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A Presentation By
LT COL LEONIDAS L HIDALGO (CAV) PA (With the ARMY EOD BN)
To The Meeting of
Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the CCW, Amended Protocol II to the Convention
(19 - 20 April 2010)
I. Brief IED History
II. CY 09, IED Incidents
III. The IEDs
IV. Analysis
V. Lessons Learned
VI. Actions Taken
I. Brief IED History
II. CY 09, IED Incidents
III. The IEDs
IV. Analysis
V. Lessons Learned
VI. Actions Taken
The significant use of IEDs started at the height of AFP’s campaign against the MILF in CY 2000
Frequent targets then were Nat’l Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power line Towers in Mindanao
Recorded IED Incidents
60 incidents in 2000
27 in 2001
48 in CY 02 and 41 in CY 03
The increase from 2001 to 2002 due to alliance of MILF’shardliners with the terror groups Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)and Abu Sayaff Group (ASG)
The significant use of IEDs started at the height of AFP’s campaign against the MILF in CY 2000
Frequent targets then were Nat’l Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power line Towers in Mindanao
Recorded IED Incidents
60 incidents in 2000
27 in 2001
48 in CY 02 and 41 in CY 03
The increase from 2001 to 2002 due to alliance of MILF’shardliners with the terror groups Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)and Abu Sayaff Group (ASG)
IED incidents reduced to 24 in CY 2004 and then 15 in CY 2005
Due to significant developments in the government-initiated peace talks
CY 06 to CY 08
Gradual but steady rise of IED incidents until the 1st semester of CY 08 with public places and business centers as targets
Sharp rise of IED incidents after the failed signing of the MOA-AD in Aug 08.
National Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power-line Towers were again one of the primary targets
IED incidents reduced to 24 in CY 2004 and then 15 in CY 2005
Due to significant developments in the government-initiated peace talks
CY 06 to CY 08
Gradual but steady rise of IED incidents until the 1st semester of CY 08 with public places and business centers as targets
Sharp rise of IED incidents after the failed signing of the MOA-AD in Aug 08.
National Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power-line Towers were again one of the primary targets
Calendar Year 2009
Maintained rise of IED incidents with urban centers, transport facilities as targets to include NGCP Power-line Towers
“Al Khobar” Group
Claimed responsibility on the IED attacks in Southern and Central Mindanao
Not to implicate the MILF with the terror attacks
Lawless MILF Groups (LMG) also led to the rise of IED incidents in CY 09 which generally targets government troops.
Calendar Year 2009
Maintained rise of IED incidents with urban centers, transport facilities as targets to include NGCP Power-line Towers
“Al Khobar” Group
Claimed responsibility on the IED attacks in Southern and Central Mindanao
Not to implicate the MILF with the terror attacks
Lawless MILF Groups (LMG) also led to the rise of IED incidents in CY 09 which generally targets government troops.
21
27
18
1211 10
4 31
4 3 335
0 0
36
46
25
18
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter
Terrorism
Extortion
Political
Feud
Total
19
8
0 1
7
1 0
29
12
2 1 2 0 0
86
1
7
2 0 1
69
0 0 0 0 35
10
15
20
25
30
35
1st Qtr
2nd Qtr
3rd Qtr
4th Qtr
2028
16 9
73
16 189 9
5236
46
25 18
125
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Total
Completed Attack
Rendered Safe
Total
2 9 8 0196 11 20
0
3720
77110
11
218
30
99
142
11
282
2 2 4 80
50
100
150
200
250
300
1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Toital
KIA (Mil/PNP)
Killed (Civ)
WIA (Mil/PNP)
Wounded
Main charge – MOL 50m commercial Detonating CordBooster – MOL 3m coiled Commercial Detonating Cord in a sardine can Detonator – Two (2) each Improvised Electric BCPower-source – 6/9V wet cell batteryContainer – cylindrical metal container w/ cone linerMeans of Initiation –Command activated via “firing wire”
Recovered in the area of Southern Mindanao
Main charge – 23 cylinders (125 g) “water gel” commercial explosivesBooster – MOL 3mtrs coiled commercial Detonating Cord in a sardine can.Detonator – Two (2) each Improvised Electric BCPower-source - 6/9V wet cell batteryContainer – Freon (Refrigerant) tankMeans of Initiation – Command activated via “firing wire”
Recovered in the area of Southern Mindanao
Main charge – MOL 10Kg Aluminized Ammonium NitrateBooster – MOL 3m coiled commercial Detonating Cord in a sardine canDetonator – 2 ea improvised Electric BCPower-source 6/9V wet cell batteryContainer – cylindrical metal container w/ cone linerMeans of Initiation –Command activated via “firing wire”Recovered in the area of
Northern Mindanao
Recovered in the area of Northern Mindanao
Main charge – ½ kg TNT & Picric Acid Booster – MOL .25m commercial Detonating Cord Detonator – 1 each Improvised Electric BCPower-source – 6/9V wet cell battery Container – metal container fashioned to that of M18A1 APers claymore mineEnhanced Fragmentation – cut corrugated steel barsMeans of Initiation – Command activated via firing wire
Main charge – One (1) rd Ctg, 60mm, HEBooster – Tetryl (standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round)Detonator – One (1) Improvised Elect BCPower-source – 2 each 9V BatteriesDisguise Container – NoneMeans of Initiation – Victim activated via trip wire w/ improvised slide switch
Recovered along the main road towards Hqs 603rd Bde, Camp Abu Bak’r, Barira, Maguindanao
Main charge – One (1) rd Ctg, 60mm, HEBooster – standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round (Tetryl)Detonator – One (1) each Improvised Elect BCPower-source – 2 each 9V BatteriesDisguise Container – NoneMeans of Initiation – Victim activated via trip wire w/ clothes pin
Recovered along a foot trail in the hinterlands of Camp Abu Bak’r, Barira, Maguindanao
An anti-lift and anti-open switch
Main charge – One (1) rd Ctg, 60mm, HEBooster – standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round (Tetryl)Detonator – One (1) each Improvised Elect BCPower-source – 2 each 9V BatteriesDisguise Container – Lunch Box (Plastic)Means of Initiation – Two way (Timer rundown & Victim activated
Main charge – Two (2) rds, Ctg, 60mm, HEBooster – standard booster of the Ctg, 60mm, HE round (Tetryl)Detonator – One (1) each Improvised Elect BCPower-source – 2 each 9V BatteriesContainer – Carton BoxMeans of Initiation – Command activated via Remote Control Toy
IED Nr 01IED Nr 01Command detonated means of initiation via Hand Held RadioNote 1: Glass jar containing the same explosive as IED #2’s main charge was used as a booster.
Command detonated means of initiation via Hand Held RadioNote 1: Glass jar containing the same explosive as IED #2’s main charge was used as a booster.
A 20ltr plastic container served as the IED container
A sack served as disguise container for the IED
Possibly TNT powder mixed with picric acid and ANFO as the main charge
KenwoodModel: TH‐234Freq: 173.11
booster
two 9v batteries
plastic
cell phone
9V batteryCommand detonated means of initiation via Nokia 3310 cell phone. Anti-personnel with 10-12 lb main charge-Possibly TNT powder
IED Nr 02
4 liter containerMOL 12lbs TNT powder as Main Charge with cut rebar and ball bearings as enhanced fragmentation.
(3) IED’s w/ advanced circuitry(4) 4-liter plastic containers filled w/TNT(5) Improvised pressure switches(1) 200 gram can filled w/ Tetryl explosive
(1) Plastic bottle w/schematic drawings(1) 60mm HE mortar
Anti-lift & Anti-open device/switches
Use of 555 IC (Time Delay & Possible RCIED)
It is suspected that this device works similar to the (3) IED’s recovered from the ASG Camp at Tubora hill due to the same circuit board and components.Due to disruption of the device, exact placement of all the components could not be determined but initial analysis suggests that the device would be initiated by anti-open, anti-lift, or time…whichever event took place first.
It is suspected that this device works similar to the (3) IED’s recovered from the ASG Camp at Tubora hill due to the same circuit board and components.Due to disruption of the device, exact placement of all the components could not be determined but initial analysis suggests that the device would be initiated by anti-open, anti-lift, or time…whichever event took place first.
One (1) 9Volt Battery (Power Source) 9V
The circuit wires
24
Fuel Tank filled with HE (Picric Acid, TNT & Comp B)
Improvised Elec Blasting Cap
Quartz Table Clock w/ One (1) AA Btry
Booster (Booster Charge for Ctg, 81mm, HE
• VBIED with a Timer Rundown Means of Initiation
• It has various Artillery Ammunition (UXO) as Main Charge.
• VBIED with a Timer Rundown Means of Initiation • It has various Artillery Ammunition (UXO) as Main
Charge.
The motorcycle’s Air Cleaner was used to contain the IED components.
Command detonated means of initiation via Cell Phone. One of the Two (2) IEDs that detonated on same day that wounded One (1) Bomb Tech from 63rd EOD Tm.
Command detonated means of initiation via Cell Phone. One of the Two (2) IEDs that detonated on same day that wounded One (1) Bomb Tech from 63rd EOD Tm.
Command detonated means of initiation w/ an electronic timer arming switch (UA 741 IC).
Command detonated via Two-Way Radio
Recovered from Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members in Midsayap, North Cotabato
Command-detonated means of initiation via a remote control activated Doorbell as switch.
A papaya fruit inside a plastic bag was used as a container to hide the IED.
A wooden box (containing 2 RPG warheads) with a pressure type means of initiation when stepped upon
An IED with a “Jetmatic” water pump body as casing and has a command means of initiation via 3310 CP
An RPG 2 Launcher rigged as an IED with command means of initiation to fire the RPG round via a 3310 CP
New People’s Army (NPA) IEDs are composed of two (2) types.
Anti Tank/Material, shaped charge to harness the optimum blast effect.
Anti personnel, patterned the design of M18A1 AP claymore mine to focus the direction of the blast to a desired target.
Both type of IED are emplaced as a road side IED to ambush passing government troops, mounted or infantry.
Command means of initiation via a firing wire.
New People’s Army (NPA) IEDs are composed of two (2) types.
Anti Tank/Material, shaped charge to harness the optimum blast effect.
Anti personnel, patterned the design of M18A1 AP claymore mine to focus the direction of the blast to a desired target.
Both type of IED are emplaced as a road side IED to ambush passing government troops, mounted or infantry.
Command means of initiation via a firing wire.
IEDs in Central and Western Mindanao evolved from simple to a more complex means of initiation.
Victim activated (Electro-Mechanical)
Timer Run down using alarm clocks
Initiation through Cell Phones, HH Radios, Radio Controlled devices and Remote Doorbell Chimes
Others has electronic timer arming system (555 & UA 741 IC) with remote means of initiation
IEDs in Central and Western Mindanao evolved from simple to a more complex means of initiation.
Victim activated (Electro-Mechanical)
Timer Run down using alarm clocks
Initiation through Cell Phones, HH Radios, Radio Controlled devices and Remote Doorbell Chimes
Others has electronic timer arming system (555 & UA 741 IC) with remote means of initiation
Main charge of choice is generally unexploded explosive ordnance.
Different disguise containers are used to blend the device with the environment.
IED used in targeting Nat’l Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power line towers has multiple main charges connected in parallel to the power source.
Main charge of choice is generally unexploded explosive ordnance.
Different disguise containers are used to blend the device with the environment.
IED used in targeting Nat’l Grid Corp of the Phil (NGCP) Power line towers has multiple main charges connected in parallel to the power source.
Elect Circuits recovered from Mohammad Baehaqi
Elect Circuits from TRANSCO Tower Nr 100, Bagontapay, M’lang, Ncot, 25 Jun 08 and TRANSCO Compound, New Carmen, Tacurong
City, Sultan Kudarat, 05 June 08
Mohammad Baehaqi, aka Salman/Latif/ Tatoh
Indonesian JI operative captured on 17 Feb 08 in Davao Oriental Provinceelectronic circuits used in most IED attacks are the same with the recovered electronic circuits
Mohammad Baehaqi, aka Salman/Latif/ Tatoh
Indonesian JI operative captured on 17 Feb 08 in Davao Oriental Provinceelectronic circuits used in most IED attacks are the same with the recovered electronic circuits
Post Mortem Recovery fm victims
Reference Components
Recovered fm Jimbaran, NyomanCafe suicide bombings in Bali,
Indonesia on 01 Oct 05
Bandung Device, 2003, Item retained by Indonesian Authorities
Electronic Switch, recovered from Mohammad Baehaqi
The similarity of IED signatures indicate that some threat groups have undergone the same training.
The JI have conducted trainings on IED construction attended by personalities from different threat groups in order to sow greater terror
Electronic devices used as component of IEDs are available in any electronic shops.
Primary source of IED main charges are dud fired (Unexploded Explosive Ordnance) artillery rounds.
The similarity of IED signatures indicate that some threat groups have undergone the same training.
The JI have conducted trainings on IED construction attended by personalities from different threat groups in order to sow greater terror
Electronic devices used as component of IEDs are available in any electronic shops.
Primary source of IED main charges are dud fired (Unexploded Explosive Ordnance) artillery rounds.
Improper disposal of misfired artillery ammunition leads to the recovery of same by the enemy recycling it as an IED main charge.
The use of IED by the terrorists in a firefight is a very effective counter mobility measure.
Operating troops fell victims to IED due to limited knowledge regarding same.
EOD Technicians have limited Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in countering the IED threat.
EOD units are still poorly equipped to combat IEDs.
Improper disposal of misfired artillery ammunition leads to the recovery of same by the enemy recycling it as an IED main charge.
The use of IED by the terrorists in a firefight is a very effective counter mobility measure.
Operating troops fell victims to IED due to limited knowledge regarding same.
EOD Technicians have limited Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in countering the IED threat.
EOD units are still poorly equipped to combat IEDs.
Rationalized the deployment of EOD personnel in order to provide continuous EOD support to Army units in priority areas.
Conduct of in-service counter-IED operations training taking into consideration the lessons learned from past IED incidents.
Conduct of Explosive related trainings such as Mine – Countermine and IED Awareness Training in coordination with DTUs and other units in order to educate AFP personnel.
Rationalized the deployment of EOD personnel in order to provide continuous EOD support to Army units in priority areas.
Conduct of in-service counter-IED operations training taking into consideration the lessons learned from past IED incidents.
Conduct of Explosive related trainings such as Mine – Countermine and IED Awareness Training in coordination with DTUs and other units in order to educate AFP personnel.
Conduct of public information campaign and seminars on IED Awareness and Bomb Threat Management in coordination with LGUstargeting various sectors of society to protect the populace from IED hazards.
Conduct of Ammunition Surveillance and Inspection of issued ammunition to Army Field Units in order to ensure serviceability of ammunition when used.
Field improvisation of EOD tools & equipment
Conduct of public information campaign and seminars on IED Awareness and Bomb Threat Management in coordination with LGUstargeting various sectors of society to protect the populace from IED hazards.
Conduct of Ammunition Surveillance and Inspection of issued ammunition to Army Field Units in order to ensure serviceability of ammunition when used.
Field improvisation of EOD tools & equipment
Conduct of Ammunition Storage and Handling seminars/trainings in coordination with DTUsand Forward Service Support Units (FSSUs) to educate AFP personnel in the maintenance of their issued ammunition.
Active participation in the formulation and advocacy of the Inter-Agency Protocol on Explosives-related Incident Investigations under the auspices of NCTU, ATC.
Requisition of EOD essential equipment to higher headquarters to upgrade the capability of EOD units.
Conduct of Ammunition Storage and Handling seminars/trainings in coordination with DTUsand Forward Service Support Units (FSSUs) to educate AFP personnel in the maintenance of their issued ammunition.
Active participation in the formulation and advocacy of the Inter-Agency Protocol on Explosives-related Incident Investigations under the auspices of NCTU, ATC.
Requisition of EOD essential equipment to higher headquarters to upgrade the capability of EOD units.
