bring precisely

because it wants too much to be loved. Te United States

knows that Canada will never walk away rom the table.

Despite the Canadian impulse to guard the bilateral

relationship, Canadas interests are not well served by

keeping its security and prosperity partnership with theUnited States as an exclusive club. Canada has growing

trade interests around the world. As relevant elements o

the BB are applied in more economic spheres (North

America, South and Central America, Asia, and the

European Union), Canada will increasingly benet as one

o the architects o the agreement.7

cULtivAtiNg ALLiANces

Te Security and Prosperity Partnership o North

America (SPP) negotiated in 2005 among Canada,Mexico, and the United States is dead, and NAFA,

while eective in governing traditional trade issues (tar-

is, rules o origin, customs classication, and the like),

has reached the limits o its useulness as an instrument

o North American economic governance or as a platorm

rom which to build uture competitiveness. NAFA

lacks an eective mechanism to amend or update the

agreement because its ramers avoided any commitments

that would cede domestic economic authority to a supra-

national decision-making process. As a result, unlike the

European Union, NAFA is a tool o economic integra-tion that contains ew mechanisms or institutional or

political integration.

Te BB may help to provide the ramework to bring

the out-o-date NAFA provisions into the 21st century.

I the BB is to avoid a similar short shel lie, however,

F Caaa, h ccp h

spcial bilaal laiship bw

w lik-i allis is a ig

chaacisic u gag

wih h Ui Sas.


12/20


it must make powerul riends in Congress who accept

that, or North America to be competitive in the global

economy, it needs to allow additional trading partners

into the inner circle o U.S. rule making.

Political support is the rst step to moving the BB

orward, but commitment at the working levelin

departments and agencies with trade, economic, and

security responsibilitiesis key to creating an agreement

that delivers results or cross-border trade and travel. TeDepartment o Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead

player in the interagency process in the United States.

Tis leadership is helpul or Canada because it ties its

interests to a powerul entity able to mobilize the political

and scal resources necessary to keep BB afoat within

the competitive U.S. interagency process. At the same

time, DHS control skews the content o the agreement

toward security concerns.

Canada may be able to hold the ocus on economic

objectives somewhat by taking advantage o the act

that U.S. ocials never have enough time or resourcesto devote to policy analysis. I Canada is willing to do

the sta work required to drat technical proposals that

are sensitive to the interests o both sides, the result

might be an agreement that achieves both security and

prosperity goals.

In addition to support rom politicians and ocials, it

is local stakeholder support that determines whether an

initiative has the momentum to make it across the goal

line. Phase one o the BB Action Plan makes a com-

mitment that stakeholders living in border communities

will be involved in planning access at the various ports.Tat is a good start, but its not enough. Business must

also be convinced o the benets o the agreement and

persuaded to remain on board or the long haul. State and

provincial stakeholders must be brought to the table as

ull participants.

Tere are both practical and political imperatives or

including participants at the regional and local level in

the negotiations. For instance, regulatory convergence is

a key component o the BB, and much o the regulatory

world is under state/provincial and municipal control. In

Canada, the provinces have a constitutional right to

participate in the decisions that aect trans-border and

international trade. Although provincial assent is not

strictly necessary beore the ederal government canundertake new trade commitments, provincial opposition

is sure to guarantee their ailure.8 In the United States, in

contrast, local interests have a preponderant infuence on

Congressional behavior. In other words, Canada infu-

ences Washington not rom inside the Beltway but rom

Bellingham and Bualo.

MANAgiNg exPectAtioNs

With a majority since 2011, the Harper government now

has more to ear rom political opposition (or indier-ence) in the United States than rom criticism at home.

Te promise o a aster, easier border or tourism and

trade plays well with most Canadian voters, and the

challenge or Canada is how to manage expectations. I

the rst phase o the action plan does not deliver tangible

improvements, this ailure will lend credence to criticism

that the agreement lacks substance. It also opens the door

or critics to play up bogeyman threats o lost sovereignty,

compromised rights and privacy, and the creeping

Americanization o Canada.

Canada is more concerned about how to maintainU.S. political attention through and beyond the presi-

dential election. In the heat o the campaign, the rhetoric

about the evils and virtues o oreign trade escalates. It

is a debate in which Canada has no direct voice and in

which it can participate only by proxy through interested

I Caaa is willig h sa wk qui a chical

ppsals ha a ssiiv h iss bh sis, h sul igh

b a ag ha achivs bh scuiy a pspiy gals.


13/20


and like-minded business allies. Canada must thereore

be ocusing outreach campaigns on U.S. businesses that

benet rom expedited trade with its northern neighbors.o create an agreement that is durable and provides

lasting benets, Canadas challenge is one o complex

event management.

Canada must overcome its attachment to the bilateral

special relationship and be prepared to expand the

agreement to other trading partners whenever and

wherever that makes sense. With the United States

as a drawing card, Canada becomes a more attractive

country to do business with because o the size o the

North American market. Furthermore, by expandingand constantly updating the BB, it remains a living

and relevant agreement. As such, it will avoid the

ossication experienced by NAFA.

Canada must recognize that DHS leadership is a

double-edged sword. By taking charge o the sta

work that DHS lacks the interest or capacity to do,

Canada can help to keep its economic interests intact,

even as it must accept that the DHS will always makesecurity interests paramount.

Canada must be engaged in a sustained and persua-

sive advocacy campaign with U.S. domestic actors

with whom it shares commercial or political interests.

Congressional representatives will give a polite hearing

to Canadian ocials who make the case or the BB,

but they are more likely to act when those interests are

relayed to them through U.S. businesses and voters.

Finally, while making the agreement appear as

important as possible south o the border, Canada

must resist the urge to do the same at home. Al-though it is tempting to get as much traction as

possible rom Harper-Obama summits, the Canadian

government must tone down the rhetoric o the big

deal so that results do not all short o the expecta-

tions o average Canadians.

On December 7, 2011, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper unveiled the the Beyond the Border (BTB)

Action Plan and the Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) Action Plan.


14/20


coNcLUsioN

Every child who has ever read aPeanutscomic strip

can appreciate Charlie Browns problem: Lucy does not

respect him. She knows that he will all or her blandish-

ments every single time. With the Beyond the Border

Action Plan, Canada succeeded in gaining the atten-tion o the United States or one aternoon on Laayette

Square, but it will not have the respect to ensure that the

ball stays in place until the kick can be completed.

Should Canada eign indierence? o play hard to get

when this agreement clearly oers so much to Canadas

economic bottom line would not be seen as credible.

Te American Lucy is smart enough to see through that.

However, Charlie Browns assets are always strongest in

a group setting. He is reasonable, likeable, and inspires

a level o trust in Linus, Snoopy, and Peppermint Patty

that Lucy could never hope or. I Canada wants to

level the playing eld with the United States, it should

immediately extend the size o the BB negotiating eld

to like-minded states in the hemisphere and expand the

mandate rom xing the northern border to one o build-

ing hemispheric competitiveness vis--vis Asia and emerg-

ing markets. A North American negotiating bloc in the

rans-Pacic Partnership is an ideal starting point. Yes,

progress will be slower, but Canadas negotiating power

will be strengthened, and the results will provide a solid

oundation or uture growth and expansion.

Notes

1. Te name o the initiative is technically Beyond the Border:

Perimeter Security and E conomic Competitiveness Action Plan,

but those involved call it either the Border Action Plan or the

Beyond the Border Action Plan.

2. Robert A. Pastor, Te North American Idea: A Vision of a Continental

Future(New York: Oxord University Press, 2011), 136.3. Hilla ry Clinton, Americas Pacic Century, Foreign Policy

(November 2011), .

4. Department o Foreign Aairs and International rade Canada,

.

5. Laura Baughman and J. Franois, U.S.Canada rade and U.S.

State-Level Production and Employment, paper prepared or the

Embassy o Canada, March 2010.

6. For many Canadians, the real agreement has always been the

1989 CanadaUnited States Free rade Agreement, and NAFA is

simply CUFA plus one.

7. States derive competitiveness gains by being among the creators

o new trade arrangements rather than having to bea r the costs o

adapting to new regimes created by others.

8. Under the ederal-provincial division o powers, the ederal govern-

ment has constitutional authority over the negotiation o oreign

trade agreements, but the provinces have authority over numerous

economic areas covered by trade agreementsnatural resources,

or example, and banking and other services.


15/20


Laura Dawson compares the hesitation o Canadians to

embrace the work o the Beyond the Border (BB) negoti-

ating group and the U.S.-Canada Regulatory Cooperation

Council (RCC) to Charlie Brown, wracked with doubt

as to whether the American Lucy will once again pull the

ootball away beore he can kick it, leaving him fat on

his back and eeling oolish. In the Peanutscomic strip,

Charlie also encounters Lucy at a booth where she oers

Psychiatric Advice or ve cents. Te Canadian Charlie

Brown that Dawson described is ull o anxiety about the

pitalls o the special relationship, the necessity o cultivat-

ing alliances, and the burden o managing expectations. I

imagine that the American Lucy would respond (crabbily)

to each o these complaints in turn.

PitFALLs oF tHe sPeciALreLAtioNsHiP

An exclusive bilateral special relationship between Canada

and the United States is simply not attainable. Te United

States isnt interested in that kind o relationship. Rather,

it wants the innovative solutions and breakthroughs on

security and regulatory cooperation it has developed with

Canada to be portable, applied across the broad spectrum

o its international partners, and, where possible, estab-

lished as global norms or commerce and deense.

Dawson identies Canadian nostalgia or the special

relationship o the past, but that relationship has been

romanticized to the point where many Canadians are

looking or a past that never existed. Tey have blinded

themselves to the unreciprocated nature o bilateral

regulatory cooperation. Canada can make concessions to

the United States in the context o BB and RCC, but

U.S. regulators and security ocials nd it hard to make

unique concessions to Canada.

It is important or Canadians to be aware that the

United States is at the center o a series o multilateral

talks that are intended to reshape the governance o

trans-boundary commerce and the movement o goods,

people, and ideas. You have a seat at the table waiting or

you, Canada, now that you have been welcomed into the

rans-Pacic Partnership; you could join the ongoing

U.S. talks with Europe and transorm the bilateral discus-

sions on border and regulatory cooperation into continen-

tal talks that include Mexico.

cULtivAtiNg ALLiANces

For many Canadians, the U.S. Congress and the tightly

woven network o special-interest lobbyists in Washington

are the enemy. No matter what Canadians do to avoid the

legislative labyrinth, it seems they are always caught up

in U.S. domestic politics, whether sotwood lumber, the

Western Hemisphere ravel Initiative, mandatory country-

o-origin labeling or bee and pork, or Buy American

provisions in U.S. stimulus-spending legislation.

Dawson wisely counsels Canadians to steel their

courage and engage Congress and U.S. special interests

directly. Forging alliances within the United States and

aggregating U.S. and Canadian domestic interests in

order to make greater progress possible at the bargaining

table is not traditional diplomacy, but Canada has done

so beoreand perormed well. Rather than avoid these

entanglements, Canada should see them as an inevitable

part o doing business with the Americans.

cHristoPHer sANDs resPoNDs to LAUrA DAwsoN

A xclusiv bilaal spcial

laiship bw Caaa

a h Ui Sas is siply aaiabl. th Ui Sas

is is i ha ki

laiship.


16/20


Canada should also insist that the Obama admin-

istration give it stronger support. Te U.S. executive

branch has been even more wary o congressional

engagement than have Canadian negotiators, who have

at least reached out to brie congressional committee

sta and engage congressional oces. While Canadian

diplomats have ound riends among industry associa-

tions and community leaders, the outreach rom the

White House has been nothing short o under whelming.

MANAgiNg exPectAtioNs

Oten Canada has been unrealistic in its expectations

or a special bilateral relationship with the United States,

and Dawson sees a similar dynamic at work in the BB

and RCC talks. Te Conservative majority government

o Prime Minister Stephen Harper is expected to del ivera big deal with the United States, but the prospects or

a historic breakthrough are hindered by a poor U.S.

economy and the distractions o the U.S. election cycle.

Te fat economy has led U.S. negotiators to ocus on

low-hanging ruitminor regulations and easy xes

to security policies such as expanding voluntary par-

ticipation in trusted traveler and shipper programs. Te

approach o the 2012 U.S. elections has led the two

governments to keep the ta lks at a low prole or now.

Soon enough, 2013 will arrive and, regardless o

the outcome o the U.S. elections, a returned PresidentObama or a newly elected President Romney will provide

an opportunity to accelerate progress on border secu-

rity and regulatory cooperation. In this sense, Canadas

optimism is well ounded: it will have the chance to press

a more ambitious vision with Washington.

Will Canada be ready? Dawson advises modesty

and persistence in the ace o adverse U.S. political and

economic conditions. Tis caution is valid in the short

term, but Canadians should remember that the beginning

o a new presidential mandate is usually the best time to

pursue big agenda itemsbeore a second-term presidentbecomes a lame duck, or a rst-term president begins to

worry about re-election. Canada should be careul not to

tamp down public expectations too low.

In the end, Laura Dawson encourages Canadians to be

ambitious and to accept slower progress with the United

States, in the context o multilateral talks, in exchange

or the greater scale o potential gains rom having more

countries at the tablein eect, to join the United States

in reshaping the global economy rather than trying to

improve only the North American corner o it. Tat is

good advice, and worth more than ve cents. o make themost o this opportunity, Canada must ace the world less

like Charlie Brown and more like Snoopy.

Caaa shul b caul

ap w public xpcais

lw.


17/20


LAUrA DAwsoN resPoNDs to cHristoPHer sANDs

Christopher Sandss excellent essay is a warning to Canadi-

ans (and other U.S. trading partners) about the core di-

culty in any attempt to build new and ormal cooperative

arrangements with the United States. Canada has long

beneted rom strong inormal ties with its southern neigh-

bor. ypically, one ocial will pick up the phone to speak

to a counterpart colleague across the border about a matter

o shared concern. As long as no new laws are required, the

matter can usually be handled at the ocial level without

any need or political intervention. Tis scenario happens

every day. Te deeper economic integration involved in

the Beyond the Border negotiations and the U.S.-Canada

Regulatory Cooperation Council, however, requires ormal

legal mechanisms, and Canada must exercise patience and

fexibility in order to get what it wants rom the process. As

the rst step, the government should careully manage do-

mestic expectations or concrete progress in the short term.

In terms o the complexity o its rules and regula-

tions, Canada can well match the United States. Te

dierence between them comes at the practical level o

making legislative changes, where the twists and turns o

Congressional infuence make Canadas parliamentary

process seem easy. In the United States, in contrast to

Canada, the support o the executive is no guarantee o

success. Congress, as Sands points out, will ultimately

determine whether the regulatory and border deals with

Canada live or die. With the responsibility or border

issues ragmented among several dierent departments,

and no one department, bureau, or agency tasked with

the role o champion, it is easy or Canadian interests to

all through the cracks.

Sands also reminds us that the attention o U.S.

ocials is being pulled in many directions as the election

approaches. Te government has ew resources right now

to devote to amending the status quo with its sae and

predictable northern neighbor. Canada must set the bar

low or the short term and ocus, as he says, on creating

the conditions to promote greater cooperation toward

the larger goal o NAFA: a single North American

market or goods and services that can compete with a

rising China, a revived Europe, and other global econo-

mies. Even small changes in the worlds largest economy

can make a big dierence to the prosperity o the trading

partner next door. With strong domestic support and a

majority government in Parliament, Canada is the more

nimble partner in these negotiations. It is also the partner

or whom the agreement is more important, given that a

deal will aect a relatively larger share o Canadas eco-

nomic activities.

Canada has an incentive to take the lead in researching

new options, reaching out to stakeholders, developing new

proposals, and making the case or benets or both sides.

Although Canadians do not vote in U.S. elections, they are

skilled at building coalitions with U.S. partners who are

willing to mobilize votes and infuence when persuaded

that their interests are shared with those o Canada. Even

legislators who are suspicious o oreign trade are recogniz-

ing the need to reduce red tape, along with the act that

billions o dollars are being wasted on duplicate regulation

and on regulatory capturethe domination o regulatory

agencies by special interests or sectors.

Te U.S. northern border communities are an impor-

tant source o potential support. Tese regions have not

Caaa us xcis paic

a fxibiliy i g

wha i was h pcss.

As h s sp, h gvshul caully aag sic

xpcais cc pgss

i h sh .


18/20


only been hardest hit by changes to the manuactur-

ing industry and by the recent economic downturn but

stand to benet most rom improved access to Canada

and rom reduced border transaction costs. Te U.S.

Department o Commerce estimates in its trade act-

sheet that only 1 percent o U.S. businesses exports their

products. For those that do, Canada is their most likely

rst market. As the U.S. manuacturing and services

sectors struggle to position themselves in the global

economy, making trade with Canada easier seems a good

place to begin. Congressional representatives rom the

border states must be convinced that long-term prosper-

ity will be achieved not through narrow protectionism

but by creating enabling conditions or well-unctioning

cross-border supply chains.

Canada is very good at doing the legwork required to

create new orms o cooperative arrangements. Tis skillhas long helped Canada to punch above its weight in

international negotiations. During the Canada-U.S. Free

rade Agreement negotiations, veteran U.S. trade negotia-

tor Bill Merkin commented that Canada knew the U.S.

positions better than the Americans did themselves. His

Canadian counterpart, Simon Reisman, later quipped:

We ought to, we wrote them. Now, by working to

provide a range o innovative, orward-looking solutions

that include a balance o benets and obligations on both

sides, Canada will be well prepared to take advantage o

the post-election burst o accomplishment that Sandspredicts may be in the ong.

Whatever the deal it makes with Canada, the United

States will, as Sands predicts, certainly repackage the

results it likes and then oer them to other trading

partners. On this score, Canada has two choices: it can

whinge about the erosion o the special relationship it

thinks it has with the United States or it can anticipate

this reality and nd ways to exploit its advantage as an

initiator in the new regime. I the Oce o the United

States rade Representative wants to use elements o

the regulatory cooperation deal in the rans-PacicPartnership, thats great. Canada will be ahead o other

partners because its policies are already aligned with

those o the United States. Canada is open or business

while everyone else is scurrying around to make domestic

reorms and adjustments.

Canada can a lso promote the results o the new

U.S.-Canada agreements in its own negotiations with

third countries such as Japan and the European Union.

A U.S.-Canada approach has much more appeal than

a unilateral Canadian proposal to countries that want

eventually to negotiate their own ree-trade agreements

with the United States.

Another chal lenge in writing new rules is thinking

through the long-term consequences o ormal coopera-

tion. For example, voluntary inormation sharing means

that Canada can sidestep any request rom U.S. authori-

ties with which it is not comortable. Te obligation to

share inormation means, however, that Canada must

be aware in advance o any agreement o all the practi-

cal implications o how the United States could use that

inormation, and it must ensure that the end use is consis-

tent with Canadian laws and values.Finally, Canadas orward-looking agil ity behooves

it to work with Mexico on matters o common interest.

Right now, the United States is negotiating with Canada

and Mexico separately on regulatory cooperation and

border matters.

In asymmetrical bargaining, when one partner signi-

icantly outweighs the other, the smaller partner is always

at a disadvantage unless it can orm a counterweight

with like-minded allies. In order to counter the dual

bilateral arrangement that the United States currently

enjoys, Canada and Mexico need to nd common causeon regulatory and border issues. I the United States is

getting the same message rom both o its border part-

ners, the chances o compromise are increased because

a broader range o U.S. political interests is engaged.

As well, Canada-Mexico al ignment on key hemispheric

issues will increase the likelihood o productive trilateral

discussions when and i they take place.

Te negotiating conditions or the BB and the

RCC are ar rom optimal, and the nal results will

certainly all short o the hype. Sands makes this case

very well, though the na l agreement should not beseen as a deeat. Rather, it is a blueprint or strategic

action. Positioning these new arrangements, as part o

a longer-term national and hemispheric competitiveness

plan, will provide the best chance o shared prosperity

and uture growth.


19/20


About the Authors

Chritophr sad n fll a h Hudn

inu and d f h Hudn na n

Nh Aman cmpn. H unl

h r Dnuhd vn Pf f

canadaUnd sa bun and enmrlan a wn wahnn Un, n

la fm h pn a pfal lu n

canadan sud a h Jhn Hpn Un

shl f Adand innanal sud. H

h auh fThe Canada Gambit: Will It Revive

North America?(Hudn inu, 2011).

A pal n U.s.-canada nm lan,

Lara Dawo, pdn f Dan sa,

pd ad un n -d

ad, ma a, and ula u.

sh a a pul pl hla a h wlncn, a n fll a h Madnald-Lau

inu, and a mm f h innanal

enm cunl f h cD H inu. in

pu a, h d a n ad n

U.s.-canada nm affa a h Und sa

ema n oaa, and h ha al auh

nnanal ad, canada-U.s. lan, and

pl anal a h Nman Pan shl f

innanal Affa a caln Un.


20/20

tHe cANADA iNstitUte, an integral program o the Woodrow

Wilson International Center or Scholars, was ounded in 2001 to

increase awareness and knowledge about Canada and Canada-U.S.

relations among U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders. Te Institute

currently stands as the only nonpartisan public policy orum in

Washington, D.C., the United Statesand even Canadadedicated

exclusively to exploring emerging policy issues in one o the most

successul and unique bilateral relationships in the world.

cANADA iNstitUte

wd wln innanal cn f shla

on wd wln Plaza

1300 Pnnlana Anu, Nw

wahnn, Dc 20004-3027

anada@lnn.

t (202) 691-4301

F (202) 691-4001

www.wiLsoNceNter.org/cANADA

tHe wooDrow wiLsoN iNterNAtioNAL

ceNter For scHoLArs provides a strictly

nonpartisan space or the worlds o policymak-

ing and scholarship to interact. By conducting

relevant and timely research and promoting dia-

logue rom all perspectives, it works to address

the critical current and emerging challenges

conronting the United States and the world.

Ba tuss

Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair

Sander R. Gerber, Vice Chair

Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO

Public Members:James H. Billington, Librarian

o Congress; Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary, U.S.

Department o State; G. Wayne Clough, Secretary,

Smithsonian Institution; Arne Duncan, Secretary,

U.S. Department o Education; David Ferriero,

Archivist o the United States; Fred P. Hochberg,

Chairman and President, Export-Import Bank;

James Leach, Chairman, National Endowment

or the Humanities; Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary,

U.S. Department o Health and Human Services

Private Citizen Members: imothy Broas, John .

Casteen III, Charles Cobb, Jr., Telma Duggin, Carlos

M. Gutierrez, Susan Hutchison, Barry S. Jackson

Wilson National Cabinet: Eddie & Sylvia Brown,

Melva Bucksbaum & Raymond Learsy, Ambassadors

Sue & Chuck Cobb, Lester Crown, Telma Duggin,Judi Flom, Sander R. Gerber, Ambassador Joseph B.

Gildenhorn & Alma Gildenhorn, Harman Family

Foundation, Susan Hutchison, Frank F. Islam,

Willem Kooyker, Linda B. & obia G. Mercuro, Dr.

Alexander V. Mirtchev, Wayne Rogers, Leo Zickler

PHotogrAPHs:

cover: Rigucci, Shutterstock

p. 2: Champiooto, Shutterstock

p. 4: Katherine Welles, Shutterstock

p. 10: Max Lindenthaler, Shutterstockp. 13: Carolyn Kaster, AP Photo

p. 19: Videowokart, Shutterstock

p. 20: Glenn Lowson

2012 wooDrow wiLsoN iNterNAtioNAL

ceNter For scHoLArs, wAsHiNgtoN, D.c.

The Beyond the Border Observer

pd ml and lan nfman au

dlpmn n h btb and rcc An Plan.

Visit beyondtheborderobserver.org.

Documents

A Safe and Smart Border