A New Understanding of God in the Japanese Contextj-stt.catholic.ac.kr/DATA/STTBOOK/1467618076372.pdfState Shinto 8. The History of the Control of Religion by Rulers 9. The Difference

100 Understanding God in the Asian Context

❚Special Issue❚ Understanding God in the Asian Context

□ Catholic Theology and Thought, Vol. 77, Summer 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.21731/ctat.2016.77.100 ISSN(print) 1225-4924; ISSN(online) 1225-2564

A New Understanding of God in the Japanese Context*

1

Prof. Fr. Ichiro Mitsunobu, S.J.

〔Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan〕

1. Japanese Society and God 2. Modern Atheism 3. The Japanese Idea of God 4. What is Shinto? 5. Shinto as an Ethnic Religion 6. Christianity and the “Kami” 7. State Shinto 8. The History of the Control of Religion by Rulers 9. The Difference between Korea and Japan in Their History of

the Reception of Christianity 10. Eastern “Nothingness” and God: As a Concluding Thought

1. Japanese Society and God

Japan is a non-Christian society. The Christian population is only

about 1 percent. According to the Agency for Cultural Affairs (2015), the

*1This research paper is commissioned, supported, and originally published by the Founda-tion of Theology and Thought, 2016.

101 Ichiro Mitsunobu / A New Understanding of God […]

total number of Japanese religious believers is 190,219,862. The break-

down is as follows: Shinto 92,168,614, Buddhist 87,126,192, Christian

1,951,381, and other various teachings 8,973,675. With these figures, the

total number of believers adds up to nearly twice the total population of

Japan!

According to a survey by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research

Institute, those who “believe in religion” amounted to 39%, those who

“do not believe in religion” were 49%. Among those who said the “be-

lieve in religion” there was a higher percentage of women than men, more

elderly people that younger people. In answer to the question “What reli-

gion do you feel friendly toward?” 65% answered Buddhism. This ratio

was the highest.

However, religious behavior here means such practices as visiting the

family grave or going to a Shinto shrine at New Year’s. Those who said

they “do so often” exceeded half of the total. Also pulling a sacred lot or a

getting a lucky charm is very popular among Japanese people. In answer-

ing questions about the existence of the “spiritual power of ancestors”,

“life after death”, and “transmigration (reincarnation)”, about 40% said

“yes”. Of those who answered “yes” to this question there were more

young people than elderly, and the ratio of people who answered “yes”

exceeded 70% among women in their 30s. There was a notable contrast in

that the ratio of people believing in religion is increasing among the

elderly.

According to the Cabinet Office survey, in answer to the question “Do

you think that religion has become a cornerstone of emotional support for

attitudes and behavior in daily life for Japan’s youth?” 13.4% answered “I

think so” and 27.4% answered “I tend to think that is true rather than the

opposite”. In comparing the percentage of those who answer “I think so”


with those in other countries, the United States has the highest at 80.5%,

South Korea follows with 62.9%, the United Kingdom with 52.4% and

France with 40.7%.

From what has been seen so far, the general trend seems to be that the

Japanese acknowledge “religion is desirable as a cornerstone of the human

mind”. But those who consider that it may be omitted are in the majority.

“As for myself, I do not need it because I can live according to other

values. I myself have no religion.”

Japan is blessed with nature and thus has had a rich aesthetic and

artistic cultural development. The Japanese might seem to have rich reli-

gious sentiment and respect for faith, at least superficially, but for many

Japanese religion, and the presence of God, is not a problem of autono-

mous conscious truth guiding one’s individual way of life. Religion and

faith are not an existential relationship of human beings with the “real

God”, but just useful functions in human society.

Since the situation in Japan is such, it is also rare to have philo-

sophical discussions about God and faith as in the West, except in some

study circles. Dostoevsky has Ivan Karamazov say, “If there is no God,

there is no civilization”. But modern civilization in Japan has become

highly developed without “God”. This civilization seems not to need any

“God”. Since the Meiji era, many Japanese intellectuals who have learned

from the wisdom of the West have not learned about the Christian founda-

tions of Western civilization and have exclusively incorporated Enlighten-

ment knowledge. Thus for them, religion has seemed like a superstition

which should be extinguished in the process of the proper development of

civilization.

Therefore, the “practical atheist”, rather than the “theoretical and ag-

gressive atheist”, is likely to account for the overwhelming majority of


people in Japanese society. The reason for this, however, is that the cir-

cumstances have also hindered the Japanese from getting access to oppor-

tunities and education so as to acquire knowledge of religion. Since Japa-

nese people lack a basic knowledge of religion, they are insensitive also to

the social harm brought about by the political influence of groups and

factions that have been affected by cults and shady religious thought.

Since people are unaware of such social harm, we often see a social path-

ology which cannot escape from a vicious circle.

The prominent Buddhist scholar, Hajime Nakamura, has the following

opinion about the religious consciousness of the Japanese. What is basic

for the Japanese is the realistic principle that they accept simply and

naively the environment or the objective conditions of the world as they

find it1. One feature of the mental attitude of certain Japanese people is

that they find the greatest significance not in the metaphysical, tran-

scendental dimension but in relationships among human beings and with-

in their secular lives. They have a secular trend that rejects recognition of

the absolute person in the distant frontiers of the phenomenon. Because of

these features, as we saw above, even while acknowledging the value of

religion, it is found that the general attitude of Japanese is that religion

could not be an existential subject of their own existence.

But would it really be so? While the mental structure of the Japanese

acknowledges the value of religion, it does not commit itself actively but

is fostered and formed naturally within the folk and has become the

natural feature of this nation. In this paper I will describe an historical

reason for this phenomenon which has received little conscious reflection.

1 Nakamura, Hajime, The Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples, Published by Print. Bureau, Japanese Govt., 1960 (中村元, 『東洋人の思惟方法, 春秋社』, 東京, 1948 年).


2. Modern Atheism

Atheism has been perceived by the modern Catholic Church as an

urgent issue. In the words of the Second Vatican Council, “The root

reason for human dignity lies in man’s call to communion with God.

From the very circumstance of his origin man is already invited to con-

verse with God. For man would not exist were he not created by God’s

love and constantly preserved by it; and he cannot live fully according to

truth unless he freely acknowledges that love and devotes himself to His

Creator. Still, many of our contemporaries have never recognized this

intimate and vital link with God, or have explicitly rejected it. Thus

atheism must be accounted among the most serious problems of this age,

and is deserving of closer examination”.2

The Council pointed out that atheism takes a variety of forms. The

basic form is a practical, rather than a philosophical, materialism defined

as a life in pursuit of worldly things only. Underlying this attitude is a

false atheistic humanism: “Those who profess atheism of this sort main-

tain that it gives man freedom to be an end unto himself, the sole artisan

and creator of his own history”.3 In addition, Marxist atheism, which pro-

jects salvation as economic and social liberation, has also gained strong

support: “Not to be overlooked among the forms of modern atheism is

that which anticipates the liberation of man especially through his eco-

nomic and social emancipation”.4 In any case, modern people tend to deny

any dependence on God and consider human autonomy as the most im-

portant value and the Japanese are not an exception in this matter, of

2 Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, from the Second Vatican Council, 19 [italics added]. 3 Ibid., 20. 4 Ibid.


course. However, I think they tend to be entirely ignorant of the idea of a

transcendental “God” and therefore are deeply influenced by an uncon-

scious practical atheism.

Gaudium et Spes defines the human within the context of traditional

concepts of God which are, however, words that are easily translated and

communicated into Japanese.

“Since this (human) dignity is rooted and perfected in God. For man

was made an intelligent and free member of society by God Who created

him, but even more important, he is called as a son to commune with God

and share in His happiness.”5

That human beings are the “image of God” according to the tradition

of the Bible and Christianity, is because they are considered to be stew-

ards of nature, preserving it, enjoying its products, preserving a proper

world population, borrowing the assistance of scientific progress to nur-

ture it, “serving” and “plowing” nature according to God’s will.

However, since the Industrial Revolution, there has been significant

progress in a variety of fields, such as in science and technology and the

social sciences, but even the destruction of nature due to that progress has

emerged, and human decisions that do not conform to truth and goodness

have led to “structures of sin” in the world.

Pope John Paul II spoke of an “anthropological fallacy”, which ad-

dresses the situation where humans forget that all things exist as God’s

creation, and human power always depends on the grace of God. This

“anthropological fallacy” has deeply penetrated Japan, and has had a

clearly negative effect on the society as a whole. Politicians in Japan have

not learned from the experience of the nuclear power plant accident in

Fukushima, not correcting the expansion of human greed to dominate the

5 Ibid., 21.


natural environment, and they continue to be biased towards the military

and economic forces. The root for this lurks, in fact, in the religious views

and the idea of God that lie in the consciousness of the persons who are in

charge of state affairs and of the general public.

3. The Japanese Idea of God6

“God” is called “Kami” (神) in Japanese. However, the usage of this

particular logogram conveys a different meaning than that which was

conveyed by the original Chinese character “神”. The Chinese character

“神” means “Unknowable forces of nature” “Magical power” “Work of

the spirit which is not visible to the eye” “some outstanding and excellent

existence” and “above”, but does not mean “God”.

There are several theories on the etymology of character “Kami”:

“Kamugami” (Bird’s-eye view from heaven), “Kagami” (mirror), “Akami”

(Crystal-clear insight), “Kashikomi” (awe), “Kushibi” (noble spirit),

“Kami” (his spirit), “Kami” (above), and “Kamui” (people who are at the

top in the Ainu language). Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) a scholar of the

18th century, said “Kami” is “some existence in not a way of the world,

but possessed of outstanding virtue and wisdom”.

The Ancient “Kami” idea has changed significantly in Japan before

and after the arrival of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism in the sixth

century.

6 Murakami, Shigeyoshi, Kami to Nihonjin―Nihon Shyukou-si Tanbou, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1984 (村上重良, 『神と日本人―日本宗教史探訪』, 東京大学出版会, 東京, 1984). Cf. Murakami, Shigeyoshi, “Japanese Religion in the Modern Century”, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1980.


Before the introduction of religions from the Asian Continent, “Kami”

was understood as an existence which was not visible to the eye, but

wielded power over humans. It was a formidable existence for human

beings, whom people should placate by making offerings or seeking ref-

uge, so as not to be harmed. “Kami” originally included the following

meanings:

1. Land God: existence of sovereignty over regions (mountains, hills,

roads, rivers, seas), wielding power over humans who are passing

through there. Generated from a primitive agrarian society.

2. Kami in heaven: existence dominating celestial world and descending

in trees and forests. It is the ancestor of rulers who govern the

terrestrial world. This usage occurs in the formation stage of the an-

cient nation.

3. Kami of ancestors

4. Such as thunder, tigers, wolves, snakes, rough and natural phenomena

and animals that wield power over humans

During the Heian period (794-1185) when Buddhism, Taoism and

Confucianism arrived, the “Kami” idea changed greatly.

1. The native Japanese “Kami” was interpreted as the incarnation of

Buddha or Bodhisattva of Buddhism.

2. The spirits of particular Human beings who suffered a violent death in

wars and upheavals came to be worshiped as a “Kami” (such as

Michizane Sugawara).

3. Some spiritual beings such as demons and foxes that threaten Humans

have been referred to as “Kami”.


4. Due to the influence of Buddhist statues, statues of human figures have

been enshrined.

5. The whereabouts of “Kami” was formerly not known clearly and

seemed to descend to earth at the time of a festival. But this “Kami”

came to be enshrined in the shrines.

6. “Kami” is however not an existence who loves and protects Humans

and takes care of the Human inner world. It is still an eerie and

frightening existence for Humans, and gives a “curse” if defied by

Human beings.

7. The spirits of the dead are, for a certain period, understood to wield

power without losing their individuality. Such spirits were called

“Kami”. Spirits, such as Hideyoshi Toyotomi, Ieyasu Tokugawa and

Masashige Kusunoki who died for his loyalty to the Emperor were

worshiped as outstanding persons. This idea led to the Yasukuni

Shrine, which enshrines the officers and soldiers who died in wars

after the Meiji era.

8. In this way, the view has been fostered that God and man are combined,

that is, the idea that God and man is a continuous existence. By plac-

ing God and Humans on the same plane, without seeing the transcen-

dent presence of God, Japanese society has become a conducive place

for the secularization of religion and for making the secular world

religious. Even after the Meiji era, this process continued and provides

the religious basis for the Tennou (Emperor) system (Tennou = living

god).


4. What is Shinto?

The uniquely Japanese ethnic religion of “Shinto” is based on, and

formed by, the primitive concept of “God” as outlined above. Shinto has,

from ancient times, a very rich diversity. In general, scholars of the Sci-

ence of Religion divide Shinto into five categories. ① Jinja-Shinto (Nat-

ural religion from the original ancient times), ② Imperial Shinto (the

court rituals of the Tennou), ③ School Shinto (Research schools), ④

Sect Shinto (sects of Shinto dating from the early modern period), ⑤

Shintoistic folk beliefs (Tenri-kyou, Kurozumi-kyou, Konkou-kyou etc.).

In the 6th century, before the arrival of Buddhism into Japan, primi-

tive Shinto was the indigenous form of animism or nature worship (Nat-

uralism). Shinto was connected to agricultural needs and the maintenance

of prosperity of the communities. The object of worship was particular

mountains, rocks, lakes or trees which were seen as sacred. In certain

sanctuaries, worship of the spirit of the dead or ceremonies to invite God

to come down from the sky were performed. At that time, the priests

chanted a congratulatory address (Norito), and after the ceremony a feast

(Naorai) was performed. The key focuses of this kind of religiosity were

prayers for reproduction, growth, fertility, and an abundant harvest

(Musubi).

In the 4th century, the Yamato-Court ruled the whole country. So

primitive Shinto all over the country was re-organized and unified under

the ancient imperial system. This institutionalization of the rituals of the

Imperial Family, which came to be called Imperial Shinto, resulted in

Shinto’s major shrines coming under the direct control of the court. In Ise,

where there was a forward base for the domination of east Japan by the

Yamato Court in the 5th century, an important Shrine (Ise-Jingu) was built.


It enshrined Amaterasu-Oomikami, who was the ancestral god of the

Imperial Family, as the supreme deity of the country. Thus, Shinto and

politics were tied to each other on the national scale, and a theocracy

(Matsurigoto) was established.

However, with the introduction of Buddhism during the 6th and 7th

centuries, the state religion was replaced by Buddhism. Buddhism success

was not just because of its universality and seeming superiority of coming

from a more advanced culture on the continent, but because the Yamato

Imperial family saw its efficacy in promoting and upholding their dignity

and prestige as rulers over the whole country

But, before long, this unified system of religion under Buddhism by

the ancient imperial state became nominal. Buddhism absorbed Shinto,

and a syncretism of Buddhism and Shintoism happened everywhere.

Buddhism, in other words, quickly lost its religious purity.

By the 12th and 13th centuries, Buddhism was indigenized as Jodo,

Nichiren, and Zen. Given their focus on memorial services for the dead

and faith in worldly profit, these new forms of Buddhism can be con-

sidered more than just hybrids but original religions. Their influence

would have been in the background, informing both the sense of crisis and

exaltation of nationalism inspired by the annexation of Mongolia. How-

ever, at a deeper level, we must ask what was the political power which

controlled Buddhism.

5. Shinto as an Ethnic Religion

Ancient Shinto, before becoming a world religion, was a folk or “nat-

ural religion” which, born in the consciousness of peasants, originally had


elements of animism and shamanism. In contrast, there is another type of

religion called “Sosho-religion” (創唱宗教) which is a religion proposed

by a person or a group. People are relieved by believing and following

some revelation by a human being.7

Christianity is a typical example of Sosho-religion. This type of reli-

gion, which draws on an interactive relationship between God and human

beings is imbued with powerful religious dynamism, is frequently perse-

cuted. For example, Christianity in Japan in the 17th Century was heavily

persecuted. Tenrikyo, Kurozumikyo and Konkokyo among others are, like

Shinto, rooted in ancient Japanese indigenous manners and customs but

are classified as Sosho-religions because they were founded by charismat-

ic leaders or gurus. These religions emerged in the late Edo period (circa

1800) when the social and political control of the Tokugawa Bakufu

(Shogunate) was weak and in turmoil. However, they were repressed

when the Meiji government began to assert control over the religious

sphere and promote State Shinto.

In contrast, Shinto is both a natural religion and an ethnic religion.

Ethnic religion occurs within the same social group defined by race and

language and in a relatively isolated sphere (ethnos). The ritual core of the

religion is praying for the prosperity and well-being of the ethnos. With

Shinto, both social and religious identity overlap.

In ancient Japan, until Buddhism arrived, primitive Shinto was not

subsumed in any other So-sho religion. Thus, Jinja (shrine) Shinto de-

veloped as an agricultural ritual to pray for the fertility of the rice harvest.

Even today, Jinja Shinto retains essential elements of its primitive, natural

roots.

7 Ama, Toshimaro, Why Are the Japanese Non-Religious?, Japanese Spirituality: Being Non-Religious in a Religious Culture, UPA, Tokyo, 2004 (阿満利麿,『日本人なぜ無宗教なのか』, ちくま新書 85, 東京, 1996 年).


To sum up, religions have always been controlled by political power

in Japan. One significant exception to this situation occurred towards the

end of the Edo period when the power of the Bakufu was weak and a

number of Shinto-based new religions emerged: including, Kurozumikyo,

Tenrikyo, and Konkokyo. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the

Meiji Government this religious freedom only lasted a short time.

6. Christianity and the “Kami”

Christianity was introduced into Japan by Francis Xavier in the 16th

century. The Society of Jesus, the first missionary organization in Japan,

wanted to found a university in the capital city (Kyoto) in order to dialog

with the Buddhism. Xavier’s dream was realized some 350 years later

with the establishment of Sophia University.

In the beginning the missionaries adopted the name, Dainichi, as the

name they used for the Christian God. Dainichi carries a sense of univer-

sal intrinsic divinity and is used in the Shingon sect of Buddhism. No-

ticing the differences, however, the missionaries began to employ other

terms including using the Latin, “Deus” “Lord of Heaven” (天主) and

“Heavenly King” (天帝). An important lexical distinction is made in a

Japanese-Portuguese Dictionary from 1603 in which the Japanese ances-

tral designation of Kami for “God” is to be distinguished from the Chris-

tian God because Kami is the “Divinity that the Japanese heathen honor”

(Japanese- Portuguese Dictionary, 1603).

After the Meiji era, Protestant missionaries, following the traditional

Chinese translation, adopted names for the Christian God which included,

“heaven” (天), “Lord of High order” (上帝), “true God” (真神) and “Weng


of Heaven” (天翁). However, in 1880 the word Kami (神) was officially

adopted, with a one vote majority, by their Bible Translation Committee.

The Catholic Church, on the other hand, continued to use the designation,

“Lord of Heaven”, until 1959.

The introduction of Christianity had an ambiguous impact on the

political rulers of that time. Nobunaga Oda was originally not a person

who had devotion to a deity, but he acknowledged Christianity and had a

relationship with missionaries in order to use the Christians to counteract

the Buddhists who were a hindrance to his domination over Japan. How-

ever, Nobunaga’s biggest interest was the foreign trade which was associ-

ated with the missionaries. Missionaries built parishes and schools from

Kyushu over the Kinki region under the patronage of Nobunaga, and

spread their teaching freely, conveying the cultural goods of the West.

Moreover, Hideyoshi, the successor of Nobunaga, had contact with

missionaries and showed interest in Western culture at the beginning of

his reign. He had many Christian vassals including, Yukinaga Konishi,

Yoshitaka Kuroda, Ukon Takayama and Joan Naito. But he changed after

the Shimadzu (Kyushu) conquest in 1587, because he happened to know

that Nagasaki had built a fort and a moat around the town, and seemed to

be completely under the control of the church. Hideyoshi increasingly be-

came wary of the spread of Christianity and final issued an edict banning

the religion in 1587.

The need for trade, however, meant that the ban was not uniformly

enforced. Thus, early in the reign of Ieyasu Tokugawa, who came to

power after Hideyoshi, missionaries were tolerated because of the benefits

of trade with Portugal and Spain. He did not, nevertheless, cancel

Hideyoshi’s Anti-Christian Edicts. Prior to the siege of the Osaka Castle

(1684-1685), Ieyasu, fearful of the impact of alignment of opposition


forces with the Catholic Imperial powers on Tokugawa dominance, soon

re-enforced Hideyoshi’s edicts when he promulgated the “Christian ban”

and the “deportation of the missionaries”.

These edicts and related events caused severe persecution which

continued for 250 years up to end of the Edo period, and into the begin-

ning of the Meiji government. The Tokugawa Shogunate issued a decree

of seclusion from 1633, and ended diplomatic relations with Catholic

countries. In order to crack down on Christians, the government set up a

Buddhist parishioner system across the country, made all citizens register.

In addition, the Shogunate created a spy system to monitor the people

and the “Fumie” test to see whether Christians would step on holy icons

or not. Using these techniques and various others, the Church was virtu-

ally destroyed during the third Shogunate of Tokugawa Iemitsu (1604-

1651).

Christianity exercised a subtle, but important, influence on the polit-

ical consciousness of the Shoguns Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu. In

their ambition to rule the whole country, they showed a self-omnipotent

consciousness which had not been seen in traditional Japanese Shinto but

was, perhaps, influenced by the Christian notion of God as almighty and

absolute. Hideyoshi insisted on “God’s country of Japan” in order to

counter Christianity, and the he himself, who had become a God for the

sake of national domination, was trying to implement sacred politics.

Hideyoshi recognized Christianity, a world religion, as a threat to his rule

yet, at the same time, adopted the universality of Christianity for the sake

of his own political vision.

And after the Edo Shogunate fell, the modern imperial state of Meiji-

Japan accepted, for its ruler, the emperor who, as a sacred and inviolable

person was a living God. The Christian doctrine of the incarnation of God


may have had some influence on this development. Perversely, the policy

of the Shogunate to control religions meant not just a thorough persecu-

tion of Christianity and complete control over Buddhism and Shinto but

also, on the other hand, that Buddhism and Shinto became de facto state

religions.

7. State Shinto8

Until the mid-19th century, Shinto was an ancient, community ritual.

However, at the end of the Edo period, Shinto was resurrected to become

the religious ideology for the political system of the Meiji Restoration.

That was the idea of reverence for the Emperor, the ideology that led to

the time of political unrest from the end of the Edo period to the Meiji

Restoration. On this base, State Shinto was formed by artificially linking

primitive Shinto and the Imperial Household Shinto. Thus, through the

revival of the ancient religious authority of the Emperor and the political

goals of overthrowing the shogunate dominance, the Meiji ideology came

together.

State Shinto was enacted by standardizing and making permanent the

relationship between Shinto, as an ethnic religion from ancient times, and

the combination of politics and religion, that is, by joining Emperor

worship with militarism. The State created the fiction that Japanese should

return to the primitive ethnic Shinto to unify the nation, and so State

Shinto became a religious representation of power of the modern imperial

state.

8 Cf. Murakami, Shigeyoshi, Kokka Sinto, Iwanami-shinsyo C155, Tokyo, 1970 (村上重良, 『国家神道』, 岩波新書C155, 東京, 1970年); Shimzono, Susumu, Kokka Shinto to Nihonjin, Iwanami-Shinsyo, 1259, 2010 (島薗進, 『国家神道と日本人』, 岩波新書 1259, 東京, 2010年).


A powerful impetus to the policy of making Shinto the state religion

was the westernization policy of the Meiji government. In Meiji Japan,

with the opening of the country, cultural goods of the West entered in

large quantities, but in the government a sense of crisis spread that Chris-

tianity might again expand. Such a sense of crisis urged the Meiji govern-

ment to re-enforce State Shinto. The promulgation of the Constitution of

the Empire of Japan (1889) and the “Imperial Rescript on Education”

(1890) were some of the more obvious ways which re-inforced State

Shinto. The Constitution included a statement that “the Emperor is sacred,

shalt not invade his authority” (Article 3). The “Imperial Rescript on

Education” (1890) was the basic philosophy to inculcate a national sense

of the Emperor’s central role, and was intended to connect education dir-

ectly to the national religion. That is, these promulgations, which acted in

ways akin to Sacred Scripture, ordered the people to dedicate everything

to the State in the face of an emergency such as war. These tools enabled

a process of intense religious indoctrination promoting an all-encom-

passing devotion to the Emperor.

This policy to make Shinto the state religion was soon associated with

the policy of the military state. Born through the victories of the Sino-

Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), a

sacred mission-consciousness of “God’s country Japan” which re-en-

forced an ideology of Japanese superiority and destiny to rule the whole

world. Under such an illusion Japan rapidly moved to become an aggres-

sor nation. The Yasukuni Shrine, which was built to accompany the rapid

increase of the war dead, was an important military and state Shinto facil-

ity for promoting and justifying the waging of war.9 Such shrines would

9 Murakami, Shigeyoshi, Irei to syoukon—Yasukuni no shisou, Iwanami-shinsyo, Tokyo, 1974 (村上重良, 『慰霊と招魂―靖国の思想』, 岩波新書, C156, 東京, 1974年).


come to be built in the invaded areas. In 1919, Amaterasuoomikami and

the Emperor Meiji were enshrined in Jinju, Korea and a further 69 Shrines

were established around the country.

In this way, State Shinto became a religious/political system that arti-

ficially reproduced the Japanese ethnic religion. In ethnic religions, cer-

tain groups carry out collective rituals such as ancient Shinto which over-

laps with social groups. Participation in a religious group is naturally for-

mative and also compulsory. State Shinto revived the characteristics of

these ancient natural religions, expanded them on the national scale, and

demanded of the people an unconditional loyalty to the nation. Unpreced-

ented in the history of the world, the Meiji government was a toxic

mixture of political power and nationalistic religion.

State Shinto forced on a community, lacking inner conviction and

freedom of belief, the necessity of participating in collective rituals. The

Meiji government, in deference to Western countries which assumed the

principle of religious freedom, incorporated in the Constitution of the

Empire of Japan the following sentence. “Japanese subjects shall, within

limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their

duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief” (Article 28). As a

result, religions other than State Shinto were placed under the control of

the government. Christianity was also placed under the supervision of the

ministry of education and local governments.

Of course, the freedom of religion and the separation of religion and

state proclaimed by the Meiji government was a sham. State Shinto had a

cover story on the one hand that it was not a religion, but a “super/religion”

guaranteed by the principle of the separation of ritual and religion. But on

the other hand, it contained a contradiction that it was the national religion

in fact because it required people to worship the Emperor as a religious


absolute. In the field of education, education about religions was banned

in public schools, but the State Shinto ideology of the “Imperial Rescript

on Education” (1890) was injected fully into the mind of students. School

education that should advocate modernity and rationality coexisted with

the ancient irrationality of Shinto ritualism, and students were ruled from

both sides by the national ideology

Shinto has been poor on the development of doctrine, and consequent-

ly vacuous as a system of thought. For this reason, the government’s

public stance that State Shinto is not a religion but a social ritual func-

tioned very effectively politically. The government, according to its par-

ticular political needs, had force and authority to implement their own

policies by incorporating an arbitrary content into its national ideology. In

this way, State Shinto was transformed from the reverence of Kami and

the ancestors of the original Shinto to an ideology to support Japanese

politics. In practice, this meant a family/national view putting the Em-

peror in the center of internal affairs, and a religious association based on

xenophobic ideas towards foreign countries. The military aggression of

the Japanese fascist period was a manifestation of the essence of State

Shinto.

This dominance of State Shinto lasted for 80 years, from the late 19th

century to 1945. As a result, first of all it hampered the voluntary and

creative self-development of religions. Thereby the interest of the public

towards religion was lowered, an indifferent attitude and paucity of know-

ledge become common, along with an institutionalized underestimation of

religion and its social role in the entire Japanese society. The largest

religious force, namely, the various denominations of Buddhism was re-

duced being a personal novelty in a secular society. In addition, the dom-

inance of State Shinto has continued to inhibit the growth of the social


consciousness of the Japanese people about such things as democratic

politics, religious freedom, and human rights. State Shinto which is, in

principle antithetical to democracy, has so penetrated the Japanese mind-

set that its impact is even felt today. For example, the significant right-

ward tilt of the current government of Japan includes a trend towards the

rehabilitation of national Shintoism and its shrines.

Why was State Shinto accepted for so long by the people of Japan?

The short answer is that State Shinto was both necessary and the benefi-

ciary of the lack of religious and political power in Japan for a long period

of history.

Japan is an island nation which enables the natural and formative

development of race and language combined with patriotism. Therefore,

even in times of change, shifts in power were not comprehensive and

established power was able to preserve its dominance. The centrality of

the Emperor system is important and continues to survive as a type of

religious authority.

In addition to the already noted traditional religious ideas of the

Japanese people, there is a poor understanding of the sense of God’s

transcendence and hence an ambiguous sense of the boundary between the

sacred and the secular. Rational judgments about the distinction and

limitations which need to exist between politics and religion have, so far,

not developed in Japan.

These circumstances are related to the ideas of feudal loyalty and an-

cestor worship based on Confucianism, and are preserved in the national

mindset through the maintenance of patriarchal family morality.

Historically, the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Church traditions,

which supposedly promote monotheism, have fully compromised, rather

than been in conflict with, State Shinto. In principle, anti Shinto was


prominent amongst protestants. However, there was a huge gap between

this theory and its practice.

8. The History of the Control of Religion by Rulers

Since ancient times, Japan’s rulers have controlled religions very

cleverly. Rulers, on one hand, have used religion for the maintenance of

their own power. On the other hand, they have persecuted religion, pro-

moted idol worship and suppressed freedom.

In the capital city of Nara (710-784), Buddhism was utilized to the

maximum so as to show off the dignity and authority of the Yamato-state.

In the Edo era (1603-1868), Buddhism was used as a tool of control

through the establishment of the “parish system”. From the emergence of

Meiji, State Shinto has used education to penetrate every aspect of nation-

al life. Christianity was persecuted harshly precisely because throughout

its history there has been a sensitivity to power morphing into idolatry.

Furthermore, contemporary people are subjected to an endless barrage

of anti-religious messaging: including, “religion is worthless” and “In this

world there are a lots of things much more beautiful, fun, and delicious

than religion”.

Another result of the neutralization of Christianity is its non-politi-

cization, concentration on personal religious experience and limiting sal-

vation in heaven and the afterlife. The ruling elite’s greatest fear is the

combination of religious with social unrest and agitation of change.

Therefore, the elite tolerate religion as long as an otherworldly perspec-

tive is maintained and preached. On the side of religion, there is the

temptation to limit its vision of reform to the area of “spiritual” only.


Jesus, for one, was not deceived by this ploy. Although he did not aim to

directly overthrow the political power of his time, the crucified one had a

clear insight about the essence of the system that would crush him: the

absolute deception of the power which absolutizes the human ego rather

than God.

9. The Difference between Korea and Japan in Their History of the Reception of Christianity10

The history of Japanese religions, as seen above, shows a special con-

trast to Korea where Christianity is presently prospering.

According to the “Population Census Statistics” (2005), 53.1% of the

total population of the Republic of Korea “have a religion”. This statistic

breaks down as follows: Buddhists 43%, Protestant 34.5% and Catholic

20.6%. Put another way, approximately 25% of the total population is

Christian.

Korean Catholics have come from the soil of martyrdom’s blood. One

reason may be due to the fact that the policy of the Paris Foreign Mission-

aries of the 19th century were conservative, and preached a message which

put the Church in direct opposition to the Joseon Dynasty and its ideology

of neo-Confucianism. Initially, at least, this rigidity resulted in a clash

10 Cf. Bishop Peter Kang U-il, Fukuin to ajia-bunka, kankoku katorikku kyoukai no rekishi to kadai, Soubun-shya, Tokyo, 2013 (姜禹一, 『福音とアジア文化―韓国カトリック教会の

歴史と課題』, 創文社, 東京, 2013 年); Suzuki, Takahiro, What Made Korea Become a Christian Country?, PowerMeUp Publishing, 2013 (鈴木崇巨, 『韓国はなぜキリスト教国になったか』, 春秋社会, 東京, 2010 年); Suh, Jeong Min (서정민), Kankoku katorikkushi gairon, Kanyou-Shyuppan, Osaka, 2015 (徐正敏, 『韓国カトリック史概論』, かんよう出

版, 大阪, 2015 年).


over the validity and practice of reverencing ancestors and whether the

memorial tablets were imbued with the spirit of one’s ancestors.

The history of Christian growth in Korea and the history of the inva-

sion by Japan overlap each other. However, those who tied themselves to

nationalism and supported the movement of independence were mainly

Protestant Christians. It could be said that Korean Protestants have grown

along with the nation in its sufferings under the old Joseon dynasty and

the subsequent Japanese colonial domination. Catholics, on the other hand,

with the exception of some important individuals such as An Jung-geun,

were generally not collectively involved in the independence movement.

At this juncture in history, the Catholic Church was contributing much to

the development of social enlightenment, educational and social activities.

However, its main emphasis was on the preservation and development of

its faith communities. Understandably so, given the huge trauma of its

recent history, and the Byeongin persecution (1866) in particular.

The reason for the callousness toward the independence issue may be

in large part because the leaders of the church at that time were western

priests. Their European Catholic centrism diluted their understanding of

traditional values and the status of Korea.

In the list of the leaders for the “3∙1 independence movement” (1919)

there are Protestants, but no names of Catholics.

During the 1930s the Catholic Church, taking its lead from the Vati-

can, tacitly approved Shinto shrine worship as “a national ritual” The

Vatican chose to compromise with the Japanese Government in respect to

State Shinto in order to protect the existence of the Catholic Church in

Japan, especially after the trouble caused by “the denial of worship in

Yasukuni Shrine of the students of Sophia University” (1932).


It could be said that the Catholic Church in Korea took a position to

adapt to the imperial power of Japan.

After liberation in 1945, the Christian Churches in Korea endured

great suffering as war divided the motherland. Catholics and Protestants

followed a similar path in their anti-communist stance.

However, in the wake of Vatican II and the oppression of the military

dictatorship, the Catholic Church began to strengthen its involvement in

the modern world. The church has increased its prominence in many so-

cial movements including the push for democratization and social justice,

the environment, and the reunification (reconciliation) movement. In the

course of the democratization movement of the 1980s, the Catholic

Church stood on the side of the vulnerable and marginalized people in

cooperation with progressive Protestant groups who promoted “Minjung =

people’s theology”, a local variant which is close to “liberation theology”.

From the leadership of Bishop Daniel Tji Hak Soun (지학순) and

Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-hwan (김수환) and continuing into the present

moment with the witness of Pope Francis on his pastoral visit in 2014, the

Catholic Church has been active in promoting a fairer, more harmonious,

Korean society. Ironically, on the one hand, a large part of the Protestant

Churches has gone stagnant because they have been indifferent to social

justice as they sought to promote individual salvation. Certainly, the

Catholic Church has benefited from the moral trust garnered through its

public engagement in social justice issues. Korean Catholics numbered

113,496 believers in 1940, but by 2014 their number has increased to 5.57

million.

In general, it has been common in both Korea and Japan to posit an

intimate connection between the political histories of each country and the

growth of Christianity. However, the attitude of the church to the respect-


ive political system has been very different and has produced a big differ-

ence in the status quo of both Churches.

A common phenomenon in both Japan and Korea is for Christianity

and other religions to have been tied, in a deep relationship, with the

dominant, feudal political power. However, the Confucian centrism of the

Joseon dynasty which took over the Buddhist centrism of the Koryo

dynasty was considerably different from the relationship of the Japanese

political power with Shinto and Buddhism. The Confucianism of the

Joseon dynasty was not void of content as was Japanese Shinto. Confu-

cianism in the Joseon dynasty was the absolute standard of spiritual

values, governance ethics, and the values of the nation itself; in a very real

sense acting as a religion. However, Joseon Confucianism, as opposed to

Shinto, did not produce the same dictatorial and tyrannical political power.

Confucianism was a dynamic and contested system in which various

schools of thought developed different factions and there was much

conflict and fighting. The politics of the kings were strictly regulated by

laws, decisions by predecessors, etiquette, ethics and Confucian philoso-

phy; therefore, an arbitrary dictatorship did not emerge.

Also schools of thought and political parties, though in an autocratic

regime, played a role such as today’s ruling and opposition parties. “Re-

porting to the Emperor” (上疏) was also submitted to the government by

scholars (Sunbee) who lived all over the country.

In the Confucian nation, it can be said that it aspired to a certain ideal

state of a political system by the distribution and mutual checks and

balances of power. And it seems to have become the soil for the demo-

cratic movement of the later eras in Korea. On this point, the history of

Japan is very different. Political power completely controlled religions

and made them into political tools in the fullest sense.


10. Eastern “Nothingness” and God: As a Concluding Thought

A missionary to Japan, Fr. Joseph Roggendorf SJ11, said that what the

church in Japan could contribute to the Catholic Church throughout the

world was the following: “The Catholic faith of the Japanese has its own

form. It is deeply sensitive, not controversial and has such a nature as to

perceive divine things simply, to be immersed in prayer, breaking away

the ego completely.” Fr. Roggendorf said that such a deep spirituality and

sensitivity to religious reality could be readily felt in both the monasteries

and the homes of Japanese Catholics.

Fr. Jean Laucaigne, who was active with the hidden Christians in

Nagasaki, reported about a young Christian from Urakami at the perse-

cutions by the authorities in 1867. He noted the “self-oblivion, gratitude

and courage” and described the characteristic of the Japanese Catholics as

“putting oneself in prayer” (Il se metait en prière).

Many philosophers and scholars of religion, such as Kitaro Nishida

and Keiji Nishitani from the Kyoto School of the Philosophy of Religion,

positively evaluate these religious attitudes as characteristic of Japanese

Catholics such as. These scholars are deeply affected by Zen Buddhism,

which emphasizes the encounter with absolute “Nothingness” (無) through

the transcendence of human being from the world to inner existence.12

11 Joseph Roggendorf S.J., Gendai-shichou to katorisshizumu, Soubun-shya, Tokyo, 1958 (J∙ロゲンドルフ, 『現代思潮とカトリシズム』, 創文社, 東京, 1958年). 12 Cf. Nishida, Kitarou, A Study of Good, Greenwood; Reprint edition, 1988 (西田幾多郎,『善の研究』), 弘文堂, 東京, 1911 年); David A. Dilworth (transl.), “The Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview”, in Nishida Kitaro, Last Writings, Honolulu (The University of Hawaii Press), 1987, pp. 47-123 (니시다 기타로, 김승철 역, 『장소적 논리와 종교적 세계관』, 난잔종교문화연구소연구총서 1, 정우서적, 『場所的論理と宗教的世界観』, 哲学論文集第七, 1945 年, 岩波文庫, 349). Nishitani Keiji, Religion and


According to them, through the practice of self-denial we encounter God

as “Absolute Nothingness” who exists in the depth of our ego. In other

words, the locus of self-realization is “Nothingness” (無), the true realiza-

tion of the self is in “the self-identity of absolute contradictories” (矛盾的

自己同一); and true religiosity is in the awareness of the “Absolute

Nothingness” (絶対無). Herein can be found the key characteristics of

Japanese religiosity.

According to the Kyoto School, the religiosity of “Absolute Nothing-

ness” has a deep relevance with the spiritual tradition of the West. That is,

the connection with the “Negative theology”, such as the “hidden upcom-

ing God” of Nicholas of Cusa. “Negative theology” acknowledges the

transcendental being which is referred to as “Nothingness” because this

God exists in a completely different realm. The confession of the “Noth-

ingness” is the expression of the “powerlessness of human beings” before

the transcendence of God’s richness. To live in that “Nothingness” is true

Christian spirituality, just as Meister Eckhart lived his communion with

God through “Letting-go of the vain self”.

Such a religiosity combines naturally with the unique mental attitude

of the Japanese. That is, the attitude of kneeling in front of the mystery

which transcends the dimension of Being. Letting-go of existence (=stand

outside) of God as “Absolute Nothingness” is a dedication of oneself

without selfish ego, in other words, true love or “agape”. The encounter

between God and humans ultimately occurs in the locus where God

becomes Nothingness and man also becomes Nothingness.

Nothingness (Japanese: Shūkyō to wa Nanika; the original title translates literally as “What is Religion?”), University of California Press, 1983 (西谷啓治, 『宗教とは何か』, 創文社, 東京, 1960 年).


This innate spirit of deep prayer may seen as a precious heritage

cultivated on the Japanese soil. However, if such quiet inner contempla-

tion remains simple passivity such as mere acceptance of the status quo or

resignation to the present social situation, no new development would

occur. Using such a gentle inward nature of the people, the political rulers

of Japan have used religion constantly as a tool for their own political

purposes by the suppression and deflection of freedom. In this regard, the

Church of Japan could learn much from the recent history of the Catholic

Church in Korea.

This latter Church did not close its eyes to the situation of political

suffering, but rose up against injustice, in so doing helped to win democ-

racy for the people. This Church began to develop its own theology which

found its locus in promoting solidarity with vulnerable and marginalized

people. They have cultivated “Minjung (people) theology” by following

the path of Jesus’ teaching to, “Love your enemies, pray for those who

persecute you”. In the face of the darkness of sin and evil, the Church

challenged resentment, violence and the desire for revenge with a mes-

sage of hope based on active reconciliation and concrete forgiveness. In

other words, the Korean people were enabled to break the chain of

revenge and learn how to journey towards God in the spirit of “Han” (恨),

the original and basic mindset of the Korean people that transcends con-

flicts through internal struggle and seeks to save both perpetrators as well

as victims.

To that end, it now seems a very important issue for Japanese society

that its people realize the crippling effect of the unconscious tie of the

influence of State Shinto, which plunders our passion for religion. When

the Japanese become aware of the unhealthy relationship between religion

and political power which has dominated its history then, and only then,


will people be able to transform the powerlessness of religion so that the

true image of the God of Jesus Christ may truly flourish.


Bibliography

Ama, Toshimaro, Why Are the Japanese Non-Religious?: Japanese Spirituality:

Being Non-Religious in a Religious Culture, UPA, Tokyo, 2004 (阿満利麿,

『日本人なぜ無宗教なのか』, ちくま新書, 85, 東京, 1996年).

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from the Second Vatican Council.

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sitity of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1984 (村上重良, 『神と日本人―日本宗教史探

訪』, 東京大学出版会, 東京, 1984); Japanese Religion in the Modern Cen-

tury, Universitity of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1980; Irei to syoukon — Yasukuni no

shisou, Iwanami-shinsyo, Tokyo, 1974 (村上重良, 『慰霊と招魂―靖国の思

想』, 岩波新書, C156, 東京, 1974年); Kokka Sinto, Iwanami-shinsyo C155,

Tokyo, 1970 (村上重良, 『国家神道』, 岩波新書, C155, 東京, 1970年).

Nakamura, Hajime, The ways of thinking of Eastern peoples, Published by Print,

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京, 1948年).

Nishida, Kitarou, A Study of Good, Greenwood; Reprint edition, 1988 (西田幾多

郎, 『善の研究』, 弘文堂, 東京, 1911年); David A. Dilworth (transl.), “The

Logic of the Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview”, in Nishida

Kitaro, Last Writings, Honolulu (The University of Hawaii Press), 1987, pp.

47-123 (니시다 기타로, 김승철 옮김, “장소적 논리와 종교적 세계관”, 난

잔종교문화연구소연구총서1, 정우서적, 『場所的論理と宗教的世界観』,

哲学論文集第七, 1945年, 岩波文庫, 349).

Nishitani, Keiji, Religion and Nothingness (Japanese: Shūkyō to wa Nanika; the

original title translates literally as “What is Religion?”), University of Califor-

nia Press, 1983 (西谷啓治, 『宗教とは何か』, 創文社, 東京, 1960年).

Peter U-il Kang (Bishop), Fukuin to ajia-bunka, kankoku katorikku kyoukai no

rekishi to kadai, Soubun-shya, Tokyo 2013 (姜禹一, 『福音とアジア文化―

韓国カトリック教会の歴史と課題』, 創文社, 東京, 2013年).

Roggendorf, Joseph S.J., Gendai-shichou to katorisshizumu, Soubun-shya, Tokyo,

1958 (J・ロゲンドルフ, 『現代思潮とカトリシズム』, 創文社, 東京, 1958年).


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薗進, 『国家神道と日本人』, 岩波新書, 1259, 東京, 2010年).

Suh, Jeong Min (서정민), Kankoku katorikku-shi gairon, Kanyou-Shyuppan, Osaka,

2015 (徐正敏, 『韓国カトリック史概論』, かんよう出版, 大阪, 2015年).

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Received: 29 April 2016 Reviewed and Edited: 30 May 2016 Finalized for Publication: 11 June 2016


❚Abstract❚

□

The Republic of Korea has become a major Christian nation today. But

in neighboring Japan, Christians are still quite a minority. Japanese people

are indifferent to religion in general. They also see that religion has

become a cause of war and terrorism in the modern world and think it is

good that there is no religion to bring about such conflicts in Japan. The

conventional explanation for this has been that the Japanese prefer a

gentle spirituality based on East Asian passivity derived from Buddhism

or from Shinto as a natural religion. However, not many are aware that at

the root of the neglect of religion among the Japanese, there is also a

historical factor concerning the relationship between politics and religion.

Rulers of Japan were very deft in handling religion, undermining religions

and using them for their own political goals. In order to promote a true

understanding of God and acceptance of Christianity in the Japanese con-

text, we cannot overlook this fact.

▶ Key Words: Japan, Shinto, Korea, Religion, Christianity.


❚국문 초록❚

□

일본 맥락에서의 새로운 하느님 이해

이치로 미쓰노부 신부

〔일본 상지대학교 신학대학 학장〕

대한민국은 오늘날 주요 그리스도교 국가가 되었다. 그러나 이웃

한 일본에서는, 그리스도교인은 여전히 소수다. 일본인들은 일반적

으로 종교에 대해 무관심하다. 일본인들은 또한 종교가 현대 세계에

서 전쟁과 테러리즘의 원인이 되었다고 보기 때문에, 그러한 갈등을

일본에 가져오는 종교는 차라리 없는 것이 낫다고 생각한다. 이에

대한 관례적인 설명은 일본인들은 온화한 영성을 선호한다는 것이었

다. 그러한 영성은 동아시아적 수동성에 기반한 것으로, 불교나 신

도(神道: 조상과 자연을 섬기는 일본 종교)에서 유래된 것이다. 그러

나 종교에 대한 무심함의 근저에는 정치와 종교 간의 관계성에 대한

일본의 역사적 요인이 자리하고 있다는 사실을 인지하는 사람들은

많지 않다. 일본의 지배자들은 종교를 다루는 데 있어서 매우 능숙

했다. 그들은 그들만의 정치적 목적을 위해서 종교를 약화시키거나

이용했다. 일본 맥락에서 하느님을 제대로 이해하고 그리스도교의

수용을 파악하기 위해서는, 우리는 이러한 사실을 간과할 수 없는

것이다.

▶ 주제어: 일본, 신도(神道), 한국, 종교, 그리스도교.

Documents

A New Understanding of God in the Japanese Contextj-stt.catholic.ac.kr/DATA/STTBOOK/1467618076372.pdfState Shinto 8. The History of the Control of Religion by Rulers 9. The Difference