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A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

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Page 1: A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions

Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice PresidentSIIT 2013

Page 2: A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

Private and Confidential2

The Research Question

• Several competition agencies have suggested intervening in the cooperative standard setting process – Stated goal is to correct the perceived problems with patent

disclosure and FRAND licensing, such as patent holdup

• Numerous proposals for changes to SSO IPR policies have been made as well– Mandating rules governing what can and cannot be done with

“standard essential patents”

• But while several good studies of current policies, little research on what SSOs have done over time to address perceived problems

Page 3: A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

Private and Confidential3

The Antitrust Debate Over Time

Page 4: A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

Private and Confidential4

Patent Ambush, 1995

Proactive

• ANSI (1967):– No standard issued without

disclosure and RAND commitment 

• ISO (1989): – Obligation among patent holders to

disclose all essential patents

• ETSI (1993):– Disclosure obligation (licensing

Undertaking)

Reactive

• IEEE (1995): – Patented technology only included

if “necessary” and RAND commitment

• TIA (2001):– Patent disclosure form

• CEN/CENELEC (2001):– Patent disclosure rules

• OASIS (2005):– Patent disclosure obligation

• VITA (2007):– Mandated patent disclosure

Page 5: A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

Private and Confidential5

Breach of FRAND – Excessive Rates, 2005

Proactive

• ANSI (1932):– Inclusion of patented technologies

“considered favorably” if the patent holder is “willing to grant such rights as will avoid monopolistic tendencies…”

• ETSI (1993) – briefly:– Mandatory royalty disclosure

(removed in 1994 policy)

Reactive

• TIA (2005): – Patent can’t be used for monopoly

• OASIS (2005): – Binding licensing commitment

• IEEE (2007): – LOA w/optional term disclosure

• VITA (2007): – Mandatory term disclosure

• ISO/IEC/ITU (2008):– Actions against non-FRAND

• CEN/CENELEC (2009):– Binding licensing commitment

Page 6: A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

Private and Confidential6

Breach of FRAND – Encumbrance, 2008

Proactive

• IEEE (2007): – Addition of a clause stating that the

transfer of essential patent rights does not affect licensing terms detailed in original LOA.

Reactive

• ETSI (2008):– Member to notify ETSI of patent

transfer and to notify transferee of FRAND obligation

• ISO/IEC/ITU (2012):– Addition of Section 1.7

“Assignment or Transfer of Patent Rights” to Annex detailing that licensing commitment are transferred along with patent rights

Page 7: A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

Private and Confidential7

Breach of FRAND – Injunctions, 2012

Proactive

• ETSI (1993) – briefly:– 1993 interim policy prohibited

injunctions as well as infringement ligation

– 1994 interim policy removed both prohibitions

Reactive

• ITU (2013?):– Announced it will release a

“compromise” during October meeting

• ETSI (2013?):– Scheduled a meeting to discuss

options in December

• Stay Tuned…

Page 8: A Review of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President SIIT 2013

Private and Confidential8

Concluding Remarks

• Ample evidence of proactive and timely responses to antitrust issues as they emerge in public debate

• Not surprising that newly emerged issues not dealt with yet– These are complex issues that will have different implications for

different SSOS

• So, no call for aggressive competition agency intervention• Safe Harbor guidelines might be helpful

– Need to recognize broad diversity in SSO needs• Industry differences, membership preferences, role and importance of IPR, etc.

all differ and all influence appropriate type/level of IPR rules