A Performance Audit of the Management of Prevention and

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE

A Performance Audit of the Management of Prevention and Mitigation of Floods at Central, Regional and Local

Levels of the Government of Tanzania

A Case Study of

FLOODS IN BABATI

A REPORT OF THE CONTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED

REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

FLOODS IN BABATI

National Audit Office – Tanzania 2

LIST OF CONTENT PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................................... 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 9 CHAPTER 1: FLOODS – ONE KIND OF DISASTER .............................................................................. 16

1.1 The importance of dealing with disasters ....................................................................................... 16 1.1.1 Babati Floods in the context of Disaster ............................................................................... 17

1.1.2 Elements of Disaster Management ....................................................................................... 17 1.1.3 Disaster preparedness ........................................................................................................... 18 1.1.4 Prevention/Mitigation ........................................................................................................... 18 1.1.5 Response ............................................................................................................................... 18 1.1.6 Recovery ............................................................................................................................... 18

CHAPTER 2: PURPOSE, DESIGN AND LIMITATIONS OF THE AUDIT ............................................ 19 2.1 Purpose and scope .............................................................................................................................. 19 2.2 Audit Design .................................................................................................................................. 20

2.2.1 Auditees ................................................................................................................................. 20 2.2.2 Audit questions ...................................................................................................................... 20 2.2.3 Method and implementation ................................................................................................. 20

2.3 Structure of the Audit report .......................................................................................................... 21 CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTION OF THE AUDIT AREA ............................................................................. 22

3.1 Law and regulations for disaster management in Tanzania ........................................................... 22 3.1.1 Law ....................................................................................................................................... 23 3.1.2 National Policy ..................................................................................................................... 23 3.1.3 National Operational Guidelines .......................................................................................... 23 3.1.4 Goals and objectives given by the government .................................................................... 23

3.2 Funding .............................................................................................................................................. 24 3.3 Key Players and Main Activities ....................................................................................................... 24

3.3.1 The Inter – Ministerial Committee ....................................................................................... 25 3.3.2 The Disaster Management Department ................................................................................ 26 3.3.3 Manyara Regional Secretariat (MRS) ................................................................................... 26 3.3.4 Babati Town and District Councils ...................................................................................... 27 3.3.5 Other concerned actors ......................................................................................................... 27

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS OF THE AUDIT ................................................................................................ 29 4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 29 4.2 Using the sketch map and photos ...................................................................................................... 29 4.3 Adequacy of Preventive Structures ................................................................................................ 31

4.3.1 The importance of the Kigongoni Outlet and the Channel ................................................... 31 4.3.2 Physical factors and structures influencing the efficiency of the Kigongoni Outlet ............. 32

4.4 The Kiongozi Channel ........................................................................................................................ 38 4.4.1 The earth embankment and the artificial waterfalls in the Channel ...................................... 39 4.4.2 Maintenance of the Channel and the waterfalls 1991 - 2005 ................................................ 43

4.5 Kiongozi Bridge ................................................................................................................................ 48 4.6 Design of the rehabilitation of the Arusha – Dodoma trunk road ................................................. 53

4.6.1 Kigongoni outlet ................................................................................................................... 53 4.6.2 Kiongozi bridge .................................................................................................................... 54

4.7 Residential and Business Location of Babati Town ....................................................................... 54 4.8 Mobilization and Funds for Flood Management. ........................................................................... 55 4.9 Pre-Disaster Planning ........................................................................................................................ 55 4.11 Summary of Findings ...................................................................................................................... 58

4.11.1 Relational graph .................................................................................................................... 58 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 59

5.1 General .............................................................................................................................................. 59 5.2 The grass barrier and the Kigongoni road embankment .................................................................... 60

5.2.1 The grass barrier .................................................................................................................... 60 5.2.2 Kigongoni road embankment ................................................................................................ 60

FLOODS IN BABATI


5.3 The earth embankment and the artificial waterfalls ........................................................................... 61 5.4 Kiongozi Bridge ................................................................................................................................ 61 5.5 Design of the rehabilitation of the Arusha – Dodoma trunk road ..................................................... 62 5.6 Residential and Business Location of Babati town............................................................................ 63 5.7 Pre-Disaster planning, Mobilization and Funds for Flood Management ........................................... 64 5.8 Training, action plans and the role of PMO-Disaster Management Department .............................. 64

CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................... 66 6.1 The grass barrier ................................................................................................................................ 66 6.2 The Kigongoni embankment ............................................................................................................. 66 6.3 The earth embankment and the artificial waterfalls ........................................................................... 66 6.4 Kiongozi bridge ................................................................................................................................. 67 6.5 Design of the rehabilitation of the Arusha – Dodoma trunk road ..................................................... 67 6.6 Residential and Business Location of Babati Town .......................................................................... 67 6.7 Pre-disaster planning and funds for flood management .................................................................... 68 6.8 Training, action plans and the role of PMO-Disaster Management Department .............................. 68

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................. 69 ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................................... 70

Annex 1: Handing Over Letter from the Steering Group to District and Regional Authorities ........... 70 Annex 2: Catchment Area of Lake Babati ............................................................................................ 72 Annex 3: Map of Babati Town indicating Flood Flow and Positions of Photographs in this Report .. 73 Annex 4: Sketch Map of Flooded Babati Town and Key Sites ............................................................ 74

FLOODS IN BABATI


PREFACE The Public Finance Act No. 6 of 2001, Section 33(1) authorises the Controller and Auditor General to carry out Performance Audit (Value-for-Money Audit) for the purpose of establishing the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of any expenditures or use of resources in the Ministries, Regions and Local Authorities. I have the honour to submit to the Minister of Finance for presentation to Parliament my first Performance Audit Report. The report concerns the prevention and mitigation of floods in Tanzania with particular reference to Babati Town and District Councils in Manyara Region. My office traditionally audits the financial statements prepared by Ministries, Departments and Agencies. Performance Audit is currently being introduced at the Tanzanian National Audit Office as part of a capacity building project in co-operation with Sida and the Swedish National Audit Office. It may be noted that Performance Audit normally has a wider coverage than Financial Audit. Performance Audits aims at better use of resources, improved operations and better decision-making in reaching policy objectives set by Parliament, in this case regarding the government authorities that are responsible for disaster prevention and management. The report contains conclusions and recommendations that directly concern Manyara Regional Secretariat, Babati Town and District Councils, TANROADS Manyara, TANROADS Head Office, and the Disaster Management Department in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO-DMD). The said MDAs have been given the opportunity to scrutinise the factual content of and comment on the draft report. I wish to acknowledge that the discussions with the auditees, i.e. the Manyara Regional leadership, TANROADS Manyara, and the (PMO-DMD) have been very constructive. In fact, some of the recommendations of the report have already been acted upon by some of the auditees. My office intends to carry out a follow-up at an appropriate time regarding actions taken by the auditees in relation to the recommendations of this report. This report has been prepared by George C. Haule and James G. Pilly under the guidance of Gregory G. Teu and Carl Ake Gerden. I would like to thank my staff for their assistance in the preparation of this report. Thanks also go to the auditees for their fruitful interaction with my office.

Controller and Auditor General Dar es Salaam, April 2007

FLOODS IN BABATI


ACRONYMS BAWASA – Babati Water and Sewerage Authority

BDC – Babati District Council

CBO – Community Based Organization

DC – District Council

DED – District Executive Director

DMD – Disaster Management Department

GoT - Government of Tanzania

LAMP – Land Management Programme

MDA – Ministries Departments and Agencies

MRS – Manyara Regional Secretariat

NAO – National Audit Office

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NOG – National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management

PMO – Prime Minister’s Office

PORALG – President’s Office Regional and Local Government Authorities

RC – Regional Commissioner

TANDREC – Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee (Inter-Ministerial Committee)

TANROADS – Tanzania National Roads Agency

REDMAC - Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee

TMA - Tanzania Meteorological Agency

FLOODS IN BABATI


Figure 1.1: Location of Babati in Tanzania

FLOODS IN BABATI


FLOODS IN BABATI


Figure 1.3: Lake Babati flooding through Babati town in April, 1990.

CHAPTER 1: FLOODS – ONE KIND OF DISASTER

1.1 The importance of dealing with disasters Tanzania has been experiencing a number of disasters for years. These have caused losses of life, property and destruction of environment. A disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a society causing wide spread human, material and environmental losses, which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope with using its own resources. The occurrence of disasters can be termed as rapid or slow onset depending on the speed and span of time of origination and impact. Both natural and human made disasters can be slow or rapid. Common hazards that carry the danger of causing disasters in Tanzania include epidemics, pest infestation, droughts, floods, major transport and industrial accidents, refugees and fires. Strong winds and earthquakes are few and occur rarely, others occur more regularly. Disasters can produce complex emergencies in some incidences. The severity of the disaster impact on a population is dependent upon its capacity to absorb, deflect or manage the actual disasters. Considering the disaster threats in the country, the government passed an Act of Parliament known as the Disaster Relief Coordination Act No.9, of 1990 and established an inter ministerial committee (TANDREC) for overseeing and coordinating overall relief operations at national level. Similar committees were to be established at regional and district levels. The policy addresses all issues embracing the disaster management cycle, namely: prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. In a Vulnerability Assessment Survey conducted by the PMO for the period of 1991 – 2001 floods were one of the big four disasters as regards frequency. The others were epidemics, pests and drought. Some towns in Tanzania, for example Dar es Salaam and Mwanza, experience floods almost every rainy season. This performance audit focused on floods as an issue of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and used the Babati floods as a case study. The floods in Babati served as a practical example of how the government’s prevention of disasters functions. Our recommendations are based on the situation regarding floods in Babati. The ministry (PMO) has confirmed to us that similar problems with floods as it is with other disasters exist in other areas. That is why there is justification for the government to consider how these experiences and recommendations can be implemented with a view to generally improve disaster management in terms of floods in Babati and in the country generally.

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1.1.1 Babati Floods in the context of Disaster Flooding is one type of disaster which Babati is experiencing occasionally. Floods had occurred at Babati – Manyara in 1998, 1990, 1980’s, 1970’s, 1964 etc. The photo below gives an impression of how floods can appear and influence on the community.

Figure 1.4: Lake Babati flooding through the main street of Babati town, April 1990. 1.1.2 Elements of Disaster Management The role of the Disaster Management Department (DMD) is to provide the necessary disaster management capability to effectively deal with disasters as and when they arise. The National Disaster Management Policy of May, 2004 identified Disasters Management as a planning, mitigation/prevention, responses, recovery/rehabilitation and preparedness with two separate but related elements – readiness and sustainability. Readiness is the ability of a community/entity (nation, region, district or ward disaster committee) to reach within a specified period of time, a level of capability whereby it will be able to perform designated operational roles and tasks.

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The elements of disaster management are as depicted on the diagram below:

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

RECOVERY/ PREPAREDNESS RESPONSESPREVENTATION/

MITIGATION REHABILITATION

Figure 1.5: Elements of Disaster Management The elements of disaster management are as explained below:

1.1.3 Disaster preparedness The issue of disaster preparedness is an aspect that involves putting in place appropriate legislative, administrative and technical measures to minimize the adverse effects of those affected by disasters.

The objective of disaster preparedness is to ensure all institutions responsible for management of disasters are prepared, coordinated and equipped with resources to handle disasters. 1.1.4 Prevention/Mitigation Prevention measures are aimed at stopping a disaster from occurring and/or preventing such occurrence having harmful effects on communities (or groups of individuals) such as vaccination programmes by the health sector. Mitigation encompasses all activities undertaken in anticipation of the occurrence of a potentially disastrous event, including preparedness and long term risk reduction measures. An example of mitigation measures is relocation or elevation of structures out of flood plains. 1.1.5 Response Response is a set of activities to address the immediate and short-term effects of an emergency or disaster. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. 1.1.6 Recovery Recovery refers to those activities necessary to provide a rapid return to normalcy both for the affected community and for those involved with the response.

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CHAPTER 2: PURPOSE, DESIGN AND LIMITATIONS OF THE AUDIT

2.1 Purpose and scope The purpose of the audit was to report if the Central Government and the Local Government have managed the flood disasters (i.e. Prevention, Rehabilitation, Preparedness and Responses) according to political decisions made. Another purpose was to suggest ways of improving the Disaster Management process. This audit has its focus on prevention and mitigation of floods. The audit was carried out in accordance with the mandate vested in the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) under section 33(1) of the Public Finance Act No.6 of 2001, as revised in 2004 which authorises the CAG to carry out Performance Audit (Value for Money Audit) for the purpose of establishing the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of any public expenditure or program. When conducting the audit, we visited the Prime Minister’s Office – Disasters Management Department, the Manyara Regional Secretariat, the Arusha Regional Secretariat, Babati District and Town Councils, TANROADS-Manyara, TANROADS-Arusha, TANROADS-HQ, and Babati Water and Sewerage Authority (BAWASA). These offices were chosen because of their roles in the management of disasters, in this case, floods. The Audit focused on the flood events from January, 1990 to December, 2005 in Babati. We conducted the audit between May 2005 (entry conference) and August 2006. In brief, the scope of the audit covers the responsibilities to be carried out by the head of the PMO-DMD down to and including the focal officers at Manyara regional and Babati district levels in terms of flood prevention and mitigation/rehabilitation. The scope is focusing physical structures to prevent and mitigate floods. It is acknowledged that Manyara region and the local authorities have tried to decrease siltation of Lake Babati and thereby lower the risk of floods through soil conservation measures around the lake. The more siltation, the more reduction of the lake depth and consequently the higher the risk of water flooding through Babati town. However, the scope of this audit concerns primarily the preventive actions through physical structures to avoid damage caused by floods after heavy rainfall. Obviously, the combined efforts of reducing concentration time of rainfall in relation to the lake and its siltation as well as physical structure of water diversion and minimising soil erosion are needed to prevent and mitigate floods in an optimum way.

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2.2 Audit Design 2.2.1 Auditees The audit focused on five auditees, which were responsible for disaster management as mandated by the Disaster Relief Coordination Act No. 9 of 1990. The five auditees are Prime Minister’s Office – Disaster Management Department (PMO – DMD), Manyara Regional Secretariat, Babati Town Council, Babati District Council and TANROADS-Manyara. 2.2.2 Audit questions This report provides the result from applying the following seven audit questions:

1. Are adequate preventive structures in place? 2. Is there an appropriate drainage system regarding flood water?

3. Are residences located in threatened areas? If so, what measures have been taken

to reduce damages or put preventive structures?

4. Is the Regional Secretariat mobilizing specific funds for floods prevention?

5. Does the Regional Secretariat have an anti-flood program?

6. Has the PMO- DMD got an adequate monitoring system for flood prevention at Babati and elsewhere in the country?

7. Has the PMO – DMD promoted/arranged seminars/workshops/courses or other

events that directly aim at improving flood management (disaster management) in Babati?

2.2.3 Method and implementation

The audit involved extensive discussions and document review in the Prime Minister’s Office – Disasters Management Department and with Manyara Regional Secretariat, Babati District Council and Babati Town Council officials. The material obtained covered views from a variety of sources including; TANROADS Manyara and TANROADS Arusha1, Arusha Regional Secretariat, BAWASA, Babati District Officers responsible for Water and Livestock Development, Works, and Natural Resources and Tourism.

1 The Audit team visited the two regions of Manyara and Arusha since before 2000 Manyara region was part of Arusha region.

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Discussions were also held with the representatives from the Non-Governmental Organizations situated at Babati such as FIDE and FARM AFRICA and the common people at Babati. Initial discussions were held with PMO-DMD and Manyara Regional Secretariat in 2005 and field work was between 19th May, 2005 and March, 2006. A number of officials at the National, Regional and District levels were interviewed. The RC, the RAS and the acting Director of DMD were interviewed to discuss about their monitoring and supervisory roles regarding flood prevention at Babati. The Regional Accountant and the Planning Officer were interviewed to discuss about funding for flood prevention. The TANROADS – Manyara Engineer and two District Engineers were interviewed to discuss about their operations and the extent of damage caused by floods. The Regional and District Focal Officers, the Managing Director of BAWASA, LAMP officials, CBOs & NGOs officials and common people were also interviewed to discuss a variety of issues regarding floods in Babati. Various documents were reviewed during the audit. The purpose of reviewing documents was to establish the mandate, role and responsibilities of key actors charged with the responsibility of disasters management and assess the level of implementation during the period of the audit. Several documents were reviewed including:

• Disaster Relief Coordination Act No. 9 of 1990 • National Disaster Management Policy of May 2004 • National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management • Wild Lake Report • Disaster Management & Early Warning Systems by Intermaecos • Vulnerability Assessment Report by the PMO- Disaster Management

Department • Land Management Program Report – BABATI by LAMP

2.3 Structure of the Audit report Chapter 3 gives a detailed description of the set up and processes of disaster prevention in Tanzania from national level down to the district level. This is done in terms of legislation, national disaster management policy and operational guidelines for disaster management in order to deal with different kinds of disasters. The description also includes goals and objectives, funding, key players and main activities. The findings of the audit are presented in chapter 4 and the conclusions of the audit in chapter 5. Recommendations appear in chapter 6 with the aim to improve capacity for prevention and mitigation of damage from floods in Babati and in the country in general. The experiences from this audit and the recommendations are likely to be relevant for management of floods elsewhere in Tanzania.

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CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTION OF THE AUDIT AREA

3.1 Law and regulations for disaster management in Tanzania Laws, rules and regulation mentioned below form the norm, which NAO will use in assessing the responsible actors.

The government has set legislation, national disaster management policy and operational guidelines for disaster management in the country in order to deal with different kinds of disasters as explained in the diagram below:

DISASTER RELIEF COORDINATION ACTS NO. 9 OF 1990 (PARLIAMENT DECISION)

Figure 3.1: Description of the Audit Area Nota bene: The above organization chart is valid from year 2000 when Manyara region was formed. From 1990 up to year 2000 Arusha regional authorities were responsible for disaster preparedness in Babati. As reflected in the above chart, the scope of Performance Audit is to assess if the actual implementation is efficient and effective and in accordance with laws, policies and directives . However, Performance Audit does not question the political goals set by Parliament.

NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT POLICY and OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

(POLICY LEVEL) POLICY MADE BY INTER MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE POLICY AND GUIDELINES MADE BY DISASTER

MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT

IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL MANYARA REGIONAL LEVEL

REGIONAL SECRETARIAT REGIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

DISTRICT LEVEL

Per

form

ance

Aud

it

BABATI TOWN and DISTRICT COUNCILS

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3.1.1 Law

Considering the disaster threats in the country, the Government passed an Act of Parliament known as the Disaster Relief Coordination Act No. 9, of 1990. The government has also established an Inter-Ministerial Committee known as Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee (TANDREC) for overseeing and coordinating overall relief operations at the national level. Similar committees were to be established at Regional and District levels 3.1.2 National Policy

The National Disaster Management Policy of May 2004 was put in place since a properly defined policy framework is crucial for disaster surveillance and management as a measure to reduce vulnerability and hence poverty reduction.

3.1.3 National Operational Guidelines

The National Operational Guidelines (NOG) of 2003 attempt to outline and address various elements in Disaster Cycle: mitigation/prevention, preparedness, responses and recovery/rehabilitation. 3.1.4 Goals and objectives given by the government

In developing the NOG, the government had the following objectives:

(i) Develop higher level of preparedness, response and mitigation capacity for all types of disasters.

(ii) Promote public knowledge and awareness of disaster and enhance the involvement of the community in disaster management.

(iii) Establish and maintain an effective institutional arrangement for the coordination and collaboration.

(iv) Promote research, information generation and dissemination. (v) Mainstream disaster management issues into development plans and

other sector/ policies and programs at all levels.

Other goals and objectives set by the government are:

(i) Sustain activities aimed at reducing or eliminating long term risks to people and property from hazards and their effects.

(ii) Build the emergency management capacity to effectively prepare for mitigation against, respond to, and recover from any hazard by planning, training, research, rehearsals and investigations.

(iii) Conduct emergency operation to save life, project livelihood and property by positioning emergency equipment and supplies, evacuating potential victims, providing foods, water, medical care, restoring critical public service, etc.

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These objectives imply that the PMO – DMD was expected to perform the following activities in relation to floods prevention in Babati:

• Clearly inform Manyara Regional Secretariat (MRS) about the policy and the need to form required disaster committees.

• Follow up and ascertain that MRS disaster committee has formulated a plan of action.

• Arrange or make others to arrange training events • Annually follow up the implementation of the action plans • In the case of floods, analyze the damage in view of the prevention

measures taken • Assist MRS to improve floods prevention measures.

3.2 Funding

The availability of financial resources for PMO-DMD, MRS and Babati District Council for Flood Prevention and Management have been reviewed in this audit. We found that no specific fund has been set aside for floods prevention and mitigation.

3.3 Key Players and Main Activities

To facilitate the whole action of dealing with floods, there is a number of key players, who are accountable according to the National Disaster Management Policy and who are supposed to perform the main activities as mentioned in the system graph below:

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Figure 3.2: Systems Graph

3.3.1 The Inter – Ministerial Committee

The Inter-Ministerial Committee - Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee (TANDREC) comprises of Permanent Secretaries of key ministries (disaster related activities), representatives from TMA, Food Security Department, Commissioner of Fire Brigade and is chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the PMO. The main activity of the Inter-ministerial committee is to be the national coordinating body for the implementation of cross-sector disaster management programs as well as to oversee the implementation of the policy and strategies at all levels are working properly

Disaster Management Department

PMO

Manyara Regional Secretariat Manyara Regional Disaster Management

Committee - Regional Focal Officer for Disaster Management

Babati District Council

District Focal Officer for Disaster Management

Babati TownCouncil

Ministry of Water &

TANROADS Livestock Manyara Developme t n

BAWASA

Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism

CBOs &

NGOs Activities aimed at reducing floods

damage and flood occurrence

Inter-Ministerial Committee

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3.3.2 The Disaster Management Department

As a secretariat to the TANDREC, the DMD is accountable/responsible for the following main activities:

• Coordinate all disaster relief operations and preparedness measures

subject to the directions of the committee. • Carry out all research relevant to its functions for the purposes of

advising the committee on measures for disaster preventions. • Arrange for and carry out the dissemination on behalf of the

committee, information concerning disaster operations preparedness and prevention.

• Formulate and recommend for establishment by the committee the scope of the disaster prevention plans and the basic policies designed to govern them.

• Review regularly and coordinate the different disaster prevention measures.

• Recommend to the committee measures and methods necessary for promoting awareness and understanding among the public, of disaster prevention activities and measures.

3.3.3 Manyara Regional Secretariat (MRS) The MRS is the pivotal point for the allocation of disaster management resources in the region. As a link between national objectives and district priorities, the MRS has the following main activities:

• Continuously monitor the hazards risk, and disaster threats and the conditions of vulnerable populations within the region.

• Conduct vulnerability analyses on emerging disaster prone areas and prepare recommendations on reducing their vulnerability.

• Mobilize and coordinate all interventions from other agencies. • Ensure that compatible disaster management is fully reflected in

Regional and national priorities. • Identify training needs and conduct training and public awareness. • Support implementation of disaster management programs agreed for

the region. • Mobilize needed financial and material resources for disaster

management. Regional Disaster Management Committee (REDMAC) This committee is the pivotal point for allocation of disaster management resources in the region. REDMAC is the committee responsible for the prevention and mitigation of disasters in the region in which case, therefore, it is the committee which was supposed to have acted during the Manyara floods.

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Regional Focal Officer/ Coordinator The regional focal officer is the desk officer appointed by the regional authority to be responsible for coordination of disaster management activities in the region and implementing the decisions made by the Regional Disaster Management Committee. 3.3.4 Babati Town and District Councils

The Babati district and town councils have the following responsibilities regarding disasters management in the Babati district:

• Mainstreaming disaster management issues in the district/councils plans.

• Continuously monitor the hazards, risks, and disaster threats and the conditions of vulnerable population within the district council.

• Identifying and mapping of all hazards in the district and conduct risk and vulnerability analysis.

• Identifying training needs and conduct education, training and public awareness programs.

• Establishing response team and civil protection system for disaster. • Mobilization of needed financial and material resources for disaster

management. District Focal Officer/ Coordinator The district focal officer is the desk officer appointed by the district authority to be responsible for coordination of disaster management activities in the district.

From the above description of the ‘chain of command’ and responsibilities regarding flood management, we conclude that the PMO-DMD particularly the officer responsible for floods in Babati area and the Manyara Regional Disaster Management committee with their focal officers at regional and Babati district level are supposed to play crucial roles in Babati flood preparedness and mitigation.

3.3.5 Other concerned actors The other actors in disaster management are:

• Ministry of Works (TANROADS–MANYARA and TANROADS–HQ)

• Ministry of Water and Livestock Development (BAWASA) • Ministry of Natural Resource and Tourism • Community Based Organization (CBOs) and Non – Governmental

Organization (NGOs)

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CBOs and NGOs are important partners in disaster management activities. They are often able to respond flexibly and rapidly to urgent needs of disasters. The main activity of these actors is to participate in training, public education, damage assessment, rehabilitation and construction activities in disaster stricken areas CBOs and NGOs are not auditees but they are important actors to consider in the total context of disaster management.

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CHAPTER 1: FLOODS – ONE KIND OF DISASTER

1.1 The importance of dealing with disasters Tanzania has been experiencing a number of disasters for years. These have caused losses of life, property and destruction of environment. A disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a society causing wide spread human, material and environmental losses, which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope with using its own resources. The occurrence of disasters can be termed as rapid or slow onset depending on the speed and span of time of origination and impact. Both natural and human made disasters can be slow or rapid. Common hazards that carry the danger of causing disasters in Tanzania include epidemics, pest infestation, droughts, floods, major transport and industrial accidents, refugees and fires. Strong winds and earthquakes are few and occur rarely, others occur more regularly. Disasters can produce complex emergencies in some incidences. The severity of the disaster impact on a population is dependent upon its capacity to absorb, deflect or manage the actual disasters. Considering the disaster threats in the country, the government passed an Act of Parliament known as the Disaster Relief Coordination Act No.9, of 1990 and established an inter ministerial committee (TANDREC) for overseeing and coordinating overall relief operations at national level. Similar committees were to be established at regional and district levels. The policy addresses all issues embracing the disaster management cycle, namely: prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. In a Vulnerability Assessment Survey conducted by the PMO for the period of 1991 – 2001 floods were one of the big four disasters as regards frequency. The others were epidemics, pests and drought. Some towns in Tanzania, for example Dar es Salaam and Mwanza, experience floods almost every rainy season. This performance audit focused on floods as an issue of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and used the Babati floods as a case study. The floods in Babati served as a practical example of how the government’s prevention of disasters functions. Our recommendations are based on the situation regarding floods in Babati. The ministry (PMO) has confirmed to us that similar problems with floods as it is with other disasters exist in other areas. That is why there is justification for the government to consider how these experiences and recommendations can be implemented with a view to generally improve disaster management in terms of floods in Babati and in the country generally.

1

1.1.1 Babati Floods in the context of Disaster Flooding is one type of disaster which Babati is experiencing occasionally. Floods had occurred at Babati – Manyara in 1998, 1990, 1980’s, 1970’s, 1964 etc. The photo below gives an impression of how floods can appear and influence on the community.

Figure 1.4: Lake Babati flooding through the main street of Babati town, April 1990. 1.1.2 Elements of Disaster Management The role of the Disaster Management Department (DMD) is to provide the necessary disaster management capability to effectively deal with disasters as and when they arise. The National Disaster Management Policy of May, 2004 identified Disasters Management as a planning, mitigation/prevention, responses, recovery/rehabilitation and preparedness with two separate but related elements – readiness and sustainability. Readiness is the ability of a community/entity (nation, region, district or ward disaster committee) to reach within a specified period of time, a level of capability whereby it will be able to perform designated operational roles and tasks.

2

The elements of disaster management are as depicted on the diagram below:

DISASTER MANAGEMENT

RECOVERY/ PREPAREDNESS RESPONSESPREVENTATION/

MITIGATION REHABILITATION

Figure 1.5: Elements of Disaster Management The elements of disaster management are as explained below:

1.1.3 Disaster preparedness The issue of disaster preparedness is an aspect that involves putting in place appropriate legislative, administrative and technical measures to minimize the adverse effects of those affected by disasters.

The objective of disaster preparedness is to ensure all institutions responsible for management of disasters are prepared, coordinated and equipped with resources to handle disasters. 1.1.4 Prevention/Mitigation Prevention measures are aimed at stopping a disaster from occurring and/or preventing such occurrence having harmful effects on communities (or groups of individuals) such as vaccination programmes by the health sector. Mitigation encompasses all activities undertaken in anticipation of the occurrence of a potentially disastrous event, including preparedness and long term risk reduction measures. An example of mitigation measures is relocation or elevation of structures out of flood plains. 1.1.5 Response Response is a set of activities to address the immediate and short-term effects of an emergency or disaster. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. 1.1.6 Recovery Recovery refers to those activities necessary to provide a rapid return to normalcy both for the affected community and for those involved with the response.

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CHAPTER 2: PURPOSE, DESIGN AND LIMITATIONS OF THE AUDIT

2.1 Purpose and scope The purpose of the audit was to report if the Central Government and the Local Government have managed the flood disasters (i.e. Prevention, Rehabilitation, Preparedness and Responses) according to political decisions made. Another purpose was to suggest ways of improving the Disaster Management process. This audit has its focus on prevention and mitigation of floods. The audit was carried out in accordance with the mandate vested in the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) under section 33(1) of the Public Finance Act No.6 of 2001, as revised in 2004 which authorises the CAG to carry out Performance Audit (Value for Money Audit) for the purpose of establishing the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of any public expenditure or program. When conducting the audit, we visited the Prime Minister’s Office – Disasters Management Department, the Manyara Regional Secretariat, the Arusha Regional Secretariat, Babati District and Town Councils, TANROADS-Manyara, TANROADS-Arusha, TANROADS-HQ, and Babati Water and Sewerage Authority (BAWASA). These offices were chosen because of their roles in the management of disasters, in this case, floods. The Audit focused on the flood events from January, 1990 to December, 2005 in Babati. We conducted the audit between May 2005 (entry conference) and August 2006. In brief, the scope of the audit covers the responsibilities to be carried out by the head of the PMO-DMD down to and including the focal officers at Manyara regional and Babati district levels in terms of flood prevention and mitigation/rehabilitation. The scope is focusing physical structures to prevent and mitigate floods. It is acknowledged that Manyara region and the local authorities have tried to decrease siltation of Lake Babati and thereby lower the risk of floods through soil conservation measures around the lake. The more siltation, the more reduction of the lake depth and consequently the higher the risk of water flooding through Babati town. However, the scope of this audit concerns primarily the preventive actions through physical structures to avoid damage caused by floods after heavy rainfall. Obviously, the combined efforts of reducing concentration time of rainfall in relation to the lake and its siltation as well as physical structure of water diversion and minimising soil erosion are needed to prevent and mitigate floods in an optimum way.

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2.2 Audit Design 2.2.1 Auditees The audit focused on five auditees, which were responsible for disaster management as mandated by the Disaster Relief Coordination Act No. 9 of 1990. The five auditees are Prime Minister’s Office – Disaster Management Department (PMO – DMD), Manyara Regional Secretariat, Babati Town Council, Babati District Council and TANROADS-Manyara. 2.2.2 Audit questions This report provides the result from applying the following seven audit questions:

1. Are adequate preventive structures in place? 2. Is there an appropriate drainage system regarding flood water?

3. Are residences located in threatened areas? If so, what measures have been taken

to reduce damages or put preventive structures?

4. Is the Regional Secretariat mobilizing specific funds for floods prevention?

5. Does the Regional Secretariat have an anti-flood program?

6. Has the PMO- DMD got an adequate monitoring system for flood prevention at Babati and elsewhere in the country?

7. Has the PMO – DMD promoted/arranged seminars/workshops/courses or other

events that directly aim at improving flood management (disaster management) in Babati?

2.2.3 Method and implementation

The audit involved extensive discussions and document review in the Prime Minister’s Office – Disasters Management Department and with Manyara Regional Secretariat, Babati District Council and Babati Town Council officials. The material obtained covered views from a variety of sources including; TANROADS Manyara and TANROADS Arusha1, Arusha Regional Secretariat, BAWASA, Babati District Officers responsible for Water and Livestock Development, Works, and Natural Resources and Tourism.

1 The Audit team visited the two regions of Manyara and Arusha since before 2000 Manyara region was part of Arusha region.

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Discussions were also held with the representatives from the Non-Governmental Organizations situated at Babati such as FIDE and FARM AFRICA and the common people at Babati. Initial discussions were held with PMO-DMD and Manyara Regional Secretariat in 2005 and field work was between 19th May, 2005 and March, 2006. A number of officials at the National, Regional and District levels were interviewed. The RC, the RAS and the acting Director of DMD were interviewed to discuss about their monitoring and supervisory roles regarding flood prevention at Babati. The Regional Accountant and the Planning Officer were interviewed to discuss about funding for flood prevention. The TANROADS – Manyara Engineer and two District Engineers were interviewed to discuss about their operations and the extent of damage caused by floods. The Regional and District Focal Officers, the Managing Director of BAWASA, LAMP officials, CBOs & NGOs officials and common people were also interviewed to discuss a variety of issues regarding floods in Babati. Various documents were reviewed during the audit. The purpose of reviewing documents was to establish the mandate, role and responsibilities of key actors charged with the responsibility of disasters management and assess the level of implementation during the period of the audit. Several documents were reviewed including:

• Disaster Relief Coordination Act No. 9 of 1990 • National Disaster Management Policy of May 2004 • National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management • Wild Lake Report • Disaster Management & Early Warning Systems by Intermaecos • Vulnerability Assessment Report by the PMO- Disaster Management

Department • Land Management Program Report – BABATI by LAMP

2.3 Structure of the Audit report Chapter 3 gives a detailed description of the set up and processes of disaster prevention in Tanzania from national level down to the district level. This is done in terms of legislation, national disaster management policy and operational guidelines for disaster management in order to deal with different kinds of disasters. The description also includes goals and objectives, funding, key players and main activities. The findings of the audit are presented in chapter 4 and the conclusions of the audit in chapter 5. Recommendations appear in chapter 6 with the aim to improve capacity for prevention and mitigation of damage from floods in Babati and in the country in general. The experiences from this audit and the recommendations are likely to be relevant for management of floods elsewhere in Tanzania.

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CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTION OF THE AUDIT AREA

3.1 Law and regulations for disaster management in Tanzania Laws, rules and regulation mentioned below form the norm, which NAO will use in assessing the responsible actors.

The government has set legislation, national disaster management policy and operational guidelines for disaster management in the country in order to deal with different kinds of disasters as explained in the diagram below:

DISASTER RELIEF COORDINATION ACTS NO. 9 OF 1990 (PARLIAMENT DECISION)

Figure 3.1: Description of the Audit Area Nota bene: The above organization chart is valid from year 2000 when Manyara region was formed. From 1990 up to year 2000 Arusha regional authorities were responsible for disaster preparedness in Babati. As reflected in the above chart, the scope of Performance Audit is to assess if the actual implementation is efficient and effective and in accordance with laws, policies and directives . However, Performance Audit does not question the political goals set by Parliament.

NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT POLICY and OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

(POLICY LEVEL) POLICY MADE BY INTER MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE POLICY AND GUIDELINES MADE BY DISASTER

MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT

IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL MANYARA REGIONAL LEVEL

REGIONAL SECRETARIAT REGIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

DISTRICT LEVEL

Per

form

ance

Aud

it

BABATI TOWN and DISTRICT COUNCILS

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3.1.1 Law

Considering the disaster threats in the country, the Government passed an Act of Parliament known as the Disaster Relief Coordination Act No. 9, of 1990. The government has also established an Inter-Ministerial Committee known as Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee (TANDREC) for overseeing and coordinating overall relief operations at the national level. Similar committees were to be established at Regional and District levels 3.1.2 National Policy

The National Disaster Management Policy of May 2004 was put in place since a properly defined policy framework is crucial for disaster surveillance and management as a measure to reduce vulnerability and hence poverty reduction.

3.1.3 National Operational Guidelines

The National Operational Guidelines (NOG) of 2003 attempt to outline and address various elements in Disaster Cycle: mitigation/prevention, preparedness, responses and recovery/rehabilitation. 3.1.4 Goals and objectives given by the government

In developing the NOG, the government had the following objectives:

(i) Develop higher level of preparedness, response and mitigation capacity for all types of disasters.

(ii) Promote public knowledge and awareness of disaster and enhance the involvement of the community in disaster management.

(iii) Establish and maintain an effective institutional arrangement for the coordination and collaboration.

(iv) Promote research, information generation and dissemination. (v) Mainstream disaster management issues into development plans and

other sector/ policies and programs at all levels.

Other goals and objectives set by the government are:

(i) Sustain activities aimed at reducing or eliminating long term risks to people and property from hazards and their effects.

(ii) Build the emergency management capacity to effectively prepare for mitigation against, respond to, and recover from any hazard by planning, training, research, rehearsals and investigations.

(iii) Conduct emergency operation to save life, project livelihood and property by positioning emergency equipment and supplies, evacuating potential victims, providing foods, water, medical care, restoring critical public service, etc.

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These objectives imply that the PMO – DMD was expected to perform the following activities in relation to floods prevention in Babati:

• Clearly inform Manyara Regional Secretariat (MRS) about the policy and the need to form required disaster committees.

• Follow up and ascertain that MRS disaster committee has formulated a plan of action.

• Arrange or make others to arrange training events • Annually follow up the implementation of the action plans • In the case of floods, analyze the damage in view of the prevention

measures taken • Assist MRS to improve floods prevention measures.

3.2 Funding

The availability of financial resources for PMO-DMD, MRS and Babati District Council for Flood Prevention and Management have been reviewed in this audit. We found that no specific fund has been set aside for floods prevention and mitigation.

3.3 Key Players and Main Activities

To facilitate the whole action of dealing with floods, there is a number of key players, who are accountable according to the National Disaster Management Policy and who are supposed to perform the main activities as mentioned in the system graph below:

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Figure 3.2: Systems Graph

3.3.1 The Inter – Ministerial Committee

The Inter-Ministerial Committee - Tanzania Disaster Relief Committee (TANDREC) comprises of Permanent Secretaries of key ministries (disaster related activities), representatives from TMA, Food Security Department, Commissioner of Fire Brigade and is chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the PMO. The main activity of the Inter-ministerial committee is to be the national coordinating body for the implementation of cross-sector disaster management programs as well as to oversee the implementation of the policy and strategies at all levels are working properly

Disaster Management Department

PMO

Manyara Regional Secretariat Manyara Regional Disaster Management

Committee - Regional Focal Officer for Disaster Management

Babati District Council

District Focal Officer for Disaster Management

Babati TownCouncil

Ministry of Water &

TANROADS Livestock Manyara Developme t n

BAWASA

Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism

CBOs &

NGOs Activities aimed at reducing floods

damage and flood occurrence

Inter-Ministerial Committee

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3.3.2 The Disaster Management Department

As a secretariat to the TANDREC, the DMD is accountable/responsible for the following main activities:

• Coordinate all disaster relief operations and preparedness measures

subject to the directions of the committee. • Carry out all research relevant to its functions for the purposes of

advising the committee on measures for disaster preventions. • Arrange for and carry out the dissemination on behalf of the

committee, information concerning disaster operations preparedness and prevention.

• Formulate and recommend for establishment by the committee the scope of the disaster prevention plans and the basic policies designed to govern them.

• Review regularly and coordinate the different disaster prevention measures.

• Recommend to the committee measures and methods necessary for promoting awareness and understanding among the public, of disaster prevention activities and measures.

3.3.3 Manyara Regional Secretariat (MRS) The MRS is the pivotal point for the allocation of disaster management resources in the region. As a link between national objectives and district priorities, the MRS has the following main activities:

• Continuously monitor the hazards risk, and disaster threats and the conditions of vulnerable populations within the region.

• Conduct vulnerability analyses on emerging disaster prone areas and prepare recommendations on reducing their vulnerability.

• Mobilize and coordinate all interventions from other agencies. • Ensure that compatible disaster management is fully reflected in

Regional and national priorities. • Identify training needs and conduct training and public awareness. • Support implementation of disaster management programs agreed for

the region. • Mobilize needed financial and material resources for disaster

management. Regional Disaster Management Committee (REDMAC) This committee is the pivotal point for allocation of disaster management resources in the region. REDMAC is the committee responsible for the prevention and mitigation of disasters in the region in which case, therefore, it is the committee which was supposed to have acted during the Manyara floods.

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Regional Focal Officer/ Coordinator The regional focal officer is the desk officer appointed by the regional authority to be responsible for coordination of disaster management activities in the region and implementing the decisions made by the Regional Disaster Management Committee. 3.3.4 Babati Town and District Councils

The Babati district and town councils have the following responsibilities regarding disasters management in the Babati district:

• Mainstreaming disaster management issues in the district/councils plans.

• Continuously monitor the hazards, risks, and disaster threats and the conditions of vulnerable population within the district council.

• Identifying and mapping of all hazards in the district and conduct risk and vulnerability analysis.

• Identifying training needs and conduct education, training and public awareness programs.

• Establishing response team and civil protection system for disaster. • Mobilization of needed financial and material resources for disaster

management. District Focal Officer/ Coordinator The district focal officer is the desk officer appointed by the district authority to be responsible for coordination of disaster management activities in the district.

From the above description of the ‘chain of command’ and responsibilities regarding flood management, we conclude that the PMO-DMD particularly the officer responsible for floods in Babati area and the Manyara Regional Disaster Management committee with their focal officers at regional and Babati district level are supposed to play crucial roles in Babati flood preparedness and mitigation.

3.3.5 Other concerned actors The other actors in disaster management are:

• Ministry of Works (TANROADS–MANYARA and TANROADS–HQ)

• Ministry of Water and Livestock Development (BAWASA) • Ministry of Natural Resource and Tourism • Community Based Organization (CBOs) and Non – Governmental

Organization (NGOs)

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CBOs and NGOs are important partners in disaster management activities. They are often able to respond flexibly and rapidly to urgent needs of disasters. The main activity of these actors is to participate in training, public education, damage assessment, rehabilitation and construction activities in disaster stricken areas CBOs and NGOs are not auditees but they are important actors to consider in the total context of disaster management.

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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS OF THE AUDIT

4.1 Introduction In this chapter, we present our findings as answers to the audit questions shown in chapter 2 of this report. The findings relate to the following aspects:

• Decreasing the risks for further damage from floods in Babati in the future. • The role of Regional (Manyara Regional Disaster Management Committee) and

Local Governments as regards prevention/mitigation of floods. • Babati Town Planning • The support from the Prime Minister’s Office - Disaster Management Department

to the regional and district levels • Maintenance of preventive structures of Minjingu – Dodoma Trunk Road • Water discharge capacity when designing the new Minjingu – Dodoma Trunk

Road. To make it easier for the reader to comprehend the relationship between key sites mentioned in the following findings, please refer to Annex 4. The following text will lead the reader through key sites and relationships represented in the map. As well, the reader can consult a more detailed map of Babati town in Annex 3. This latter map contains numbers indicating the positions where some of the photos in this report were taken.

4.2 Using the sketch map and photos During the 1990 floods, water was flowing through the town and the artificial Kiongozi channel. The water flowing through the town and the channel converged just before the Mrara Bridge, where the Kiongozi River starts.1 From there, the water flowed to Kiongozi bridge and onwards to Kiru Valley. The sketch map in Annex 3 shows where the water entered and flowed through the streets of the town. As well, it depicts where the water left the lake through the Kigongoni outlet. To illustrate the effect of the 1990 floods we may use the destruction of the Mrara Bridge. The Mrara Bridge was a box culvert with a small waterway and could by no means accommodate all the water. Thus, the bridge came to function as a dam and was eventually overtopped and washed away. The damage is reflected in the two following pictures.

1 The Kiongozi river is fed by water flowing from the catchment of the Ufyome Mountain.

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Figure 4.1: The remains of the Mrara Bridge after the floods in 1990 washed away the bridge which connected Babati town with its hospital. To the right is the foot bridge, which was constructed for pedestrians and to support the emergency pipe for water supply to Babati town.

Figure 4.2: A few months later in 1990: This picture was taken of the same place after the flood water had subsided. In the forefront there are pieces of concrete from the original bridge that was broken down by the flood water. The remaining abutment of Mrara bridge still stands to the right in the picture. In the background is the temporary bridge, which was constructed using Eucalyptus logs.

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To facilitate understanding of the analysis and conclusions from our findings, we will continue to use maps and pictures taken during the 1990 and 1998 floods as well as pictures taken in 2005. The intention is that readers that have never visited Babati should be enabled through the use of maps and photos to grasp the physical features and relationships of the sites relevant to the floods. The following presentation of our findings will start at the Lake Babati, go through the Kigongoni outlet, follow the Channel downstreams and continue along Kiongozi River down to the Kiongozi bridge. The findings for the past 15 years of relevant sites have assisted us to assess the maintenance of structures. It has also enabled us to consider the adequacy of the preventive structures as regards the prevention of floods and the mitigation of damages in case of a future extraordinary rainfall in the Babati area which could lead to other floods.

4.3 Adequacy of Preventive Structures In this chapter, we will address the following audit questions: Audit question 1: Are adequate preventive structures in place? Audit question 2: Is there an appropriate drainage/discharge system regarding flood

water? Applying the time scope2 of 1990 – 2005 we present the following findings regarding the physical structures. 4.3.1 The importance of the Kigongoni Outlet and the Channel The Kiongozi Channel, which runs from the culverts in the Kigongoni roadbank to Mrara Bridge is of great importance to prevent floods through Babati town. When the level of water is very high at Lake Babati, the water can be discharged through Kigongoni outlet and onwards through the channel, provided there are no obstacles at the outlet and the Channel. Without this channel, heavy downpours of rain risk to fill up Lake Babati and the water would be discharged through the town. The existence of the channel has in the past contributed to avoid floods and thereby reducing property damage and human suffering.3 Thus, the efficient use of the Channel as an outlet for “excess” water is important when trying to prevent future floods through Babati town.

2 See chapter 2.1 on audit scope. 3 Details can be found in chapter 8 of ”The Wild Lake”, The 1990 floods in Babati, Tanzania – rehabilitation and prevention, SIDA’s Regional Soil Conservation Unit, 1992.

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4.3.2 Physical factors and structures influencing the efficiency of the Kigongoni Outlet

Grass barrier between the Lake and Kigongoni outlet Starting from Lake Babati, it is important to keep a path for water flow through the grass covered area to the culverts at Kigongoni outlet free from being blocked by growing grass. The grass vegetation during the time of the audit was low but may grow and eventually present a barrier to water discharge through the Kigongoni outlet. The below pictures show the extent of grass barrier in 1990, how it was removed, as well as the corresponding vegetation in 2005. Besides the grass acting as a barrier to the smooth flow of water, the capacity of the culverts in the Kigongoni road embankment, in 1990, was too small to discharge the flood water. The road embankment functioned to a large extent as a dam. The increasing water in the Lake flowed through the Babati town.

Figure 4.3: (Position 10 in Annex 3) The thick grass barrier between the Lake and the Kigongoni outlet during the 1990 floods. In 1990 the Kigongoni outlet contained five small culverts4. The maximum capacity of these culverts for discharging water was 1.35 cu m/second. This capacity was too small compared to the estimated maximum flood of about 16 cu m/second.

4 There were four culverts of 600 mm diameter and one of 1,200 mm diameter. The small culverts were clogged by mud during the 1990 floods.

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. Figure 4.4: (Position 10 in Annex 3) This picture taken in 1990 shows how the thick grass barrier between the Lake and Kigongoni Outlet was removed to open a path for water flowing into the Channel.

Figure 4.5: (Position 10 in Annex 3) The removal of grass in 1990 finally created a wider path for the water in 1990 which facilitated in preventing a flood through Babati town during the long rains in 1991. The below photo of the same area, from the Kigongoni outlet towards the lake, illustrates that the rainfall in 1997/8 was extraordinarily heavy. A much larger area was covered by water than in 1990.

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Figure 4.6: (Position 10 in Annex 3) A very large area was inundated at Kigongoni outlet during the 1997/8 rains. A comparison can be made with the above pictures depicting how the grass barrier was removed. The water in 1997/8 presented a challenge to the capacity of the culverts installed in 1990/91 at the Kigongoni road embankment. Although some of the culverts were completely submerged by the water, the total discharge capacity of the culverts was (fortunately) enough and the road embankment did not act as a dam, which was the case during the 1990 floods.

Figure 4.7: (Position 10 in Annex 3) The water masses coming from the Lake in 1998 flows through the culverts at the Kigongoni road embankment further into the Channel.

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Figure 4.8: (Position 10 in Annex 3) The grass cover between the Lake and the Kigongoni Outlet in May 2005. A herd of cattle is grazing close to the lake which is against the local by-laws. A contributing factor to the low grass cover at the time of audit was probably due to grazing by cattle, which we also witnessed both close to the Lake (see above picture) and in the Channel itself. However,there is a by-law prohibiting grazing around the Lake but the law seems to be frequently violated. The awareness of the blocking function of the grass seems to be low. When asked about it, one concerned officer seemed for the first time to realize that the grass may act as barrier for water to flow through Kigongoni outlet. However, another officer pointed out that the grass was cut as a matter of routine. Culverts at Kigongoni outlet For the culverts at Kigongoni outlet to effectively discharge water from the lake into the channel, it is obviously necessary to keep them clean from blocking debris and clogging mud. According to TANROADS-Manyara, the cleaning of the culverts is performed annually as a matter of routine. During the audit we witnessed that the culverts at the were Kigongoni outlet were being unclogged. This is shown in the below picture which also depicts that deposits have accumulated down streams close to the culverts. These deposits form another hindrance for smooth water flow.

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Figure 4.9: This picture, taken in May 2005, shows how mud from the culverts is being put in heaps downstream close to the culverts. The picture also shows at the far end that previous deposits have formed humps that prevent smooth water flow from the low lying culverts. Inadequate capacity of culverts The culverts at Kigongoni road embankment were increased after the 1990 floods. The below picture shows the Kigongoni embankment with a total of 13 culverts.

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Figure 4.10: The picture was taken in September 1991. The discharge capacity of the Kigongoni outlet with a total of 13 culverts is 4 cu m/sec, which is only 25% of the estimated flood flow of 16 cu m/sec experienced at the 1990 floods. (The Wild Lake report page 45) During the audit it was established that no action had been taken to increase the discharge capacity of the Kigongoni outlet since 1991. This fact is reflected in the below picture, which shows the upstream/lake side of the Kigongoni embankment. The picture was taken the same day in May 2005 as the previous picture of the downstream side.

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Figure 4.11: The above picture, taken in 2005, shows also that cleaning of the culverts took place on the upstream/lake side of the Kigongoni embankment, which contains the same number of culverts as in 1991.

4.4 The Kiongozi Channel The water from Lake Babati leaves the lake at the Kigongoni outlet, where the water passes through culverts under the trunk road between Arusha and Dodoma. At the outlet at Kigongoni begins an artificial channel,5 the Kiongozi channel, which leads the water to the Mrara Bridge, where the Kiongozi River starts. The soil just after Kigongoni outlet is very erodible. This fact is illustrated in the below photo from the 1990 floods.

5 The channel first dug after the floods in 1964. The channel did not function effectively during the 1990 floods as it was to a large extent clogged by debris and mud. Thus, instead the water from the lake flowed through Babati town.

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Figure 4.12: (Position 13 in Annex 3) This picture taken in 1990 shows that the flood water created a long, deep and wide gully creeping up towards the lake. Attempts to stop the gully formation through gabions failed. The collapsed gabion is seen at the right lower corner. To prevent the gully head to move further towards the lake it was decided to construct a “waterfall”. 4.4.1 The earth embankment and the artificial waterfalls in the Channel To combat gully erosion, artificial “waterfalls”6 were constructed in 1990 to prevent gullies from developing further after the 1990 floods. The first and bigger waterfall that was built appear in the below two photos. To make the water pass through the waterfall an embankment (earth wall reinforced by sandbags) was built as part of the general widening of the Channel down streams from the Kigongoni road embankment. The following two photos show the work of widening the Channel and creation of the embankment. It is followed by two photos that depict the first waterfall without and with water.

6 ”Waterfall” means in this case a concrete structure to prevent further scouring and erosion at a gully head.

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Figure 4.13: (Position 12 in Annex 3) The Channel after the Kigongoni road embankment is being widened in 1990. An earth wall, reinforced by sandbags and later stabilised by planting trees7, is being created to train the water to flow into the gully where an artificial waterfall is preventing further gully formation.

Figure 4.14: (Position 12 in Annex 3) The earth wall/embankment in the widened Channel is directing the water to the bigger waterfall. 7 The tree seedlings were surrounded by a wooden protection to prevent from cattle grazing. The wood was soon removed (possibly for firewood) and the seedlings eaten by cattle.

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Figure 4.15: (Position 13 in Annex 3) To prevent further scouring a concrete slope was constructed at the gully head and gabions were put in place along the gully banks and stones on the gully floor.

Figure 4.16: (Position 13 in Annex 3) The concrete “waterfall” structure preventing further erosion at the gully head. The picture was taken during the beginning of the long rains in March 1991, i.e one year after the 1990 floods.

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After assessing the masses of water that was supposed to pass through the bigger waterfall, it was decided to build a second parallel artificial waterfall. The following sketch-map shows the positions of the above mentioned earth wall and the bigger and smaller waterfalls. The sketch-map is followed by a photo of the smaller waterfall without water.

Earth embankment Figure 4.17: Sketch-map of the earth embankment and the two waterfalls in the Channel

Figure 4.18: (Position 15 in Annex 3) The construction of the small waterfall aiming at further decreasing gully formation in the Channel.

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4.4.2 Maintenance of the Channel and the waterfalls 1991 - 2005 Through photos from the extraordinary rainfall (El Nino) in 1998 and site visits in February, May, October 2005, and December 2006, we have been able to obtain findings that throws light on the maintenance of the Channel and the artificial waterfalls by the regional and local authorities during a fifteen year period. The earth embankment and the waterfalls The earth embankment directing the water in the Channel towards the waterfall should be seen as a system of preventing gully erosion in general ( avoiding loss of productive agricultural land). In particular, it should be seen as a systematic measure to decrease the risk that a gully will eventually develop up to the Kigongoni outlet, where it would undermine the road embankment of the trunk road. In the worst scenario, further gully formation would provide conditions for a severe draining of Lake Babati. The original ambition (refer to Annex 1) to maintain and strengthen the earth embankment was important in order to make the waterfalls continue performing their function of preventing gully formation during heavy rains. Previous photos of the Kigongoni outlet towards the lake showed that the rainfall in 1998 was extraordinary and presented a real challenge to the said soil prevention structures in the Channel. The following photos from the time of severe rains in 1997/98 show the earth embankment that was demolished by the force of the water masses. Another channel was created which lead into development of a new gully.

Figure 4.19: (Position 12 in Annex 3) The picture taken in 1998 shows that the water flowing through the Kigongoni culverts has broken through and washed away the earth embankment.

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Figure 4.20: (Position 12 in Annex 3) The picture taken in 1998 shows remains of sandbags and wood stems mark the position of the original retaining wall. The channel to the left leads the water to the bigger waterfall. The water to the right is flowing into a newly created gully. Compare with figure 4.14 taken in 1990.

Figure 4.21: (Position 12 in Annex 3) After the water had washed away the earth embankment, the water started creating a gully. The picture is taken upstream. The demolished embankment is behind the bush to the right in the picture.

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Figure 4.22: (Position 12 in Annex 3) The same, long gully formation from the opposite vantage point in 1998.

Figure 4.23: (Position 12 in Annex 3) The same gully from the same vantage point as the previous picture. However, this picture was taken in February 2005, seven years later. The water has continued to erode and enlarge the gully considerably. The waterfalls in 1998 and 2005

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Our findings and pictures show that the big waterfall was to a large extent by-passed during the 1997/98 floods. However, substantial water masses still descended at this waterfall. This is reflected in the below picture. It is followed by another picture showing that the area of small waterfall had been cultivated. No water was flowing through the small waterfall. It was in fact of no use at all as to its original purpose of preventing soil erosion.

Figure 4.24: (Position 13 in Annex 3) Water descending the big waterfall during the 1998 floods.

Figure 4.25: (Position 15 in Annex 3) The side channel leading up to and the area of the concrete structure of the small waterfall are under cultivation. This picture of 1998 shows some of the remaining concrete structures. The reader may compare with a previous figure 4.18 depicting the complete concrete structure of the small waterfall. The area of the small waterfall was still being cultivated in May 2005.

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In May 2005, we found that the big waterfall had been abandoned as a structure for preventing soil erosion. The channel from the embankment leading up to the waterfall as well as the waterfall itself was overgrown by vegetation. This is reflected in the following picture. In May 2005, it was somewhat difficult to locate both the big and the small waterfall due to thick vegetation and soil covering the concrete structures.

Figure 4.26: (Position 13 in Annex 3) The top part of the big waterfall is appearing at the left lower corner of this picture from May 2005. The rest of the waterfall is covered by vegetation. Visiting the waterfalls, we noted an activity that may be detrimental to efficiency of the Channel. The clay soil of the area of the Channel and the growing gully is being used for brick making. This activity is evidenced in the below picture.

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Figure 4.27: (Position12 in Annex 3) The head of the big growing gully after the broken embankment. In the background of this picture taken in May 2005 bricks that were made using soil from the area of the gully and the waterfalls are being burned. In December 2006, it was noted that the scouring effects of the water had lowered the bed of the channel at the embankment to such an extent that the its level is below the level of both the small and the big waterfalls. This fact has a direct consequence for the possibilities of using the existing waterfalls for preventing further gully formation. we will discuss this issue further in the conclusions and recommendations.

4.5 Kiongozi Bridge The trunk road between Arusha and Babati passes Kiongozi bridge 15 kilometres from Babati town. The banks of Kiongozi river at the bridge were heavily eroded during the 1990 floods. The erosion threatened to destabilise the bridge abutments. To prevent further erosion, retaining walls of 28 metres length along the river bends up to the abutments were built on the upstream side. The following pictures reflect this work and the need to remove debris and large tree trunks blocking the waterway.

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Figure 4.28: The flood water in 1990 eroded behind the wing wall of the abutments of the Kiongozi Bridge and threatened to cut off the road to Arusha as shown on the right of the above picture. The picture also shows fallen tree trunks and uprooted trees blocking the waterway.

Figure 4.29: Construction of a retaining walls on both sides of the river upstreams at Kiongozi Bridge in 1990.

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Figure 4.30: Construction of the retaining wall from the vantage point of the Kiongozi Bridge in 1990. The severe floods in 1997/98 destroyed the retaining wall. The force of the water cut the wall into pieces, which is illustrated by the following picture.

Figure 4.31: This picture, taken in 1998, from the same vantage point as picture number 4.30 shows the construction of the retaining wall. The wall was in 1998 overtopped and broken down by the water masses.

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After the floods in 1998, the broken retaining wall was left unattended for seven years. The below picture shows that water masses cut through the road bank at the wing wall on the Arusha side of the Kiongozi bridge. However, this pictorial evidence does not concur with the memory of the TANROADS Manyara Engineer, who has informed us that he took the picture in 2004. His memory is that the road embankment was heavily damaged but not cut through by the floods. Other officers of Manyara region advocate that the picture must have been taken in 1998. Regardless of the date of the below picture and the extent of damage done to the road bank, this image reflects the dilapidated state of the retaining wall during five years.

Figure 4.32: This picture, probably taken in 2004, shows that the original retaining wall is not there. The water has eroded the Arusha – Babati trunk road to the right of the right abutment of the Kiongozi Bridge. To restore the possibilities of using the bridge for traffic, the damage to the road bank was repaired. To mitigate further erosion from rainfall at this sensitive transport site, new retaining wall was built during January and February 2005.

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Figure 4.33: New gabions being put into place in January 2005 to construct a new retaining wall at Kiongozi Bridge.

Figure 4.34: This picture taken in May 2005 shows the new retaining wall at Kiongozi Bridge. We could establish that the retaining wall of 2005 was built without consultation with soil conservation experts. This brings us to the next chapter, which contains another main

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findings regarding the future adequacy of flood prevention and mitigating structures of the Arusha – Dodoma trunk road.

4.6 Design of the rehabilitation of the Arusha – Dodoma trunk road

In the course of the audit, we have tried to establish if records and experiences of local, regional and central government authorities from previous floods are being considered by the consultants designing the rehabilitation of trunk roads Singida – Babati - Minjingu and Babati – Dodoma. For the stretch Babati – Dodoma a feasibility study has been completed. For Singida - Babati – Minjingu a detailed design is under way. In view of the findings we am particularly thinking of the two sensitive points at Kigongoni road embankment, including the area down streams the channel, and Kiongozi Bridge. The discharge capacity of these two points should be commensurate with the water discharge from the catchment’s areas during torrential rainfall. In order to prevent floods through Babati town, it is crucial that the road embankment at Kigongoni has sufficient capacity to avoid it acting as a dam. Likewise, the discharge capacity of Kiongozi bridge and the protection structures around the bridge abutments must withstand the onslaught of masses of flood water without the trunk road being cut through. We wish to note that the orientation of the bridge in relation to Kiongozi river means high risk of severe erosion at bridge abutments during floods. 4.6.1 Kigongoni outlet Our contacts with TANROADS HQs in Dar es Salaam has given us the understanding that the feasibility study for the Dodoma – Babati road, November 2006 does consider in general terms floods when discussing the discharge capacity of the “project road”.8 However, the feasibility study does not mention any details regarding discharge capacity of the Kigongoni outlet and experience of previous floods. Our impression is that such issues may be the subject of the detailed design phase, “such that the water velocities across the structures remain reasonably low without expensive elaborate measures for scour protection works” (chapter 5.3.2). Thus, it is too early to draw any conclusions of what future possible hydrological studies may result into as regards the particular design of the Kigongoni outlet. The consultant for the feasibility study interviewed representatives of TANROADS HQs, TANROADS in Arusha and Manyara regions, and Babati District Council Works department. The feasibility study does not reflect any data from or mentioning of the previous floods. 8 Feasibility Study Report for upgrading of Dodoma – Babati Road , Carl Bro A/s in association with M-Konsult, November 2006, chapter 5.3.

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4.6.2 Kiongozi bridge The consultancy studies concerning Singida - Babati – Minjingu road has moved into the design phase.9 The proposed design for the Kiongozi Bridge is 25 metres span with soffit level of 6.0 metres above the river bottom and a free board of 1.0 metre (hyrological studies resulted into a design flood of 140.6 cumecs). The design peak flood is based on hydrological studies which takes into account the total runoff from the catchment area.

4.7 Residential and Business Location of Babati Town Audit question 3 Are residential premises located in threatened areas? If so, what

measures have been taken to reduce damages or install preventive structures?

The above audit question should be seen in the light of two important factors: • Studies have shown that the land-use pattern around Lake Babati has changed

drastically during the past 45 years. For example, 1960 – 1990 cultivation around this area has increased by 155 per cent. This means that many gullies have been formed as a result of the intensified land-use, which help to transport the rainwater quickly from the catchment area to the lake. The “time of concentration” is thus much shorter than in the past. Thus, the lake level increases quickly after rainfall. The changes in land use in areas around the Lake have continued. Our interviews confirmed that houses continue to be constructed in the catchment areas of Lake Babati.

• The natural spillway of Lake Babati is through Babati town. A major part of the town

is located below the level of the Lake. The present main street and the eastern side streets of Babati town are thus flood prone.

In our audit, we have tried to establish if the above factors have been taken into consideration in the master and detailed plans for Babati town. I have made the following findings. (i) Babati Town and District Councils have no master plan for Babati town and

district. (ii) Some of the residential and business activities have been located at low lying,

flood prone areas. Babati Town bus stand is one example. Water passages have been blocked by location of plots for residential purposes.

(iii) Relief structures to safeguard the roads and residential buildings against severe

rainfall appear inadequate. This was confirmed in interviews with a concerned 9 Draft Final Engineering Design Report for the Babati – Minjingu Road, CTC and Carl Bro, October 2006 Chapter 0.2.4 (page 9).

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officer, who advocated that a redesign of existing relief structures with proper outlets should be undertaken. After the 1997/98 floods, there were limited funds for rehabilitation. Hence, only light structures were put in place.

4.8 Mobilization and Funds for Flood Management. Audit question 4 Is the Regional Secretariat mobilizing specific funds for floods

prevention? Effective flood prevention and mitigation require plans and resources to execute the plans. In this regard we have obtained the following findings (i) There are no budget allocations for flood prevention activities, both at regional

secretariat level and at the Babati Town or District Council level. (ii) The Regional Secretariat, Babati Town and District Councils have no plan for

disasters or floods. Also, there is no plan for how they can mobilize or solicit funds for flood prevention (or disaster management in general). The said authorities have not identified any major source of funds that could be utilized for disaster related activities.

(iii) There is no effort to put the activities relating to flood prevention in the Medium

Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

4.9 Pre-Disaster Planning Audit question 5 Does the Regional Secretariat have an anti-flood program? Even if the concerned authorities mentioned above do not have plans for flood prevention, still, an Anti-flood program may in practice be more or less formulated if one considers the activities of the region and the councils where the involvement of different parts of the community plays an important role. Our audit findings regarding the involvement of the civil society in the preparation of an Anti-flood Program are as follows: (i). The Regional Secretariat, District and Town Council have neither formed of an

Anti-Flood Program in place nor have they made preparations to such an end. This was confirmed in interviews with concerned officers.

(ii). There is insufficient coordination between the Focal Officers at the Regional &

District levels. No officer seems to emphasize proactively regarding Pre-disaster planning and an Anti-Flood Program. Interviews with local NGOs and CBOs reflected a lack of involvement regarding prevention and mitigation of floods.

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4.10 Training, action plans, role of PMO-DMD Audit question 6 Has the PMO-DMD executed adequate monitoring of flood

prevention at Babati and elsewhere in Tanzania? Audit question 7 Has the PMO – DMD promoted/arranged

seminar/workshop/courses or other events that directly aim at improving flood management (disaster management) in Babati?

The PMO-DMD conducted training in November 2004 in sensitization and awareness for disaster management and early warning systems. Seven participants from Babati district attended the training. The participants were taught;

• Prevention activities of disaster • Preparedness activities of disaster; and • Identification of source of risk or disaster

After the training, the PMPO -DMD has not made follow up regarding the development of council plans of action for disaster management and early warning, which the participants were supposed to prepare/develop and implement accordingly. As regards plans in Babati, we have established that the said training did not generate plans on Anti-Flood Programs for the Babati area. If there would be another flood, it will take a long time for PMO - DMD to react with regard to release of funds. This was established in interviews with PMO – DMD officials. The above findings reflect lack of a proactive working strategy regarding floods. This should be seen against the obligations of the PMO-DMD to be forward looking and chart out preventive strategies and actions. These obligations appear in the following way in the below excerpts from the two guiding documents for the work of PMO-DMD, i.e. the Disaster Relief Coordination Act, 1990, and the National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management (NOG) (first edition-2003): Disaster Relief Coordination Act, Part III: Mobilization for Disaster Relief. “7. There shall be established within the Prime Minister’s Office, a department of Government to be known as the Disaster Relief Coordination Department. 8. – (1) The Department shall, under the charge of the Director, be the executive organ of the Committee and shall be responsible to the Committee for the discharge of its functions under this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the subsection (1), the Department shall – (a) Coordinate all disaster relief operations and preparedness measures, subject to the directions of the Committee;

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(b) carry out or coordinate all research relevant to its functions for the purpose of advising the Committee on measures necessary for disaster preventions; (e) formulate and recommend for establishment by the Committee the scope of the disaster prevention plans and the basic policies designed to govern them; (f) review regularly and coordinate different disaster prevention measures (g) seek and collate current data on disaster prevention measures, and recommend suitable measures to the Committee for implementation.” “Department to keep and maintain records. “10. (1) The Director shall cause to be kept and maintained in the Department – (iv) all other matters and things relevant to relief operations and coordination

during or after a disaster.” “Power to call information” “12 – (1) For the purposes of securing proper performance by the Committee and its functions under this Act, the Department may require in writing any department, organization, authority or person or body of persons, to furnish to it such information required for the purposes of disaster relief planning or prevention as the committee or the Director may deem necessary and specify in writing.” The National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management (NOG) (First Edition – 2003) Annex iii: Hazard – Specific guidelines “S/No 2. Floods: Prone areas: Tanga, Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Mtwara, Rukwa, Pwani. Leading agency: MoWL. Preparedness: Risk assessment, and Hazard Mapping, Monitoring of stream flows, Prepare contingency plan. Support: MoW. Construct flood banks. As regards floods as one type of disaster, the PMO-DMD has the obligation and the powers to carry out or coordinate research relevant to floods, formulate flood prevention plans, review regularly and coordinate different flood prevention measures, seek and collate current data on flood prevention measures, and shall cause to be kept and maintained in the Department all other matters and things relevant to relief operations and coordination during or after a flood. Through interviews we have established that PMO-DMD does not have a register of floods that have occurred in Tanzania. Floods in Tanzania are neither systematically recorded, nor does the department conduct proactive analyses of flood risks for flood prone and economically important areas.

4.11 Summary of Findings

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4.11.1 Relational graph The below graph summarizes the findings and shows the relationship between clusters of findings.

Continued risks for further preventable damage from floods in Babati

- inadequate and deteriorating preventive structure

- inappropriate location of residential areas - inadequate maintenance and design of

Minjingu – Dodoma trunk road

Regional (Manyara Regional Disaster Management Committee) and Local Governments have not adequately performed their role as regards prevention/mitigation of floods.

Inadequate Town Planning

Inadequate maintenance and lack of proactive inputs for a flood orientated design of the Minjingu – Dodoma trunk road

Local Government don’t get sufficient support, monitoring, and proactive analyses from PMO-DMD, which does not have a national flood register.

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS Our audit findings presented in the previous chapter give us reasons to draw the following conclusions.

5.1 General The Babati District Council, the Manyara Regional Secretariat, and Ministry of Works (through the Arusha Regional Engineer)/ TANROADS-Manyara1 have not adequately fulfilled their obligation to proactively plan, maintain and invest in physical structures to prevent and mitigate floods in the Babati area. Our findings of inaction of the concerned authorities regarding the crucial function of the Kigongoni road embankment, the Kiongozi Channel for prevention of floods in the low-lying areas of Babati town merit such a conclusion. Addressing “floods as something that you deal with when they occur”2 is an attitude which was confirmed in interviews. As regards Kiongozi bridge, TANROADS-Manyara have rehabilitated the retaining structures (gabions), but Ministry of Works/TANROADS-Manyara actions have been too slow before and after 2000 when TANROADS took responsibility for the bridge. It should not have taken seven years to rehabilitate the retaining structures to protect this trunk road bridge and its road bank after the 1997/8 floods The inactivity evidenced by our findings is somewhat remarkable as the report from the 1990 floods3 specified measures to counteract damage of future floods. Annex 1 reflects what actions the Steering Group for Flood Control, working under the Babati District Commissioner, recommended the regional and district authorities to undertake to prevent and mitigate floods in Babati. Our general conclusion on the role of PMO-DMD is that this department should improve on executing a proactive national role in follow-up, record-keeping and facilitation as regards flood prevention in relation to regional and local authorities as prescribed in the country’s laws and policies. Using the three E’s of Performance Audit – Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness – we conclude that the actions of concerned authorities at local, regional, and national level regarding flood preparedness do not score well in terms of these classic indicators of good governance. Rather, the lack of actions portray negligence by the accountable authorities. Our conclusion should also be seen against the fact that the desired preventive 1 Before 2000 the Ministry of Works through the Arusha Regional Engineer was responsible for the Arusha-Babati trunk road. It may be noted that the Manyara region was formed in 2003. We have been informed that TANROADS started effectively to work in Manyara region in 2004. 2 Quote from one officer interviewed. 3 The Wild Lake. The 1990 floods in Babati, Tanzania – rehabilitation and prevention. RSCU/Sida, 1992, Annex H.

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actions do not require any heavy investments. Lack of resources cannot in this case be used as an excuse or reason for not taking action. Our general conclusion is underpinned by the following elaborated specific conclusions:

5.2 The grass barrier and the Kigongoni road embankment Historic records and our findings prove the utmost importance of the Kigongoni outlet and Channel for preventing floods through Babati town. The “entrance” for the water to the Channel is the grass-covered field between the open Lake and the Kigongoni outlet. 5.2.1 The grass barrier The area between the open Lake and the Kigongoni road embankment was covered by tall, thick grass in 1990, a fact that prevented water to reach the Channel. Our findings from 2005 show that the grass is short. This crew-cut state of the grass can probably be attributed to the fact that cattle is grazing in that area. Grazing close to the Lake is prohibited according to the local by-law, which apparently is not followed and not strictly enforced. Assuming that the local authorities would enforce the by-law, grass would probably quickly grow up. Hence, the Babati Councils should keep up with the stated routine of monitoring the growth of the grass and cut it to avoid a “barrier” to be established, which would prevent free passage of water from the Lake up to the road embankment. 5.2.2 Kigongoni road embankment To keep the discharge capacity of the culverts at the Kigongoni outlet intact, it is imperative to continuously monitor if the culverts have been clogged by mud or debris, particularly after water have passed through the culverts after heavy rainfall. We were informed by TANROADS-Manyara that the culverts are unclogged as a matter of routine. We witnessed unclogging of mud from some of the culverts during the site visit. Such a minor input may be a major contributing factor in avoiding a future flood through Babati town. Since the 1990 floods no action has been taken to increase the discharge capacity of the culverts at Kigongoni. Fortunately, their capacity proved to be sufficient during the heavy rainfall in 1998. However, in our view TANROADS and the local authorities should have taken action to decrease the risk for future floods by at least replacing some of the smallest culverts in the road embankment on the side of Babati town with bigger culverts. Such a minor investment would significantly reduce the risk of the embankment acting as a dam. Lake Babati has continuously been silted and the Lake depth has been reduced. Considering that this fact reduces this capacity of the Lake to hold water, an increase in the discharge capacity of the culverts is more and more called for.

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5.3 The earth embankment and the artificial waterfalls Our findings show that the local authorities have not repaired the earth embankment after the 1998 floods. Further, the small waterfall was left unattended and the farmer of the area cultivated and covered the concrete structure with a maize field already before the 1998 floods. The bigger waterfall functioned in 1998 but was thereafter overgrown with vegetation and the dug canal leading up to it is part of an agricultural field. The result of neglecting the maintenance of the preventive investments (earth embankment and two waterfalls) is that a huge gully has been formed and grown over the years. The system of preventing gully erosion in general and avoiding loss of productive agricultural land has not been maintained. The gully head is gradually creeping closer and closer to the Kigongoni embankment. If this would continue without redress, eventually the embankment would be undermined and the Lake would be drained by such a gully formation. We are not there yet and we would not like to sound unnecessary alarmist. However, having made a point by depicting a disastrous scenario, our conclusion is that the concerned authorities should take action to avert such a situation while time is still on their side. We conclude that actions should aim at minimizing future erosion of the erodible area around the waterfalls and the huge growing gully. To minimize damage from the next extreme rainfall the area should not be made more prone to erosion through human activities like cultivation and brick making. As the channel bed at the embankment has become lower than the waterfalls these soil protection investments can no longer be utilized. We conclude that further investments in new physical structures and vegetative cover to prevent soil erosion should be considered. In the following chapter, on Recommendations, we will elaborate further on actions that can be considered.

5.4 Kiongozi Bridge The flood water of 1990 excavated behind the aprons of the Kiongozi Bridge and threatened to cut off the Arusha – Babati trunk road. A retaining wall consisting of gabions was constructed in 1990 to mitigate the damage of a possible future flood. The 1998 flood broke down the retaining wall. As shown in one pictures of this report the road bank leading up to the bridge on the Arusha side was eventually washed away or at least very severely damaged. These events illustrate well the massive earthmoving forces of flood water that road engineers have to consider when trying to prevent this important trunk road from becoming impassable. After a period of seven years, TANROADS took action to rehabilitate the retaining wall. Considering the economic and social importance of the Arusha – Dodoma and Arusha – Singida trunk roads, physical flood mitigation structures should have been put in place

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much earlier. We find this an example of questionable priorities within TANROADS. To construct a retaining wall of gabions is not a major financial investment. But it goes a long way to prevent erosion of the road bank and enabling transport to continue unhindered even after a heavy downpour. During our visit in February 2005, we witnessed the construction of a second, higher retaining wall. This is in our view a necessary (but late) investment to mitigate damage from future flood water onslaught. The TANROADS action is appreciated. At the same time we see room for improvement. We think that TANROADS should have discussed alternative designs of constructing the retaining wall in order achieve optimum strength and minimizing risk of future erosion. For example, the present design leaves an opening for erosion between the wing wall of the bridge and the new retaining wall. According to the TANROADS Engineer, this opening is left to cater for rain water back flow from the area behind the retaining wall. This opening constitutes an entry point for scouring of the road bank close to the bridge abutment. In our view, consultation with experienced Bridge Engineers/Soil Engineers could have resulted in a less erosion prone design using a combination of gabions, pipes and lined drains to cater for the backflow. Experience shows that the forces of the flood water at Kiongozi Bridge can be enormous. Erosion specialists should have been given the opportunity to give the design of the retaining wall the necessary dimensions for preventing road bank damage in an optimum way. Given the fact that the orientation of the Kiongozi Bridge means high risk of erosion at abutments, we draw the conclusion that a realignment of the bridge need to be considered.


Our findings in chapter 4 have pointed out the importance of the Kigongoni outlet and the Kiongozi bridge having sufficient water discharge capacity and soil protective structures to cope with events of torrential rainfall. Interviews with concerned local, regional and central authorities make us draw the conclusion that the experiences of previous floods may not have been communicated sufficiently to the consultancy firm that is doing the design for the rehabilitation of the Singida – Babati – Minjingu road and the Dodoma – Babati road. Calculations made after the 1990 floods can serve as an illustration of our aforementioned concern regarding the proactive involvement of the government authorities, which are supposed to prevent and mitigate damage from future floods. In 1991 the Steering Group for Flood Control held discussions with the consultant (Dorsch Consult) for the trunk road rehabilitation about the span of the box culverts need to take care of the run-off from the catchment areas of Lake Babati. Dorsch Consult suggested initially three box culverts, based on a run-off from 65 per cent of catchment area around

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the Lake.4 According to the calculations, which were based on the total catchment area and considering the constraints of depth at Kigongoni, the water engineers in the Steering Group for Flood Control concluded that box culverts with a larger total capacity would be needed. The calculations of the Steering Group for Flood Control estimated that a total span of 20 m would be needed to prevent lake water from spilling through the Babati town. Time will tell if the consultants concerned with the future design of the Kigongoni Outlet will consider the above data in their forthcoming engineering design report on the Dodoma – Babati road. However, we seem to have reasons to expect that the design will be based on a total runoff from the whole catchment area, as this apparently was the approach chosen by the consultants in the hydrological and design studies for the Kiongozi bridge. This notwithstanding, we wish to underline that the consultant should among other things take into account the fact that prevention of flood water through Babati town has to consider continued siltation of the Lake. With decreased Lake depth the capacity of the Lake Babati to contain water will be reduced and hence the risk of floods through Babati town will increase - unless the discharge capacity at Kigongoni is increased. Nevertheless, we want to generally underline the need for local authorities to establish an active institutional memory on floods to be used for proactive inputs to prevent and mitigate human suffering.

5.6 Residential and Business Location of Babati town A major part of Babati town is located below the level of the Lake. The present main street and the eastern side streets of Babati town are therefore at high risk of being flooded if the Lake level increases drastically after heavy rainfall. Our conclusion is that the Babati Town and District Councils, which so far have no Master Plan, have not taken the above risk factor into consideration when locating areas for residential and business purposes. For example, Babati Town bus stand is located in the flood prone area of the town. Further, relief structures to safeguard the roads and residential buildings against severe rainfall appear inadequate. It seems to us that there is a need to raise awareness among Babati town planners regarding the risk of floods when doing practical town planning in the absence of a well thought through and systematic Master Plan for the town.

4 See Annex 2 for a map of the Lake Babati Catchment Area

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5.7 Pre-Disaster planning, Mobilization and Funds for Flood Management

It goes without saying that effective flood prevention and mitigation require preparedness in terms of plans and resources to execute the plans. Our findings show that there are nor plans for disasters or floods nor budget allocations for flood prevention activities, neither at regional secretariat level nor at Babati Town or District Council level. Further, there is also no plan for how they can mobilize or solicit funds for flood prevention (or disaster management in general). The activities related to flood prevention are also not included in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Our conclusion is that the regional and district authorities have neglected their obligation to plan and budget for disaster/flood management in accordance with national policies. Our conclusion is also valid for an Anti-Flood Program, which would involve the civil society to be aware of and participate in flood prevention activities. The Focal Officers at regional and district level have been passive and do not seem to have understood their important role in this regard. We find it remarkable to draw the above conclusion in spite of the fact that seven participants from Babati participated in 2004 in a course for sensitization and awareness regarding disaster management and early warning systems (see below 5.8).

5.8 Training, action plans and the role of PMO-Disaster Management Department

An Official of the Disaster Management Department was involved as a resource person in a workshop in November 2004 in Dodoma regarding sensitization and awareness for disaster management and early warning systems.5 Among the some 20 participants from four districts, seven participants from Babati district were taught;

• Prevention activities of disaster • Preparedness activities of disaster; and • Identification of source of risk or disaster

We have established that the said training did not generate plans or Anti-Flood Programs for the Babati area. Our conclusion is that the course was hardly of any practical use. Both the district and regional levels did not make follow-up to ensure that the officers trained initiated a disaster planning process as expected. Neither did the PMO-DMD make any follow up to promote value for the money spent on the training. The PMO-DMD did not ascertain that the participants developed council plans for disaster

5 The workshop was financed by Sida through the LAMP Programme. The participants were given an assignment to produce disaster management plans based on the situation in each district.

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management and early warning, which were supposed to prepare/develop and implement after the training. Our conclusion is that there is room for improvements towards a proactive working strategy regarding floods within the PMO-DMD. In line with the obligations of the PMO-DMD in the Disaster Relief Coordination Act, 1990, and the National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management (NOG) (first edition-2003), the PMO-DMD has not sufficiently used its powers to carry out or coordinate research relevant to floods, formulate flood prevention plans, review regularly and coordinate flood prevention measures. Although obliged by law, the PMO-DMD does not have a register of floods in Tanzania, where floods should systematically be recorded and analysed. Nor does the department conduct proactive analyses of flood risks for flood prone and economically important areas. In spite serious of floods reoccurring in Babati and other parts of the nation, we find it remarkable that the PMO-DMD, after more than ten years of existence, has not developed such a flood register. Such a register would be the base for developing a strategic preventive approach regarding floods in the country. The PMO-DMD and regional, local authorities rather react after floods have occurred without making continuous risk assessments in the light of experiences from previous floods. For example, records of previous experiences, fact finding and analysis of flood risks along trunk roads in Tanzania could give a basis for preventive actions to avoid or mitigate damage. To exemplify our point, we refer to the washing away of the bridge in Lugoba along the Chalinze – Moshi trunk road in March, 2006. The risk of the Lugoba bridge disaster in March 2006 could possibly have been foreseen with a forward looking, systematic, and imaginative assessment of flood risks and mud slides along the Chalinze – Moshi road and assessment by the PMO-DMD.6

6 A bridge located in Lugoba along the trunk road Dar es Salaam – Moshi was washed away after heavy rainfall in March 2006. Traffic was disrupted for several days until a metal bridge was constructed by the TPDF engineering unit. The water masses came from a large catchment area, which also contains a dam that apparently collapsed after the heavy downpour. A huge gush of water from the dam washed away the bridge on the Mkombezi River. PMO-DMD, with the help of a systematic records of flood risks along major trunk roads, could in our view have analysed and discovered the potential risk of a dam burst washing away the Lugoba bridge. Subsequently, in liaison with concerned water authorities, the quality of the dam wall could have been investigated and strengthening measures, if found necessary, could have been undertaken and therefore save the bridge from being washed away.

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CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The grass barrier To Babati Town and District Councils Babati Councils should monitor and control growth of the grass barrier in order to avoid a grass barrier preventing flow of water into the Kigongoni outlet. In addition, cattle grazing in the prohibited area around the Lake should not be allowed.

6.2 The Kigongoni embankment To TANROADS Manyara To decrease the risk of floods through Babati town, TANROADS Manayra should as a short term measure replace the small culverts in the Kigongoni embankment with bigger ones. Such action would significantly reduce the risk of the embankment acting as a dam. To TANROADS-HQ TANROADS should ensure that the on-going engineering design will result into a discharge capacity of culverts at the Kigongoni embankment that will adequately accommodate enough water flow to avoid Lake water flooding through Babati town. The estimated discharge capacity should take into account the fact that the flood risk may increase with time due to siltation of the Lake.

6.3 The earth embankment and the artificial waterfalls To the Manyara Region and Babati Councils Considering the investments made, the huge gully formed, the lowering of the channel bed at the embankment, and the need to avoid further excavation of easily erodible soil, we would like to recommend concerned authorities to consult soil conservation experts on on alternative ways forward. We can see the following as possible further actions: • Establish a canal with strong embankment from the place of the former earth

embankment to the new huge gully and construct a waterfall at the gully head to prevent further increase of the gully as well as structures to promote siltation at the gully.

• Declare the area from the Kigongoni embankment to the end of the gullies with waterfalls a prohibited area from cultivation, grazing, brick making etc and plant a large number of trees and other forms of soil retaining vegetation to prevent erosion.

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6.4 Kiongozi bridge To TANROADS-Manyara TANROADS-Manyara should ensure that rehabilitation works on flood mitigation structures is done much earlier to prevent roads from probable closure due to further potential damage by future floods. TANROADS should consult experienced Bridge Engineers/Soil Engineers when considering the further designing of the retaining wall to give it optimum structure and the necessary dimensions for preventing road bank damage in the most favourable way.


To TANROADS-HQ TANROADS-HQ should ensure that the experiences of previous floods are communicated sufficiently to the consultancy firm that is doing the design for the rehabilitation of the Dodoma – Babati road and Singida – Babati – Minjingu road. The aim should be to ensure that hydrological calculations regarding the run-off from the watershed areas surrounding the sensitive discharge points of Kigongoni Outlet and Kiongozi Bridge take past flood events into account. In this context, realignment of the bridge to a less erosion-prone future site should be considered.

6.6 Residential and Business Location of Babati Town To Babati Town Council

• Town planners in the Babati Town Council should take into account the flood risks when allocating land. In addition, efforts should be made to ensure that preventive structures/measures are installed in flood prone areas which have been allocated for residential and business purposes.

• A systematic master plan for Babati Town should be put in place to address all

high risk factors when allocating areas for residential and business purposes.

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6.7 Pre-disaster planning and funds for flood management To Manyara Region and Babati Councils

• The regional and district authorities should include disaster/flood management in their annual budgets.

• The regional and district authorities should ensure that the civil society and focal

officers at respective levels play their roles in anti-flood programmes.

• Manyara Regional Secretariat should ensure that priority issues relating to floods are incorporated in their annual plans and budgets.

To PMO-DMD The PMO-DMD should execute its oversight role to ensure that the regional and district authorities play their roles in pre-disaster planning.

6.8 Training, action plans and the role of PMO-Disaster Management Department

To PMO-DMD The PMO-DMD should monitor to ensure that training given to Local Authorities give a relevant impact on flood prevention and mitigation activities. The PMO-DMD should develop a proactive working strategy regarding floods. In line with the obligations of the PMO-DMD in the Disaster Relief Coordination Act, 1990, and the National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management (NOG) (first edition-2003), the PMO-DMD should use its powers to carry out or coordinate research relevant to floods, formulate flood prevention plans, review regularly and coordinate flood prevention measures. The PMO-DMD should soonest develop a register of floods in Tanzania, where floods will systematically be recorded and conduct proactive analyses of flood risks for flood prone and economically important areas. Such a register would be the base for developing a strategic preventive approach regarding floods in Tanzania. The PMO-DMD should get its preparedness priorities for floods risks in the nation as a whole in place.

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REFERENCES

• Disaster Management & Early Warning Systems. Report from

training provided by Intermaecos Ltd, 2004

• Disaster Relief Coordination Act No. 9 of 1990

• Land Management Program Report – BABATI by LAMP

• National Disaster Management Policy of May 2004

• National Operational Guidelines for Disaster Management of 2003

• Vulnerability Assessment Report by the PMO - Disaster

Management Department

• Wild Lake Report by Babati District and SIDA’s Regional Soil

Conservation Unit, 1992

• Detailed Engineering Design Report for Singida - Babati – Minjingu

road, Carl Bro, 2006

• Feasibility Study Report for Dodoma – Babati road, Carl Bro, 2006

FLOODS IN BABATI

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Handing Over Letter from the Steering Group to District and Regional Authorities


FLOODS IN BABATI


FLOODS IN BABATI

Annex 2: Catchment Area of Lake Babati


FLOODS IN BABATI

Annex 3: Map of Babati Town indicating Flood Flow and Positions of Photographs in this Report


FLOODS IN BABATI

Annex 4: Sketch Map of Flooded Babati Town and Key Sites


Documents

A Performance Audit of the Management of Prevention and