A New Pedagogy for Explanatory Public Speaking

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A new pedagogy for explanatory

public speaking: Whyarrangement

should not substitute for invention

Katherine E. Rowana

aAssociate Professor in the Department of Communication ,

Purdue University , West Lafayette, IN, 47907

Published online: 18 May 2009.

To cite this article:Katherine E. Rowan (1995) A new pedagogy for explanatory public

speaking: Why arrangement should not substitute for invention, Communication Education,

44:3, 236-250, DOI: 10.1080/03634529509379014

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03634529509379014

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A NEW PEDAGOGY FOR EXPLANATORY

PUBLIC SPEAKING: WHY

A R R A N G E M E N T S H O U L D N O T

S U B S T I T U T E F O R I N V E N T I O N

Katherine E. Rowan

Because of its eighteenth- and nineteenth-century roots, current informative speaking

pedagogy empha sizes arrangemen t rather than invention. Today s pedagogy provides

speakers w ith a rich array of possibilities for organizing speeches but gives little systematic

assistance in anticipating and overcoming audiences likely sources of confusion. Because

rhetorical forms themselves do not make c omplex ideas clear, this approach is inadequate.

Speakers attempting to inform need heuristics or diagnostic frameworks for determining

why comp lex material is apt to confuse. They also need tested methods for avoiding such

confusions. This essay offers a new pedagogy for explanatory speaking, a type of

informative speech, built around such heuristics. T his pedagogy is supported by classical

rhetoric s emphasis on the importance of invention or inquiry prior to presentation and by

decades of contemporary educational research. In essence, this new pedagogy casts

informative speaking as an explicitly strategic enterprise for which there is im portant

traditional and recent empirical guidance.

In many ways, contemporary textbook treatments of informative speaking are

impressive. Verderber 's (1994) ninth edit ion of The Challenge ofEffective Speak-

ing, for example, uses testimonials from professional speakers, eye-catching

graphics, a rich array of examples, and expert advice to assist student speakers

in producing well-prepared and well-delivered informative presentat ions. In-

deed, the informative speaking sections in top-selling textbooks like Beebe and

Beeb e (1994), DeV ito (1990), Lucas (1992), Nelson an d Pea rson (19 90), Osb orn

and Osborn (1994), and Verderber (1994) seem so sound that one might think

th er e was relatively litt le one could d o to im pro ve the m .

1

There is , however, an important way in which instruction in informative

speaking can be refined. Textboo ks could give informative speakers m ore he lp

with strategy, particularly for the speech that explains a difficult idea.

2

Speeches

of this sort help audiences understand topics such as how we see colors, what

M anifest Destiny m ea ns, or why abstract ar t can be mo re technically challeng-

ing than po rtra i tur e. T he principal help stude nts nee d with the speech to

teach is guid anc e in increasing the likelihood that the audien ce truly learns

from it.

Un fortuna tely, this assistance is no t readily available. In c ur re nt trea tm en ts of

informative speaking, advice on arrangement substi tutes for inventional guid-

ance. Unlike coverage of persuasion where students are guided to consider

l ikely obstacles to agreement and research-supported methods for overcoming

them, in treatments of informing, s tudents are not aided in considering l ikely

Katherine E. Row an (Ph.D., Purdue University)is an Associate Professor in the D ep art m en t of

Com mu nication at Pu rdu e University, West Lafayette, IN 47907.

COMMUNICATION EDUCATION, Volume 44, July 1995

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PEDAGOGY FOR EXPLANATORY SPEAKING237

obstacles to intellectual understanding. Rather, the focus is on ready-made

solutions or arrangement forms. Typically, these chap ters suggest students

use definitions, examples, visual aids, and some type of organizational frame-

work. Often it is suggested that a variety of these techniques be used in hopes

that one or more will work, the level of insight here being somewhat similar to

the status of medicine before the discovery of infectious diseases. Prior to the late

nineteenth century, physicians knew certain drinking wells were associated with

cholera but could not say why. They did not know the human fecal matter

fouling the water contained cholera-causing microbial organisms. Similarly, the

best treatments of informative speaking currently say certain message features

such as short sentences, examples, analogies, and the like are useful in explain-

ing difficult ideas. But they do not specify whenand whycertain techniques

cure

frequent forms of confusion (and when these techniques cause

more

confusion).

If we did not know the most frequent sources of difficulty in mastering

complex information, we would be forced to keep our teaching of informative

speaking at its current stage. However, decades of contemporary educational

research have identified key causes of confusion and tested techniques for

overcoming them. Further, the classical rhetorical tradition has always stressed

the importance of systematic obstacle analysis prior to making decisions about

information arrangem ent. Consequently, this essay draws from classical rhetori-

cal theory and contemporary research to present a new, invention-emphasizing

pedagogy for an important type of informative speaking.

To show why treatm ents of informative speaking even in our best textbooks

are frequently less useful to studen ts than treatm ents of persuasion, I first offer a

brief history of the teaching of expository discourse. Second, I define explana-

tory speaking, identifying its relation to informative speech. Third, a pedagogy

for explanatory speaking is presented, one built on the classical rhetorical

tradition and contemporary research. Finally, I describe implications of this new

pedagogy for teacher training, s tudent study skills, and assessment of informa-

tive speaking skills.

TRADITIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

OF INFORMATIVE DISCOURSE

Speech communication and English composition texts frequently have sections

on expository or informative speaking and writing, expository being the more

traditional term and the one more often used in composition texts. As tradition-

ally conceived, expository discourse is principally concerned with the presenta-

tion of subject matter. The terms

exposition

and

expository

mean setting forth,

disclosing, unm asking, or explaining in detail.

EXPOSITION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY RHETORICS

Th e classical rhetorics of Greece and Rome emphasized persuasive rath er than

expository discourse (Howell, 1973). Expository discourse received greater

attention from eighteenth-century rhetoricians like Hugh Blair, Richard What-

ely, and George Campbell. Campbell, particularly, stressed the importance of

exposition in enhancing understanding. Drawing from John Locke and David

Hume, he argued that the world is known by identifying certain ubiquitous


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238ROWAN

structures in it. Further, the human mind was held to operate by universal,

associative patte rns. These realist premises led Campbell to reason that effective

and efficient comm unication would occur when subject matter was presented in

the associative pa tterns that naturally appeal to the minds of audiences (Camp-

bell, 1988/1776; Golden & Corbett, 1968;How ell, 1971, 1973). Th us , the task of

a rhetor was to locate the patterns inherent in subject matter and practice their

effective use.

Campbell believed that those seeking to persuade others first had to establish

understanding in the minds of audiences by using the techniques of exposition.

Thus,

exposition, in this realist perspective, was an exercise in revealing pure

subject matter. Since the subject matter suggested its own arrangement, mini-

mal consideration of speakers' and audiences' purposes was needed. This

approach to exposition or informative discourse equated informing with arrange-

ment.

EXPOSITION IN NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY TEXTBOOKS

Th e patterns of exposition or modes of discourse became the organizing

frameworks for best-selling composition textbooks in the nineteenth and twenti-

eth centuries (Berlin, 1984, 1987; Johnson, 1991). The Forms of Support and

Informative Speak ing chap ters in today's public speaking books have their

roots in textbooks such as Alexander Bain's EnglishComposition and Rhetori

(1866, cited by Connors, 1981), which was organized to teach expositional

patterns like narration, description, and definition. In the last two centuries,

numerous composition and public speaking textbooks have equated informing

with selection or mastery of forms of support (Berlin, 1984, 1987; Connors,

1981;

Johnson, 1991; Kinneavy, 1971). The problem with this approach lies

neither with the forms of support nor with any particular textbook. It lies

instead with substituting forms of suppor t for systematic anticipation of likely

confusions. Further, the realist assumptions underlying conceptions of exposi-

tory or informative discourse are also problematic. Unlike Campbell, we no

longer view informative comm unication as a process of revealing pu re tru th

inherent in subject matter. Contemporary epistemologies view communication

as a process whereby communicators negotiate shared meanings. In a contem-

porary constructivist perspective, informing should be viewed as a process of

anticipating and overcoming potential misunderstandings or confusions.

DIFFICULTIES IN EQ UATING INFORMING W ITH ARRANGEMENT

Several pedagogical problems have arisen from equating informative speaking

with arrangement. First, even in today's best public speaking textbooks the

purpose of informative speaking is not clear. This confusion is not surprising .

Because of its realist roots, the term expository or informative discourse has

several meanings. It sometimes refers to a type of subject m atter (all nonfiction),

sometimes to a goal (informing or teaching), and sometimes to arrangement

forms themselves. Although today's textbooks could classify informative speeches

by goal (e.g., the speech to teach), they usually classify on the basis of form (e.g.,

speeches that describe, define, or dem onstrate [DeVito, 1990] or speeches about

objects, processes, events, and concepts [Lucas, 1992]). Unfortunately, classify-

ing by form causes some textbook treatments to imply wrongly that adherence

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to a certain form is what designates a speech as informative. O ne sample speech

in DeVito's (1990) informative speaking chapters is a presentation defining

leadership and u rging the audience to believe that the pursu it of excellence is

the essence of true leadership. Although the speech's goal seems epideictic or

persuasive, it is placed in the chapters on informing presumably because of its

rhetorical formdefinition. Another sample speech in DeVito's informative

speaking unit is a comm encement address with the thesis, Use time wisely (pp.

226-229). Again the speech's purpose seems epideictic or persuasive rather

than informative. Of it,

De Vito

writes: This speech is probably best thought of

as one of description, but it is really a combination of information and persua-

sion (p. 228). The latter half of this sentence suggests DeVito's own good

instincts are m ore on the mark than his classificatory scheme.

Some sample speeches, though classified by form, are in fact informative

because of their purpose. They attempt to enhance understanding. For ex-

ample, a speech in Monroe and Ehninger (1969) explains why ice floats.

Verderber (1994) presents a sample informative speech on the nature and

treatment of dyslexia; Lucas (1992) includes one on the medicinal and culinary

benefits of dandelions. These speeches clearly aim to broaden understanding

about some topic. But the fact that even some textbook authors exhibit confu-

sion over what constitutes an informative speech suggests that we er r in making

form a classificatory principle. As Kinneavy (1971, pp. 28-29) has argued,

rhetorical forms like defining, describing, and demonstrating are

means

not

ends.

Wedefine, demonstrate,andnarratefor many purposes: to inform, persuade,

or entertain. Classification by forms such as definition, demonstration, and

narration draws analysis of speech inappropriately toward analysis of form for

form's sake rather than toward questions about effectiveness.

A second problem with over-focusing on form is tha t it blunts consideration of

informative strategy. Current pedagogy identifies informing with selecting a

rhetorical form (e.g., defining, narrating) just as eighteenth- and nineteenth-

century rhetorics did. Of course, these rhetorical forms can be viewed as

frequent solutions to challenges that informative speakers face. There is a

problem , however, with substituting form selection for inventional inquiry. It

reduces the likelihood that informative speakers will systematically diagnose

their genuine informative challenges. This by-passing of invention (and moving

immediately to arrangement) has apparently been normative in informative

speaking pedagogy for most of this century. Monroe (e.g., Monroe, 1945;

Monroe & Ehninger, 1969) is famous for the motivated sequence, the strategic

approach to the teaching of persuasive speaking. But in his treatment of

informative speaking, he explores strategy only for gaining an audience's

attention and establishing the audience's need for certain information (Monroe,

1945).To assist speakers in anticipating an audience's conceptual difficulties, he

offers organizational forms (e.g., time order, space, causal, p . 125).

Monroe 's pat tern is still followed today. Despite the fact that Beebe and Beebe

(1994) emphasize audience analysis throughou t their textbook, like nearly all in

use today, they wrongly imply that rhetorical forms themselves make confusing

ideas understandable. For instance, one speech outlined in the chapter on

informative speaking is designed to inform the audience about liberation

theology (pp. 315-316 ). At the speech's end, the speaker expects the audience to


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240ROWAN

be able to discuss the definition and origin of liberation theology in Latin

America (p. 315). Th at is, a clear statement of purpose and a behavioral

objective are presented. What is missing is an analysis ofwhythe audience may

have troub le m eeting the speaker's expectation. What obstacles will they encoun-

ter in und erstand ing the definition of this concept and its history? What are the

frequent obstacles people face when attempting to learn a new concept? What

are the frequent obstacles encountered when people attempt to follow a history?

Instead of addressing these issues this textbook, like most, offers minimal

inventional guidance. Th e authors write: Luisa [the speaker] decided tha t the

most logical way to explain liberation theology was to talk first about the

definition of liberation theology and second about its origins. She chose a topical

organizationa logical division of available information about liberation theol-

ogy (p. 316). Note here the assumption that

theforms

definition and topical

organization will by themselves explain complex information to an audience.

This is a notion born of eighteenth-century epistemology that still pervades

textbook treatments of both informative and persuasive speeches and is espe-

cially preva lent in treatments of informing.

Arrangem ent advice substitutes for inventional guidance in other ways. Some

public speaking textbooks substitute variety for diagnosis. They discuss informa-

tive speeches of definition or of demonstration, and then offer a wide array of

rhetorical forms that one could use to define or to dem ons trate. With respect to

defining, for example, DeVito (1990) lists a variety of methods: etymology,

authority, operationalization, o r symbolization (pp. 221-223 ). Similarly, Nelson

and Pearson (1990) list definitional devices such as comparison, contrast,

synonyms, antonyms, etymology, differentiation, operational definition, and

experiential definition. Again, students are being encouraged to arrange their

material before they have considered systematically why the material may be

difficult to follow.

Yet another example of arrangem ent advice replacing inventional guidance

involves locking students into certain organizational forms without helping

them think about whether these forms will alleviate confusions. For example,

Lucas (1992) lists the following types of informative speeches: speeches about

objects, processes, events, and concepts. Bu t Lucas subdivides this classification

and offers arrangem ent advice for each sub-category. So, within speeches about

objects, there are speeches abou t subjects (people) or objects, and one can speak

either about the history of a subject or about its main features. In the first

instance, the speech is chronologically ordered. In the second instance, it is

spatially ordered. There are two problems with this approach. First, no one in

the real world has the goal of speaking chronologically or spatially. These are

forms, not goals. The speaker's goal is to teach or deepen understanding.

Second, substituting arrangement for invention fails to assist students in consid-

eringwhyaudiences might not und erstan d some information. For instance, one

sample speech outlined by Lucas is designed to inform the audience about the

major tenets of Islam. Lucas writes that this speech is effectively presented by

identifying the major e lements of the religion and then illustrating each element

(p.

288). The problem here is that, again, there is no discussion of why an

audience m ight not understan d the key points. Why might an audience of U.S.

college students have trouble in this case? An obstacle is likely to be the

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presumption that Islam is entirely different from Christianity or Judaism, the

religions more familiar to many U.S. students. If that obstacle analysis is correct,

then perhaps the speaker could help the audience overcome this difficulty by

comparing the tenets of Islam and Christianity. Ultimately, the expository

forms,

com parison or analogy, may be used as a way of assisting the audience in

understanding Islam, but they should be discussed

after

an analysis of why the

goal of explaining the religion's tenets might fail, not before. This consideration

of strategy makes the teaching of informative speaking more interesting than

the form-focused approach.

A third problem results from the idea that informing equals arrangement.

This implicit notion makes the steps to informative speaking seem obvious and

therefore unworthy of further study. Such beliefs may discourage authors of

public speaking textbooks from gathering new research on strategies for explain-

ing difficult ideas.

3

Such research exists in abundance. In the last several

decades, educational research has made impressive headway in identifying

multiple bases for determ ining why ideas are difficult to und ersta nd . This work

may be found in fields such as concept learning or instructional design,

educational psychology, science education, and related areas (for reviews, see

Rowan, 1988, 1992; Shymansky & Kyle, 1988). These fields offer lines of inquiry

and important findings relevant to informative speakers.

In sum, current pedagogy for informative speaking implicitly rests on an

outdated epistemology, creates confusion about the purposes of informative

speaking, is essentially nonstrategic, and generally fails to familiarize students

with research relevant to explaining ideas well. The re are good reasons then for

exploring alternative approaches. The ideal pedagogy should be (a) definition-

ally clear and focused on speakers' purposes or functions when informing, (b)

useful in diagnosing likely audience confusions with some topic, and (c) helpful

in guiding speakers to empirically supported techniques for overcoming confu-

sion. In the following section, I present an alternative pedagogy designed to

meet these criteria.

AN ALTERNATE PEDAGOGY

Explanatory speaking may be defined by drawing from Kinneavy's Theory

of

Discourse(1971). He classifies all discourse by inferable authorial aim (see Figure

1) and identifies four types of discursive aim: self-expression, persuasion,

reference, and literary.

4

Reference refers to discourse where communicators

chiefly represent some aspect of reality, rather than persuading, expressing

themselves, or creating literary artifacts. For Kinneavy, expository speech is one

form of reference discourse (see figure 1).

Kinneavy divides reference discourse into three sub-types by locating more

specific authorial goals: scientific, exploratory, and informative. Scientific or

scholarly discourse represents some aspect of reality by proving claims about it

(scholarly papers and presentations are instances).Exploratorydiscourse (specu-

lative essays) represents an aspect of reality by questioning accepted notions.

Informativediscourse, found in news reports , textbooks, teachers' lectures,

popular magazines, and encyclopedias, represents reality by making informa-

tion accessible to lay audiences.


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242ROWAN

Discursive Aims

E L E M E N T

G O A L S

Speaker

Self-expressive

Audience

Persuasive

Reality or World

Reference

T Y P E S O F

R E F E R E N C E

Exploratory

Language

Literary

Informative

Scientific

Representat ive

T Y P E S O F

INFORMATIVE

T Y P E S O F

EXPLANATORY

Explanatory

Informatory

Transformative

Quasi-Scientific

Elucidating

F I G U R E 1

A THEORY OF EXPLANATORY DISCOURSE BUILT FROM K I N N E A VY S ( 1 9 7 1 ) THEORY OF DISCURSIVE AIMS. A VERSION

OF THIS DIAGRAM APPEARS IN ROWAM ( 1 9 8 8 ) .

Notions of expository discourse can be further refined. Following Kinneavy's

logic, Rowan (1988) suggested dividing informative discourse into two sub-

types.Informatorypresen tations create awareness of the latest information about

some topic. A news report on the latest fighting between the Serbs and the

Croatians would be informatory. In contrast,explanatorypresentations enhance

understanding of phenomena about which we are aware but do not fully

understand . A presentation on why the Serbs and Croats are historical enemies

would be explanatory . To illustrate further: a university's schedule of classes is

informatory; an account of how to register for these classes is explanatory. A

presentation on the latest graphics software available for DOS machines could

be informatory (if it focused on aw areness-creation more than on gaining sales);

a presentation on why laser printing a graphic is more complex than printing

text would be explanatory. When we teach informative speaking, we usually

want explanatory, not informatory discourse. News reports a re informatory. In

a classroom setting, we generally want students to deepen our understanding of

some phenomenon or aid us in mastering some skill. Generally, we do not

assume they are in a position to provide classmates the latest information

about some topic. Consequently, my focus is on pedagogy for explanatory

discourse.

Good explanatory speeches are frequently those that address questions of

how, why, or what does that mean? Paradigmatic instances of students'

explanatory speeches include answers to questions such as: How do locks and

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keys work? Why do people yawn? What are modern artists trying to achieve?

How do we get ou r drinking water? Why is irradiated food healthful? What's the

difference between stocks and bonds? Th e challenge for explanatory speakers is

to classify the principal sort of difficulty their audience will face for a particular

topic and then to shape their speech so as to overcome tha t difficulty.

METHODS FOR OVERCOMING CONFUSION

There are th ree chief difficulties in understand ing complex ideas (Rowan, 1988,

1990,1992). An idea may be difficult or confusing because it involves (a)

difficult

conceptsor language,(b)difficult to envision structuresor processes, or (c) notions that

a re difficult to understand because they are hard to believe(e.g., the Ea rth is w eight-

less).

Scholars in educational research have explored each of these obstacles to

understanding by identifying effective techniques at overcoming each (e.g.,

Brown, 1992; Hewson & Hewson, 1983, 1984; Hynd & Alvermann, 1986;

Mayer, 1983, 1989; Mayer & Anderson, 1992; Merrill & Tennyson , 1977;

Shymansky & Kyle, 1988; Tennyson & Cocchiarella, 1986; Watts & Pope, 1989).

Efforts to overcome each of these difficulties constitute a characteristic type of

explanation. Th ere a reelucidating explanationswhich clarify the m eaning and use

of terms,quasi scientific explanationswhich help audiences mentally model com-

plex phenom ena, andtransformative explanationswhich help people understand

counter-intuitive or implausible ideas.

Following are discussions of the above explanation types including the fea-

tures most likely to make them effective. Just as a theory of causes of disease

helps contemporary physicians classify, diagnose, and implement appropriate

curative strategies, knowledge of the principal types of confusion that audiences

experience can help exp lanatory speakers anticipate an audience's difficulties in

understand ing complex ideas.

ELUCIDATING EXPLANATIONS

If the audience's chief difficulty rests in mastering the meaning and use of a

certain term, then the strategy governing a speaker's presentation should be

that of anelucidating

explanation.

Elucidating explanations illuminate a concept's

meaning and use. For example, speakers principally concerned with explaining

notions such as the difference between validity and reliability, the meaning of

liberation theology, or why corals are classified as animals and not plan ts, should

use elucidating exp lanations.

Research in instructional design and linguistics shows that when people are

struggling to understand the meaning or the use of a term, they are in fact

struggling to distinguish a concept'sessential(always present) from itsassociated

(frequent but not necessary) features (Merrill & Tennyson, 1977; Tennyson &

Cocchiarella, 1986). Th us , good elucidating explanations focus attention on this

distinction. Specifically, researchers in instructional design have found that

good elucidating explanations contain (a) a typicalexemplarof the concept, (b) a

definitionthat lists a concept's essential features, (c) an array of variedexamples

andnonexamples(nonexamples are instances likely to be mistaken for examples),

and (d) opportunities topracticedistinguishing examples from nonexam ples by

looking for essential features (Merrill & Tennyson, 1977; Tennyson & Cocchi-

arella, 1986).


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244ROWAN

Because good elucidating explanations include sets of varying examples and

nonexamples as well as definitions, they are more effective at emphasizing a

concept's critical features than definitions alone. That is, concept mastery occurs

when people consider a concept's application to an array of varying instances

and practice distinguishing examples of the concept from tempting nonex-

amples. Or, they listen to a presentation tha t explores these distinctions.

For example, one student, who had worked at a nuclear power plant, gave a

speech explaining radiation. He noted that many people think radiation is

always bad or dangerous. They believe dangerous is an essential qualifier

associated with all instances of radiation. The

Associated Press Stylebook

(Fren

Powell, & Angione, 1992) defines radiation as invisible particles or waves given

off by radioactive m aterial, such as uran ium . R adiation can dam age or kill body

cells,

resulting in genetic damage or dea th (p. 140). Th e term radiation,

however, generally refers to electromagnetic radiation, which includes every-

thing from kilometers-long radio waves to tiny x-rays and gamm a rays. . . .

Radiation can refer to the electromagnetic radiation emitted by a candle flame

or the subatomic particles emitted by uranium ore (Mims, 1992, p. 101). Th us ,

radiation includes sunlight, energy from light bulbs, televisions, computers,

electrical wires, and many other ubiquitous phenomena. The speaker con-

cluded that dangerous is not an essential feature of radiation's meaning even

though exposure to certain types of radiation may be dangerous (danger being

determined by the radiation source, the intensity of that source, and the

duration of exposure). By offering an array of examples and by demonstrating

that danger was an associated meaning of radiation and not an essential one,

the speaker assisted his audience in developing a more accurate conception of

this much used, bu t often misunderstood , concept.

QUASI-SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS

If an idea is difficult chiefly because complexity obscures its main points, then

speakers should present aquasi scientific explanation. Just as scientists try

develop m odels of the world, quasi-scientific explanations model or picture the

key dimensions of some phenomenon for lay audiences. Speakers presenting

difficult-to-envision topics such as how radar works, the s truc ture of the U.S.

federal court system, the similarities and differences between Islam and Chris-

tianity, or how DNA molecules pass on genetic information, should use quasi-

scientific exp lanations.

Perhaps because the chief difficulties in adequately modeling complex phe-

nomena lie in locating their key components or processes, good quasi-scientific

explanations have easily discernible main points and clear connections among

them. Specifically, researchers in educational psychology (e.g., Mayer, 1983,

1989;Mayer & Andersen, 1992; Mayer, Dyck, & Cook, 1984) have found that

effective quasi-scientific explanations contain features that highlight the struc-

ture of the phenom enon being explained and essentially overcome two obstacles

to com prehension : difficulties in getting a general impression of some phenom -

enon and difficulties in conceptualizing that phenomenon's parts, processes,

and interrelations. Current informative speaking pedagogy is useful in helping

students consider these obstacles to understa nd ing (e.g.,

De

Vito, 1990; V erder-

ber, 1994).

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The difficulty of not having the big pic ture is best overcome through devices

that quickly convey structure or gist. These include graphic features such as

simplified draw ings, cartoons, videos,

an d

models

of all sorts (G ilbert & O sb orn e,

1980; Mayer & Anderson, 1992; Robins & Mayer, 1993). Verbal strategies are

also helpful. Some effective strategies includestructure suggesting titles( Green-

house Earth or Five Areas of Study ),

organizing analogies

(e.g., Your brain

works like a computer ), andmodel suggesting topic sentences (e.g., Radar works

like an echo or Islam is similar to Christianity in some ways and different in

others ) (See Loman and Mayer, 1983, Mayer, 1985a, Mayer 1985b, and Mayer,

Dyck, and Cook, 1984).

The second difficulty good quasi-scientific explanations m ust overcom e is that

of helping listeners see the relationships among a phenomenon's sub-

components or sub-processes. Transitional phrases, previews, summaries, and

explicit statements of relationships all aid people in refining the ir mental models

of some subject (Loman & Mayer, 1983; Mayer, Dyck, & Cook, 1984). Interest-

ingly, research has shown that over-use of short sentences can actually harm

people's abilities to see connections among ideas, particularly when sentences

are arbitrarily shortened for shortness' sake. In some cases, important linking

words such as because and for exam ple are cut from sentences in the

mistaken belief that short sentences inevitably enhance comprehension (Davi-

son, 1984).

One text feature that helps people see relationships among complex ideas is

that of continually re-invoking initial comparisons. This technique facilitates

mapping old knowledge onto the new. We see interrelations among sub-

components illuminated in Gentner's (1988) analysis of Rutherford's analogy

comparing the hydrogen atom to the solar system. As Gentner notes, this

analogy facilitates learn ing because of its high systematicity. Rutherford went on

to show how his analogy held among sub-components of both systems: the

nucleus in the atom is like the sun in the solar system, the electrons like plane ts,

the attractive forces between the atom's nucleus and electrons like those be-

tween the sun and its planets. Similarly, a good quasi-scientific presentation on

how human vision works could compare an eye's parts with those of a camera.

Links may be made between the relation of the pupil to the retina with that of

the apertu re adjustment to film.

Another good quasi-scientific speech might explain how radar works. Using

an organizing analogy, the speaker could say that radar works essentially the

way an echo does, except that radio, rather than sound waves, are sent and

received. The speaker could refer to the echo analogy as she points to a visual

aid and discusses the radar signal's transmission (similar to shouting in a

canyon) and reception (similar to hearing the echo).

TRANSFORMATIVE EXPLANATIONS

If the chief source of difficulty is neithe r a confusing term no r a complex mass of

information, but is rathe r the counter-intuitivity of an idea, then speakers could

design their talks astransformativeexplanations.For example, the idea that when a

person pushes on a concrete wall, that wall exerts an equal and opposite force

(Newton's Third Law of Motion) contains no difficult terms, but from a lay

perspective, it may seem implausible. Transformative explanations a re designed

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to presen t such counter-intuitive ideas by helping lay audiences transform their

everyday theories of phenom ena into more accepted notions. Questions best

answered with transformative presentations might include: why natural foods

such as potatoes contain dangerous toxins, how m en can get breast cancer, why

belief in a jus t world leads people to blame victims for their plights, or why

abstract art can be more technically and intellectually demanding than portrai-

ture.

Educational research shows that people's chief difficulties in understanding

counter-intuitive ideas lie in understanding why their own, implicit theory is

inadequate (Brown, 1992; Hewson & Hewson, 1983; Shymansky & Kyle, 1988;

Watts & Pope, 1989). Th us , good transformative explanations begin by discuss-

ing the audience's implicit theory first and then demonstrating its limitations

(Anderson & Smith, 1984; Hewson & Hewson, 1983; Hynd & Alvermann, 1986;

Rowan, 1991). Specifically, science educators have found that the best transfor-

mative explanations are those tha t (a) state peop le's implicit or lay theory

about the pheno menon or ask questions that elicit this theory , (b) acknowledge

the app are nt plausibility of the lay theory, (c) reject the lay theory and dem on-

strate its inadequacy with examples familiar to the audience, and (d) state the

more accepted account and illustrate its greater effectiveness.

In one of my classes, several students developed a transformative explana-

tion aimed at nonscience studentsfor why otherwise healthful foods contain

natura l toxins. He re are the principal components ofthat account. Th e studen ts

used Am es, Magaw, and Gold (1987) to inform their explanatory efforts.

[State lay

theory].

It seems reasonableno, OBVIOUSto believe that when we eat healthf

foods we are ingesting substances tha t are good for us.

[Acknowledgetheapparent plausibilityofthelay theory, but thenrejectit and illustrate itsinadequac

locatingcontradictory examplesfamiliar to theaudience.] There are many good reasons for believin

natural foods are good for us . Clearly, eating healthful food is associated with well-being.

Many long-lived people are known for their healthful ea ting. Personal experience tells us we feel

better when we have a balanced diet. However, it is not the case that all things natural are

healthful. We know that some snakes are poisonous, that forests contain poison ivy, and that

simply eating too m uch foodhowever naturalis bad for us. So, perh aps we should not be too

surprised to learn that healthful foods such as fresh baked bread, shrimp, potatoes, and peanuts

often contain naturally created toxins, pesticides, and hum an carcinogens.

[Demonstrate theadequacy of the more orthodox view].Why w ould n atu ral tox ins exist in foods

Plants develop these toxins to protect themselves from fungi, insects, and predators. According

to B ruce Ames, a biochemist at the University of California, Berkeley, and his associates, natural

carcinogens may be more responsible for human cancers than synthetic chemicals. As these

scientists say, We are ingesting in our diet at least 10,000 times more by weight of natu ral

pesticides than of manmade pesticide residues (Ames et al., 1987, p. 272).

For example, one human carcinogen is aflatoxin. Aflatoxin is a natural toxin that contami-

nates wheat, corn, nuts, and stored carbohydrate foods like peanut butter. Aflatoxin is also

found in the milk of cows that eat moldy grain.

As Ames et al. write, We . . . are almost completely ignorant of the carcinogenic potential of

the enormous background of natural chemicals in the world. For example cholinesterase

inhibitors are a common class of pesticides, both man-made and natural. Solanine and

chaconine (the main alkaloids in potatoes) are cholinesterase inhibitors and were introduced

into the human diet about 400 years ago with the dissemination of the potato from the

Andes. . . . Neither alkaloid has been tested for carcinogenicity. . . . (p. 277).

In essence, the idea that natural foods are entirely healthful is not a sound one. There are a

variety of forces in natu re, not all of which are beneficial to human hea lth. Plants' need to survive

causes them to develop defense systems, some of which are harmful to humans. Further,

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because cancers usually take a long time to kill, evolution may not have helped us develop

defenses against them. We may be biologically better equipped to avoid acute hazards than we

are chronic dangers that manifest themselves past usual reproductive ages.

As this exam ple shows, the key to good transformative explanation is recogniz-

ing that when people have deeply held implicit theories, they do not reject their

theories easily. Implicit theories exist because they seem to work. Good transfor-

mative explanations do not simply reject them. Instead, these explanations

remind audiences that their implicit theories do not account for phenomena

with which they themselves are familiar.

After considering this na tural carcinogens exam ple, one might wonder if

transformative explanations are appropria te only for na tural science topics. But

while there are many non-intuitive scientific notions, counter-intuitive notions

are not exclusively scientific. People develop powerful but tacit lay theories

about familiar dimensions of life (e.g., art and race relations as well as nu trition

and disease). In fact, communication teachers often generate good transforma-

tive explanations while lecturing on the notion that perception is a subjective,

rather than an objective, process. Instructors a re aware that simply asserting the

subjective and constructive character of perception would not be effective.

Consequently, they usually begin lectures by acknowledging the apparent

plausibility of the objective-perception hypothesis. They tell students that it is

natu ral to assume that w hat is perceived is exactly correspondent to reality. But

then the inadequacy of the objective-perception hypothesis is dem onstrated by

using optical illusions or attribution exercises, showing that the mind partly

creates the reality it perceives. Only after these exercises, do instructors assert

and explain the subjectivity of perception.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PEDAGOGY

This alternative approach to the teaching of explanatory speaking improves

instruction in several ways. First, it improves teaching by giving it a more

analytic, more reasoned approach. Novice public speaking instructors tend to

translate instruction in informative speaking into lists of requirements for form.

According to some novices, a good informative speech has an introduction, a

body with at least two main points, a summary conclusion, at least one visual aid,

and a subject of interest to the audience. Of course, such an approach is form

rather than function focused. It fails to give students practice in analyzing the

conceptual challenges an audience might face in listening to a complex presen-

tation.

This alternative pedagogy encourages thinking. Students assigned explana-

tory speeches first consider several topics that their classmates would like to

learn and the principal reasons for any difficulty in understand ing the subject.

Toward this end, speakers interview class members. Then they produce strate-

gic analyses, noting what conceptual difficulties audience members have with

their topics. Next, they conduct research on their topics and eventually generate

speech outlines using the explanation type that best overcomes these difficulties.

Student speeches developed in this manner are frequently well-reasoned and

fun.

Additionally, having a theory of explanatory discourse makes lecturing and

tutorial explanation more intellectually stimulating. Having a theoretical basis

for considering why, for example, students have difficulty mastering some


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apparently mundane distinction (e.g., the difference between independent and

dependen t clauses) makes the task of explaining more of a challenge. Regardless

of whether the explanation succeeds or fails, teachers can attempt to determ ine

the reason for its effect on the audience.

The proposed theory of explanatory discourse may also have important

benefits for teacher training. First, it may encourage reflection in lesson plan-

ning, lecturing, and text selection. Second, the theory may especially help

novice teachers with course material planning. In reviewing the content for a

given class, novice teachers could be trained to anticipate and minimize likely

difficulties that their students may face in mastering certain material. They

could produce brief strategy analyses that require them to draw from the

appropriate techniques discussed earlier (e.g., an extended elucidating, quasi-

scientific, or transformative explanation).

Finally, the proposed theory can be presented as a heuristic device to

students; tha t is, it can function as a way of checking com prehension of lecture

or textual explanations. It can serve also as a basis for re-th inking or challenging

such m aterials. For exam ple, one may envision a communication class session on

the definition of mass communication. Frequently such exercises are teacher-

dominated. Students taught to analyze definitions as elucidating explanations

may be better able to engage in or critique a teacher's definitional claims. For

instance, some definitions of mass communication insist tha t all instances of this

phenomenon must be directed to mass audiences. A student may object,

though, and ask whether telephone conversations used in telemarketing count

as instances of mass communication. The student could argue that telemarket-

ing allows access to mass audiences even though the mem bers of such audiences

are contacted individually. Learning that one tests definitions by generating a

range of instantiating examples can assist students in considering definitional

claims. Additionally, knowledge of the features of good quasi-scientific and

transformative explanations should help them check their understanding of

complex structures and processes.

CONCLUSION

Eighteenth-century rhetoricians such as Campbell believed the human mind

reasons by certain universal patterns. Placing information in these patterns

(e.g., by chronology, causal order) therefore seemed the key step in making

information clear. In twentieth-century public speaking textbooks, we still see

similar treatments of informative speaking, treatments that equate the goal of

informing with matters of arrangement. When informing is equated with

arrangement, however, students are discouraged from actively considering an

audience's likely difficulties in understanding complex subject matter. In addi-

tion, the false notion that informing is an uninteresting and obvious process is

encouraged. Unfortunately, this false notion still pervades pedagogy and makes

even our best public speaking textbooks less effective.

This essay offers a new, invention-emphasizing pedagogy for explanatory

speaking. This pedagogy is supported by classical rhetoric's em phasis on inven-

tion and by decades of contemporary educational research on sources of

intellectual confusion and methods for addressing them. In essence, it trans-

forms the process of explaining difficult ideas into an explicitly strategic enter-

prise for which there is important traditional and recent empirical guidance.

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Just as discovering the causes of infectious diseases improved physicians' diag-

nostic capabilities, so too can discovering causes of confusion assist explanatory

speakers. Since the fifth century BC, rhetorical training has aided speakers in

discerning the available means of persuasion. This pedagogy provides similar

guidance to those explaining difficult ideas.

NOTES

1

To identify prevalent ways of teaching informative speaking for this essay, I located six recent, top-selling

public speaking textbooks that have at least one chapter devoted to informative speaking. I reviewed the

informative speak ing chapters in these textbooks carefully and e xam ined their coverage of othe r topics relevant

to informing, such as advice on re search , audien ce analysis, forms of sup po rt, visual aids, and langua ge choice. I

selected textbooks for this analysis that focused on the teaching of public speaking, rather than on other

com mu nication subject matter. Thes e contem pora ry texts were: Beebe and Beebe (1994), DeVito (1990), Lucas

(1992), Nelson and Pearson (1990), Osborn and Osborn (1994), and Verderber (1994). In addition, I examined

two editions of a textbook first issued in the 1930s: Monroe (1945) and Monroe and Ehninger (1969). These

latter textbooks were reviewed to see if pedago gy for informative sp eaking had chan ged substantially in the last

few de cades. It has not.

2

Several of the eight textbooks I examined include sections on the speech to explain a difficult idea. These are

Lucas (1992), Nelson and Pearson (1990) and Osborn and Osborn (1994). Each gives good advice; emphasis is

placed, however, on the use of rhetorical forms for explaining, rather than on offering inventional guidance to

assist speakers in anticipating likely confusions.

3

Several contemporary public speaking textbooks offer some discussion of contemporary educational

research relevant to informative speaking. For example, Lucas (1992) discusses research from educational

psychology on the role of visual aids in assisting learning. For their discussion of informative speaking Nelson

and Pearson (1990) draw from research on learning and memory. In addition, Osborn and Osborn (1994) cite

my integrations of rhetorical theory with educational research (e.g., Rowan, 1988, 1990) in their treatment of

the speech to explain. For the most part, though, this research appears sporadically in contemporary public

speaking textbooks. It does not inform systematic inquiry about obstacles to understanding complex subject

matter .

4

Note that Kinneavy (1971) takes the position that there are at least four fundamental communication goals.

From his perspective, then , on e kind of com mu nication is principally persuasive, but no t all kinds. Oth ers argu e

that all communication efforts are persuasive. For instance, in their public speaking textbook, Nadeau,

Jablons ki, & G ard ne r, (1993) write that all talks, presen tations, speeches, discourses, lectures, serm ons, or

reports are fundamentally persuasive. Th e persuasive componen t of the speaker 's e th o s . . . is ever present even

in a mathematics class (p. 157). A third perspective is that claims about fund ame ntal types of discourse are not

ontological but rath er in terpretiv e. Th at is, those taking this third position w ould say it is sometimes useful to

analyze discourse

as though

it is entirely persu asive , or self-expressive, or info rmative , or literary . On the o th er

han d, it is sometimes useful to analyze discourse as tho ugh multiple aims are pu rsuab le in m ost contexts while

the dominant aim in a given case can bepersuasion, orunders tanding, or enter ta inment , or self-expression.

Critics can m ake jud gm en ts ab out th e dom inan t aim anim ating a given text by assessing features of the text and

its context. Subscribing to this last view, I argue, as Kinneavy does, that it is illuminating

to

maintain that some

discourse is more oriented toward deepening understanding (e.g., teaching) than it is toward gaining

agr eem ent (e.g., selling). But wh ether o ne sees aims in discourse as phe nom ena that differ in degree o r kind, the

essential argument of this essay is that there is as much exciting strategy involved in explaining something

difficult as there is in gaining agreement. Consequently, speech communication textbooks should do more to

assist speakers with the former kind of strategizing.

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A New Pedagogy for Explanatory Public Speaking