A Policy of Rock: How Rock and Roll Undermined the

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University UndergraduateJournal of History, Series II

Volume 16 Article 14

2011

A Policy of Rock: How Rock and Roll Underminedthe Communist Revolution in Cold War RussiaNeal Albright

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Recommended CitationAlbright, Neal (2011) "A Policy of Rock: How Rock and Roll Undermined the Communist Revolution in Cold War Russia," HistoricalPerspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II: Vol. 16 , Article 14.Available at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol16/iss1/14

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142 Historical Perspectives May 2011

pathologization survive. It must be eradicated in orderto move American society forward into the next step inrace relations.

Christina Forst is currently a junior History majorand Philosophy minor with a Pre-Law emphasis. Thispast spring, she presented this paper at the NorthernCalifornia Phi Alpha Theta conference. After gradua-tion, Christina plans on attending law school.

A Policy of Rock 143

A Policy of Rock: How Rock and RollUndermined the Communist Revolutionin Cold War Russia

Neal Albright

“Capitalism was the engine of rock’s develop-ment as a global cultural phenomenon.”1

Today, we know how the story of the Soviet Unionends. In 1921, however, at the end of four years ofbitter civil war, the future seemed limitless, andVladimir Lenin was prepared to take full advantage ofit. Lenin’s ultimate goals went further than simplecompetent governance. His party, the Bolsheviks, “tookpower with an extraordinarily ambitious programaimed...at remaking humanity.”2

As the civil war wound down and Bolshevik victoryappeared imminent, Lenin turned his attentions tocatalyzing a Russian economic recovery in the wake offour tumultuous and destructive years. In line with hisvision for a worldwide Socialist revolution, Leninsought to modernize Russia into a twentieth centurypower. Observing the newly ascendent great power inthe West, Lenin came to the conclusion that America’ssuccess lay in its technological achievements, espe-cially in its innovative uses of electricity. By co-optingthe American focus on technological modernity, Lenin

Thomas Cushman, Notes from the Underground (New1

York: Albany State University of New York Press 1995), 19. Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from Beginning to2

End (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 30.

1

Albright: A Policy of Rock

Published by Scholar Commons, 2011


believed that Russia could become an even greaterpower. As he famously asserted, “Communism = Sovietpower + electrification.”3

Moreover, modern industry and the electricity itrelied on would also be crucial to achieving Lenin’spredicted Communist apotheosis. In a 1920 speech, hedeclared that "...the organization of industry on thebasis of modern, advanced technology, on electrifica-tion...will put an end to the division between town andcountry, will make it possible to raise the level ofculture in the countryside and to overcome, even inthe most remote corners of land, backwardness,ignorance, poverty, disease, and barbarism." Lenin4

stressed that “industry cannot be developed withoutelectrification.” Consequently, “without reconstructionof industry on lines of large-scale machine production,socialist construction will obviously remain only a setof decrees.” Throughout its seventy years of existence,5

this theme of technological and industrial modernityremained central not only to the USSR’s nationalgoals, but also to its core ideology.

Lenin died in 1924 predicting a coming globalSocialist revolution, with urban industrialization andtechnological prowess as its catalysts. Perhaps heforesaw automobiles replacing horses for personaltransport, nuclear weapons threatening the veryexistence of humanity, or communication technologyconnecting the planet on an unprecedented scale.However, it is unlikely that the brilliant Socialist could


augur the circumstances wherein, thirty years laterand across the world in the United States, a generationof young musicians would plug electricity into guitarsand subsequently popularize a new form of music thatwould in turn emigrate throughout the world, includ-ing into Lenin’s oft-purged Soviet Union. He could notknow that this music would then collectivize societaldiscontent and contribute to the eventual fall of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics. The grand Com-munist apotheosis, achievable only with technologicalmodernity, would be undone, in part, by the technol-ogy that enabled the loud, electric musical stylings ofdissatisfied, bored, and rock and roll-obsessed kids.

In the twenty years since the dissolution of theUSSR and end of the Cold War, an array of both Sovietand American scholars have studied the effects ofWestern rock and roll music on Soviet governmentpolicy and on the daily lives of Soviet citizens. Thesescholars generally agree that rock and roll music helda significant role in both improving the standing ofAmerica and the West in the minds of Soviet citizenswhile also distracting from and undermining Commu-nist ideology. Furthermore, a broad consensusemerges throughout Soviet rock studies that thepopularity of Western culture contributed to a culturalrebellion that, by its inherent nature, was at odds withSoviet policy and ideology.

Scholars disagree about the exact nature of thisrevolt. Thomas Cushman argues that rock musiccreated a Russian counterculture which activelyprotested against Soviet policies, akin to the Americancounterculture of the 1960s. In contrast, AlexeiYurchak writes that rock and roll merely created apolitical apathy among the youth, resulting in an

2

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 16 [2011], Art. 14

http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol16/iss1/14


believed that Russia could become an even greaterpower. As he famously asserted, “Communism = Sovietpower + electrification.”3

Moreover, modern industry and the electricity itrelied on would also be crucial to achieving Lenin’spredicted Communist apotheosis. In a 1920 speech, hedeclared that "...the organization of industry on thebasis of modern, advanced technology, on electrifica-tion...will put an end to the division between town andcountry, will make it possible to raise the level ofculture in the countryside and to overcome, even inthe most remote corners of land, backwardness,ignorance, poverty, disease, and barbarism." Lenin4

stressed that “industry cannot be developed withoutelectrification.” Consequently, “without reconstructionof industry on lines of large-scale machine production,socialist construction will obviously remain only a setof decrees.” Throughout its seventy years of existence,5

this theme of technological and industrial modernityremained central not only to the USSR’s nationalgoals, but also to its core ideology.

Lenin died in 1924 predicting a coming globalSocialist revolution, with urban industrialization andtechnological prowess as its catalysts. Perhaps heforesaw automobiles replacing horses for personaltransport, nuclear weapons threatening the veryexistence of humanity, or communication technologyconnecting the planet on an unprecedented scale.However, it is unlikely that the brilliant Socialist could


augur the circumstances wherein, thirty years laterand across the world in the United States, a generationof young musicians would plug electricity into guitarsand subsequently popularize a new form of music thatwould in turn emigrate throughout the world, includ-ing into Lenin’s oft-purged Soviet Union. He could notknow that this music would then collectivize societaldiscontent and contribute to the eventual fall of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics. The grand Com-munist apotheosis, achievable only with technologicalmodernity, would be undone, in part, by the technol-ogy that enabled the loud, electric musical stylings ofdissatisfied, bored, and rock and roll-obsessed kids.

In the twenty years since the dissolution of theUSSR and end of the Cold War, an array of both Sovietand American scholars have studied the effects ofWestern rock and roll music on Soviet governmentpolicy and on the daily lives of Soviet citizens. Thesescholars generally agree that rock and roll music helda significant role in both improving the standing ofAmerica and the West in the minds of Soviet citizenswhile also distracting from and undermining Commu-nist ideology. Furthermore, a broad consensusemerges throughout Soviet rock studies that thepopularity of Western culture contributed to a culturalrebellion that, by its inherent nature, was at odds withSoviet policy and ideology.

Scholars disagree about the exact nature of thisrevolt. Thomas Cushman argues that rock musiccreated a Russian counterculture which activelyprotested against Soviet policies, akin to the Americancounterculture of the 1960s. In contrast, AlexeiYurchak writes that rock and roll merely created apolitical apathy among the youth, resulting in an

3




active disinterest and withdrawal from Communismand its tenets. In a country founded predominantlyupon the ideal of a citizenry united in solidarity withinSocialism, such a profound disconnect would thereforebe fatal to the authority of the State’s social contractbetween citizen and government.

This paper argues that the concept of technologicalmodernity was central to Soviet Communist ideologyand intertwined with the rock and roll explosion of thelatter half of the 20th century. In interesting and ironicways, serving to undermine its own legitimacy, theSoviet government inadvertently instigated and perpet-uated rock and roll awareness, and its harsh reflectionon Soviet society. By seeking to contain the ideologicalpower of rock and roll, the regime implicitly acknowl-edged the techno-superiority of the West. In the end,rock and roll and its related technologies confirmedwhat most Soviets already suspected: the West hadwon the war of technological modernity.6

1957-1964: Krushchev, De-Stalinization, and aSingle Voice

Blank tape was hard to find, but the stores hadplenty of tapes with old Revolutionary anthemsin stock...on my tapes you could hear bursts ofthe Red Army Choir between the sides of StickyFingers.7

Magnitizdat


In 1953, Joseph Stalin suffered a stroke and soonafter died. Hundreds of thousands packed Moscow’spublic areas, jostling for the chance to view his dis-played corpse. Stalin had institutionalized a statesystem whose key tenets included mass murder,forced collectivization, and omnipresent secret police.It was also the only life many Soviet people had everknown, and Stalin’s death evoked a deep and uncer-tain anxiety about the future.8

Nikita Khrushchev emerged victorious amid thechaotic power struggle to succeed the dictator.Khrushchev became what Soviet historian Peter Kenezdescribed as, “the last Soviet leader with a firm beliefin the superiority of the Marxist-Leninist ideology” and“a fervent Communist...[who] never doubted the justiceof the cause.” Khrushchev instituted a series of re-forms toward this end - including the period of de-Stalinization. Notably, Khrushchev denounced the“cult of personality,” the concept of idolizing a politicalfigure in the popular imagination in order to obfuscatecontroversial (and usually brutal) policies. UnderKhrushchev’s watch, Soviet Russia charted a moremoderate (though still repressive) path.

One effect of de-Stalinization was a resulting“cultural thaw.” By the mid-1950s, “many of the old[artistic] restrictions were lifted, and every componentof Soviet culture benefited.” Kenez asserts that the newsociety allowed Soviet intellectuals to “distinguishbetween friends and foes of change.” As a result, “fromthis time on...the Soviet Union ceased to be a totalitar-ian society.” Still, officially published and distributed9

Kenez, 185.8

Ibid, 191.9

4




active disinterest and withdrawal from Communismand its tenets. In a country founded predominantlyupon the ideal of a citizenry united in solidarity withinSocialism, such a profound disconnect would thereforebe fatal to the authority of the State’s social contractbetween citizen and government.

This paper argues that the concept of technologicalmodernity was central to Soviet Communist ideologyand intertwined with the rock and roll explosion of thelatter half of the 20th century. In interesting and ironicways, serving to undermine its own legitimacy, theSoviet government inadvertently instigated and perpet-uated rock and roll awareness, and its harsh reflectionon Soviet society. By seeking to contain the ideologicalpower of rock and roll, the regime implicitly acknowl-edged the techno-superiority of the West. In the end,rock and roll and its related technologies confirmedwhat most Soviets already suspected: the West hadwon the war of technological modernity.6

1957-1964: Krushchev, De-Stalinization, and aSingle Voice

Blank tape was hard to find, but the stores hadplenty of tapes with old Revolutionary anthemsin stock...on my tapes you could hear bursts ofthe Red Army Choir between the sides of StickyFingers.7

Magnitizdat


In 1953, Joseph Stalin suffered a stroke and soonafter died. Hundreds of thousands packed Moscow’spublic areas, jostling for the chance to view his dis-played corpse. Stalin had institutionalized a statesystem whose key tenets included mass murder,forced collectivization, and omnipresent secret police.It was also the only life many Soviet people had everknown, and Stalin’s death evoked a deep and uncer-tain anxiety about the future.8

Nikita Khrushchev emerged victorious amid thechaotic power struggle to succeed the dictator.Khrushchev became what Soviet historian Peter Kenezdescribed as, “the last Soviet leader with a firm beliefin the superiority of the Marxist-Leninist ideology” and“a fervent Communist...[who] never doubted the justiceof the cause.” Khrushchev instituted a series of re-forms toward this end - including the period of de-Stalinization. Notably, Khrushchev denounced the“cult of personality,” the concept of idolizing a politicalfigure in the popular imagination in order to obfuscatecontroversial (and usually brutal) policies. UnderKhrushchev’s watch, Soviet Russia charted a moremoderate (though still repressive) path.

One effect of de-Stalinization was a resulting“cultural thaw.” By the mid-1950s, “many of the old[artistic] restrictions were lifted, and every componentof Soviet culture benefited.” Kenez asserts that the newsociety allowed Soviet intellectuals to “distinguishbetween friends and foes of change.” As a result, “fromthis time on...the Soviet Union ceased to be a totalitar-ian society.” Still, officially published and distributed9

Kenez, 185.8

Ibid, 191.9

5




works were subject to government approval, and mediawere always subject to the political whims of theState.10

In an effort to showcase its post-Stalinist societaltransformation, the Kremlin hosted in 1957 theMoscow Youth Festival. The State gathered tens ofthousands of teenagers from across the USSR andinvited musical acts from both sides of the Iron Cur-tain to perform, including groups from Great Britain.The British groups brought an array of unorthodoxinstruments, including electric guitars. What they didwith them horrified the older generation in attendance,but “the rock and roll numbers aroused great interestamong the youth of the socialist camp.” This was not11

to be an isolated event but a vanguard of not only anew era of popular electrified music, but a new era ofhow the populace interacted with its government, andeach other.

By the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s, publicdemand for Western rock and roll music had spread.Most of the music was illegal and not available forpurchase from official commercial venues. The youthacquired the forbidden tunes anyway, mainly throughthe emergence of domestic electrical technology thatallowed rock and roll music to be pirated and distrib-uted ubiquitously throughout the USSR. This distribu-tion of Western culture was itself illegal and thus anact of protest, and the issue gained traction whenunderground Soviet musicians began writing their ownsongs using Russian lyrics and distributing that on


the same networks, creating a collective acknowledge-ment of status quo discontent. First on discarded x-rayplates that doubled as second-hand ‘vinyl’ records(known as “records on ribs” ), and then on tape12

recorders, this distribution was primarily possiblethrough magnitizdat; literally “tape-recorder culture.”

The concept of magnitizdat illustrates beautifullythe democratizing effect that technology had upon theSoviet masses. Specifically, the release of State-manu-factured tape recorders starting in 1960 had hugelysignificant and unintended consequences on thenature of public communication. The machinesallowed the population to spread music and thus ideasthat were not officially sanctioned by the state censors.The 128,000 recorders that appeared on the market in1960 sold out quickly, and by the end of the decade,sales numbered more than a million units per year.13

Party leaders and ideological censors seemed to haveno conception of the potential impact of the devices, orhow they would be used.

As de-Stalinization continued into the late 1950sand early 1960s, social criticism gained in bothpopularity and government acceptance. Comedy clubsfeatured acts satirizing the hubris of the contemporarySoviet state, while young singer-songwriters performedprotest songs for groups of friends in private areas. Aprominent Eastern German musician, Wolf Biermann,achieved exceptional notoriety with his sparse guitarplaying, catchy melodies and pointed, political lyrics.Among others, artists such as Vladimir Vysotsky and

Artemy Troitsky, Back in the USSR (London: Omnibus12

Press, 1987), 19. Ryback, 37.13

6




works were subject to government approval, and mediawere always subject to the political whims of theState.10

In an effort to showcase its post-Stalinist societaltransformation, the Kremlin hosted in 1957 theMoscow Youth Festival. The State gathered tens ofthousands of teenagers from across the USSR andinvited musical acts from both sides of the Iron Cur-tain to perform, including groups from Great Britain.The British groups brought an array of unorthodoxinstruments, including electric guitars. What they didwith them horrified the older generation in attendance,but “the rock and roll numbers aroused great interestamong the youth of the socialist camp.” This was not11

to be an isolated event but a vanguard of not only anew era of popular electrified music, but a new era ofhow the populace interacted with its government, andeach other.

By the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s, publicdemand for Western rock and roll music had spread.Most of the music was illegal and not available forpurchase from official commercial venues. The youthacquired the forbidden tunes anyway, mainly throughthe emergence of domestic electrical technology thatallowed rock and roll music to be pirated and distrib-uted ubiquitously throughout the USSR. This distribu-tion of Western culture was itself illegal and thus anact of protest, and the issue gained traction whenunderground Soviet musicians began writing their ownsongs using Russian lyrics and distributing that on


the same networks, creating a collective acknowledge-ment of status quo discontent. First on discarded x-rayplates that doubled as second-hand ‘vinyl’ records(known as “records on ribs” ), and then on tape12

recorders, this distribution was primarily possiblethrough magnitizdat; literally “tape-recorder culture.”

The concept of magnitizdat illustrates beautifullythe democratizing effect that technology had upon theSoviet masses. Specifically, the release of State-manu-factured tape recorders starting in 1960 had hugelysignificant and unintended consequences on thenature of public communication. The machinesallowed the population to spread music and thus ideasthat were not officially sanctioned by the state censors.The 128,000 recorders that appeared on the market in1960 sold out quickly, and by the end of the decade,sales numbered more than a million units per year.13

Party leaders and ideological censors seemed to haveno conception of the potential impact of the devices, orhow they would be used.

As de-Stalinization continued into the late 1950sand early 1960s, social criticism gained in bothpopularity and government acceptance. Comedy clubsfeatured acts satirizing the hubris of the contemporarySoviet state, while young singer-songwriters performedprotest songs for groups of friends in private areas. Aprominent Eastern German musician, Wolf Biermann,achieved exceptional notoriety with his sparse guitarplaying, catchy melodies and pointed, political lyrics.Among others, artists such as Vladimir Vysotsky and

Artemy Troitsky, Back in the USSR (London: Omnibus12

Press, 1987), 19. Ryback, 37.13

7




Bulat Okudzhava also found success with similarsongs. Collectively, these musicians and the otherslike them became known as the Bards of Discontent. 14

Bulat Okudzhava had direct experience with theterrorism of the Stalin era. Though serving no time inlabor camps himself, “his father had been ‘liquidated’by Stalin in 1937 and his mother banished toSiberia.” After Stalin’s death, many political prisoners15

had remained incarcerated for years, until by 1956 itwas “impossible to keep most political prisoners in thecamps any longer.” The Soviet population surelynoticed “the return of so many of Stalin’s victims,”making “the Stalinist horrors visible to all.” Perhaps16

this prisoner return influenced Bulat Okudzhava towrite and eventually become the first hero of themagnitizdat.

Mr. Okudzhava began composing in the mid-1950s,performing songs in his apartment for the enjoymentof friends. At some point in the early sixties, an audi-ence member with a Soviet-made tape recorder cap-tured a typical performance, which included referencesto love as well as criticism of the Stalinist years, twotaboo subjects. Almost overnight, two things explodedin popularity: Bulat Okudzhava, and the concept oftrading in underground music. No longer “was themusic of the bards restricted to small groups of ten ortwenty people who gathered in private apartments.Tapes with underground songs soon circulated by themillions.”17


Though the controversial subject matter ofOkudzhava’s songs surely drew interest in his mate-rial, it may have been the very concept of sharingofficially unapproved ideas in a conspiratorial mannerthat appealed to the population. Vladimir Frumkin, amusician who graduated from the Leningrad Conser-vatory of Music, describes the impact of Okudzhava aslarger than its content. Frumkin summarizes thesituation:

“Before Okudzhava, the Soviet song industryhad virtually no competition from within thecountry. The state monopoly on songs seemedunshakeable. Suddenly it was discovered thatone person could compose a song and make itfamous, without the Union of Soviet Composers,with its creative sections and department ofpropaganda, without help of popular singers,choirs and orchestras, without publishinghouses, radio and television, film and recordcompanies, editors and censors.”18

Okudzhava proved that one person, with the rightmessage and the right means of spreading that mes-sage, could profoundly impact the society in which heor she lived. This smacked of individuality in therigidly collectivist USSR, and revealed that officialcensorship could be undermined on a mass scale.

Magnitizdat listeners experienced more than musicon their pirated tapes. On a typical recording, “oneheard...the presence of the audience: chairs scrapingacross the floor, a bottle knocking against glasses,

Ryback, 45.18

8




Bulat Okudzhava also found success with similarsongs. Collectively, these musicians and the otherslike them became known as the Bards of Discontent. 14

Bulat Okudzhava had direct experience with theterrorism of the Stalin era. Though serving no time inlabor camps himself, “his father had been ‘liquidated’by Stalin in 1937 and his mother banished toSiberia.” After Stalin’s death, many political prisoners15

had remained incarcerated for years, until by 1956 itwas “impossible to keep most political prisoners in thecamps any longer.” The Soviet population surelynoticed “the return of so many of Stalin’s victims,”making “the Stalinist horrors visible to all.” Perhaps16

this prisoner return influenced Bulat Okudzhava towrite and eventually become the first hero of themagnitizdat.

Mr. Okudzhava began composing in the mid-1950s,performing songs in his apartment for the enjoymentof friends. At some point in the early sixties, an audi-ence member with a Soviet-made tape recorder cap-tured a typical performance, which included referencesto love as well as criticism of the Stalinist years, twotaboo subjects. Almost overnight, two things explodedin popularity: Bulat Okudzhava, and the concept oftrading in underground music. No longer “was themusic of the bards restricted to small groups of ten ortwenty people who gathered in private apartments.Tapes with underground songs soon circulated by themillions.”17


Though the controversial subject matter ofOkudzhava’s songs surely drew interest in his mate-rial, it may have been the very concept of sharingofficially unapproved ideas in a conspiratorial mannerthat appealed to the population. Vladimir Frumkin, amusician who graduated from the Leningrad Conser-vatory of Music, describes the impact of Okudzhava aslarger than its content. Frumkin summarizes thesituation:

“Before Okudzhava, the Soviet song industryhad virtually no competition from within thecountry. The state monopoly on songs seemedunshakeable. Suddenly it was discovered thatone person could compose a song and make itfamous, without the Union of Soviet Composers,with its creative sections and department ofpropaganda, without help of popular singers,choirs and orchestras, without publishinghouses, radio and television, film and recordcompanies, editors and censors.”18

Okudzhava proved that one person, with the rightmessage and the right means of spreading that mes-sage, could profoundly impact the society in which heor she lived. This smacked of individuality in therigidly collectivist USSR, and revealed that officialcensorship could be undermined on a mass scale.

Magnitizdat listeners experienced more than musicon their pirated tapes. On a typical recording, “oneheard...the presence of the audience: chairs scrapingacross the floor, a bottle knocking against glasses,

Ryback, 45.18

9




muted laughter or quiet applause.” Taken togetherwith the music and the illicit distribution methods,and “legends emerged, faceless legends, recognizableonly by their voices, their music, and their lyrics.” As19

Khrushchev called on the government to end the “cultof personality” of political leaders, his population wasvery much doing so on their own, forming an apprecia-tion of their own heroes based solely on musicalmessage. Solidarity stemmed from the recorded,audible evidence that across the country, other groupsof people were doing the exact same thing.

The magnitizdat acted like the Guttenberg printingpress, but better. Though Guttenberg’s machinebrought the written word to the poor masses, thosemasses were still constrained by rampant illiteracy.Everyone in the Soviet Union, however, had ears.Whether Western rock music or songs from the Bards,the Soviet-produced home tape recorders allowednearly anybody to pirate a song, re-distribute it, andbe exposed to the messages contained within. Musicwas an ideal vehicle to spread non-Party approvedmessages, because of the technological distributionadvantages of the time and context.

As outlined in Marx’s theory on the means ofproduction, the State owned the physical machinerynecessary to produce large amounts of cultural out-put, which it could in turn use to propagate ideology.It possessed such tools of cultural production in therealms of cinema, literature, and official music. TheState officially owned the labor as well; in the field ofmusic, only those people who had studied at officialconservatory levels were approved to produce music,


and only then under the strict boundaries of tastedictated by the censors. With these appropriations, theState felt it could dictate proper popular culture, andthus control the entertainment arena’s impact uponideology.

The phenomenon of magnitizdat proved thatconcept a fallacy. The public produced and listened tothe music it wanted to hear, despite and because ofthe poor sound quality and illegal methods of acquire-ment. As the classically-trained musician VladimirFrumkin asserts above, the government controlled theofficially trained writers, producers, editors, andnecessary equipment to produce top quality music.20

But people preferred the grainy tape recordings be-cause content matters. Bulat Okudzhava, VladimirVysotsky, Wolf Biermann and others sang about thedaily hardships of Soviet life, which resonated in a waythat the officially sanctioned, government-producedmusic could not.

Radio

“An emphasis on technical progress andtechnical-scientific education was a main themeof Communist Party propaganda since the firstdays of Soviet history ...”21

Nearly all Western rock and roll music was im-ported illegally into the Soviet Union. Some recordscame with visiting Western students, or were brought

Cushman, 40.20

Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City (Baltimore:21

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 32.

10




muted laughter or quiet applause.” Taken togetherwith the music and the illicit distribution methods,and “legends emerged, faceless legends, recognizableonly by their voices, their music, and their lyrics.” As19

Khrushchev called on the government to end the “cultof personality” of political leaders, his population wasvery much doing so on their own, forming an apprecia-tion of their own heroes based solely on musicalmessage. Solidarity stemmed from the recorded,audible evidence that across the country, other groupsof people were doing the exact same thing.

The magnitizdat acted like the Guttenberg printingpress, but better. Though Guttenberg’s machinebrought the written word to the poor masses, thosemasses were still constrained by rampant illiteracy.Everyone in the Soviet Union, however, had ears.Whether Western rock music or songs from the Bards,the Soviet-produced home tape recorders allowednearly anybody to pirate a song, re-distribute it, andbe exposed to the messages contained within. Musicwas an ideal vehicle to spread non-Party approvedmessages, because of the technological distributionadvantages of the time and context.

As outlined in Marx’s theory on the means ofproduction, the State owned the physical machinerynecessary to produce large amounts of cultural out-put, which it could in turn use to propagate ideology.It possessed such tools of cultural production in therealms of cinema, literature, and official music. TheState officially owned the labor as well; in the field ofmusic, only those people who had studied at officialconservatory levels were approved to produce music,


and only then under the strict boundaries of tastedictated by the censors. With these appropriations, theState felt it could dictate proper popular culture, andthus control the entertainment arena’s impact uponideology.

The phenomenon of magnitizdat proved thatconcept a fallacy. The public produced and listened tothe music it wanted to hear, despite and because ofthe poor sound quality and illegal methods of acquire-ment. As the classically-trained musician VladimirFrumkin asserts above, the government controlled theofficially trained writers, producers, editors, andnecessary equipment to produce top quality music.20

But people preferred the grainy tape recordings be-cause content matters. Bulat Okudzhava, VladimirVysotsky, Wolf Biermann and others sang about thedaily hardships of Soviet life, which resonated in a waythat the officially sanctioned, government-producedmusic could not.

Radio

“An emphasis on technical progress andtechnical-scientific education was a main themeof Communist Party propaganda since the firstdays of Soviet history ...”21

Nearly all Western rock and roll music was im-ported illegally into the Soviet Union. Some recordscame with visiting Western students, or were brought

Cushman, 40.20

Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City (Baltimore:21

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 32.

11




back by the very small number of Soviet citizens thatwere allowed to travel abroad. However, a significantamount of this music was imported from Westernradio stations.

Soon after the Cold War began, the United Statesestablished radio stations in West Germany with theexplicit purpose of broadcasting information andentertainment into the USSR. The station, RadioLiberty, broadcast in Russian. Interestingly, the West22

piggybacked on a technological innovation of the SovietUnion. Soviet radio carried the unique distinction ofbeing broadcast almost entirely in shortwave fre-quency, as opposed to the “medium wave (AM) or FMbroadcasts” that did not carry well over long distances.Yale Richmond writes in Cultural Exchange and theCold War that the Russians themselves “pioneeredshort-wave when Lenin used it in 1922 to addresslisteners in the far corners of Russia.” Consequently,“Soviet-produced radios, even inexpensive ones, hadshortwave bands.” The West then took advantage of23

these shortwave capabilities to broadcast their owncontent. In response, the Soviet government “built avast network of jammers...which made listening diffi-cult.” Despite these efforts, Richmond could pick upWestern broadcasts even in the middle of Moscow,where he spent “a tour of duty” from 1967-69. As heputs it, “if a listener had a decent radio, knew some-thing about antennas, and was determined to learn


what was being said in the West, it was indeed possi-ble to hear Western broadcasts despite the jamming.”24

Like Voice of America, Western programs from theBBC, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and RadioLuxembourg contained similar content and werelikewise available to many Soviets, especially those inthe Eastern European bloc. In a country philosophi-cally isolated by the Iron Curtain and physicallyisolated by such barriers as the Berlin Wall andintense travel restrictions, radio technology tran-scended not only geography, but ideology as well.Radio broke “the Soviet information monopoly” andallowed “listeners to hear news and views that differedfrom those of the Communist media.” Many Soviet25

youth tuned into the Voice of America program forrock and roll music, and stayed for Western newsanalysis.

Soviet Government pushed technological modernitynot only in its ideology, but in its education as well. An“emphasis on technical progress and technical-scien-tific education was a main theme of Communist Partypropaganda since the first days of Soviet history,”resulting in “unforeseen results among Soviet youth.”In the late 1950s and early 1960s, thousands of high-school and college students designed and built theirown radio devices, with some students even broadcast-ing their own radio shows. The primary purpose of26

these home-made gadgets was to acquire and retrans-mit Western music. Three college students arrestedand interrogated by the KGB in 1960 confessed that

Richmond, 185.24

Richmond, 184.25

Zhuk, 32.26

12




back by the very small number of Soviet citizens thatwere allowed to travel abroad. However, a significantamount of this music was imported from Westernradio stations.

Soon after the Cold War began, the United Statesestablished radio stations in West Germany with theexplicit purpose of broadcasting information andentertainment into the USSR. The station, RadioLiberty, broadcast in Russian. Interestingly, the West22

piggybacked on a technological innovation of the SovietUnion. Soviet radio carried the unique distinction ofbeing broadcast almost entirely in shortwave fre-quency, as opposed to the “medium wave (AM) or FMbroadcasts” that did not carry well over long distances.Yale Richmond writes in Cultural Exchange and theCold War that the Russians themselves “pioneeredshort-wave when Lenin used it in 1922 to addresslisteners in the far corners of Russia.” Consequently,“Soviet-produced radios, even inexpensive ones, hadshortwave bands.” The West then took advantage of23

these shortwave capabilities to broadcast their owncontent. In response, the Soviet government “built avast network of jammers...which made listening diffi-cult.” Despite these efforts, Richmond could pick upWestern broadcasts even in the middle of Moscow,where he spent “a tour of duty” from 1967-69. As heputs it, “if a listener had a decent radio, knew some-thing about antennas, and was determined to learn


what was being said in the West, it was indeed possi-ble to hear Western broadcasts despite the jamming.”24

Like Voice of America, Western programs from theBBC, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and RadioLuxembourg contained similar content and werelikewise available to many Soviets, especially those inthe Eastern European bloc. In a country philosophi-cally isolated by the Iron Curtain and physicallyisolated by such barriers as the Berlin Wall andintense travel restrictions, radio technology tran-scended not only geography, but ideology as well.Radio broke “the Soviet information monopoly” andallowed “listeners to hear news and views that differedfrom those of the Communist media.” Many Soviet25

youth tuned into the Voice of America program forrock and roll music, and stayed for Western newsanalysis.

Soviet Government pushed technological modernitynot only in its ideology, but in its education as well. An“emphasis on technical progress and technical-scien-tific education was a main theme of Communist Partypropaganda since the first days of Soviet history,”resulting in “unforeseen results among Soviet youth.”In the late 1950s and early 1960s, thousands of high-school and college students designed and built theirown radio devices, with some students even broadcast-ing their own radio shows. The primary purpose of26

these home-made gadgets was to acquire and retrans-mit Western music. Three college students arrestedand interrogated by the KGB in 1960 confessed that

Richmond, 185.24

Richmond, 184.25

Zhuk, 32.26

13




they recorded the popular music of capitalist countriesfrom the radio (presumably using State-manufacturedtape recorders!) and then re-broadcast them to localaudiences. According to the KGB report, “these stu-dents not only listened to the Western radio stationsbut also spread ‘anti-Soviet information’ among theirclassmates.” Undoubtably, these students acquired27

the technical skills required to build relatively ad-vanced electronic devices because of the obsessivefocus in Soviet education on science and technology.

What was the appeal of Western music to theSoviets? Memoirist David Gurevich describes growingup in the Soviet Union and listening to rock musicwith his friends on the “numerous radio stations likeRadio Luxembourg or the BBC” because “it was morethan a breath of fresh air - it was a hurricane, arelease, a true voice of freedom.” Gurevich recalls afriend from school named Sergei, who “seemed to haveno life outside his legendary tape collection.” Notingthe meticulous arrangement of the collection, Gurevichasks rhetorically “How much of it was an obsessionwith music? With its message? Was the inaccessibilityof records and other rockabilia related to, perhaps,some other emptiness in his life?” The same question28

could be asked about many Soviet youth of the era. Like the ubiquity of the magnitizdat, the enormous

popularity of Western radio in the Soviet Union camefrom two factors: natural curiosity about the forbiddenWest, and the relatively easy access to information thatradio provided. Rock music was the ideal vehicle tospread forbidden information because - as with the


magnitizdat - one did not require expensive and illegalcultural production equipment; just a radio. AsGurevich notes, “you needed...some command ofEnglish and the proper connections, to get a hold ofand read 1984. You needed friends in high places tosee Midnight Cowboy. But rock was readily availablefrom the numerous radio stations.”29

The ideological effects of Western rock and rollmusic cannot be overstated. Yale Richmond, thediplomat, reproduces an email he received from SergeLevin, a Russian native who grew up in the 60s and70s. Levin credits rock and roll as the “main factorthat brought down the Communist regime,” explainingthat

It was the cultural dynamite that blew up theIron Curtain. People were bringing Westernrecords from abroad, and they could be boughton the black market...young people duplicatedthose records like crazy. And I’m telling you, thesmell of freedom radiated by that music had aprofound impact on myself and thousands,maybe millions of young people in my country.Very few knew what the songs were about interms of lyrics, but everyone could feel theenergy and was able to figure it out by them-selves. So the music was the main factor in“Westernization” of the Russian people, at leastin my generation.30

Gurevich, 127.29

Richmond, 206.30

14




they recorded the popular music of capitalist countriesfrom the radio (presumably using State-manufacturedtape recorders!) and then re-broadcast them to localaudiences. According to the KGB report, “these stu-dents not only listened to the Western radio stationsbut also spread ‘anti-Soviet information’ among theirclassmates.” Undoubtably, these students acquired27

the technical skills required to build relatively ad-vanced electronic devices because of the obsessivefocus in Soviet education on science and technology.

What was the appeal of Western music to theSoviets? Memoirist David Gurevich describes growingup in the Soviet Union and listening to rock musicwith his friends on the “numerous radio stations likeRadio Luxembourg or the BBC” because “it was morethan a breath of fresh air - it was a hurricane, arelease, a true voice of freedom.” Gurevich recalls afriend from school named Sergei, who “seemed to haveno life outside his legendary tape collection.” Notingthe meticulous arrangement of the collection, Gurevichasks rhetorically “How much of it was an obsessionwith music? With its message? Was the inaccessibilityof records and other rockabilia related to, perhaps,some other emptiness in his life?” The same question28

could be asked about many Soviet youth of the era. Like the ubiquity of the magnitizdat, the enormous

popularity of Western radio in the Soviet Union camefrom two factors: natural curiosity about the forbiddenWest, and the relatively easy access to information thatradio provided. Rock music was the ideal vehicle tospread forbidden information because - as with the


magnitizdat - one did not require expensive and illegalcultural production equipment; just a radio. AsGurevich notes, “you needed...some command ofEnglish and the proper connections, to get a hold ofand read 1984. You needed friends in high places tosee Midnight Cowboy. But rock was readily availablefrom the numerous radio stations.”29

The ideological effects of Western rock and rollmusic cannot be overstated. Yale Richmond, thediplomat, reproduces an email he received from SergeLevin, a Russian native who grew up in the 60s and70s. Levin credits rock and roll as the “main factorthat brought down the Communist regime,” explainingthat

It was the cultural dynamite that blew up theIron Curtain. People were bringing Westernrecords from abroad, and they could be boughton the black market...young people duplicatedthose records like crazy. And I’m telling you, thesmell of freedom radiated by that music had aprofound impact on myself and thousands,maybe millions of young people in my country.Very few knew what the songs were about interms of lyrics, but everyone could feel theenergy and was able to figure it out by them-selves. So the music was the main factor in“Westernization” of the Russian people, at leastin my generation.30

Gurevich, 127.29

Richmond, 206.30

15




David Gurevich, for his part, did understand the lyrics,and describes the effect that Bob Dylan (notable for hisunorthodox, nasally singing voice) had upon hispsyche. He recalls that he “would not accept for onemoment that you needed to be a musical genius inorder to stand up to the powers that be, to people whothink that their money or nationality or breeding orjust plain connections give them the right to look downon you.”31

The 1970s: Brezhnev, VIA, and Time Machine

So now you consider us a bourgeois sell-out...musicians, including rockers, need towork professionally...professionalism is theability to achieve one’s desired results.

– Andrei Makarevich32

Vokal’no-instrumental’nyi ansambl’

Tired of his mercurial mood swings and unpredict-able reform attempts, the party elites turned onKhrushchev in 1964, and the political veteran LeonidBrezhnev eventually came to replace him as the chiefauthority in the Soviet Union. By the end of the 18-year Brezhnev period, culminating with his death in1982, Brezhnev and his administration were regardedboth domestically and internationally as aging and outof touch with the modern world.33


Brezhnev’s rule is characterized by economicstagnation resulting from the difficulties of a centralplanning approach toward an increasingly complicatednational economy, political corruption, and the end ofthe utopian promise of Communism. The administra-tion publicized Brezhnev’s tenure as “real, existingsocialism,” because, as Peter Kenez argues, “the newleaders felt uncomfortable with a utopian ideology,unconsciously realizing that the promise of a just andaffluent society in the distant future had outlived itsusefulness: people were tired of waiting.” Thus, theBrezhnev “era was one of complacency and conserva-tism.”34

These adjectives stood in sharp contrast from thegrandiose promises of Khruschev and even Stalinconcerning the development of high technology. Sinceits inception, the Soviet Union had consistently guar-anteed its citizens a quality of life to eventually exceedthat of the West. As late as the Khruschev era, Sovietofficials continued to insist that the technological gapbetween Russia and the West was closing rapidly, asevidenced by the 1959 launching of Sputnik satellite(and the production of domestic technology, like taperecorders). Yet, by the time of Brezhnev, “Sovietcitizens believed that absolutely everything made inthe West was superior to its domestic products” andthat “even simple Soviet citizens who fully accepted theexisting social and political order knew well thatpeople in the West enjoyed a much higher standard ofliving.” Though complacent and conservative, the35

government did not openly acknowledge any techno-

Kenez, 216.34

Kenez, 223.35

16




David Gurevich, for his part, did understand the lyrics,and describes the effect that Bob Dylan (notable for hisunorthodox, nasally singing voice) had upon hispsyche. He recalls that he “would not accept for onemoment that you needed to be a musical genius inorder to stand up to the powers that be, to people whothink that their money or nationality or breeding orjust plain connections give them the right to look downon you.”31

The 1970s: Brezhnev, VIA, and Time Machine

So now you consider us a bourgeois sell-out...musicians, including rockers, need towork professionally...professionalism is theability to achieve one’s desired results.

– Andrei Makarevich32

Vokal’no-instrumental’nyi ansambl’

Tired of his mercurial mood swings and unpredict-able reform attempts, the party elites turned onKhrushchev in 1964, and the political veteran LeonidBrezhnev eventually came to replace him as the chiefauthority in the Soviet Union. By the end of the 18-year Brezhnev period, culminating with his death in1982, Brezhnev and his administration were regardedboth domestically and internationally as aging and outof touch with the modern world.33


Brezhnev’s rule is characterized by economicstagnation resulting from the difficulties of a centralplanning approach toward an increasingly complicatednational economy, political corruption, and the end ofthe utopian promise of Communism. The administra-tion publicized Brezhnev’s tenure as “real, existingsocialism,” because, as Peter Kenez argues, “the newleaders felt uncomfortable with a utopian ideology,unconsciously realizing that the promise of a just andaffluent society in the distant future had outlived itsusefulness: people were tired of waiting.” Thus, theBrezhnev “era was one of complacency and conserva-tism.”34

These adjectives stood in sharp contrast from thegrandiose promises of Khruschev and even Stalinconcerning the development of high technology. Sinceits inception, the Soviet Union had consistently guar-anteed its citizens a quality of life to eventually exceedthat of the West. As late as the Khruschev era, Sovietofficials continued to insist that the technological gapbetween Russia and the West was closing rapidly, asevidenced by the 1959 launching of Sputnik satellite(and the production of domestic technology, like taperecorders). Yet, by the time of Brezhnev, “Sovietcitizens believed that absolutely everything made inthe West was superior to its domestic products” andthat “even simple Soviet citizens who fully accepted theexisting social and political order knew well thatpeople in the West enjoyed a much higher standard ofliving.” Though complacent and conservative, the35

government did not openly acknowledge any techno-

Kenez, 216.34

Kenez, 223.35

17




logical gap between the societies, and increased itsattention toward controlling the ideological influencesthat the Soviet population had access to. This includ-ing reigning in increasingly popular home-grown (andillegal) Soviet rock bands.

These bands were formed in the mold of popularWestern groups. The Beatles gained massive popular-ity in 1964, and by 1966 over 250 rock bands hadformed in Moscow alone. Reacting to the lack of36

access to quality musical equipment, rock musicianstypically assembled their own equipment and soundsystems with whatever equipment they could find,37

including components from public pay-phones thatthey could use to convert acoustic guitars into electricones. Highly desired Western instruments were38

available on the black market, albeit at exorbitantlyexpensive prices; most rock bands could not affordsuch equipment. Nevertheless, even with homemadegear, the bands drew devoted followers.

In the late 1960s, the State took a new approach inits attempts to counter the ideological difficultiesposed by the popularity of rock and roll. In 1966 “theMinistry of Culture approved the formation of the firststate-supported beat-music ensembles,” entitled VocalInstrument Ensembles, or VIA’s. Cushman describes39

the relationship as a Faustian bargain: “musiciansagreed to temper the content of their music - first andforemost the lyrical content - in return for access to themeans of cultural production and reproduction...and


money.” Artemy Troitsky describes VIA music as “a40

disciplined (or, to be frank, castrated) version of beatmusic.”41

The VIA held two concurrent purposes: to drain theideological challenge of rock and roll by co-opting themusical form to propagate pro-Soviet ideology. Inmany cases, songs were written by the Union of SovietComposers. Common topics included “steel produc-tion, grain harvests, and antifascist solidarity. Onepopular song...was dedicated to the trans-Siberianpipeline.”42

Why would underground rock bands compromisetheir independent voice, which seems so at odds withthe original draw of rock and roll in the first place? Onone hand, some “amateur bands...had little need ordesire for official recognition...young people’s insatia-ble hunger for live Western rock guaranteed fullhouses; foreign radio broadcasts and black-marketrecordings invigorated repertoires with fresh materialfrom the West.” On the other, good equipment was43

expensive, and “amateur status meant you had to holda regular job and could only play in your space time.”44

Furthermore, “using worn out home-made equipmentand low quality instruments was both unaesthetic anduncool. But Western equipment...was only available onthe black market...A Fender or Gibson electric guitarwent for three to five thousand roubles.” State45

sponsorship allowed musicians access to superior

Cushman, 80 (emphasis mine).40

Troitsky, 28.41

Ryback, 151.42

Ryback, 153.43

Ryback, 152.44

Troitsky, 43.45

18




logical gap between the societies, and increased itsattention toward controlling the ideological influencesthat the Soviet population had access to. This includ-ing reigning in increasingly popular home-grown (andillegal) Soviet rock bands.

These bands were formed in the mold of popularWestern groups. The Beatles gained massive popular-ity in 1964, and by 1966 over 250 rock bands hadformed in Moscow alone. Reacting to the lack of36

access to quality musical equipment, rock musicianstypically assembled their own equipment and soundsystems with whatever equipment they could find,37

including components from public pay-phones thatthey could use to convert acoustic guitars into electricones. Highly desired Western instruments were38

available on the black market, albeit at exorbitantlyexpensive prices; most rock bands could not affordsuch equipment. Nevertheless, even with homemadegear, the bands drew devoted followers.

In the late 1960s, the State took a new approach inits attempts to counter the ideological difficultiesposed by the popularity of rock and roll. In 1966 “theMinistry of Culture approved the formation of the firststate-supported beat-music ensembles,” entitled VocalInstrument Ensembles, or VIA’s. Cushman describes39

the relationship as a Faustian bargain: “musiciansagreed to temper the content of their music - first andforemost the lyrical content - in return for access to themeans of cultural production and reproduction...and


money.” Artemy Troitsky describes VIA music as “a40

disciplined (or, to be frank, castrated) version of beatmusic.”41

The VIA held two concurrent purposes: to drain theideological challenge of rock and roll by co-opting themusical form to propagate pro-Soviet ideology. Inmany cases, songs were written by the Union of SovietComposers. Common topics included “steel produc-tion, grain harvests, and antifascist solidarity. Onepopular song...was dedicated to the trans-Siberianpipeline.”42

Why would underground rock bands compromisetheir independent voice, which seems so at odds withthe original draw of rock and roll in the first place? Onone hand, some “amateur bands...had little need ordesire for official recognition...young people’s insatia-ble hunger for live Western rock guaranteed fullhouses; foreign radio broadcasts and black-marketrecordings invigorated repertoires with fresh materialfrom the West.” On the other, good equipment was43

expensive, and “amateur status meant you had to holda regular job and could only play in your space time.”44

Furthermore, “using worn out home-made equipmentand low quality instruments was both unaesthetic anduncool. But Western equipment...was only available onthe black market...A Fender or Gibson electric guitarwent for three to five thousand roubles.” State45

sponsorship allowed musicians access to superior

Cushman, 80 (emphasis mine).40

Troitsky, 28.41

Ryback, 151.42

Ryback, 153.43

Ryback, 152.44

Troitsky, 43.45

19




Western equipment, the best State recording studiosavailable, official State venues, and media attentionthrough television and radio promotion. Not inciden-tally, the job also paid extraordinarily well. Yuri Valov,of the Moscow band Winds of Change, abandoned hisstudy of law when he realized he could make threetimes more money as a VIA member than as a lawyer.He then continued to play in the underground in hisspare time. In this way, he both earned an outstandingliving and retained some segment of individualitythrough rock and roll.46

Herein lies the irony of Soviet VIAs. In the contin-ued effort to control the ideological message expressedin its culture, the Soviet Union bribed undergroundbands to stop producing controversial material withWestern instruments and technology. Implicit then isthe acknowledgment by the State it could not matchthe quality of Western goods, a self-defeating admis-sion that belies the whole point of attacking thesubversive ideology of rock and roll in the first place. The Soviet population had long suspected that theWest was much more technologically advanced thanthe USSR. With VIA, the State seemed to concede thepoint as well.

Conclusion - Techno-Irony

“The West was inherently subversive, becausethe vision of Western affluence undermined theSoviet regime.”47


During the period of de-Stalinization, in the years1957-1964, Bards of Discontent, acting in the historictradition of the Russian guitar-bard, provided aframework of individual expression and demonstratedthe cultural power of magnitizdat distribution. Then,from the emergence of the Beatles in 1964, throughthe early 1980s, millions of (mostly young) Soviets,revolting against official rock bans and State dictumson proper cultural consumption, grew addicted to theculture of the West, primarily experienced throughunderground rock and roll recordings. The effect wasto destabilize the Communist indoctrination of theyouth while simultaneously providing an alternativearea of collective focus.

The Soviet government aided in this process in aphysical way by distributing tape recorders, short-wave state-manufactured radios, and Western musicalequipment. There is a key philosophical element inplay here, as well. Technological modernity is a centraltenet of Soviet ideology, first articulated by Lenin inthe early 1920s. This view, in turn, was drilled intoSoviet youth as part of their Communist indoctrina-tion. As late as the early 1960s, the governmentrepeatedly promised that within a generation, theSoviet Union would catch up to and surpass theUnited States. Yet, they never did, and because of theavailability of Western culture, predominantly in theform of music and radio broadcasts from abroad, everySoviet citizen became aware by the 1970s of the vasttechnological advantage of the West. The governmentappeared to concede this point, if accidentally, in itsefforts to co-opt Western rock and roll by promotingVIAs and supplying them with Western instrumentsand equipment. Could it be that the Soviet population

20




Western equipment, the best State recording studiosavailable, official State venues, and media attentionthrough television and radio promotion. Not inciden-tally, the job also paid extraordinarily well. Yuri Valov,of the Moscow band Winds of Change, abandoned hisstudy of law when he realized he could make threetimes more money as a VIA member than as a lawyer.He then continued to play in the underground in hisspare time. In this way, he both earned an outstandingliving and retained some segment of individualitythrough rock and roll.46

Herein lies the irony of Soviet VIAs. In the contin-ued effort to control the ideological message expressedin its culture, the Soviet Union bribed undergroundbands to stop producing controversial material withWestern instruments and technology. Implicit then isthe acknowledgment by the State it could not matchthe quality of Western goods, a self-defeating admis-sion that belies the whole point of attacking thesubversive ideology of rock and roll in the first place. The Soviet population had long suspected that theWest was much more technologically advanced thanthe USSR. With VIA, the State seemed to concede thepoint as well.

Conclusion - Techno-Irony

“The West was inherently subversive, becausethe vision of Western affluence undermined theSoviet regime.”47


During the period of de-Stalinization, in the years1957-1964, Bards of Discontent, acting in the historictradition of the Russian guitar-bard, provided aframework of individual expression and demonstratedthe cultural power of magnitizdat distribution. Then,from the emergence of the Beatles in 1964, throughthe early 1980s, millions of (mostly young) Soviets,revolting against official rock bans and State dictumson proper cultural consumption, grew addicted to theculture of the West, primarily experienced throughunderground rock and roll recordings. The effect wasto destabilize the Communist indoctrination of theyouth while simultaneously providing an alternativearea of collective focus.

The Soviet government aided in this process in aphysical way by distributing tape recorders, short-wave state-manufactured radios, and Western musicalequipment. There is a key philosophical element inplay here, as well. Technological modernity is a centraltenet of Soviet ideology, first articulated by Lenin inthe early 1920s. This view, in turn, was drilled intoSoviet youth as part of their Communist indoctrina-tion. As late as the early 1960s, the governmentrepeatedly promised that within a generation, theSoviet Union would catch up to and surpass theUnited States. Yet, they never did, and because of theavailability of Western culture, predominantly in theform of music and radio broadcasts from abroad, everySoviet citizen became aware by the 1970s of the vasttechnological advantage of the West. The governmentappeared to concede this point, if accidentally, in itsefforts to co-opt Western rock and roll by promotingVIAs and supplying them with Western instrumentsand equipment. Could it be that the Soviet population

21




accepted the Communist premise that the key to amodern, successful society was technological moder-nity, and then grew to understand that the West hadachieved it first? I contend that the Soviet people,exposed to Western culture with lots of inadvertenthelp from the Soviet government itself, did just that.Consequently, accepting that premise and realizingthat the Soviet standard of living was getting farther,and not closer, to the bar set by the West, the Sovietpopulation understood that the Soviet system con-tained a fatal flaw. They may not have know whatexactly it was, or why it existed, but at some point, theSoviet population, with the help of rock and roll,realized the ironic truth: the State had convinced themthat technological modernity was key to a successfulsociety, and the West had beaten them to it, handily.

Neal Albright is a graduating senior at Santa ClaraUniversity.

American Press Coverage of Genocide 165

American Press Coverage of Genocide inCambodia: The “Ideological Blinders”that Led to a Failure in Public Responsi-bility

Amelia Evans

The overthrow of longtime authoritarian rulerHosni Mubarak in Egypt has already been distin-guished as 2011’s political event to remember. Ameri-cans watched, on the edge of their seats, as eventsunfolded in Cairo. Faced with the censorship of theprint press, Egyptian protestors spread their messagethrough social networking sites like Facebook andTwitter. The Egyptian government’s attempts to shutdown the Internet in Egypt proved fruitless—too muchinformation had already flooded the nation. In a post-9/11 world, Americans are more concerned than everabout the state of the Middle East, and have dependedon the media to keep them informed. Revolutionizedby the worldwide expansion of the Internet, the medianow have a greater, and less regulated stake than everin matters of national security. The media have alwaysplayed a key role in the functioning of Americandemocracy, carrying the responsibility to not onlyinform the public, but to also keep the government incheck by serving as a “watchdog.” The traditionalAmerican press, however, has failed to fulfill itsresponsibilities at some critical points in history. Inone particularly egregious case, that press failed toinvestigate one of the worst instances of genocide sincethe Holocaust.

22



Documents

A Policy of Rock: How Rock and Roll Undermined the