A review of Thailand's foreign policy in mainland Southeast Asia: exploring an ideational approach

7/31/2019 A review of Thailand's foreign policy in mainland Southeast Asia: exploring an ideational approach

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Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, DOI: 10.1163/15700615-20120009

EJEAS ()

European Journal

of

East Asian Studies

www.brill.nl/ejea

A Review of ailands ForeignPolicy in Mainland Southeast Asia:Exploring an Ideational Approach1

Pongphisoot Busbarat

Australian National [email protected]

Abstract

In the post-Cold War period, mainland Southeast Asia has been significantly marked bypeace and stability, despite occasional bilateral tensions among neighbouring countries.

Within this environment ailand has been a primary advocate for various sub-regionalco-operation initiatives since the early s. Interestingly, these regional projects havemainly been ailands own self-initiated version, in which ailand acts as the main co-ordinator, sometimes bypassing broader regional entities, especially ASEAN. Conventional

wisdom may explain this phenomenon by resorting to the economic rationale in aiforeign policy. However, in some circumstances economic benefit is not a decisive factorconsidering associated costs. is article, therefore, proposes to use an ideational lens toreassess ailands regional leadership by focusing on the role of self-perception/identityin determining ailands foreign policy preferences. It argues that ailands identity asa leading country in mainland Southeast Asia helps sustain its active role in sub-regionalendeavours. e Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) initiative is examined here toshow the intervention of ailands self-perception in the endurance of its leadership in thisregional initiative.

Keywordsai foreign policy; self-perception; national identity; sub-regional co-operation

1) e author appreciates Gertjan Dijkink, Narayanan Ganesan, Tyrell Haberkorn, AndrewMacIntyre, William Tow and Andrew Walker for their helpful comments and suggestionson earlier versions of the manuscript, including the Department of Political & Social

Change, College of Asia & the Pacific, ANU for facilities provided during the initial stageof writing.


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Pongphisoot Busbarat / EJEAS ()

Introduction

Conflict and co-operation are two major overarching themes in the study ofinternational relations (IR). Regarding the issue of nationalism, its influence

in international politics is generally viewed as generating conflicts.2 Likewise,

ailands relations with its mainland Southeast Asian neighbours are normally

complicated by nationalism in each country, involving antagonistic historicalnarratives and disagreements over border demarcation inherited from the colo-

nial era. ailands historical narratives reflect its negative view towards aggres-

sive Burma, weak Laos and the untrustworthy Khmer.3 Indochinese states are

also suspicious of ailands hegemony, rooted in bitter experiences of Siamese

aggression centuries ago and ailands support of foreign intervention in theircountries during the Cold War. Complicated by domestic politics, nationalism

also exacerbates bilateral conflicts on many occasions, especially when border

issues are involved. Recent ai-Cambodian conflict over the ownership of

the ancient ruin of Preah Vihear Temple during resurfaced as part

of an attempt by the conservative group to insult aksin and his allies forcompromising ailands national interests. ey demanded that the Abhisit

government adopt hawkish measures to reclaim the ancient ruin. In Cambo-

dia, Hun Sen also took advantage of this situation to capitalise on nationalisticsentiment against ai hegemony and promote popular support for his lead-ership. erefore, nationalism is generally viewed as a diminishing factor, not

an attribute to co-operation in ailands relations with neighbouring coun-

tries.

At the same time, despite occasional tensions, mainland Southeast Asia

can actually be seen as largely peaceful since the decline of the Cold War,marked by ailands turning the battlefields into marketplaces policy under

2) See discussion in Arjun Appadurai, e grounds of the nation-state: identity, violenceand territory, in Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz and Charles Westin (eds) Nationalismand Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Routledge, ), pp. ;and Stanley Hoffmann, Nationalism and world order, in the same volume, pp. ;Martha L. Cottam and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics: e Political Behaviouror Nation States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, ); Douglas Woodwell, Nationalism inInternational Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity(New York: Palgrave Macmillan,).3) Charnvit Kasetsiri, ailandCambodia: a love-hate relationship, Kyoto Review of South-

east Asia, No. (), available at: http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/issue/index.html.


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the Chatichai Choonhavan government in . Since then ailand has been

among the enthusiasts in restoring regional peace and prosperity, especially by

advocating sub-regional co-operation in mainland Southeast Asia. e con-ventional view would explain this development in ailands foreign rela-

tions through the economic rationale of globalisation in the post-Cold War

period. However, one piece of the jigsaw is still missing. ailand has been

relentless in trying to promote its own version of new regional initiativessuch as the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) initiative, the Bay

of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation

(BIMSTEC), the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation

Strategy (ACMECS), the Emerald Triangle and the Asia Co-operation Dia-

logue (ACD). ese important initiatives have one thing in common:they place Bangkok as a crucial player linking countries into a web of co-

operation.

is policy preference seems to be a rational choice of action, but this is

not always the case as it involves tremendous resources to manage and sus-

tain such co-operation. Scholars have long argued that foreign policy-makingis basically done by human beings, and so is not a perfectly rational enter-

prise. erefore, this paper looks at the influence of ideational aspect in ai

foreign policy-making. is self-perception/identity is defined here in the for-eign relations domain as ailand perceiving itself to be a leading nationin Southeast Asia, hence its aspirations to remain so. It is developed with

reference to ai modern state-building and nationalism, and helps sustain

ailands policy preference of assuming a role in promoting its own version

of regional co-operation. is perception is cultivated throughout its con-

temporary history of nation-state building. e Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) initiative is examined here to show the intervention of ai-

lands self-perception in the endurance of its leadership in this regional initia-

tive.

. e Construction of ailands Self-perception

is article concurs with the ideational account that actors interests are not

exogenously determined. One area of common ground is that actors live

in a society and engage in the social processes of sharing and distributing

ideas and knowledge through socialisation. As Judith Goldstein and RobertKeohane suggest, ideas can affect policy in three ways. First, ideas provide

world views in which possibilities for action are perceived. ey also actas principled beliefs, defining certain criteria for judging what is right or


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wrong, and as causal beliefs offering guidelines on how to achieve objectives.

Second, ideas serve as road maps to particular preferences while other possible

alternatives are excluded. ird, ideas also help to determine the levels of co-operation and cohesion for particular groups or to serve as focal points. Policy-

makers may resolve collective action problems and reach agreement based on

shared culture and other normative factors. Over time, some ideas become

institutionalised while the levels of interest supporting certain initial ideas mayfade or change. erefore, ideas certainly shape policy preferences; and certain

shared ideas may dominate policy-making and generate certain types of policy

options for a long period of time.4

An important variant of ideas is self-perception or identity that actors create

as a mental shortcut. It provides a clue to how actors should think, feel, eval-uate, and ultimately, behave5 in response to surrounding environments. e

construction of identity is achieved through social interactions within a society

and with outsiders, which may produce either positive or negative aspects of

self-other relationship. Once actors have embraced a particular identity, it will

help them to define the interests and roles consistent with that identity.6 ere-fore, actors basically hold this identity when they decide what policy response

they should pursue with other actors in the first place, mostly regardless of real-

ity. is is thus an important factor determining policy preference in foreignpolicy-making.7 Simply speaking, identities constitute interest and role which

4) Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and foreign policy: a analytical frame-work, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,Institutions, and Political Change(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, ), pp. .5) Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and Benjamin Frankel, Introduction: tracing the influ-ence of identity on foreign policy, in Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas and Benjamin Frankel

(eds) e Origins of National Interests (London: Frank Cass, ), pp. viixxii.6) See Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, e culture ofnational security: norms and identity in world politics, and Peter J. Katzenstein, Intro-duction: alternative perspectives on national security, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) eCulture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: ColumbiaInternational Affairs Online, ), available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/index.html; Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction ofpower politics, International Organization, Vol. , No. (), pp. .7) Michael Brecher, Blema Steinburg and Janice Stein, A framework for research on foreignpolicy behaviour, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. , No. (), pp. ; Alexan-der George, e operational code: a neglected approach to the study of political leaders

and decision-making, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. , No. (), pp. ;Richard Herrmann, e power of perceptions in foreign-policy decision making: do views


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inform possible actions.8 For a state, foreign policy is thus an important tool

because it reproduces the states identities that ensure self and other differ-

entiation.9 For this reason, self-perception is worth studying as a significantvariable explaining a states international policies and actions.

is section traces the origin of how ai elites understand and perceive

themselves and their countrys relational position and role vis--vis outsiders.

It depicts the influence of the socialisation process since the advent of modernai nation-building and its impact on shaping ailands identity, especially

in its relations with neighbouring countries. is identity propounds the view

that ailand is of higher status and hence should be the centre of regional

political economy, resulting in the foreign policy preference that ailand

should lead the co-ordination of regional development.

.. e Emergence of ailands Self-perception

ailands self-perception is closely associated with the emergence of nation-

alism sponsored primarily by the ai state as part of its statecraft or nation-state building. Nationalism has been used by political elites in different peri-

ods but always with the same purpose in mindto form national characteris-

tics and knowledge shared by different groups of people residing in the newlydemarcated territories or, to use Benedict Andersons words, to shape an imag-ined community.10 is imagined ailand was constructed mainly through

Bangkoks promotion of so-called official nationalism. is version of nation-

alism underscores royalty as one of the supreme national pillars: the nation,

religion and the king.

of the Soviet Union determine the policy choices of American leaders? American Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. , No. (), pp. ; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misper-ception in International Politics(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ).8) Chris Reus-Smit, e constructivist turn: critical theory after the Cold War, WorkingPaper No. / (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Research School ofPacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, ); Wendt, Anarchy is whatstates make of it.9) David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity(Manchester: Manchester University Press, ); Gertjan Dijkink, National Identity andGeopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain (London: Routledge, ); Christopher Hill,e Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, ).10) Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (London: Verso, ).


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To consolidate the ai nation-state building project, ai elites since King

Chulalongkorn () have employed various strategies to enforce, pop-

ularise and imbue an official nationalism into the ai people.11 Bangkok haspursued overt national consolidation policies, as evidenced by the case of the

Siamese court forcing other smaller kingdoms both militarily and voluntar-

ily to accept Bangkok as the sole sovereign for modern Siam. is resulted in

ailand engaging with Western powers to demarcate its physical territories inwhich the new map was the encoding of desire.12 e new mapping created

a geopolitical vision of the ai state which helped shape ideas of its own

identity and relations with others, resulting in a collective mission or foreign

policy strategy.13

However, it was the enforcement of socialisation processes that embed-ded the imagined ailand among ai citizens. Within a new reality of

a Western-dominated international system where ailand was in fact sub-

ordinated, the nation needed to be reassured of its relevance and signifi-

cance. As ongchai asserts, the ai elite did this by resorting to building

the concept of siwilai (from the English civilised) so that ailand was ableto measure up to other races within the new Siam, and to other nations in

the region, on the same Western scale.14 Various modernisation projects can

be seen emerging through this vision, such as Western-style military train-ing, legal system, modern transport and buildings, as well as the CulturalMandates established under the Phibun government to promote a uniformed

civilised ai-ness according to the states definitions15 between and

.

According to this view, ailand was more civilised and modernised than

its neighbours who had succumbed to Western colonial rule. Popular educa-tion was a key instrument in the socialisation of this idea, and has continued

its emphasis on ailands superiority in Southeast Asia, its past victories and

11) Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of ailand (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, ).12) ongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation (Honolulu:University of Hawaii Press, ), p. .13) Dijkink, National Identity, p. .14) ongchai Winichakul, e quest for Siwilai: a geographical discourse of civiliza-tional thinking in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Siam, Journal of AsianStudies, Vol. , No. (), pp. .15) Piyanat Bunnag, Modern ai History: From the Bowring Treaty to the October Incident (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, ), in ai.


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its expansion into present-day neighbouring countries,16 a version of history

that is still being taught in ai schools even today.17 is nationalist sen-

timent became crystallised in the regional vision of the ai elite, especiallywithin the military circle of the ss, becoming widely known as the

Suvarnabhumiconcept that continental Southeast Asia should be under ai-

lands leadership.18 is version of royal-nationalism has been so hegemonic

that other versions of nationalism, if they existed at all, have survived onlybriefly, such as the nationalism promoted by liberal intellectuals during the

s in the aftermath of the Revolution, the leftist nationalism of the

ss and the social movement of the s.

ailands identity was also reinforced by the external environment. Expe-

riences during the Cold War not only rationalised the tangible security threatperceived by ailand towards its neighbours but also deepened the sense of

Bangkoks regional centrality. ailands role as an American ally and a regional

frontline state against communism during this period mirrored its struggle

for influence over mainland Southeast Asia. e perception of ailand as

a centre of Southeast Asia was also reaffirmed by ailands major securitypatron, the United States. Edwin F. Stanton, former US Ambassador to ai-

land, expressed American concern regarding ailands security threat in the

aftermath of the Geneva Conference of . He stated that Because of hergeographical and strategic location, ailand is the heart and citadel of theregion19 and should thus be preserved from being overtaken by neighbouring

communist countries. He further proposed that the US government should

provide assistance to maintain ailands participation in the free world, and

should base its defensive system for Southeast Asia in ailand. He said, If

ailands freedom and independence can be preserved, the heart and muchof the body of Southeast Asia will have been saved.20 erefore, it can be seen

16) Warunee Osatharom, ai school textbooks and Southeast Asia our neighbor: areflection of hidden agenda of ai nationalism, in Kanchanee Laongsri (ed.) Laos andailand: What Do We Learn? (Bangkok: Alpha Publishing, ), in ai.17) ongchai Winichakul, Nationalism and the radical intelligensia in ailand, irdWorld Quarterly, Vol. , No. (), pp. ; see p. .18) Tobias Nischalke, Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and the ideaof regional community, e Pacific Review, Vol. , No. (), pp. .19) Edwin F. Stanton, Spotlight on ailand, Foreign Affairs, Vol. , No. (), pp.

; see p. .20) Stanton, Spotlight on ailand, p. .


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that US military assistance during the Cold War and its political support21were

partly due to its perception that ailand was the critical fortress for the free

world in this region.e creation of ASEAN can also be seen as part of US support for ailands

role in the region. Despite the conventional belief that ASEAN was created

by like-minded Southeast Asian nations, a US archival document reveals the

possibility that ASEAN may in fact have been an American idea but withoutthe overt involvement of the US. A memoir from Dean Rusk to President

Johnson on May mentions that US objectives were to foster Asian

regional co-operation with ailand playing a leading role.22 It suggests that

the US perceived ailand as a key actor and wanted to support its role in this

regional arrangement.e Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in also sensitised ailand

to an historical enemy that had always challenged Bangkoks sphere of influ-

ence.23e ai elite felt threatened by rising Vietnamese influence, and thus

designated ailands role as one of defence against Hanoi, as it had done

before. ailands calls for support from the great powers and the internationalcommunity in this episode placed Bangkok under the world political spotlight

in the Cambodia conflict. ailand played a central role in brokering a series

of peace talks as well as shaping an environment and policy to end the con-flict. e conclusion of the Cold War and the resolution of the Cambodianissue both elevated the esteem of ai policy-makers relative to their countrys

centrality in the region.

ese historical experiences not only helped to develop the idea of ailand

as a leading player in mainland Southeast Asia, but also invariably encour-

aged the ais to cultivate a negative image of other nations, particularly theirneighbours. ailands neighbouring countries and their peoples are generally

portrayed as uncivilised, subordinate, treacherous or untrustworthy. ais thus

21) Natthaphon Jaijing, Monarchy under the eagles shadow: American psychological strat-egy and the strengthening of the monarchy as the national symbol, Fa Diao Kan, Vol. ,No. (), pp. , (in ai); Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policyand ailand Military Rule (Bangkok: Duang Kamol, ), in ai.22) Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead, ai Politics During Saritanom Regimes under GlobalPower Structure(Bangkok: Years Foundation, Bank of ailand, ), p. , in ai.23) Ralf Emmers, Security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: evolution of concepts and prac-tices, in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds) Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: NationalInterests and Regional Order (Armonk: East Gate, ); N. Ganesan, ailands relations

with Malaysia and Myanmar in post-Cold War Southeast Asia, Japanese Journal of PoliticalScience, Vol. , No. (), pp. .


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tend not to view themselves in close association with their immediate neigh-

bouring countries despite their sharing of cultural, historical, linguistic, reli-

gious and ethnic roots. e nation-building and socialisation processes haveresulted in the formation of a self and other dichotomy in which the self is

superior and the others are inferior. In other words, ai self-perception was

formed around the core idea of ailands higher status, and from this came

its role, as deemed by its policy elites, as a regional leader. is self-perceptionalso interacted with the structural environment in the Cold War time frame,

resulting in ailand defining its national interest as protection of its security

from communist neighbours. Policies grounded in distrust therefore domi-

nated ailands foreign policy behaviour throughout the post-war era.

.. Globalisation and ailands (Re)Emerging Regional Aspirations

e decline of political contestation and the rise of economic globalisation at

the end of the Cold War involved both material and ideational changes in ai-

land. As stipulated by ideational theories, agents and structure are mutuallyconstituted,24 and the decline of Cold War tensions and the internationalisa-

tion of the ai economy certainly had an impact on the adjustment of ai

policy-makers cognitive aspects, and hence on its foreign policy behaviour.e ai economy was further transformed, particularly after the Plaza Accordin when the rise in the Japanese yen forced a new round of Japanese

investment in Southeast Asia, including in other East Asian newly industrialis-

ing economies (NIEs) at a later stage, to escape the increasing cost of produc-

tion.25 ailands economic structure and policy changed from import substi-

tution to export orientation focusing on low-end and low-value-added elec-tronic industries, textile and other consumer products.26

24) Chris Reus-Smit, Constructivism, in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Deve-tak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, Chris Reus-Smit and Jacqui True (eds)eories of International Relations, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, ).25) Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill, New Hierarchies in East Asia: e Post-PlazaDivision of Labour (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian NationalUniversity, ); Christopher M. Dent, e Foreign Economic Policies of Singapore, SouthKorea and Taiwan (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, ); John Ravenhill, Japanese and USsubsidiaries in East Asia: host economy effects, in G.H. Marcus and M.J. Marcus (eds)e MIT Japan Program: Science, Technology, Management (Cambridge, MA: Center forInternational Studies, MIT, ).26) Pasuk Phongpaichit, e New Wave of Japanese Investment in ASEAN: Determinants andProspect (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ).


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Not only did the internationalisation of the ai economy shift ailands

production structure into an export-led economy, it also facilitated change

in the political structure. A more globalised ai economy brought aboutthe expansion of the capitalists and the middle class. is socio-economic

change also meant that the political landscape was more open to their direct

involvement in politics, a change which eventually resulted in the decline of

the political system led by the military and the reintroduction of a civilianregime a long decade after the short-lived civilian government of .

e Chatichai government was a turning point in ailands political economy,

with the government enjoying civilian rules with support from businessmen.

As Anek Laothamatas argues, the increasing role of capitalists transformed ai

politics from bureaucratic polity to liberal corporatism.27 In this type of state,international competitiveness replaced security dilemmas and became another

important raison d tatindicating the ai states interest, policy and strategies,

including the ideas of competition, co-option and co-operation.

However, within this environment the core of ailands self-perception as a

leading actor in the region stayed firm. Since ailands economic and indus-trial policy had already been transformed to accommodate the competitive

mentality of the globalised world economy, the final vanguard of the Cold

War was found in security and foreign policy. erefore, it was not surprisingto see Chatichais attempt to change the countrys policy towards its neighboursby announcing the turning the battlefields into marketplaces policy. is was

to open more economic opportunities for the emerging ai economy.

ailands self-perception started to develop into a more co-operative mode,

while its core element relating to its self-appointed sense of superiority

remained intact. In other words, the Cold War antagonistic perception towardsneighbouring countries gradually became outmoded in the post-Cold War era.

Yet the view of ailand as a leading nation in Southeast Asia remained an

important operational idea among ai policy-makers. eir identity was stillcentred on the idea of ailands leading position in the region, but it was

linked more closely to a co-operative approach than to the power competitionof the Cold War. is resulted in ailand seeking to exercise its regional lead-

ing roleits so-called regional aspirations. is characteristic has arguably

been sustained throughout the post-Cold War period as an important element

in ailands foreign policy.

27) Anek Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy of ailand: FromBureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism (Boulder: Westview Press, ).


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Interestingly, parallel to the embracing of globalised economy, various sec-

tors in ailand began to search for the authenticity of ai cultures by looking

outside ailand. In the late s, ai academics, pioneered by ChatthipNatsupha, regained their interest in the trans-historical elements of authen-

tic ai cultures among other ethnic Tai/ai in Laos, Myanmars Shan state,

southern China, parts of Indias Assam state and western Vietnam.28 A large

number of academics, businessmen and state officials travelled to these areasand made proposals to link the Tai/ai brotherhood within ailands orbit

through various programmes including the promotion of tourism, transport

and economic projects.29 For example, the governor of Chiangrai Province,

accompanied by local businessmen, made a series of visits to these areas in

to promote trade links with ailands northern provinces under the FiveChiangs strategy encompassing Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Chiangtung, Chian-

grung and Chiangthong.30 is idea was later incorporated into and promoted

under the Quadrangle Growth initiative in . At the same time, the promi-

nent ai scholar Chai-anan Samudavanija, among others, also lent his support

to the development of this sub-region. He argues that this idea reinvigoratedold trade routes in this sub-region, which had been constrained by the Cold

War conflict.31 Reynolds contends that these attempts gave a meaning to ai

national identity itself. e underlying idea is similar to the pan-ai state con-cept, emphasising the dominant role of the ai race in mainland SoutheastAsia as advocated by the nationalist elite in the s.32

.. ailands Regional Aspirations and Its Foreign Policy Behaviour

To put ailands post-Cold War foreign policy into the aforementioned con-text, it can be seen that it was largely occupied with regional agendas after the

Chatichai administration (). Chatichais foreign policy of turning

28) ongchai Winichakul, Nationalism and the radical intelligensia in ailand.29) Craig J. Reynolds, Globalization and nationalism in modern ailand, in Joel S. Kahn(ed.) Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Representation in Indonesia, Malay-sia, Singapore, and ailand (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ).30) Chiangtung, Chiangrung and Chiangthong are names used by ai people in ailandfor Kentung, Jinghong and Luang Prabang, respectively. See also Arun Narongchai, Howdid the five angle strategy come about? Public Relations Office Region , Chiangmai, inai, available at: http://www.prdnorth.in.th/article/a.htm.31) Chai-anan Samudavanija, Bypassing the state in Asia, New Perspectives Quarterly,

Vol. , No. (), pp. .32) Reynolds, Globalization and nationalism.


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battlefields into marketplaces was partly intended to stimulate economic activ-

ity by bridging economic opportunities between ailand and Indochinese

states through border trade. is strategy was later supported by the expansionof transport infrastructure that linked inner regions to seaports on the east coast

of ailand.33 is significantly impacted not only economic development but

also security and politics in Southeast Asia. ailand was playing a leading role

in paving the way towards peace and development in the region, with histor-ical foes becoming friends. e rapprochement with Hanoi may have been

an impossible achievement under previous governments because Vietnam was

regarded as the foremost threat to ailands security. is policy also left its

legacy in ASEANs practice of constructive engagement with authoritarian

neighbours.Chatichais successors continued foreign policy objectives in a similar vein

by searching for ways in which ailand would become a key regional player

in constructing developmental regionalism. e Anand government (

) successfully pushed the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) forward in

. It was also Anand who formalised and advocated Chatichais idea ofconstructive engagement as a major guideline for ailands policy towards

its neighbours, with a particular focus on Myanmar.34 is policy also had

regional repercussions, as it became a common regional practice with a broadreference to a general principle of non-interference in ASEAN members inter-nal affairs. During the Chuan government () the promotion of

sub-regional economic co-operation was one of its major foreign policies. e

Quadrangle Economic Co-operation initiative was proposed to co-ordinate

development projectsmainly with respect to transport linksamong ai-

land, China, Myanmar and Laos, and placed ailand at the centre of theproject.35 e Chavalit government () attempted to assert ai-

lands role as an epicentre of mainland Southeast Asia through its Indochina

33) Chuan Leekpai, Policy statement of the Council of Ministers of Prime Minister ChuanLeekpai delivered to Parliament on Wednesday, October , National Assembly Report,/ (Bangkok: e Secretariat of the House of Representatives, ), in ai.34) Pavin Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation (Lanham: University Press of America,).35) E.C. Chapman and Peter Hinton, e emerging Mekong Corridor: a note on recentdevelopment (to May ), aiYunnan Project Newsletter, Vol. (June ), availableat: http://www.nectec.or.th/thai-yunnan/.html; Kusuma Snitwongse, ai foreign policy

in the global age: principle or profit? Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. , No. (),pp. .


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policy. Chavalits foreign policy highlight revolved around the exercise of ai-

lands influence over ASEANs admission of Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos,

including ASEANs economic programmes aiming at expanding transportlinks between countries in Indochina and the other ASEAN countries, for

which ailand was a major hub.36 Chavalit also wanted to link South and

Southeast Asia under his Look West policy, facilitated by a new forum of

the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC).37 It can be seen that ai foreign policy from Chatichai

until before the Financial Crisis focused on nominating ailand as a

centre of regional dynamics. ailand envisioned its leadership as being recog-

nised, and therefore invested extensively in its regional policy throughout this

time. Former Ambassador Kasit Piromya also confirmed this vision that aileaders from Prem, Chatichai and Anand onwards shared a similar vision of

ailands regional leading role in the early post-Cold War period.38

e Asian Financial Crisis, which hit ailand in , was a sign of

ailand losing its competitiveness, and hence seriously affected its confidence

to continue in the leading role. Although ai foreign policy during thistime was understandably framed within its relations with external powers and

financial institutionsnotably the US, the European Union, Japan, the IMF,

the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)

39

its aspirationsfor regional leadership did not totally disappear.ailands proposal of Flexible Engagement during the second Chuan

government tried both to preserve its material interest and to manoeuvre

foreign policy to emphasise ailands identity as a regional leading player.

e proposed initiative was to radically adjust ASEAN members traditional

non-interference in each others domestic affairs by allowing frank discussions

36)

John Funston, ai foreign policy: seeking influence, Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ).37) BIMSTEC website, available at: http://www.bimstec.org/.38) Interview, December . Kasit Piromya was ailands retired senior diplomat. He

was later appointed Foreign Minister in the Abhisit government between December and July .39) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, e preliminary assessment and observation on ideas andposition towards ailands Flexible Engagement after the ASEAN Ministerial Meetingin Manila, July , No. Athen Embassy /, (Bangkok: Archives and LibraryDivision, ), in ai; Prapat epchatree, Vision in ai foreign policy in the newmillennium, in Corrine Phuangkasem et al. (eds) Collection of Articles and Speeches on ai

Foreign Affairs from the Past to the Present (Bangkok: ammasat University Press, ), inai.


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on domestic issues which would have implications for other members and the

group. It was rejected by most ASEAN members, which had previously been

anticipated by ai foreign policy-makers, according to the interviews withformer Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan,40 former Ambassador Kasit Piromya41

and former Ambassador Surapong Jayanama.42e rejection had a positive

effect on ailands leading status in the group. In Surapongs words, ailand

wanted to play a leading role in Southeast Asia. We had the potential to do so.It was the politics of identity-making and we needed to show clearly that we

could lead on democracy and human rights issues.

e foreign policy of the succeeding aksin government () like-

wise clearly demonstrated a further attempt to illuminate ailands role in

the region and the world. aksins Forward Engagement initiative revolvedaround new regional initiativesthe Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Eco-

nomic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS) and the Asia Co-operation Dialogue

(ACD), complemented by bilateral economic co-operation.43 It was bold,

assertive, unconventional and controversial, and departed from business-as-

usual. It sought to utilise ailands geopolitical leverage to strengthen exist-ing international co-operation while further engaging new partners on an

equal basis.44 us, this proactive foreign policy certainly afforded ailand

the opportunity to enhance its leading role, albeit with varying degrees of suc-cess.At this point, it can be conceptualised that ailands foreign policy dur-

ing this period has developed into three major characteristics. First, foreign

policy has become an integral part of the effort to advance ailands compet-

itiveness in the international economy. To achieve this goal ailand needs to

secure and search for comparative advantage. Second, ai policy elites thus

40) Interview, January .41) Interview, December .42) Interview, January .43) Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmesh-ment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order, IDSS Working Paper Series (Singapore: Instituteof Defence and Strategic Studies, ); itinan Pongsudhirak, ailands foreign policyunder the aksin Government, EurAsia Bulletin, Vol. (JulyAugust ), pp. .44) Surakiart Sathirathai, ailand: the path forward, Asia Society, available at: http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/sathirathainy.html; aksin Shinawatra, Forward Engage-ment: the new era of ailands foreign policy, inaugural lecture at the Saranrom Insti-

tute of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, March , available at: http://www.thaiembdc.org/pressctr/statemnt/pm/sifa.html.


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view mainland Southeast Asia as ailands pivotal sphere of influence and are

willing to exercise ailands leading role in this area. is can be symbolised

by the visit of the King of ailand to Laos in , his first overseas tripin years. It indicates Bangkoks serious attempt to weave the Mekong sub-

region into its sphere of influence through boosting these linkages and close

contacts. e success of this campaign further ensured that ailand would be

able to regulate economic activities and become the centre of gravity in main-land Southeast Asias overall economic development efforts. ird, however,

ailands relatively limited structural power requires it to utilise multilateral

approaches to regional co-operation. Depending on circumstances, ailand

regards its role in regional co-operation primarily as a bridge, a facilitator or

a co-ordinator in broader regional co-operation. is feature in ai foreignpolicy can be seen throughout the post-Cold War era under different govern-

ments and their regional implications. e next section will use an empirical

case study of the Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) initiative under

the Chuan government in order to illuminate the role of ailands regional

aspirations in foreign decision-making.

. e Quadrangle Economic Co-operation (QEC) Initiative: Crystallising

ailands Regional Aspirations

e QEC initiative is particularly interesting in its own right for several rea-

sons. First, this initiative was ailands earliest attempt to rearrange the

regional setting in mainland Southeast Asia based on a multilateral approach

after the Cold War. Prior to this initiative, its strategy was based on normal-

ising bilateral relations inherited from Chatichais policy of turning the bat-tlefields into marketplaces. e QEC was thus ailands attempt to enfold

the socialist countries into a market-led system and to prepare them to engage

in wider regional order. Second, this initiative did not offer self-evident ben-efits for ailand in material terms relative to the potential costs in the eco-

nomic, political or security sectors. e fact that ailand proposed this initia-tive and determinedly sustained it regardless of its ambiguous potential for

success leaves space for observing the role of identity in its policy-making.

ird, this initiative was also one of the earliest multilateral forums in mainland

Southeast Asia in which China participated. It offers another lens in under-

standing the dynamics of the interplay between Beijing and other regionalactors.


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.. e Background of the QEC in Brief

Parallel to the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) project under the AsianDevelopment Bank, the QEC initiative was one of the first regional initiatives

proposed by ailand in the early post-Cold War period and comprised China,

Laos, Myanmar and ailand. ere is a misunderstanding that the QEC

initiative was a brainchild of the ADB; it was actually proposed by ailand. 45

e ADB was involved at the beginning as ailand requested its assistance

in feasibility studies, but its priority at that time was limited to the East-West

Corridor development. us, regardless of the ADBs presence, ailand was

still a major player in the initiative until it lost interest and the ability to

maintain this project through the Asian Economic Crisis, which started inailand in and later spread to other Asian economies such as South

Korea and Indonesia.

An inadequate regional infrastructure, especially in Laos and Myanmar and

to a certain extent in Yunnan Province, was seen by the participating countries

in the QEC, and by the ADB, as the major obstacle to expanding economic co-operation in this sub-region. erefore, the major projects under this initiative

focused on linking four countries through two major highways (RA and

RB). e discrepancy in financial capacity of each country made tangibleprogress dependent on the intensity of each countrys policy commitment. Laosand Myanmar felt that the QEC mainly benefited China and ailand,46 and

they could not finance the proposed projects unilaterally. erefore, most of the

funding and progress was driven by other actors. For instance, it was reported

that the completion of km of Route RA in Laos could not be achieved

without the financial assistance of the ADB, China and ailand. ailandalso contributed directly to the progress of the QEC, especially during its early

development. ailand offered to connect its roads to Laos by building km

of each, while persuading the ADB to give a soft loan to the Laos governmentto construct the remaining km.47 ailand approved a loan of US

45) United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Economiccooperation and regional integration in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) (),available at: http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/swp.pdf.46) IMF in the midst of Asian nationalism, Manager ( May ), in ai Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Projects for the Quadrangle Growth Promotion, No. I (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, ), in ai.47) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegram: the role of Yunnan Province in ASEAN-China

framework, No. KMG /, December (Bangkok: Archives and LibraryDivision, ), in ai.


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million to Myanmar in to improve a km road from Tachilek to

Kengtung, which was part of Route RB.48

Other projects were also discussed during the implementation of the initia-tive. Expanding trade and investment opportunities within the QEC countries

were to be achieved by proper adjustments in trade and investment regula-

tions. ailand addressed the need for better currency-clearing arrangements

and a reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Moreover, issues of legal frame-works to facilitate the movement of people were also raised, especially in cus-

toms, immigration and travel procedures. Tourism was viewed as having much

potential for co-operation and as being more convenient to implement. e

meeting in agreed to facilitate this activity by exploring ways to simplify

travel formalities such as visa and customs procedures, promotion of invest-ment in service sectors and facilities, and expansion and improvement of air

transport services.49 In connection with this, ailand hosted a meeting dur-

ing August in Chiangrai on tourism co-operation among the four

countries. Later that year, a friendship caravan, travelling from ailand to

Myanmar and Yunnan during December , was sponsored by ai-lands Tourism Authority and the Chiangmai Tourism Business Association.

e tour involved representatives of leading ai travel agencies and aimed

to promote potential tourist sites and routes between ailand and Myan-mar and Yunnan Province.50Air transport links also constituted an importantpart of the tourism venture. ere were discussions about improving poten-

tial airports in the sub-region to facilitate an increase of flights and tourists. In

August , Bangkok Airways started its service from Chiang Mai to Man-

dalay. In addition, ailand also requested China to allow more flights between

Bangkok and Kunming, with an increase from five times a week to one a day.51

48) Chiangrai Province, Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. I

, April (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, MFA, ), in ai.49) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agreed minutes of the Quadripartite Meeting on Subre-gional Transportation Linkages, Bangkok, ailand, May , No. / (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, ), in ai; Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Draft concept paper of Quadrangle Economic Cooperation (ChinaLaosMyanmarailand), No. I (Bangkok: Archives and LibraryDivision, ), in ai.50) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Quadrangle economic growth amongst MyanmarLaosailandChina (Southern), No. / (Bangkok: Archives andLibrary Division, ), in ai.51) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Quadripartite meeting (ChinaMyanmarLaosailand)on tourism co-operation, No. /, Ausgust (Bangkok: Archives and LibraryDivision, ), in ai.


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ailand also proposed helping Laos improve its regional airport in Luang

Prabang. e first phase of this project was completed in January but the

second phase was postponed owing to ailands economic slowdown duringthe Asian Financial Crisis.52

As China was another key actor in this co-operation, its commitment to

fulfilling the initiatives goal was also critical to its progress. However, the

initiative was limited mainly to the interests of Yunnan Province. A aiofficial complaint pointed out that Beijing focused more on expanding trade

opportunities with its major Western trading partners than with its small

neighbours in the south.53 e route through ailand was not Chinas only

option for reaching the sea: routes through Myanmar and Vietnam would serve

the same purpose. erefore, QEC projects sometimes lacked strong supportfrom Beijing while other projects were given more urgent attention, such as the

western Kunming-Bhamo road, completed in , rather than the southern

R route (Jinghong-Boten).54

.. Costs or Benefits?

ailand justified the QEC mainly on the rationale that growth areas are

designed to exploit the existing natural cross-border economies and socio-political links, with the intention of extending the range and scope of activ-ities.55 With ailands advantages in skilled labour, entrepreneurs, infras-

tructure and regulatory settings, and its strategic location in the heart of

mainland Southeast Asia, ai policy-makers anticipated that ailand would

reap substantial gains. Its disadvantages in terms of the shortage of natu-

52) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, e visit to Laos PDR of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

No. /, June (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, ), in ai.53) IMF in the midst of Asian nationalism.54) Asian Development Bank, Greater Mekong Subregion, available at: http://www.adb.org/GMS/default.asp; Ministry of Commerce, Peoples Republic of China, Xishuang-bannas investment environment, available at: http://xsbn.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gzdy//.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegram; Wang Shilu et al.,GMS economic corridor construction in Yunnan: progress, problems and policy implica-tions, Mekong Institute Research Working Paper No. / (Khon Khaen: Mekong Insti-tutte, ); United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,China: project profile of priority projects along the Asian Highway, Transportation Divi-sion, available at: http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/common/TIS/AH/files/profiles/china.pdf.55) Pushpa ambipillai, e ASEAN growth areas: sustaining the dynamism, e PacificReview, Vol. , No. (), pp. ; see p. .


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ral resources and expensive labour would be complemented by its rich well-

resourced neighbours. e result was expected to be a win-win situation for

all parties. Although there were concerns regarding this co-operation, ai-land still pursued it actively. e question arises as to whether economic and

other benefits were so great that they led ailand to assume a leading role for

almost a decade. If not, what can help explain ailands willingness to sustain

the co-operation?Road network expansion within the sub-region was expected to increase

trade opportunities for ai exporters, especially in the Chinese market. How-

ever, the Chinese market was fragmented and infrastructure in Yunnan

Province was not fully developed at that time, resulting in the likelihood of

increased price per unit in shipping. Moreover, Yunnan Province was one ofthe poorest regions in China, with per capita GDP less than US, in

;56 thus, it was possible that its purchasing power would not be able to

absorb ai exports in the medium term.57Although it was expected that this

problem would be resolved when the Chinese economy became more mature,

this was a long-term forecast and full of uncertainties.Instead of increasing the flows of ai products to other countries in the

sub-region, the removal of natural trade barriers allowed cheaper Chinese

products to penetrate markets not only in ailand but also in Laos, Myanmarand Cambodia, where ai products had already dominated.58 ailand wascompeting with China as another significant trading partner, especially in

the consumer goods area.59 At the same time, cheap agricultural products

from China, Myanmar and Laos such as onions, garlic, soybean, corn, rice,

vegetables and livestock also competed with the ai farming sector, especially

in the north where farmers produce similar crops.60 More convenient water

56) Chi Hung Kwan, Regional Disparities Have Gone Beyond Acceptable Limitse Path toan All-round Well-off Society Remains Distant, China in Transition Series (Tokyo: ResearchInstitute of Economy, Trade and Industry, ).57) Somkiat Osotsapa, Economic Route Linkage between ailand and Southern China, Dis-cussion Paper No. (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, ), in ai.58) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Considerations for providing assitance to Myanmar forthe improvement of Tachilek-Kentung road, No. /, May (Bangkok:

Archives and Library Division, ), in ai.59) Poon Kim Shee, e political economy of China-Myanmar relations: strategic andeconomic dimensions, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, Vol. (),

pp. .60) Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), Strategic


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transport along the Mekong River brought a similarly negative result in terms

of the influx of cheap Chinese products to southern neighbours. Moreover, the

promotion of tourism through the Mekong River would end up as a one-waymovement from ailand to China, since the costs were still high. At the same

time, the Chinese were able to control navigation on the Mekong River as

they had been active in surveying and developing river navigation knowledge

and expertise for quite some time.61 Overall Sino-ai trade trends revealedthat ailand suffered an overall trade deficit with China. is remained

unchanged even after the implementation of the Sino-ai free trade agree-

ment in .62

Other social and security problems were also of concern to the ai author-

ities, especially trans-boundary issues. Adisak Tanyakul, Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council, expressed ailands concerns on

opening borders under this initiative, especially regarding Chinas power expan-

sion and its competition with other regional powers, lifestyle changes among

people in the Mekong Basin, and opening a connection between possible

transnational crimes in China and Southeast Asia.63 e development of trans-port and increasing economic activities could also increase political competi-

tion among regional powers, especially between China and the US. Chinese

influence in the sub-region had already raised security concerns in smallercountries. Myanmar was also worried about increasing American politicalinterference because of open borders and foreign direct investment. erefore,

Myanmar did not want to see rapid progress of the initiative.64 In fact, the

transport link between ailand and Myanmar intensified security concerns

among ai security agencies. ailand had to directly confront Myanmars

central authority on their common border as well as indirectly facing Chineseinfluence in adjacent areas without obvious buffer zones.

Plan for Economic Co-operation in the Mekong Sub-region: e Final Report (Bangkok:NESDB and TIS Consultants, ), in ai; Somkiat Osotsapa, Economic Route Link-age.61) Evelyn Goh, Developing the Mekong: Regionalism and Regional Security in ChinaSoutheast. Asian Relations, Adelphi Papers (London: Routledge, ).62) Bencha Silarak, Ginggorn Narithonkun and Nantha Sithiratch, Sino-ai trade: whoharvests the benefits?, FTA Watch Group, in ai, available at: http://www.ftawatch.org/autopage/show_page.php?t=&s_id=&d_id=.63) Interview, January .64) Myanmar ignores the Golden Quadrangle due to worries of US intereference in thecountry, Krungthep urakit ( May ) in ai.


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Convenient transport facilitated flows of people from the sub-region into

ailand, and this also produced some negative consequences. Despite bene-

fiting certain sectors, the influx of foreign migrants exacerbated other socio-security problems, such as drug-smuggling, prostitution and trans-border dis-

eases. Costs accruing from the labour movement to ailand were incurred

in areas of law enforcement and health services, as ailand needed to allo-

cate its financial resources and security and health personnel to manage thesemigrant movements. e estimated number of foreign workers emigrating

mostly from ailands neighbours, particularly Myanmar, into ailand in

was approximately one million people.65 It rose to around three million

in , of which about two-thirds stayed illegally.66

Ultimately, trade and economic development in the region was likely toaffect environmental and human security in the lower Mekong countries,

especially through Chinas hydropower plans as well as through other projects

in the downstream states. ese projects would affect the food chain of per

cent of those living in the lower basin, as the lower level of downstream water

would deplete fish supplies, biodiversity and soil fertility and would generatetoxic waste. is would result in a weakened irrigation system and lowered

agricultural production as well as exacerbated poverty and reduced nutrition

quality for over million people.

67

Furthermore, it could lead to changingpatterns of river flow and affect natural border demarcation, especially betweenLaos and ailand, a concern expressed by the ai military.68 erefore,

future border disputes could erupt between the two neighbours should the

river change its course, suffer bank erosion or incur blurring thalweg.69

is alarming perception of Chinese influence appeared in a confidential

policy document circulating in within the ai Ministry of ForeignAffairs (MFA).70 e paper reflects on China more pessimistically than was

65) Somkiat Osotsapa, Economic Route Linkage.66) Pramote Prasartkul and Patama Vapattanawong, Transitional point of the ai popu-lation, in IPSR Annual Conference(Bangkok: Institute for Population and Social Research,Mahidol University, ).67) Goh, Developing the Mekong; Lawrence E. Grinter, China, the United States, and main-land Southeast Asia: opportunism and the limits of power, Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol. , No. (), pp. ; Jeffrey W. Jacobs, e Mekong River Commission:transboundary water resources planning and regional security, e Geographical Journal,Vol. , No. (), pp. ; Somkiat Osotsapa, Economic Route Linkage.68) Goh, Developing the Mekong.69) alweg is the line defining the lowest points along the length of a river bed or valley.70) Division of Political Affairs, Recommendations for proactive policy direction toward


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publicly known. It states that Chinas intention was to secure its own eco-

nomic interests and to build a Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia so

as to deter other major powers direct influence in the region. is southward-looking approach would affect the significance of ailands role in mainland

Southeast Asia. In the long run, competition, especially in economic growth

areas, might undermine the ai-Sino relationship. China was perceived as

a security threat to ailand as it could manipulate ai policy-makers andbusiness in favour of its own interests. Chinese diplomats and officials had

established close and solid contacts with high-ranking ai officials and over-

seas Chinese associations, resulting in a sympathetic attitude towards China

among ais. e document recommends that, although ailand inevitably

needs to maintain close ties with Beijing, it should also use this relationship tolimit negative implications.

.. ailands Self-perception and the Sustainability of the QEC

ailands decision to pursue and sustain this initiative gives rise to severalquestions regarding the survival of the project, particularly as explained by

realist and institutionalist approaches. First, the increasingly direct influence

of China in mainland Southeast Asia definitely challenged the sub-regionstraditional power structure, which was dominated by ailand and Vietnam.ailand could have chosen to limit co-operation with China, through which

the latter would have gained relative economic and political advantages. is

security awareness would have resulted in a less co-operative environment.

However, the opposite policy option was chosen: instead, ailand tried to

engage China in this co-operation.In fact, co-operation with China was chosen as a means to maximise eco-

nomic benefits from a big market or bandwagoning for profit.71 Still, co-

operation would have lasted until ailand thought Chinese gain had exceededan acceptable level. Such a break-off situation could result from Chinas con-

struction of dams while ignoring the concerns of the lower Mekong coun-tries over water supply, environmental impacts and boundaries, which would

directly threaten ailands economic and border security, hence impeding

China, No. /, March (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, MFA,), in ai. Declassified by the authors request in .71) Ann Marie Murphy, Beyond balancing and bandwagoning: ailands response toChinas rise, Asian Security, Vol. , No. (), pp. .


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further co-operation. However, the slow progress of the QEC resulted not

from political tension between China and ailand but from other technical

problems.Moreover, the different positions between Beijing and other lower ripar-

ian states in dam-construction projects could have brought ailand to sup-

port the downstream nations against Chinas actions. In fact, this did not

aggravate tensions between the two countries. In contrast, ailand tried topersuade China to co-operate further within the Mekong River Commission

(MRC).72 ailand was finally able to persuade China to reach a multilateral

agreement among four countries over river navigation, despite Chinas initial

reluctance and preference to pursue bilateral agreements with individual coun-

tries. In April the Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang-Mekong River was signed by four countries. us it can be seen that although

ailand and China were taking different positions on this issue, ailand was

able to persuade China to reach agreement.

Facing the possibility of Chinas increasing influence in this geographical

area, ailand could have pursued a balancing strategy by seeking closer co-operation with external powers at the same time. However, it is not clear that

ailand acted this way, or that any other players were active enough under the

QEC to balance Chinas influence. e ADB and perhaps Japan, includingthe MRC, ASEAN and other individual Southeast Asian countries, may beseen as constraining forces to Chinas ultimate objectives. However, they never

really challenged China to the point where Beijing needed to reconsider its

position, for example on its Lancang-Mekong development projects. However,

China was finally able to secure financial approval from the ADB without

Japan, as the major donor in the ADB, voting against it. is accommodatingapproach taken by regional stakeholders towards China suggests that the logic

of geopolitical competition cannot fully explain the intention of this initiative.

e creation of a regional institution as a set of rules or a regime may increaselevels of certainty, trust and economic interdependence:73 it is not certain that

the QEC can play such a role. is sub-regional scheme included a series ofmeetings and had no real guidelines for participating countries. It is difficult to

72) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, e development of water transport in Mekong Riveramongst four countries (ChinaMyanmarLaosailand), No. /, August (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, ), in ai.73) Robert Jackson and Georg Srensen, Introduction to International Relations: eories and

Approaches(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ); James N. Rosenau, e Scientific Studyof Foreign Policy(New York: Nicholus, ).


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conclude that institutionalisation of this co-operation was a primary objective

of its members. erefore, this case may not fully illustrate that institutions

have an independent impact on strategies and outcomes74 as the main actorsand actions in the QEC initiative were still state-centric.

e issue of cost-sharing to sustain the co-operation was also a puzzle. A

state turns to collective action only to compensate for imperfection or when it

cannot pursue policy objectives unilaterally or bilaterally. Yet collective actionshould not eventually impose greater cost on states, otherwise the arrangement

should cease.75 is was the clearest rationale for ailand to initially seek sub-

regional co-ordination inclusive of China. As a regional power, China would

have been expected to play an active role and be willing to bear a greater cost

of the co-operation considering its foreign policy of maintaining good neigh-bourliness with the surrounding states in Southeast Asia. However, in this case

ailand did not contribute less financial assistance than China. ailand and

China offered roughly equal financial assistance to Laos for building roads

and bridges to complete the R routes. ailand also extended unilateral assis-

tance to Myanmar to complete the project, considering the latters difficultyin accessing financial support from the international community owing to the

state of its human rights record.

Regarding concerns about a Chinese threat, these have not waned in South-east Asia in the post-Cold War period although various co-operative projectshave been initiated. e QEC can be a means by which ailand and other

small states employ constraints and engagement with China, hence cultivat-

ing economic interconnectedness, regional norms and institutionalisation.76

However, the basic question of why ailand wanted to play this role is still a

legitimate issue. Considering its weaker power vis--vis China, a more rationaloption for ailand would have been to invite more members into this initia-

tive, especially from ASEAN and external donors, or to give way to a bigger

project from the beginning. On the contrary, ailands attempt to promoteco-operation within limited membership in mainland Southeast Asia, instead

of within the GMS project, still leaves some room for questions.

74) Robert O. Keohane, Institutional theory in international relations, in Michael Brecherand Frank P. Harvey (eds) Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, ), p. .75) John G. Ruggie, Constructing World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization

(London: Routledge, ).76) Goh, Developing the Mekong.


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erefore, politico-strategic motives may not fully explain why ailand

assumed an active role in the QEC or why this role was so persistent when

material and strategic interests were reduced or worked against ailands inter-est. By incorporating ailands self-perception as a leading actor in mainland

Southeast Asia, a clearer picture can be obtained of how ailand sees its role

in the international arena, and hence its policy options and preferences.

e promotion of Quadrangle Growth was ailands national agenda.Its leadership in the QEC signified that ai foreign policy no longer con-

formed to the conventional view of bending with the wind and that ai-

land was determined to effect change in Southeast Asias political and eco-

nomic environments despite China and other regional actors. As an emerging

regional power, China could certainly make or break the QEC initiative. How-ever, ailand did not allow its destiny to be placed in the hands of Beijing.

Although Bangkok was willing to share leadership in this initiative to some

extent, it was extremely proactive in its own right, as is seen in its investing

financial resources and co-ordinating efforts to allow and encourage its smaller

neighboursLaos and Myanmarto participate in the project.When the co-operation began in , ailand persuaded the ADB to

fund the feasibility study for the R route project, valued at US,.77

It also successfully urged the ADB to pay attention to programmes in theQEC. After the ADBs feasibility study in , ailand offered US.million assistance to Laos to appoint an engineering company to design the

road. Coupled with the ADBs financial assistance for the roads construction,

ailand proposed to finance per cent of the total cost.78 With regard

to Myanmar, the ai government also approved US million in loans

initially at per cent interest, to Myanmar for the R route. ailand laterperceived that Myanmar was increasingly cooperative and committed to this

regional development,79 and so lowered interest rates to . per cent with fewer

conditions attached.80

77) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Proposed transport network projects linking ailandIndochinaMyanmarChina (Southern), No. / (Bangkok:

Archives and Library Division, ), in ai.78) Office of the NESDB, Strategic Plan for Economic Co-operation.79) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Outcome of the rd Mekong River sub-regional economicco-operation ( countries), No. /, April (Bangkok: Archives and LibraryDivision, ), in ai.80) Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Greater Mekong

Subregional Economic Co-operation Project Amongst Countries (LaosCambodiaVietnamChinaMyanmarailand), February (Bangkok: NESDB, ), in ai.


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ailand also did not allow its role to be totally overshadowed by regional

actors or institutions. Although the ADB and ASEAN were also involved in

the initiative, they did not lead the project decisively. Even during the FinancialCrisis in , when the merging of the initiative into the GMS project seemed

to be economically rational, ailand refused to relinquish its primary role in

the QEC initiative. ai policy-makers initially rejected the idea of merging

the QEC into the GMS and persisted in maintaining this stance for quitesome time afterwards. e idea of reviving the QEC started during the second

Chuan government. In , ailands Foreign Ministry proposed realigning

the project to make it more efficient and to separate it from the GMS. e MFA

believed that integrating the QEC into the GMS framework would result in

the QEC being unable to capture sufficient attention. e MFA documentindicated:

Projects under the QEC should have been pushed for progress faster than it is at thepresent stage. e main obstacle is that many programmes are increasingly dictatedby the ADB and donor countries erefore, ailand should be able to pullthem back and build a separate and clearer strategy to promote this framework byitself.81

e QEC initiative continued from its commencement in until theearly s, mainly owing to ailands ambition to maintain its role in this

sub-region. e promotion of transport linkages in this initiative became an

important instrument for ailand in persuading other participating coun-

tries that they shared a common interest in its success. Two major routes, the

RA and RB, were proposed to link the member countries, with the inten-tion of facilitating trade, investment and tourism in the sub-region. However,

considering its size and power, especially compared to China, it is interest-

ing to observe ailand as willing to lead the co-ordination and sometimes

equally sharing financial responsibility in the scheme. Apparently, limited eco-nomic benefits, competing projects of the same kind (particularly the GMSproject) and poor co-ordination between the ai public and private sectors

in realising the economic objectives of this initiative weakened ailands abil-

ity to sustain the QEC. However, most stakeholders still supported the prin-

ciple of ailands leading role in this regional project. Ultimately, the lifeof the initiative could have been shortened, and it would not have lasted

81) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adjustment of the Quadrangle Growth framework,No. /, April (Bangkok: Archives and Library Division, ), in ai.


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for almost a decade without ailands regional aspirations driving this for-

eign policy calculation. Although ailand relinquished its active role in the

QEC, such regional ambition did not disappear. Ostensibly, the very simi-lar regional interest was renewed and expanded in aksins administration

under the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy

(ACMECS). ACMECS was initiated in and continues until the present

with various active programmes.82

Conclusion

is paper has demonstrated that ailands self-perception as an important

actor in Southeast Asia produced a regional co-operative foreign policy inthe post-Cold War period. ailands identity was constructed, sustained and

adjusted through the socialisation process in ai society and in the context

of economic globalisation. It has resulted until today in ailands attempts

to establish a leading position in regional politics. In other words, a general

policy preference of shaping a co-operative environment in the region by whichailand is a key player has been institutionalised in ailands post-Cold War

foreign policy.

By adopting an ideational approach, the paper helps broaden our under-standing of ai foreign policy beyond the conventional wisdom of bam-boo diplomacy heavily based on a realist/materialist framework, under which

material interests and survival are taken a priori. It offers an alternative view

as it shows that ailands post-Cold War foreign policy can no longer be

decisively labelled reactive. ailand has aimed to change its external envi-

ronment on its own terms and its foreign policy behaviour has graduallybecome more proactive. ailand considers its leading position as a catalyst

for change in regional affairs, especially in mainland Southeast Asia, or as a

bridge between various levels of regional co-operation. e QEC was a test-ing ground for this approach. Multilateral co-operation emerged as a ai

policy preference and gained consensus within Bangkoks policy-making cir-cles.

Starting from Prime Minister Chatichais turning the battlefields into mar-

ketplaces policy, ai foreign policy has been consistent in its regional aspira-

tions. is continuity is well captured by former prime minister Anand Pan-

yarachuns remarks:

82) See projects under ACMECS: http://www.acmecs.org/.


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Our approach and style may be different but, basically, we will continue with the mainthrust of the policy of turning battlefields into marketplaces as seen in the larger

context of bringing peace and stability throughout the whole of Southeast Asia.83

rough advocating its own version of sub-regional co-operation in mainland

Southeast Asia, ailand was able to ensure that the rearrangement of the sub-

regional political economy after the Cold War would work in its favour in both

cognitive and material aspects. at is, ailands promotion of sub-regional

co-operation in mainland Southeast Asia would allow it to be a primary bene-factor from untapped resources within its neighbours. More importantly, it

resurrected and reaffirmed the ai policy elites sense of regional leadership.

ailand, a more modern or siwilai nation compared to its backward neigh-bours, once again became a centre of regional gravity that would determine the

course of regional development in the new era of the post-Cold War.

83) Anand Panyarachun, Address of the Prime Minister Mr Anand Panyarachun to the

Foreign Correspondents Club of ailand on ursday, April , ailand ForeignAffairs Newsletter, AprilMay (), in ai.

Documents

A review of Thailand's foreign policy in mainland Southeast Asia: exploring an ideational approach