ANEWARISTOTLEREADER

EDITEDBY

J.L.ACKRILL

PRINCETONUNIVERSITYPRESSPRINCETON,NEWJERSEY

Copyright©J.L.Ackrill1987

PublishedintheUnitedStatesbyPrincetonUniversityPress,41WilliamStreet,Princeton,NewJersey08540Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwise,withoutthepriorpermissionofPrincetonUniversityPress

LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationDataAristotle.AnewAristotlereader.Bibliography:p.1.Philosophy.I.Ackrill,J.L.II.Title.B407.A241987b18587-42739ISBN0-691-07317-1ISBN0-691-02043-4(pbk.)

PrincetonUniversityPressbooksareprintedonacid-freepaperandmeettheguidelinesforpermanenceanddurabilityoftheCommitteeonProductionGuidelinesforBookLongevityoftheCouncilonLibraryResources

TypesetbyJoshuaAssociatesLimited,OxfordPrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaFourthpaperbackprinting,withcorrections,1989

19181716151413ISBN-13:978-0-691-02043-3(pbk.)

ISBN-10:0-691-02043-4(pbk.)

CONTENTS

Translations

Aristotle’sWorks

Introduction

Glossary

TEXTS

Logic

NaturalPhilosophy

Metaphysics

PracticalPhilosophy

Topics

ListofBooks

TRANSLATIONS

Logic

Categories

1–5

DeInterpretatione

1–11

PriorAnalytics

I.1–7;27,43a25–43

II.21

PosteriorAnalytics

I.1–4,10,13

II.1–2,8–10,12,19

Topics

I.

NaturalPhilosophy

Physics

I.1–2,5–9

II.

III.1–3,5.205a7–6.207a14

IV.4.21Ob32–212a21;10–11

VIII.6;10.267a21–b26

OntheHeavens

I.2;9;10.279b4–280a10;12.281b3–33

II.12.292a1O–b25

III.6

OnGenerationandCorruption

I.3;4.319b6–21

II.1.329a24–b5;3.330a30–b6;330b31–331a6;4.331a6–b12;9–11

Meteorology

I.1

IV.12

OntheSoul

I.1;4408a34–b29

II.exceptc.7

III.exceptcc.12–13

OnMemory

1

OnSleep

2

OnDreams

2.459a23–b23,460a32–b27;3.461a30–462a8

OnYouthandOldAge

3.468b28–4.469b20

PartsofAnimals

I.1,5

II.1

MovementofAnimals

6–11

GenerationofAnimals

I.21.729b1–II.1.732a12

II.1.734b21–735a26;3.736a24–737a34

V.1.778a16–b19;8

Metaphysics

Metaphysics*

I.(A)1–2

III.(B)1

IV.(Γ)1–3;4.1005b35–1006a28,1008b2–1009a5;5.1009a6–16,1010b1–29

V.(Δ)4–8;29

VI.(E)

VII.(Z)

VIII.(H)

IX.(Θ)

X.(I)1;9

XII.(Λ)

XIII.(M)4–5;10

PracticalPhilosophy

NicomacheanEthics

I.1–8;13

II.1–7;9

III.

V.1–2;5.1133b29–1134a16;7.1134b18–1135a5;8;9.1137a5–26;10

VI.

VII.

IX.4;8;9

X.

EudemianEthics

I.1–5

II.1;6–10

VIII.2;3

Politics

I.1–7

III.1–4

VII.1–3;13–15

VIII.1–3

Poetics

1–15(withomissions);19–20*BooksoftheMetaphysicsareoftenreferredtobyGreekcapitalletters,givenhereinbrackets.

ARISTOTLE’SWORKS

This listcontainsall theworks translatedor referred to in thisvolume.Theorderisthetraditionalone:Logic,NaturalPhilosophy,Metaphysics,PracticalPhilosophy.

ReferencestoAristotle’sworksmaybebybookandchapter,butuseisalsomade of the numerals and letters printed in the outermargin. These derivefromBekker’s1831editionofthetext.Thus‘170a13’referstothethirteenthlineoftheleftcolumnonpage170ofBekker’sedition.Theline-numberinatranslationcannotalwayscoincideexactlywiththelineintheGreek.

DEINTERPRETATIONS*

CHAPTER116a

Firstwemustsettlewhatanameisandwhataverbis,andthenwhatanegation,anaffirmation,astatement,andasentenceare.

Nowspokensoundsaresymbolsofaffectionsinthesoul,andwrittenmarkssymbolsofspokensounds.Andjustaswrittenmarks

5

arenotthesameforallmen,neitherarespokensounds.Butwhattheseareinthefirstplacesignsof—affectionsofthesoul—arethesameforall;andwhattheseaffectionsarelikenessesof—actualthings—arealsothesame.Thesemattershavebeendiscussedintheworkonthesoulanddonotbelongtothepresentsubject.

10

Justassomethoughtsinthesoulareneithertruenorfalsewhilesomearenecessarilyoneortheother,soalsowithspokensounds.Forfalsityandtruthhavetodowithcombinationandseparation.Thus

15

namesandverbsbythemselves—forinstance‘man’or‘white’whennothingfurtherisadded—arelikethethoughtsthatarewithoutcombinationandseparation;forsofartheyareneithertruenorfalse.Asignof this is thateven‘goat-stag’signifiessomethingbutnot,asyet,anythingtrueorfalse—unless‘is’or‘isnot’isadded(eithersimplyorwithreferencetotime).

CHAPTER2Anameisaspokensoundsignificantbyconvention,withouttime,

20

noneofwhosepartsissignificantinseparation.

Forin‘Whitfield’the‘field’doesnotsignifyanythinginitsownright,asitdoesinthephrase‘whitefield’.Notthatitisthesamewithcomplexnamesaswithsimpleones:inthelatterthepartisinnoway

25

significant,intheformerithassomeforcebutisnotsignificantofanythinginseparation,forexamplethe‘boat’in‘pirate-boat’.

Isay‘byconvention’becausenonameisanamenaturallybutonlywhenithasbecomeasymbol.Eveninarticulatenoises(ofbeasts,forinstance)doindeedrevealsomething,yetnoneofthemisaname.

‘Notman’isnotaname,noristhereanycorrectnameforit.Itis30

neitheraphrasenoranegation.Letuscallitanindefinitename.

‘Philo’s’,‘to-Philo’,andthelikearenotnamesbutinflexionsofnames.Thesameaccountholdsforthemasfornamesexceptthatan

16b

inflexionwhen combinedwith ‘is’, ‘was’, or ‘will be’ is not true orfalsewhereasanamealwaysis.Take,forexample,‘Philo’sis’or‘Philo’sisnot’;sofarthereisnothingeithertrueorfalse.

5

CHAPTER3A verb is what additionally signifies time, no part of it beingsignificantseparately;anditisasignofthingssaidofsomethingelse.

Itadditionallysignifiestime:‘recovery’isaname,but‘recovers’isaverb,becauseitadditionallysignifiessomething’sholdingnow.Andit

10

isalwaysasignofwhatholds,thatis,holdsofasubject.

‘Doesnotrecover’and‘doesnotail’Idonotcallverbs.Forthoughtheyadditionallysignifytimeandalwaysholdofsomething,yetthereisadifference—forwhichthereisnoname.Letuscallthemindefiniteverbs,becausetheyholdindifferentlyofanythingwhetherexistentor

15

non-existent.

Similarly,‘recovered’and‘will-recover’arenotverbsbutinflexionsofverbs.Theydifferfromtheverbinthatitadditionallysignifiesthepresenttime,theythetimeoutsidethepresent.

Whenutteredjustbyitselfaverbisanameandsignifiessomething—thespeakerarrestshisthoughtandthehearerpauses—

20

butitdoesnotyetsignifywhetheritisornot.Fornoteven‘tobe’or‘not to be’ is a sign of the actual thing (nor if you say simply ‘thatwhichis’);forbyitselfitisnothing,butitadditionallysignifiessomecombination,whichcannotbethoughtofwithoutthecomponents.

25

CHAPTER4A sentence is a significant spoken sound some part of which issignificantinseparation—asanexpression,notasanaffirmation.

Imeanthat‘animal’,forinstance,signifiessomething,butnotthatitisorisnot(thoughitwillbeanaffirmationornegationifsomethingis

30

added);thesinglesyllablesof‘animal’,ontheotherhand,signifynothing. Nor is the ‘ice’ in ‘mice’ significant; here it is simply aspokensound.Indoublewords,aswesaid,apartdoessignify,butnotinitsownright.

17a

Everysentenceissignificant(notasatoolbut,aswesaid,byconvention),butnoteverysentenceisastatement-makingsentence,butonlythoseinwhichthereistruthorfalsity.Thereisnottruthorfalsityinallsentences:aprayerisasentencebutisneithertruenorfalse.Thepresentinvestigationdealswiththestatement-making

5

sentence;theotherswecandismiss,sinceconsiderationofthembelongsrathertothestudyofrhetoricorpoetry.

CHAPTER5Thefirstsinglestatement-makingsentenceistheaffirmation,nextisthenegation.Theothersaresingleinvirtueofaconnective.

Everystatement-makingsentencemustcontainaverboran10

inflexionofaverb.Foreventhedefinitionofmanisnotyetastatement-making sentence—unless ‘is’ or ‘will be’ or ‘was’ orsomethingofthissortisadded.(Toexplainwhy‘two-footedlandanimal’isonethingandnotmanybelongstoadifferentinquiry;certainlyitwillnotbeonesimplythroughbeingsaidalltogether.)

15

Asinglestatement-makingsentenceiseitheronethatrevealsasinglethingoronethatissingleinvirtueofaconnective.Therearemorethanoneifmorethingsthanonearerevealedorifconnectivesarelacking.

(Letuscallanameoraverbsimplyanexpression,sincebysayingitonecannotrevealanythingbyone’sutteranceinsuchawayastobemakingastatement,whetheroneisansweringaquestionorspeakingspontaneously.)

20

Of these the one is a simple statement, affirming or denyingsomethingofsomething,theotheriscompoundedofsimplestatementsandisakindofcompositesentence.

Thesimplestatementisasignificantspokensoundaboutwhethersomethingdoesordoesnothold(inoneofthedivisionsoftime).

CHAPTER625

Anaffirmationisastatementaffirmingsomethingofsomething,anegationisastatementdenyingsomethingofsomething.

Nowitispossibletostateofwhatdoesholdthatitdoesnothold,ofwhatdoesnotholdthatitdoeshold,ofwhatdoesholdthatitdoeshold,andofwhatdoesnotholdthatitdoesnothold.Similarlyfor

30

timesoutsidethepresent.Soitmustbepossibletodenywhateveranyonehasaffirmed,andtoaffirmwhateveranyonehasdenied.Thusitisclearthatforeveryaffirmationthereisanoppositenegation,andforeverynegationanoppositeaffirmation.Letuscallanaffirmationand a negation which are opposite a contradiction. I speak ofstatementsasoppositewhentheyaffirmanddenythesamethingofthesame

35

thing—nothomonymously,togetherwithallothersuchconditionsthatweaddtocounterthetroublesomeobjectionsofsophists.

CHAPTER7Nowofactualthingssomeareuniversal,othersparticular(Icalluniversalthatwhichisbyitsnaturepredicatedofanumberofthings,andparticularthatwhichisnot;man,forinstance,isauniversal,

17b

Calliasaparticular).Soitmustsometimesbeofauniversalthatonestatesthatsomethingholdsordoesnot,sometimesofaparticular.Nowifonestatesuniversallyofauniversalthatsomethingholdsordoesnot,therewillbecontrarystatements(examplesofwhatImean

5

by‘statinguniversallyofauniversal’are‘everymaniswhite’and‘nomaniswhite’).Butwhenonestatessomethingofauniversalbutnotuniversally,thestatementsarenotcontrary(thoughwhatisbeingrevealedmaybecontrary).ExamplesofwhatImeanby‘statingofauniversal not universally’ are ‘a man is white’ and ‘a man is notwhite’;

10

manisauniversalbutitisnotuseduniversallyinthestatement(for‘every’doesnotsignifytheuniversalbutthatitistakenuniversally).Itisnottruetopredicateauniversaluniversallyofasubject,fortherecannotbeanaffirmationinwhichauniversalispredicateduniversally

15

ofasubject,forinstance‘everymaniseveryanimal’.

Icallanaffirmationandanegationcontradictoryoppositeswhen

whatonesignifiesuniversallytheothersignifiesnotuniversally,e.g.‘everymaniswhite’and‘noteverymaniswhite’,‘nomaniswhite’and‘somemaniswhite’.ButIcalltheuniversalaffirmationandthe

20

universalnegationcontraryopposites,e.g.‘everymanisjust’and‘nomanisjust’.Sothesecannotbetruetogether,buttheiroppositesmaybothbetruewithrespecttothesamething,e.g.‘noteverymanis

25

white’and‘somemaniswhite’.

Ofcontradictorystatementsaboutauniversaltakenuniversallyitisnecessaryforoneortheothertobetrueorfalse;similarlyiftheyareaboutparticulars,e.g.‘Socratesiswhite’and‘Socratesisnotwhite’.Butiftheyareaboutauniversalnottakenuniversallyitisnotalways

30

thecasethatoneistrueandtheotherfalse.Foritistruetosayatthesametimethatamaniswhiteandthatamanisnotwhite,orthatamanisnobleandamanisnotnoble(forifbase,thennotnoble;andifsomethingisbecomingsomething,thenitisnotthatthing).This

35

mightseemabsurdatfirstsight,because‘amanisnotwhite’looksasifitsignifiesalsoatthesametimethatnomaniswhite;this,however,doesnotsignifythesame,nordoesitnecessarilyholdatthesametime.

Itisevidentthatasingleaffirmationhasasinglenegation.Forthenegationmustdenythesamethingastheaffirmationaffirmed,andof

18a

thesamething,whetheraparticularorauniversal(takeneitheruniversally or not universally). I mean, for example, ‘Socrates iswhite’and ‘Socrates is not white’. But if something else is denied, or thesamething is denied of something else, that will not be the oppositestatement,butadifferentone.Theoppositeof‘everymaniswhite’is‘not

5

everymaniswhite’;of‘somemaniswhite’,‘nomaniswhite’;of‘amaniswhite’,‘amanisnotwhite’.

Wehaveexplained,then:thatasingleaffirmationhasasinglenegationasitscontradictoryopposite,andwhichtheseare;that

10

contrarystatementsaredifferent,andwhichtheseare;andthatnotallcontradictory pairs are true or false,why this is, andwhen they aretrueorfalse.

CHAPTER8Asingleaffirmationornegationisonewhichsignifiesonethingabout

15

onething(whetheraboutauniversaltakenuniversallyornot),e.g.‘everyman iswhite’, ‘not everyman iswhite’, ‘aman iswhite’, ‘amanisnotwhite’,‘nomaniswhite’,‘somemaniswhite’–assumingthat‘white’signifiesonething.

Butifonenameisgiventotwothingswhichdonotmakeuponething,thereisnotasingleaffirmation.Suppose,forexample,thatone

20

gavethename‘cloak’tohorseandman;‘acloakiswhite’wouldnotbeasingleaffirmation.Fortosaythisisnodifferentfromsaying‘ahorseandamaniswhite’,andthisisnodifferentfromsaying‘ahorseiswhiteandamaniswhite’.Soifthislastsignifiesmorethanonething

25

andismorethanoneaffirmation,clearlythefirstalsosignifieseithermorethanonethingornothing(becausenomanisahorse).Consequentlyitisnotnecessary,withthesestatementseither,foronecontradictorytobetrueandtheotherfalse.

CHAPTER9Withregardtowhatisandwhathasbeenitisnecessaryfortheaffirmationorthenegationtobetrueorfalse.Andwithuniversals

30

takenuniversallyitisalwaysnecessaryforonetobetrueandtheotherfalse,andwithparticularstoo,aswehavesaid;butwithuniversalsnotspokenofuniversallyitisnotnecessary.Butwithparticularsthataregoingtobeitisdifferent.

Forifeveryaffirmationornegationistrueorfalseitisnecessaryforeverythingeithertobethecaseornottobethecase.Forifoneperson

35

saysthatsomethingwillbeandanotherdeniesthissamething,itisclearlynecessaryforoneofthemtobesayingwhatistrue—ifeveryaffirmationistrueorfalse;forbothwillnotbethecasetogetherundersuchcircumstances.Forifitistruetosaythatitiswhiteorisnotwhite,itisnecessaryforittobewhiteornotwhite;andifitiswhiteor

18b

isnotwhite,thenitwastruetosayordenythis.Ifitisnotthecaseitisfalse, if it is false it is not the case. So it is necessary for theaffirmationorthenegationtobetrue.Itfollowsthatnothingeitherisorishappening,orwillbeorwillnotbe,bychanceoraschancehasit,but

5

everythingofnecessityandnotaschancehasit(sinceeitherhewhosaysorhewhodeniesissayingwhatistrue).Forotherwiseitmightequallywellhappenornothappen,sincewhatisaschancehasitisnomorethusthannotthus,norwillitbe.

Again,ifitiswhitenowitwastruetosayearlierthatitwouldbe10

white;sothatitwasalwaystruetosayofanythingthathashappenedthatitwouldbeso.Butifitwasalwaystruetosaythatitwasso,orwouldbeso,itcouldnotnotbeso,ornotbegoingtobeso.Butifsomethingcannotnothappenitisimpossibleforitnottohappen;andifitisimpossibleforsomethingnottohappenitisnecessaryforittohappen.Everythingthatwillbe,therefore,happensnecessarily.So

15

nothing will come about as chance has it or by chance; for if bychance,notofnecessity.

Nor,however,canwesaythatneitheristrue—thatitneitherwillbenorwillnotbeso.For,firstly,thoughtheaffirmationisfalsethenegationisnottrue,andthoughthenegationisfalsetheaffirmation,onthisview,isnottrue.Moreover,ifitistruetosaythatsomethingis

20

whiteandlarge,bothhavetoholdofit,andiftruethattheywillholdtomorrow, theywill have tohold tomorrow;and if it neitherwill benorwillnotbethecasetomorrow,thenthereisno‘aschancehasit’.Takeasea-battle:itwouldhaveneithertohappennornottohappen.

25

Theseandotherslikethemaretheabsurditiesthatfollowifitisnecessary,foreveryaffirmationandnegationeitheraboutuniversalsspokenofuniversallyoraboutparticulars,thatoneoftheoppositesbe

30

trueandtheotherfalse,andthatnothingofwhathappensisaschancehasit,buteverythingisandhappensofnecessity.Sotherewouldbenoneedtodeliberateortotaketrouble(thinkingthatifwedothis,thiswillhappen,butifwedonot,itwillnot).Forthereisnothingtopreventsomeone’shavingsaidtenthousandyearsbeforehandthatthis would be the case, and another’s having denied it; so thatwhichever

35

ofthetwowastruetosaythen,willbethecaseofnecessity.Nor,ofcourse,doesitmakeanydifferencewhetheranypeoplemadethecontradictorystatementsornot.Forclearlythisishowtheactualthingsareevenifsomeonedidnotaffirmitandanotherdenyit.Foritisnotbecauseoftheaffirmingordenyingthatitwillbeorwillnotbethecase,norisitaquestionoftenthousandyearsbeforehandrather

19a

thananyothertime.Hence,ifinthewholeoftimethestateofthingswassuchthatoneortheotherwastrue,itwasnecessaryforthistohappen,andforthestateofthingsalwaystobesuchthateverythingthathappenshappensofnecessity.Forwhatanyonehastrulysaid

5

wouldbethecasecannotnothappen;andofwhathappensitwasalwaystruetosaythatitwouldbethecase.

Butwhatifthisisimpossible?Forweseethatwhatwillbehasanoriginbothindeliberationandinaction,andthat,ingeneral,inthings

10

thatarenotalwaysactualthereisthepossibilityofbeingandofnotbeing;herebothpossibilitiesareopen,bothbeingandnotbeing,and,consequently,bothcomingtobeandnotcomingtobe.Manythingsareobviouslylikethis.Forexample,itispossibleforthiscloaktobecutup,andyetitwillnotbecutupbutwillwearoutfirst.Butequally,

15

itsnotbeingcutupisalsopossible,foritwouldnotbethecasethatitworeoutfirstunlessitsnotbeingcutupwerepossible.Soitisthesamewithallothereventsthatarespokenofintermsofthiskindofpossibility.Clearly,therefore,noteverythingisorhappensofnecessity:somethingshappenaschancehasit,andoftheaffirmation

20

andthenegationneitheristrueratherthantheother;withotherthingsitisoneratherthantheotherandasarule,butstillitispossiblefortheothertohappeninstead.

What is, necessarily is,when it is; andwhat is not, necessarily isnot,when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is; and noteverything

25

thatisnot,necessarilyisnot.Fortosaythateverythingthatis,isofnecessity,whenitis,isnotthesameassayingunconditionallythatitisofnecessity.Similarlywithwhatisnot.Andthesameaccountholdsforcontradictories:everythingnecessarilyisorisnot,andwillbeorwillnotbe;butonecannotdivideandsaythatoneortheotherisnecessary.Imean,forexample:itisnecessaryfortheretobeornotto

30

beasea-battletomorrow;butitisnotnecessaryforasea-battletotakeplacetomorrow,norforonenottotakeplace—thoughitisnecessaryforonetotakeplaceornottotakeplace.So,sincestatementsaretrueaccordingtohowtheactualthingsare,itisclearthatwherevertheseare such as to allow of contraries as chance has it, the samenecessarilyholdsforthecontradictoriesalso.Thishappenswiththingsthatare

35

notalwayssoorarenotalwaysnotso.Withtheseitisnecessaryforoneortheotherofthecontradictoriestobetrueorfalse—not,however,thisoneorthatone,butaschancehasit;orforonetobetrueratherthantheother,yetnotalreadytrueorfalse.

Clearly,then,itisnotnecessarythatofeveryaffirmationand

19b

oppositenegationoneshouldbetrueandtheotherfalse.Forwhatholdsforthingsthataredoesnotholdforthingsthatarenotbutmaypossiblybeornotbe;withtheseitisaswehavesaid.

CHAPTER10Nowanaffirmationsignifiessomethingaboutsomething,thislast

5

being either a name or a ‘non-name’; andwhat is affirmedmust beonethingaboutonething.(Namesand‘non-names’havealreadybeendiscussed.ForIdonotcall‘not-man’anamebutanindefinitename—forwhatitsignifiesisinawayonething,butindefinite—justasIdonotcall‘doesnotrecover’averb.)Soeveryaffirmationwillcontain

10

eitheranameandaverboranindefinitenameandaverb.Withoutaverbtherewillbenoaffirmationornegation.‘Is’,‘willbe’,‘was’,‘becomes’,andthelikeareverbsaccordingtowhatwelaiddown,sincetheyadditionallysignifytime.Soafirstaffirmationandnegationare:‘amanis’,‘amanisnot’;then,‘anot-manis’,‘anot-manisnot’;

15

and again, ‘every man is’, ‘every man is not’, ‘every not-man is’,‘everynot-manisnot’.Fortimesotherthanthepresentthesameaccountholds.

Butwhen‘is’ispredicatedadditionallyasathirdthing,therearetwowaysofexpressingopposition.(Imean,forexample,‘amanis

20

just’;hereIsaythatthe‘is’isathirdcomponent—whethernameorverb—intheaffirmation.)Becauseofthistherewillherebefourcases(twoofwhichwillberelated,astoorderofsequence,tothe

25

affirmationandnegationinthewaytheprivationsare,whiletwowillnot).Imeanthat‘is’willbeaddedeitherto‘just*orto‘not-just’,andso,too,willthenegation.Thustherewillbefourcases.Whatismeantshouldbeclearfromthefollowingdiagram:

(a)‘amanisjust’

(d)‘amanisnotnot-just’Thisisthenegationof(c).

(b)‘amanisnotjust’Thisisthenegationof(a).

(c)‘amanisnot-just’30

‘Is’and‘isnot’arehereaddedto‘just’andto‘not-just’.

Thisthenishowthesearearranged(asissaidintheAnalytics).Similarly,too,iftheaffirmationisaboutthenametakenuniversally,e.g.:

(a)‘everymanisjust’

(d)‘noteverymanisjust’

(b)‘noteverymanisnot-just’

(c)‘everymanisnot-just’35

Here, however, it is not in the same way possible for diagonalstatementstobetruetogether,thoughitispossiblesometimes.

These, then, are two pairs of opposites. There are others ifsomethingisaddedto‘notman’asasortofsubject,thus:

(a)‘anot-manisjust’

(d)‘anot-manisnotjust’

(b)‘anot-manisnotnot-just’

(c)‘anot-manisnot-just’

20a

Therewillnotbeanymoreoppositionsthanthese.Theselastareagroupontheirownseparatefromtheothers,inthattheyuse‘not-man’asaname.

Incaseswhere‘is’doesnotfit(e.g.with‘recovers’or‘walks’)the5

verbshave the sameeffectwhensoplacedas if ‘is’were joinedon,e.g.:

(a)‘everymanwalks’

(d)‘everymandoesnotwalk’

(b)‘everynot-mandoesnotwalk’

(c)‘everynot-manwalks’

Hereonemustnotsay‘noteveryman’butmustaddthe‘not’,the10

negation,to‘man’.For‘every’doesnotsignifyauniversal,butthatitistakenuniversally.Thisisclearfromthefollowing:

(a)‘amanwalks’

(d)‘anot-mandoesnotwalk’

(b)‘amandoesnotwalk’

(c)‘anot-manwalks’

Forthesedifferfromthepreviousonesinnotbeinguniversal.So‘every’ or ‘no’ additionally signify nothing other than that theaffirmationornegationisaboutthenametakenuniversally.Everythingelse,therefore,mustbeaddedunchanged.

15

Sincethecontrarynegationof‘everyanimalisjust’isthatwhichsignifiesthatnoanimalisjust,obviouslythesewillneverbetruetogetherorofthesamething,buttheiroppositessometimeswill(e.g.‘noteveryanimalisjust’and‘someanimalisjust’).‘Nomanisjust’

20

followsfrom‘everymanisnot-just’,whiletheoppositeofthis,‘noteverymanisnot-just’,followsfrom‘somemanisjust’(fortheremustbeone).Itiscleartoothat,withregardtoparticulars,ifitistrue,whenaskedsomething,todenyit,itistruealsotoaffirmsomething.Forinstance:‘IsSocrateswise?No.ThenSocratesisnot-wise.’With

25

universals,ontheotherhand,thecorrespondingaffirmationisnottrue,butthenegationistrue.Forinstance:‘Iseverymanwise?No.Theneverymanisnot-wise.’Thisisfalse,but‘thennoteverymaniswise’istrue;thisistheoppositestatement,theotheristhecontrary.

30

Namesandverbsthatareindefinite(andtherebyopposite),suchas‘not-man’and‘not-just’,mightbethoughttobenegationswithoutanameandaverb.Buttheyarenot.Foranegationmustalwaysbetrueorfalse;butonewhosays‘not-man’—withoutaddinganythingelse—

35

hasnomoresaidsomethingtrueorfalse(indeedratherlessso)thanonewhosays‘man’.

‘Every not-man is just’ does not signify the same as any of theabove,nordoesitsopposite,‘noteverynot-manisjust’.But‘everynot-manisnot-just’signifiesthesameas‘nonot-manisjust’.

Ifnamesandverbsaretransposedtheystillsignifythesamething,

20b

e.g. ‘aman is white’ and ‘white is aman’. For otherwise the samestatementwillhavemorethanonenegation,whereaswehaveshownthatonehasonlyone.For‘amaniswhite’hasfornegation‘amanisnot

5

white’, while ‘white is a man’–if it is not the same as ‘a man iswhite’–willhavefornegationeither‘whiteisnotanot-man’or‘whiteisnotaman’.Butoneoftheseisanegationof‘whiteisanot-man’,theotherof‘amaniswhite’.Thustherewillbetwonegationsofonestatement.

10

Clearly, then, if the name and the verb are transposed the sameaffirmationandnegationareproduced.

CHAPTER11To affirm or deny one thing of many, or many of one, is not one

affirmationornegationunlessthemanythingstogethermakeupsomeone

15

thing.Idonotcallthemoneifthereexistsonenamebutthereisnotsomeonethingtheymakeup.Forexample,manisperhapsananimalandtwo-footedandtame,yetthesedomakeupsomeonething;whereaswhiteandmanandwalkingdonotmakeuponething.Soif

20

someoneaffirmssomeonethingoftheseitisnotoneaffirmation;itisonespokensound,butmorethanoneaffirmation.Similarly,iftheseareaffirmedofonething,thatismorethanoneaffirmation.Soifadialecticalquestiondemandsasanswereitherthestatementproposedoronesideofacontradiction(thestatementinfactbeingasideofonecontradiction),therecouldnotbeoneanswerinthesecases.Forthe

25

questionitselfwouldnotbeonequestion,eveniftrue.ThesemattershavebeendiscussedintheTopics.(Itisalsoclearthat‘Whatisit?’isnotadialecticalquestioneither;forthequestionmustgiveonethechoiceofstatingwhicheversideofthecontradictiononewishes.The

30

questionermustspecifyfurtherandaskwhethermanisthisornotthis.)

Of things predicated separately some can be predicated incombination,thewholepredicateasone,otherscannot.Whatthenisthedifference?Forofamanitistruetosaytwo-footedseparatelyandanimalseparately,andalsotosaythemasone;similarly,whiteand

35

manseparately,andalsoasone.Butifsomeoneisgoodandacobbleritdoesnotfollowthatheisagoodcobbler.Forifbecauseeachoftwoholdsbothtogetheralsohold,therewillbemanyabsurdities.Forsinceofamanboth‘white’and‘aman’aretrue,soalsoisthewholecompound;again,if‘white’thenthewholecompound—sothathewill

21a

beawhitewhiteman,andsoonindefinitely.Oragain,weshallhave‘walkingwhitemusician’,andthenthesecompoundedmanytimesover.Further,ifSocratesisamanandisSocrateshewillbeaman

Socrates;andiftwo-footedandamanthenatwo-footedman.Clearly,5

then, one is led into many absurdities if one lays down withoutrestrictionthatthecompoundscomeabout.Howthemattershouldbeputwewillnowexplain.

Ofthingspredicated,andthingstheygetpredicatedof,thosewhicharesaidaccidentally,eitherofthesamethingorofoneanother,will

10

notbeone.Forexample,amaniswhiteandmusical,but‘white’and‘musical’arenotone,becausetheyarebothaccidentaltothesamething.Andevenifitistruetosaythatthewhiteismusical,‘musicalwhite’willstillnotbeonething;foritisaccidentallythatthemusicaliswhite,andso‘whitemusical’willnotbeone.Nor,consequently,

15

willthecobblerwhois(withoutqualification)good,thoughananimalwhichistwo-footedwill(sincethisisnotaccidental).Further,whereoneofthethingsiscontainedintheother,theywillnotbeone.Thisiswhy‘white’isnotrepeatedandwhyamanisnotananimalmanoratwo-footedman;fortwo-footedandanimalarecontainedinman.

Itistruetospeakoftheparticularcaseevenwithoutqualification;e.g.tosaythatsomeparticularmanisamanorsomeparticularwhite

20

manwhite.Notalways,though.Wheninwhatisaddedsomeoppositeiscontainedfromwhichacontradictionfollows,itisnottruebutfalse(e.g.tocalladeadmanaman);butwhennosuchoppositeiscontained,itistrue.Orrather,whenitiscontaineditisalwaysnottrue,butwhenitisnot,itisnotalwaystrue.Forexample,Homeris

25

something(say,apoet).Doesitfollowthatheis?No,forthe‘is’ispredicatedaccidentallyofHomer;foritisbecauseheisapoet,notinitsownright,thatthe‘is’ispredicatedofHomer.Thus,wherepredicatesbothcontainnocontrarietyifdefinitionsareputinsteadofnamesandarepredicatedintheirownrightandnotaccidentally,in

30

thesecasesitwillbetruetospeakoftheparticularthingevenwithoutqualification.Itisnottruetosaythatwhatisnot,sinceitisthought

about,issomethingthatis;forwhatisthoughtaboutitisnotthatitis,butthatitisnot.