A Rapid Global Effects CapabilityAIR UNIVERSITY
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
A Rapid Global Effects Capability
Gabe S. Arrington, major, usaf
Wright Flyer Paper No. 62
Air University Press Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine
Development and Education
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Accepted by Air University Press May 2016 and published April
2019.
Disclaimer
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied
within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force, the Air Education and Training Command, the Air Univer-
sity, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public
release: distribution unlimited.
This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are available
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Foreword v
Abstract vi
Acknowledgments vii
Purpose 1
USAF Wargame Results 10
Deputy Secretary of Defense Work’s Five Points of Interest and The
Future 11
External Policy Implications of Development 15
Policy Implications Concerning Near- Peer Adversaries 20
Analysis 26
Recommendations 26
Notes 27
Abbreviations 31
Bibliography 32
2. Artist depictions of Rapid Global Effects Capability platforms
4
3. Artist depiction of Expendable Entry Capsule and its deployment
5
4. Artist Depiction of DARPA’s XS-1 7
5. Coverage Expansion from S-400 SAM and J-10 Deployment to South
China Sea Airfields 22
6. Russian Surface- to- Air Missile Coverage 23
Table
v
Foreword
It is my great pleasure to present another issue of The Wright
Flyer Papers. Through this series, Air Command and Staff College
presents a sampling of exemplary research produced by our residence
and distance-learning stu- dents. This series has long showcased
the kind of visionary thinking that drove the aspirations and
activities of the earliest aviation pioneers. This year’s selection
of essays admirably extends that tradition. As the series title
indi- cates, these papers aim to present cutting-edge, actionable
knowledge—re- search that addresses some of the most complex
security and defense chal- lenges facing us today.
Recently, The Wright Flyer Papers transitioned to an exclusively
electronic publication format. It is our hope that our migration
from print editions to an electronic-only format will fire even
greater intellectual debate among Air- men and fellow members of
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airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Wright-Flyers/.
Thank you for supporting The Wright Flyer Papers and our efforts to
dis- seminate outstanding ACSC student research for the benefit of
our Air Force and war fighters everywhere. We trust that what
follows will stimulate think- ing, invite debate, and further
encourage today’s air, space, and cyber war fighters in their
continuing search for innovative and improved ways to de- fend our
nation and way of life.
BRIAN HASTINGS Colonel, USAF Commandant
vi
Abstract
The United States is increasingly concerned with its ability to
project power and influence world events. A rapid change in various
technologies and their integration into strategies used by
adversaries of the United States compli- cates matters, leading to
nontraditional challenges. Slower growth in the world economy has
led to shrinking and static defense budgets not only for the United
States, but also for allies and adversaries as well. The change in
strategic defense spending has steered defense investments in many
areas in- cluding, but not limited to, basing, emerging
technologies, future platforms, and force structure.
Research included historical references, primary resources, and
secondary sources. Additionally, interviews, panels, wargames, and
workshops were the key methodologies for conducting research.
A Rapid Global Effects Capability will provide the Air Force with
opera- tional agility. This ability will enable the Air Force to
achieve the core missions of Multi-Domain Command and Control,
Adaptive Domain Control, Global Integrated Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Rapid Global Mo- bility, and
Global Precision Strike by 2035. The ability to rapidly deliver
global effects will have implications to both domestic and foreign
policy.
vii
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the Air University Team at Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL, for their support and mentorship during this research
effort. In particu- lar, I would like to thank Lt Gen Steven Kwast
for his mentorship and the latitude that he has given research
students in researching topics that impact Airmen across the United
States Air Force.
This research would not have been possible without the support of
the team at the Air Force Research Institute led by Lt Gen (Ret) Al
Peck. Thank you for your patience and understanding.
The LeMay Center Wargaming Institute and Air Force Research Labora-
tory are responsible for many of the wargames, workshops, and
products ref- erenced. Thank you for your leadership in this field
and willingness to reach across institutions with an eye toward the
future.
I would like to thank the fine people from the following commands
and organizations that have contributed to this research: United
States Air Forces Europe, Air Education and Training Command, Air
Mobility Command, Air Force Space Command, Air Force Global Strike
Command, the Air Warfare Center, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Los Alamos Na- tional Laboratory, and Sandia
National Laboratory. In particular, I would like to thank Maj Gen
Timothy Zadalis for his mentorship and willingness to ex- pose the
USAFE Team to emerging technology. This research would not have
been possible without the partnership of civilian industry partners
and policy experts. My true appreciation goes to the Center for New
American Security, the Heritage Foundation, the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, and SpaceWorks Enterprises.
To all that have helped in this endeavor and to the patriots who
keep the United States safe . . . Thank You!
1
Purpose The purpose of this research is to provide the Secretary of
the Air Force,
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Air University Commander, and
govern- ment policy makers with credible research regarding some of
the potential policy implications of a Rapid Global Effects
Capability.
Problem Statement The United States is increasingly concerned with
its ability to project power
and influence world events.1 A rapid change in various technologies
and their integration into strategies used by adversaries of the US
complicates matters, leading to nontraditional challenges.2 Slower
growth in the world economy has led to shrinking and static defense
budgets not only for the US, but also for allies and adversaries as
well. The change in strategic defense spending has steered defense
investments in many areas including, but not limited to, bas- ing,
emerging technologies, future platforms, and force
structure.3
Thesis Statement A Rapid Global Effects Capability will provide the
Air Force with opera-
tional agility.4 This ability will enable the Air Force to achieve
the core mis- sions of Multi- Domain Command and Control (MDC2),
Adaptive Domain Control (ADC),Global Integrated Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnais- sance (GIISR), Rapid Global Mobility
(RGM), and Global Precision Strike by 2035.5 The ability to rapidly
deliver global effects will have implications for both domestic and
foreign policy.
Setting
The political environment is calling for a change in investment
strategies as they relate to technology. Senator John McCain
highlighted the need to allow the military services to have more
ownership over acquisition processes. In granting this, the armed
forces would be better able to enforce acquisition re- form and
advance accountability. He also stressed the importance of the new
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (2015) and the need to
incentiv- ize commercial investment in a speech to the US Chamber
of Commerce.6
In congressional testimony, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) identified Russia as the leading threat to the
existence of the US.7 Fur- thermore, many strategists believed that
the only options the military could offer to the president of the
US during Russian aggression in Crimea was
2
either nuclear attack or acquiescence. These viewpoints are an
example of the shifting nature of warfare; one in which agility is
needed to address a plethora of varied threats.
The 2015 US National Security Strategy (NSS) outlines the strategic
foun- dation of the United States. It states, “The world is
connected by shared spaces—cyber, space, air, and oceans—that
enable the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas. They
are the arteries of the global economy and civil society, and
access is at risk due to increased competition and provoca- tive
behaviors. Therefore, we will continue to promote rules for
responsible behavior while making sure we have the capabilities to
assure access to these shared spaces.”8 The strategy notes that
global access is a fundamental re- quirement of these shared
spaces, and is important for the global economy, peace, and
progress. However, the US must choose which development pri-
orities are most important to its national security, particularly
in the pursuit of emerging technologies.
To maintain dominant and balanced air, space, and cyberspace forces
in the 2030s, the US armed forces must invest in operational
agility enabled by emerging technologies to achieve their core
missions. In choosing its devel- opment priorities, the US must
identify what it considers to be its strategic risks throughout the
world. The 2015 NSS lists these strategic risks as:
• Catastrophic attack on the US homeland or critical
infrastructure. • Threats or attacks against US citizens abroad and
our allies. • Global economic crisis or widespread economic
slowdown. • Proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction or
both. • Severe global infectious disease outbreaks. • Climate
change. • Major energy market disruptions. • Significant security
consequences associated with weak or failing states
(including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational
orga- nized crime).9
These strategic risks are global, broad, and increasingly dynamic
in nature. As an example of a service’s response to the identified
strategic risks, in 2015, the United States Air Force (USAF)
produced the Air Force (AF) Future Op- erating Concept (FOC).
The AF FOC is representative of each service’s changing views on
the na- ture of warfare. It outlines what the USAF believes the
required force struc- ture, missions, and investment strategy
should be to effectively address the
3
strategic risks outlined in the 2015 NSS. Written with the years
2035-2040 in mind, “it identifies four emerging trends that are
highly likely to characterize the future: increasing speed and
proliferation of technological change, geopo- litical instability,
increasing scarcity of natural resources, and an increasingly
important and vulnerable global commons.”10 As a result of these
emerging trends, the USAF identified operational agility as the
cornerstone of future mission success.11
Operational agility will be the USAF’s and other service’s key to
future war- fare. The AF FOC states that operational agility
provides “the ability to rapidly generate—and shift among—multiple
solutions for a given challenge.”12 It also states that operational
agility will rely upon “flexibility, speed, coordination, balance,
and strength.”13 Key to future warfare, operational agility will
ensure that the armed forces have the ability to react to a diverse
range of situations and threats anywhere in the world. Operational
agility will allow the armed forces of the US to succed in their
missions.
The core missions that each service identifies aids in achieving
the national security priorities of the US. The top priority of the
Department of Defense (DOD) is to protect the US and its citizens
from attack. This has been the foundational charge for the DOD
since its inception. To meet this require- ment, each service in
the DOD outlines their respective core missions. Throughout
history, the core missions of each service have evolved with the
current operating environment.
For instance, the AF FOC highlights the evolution of the Air Force
core missions as:
Figure 1. Evolution of the Air Force Core Missions14
Emerging technologies are enabling this evolution in core missions
and are transforming the way that the AF conducts its missions in
support of the NSS. A diverse set of emerging technologies have
made it feasible to develop a Rapid Global Effects
Capability.
1947 Air Superiority
Today Air & Space Superiority Global Integrated ISR Rapid
Global Mobility
Global Strike Command and Control
Future Adaptive Domain Control
Multi-domain Command and Control
Concept Description
Mr. Barry Hellman from the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has
been conducting research and development on a Rapid Global Effects
Capa- bility. His concept is a launch- on- demand “space truck”
based in the US. Technical analysis is underway concerning the
advantages and disadvantages of vertical and horizontal takeoff and
landing. The design has a reusable first stage booster that returns
to the launch site approximately 30 minutes after initial
launch.
The “space truck” portion of the concept launches from ground into
low Earth orbit between an altitude of 300 and 600 thousand feet,
or into space, with re- entry airspeeds of approximately Mach 25.
The concept’s initial de- sign allows it to have a 20,000 pound
payload, or a 6,000 pound soft payload anywhere in the world within
two hours.15 The “space truck” deploys a pay- load to a target area
and then recovers to the launch site or to another desig- nated
site.16
The deployable payload releases approximately 2,500 – 4,000 miles
before to the target area. The payload reaches the ground
approximately 20 minutes after release. This creates a three to
four minute communications blackout period.17 The anticipated G-
loading is six on ascent and nine for capsule re- entry. Mr.
Hellman bases his concept on technologies that are currently in
development in both the military and commercial sectors.18
Figure 2. Artist depictions of Rapid Global Effects Capability
platforms.19
5
Figure 3. Artist depiction of Expendable Entry Capsule and its
deployment.20
The DOD and commercial industry are currently conducting
technologi- cal research applicable to a Rapid Global Effects
Capability. Commercial in- vestment has led to an environment in
which the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of the technology
needed to field a Rapid Global Effects Capability is achievable.
The TRLs for the technologies currently in research are at a TRL 5
or above.21 According to NASA, “once the proof- of- concept
technology is ready, the technology advances to TRL 4. During TRL
4, multiple component pieces are tested with one another. TRL 5 is
a continuation of 4, however, a technology that is at five is
identified as a breadboard technology and must undergo more
rigorous testing than technology that is only at TRL 4.”22 Using
technologies that are already being developed allows for government
invest- ment later in the development process, thus cutting overall
acquisition and costs to the US government. Companies such as
SpaceWorks, SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Masten Space Systems are
conducting similar research and development.
Industry Research Research and development of a multitude of new
technologies is further
advancing the concept of a Rapid Global Effects Capability. In the
commercial sector, SpaceX Designs is the most noticeable entity in
the field of space ex- ploration. They are focusing research and
design on efforts to reduce the cost of accessing space through
reusable platforms. Ultimately, their goal is explo- ration and
colonization of Mars by humans. Recently, they have had many
important successes.
In 2014, SpaceX and their “commercial space program received
approval to transport a crew to the International Space Station –
SpaceX’s first such
6
mission.”23 These missions represent a shift in US government use
of com- mercial space vehicles to travel to or from space. However,
this shift is not without a level of accepted risk. In January of
2016, “SpaceX’s. .. attempt to land a rocket upright on a platform
in the Pacific Ocean failed in a spectacular fashion.”24 Therefore,
it is important to distinguish acceptable levels of risk from
reckless risk in the research and development of technologies
associated with space exploration and a Rapid Global Effects
Capability.
Acceptable levels of risk are possible due to flexibility in the
commercial research and development process. Traditional
acquisition, research, and de- velopment processes controlled by
the US government cannot compete with this process and level of
risk. The SpaceX use of the Falcon 9 rocket is an ex- ample of
unacceptable levels of risk. SpaceX is able to deliver that
capability at one- tenth of the cost of NASA’s approach with their
Falcon 9.25
Blue Origin and Masten Space Systems are also leading the way in
various technological development projects involving space
exploration. In a historic moment on 24 November 2015, “Jeff Bezos’
rocket ship achieved a break- through.. . by traveling 329,839 feet
into outer space and then landing upright upon its return to
Earth.”26 This was the first launch of a rocket in which por- tions
of the rocket were recoverable and could be used again. Bezos’ pro-
claimed, “Full reuse is a game changer, and we can’t wait to fuel
up and fly again.”27 He compares reusing rockets to airlines that
fly their commercial aircraft repeatedly. On 2 April 2016, Blue
Origin made their third launch of their New Shepard rocket. “Both
the rocket and the capsule, which will even- tually carry paying
customers, landed successfully. During this test, the cap- sule was
carrying two microgravity experiments from the Southwest Research
Institute and the University of Central Florida.”28 Ultimately,
reusable rockets will have a dramatic impact on the overall cost to
access space.
Masten Space Systems, founded by Dave Masten, is a smaller company
in comparison to SpaceX and Blue Origin. Located in the Mojave
Desert, they are taking strides to redefine space launch and
access. On their company web- site they laud, “You don’t need to be
a hundred miles above the Earth’s surface to alter the future of
space exploration, you just need to be a hundred miles north of Los
Angeles. At our testing facility here in the Mojave Desert, we
rapidly mature the technologies of the present into the space
exploration ca- pabilities of the future.”29 The US government has
realized their expertise in reusing rockets by awarding them
contracts in the development of their XS-1 concept.
While difficult to compete with commercial design and acquisitions
pro- cesses, the US government is investing in technologies
involving a Rapid Global Effects Capability. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency
7
(DARPA) is exploring a similar concept with their Experimental
Spaceplane (XS-1) concept.
DARPA believes that there is an increasing demand for reusable
launch vehicles for the future. They base their beliefs on a
growing commercial de- mand for flexible space launch options that
both the US and international community are demanding, as well as
an increasing DOD demand for flexible launch options in response to
the changing nature of warfare. The key in each case is the need
for flexible launch options.30
In the commercial sector, DARPA outlines the spacecraft market,
space- craft cost, and spacecraft technology as areas influencing
the need for flexible launch options. They predict that there will
be a large growth in the market of spacecraft development. However,
the current market is unprepared to meet this demand. DARPA also
predicts that emerging technologies will reduce the cost of
commercial satellite costs, therefore driving the demand for low-
cost spacecraft to deliver low- cost satellites. DARPA also sees a
notable reduction in the size of spacecraft technology in the
future.31
In the defense sector, DARPA outlines expendable vehicle launch
sites, contested space environment, and reusable first stage launch
sites as areas influencing the need for flexible launch options.
They believe that coastal launch sites are important to
contributing to expendable systems and that expanded launch
flexibility reduces US vulnerabilities from adversaries. They also
highlight the changing dynamics of space threats and how they drive
a responsive launch capability. DARPA also stresses that operations
that focus on being similar to aircraft will lead to flexible
basing and potential inland basing options.32
Combining DARPA’s view of the changing commercial and defense
sectors has led them to design the XS-1.
Figure 4. Artist Depiction of DARPA’s XS-1.33
8
While DARPA’s XS-1 design allows it to operate like a traditional
aircraft squadron, there are some notable advantages and
differences. One of XS-1’s goals is to provide global reach
anywhere in the world within 90 minutes. It will have the ability
to fly globally at any time. It will use unpredictable over- flight
patterns that make it difficult for adversaries to target, engage,
and de- feat. These aspects will ensure survivability in an anti-
access area denial (A2AD) environment.34 With the future in mind,
the goal is to show reusabil- ity with 10 flights within 10
days.35
Reusable, low- cost launch capabilities will make rapid global
presence a reality for the US. Currently, access to space costs
around $10,000 per kilo- gram. Low- cost access to space is
considered by many to be a factor 10 times lower than that.36 This
number is relative, however, to the economic incen- tives that
asteroid mining and associated activities in space could provide to
mankind to offset costs. However, there are policy implications to
consider with its development.
Air Force Internal Policy Implications of Development
A Rapid Global Effects Capability will have internal policy
implications for the USAF and its future, core missions. The AF FOC
outlines operational agility as the critical factor in its future,
core missions, and warfighting capa- bility. The AF core missions
of the future will be ADC, GIISR, RGM, Global Precision Strike, and
MDC2.37
Operational agility is a cornerstone of ADC. The AF FOC defines ADC
as “the ability to operate in and across air, space, and cyberspace
to achieve vary- ing levels of domain superiority over adversaries
seeking to exploit all means to disrupt friendly operations.”38
This core mission is essential to achieving the national security
objectives of the US.
GIISR operations are another increasingly important core mission of
the AF. The AF FOC highlights that “GIISR continues to enable
current and fu- ture operations through the cross- domain
synchronization and integration of: planning and operation of
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets;
collection using near- ubiquitous sensors; and processing, exploi-
tation and dissemination (PED) of finished intelligence.”39 It is a
key mission support area that links the other core missions
together.
RGM allows the United States to project global power. The AF FOC
states, “at its core, RGM has always focused on the relocation of
manpower and physical materials, but this process now occurs
through a much wider portfo-
9
lio of physical—and virtual—methods across multiple domains.”40
Without RGM, the US does not have the ability to represent a global
presence.
Global Precision Strike remains the pinnacle core mission of the
AF. The US’s evolution in this domain has allowed it to deter
adversaries prior to con- flict, and win the nation’s wars if
deterrence fails. However, the global strike mission has changed
over time. The AF FOC notes that “integration enable AF assets to
conduct integrated multi- domain global precision strike using a
balanced capabilities mix of forces, in collaboration with joint
and multina- tional partners.”41 The ability to rapidly perform the
global strike mission, to be rapidly present anywhere in the world,
while intertwined with other core missions will continue to become
more important in the future.
At the center of each core mission previously discussed is the core
mission of MDC2. Rightfully, the AF FOC describes C2 as
“fundamental to military operations.”42 C2 enables the other core
missions to execute effectively. Unfor- tunately, adversaries of
the United States are actively working to prevent the armed forces
from achieving their core missions. It will take the vision and
leadership of current and future generations for the US to maintain
its com- petitive advantages.
An important aspect to future investment is the potential
inspiration that the USAF will have on future generations of
leaders. A research study was conducted with the Auburn University
AF Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Detachment. The intent of
the research was to brief the detachment on the Rapid Global
Effects Capability concept and receive feedback from a generational
and inspirational perspective.
The following questions were asked of the cadets in a survey and
their re- sponses are annotated:
• Does this inspire the next generation of Air Force Leaders? 100%
(64 out of 64) said they were inspired
• Does this motivate you to join/stay in the Air Force? 95% (61 out
of 64) said this motivates them to join/stay in the Air Force
• Would you want to be a part of this concept? 94% (60 out of 64)
said they would want to be a part of this concept
• What is one word you would use to describe this concept (some
words were used more than once)?
Wow, Efficient, Deadly, Innovating, Thrilling, Air Superiority,
Intimi- dating, Futuristic, Interesting, Future, Exciting,
Effective, Superior, Intriguing, Capability, Revolutionary,
Expensive, Powerful, New- Age, Powerful, Controversial, Mind-
Blowing, The Future, Intriguing, Awe- some, Ambitious,
Cool.43
10
Overall, the cadets at the Auburn ROTC Detachment were very
receptive and motivated concerning a Rapid Global Effects
Capability concept. The ability of the USAF to attract and retain
the best and brightest leaders from around the world is the
cornerstone of success. A strategy of investing in ca- pabilities
that achieve decisive effects against adversaries while inspiring
cur- rent and future generations is a prudent course of action for
the USAF.
While inspirational to future generations of leaders, the precise
impacts that a Rapid Global Effects Capability would have on the
core missions of the USAF are currently unknown. Few people can
truly envision the potential impact of a Rapid Global Effects
Capability and how to properly employ it. In an effort to bridge
the gap between today’s core missions and the core mis- sions of
the future, the USAF Wargaming Institute conducted a wargame on the
potential impact of a Rapid Global Effects Capability.
USAF Wargame Results The AFRL and Air University sponsored a
wargame in June 2015 to deter-
mine how a Rapid Global Effects Capability might impact AF core
missions. The wargame team traveled to four locations to conduct
research: Air Mobil- ity Command, AF Space Command, AF Global
Strike Command, and the Air Warfare Center at Nellis AFB. Their
research found that 92 percent of partici- pants either “Agreed” or
“Strongly Agreed” that the Rapid Global Effects Ca- pability
concept was relevant to their mission set.44
Participants agreed that the concept would be most effective in
conven- tional strike, C2, ISR, and humanitarian relief missions.
Particularly, partici- pants believed that time sensitive missions
and targets are uniquely suited to be matched against a Rapid
Global Effects Capability.45 In a fiscally con- strained
environment, this may augment current conventional forces in
achieving current and future missions. However, there is a
counterargument as to what current assets or fiscal policies may
have to change in order to in- vest in the development of a Rapid
Global Effects Capability. While outside the scope of this
research, it warrants a discussion at the service and depart- ment
levels when prioritizing strategic investment strategies
occurs.
There were areas, however, where the participants agreed the
concept should not be used. Most participants agreed that the
concept should not be used for nuclear weapons transport or
employment. Participants also ques- tioned the impact of signaling
Rapid Global Effect Capability to adversaries as well as
stabilizing versus destabilizing effects.46
Each group of participants also brought up the ability of a Rapid
Global Effects platform to deliver drone technology in futuristic
strike packages. For
11
instance, a 20,000 pound payload could deliver 20 remotely- piloted
aircraft; each with differing capabilities including strike,
communications nodes, and ISR. In effect, a Rapid Global Effects
Capability could deliver an autonomous strike package with a degree
of artificial intelligence (AI) in which each drone could “talk” to
other drones. They could have the ability to operate indepen-
dently or in an autonomous swarm.47 A counterargument to this
possibility is that remotely- piloted assets coud instead be
delivered by air or sea- based platforms. However, this also
creates traditional logistics lines of support. A continental US
(CONUS) based Rapid Global Effects Capability limits tradi- tional
logistics lines that become expensive. A Rapid Global Effects
Capability complements other technologies that are emerging,
particularly the technolo- gies that Deputy Secretary of Defense
Work said will be critical to the DOD’s third offset
strategy.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Work’s Five Points of Interest and The
Future
In November 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work
outlined five points of interest in emerging technologies. They
include learning sys- tems, human- machine collaboration, human-
machine combat teaming, as- sisted humano, and networked- enabled,
cyber hardened autonomous weap- ons.48 These five points of
interest will shape investment and policy for the AF moving
forward. There is recent research that complements these points of
interest.
Significant research is underway on autonomy and swarming
technology. The AFRL is researching autonomy to counter land mines
and sea mines. A dominant question is, “How do we deal with data
overload?” Is there a way to couple autonomy and AI with human
decision makers to reduce tasking over- load? Reid Porter works on
Data Analytics and Autonomy at Los Alamos National Laboratory and
is answering this very question. A Rapid Global Ef- fects
Capability offers the solution for delivering a host of emerging
technolo- gies, taking advantage of speed and maneuver to create an
advantage.
Air University recently conducted a wargame to discover the impact
that an autonomous swarm capability could have on an integrated air
defense sys- tem. The technology, called CLEAVER, is a cruise
missile launched from an airlift asset. A C-17 can carry a
substatinal number of the CLEAVER as it is a light- weight system.
CLEAVER has standoff capability outside of A2AD envi- ronments,
such as evidenced by the one that China is creating in the South
China Sea. However, the wargame displayed that CLEAVER’s range is
limited because of the delivery requirement from a traditional
airlift asset. The
12
CLEAVER system also has the ability to form an integrated network
with other CLEAVER assets that are airborne. CLEAVER assets have
the ability to perform strike, C2, and ISR missions. Additionally,
CLEAVER would have the ability to carry directed- energy
capabilities.49
Perhaps the most high- profile directed- energy technology is a
system called Counter- electronics High Power Microwave Advanced
Missile Project (CHAMP). CHAMP is a joint concept technology
demonstration led by the AFRL’s Directed- Energy Directorate at
Kirtland Air Force Base to develop an air- launched directed-
energy weapon capable of incapacitating or damaging electronic
systems.50 This directed- energy technology, combined with a Rapid
Global Effects Capability, offers operational agility to the armed
forces.
A Rapid Global Effects Capability has the potential to link Deputy
Secre- tary of Defense Work’s five essential elements of the Third
Offset strategy. A Rapid Global Effects Capability could manipulate
the aspect of time. It could promote human- machine collaboration,
human- machine combat teaming, assisted human operations, and
network- enabled, cyber hardened autono- mous weapons. A Rapid
Global Effects Capability could have the ability to deliver a swarm
of autonomous drones, strike assets, ISR capability, and even
enable satellites to orbit.
The combination of a Rapid Global Effects Capability, autonomy,
swarm- ing, and directed- energy technology allows for the armed
forces to achieve operational agility. As a result, this technology
will allow the AF to achieve its core missions of ADC, GIISR, RGM,
Global Precision Strike, and MDC2 by 2035. A Rapid Global Effects
Capability could have a profound impact on the combat forces of the
US. Research involving United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) was
conducted to analyze the impact that a Rapid Global Effects
Capability may have on its operations.
In an effort to further explore the lessons learned from the AF’s
Wargam- ing efforts, interviews were conducted with key staff
members of USAFE. Those staff members have articulated the
potential benefits that a Rapid Global Effects Capability could
bring to the challenges they face in their the- ater. Key areas of
discussion were USAFE presence and posture, command and control
(C2), command relationships (COMREL), basing, force struc- ture,
and interoperability.
In discussions involving the US’s military involvement in Europe,
there ex- ists and previously existed a balance between presence
and posture. Each of- fice at USAFE is addressing to some extent a
decreasing US presence in Eu- rope. Members cite basing and
personnel downsizing as concerns. Members also cite concerns over
the signaling that deployment of the A-10 in Europe sends to
potential adversaries. In April 2015, “demonstrating its
commitment
13
to a ‘free’ and ‘secure’ Europe, the United States deployed 12
F-15C Eagles and approximately 350 Airmen to Iceland and the
Netherlands.”51 The USAF is deploying weapons systems, maintenance,
and support personnel to Europe to deter Russian aggression and
assure its allies. This is both time- consuming for personnel and
expensive.
With respect to a Rapid Global Effects Capability, members note
that its posture could offer a balance to changes in the US
presence in Europe.52 They believe that posturing with CONUS assets
that have the ability to rapidly re- spond to combatant commanders
critical needs holds merit in the overall presence andposture
dilemma. However, those interviewed also caution that posturing an
asset like a Rapid Global Effects Capability comes with C2 and
COMREL challenges.53
Emerging technologies are presenting challenges to USAFE C2
dynamics as well as COMREL. For instance, USAFE members highlight
how the opera- tion of remotely- piloted aircraft (RPA’s) have
outpaced current AF and Joint Doctrine.54 USAFE is at the leading
edge in this field and are solving doctrinal challenges at the
tactical and operational level in order to support commander and
warfighter needs. Currently, RPA’s are controlled from CONUS,
launched from USAFE, in support of three different commands (USAFE,
US Africa Command and US Central Command).55
NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) C2 structure has current
chal- lenges. The US must rely on coalition BMD capabilities to
mitigate the high- demand, low density asset challenge.56 This
issue has become more problem- atic due to recent refugee
migrations from areas of conflict throughout the Middle East to
Europe. In the past, NATO nations have agreed to contribute two
percent of each country’s gross domestic product to the collective
defense of the alliance. Allies to the US in NATO, now strained
with millions of refu- gees, are finding it difficult to maintain
this spending rate on defense.57
Emerging technologies will continue to test C2, COMREL, and current
doctrinal policies. USAFE members note that a Rapid Global Effects
Capabil- ity will have similar challenges to the RPA community in
each of these areas, both within CONUS and in various geographic
areas throughout the world. USAFE members note that a Rapid Global
Effects Capability may be able to aid in the BMD challenges that US
European Command is facing. Sacrificing a window of time in order
to position critical assets away from BMD duties may be a trade-
off that NATO leadership is willing to take. The US would have the
ability to maintain its deterrent capability while ensuring allies
with a diverse platform and a different response window.58
USAFE is currently undergoing many vast basing changes to support
its force of the future. USAFE is currently divesting Royal Air
Force (RAF)
14
Mildenhall, RAF Alconbury- Molesworth, and streamlining Lajes Air
Base. Upgrade projects include special operations facilities at
Spangdahlem Air Base and tanker facilities at Ramstein Air Base.
Challenges include funding, RC-135 host nation sensitivities, and
high- density operations in Germany.59
Changes in basing are representative of the challenges that USAFE
is facing with presence. A Rapid Global Effects Capability has the
ability to offer op- erational flexibility from CONUS for USAFE
that will help alleviate some basing challenges. USAFE members cite
that a Rapid Global Effects Capabil- ity would alleviate host
nation sensitivity to RC-135 basing and operational employment.
Basing of the RC-135 has become a sensitive issue due to previ- ous
allegations that the US used various means to collect intelligence
on allies. Also, with additions to basing structures in Germany,
USAFE members note that congested airspace is becoming an issue for
joint training and opera- tional missions. Utilizing a CONUS- based
platform for some missions would enable other legacy platforms to
perform more high- demand missions for the major and combatant
commanders.60
USAFE team members also note that a Rapid Global Effects Capability
could impact force structure. An example of current force structure
chal- lenges at USAFE is the alert posture of two C-130 aircraft at
Ramstein Air Base (AB) in the “New Normal Now” structure.61 The
alert posture allows USAFE to respond to contingency operations in
USAFE and Air Forces Af- rica. Thus, two aircraft are unavailable
for other daily missions in order to support the alert tasking.
Depending on the requirement, a Rapid Global Ef- fects Capability
could deliver equipment and supplies to a remote location in
Africa. A Rapid Global Effects Capability will allow greater
operational agility while potentially returning two C-130’s,
associated aircrews, maintenance, and support personnel to perform
immediate needs within USAFE. USAFE members also note that it will
also allow for a more immediate response to contingencies in which
traditional assets may not have the ability to support (due to
large distances in Africa).62
USAFE operations are always concerned with interoperability with
NATO partners.63 USAFE professionals caution the DOD to consider
how a Rapid Global Effects Capability may interoperate with NATO
partners.64 For in- stance, should a Rapid Global Effects
Capability system base and operate from Lajes AB? What are the C2
implications in NATO for a Rapid Global Effects Capability? These
are credible questions that the US should consider when developing
future concepts.
The areas that USAFE interviewees highlight are applicable to other
com- mands and the AF at large. They particularly highlight how new
and future technologies will test our current doctrine models while
alleviating some
15
challenges and providing support to warfighters and commanders.
Addition- ally, they point to how these emerging technologies will
impact domestic and international policy.
External Policy Implications of Development Research points to
external policy implications of the development of a
Rapid Global Effects Capability. In particular, professionals have
expressed their interest in treaty implications, such as the 1967
Outer Space Treaty, Stra- tegic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT- II),
and Strategic Arms Reduction Trea- ty.65 66 There are also
international airspace questions that one should consider that
affects development.
One- hundred and two countries were involved in the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty. An additional 27 have signed, but not ratified, the
treaty. Most coun- tries and industries use this as the
international standard for conduct in and through space. It uses
the Antarctic Treaty as a model and seeks to “prevent ‘a new form
of colonial competition’ and the possible damage that self- seeking
exploitation might cause.”67 It begins by stating:
Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a
result of man’s entry into outer space,
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of
the exploitation and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes,
Believing that the exploitation and use of outer space should be
carried on for the ben- efit of all peoples irrespective of the
degree of their economic or scientific development,
Desiring to contribute to broad international co- operation in the
scientific as well as legal aspects of the exploitation and use of
outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that such co- operation will contribute to the
development of mutual under- standing and to the strengthening of
friendly relations between States and peoples . . .68
This introduction undeniably sets forth the understanding for all
parties that the treaty for space should be for peaceful purposes
for each nation and all mankind. The treaty references resolution
1884 which calls “upon States to refrain from placing in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such
weapons on celestial bodies.”69 Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty goes on to outline this in detail by saying, “States Parties
to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or
station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”70
16
Article IV has remarkable implications for the development of a
Rapid Global Effects Capability.
The language that the signatories use in Article IV is lacking for
the mod- ern era. In 1967, the entities capable of space launch and
exploration were clearly defined sovereign states. Currently, this
model has reversed itself with private industry leading the space
development and exploration efforts around the world. This is not
surprising considering the age of the treaty is nearing 50 years
old. This fact, however, is representative of how emerging
technology will push external policy decisions and treaties to
change in com- parison to historical models.
Article IV also forbids states from placing nuclear weapons or
other weap- ons of mass destruction in orbit. The intent of this
article concerns the poten- tial destabilizing effects that weapons
of mass destruction could bring to the world from space.
Conversations with wargame participants brought up this concern
regarding the Rapid Global Effects Capability.
Participants in the wargame recommended against using such a
concept for nuclear weapons, component, or material transportation
or employment.71 Their main justification was the destabilizing
effects such a step would have upon the international policy arena.
However, they did caution that the US should continue to pursue
such technology and have the capability to rapidly employ nuclear
weapons with a Rapid Global Effects Capability. Especially if the
national security of the US required it. For instance, if a near-
peer adver- sary intened to develop that capability, the US could
not afford to let the ad- versary develop the capability
uncontested.
A Rapid Global Effects Capability is different from conventional
Inteconti- nental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and the Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent under development. It has both conventional and
nuclear mission applica- tions. Also, depending on the choices made
in development, it has the poten- tial to be a highly mobile asset.
Ultimately, if a Rapid Global Effects Capability is chosen to
support a nuclear mission, it would offer the US options in ad-
ditiona to the nuclear triad. In an era when the US is investing
heavily in the revitalization of its nuclear force, this warrants
consideration.
17
Concerning Article IV, a Rapid Global Effects Capability is within
the in- ternational norm for the delivery of nuclear weapons or
weapons of mass destruction. This is due to the fact that the
capability would transit space (low Earth orbit) in order to
deliver the munitions. It would not place a nuclear weapon or
weapon of mass destruction into orbit. Further, Article IV “allows
fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS), a 1960s Soviet ICBM
pro- gram that after launch would go into a low Earth orbit and
would then de- orbit for an attack.”72 Thus, a Rapid Global Effects
Capability meets the obliga- tions of the Outer Space Treaty.
Article VI states:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities,
and for assur- ing that national activities are carried out in
conformity with the provisions set forth in the present
Treaty.73
This article impacts both external and internal policy of the US.
The US government is responsible for the actions of industry
leaders such
as SpaceX and Blue Origin in their pursuit of space exploration and
develop- ment. For instance, if a private industry rocket launch
damages a nation’s sat- ellite after being launched the US is
responsible. If private companies begin asteroid mining, the US
government is responsible for their regulation and protection. If
international treaties bound the US to bear responsibility for
their industries’ actions, it would be prudent to have the
capability to do so. A Rapid Global Effects Capability and the
technology related to it would help the US meet their treaty
obligations. The capability to rapidly launch into space ensures
that the US can protect and regulate interests in space.
Article VII further outlines international responsibility when it
states:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory
or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or
juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the
Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies.74
Clearly, the US government has a responsibility to be involved in
the gov- erning of developing space- related technology as well as
the regulation of space exploration in the industrial sector.
18
Article X states: In order to promote international co- operation
in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this
Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis
of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to
be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects
launched by those States. The nature of such an opportunity for
observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded
shall be determined by agreement between the States
concerned.”75
Due to the fact that the Outer Space Treaty determines that states
are respon- sible for their industries’ actions in space, this
presents an interesting di- lemma. Could adversaries to the US
require private US companies to provide sensitive information to
meet treaty obligations? What constitutes observing the flight of
space objects? Could adversaries invoke Article X and request to
observe the private industry launches of SpaceX or Blue Origin? By
being able to observe space objects launched from the US,
adversaries are better able to target those objects. As space
exploration and development continues, de- fense related systems
will require maneuverability and speed in order to de- feat
adversaries’ observations in accordance with Article X.
Article XI states: In order to promote international co- operation
in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties
to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-
General of the United Nations as well as the public and the
international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible
and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of
such activities.76
This article has profound implications for external policy
considerations. If a private company discovers valuable minerals on
a celestial body, the US is bound by the Outer Space Treaty to make
that information public, reporting it to both the UN and the
scientific community. This, in turn, will produce a “rush” in the
international community to mine these minerals similar to gold
rushes tha occurred throughout our history. Again, the US is bound
by inter- national treaty to regulate private industries based out
of the US. It would be prudent to have the space launch capability
to enforce international treaties and laws in space.
A Rapid Global Effects Capability would have vast implications for
access to space. Not only would it provide the capability to
influence traditional mil- itary operations on Earth, but also it
would provide the US with rapid access to space as well. As
technologies emerge that influence space operations, hav- ing the
capability to rapidly deploy assets such as Cubesats would be
highly beneficial. This allows for the reconstitution of
compromised traditional
19
satellites. Also, a Rapid Global Effects Capability would allow for
the deploy- ment of personnel or equipment into space for mining
operations. The de- ployment of personnel would help enforce
international treaties and laws in space.
The Outer Space Treaty allows for the development of a Rapid Global
Ef- fects Capability. The Outer Space Treaty even allows for
weapons transport and delivery as long as those weapons are not
nuclear or considered weapons of mass destruction. The broader
external policy implications come with the development of emerging
technologies that will push the US and the interna- tional
community into space. The US will be responsible for the industrial
base within the US and their actions. As a result, the US will need
the capabil- ity to rapidly respond to challenges within and
through space. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will also influence future
US policy.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks “banned FOBS or any significant
ad- vancement in ICBM key performance parameters, but was not
ratified by the US due to other Soviet treaty violations.”77
However, SALT- II was traditionally honored by both the US and
Soviet Union. SALT- II has been replaced with the “Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START), Comprehensive Nuclear- Test- Ban Treaty,
and New START which has been ratified and is applicable through
2021.”78 Currently, these treaties prevent both the US and Russia
from pursing the development of FOBS. These treaties do not
“address con- ventional weapons in space, orbital or suborbital;
however, the range and ca- pability of carrier systems such as
cruise missiles that could carry nuclear arms are limited . . .but
not the manned aircraft that carry them.”79
The development of a Rapid Global Effects Capability is allowable
accord- ing to the New START Treaty and is in line with the
historical framework of previous treaties such as SALT- II.
According to the framework of the New START Treaty, it is
beneficial for a Rapid Global Effects Capability to be a manned
platform if the US is interested in having the option to have a
nuclear capability. If the US chooses to focus on conventional
capabilities, this pro- vides an opportunity for enhanced human-
machine operations or remotely- piloted options. Due to these
current treaties, it is also important to under- stand at what
altitude space begins.
20
A nation’s sovereign territory includes the airspace above it.
However, it does not include the “space” above it. The Karman Line
is at an altitude of 100 kilometers above the Earth’s surface. It
“represents the boundary between the Earth’s atmosphere and outer
space according to the Federation Aeronautique Internationale, an
international standard setting and record- keeping body for
aeronautics and astronautics.”80 At this altitude, an aircraft or
space vehicle has to “fly faster than orbital velocity to have
enough lift to overcome drag.”81 However, it is important to note
that this is not international law, nor is it in- cluded in any
international treaties.
The US has “consistently maintained that discussions of
delimitation be- tween air and outer space are premature and
advocates the removal of de- limitation from the agenda of the
Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space.”82 The current international standard is that
airspace below 100 kilometers is a nation’s sovereign territory and
above 100 kilometers is international space.83 This allows nations
to place satellites, launch rockets, or allow entery of space
vehicles in any orbit. A Rapid Global Effects Capability that
utilized low Earth orbit meets the current international standards
and would not violate other nation’s sovereign terri- tory or
airspace.
Policy Implications Concerning Near- Peer Adversaries—China and
Russia
Recently, the Vice Chairman of the JCS said that Russia was the
number one existential threat to the US.84 Many other strategists
believe China to be the number one long- term threat to the United
States.85 Each country pro- vides specific, yet sometimes similar,
threats to the US.
China is expanding its sphere of influence regionally. China is
currently interested in expanding into the South China Sea. They
are focused on expan- sion due to a ballooning population that
needs the support of natural re- sources. Also, China is interested
in the military advantages that the South China Sea
possesses.86
The South China Sea has important strategic implications. Robert
Kaplan notes that “the South China Sea functions as the throat of
the Western Pacific and Indian oceans—the mass of connective
economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce.”87 It also has
substantial oil reserves that serve China’s eco- nomic development
interests. Militarily, the South China Sea forms a geo- graphic
barrier to the potential invasion of China.
21
China is creating an A2AD environment in the South China Sea.
Kaplan notes that “domination of the South China Sea would
certainly clear the way for pivotal Chinese air and naval influence
throughout the navigable rimland of Eurasia—the Indian and Pacific
oceans both.”88 Russia is also presenting strategic problems for
the US and putting stress on the national security
objectives.
Russia is a prideful nation that is attempting to regain its
international prestige. After the downfall of the Soviet Union,
many former Soviet bloc states separated from the nation and
declared their independence. The Soviet Union’s economy collapsed
and with it so did its military capability. Today, Russia is
pursuing international actions to reassert itself in the
world.89
Russia has shown recent military aggression in both Georgia and the
Ukraine. In each instance, the international community condemned
the ac- tions but did little militarily to respond. Economic
sanctions of Russian banks and key leaders were the major responses
that the international community imposed for each aggression. They
also believed options were limited and did not pursue military
options as they feared conflict escalation.
Russia has also projected global power into the Middle East—in the
Syrian conflict and the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria.90 Fareed Za- karia notes that “global power is, above all,
dominance over ideas, agendas, and models.”91 Russia is attempting
to dominate the agenda in the Middle East and assert its influence.
Again, the US believes that it has few options available to counter
this power projection threat.
Emerging technology will allow the US armed forces to achieve their
fu- ture, core missions with operational agility. In doing so, the
armed forces will offer the US leadership a more expansive list of
options to choose from. Ulti- mately, the objective of the
investment in emerging technology is peace through deterrence while
achieving the national security objectives of the US. A Rapid
Global Effects Capability will aid in this effort.
A Rapid Global Effects Capability will mitigate China’s A2AD
environ- ment. It will offer an asymmetric advantage that the
Chinese will have to con- sider in their strategic investments for
the future. The Chinese attempt to cre- ate a defensive barrier
with land- based missiles in the South China Sea is a moot point
considering CONUS- based assets.
22
Figure 5. Coverage Expansion from S-400 SAM and J-10 Deployment to
South China Sea Airfields92
For instance, a Rapid Global Effects Capability system launched
from CONUS delivers a swarm of autonomous CLEAVER drones and aids
in negat- ing specific areas of negates China’s A2AD environment.
The CLEAVER swarm will use operational agility and maneuver to
overwhelm China’s defenses.93 There is a counterargument that
CLEAVER assets could be delivered by cur- rent conventional assets,
such as a C-17 or B-52. Based on wargames that have been conducted,
however, this severely limits the range and available
targets.94
These technologies will have the ability to achieve any of the AF
core mis- sions.95 As a result, it will also achieve the US
national security objectives in promoting and ensuring global
access to sea lines of communications and natural resources in the
South China Sea. These technologies will deter ag- gression from
Russia as well.
As noted previously, there were few options to stop Russian
aggression in Ukraine and Georgia. Many feared escalating the
situation, so the response from the US militarily was not to act.
The launch of a Rapid Global Effects Capability to deliver an
autonomous swarm of CHAMP cruise missiles could have a stabilizing
effect.96 They could use directed- energy to eliminate any
electronic capability that advancing Russian forces were using. The
combina- tion of these emerging technologies could make a Russian
Surface- to- Air threat noted below virtually nonexistent.
23
Missile Name Range (nm)
SA-7 Grail 3.5 15,000 1.7 N/A 1966 MANPAD
SA-8 Gecko 8.6 37,000 2.4 N/A 1975
SA-9 Gaskin 4.3 26,000 1.8 N/A 1968
SA-10 Grumble 49 82,000 5+ 19 1980 ACM
SA-11 Gadfly 17.3 62,000 3 N/A 1983
SA-12A Gladiator 40.5 82,000 5.75 UNK 1987
SA-12B Giant 54 98,400 8 21.6 1992 AHV, ABM
SA-13 Gopher 2.7 20,000 2 N/A 1978
SA-14 Gremlin 3.2 18,000 1.75 N/A 1978 MANPAD
SA-15 Gauntlet 6.5 20,000 3 UNK 1990 ACM, APGM
SA-16 Gimlet 3.1 12,000 1.7 UNK 1986 MANPAD
SA-17 Grizzly 28 82,000 3.5 12.5 1998
SA-18 Grouse 3.2 11,000 UNK UNK 1983 MANPAD
SA-19 Grison 7.5 20,000 3.3 N/A 1998
SA-20A Gargoyle 80 89,000 8.2 22 1993 ACM
SA-20B 124 89,000 8.8 22 1997 ABM
SA-21 Growler 216 115,000 UNK UNK 2007 AHV, ABM
Figure 6. Russian Surface- to- Air Missile Coverage98
24
This could deescalate a Russian advance and create a situation for
the Rus- sians to respond to with either escalation or retreating.
Escalation may be a cost too high for the Russians. Perhaps
nonlethal effects delivered outside Russia against Russian-
supported forces would prevent an escalated response. Research has,
however, exposed some policy questions concerning both China and
Russia.
Many interviewees questioned basing a Rapid Global Effects
Capability solely in the CONUS. It was widely agreed that this
basing dynamic would drastically reduce overseas basing and
logistics costs, as well as the personnel strain of members of the
armed forces living overseas. However, a CONUS- based system leaves
the only available target for adversaries within CONUS.99
Interviewees consider this to be a destabilizing aspect of the
system. They recommend considering the placement of a Rapid Global
Effects Capability within allied countries such as Great Britain
and Australia. Other sites recom- mended for basing included the
Ascension Islands in the Atlantic Ocean, Guam AB in the Pacific
Ocean, and Diego Garcia AB in the Indian Ocean, reducing the risk
of an adversary striking CONUS. This also provides for op-
erational agility through global presence. However, this would
create addi- tional logistics considerations that a CONUS- based
system would not en- counter. Signaling is also a concern that some
mention in association with a Rapid Global Effects
Concept.100
In the wargame that the AF conducted in June 2015, tactical experts
cited signaling as one of their main concerns for the operational
use of a Rapid Global Effects Capability. Quite simply, would
allies and adversaries detect the launch of this concept and
misinterpret it as a nuclear ICBM launch? This is a valid question
and concern for a number of reasons.
Near- peer adversaries such as China and Russia would be able to
distin- guish between the launch of a Rapid Global Effects
Capability and an ICBM.101 Types of fuel used for propulsion,
horizontal vs. vertical takeoff options, launch locations, and most
importantly trajectory are factors that would distinguish between
the two capabilities. A Rapid Global Effects Capa- bility is being
designed to launch into low Earth orbit, while an ICBM goes into a
much higher, elliptical “flight path” in order to re- enter the
atmosphere and strike its target.102 Near- peer allies would also
be able to distinguish be- tween these launch factors as well as
have the added benefit of potential intel- ligence sharing.
Adversaries that do not have the capabilities of China and Russia
pose a separate challenge. Countries such as Iran and North Korea
may not have the capability to distinguish between a Rapid Global
Effects Capability and an ICBM launch. However, they do have
considerable conventional military
25
capabilities that they could utilize if they felt that they were a
target of an ICBM.103 The USAF can address signaling concerns with
horizontal takeoff capability, basing location decisions, doctrine
that prevents the use of a Rapid Global Effects Concept with
nuclear capabilities, and deception operations. Alternatively, the
US could opt to publically use a Rapid Global Effects Capa- bility
and the current ICBM fleet to diversify its nuclear capability and
present adversaries with more expansive dilemmas on how to counter
US nuclear doctrine and operations. Interviewees and wargame
participants also brought up the issue of creating a potential arms
race.
The concern of an arms race is a valid concern and one that
military strate- gists and US policy makers must consider. The US,
in general, has not been concerned with arms races due to a
dominant economic presence and his- torical success during the Cold
War. However, these aspects are not guaran- tees for success in the
future.
A Rapid Global Effects Capability would have considerable impact on
the future, core missions of the USAF.104 A discussion about the
trade- off between investments in this future concept, legacy
systems currently in use, and how each would complement each other
moving forward is appropriate. While outside the scope of this
study, the economic factors include impact on per- sonnel, basing,
and investment in other emerging technology are all critical to the
overall discussion. However, preliminary research supports the
conclu- sion that a Rapid Global Effects Capability, while enabling
the future, core missions, would give the USAF flexibility in
personnel decisions, basing op- tions, and complement legacy
systems in their current operations. These as- pects present a
dilemma for both China and Russia.
In terms of an arms race, China and Russia would face difficult
investment decisions moving forward.105 Each have made considerable
investments in creating A2AD environments, particularly China. A
capability that can ma- nipulate distance and time like a Rapid
Global Effects Capability would se- verely disrupt those efforts.
Adversary decisions would have to be made re- garding how to invest
in order to counter that capability. The most likely option is to
develop some kind of defensive capability to limit its
effectiveness. Thus, a Rapid Global Effects Capability has the
potential to become part of a greater cost- imposition strategy for
the US. Ultimately, the US’s goal is to maintain peace by creating
a situation in which it holds the military advan- tage and is
better able to influence adversaries with other instruments of
power.
26
Analysis The research has demonstrated that a Rapid Global Effects
Capability will
have a significant impact on domestic and foreign policy as well
the ability of the USAF to accomplish its core missions in the AF
FOC. Domestically, it will highlight a new era in AF technological
investment and acquisition strategy while inspiring the youth of
tomorrow. Foreign policy will shift with the im- pact on current
treaties, a wide range of deterrent effects, and impact on com-
batant commander operational plans. For the AF core missions, new
dimen- sions in the vertical nature of warfare will change
dramatically while igniting a new interest both in space and in
service to the nation.106 This research has also identified key
areas in which a Rapid Global Effects Capability may im- pact
future operations in Europe. This impact is possible through a new
para- digm by commercial investment in technology while partnering
with govern- ment and academic institutions.
Technological investment in capabilities like a Rapid Global
Effects Capa- bility could provide the president with more options
to achieve operational agility. Operational agility allows for the
armed forces to achieve their future, core missions. An example of
this is the AF’s 2035 core missions of ADC, GIISR, RGM, Global
Precision Strike, and MDC2. In achieving their core missions, the
US armed forces ensure that the nation’s national security objec-
tives are achievable.
Recommendations 1. Pursue a Rapid Global Effects Capability through
a dedicated acquisi-
tion model outside of traditional government acquisitions modeling
and timelines. Invest with the appropriate amount of risk in order
to fail early and smartly, driving advancement in the technological
fields that the USAF needs.
2. Enable and partner with commercial industry leaders to field a
fully op- erational Rapid Global Effects Capability on a 10 year
developmental timeline.107
3. Dedicate an Air Force major or lieutenant general as the program
man- ager who reports directly to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary
of Defense. This level of commitment has historical precedence as
is evidenced by the placement of Gen Bernard Schriever in Southern
California to develop the USAF’s future ICBM program. Today, his
success is seen in one pillar of the US’s nuclear triad.
4. Establish a dedicated field office in Seattle, Washington, San
Francisco, California, or Los Angeles, California. This office
should be for the sole
27
purpose of Rapid Global Effects Capability development and should
not be co- located with other acquisition programs. The location
will allow for daily interaction with the industries associated
with development, while creating a necessary buffer between the
development team and traditional military de- velopment protocols.
This will allow the pursuit of the effort to fail early and
smartly, creating agility in the process so that the program
manager can redi- rect efforts easily.
5. Assign leaders from various backgrounds (military, civilian, and
aca- demia), services, and year groups to the field office. The
program manager (major or lieutenant general) should sign
performance reports as the addi- tional rater on performance
reports with the Secretary or Under Secretary of Defense. This
provides for program legitimacy throughout the USAF and en- sures
that the best in each career field and year group are placed on the
field office team. Make this a joint creditable assignment.
All recommendations are the opinion of the author and not Air
University, USAF, or DOD opinion. Conclusions and recommendations
are based on re- search and previous experience. The author
realizes that many of the recom- mendations, if implemented, would
be nontraditional in their application.
Notes
(Notes appear in shortened form except where indicated. For full
details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)
1. Robert George (National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
Wright-Patterson AFB: OH), comments made 22 Sept 2015..
2. Colby, “From Sanctuary to Battlefield.”. 3. Welsh, Air Force
Challenges and Priorities. 4. James and Welsh, AF FOC, 4. 5. James
and Welsh, AF FOC, 12. 6. McCain, Remarks On Defense Acquisition
Reform. 7. Selva, comments 8. Office of the President, NSS. 9.
Office of the President, NSS, 2. 10. James and Welsh, AF FOC, 5.
11. James and Welsh, AF FOC. 12. James and Welsh, AF FOC, 7. 13.
James and Welsh, AF FOC. 14. James and Welsh, AF FOC. 15. Hellman
and St. Germain, “A Rapid Global Effects Capability.” 16. Hellman
and St. Germain, “A Rapid Global Effects Capability.”
28
17. Hellman and St. Germain, “A Rapid Global Effects Capability.”
18. Hellman and St. Germain, “A Rapid Global Effects Capability.”
19. Hellman and St. Germain, “A Rapid Global Effects Capability.”
20. Hellman and St. Germain, “A Rapid Global Effects Capability.”
21. Sponable, comments. 22. Mui. “Technology Readiness Level.” 23.
Garcia, “Spacex Gets Mission to Take NASA Crew to Space Station.”
24. Wattles and McLean, “SpaceX Rocket Explodes after Landing.” 25.
Sercel, Sub-Orbital Transport. 26. Isadore and Crane, “Jeff Bezo’s
Rocket Lands.” 27. Isadore and Crane, “Jeff Bezo’s Rocket Lands.”
28. Garcia, “Jeff Bezos’ Space Company Blue Origin Launches and
Successfully
Lands Rocket.” 29. Masten Space Systems, http://masten.aero/. 30.
Ideas for this paragraph were inspired and wording used from
comments
made by Jess Sponable (Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 22 February
2016). 31. Sponable, comments. 32. Sponable, comments. 33. Szondy,
“Darpa’s Xs-1 Sets Goal of Space Launches with One-Day Turnaround.”
34. Sponable, comments. 35. Szondy, “Darpa’s Xs-1 Sets Goal.” 36.
Ideas from discussions with Sercel, Sub- Orbital Transport. 37.
James and Welsh, AF FOC. 38. James and Welsh, AF FOC, 18. 39. James
and Welsh, AF FOC, 23. 40. James and Welsh, AF FOC, 26. 41. James
and Welsh, AF FOC, 30. 42. James and Welsh, AF FOC, 14. 43.
Multiple interviews and surveys with Auburn University ROTC
Detachment. 44. LeMay Center, A Rapid Global Effects. 45. LeMay
Center, A Rapid Global Effects. 46. LeMay Center, A Rapid Global
Effects. 47. LeMay Center, A Rapid Global Effects. 48. Work,
“Reagan Defense Forum.” 49. Ideas and information for this
paragraph were inspired from wording used
from LeMay Center Wargaming Directorate personnel in 2015 and 2016.
50. Robert Torres, CHAMP (Sandia National Laboratory, Kirtland AFB,
NM), in-
terviewed by Maj Gabe Arrington, October 2015. 51. Zachary Cohen,
“US F-15’s Deployed to Iceland.” 52. Brian McNulty (Headquarters,
USAFE, Ramstein Air Base, Germany), inter-
view conducted by the author 8 February 2016. 53. McNulty,
interview. 54. McNulty, interview.
55. McNulty, interview. 56. Capt Chris Jones (Headquarters, USAFE,
Ramstein Air Base, Germany), in-
terview conducted by the author 8 February 2016. 57. Craig Smeeth
(Headquarters, USAFE. Ramstein Air Base, Germany), inter-
view conducted by the author 8 February 2016. 58. McNulty,
interview. 59. Theresa Moore (Headquarters, USAFE, Ramstein Air
Base, Germany), inter-
view conducted by the author 9 February 2016. 60. Moore,
intervivew. 61. Lt Col Shane Hall (Headquarters, USAFE, Ramstein
Air Base, Germany), in-
terview conducted by the author at 8 February 2016. 62. Hall,
interview. 63. Steven Hinders (Headquarters, USAFE, Ramstein Air
Base, Germany), inter-
view conducted by the author 9 February 2016. 64. McNulty,
interview. 65. Heritage Foundation (Washington DC, Heritage
Foundation), multiple inter-
views by the author 2 March 2016. 66. Center for New American
Security (Washington, DC, New American Secu-
rity), multiple interviews by the author 2 March 2016. 67. Signed
in Washington DC, London, and Moscow, 27 January 1967, please
see
the US Department of State. “Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.”
68. US Department of State, “Treaty on Principles.” 69. US
Department of State, “Treaty on Principles.” 70. US Department of
State, “Treaty on Principles.” 71. LeMay Center, A Rapid Global
Effects. 72. Sercel, Sub- Orbital Transport. 73. US Department of
State, “Treaty on Principles.” 74. US Department of State, “Treaty
on Principles.” 75. US Department of State, “Treaty on Principles.”
76. US Department of State, “Treaty on Principles.” 77. Sercel,
Sub- Orbital Transport. 78. Sercel, Sub- Orbital Transport. 79.
Sercel, Sub- Orbital Transport. 80. Sercel, Sub- Orbital Transport.
81. Sercel, Sub- Orbital Transport. 82. Sercel, Sub- Orbital
Transport. 83. Sercel, Sub- Orbital Transport. 84. Selva, Trends in
Military Technology, comments. 85. Heritage Foundation, multiple
interviews. 86. Center for New American Security, multiple
interviews. 87. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 9.
30
88. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 49. 89. Center for New American
Security, multiple interviews. 90. Star and Lendon, “Russian
Fighter Came within 15 Feet of Us Air Force Jet.” 91. Zakaria, The
Post-American World, 49. 92. Corr and Michaelides, “Effect of South
China Sea Air Strips on the Range of
Chinese Surface-to-Air Missiles and the J-10 Fighter.” 93. LeMay
Center. A Rapid Global Effects. 94. Ideas and information for this
paragraph were inspired from wording used
from LeMay Center Wargaming Directorate personnel in 2015 and 2016.
95. LeMay Center Wargaming Directorate personnel, wording. 96.
Hall, interview. 97. “Anti Aircraft Systems 2012,” Military
Periscope. 98. Graphic provided by RussianDefence.net 99. Heritage
Foundation, multiple interviews. 100. LeMay Center, A Rapid Global
Effects. 101. Sercel, Sub- Orbital Transport. 102. Scott Carsetter
(Washington DC, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analyis
Space Workshop), comments made 9 and 10 November 2015. 103.
Heritage Foundation, multiple interviews. 104. LeMay Center, A
Rapid Global Effects. 105. Center for New American Security,
multiple interviews. 106. Woodrow Meeks inspired ideas for this
paragraph from a meeting on
Rapid Global Effects Capability Concept,” (meeting, Air University,
Maxwell AFB, AL, 21 October 2015).
107. Timeline based on estimates from AFRL and SpaceWorks.
31
Abbreviations Abbreviation Definition
AB Air Base ADC Adaptive Domain Control AF Air Force AFRL Air Force
Research Laboratory AI Artificial intelligence BMD Ballistic
Missile Defense C2 Command and Control CHAMP Counter-electronics
High Power Microwave
Advanced Missile Project COMREL Command relationships DARPA Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency DOD Department of Defense FOBS
Fractional orbital bombardment systems FOC Future Operating Concept
GIISR Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance ICBM Intecontinental Ballistic Missiles ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais-
sance JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff NSS National Security Strategy PED
Processing, exploitation and dissemination RAF Royal Air Force RGM
Rapid Global Mobility ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps RPA
Remotely-piloted aircraft SAM Surface-to-air-Missiles
32
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