A Methodology for Theological Systems: The Relation

A Methodology for Theological Systems: The

Relation between Theological Systems and External

Data

Mansour Nasiri

Associate Professor, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.

E-mail: [email protected], (Corresponding author).

Muhammad Legenhausen Professor, Imam Khomeini Educational and Research institute, Qom,

Iran. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

In this paper, the scientific methodology of the contemporary

philosopher Imre Lakatos is revised to construct a methodology for

theological systems. In this methodology, each theological system

consists of the following main elements: (1) hard core I, (2) protective

wall, (3) hard core II, and (4) auxiliary hypotheses. We will expound

the criteria for the evaluation of different theological systems and show

how a theological system prevails over other theological systems in the

light of these criteria. These criteria are of two types: first, the criteria

that we have presented for a successful and progressive theological

system; second, the criteria mentioned in the philosophy of science for

the evaluation of competitor scientific hypotheses and theories. In

conclusion, we present the results of our proposed theological plan.

Some of the results include preserving religion from distortion and

deterioration, resolving the disputes over the relation between science

and religion or reason and religion, and considering theology as a

science parallel to other sciences.

Keywords: explanation, theology, methodology of theological theories.

Religious Inquiries, Volume 8, Number 16, December 2019, pp. 25-42 DOI: 10.22034/ri.2019.100713

Received: 20-08-2019; Accepted: 02-11-2019

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

26 / Religious Inquiries

1. The Methodology of Scientific Theories in Lakatos’s View

In his The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (1978; see

also Lakatos 1970; 1976), Lakatos holds that a research program in any

science or tradition of scientific theorizing is carried out on the basis of

the following structure: The research program has a pivot and center,

including a central theory called its hard core. The hard core is stable

and unifies the program by providing a general view of the entities

being investigated. Immediately after this hard core, which is the axis

of the research program, there are auxiliary hypotheses. Auxiliary

hypotheses provide the information needed in order to make possible

the relation between the data and the central theory. Auxiliary

hypotheses constitute, indeed, lower level theories, which define and

support the core theory. On the other hand, the various data, which are

discussed in various sciences, support the auxiliary hypotheses.

Some of the auxiliary hypotheses are of a higher level and some of

a lower level. The higher-level hypotheses are the ones closer to the

core or center and explain the lower level theories. The auxiliary

hypotheses, as such, form a protective belt around the central theory,

because the potentially falsifying data are explained by making changes

in the auxiliary hypotheses rather than in the core theory. In fact, in case

of observing or encountering potentially falsifying data, some of the

auxiliary hypotheses will be changed and thereby the central theory will

be protected. Thus, some scholars say, “It would thus be more accurate

to say that a research program is a temporal series of networks of theory,

along with supporting data, since the hard core stays the same but the

belt of auxiliary hypotheses changes over the time to account for new

data” (Murphy and Ellis, 1996, 11). The hard core will be abandoned

only if, in comparison to rival research programs, it cannot explain the

observed phenomena.

A Methodology for Theological Systems: The Relation between Theological… / 27

By defining the concepts of positive heuristic and negative heuristic,

Lakatos distinguishes between mature and non-mature sciences. The

negative heuristic is a program for protecting the central theory from

falsification. It requires the basic characteristic of the research program

or its core theory not to be abandoned and/or adjusted but be kept away

from falsification. On the other hand, the positive heuristic is a plan,

which includes approximate guides for making possible the expansion

of the research program.

Therefore, the positive heuristic includes a set of proposals or

indications mentioned in the research program that prove the manner of

change and expansion in the cancelable variable of a research program

and, in other words, show the manner of adaptation and adjustment

and/or expansion of the protective belt. On this basis and as an instance,

it is to be noted that the central core of the Newtonian research program

was formed from the three laws of motion and the law of gravity. The

auxiliary hypotheses of this program, also, included the preliminary

conditions and application of laws appropriate to special cases. The

positive heuristic included items such as a plan to find a solution to very

complicated issues about the circuits of the planets.

2. The Explanatory Methodology for Theological Systems

After this brief survey of the methodology of scientific research from

the viewpoint of Lakatos, we can explain our view on the methodology

of theological explanation. Although the method presented here for

theological explanation is similar to that proposed by Lakatos for

scientific research programs, we will see that there are significant

differences between the two methodologies.

In every theology, firstly, there are a series of doctrines considered

as the main hard core (hard core I), which is central to that theology.


More accurately, this hard core is not itself a part of the theology but

consists of the primary doctrines of the religion, which, in the case of

Islam, are expressed in the Quran and hadiths of the Prophet as the

sources for theological speculation. These sources are considered to be

unquestionable sources for all scholars of divinity and therefore

protected as hard core I in all theological doctrines.

The starting point for the establishment of a theological system

occurs when we want to have a systematic understanding of a religion.

Once we want to present a systematic concept of a religion and to take

doctrines from it, we start establishing and forming a theological

system. Therefore, reasoning or intellectualization is always

inseparable from theologizing; and, thus, reason always helps the

theologian. Sometimes theologizing shows a theologian’s attachment to

a certain philosophical school. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi is one of the

most outstanding Shiite theologians, whose attachment to Aristotelian

philosophy is an example of this point. In his works, we can see how he

relates philosophy to theology. Philosophy is present in all steps of

theologizing (which will be explained more below) as an assistant and

helper for the theologian. In the first steps of theologizing or

establishing a theological explanatory system, the founder of a

theological system or a particular theological explanation usually

selects one or several basic doctrines as criteria or as a source for all

other doctrines. Thus, the hard core II is formed, and the auxiliary

hypotheses are placed after it. This is the first difference between the

methodology of a theological system or explanation and the method of

Lakatosian scientific research programs, because, according to Lakatos,

in the major scientific theories, firstly there is a hard core, and secondly

this hard core is a part of the scientific research program and a part of

the scientific theory. However, in an Islamic theological system or

explanation program, there are two hard cores: (1) the main hard core,


or hard core I, which is given by the Quran and/or hadiths of the

Prophet, and (2) hard core II, which includes the initial doctrines of the

founder of the theological system.

Around hard core I, there is a protective wall. Here we find another

difference, because, according to Lakatos, there is only one hard core

in scientific theories and, after the hard core, there are the auxiliary

hypotheses, which are changeable and adjustable at any time. However,

we hold that there are two hard cores in a theological explanation

program or system, and there is a protective wall after hard core I. This

protective wall consists of the interpretation, given by the Imams (in

Shiism) or by the Companions (in Sunnism), of the doctrines of the

religion. Since the Imams are not considered to be the “lawgivers” but

rather the interpreters of the divine law, their words and teachings may

be regarded as theologizing. However, since, in the Shiite view, they

are infallible, this protective wall, contrary to auxiliary theories, never

falls and is secured as an unchangeable part of any theological school.

Therefore, hard core I (the religious texts and the essentials of religion)

and also some other doctrines will be secured in all theologies. So, the

believers will retain their beliefs, reject doctrinal relativism, and uphold

the truthfulness of their religious system, because it is impossible to

develop a theological system that meets the proposed criteria while

challenging the main hard core of the religion. This point illustrates

another difference between our methodology and Lakatosian scientific

research methodology.

Hard core II is beyond the protective wall, and the auxiliary

hypotheses are beyond the second hard core. Auxiliary hypotheses

include various factors of the theological explanation program, and one

of the most important auxiliary hypotheses is the presupposition that


the founder of a theological school has an intellectual treasure. They

include, also, doctrines that founders of theological systems present in

order to explain and illustrate the second hard core, as well as systems

by secondary thinkers in a given theological school. In addition,

auxiliary hypotheses include the results of the arguments presented by

the founder and advocates of the theological school to prove hard core

II.

The auxiliary hypotheses of a theological school are divided into two

general groups: (1) High-level hypotheses that are initial auxiliary

hypotheses. These are immediately proximate to the second hard core

and explain, demonstrate, or defend it against challenges. (2) Lower-

level hypotheses that are auxiliary hypotheses formed at the second

level. They explore, explain, demonstrate, or defend the high-level

auxiliary hypotheses.

Finally, the auxiliary hypotheses of a theological program explain

phenomena by referring to the second hard core. Thus, auxiliary

hypotheses themselves have several levels and each higher level

explains the auxiliary hypotheses of the lower levels. This procedure

continues until the second hard core is reached. In the second hard core

too one or more main doctrines are considered as final explanations.

The complete explanation of a given explanandum will be accepted if

it can be based on or supported by these final explanations. For

example, the existence of God is the final explanation of the existence

of the world, and the wisdom and intention of God is the final

explanation of some of the phenomena in it.

It must be noted that the auxiliary hypotheses are at first few and

probably in a relatively raw state. They will be subject to dispute and will

be developed gradually along with the progress of the theological school;

they may be reformed in view of challenges or otherwise elaborated.


According to the Lacatosian view of scientific research programs, if

challenges are so strong that the auxiliary hypotheses fail to resist them,

then the hard core is broken suddenly and the whole theory and

scientific system falls and is replaced by another scientific system (as

in the shift from classical cosmology to Copernican cosmology or the

shift form Newton’s system to Einstein’s system). In our theological

program, however, this can happen only to the second hard core. Thus,

if the challenges were so strong that the auxiliary hypotheses fail to

resolve them, then the whole theological school formed by the

protective wall and the second hard core would collapse and the

explanation program would be regarded as obsolete and would be

abandoned; however, if the proponents of the school can reply and

handle the challenges, then their explanatory program will be regarded

as progressive and will survive.

How can we evaluate competing theological systems and choose

among them? This will be discussed in the following section.

3. Criteria for the Evaluation of Theological Systems

Criteria for evaluating competing theological systems are divided into

two general groups: (a) special theological standards and (b) standards

that are presented in the philosophy of science to evaluate scientific

hypotheses and theories.

3.1 Special Theological Criteria

A progressive theological explanatory program is a program that

possesses the following properties:

1. The ability to reply to intra and inter-religious challenges: When

new theological schools of thought are first establishing themselves

in a religion, it is natural for them to challenge the dominant


interpretations of religious doctrines and practices of the same or

other religions. These challenges result in a development from the

raw state of the original teachings toward sophisticated elaborations.

Theological explanatory programs must be able to reply to these

challenges through the employment of their initial auxiliary

hypotheses or by inventing new auxiliary hypotheses that are

defensible to a greater extent.

2. The ability to reply to intra and inter-theological challenges:

These challenges arise from within a given denomination when there

seem to be discrepancies among its theological teachings. Clearly, if

we observe that there are inconsistencies in our beliefs, we have to

remove them. A theological school usually tries to remove such

inconsistencies by inventing auxiliary hypotheses, by removing

some auxiliary hypotheses of its theological explanatory program,

or by inventing other auxiliary hypotheses as supplementary

hypotheses. Fayd Kashani’s Kalimat maknunah (which is a

collection of the views of select philosophers and mystics on

different religious topics) is a sample of the attempt to resolve

apparent contradictions among auxiliary hypotheses in theology; for

example, in the first chapter of that book entitled “A Word by Which

It Is Possible to Resolve the Contradiction between the Impossibility

and Possibility of Knowing and Observing God,” Kashani tries to

resolve the apparent contradiction between two auxiliary

hypotheses: (A) an auxiliary hypothesis that implies the

impossibility of knowing and observing God and (B) an auxiliary

hypothesis that implies the possibility of knowing and observing

God. He replies to this inter-theological challenge, explores the

conflicting auxiliary hypotheses, and adds other auxiliary

hypotheses. He performs this task by introducing two lower level

hypotheses, one related to the auxiliary hypothesis A and the other


related to the auxiliary hypothesis B. Thus, these two new auxiliary

hypotheses are clarifications of the auxiliary hypotheses A and B.

The auxiliary hypothesis which clarifies A refers to the fact that

human beings cannot grasp the divine essence: “There is no way to

the essence of God, because God encompasses all things and thus

cannot be encompassed by anything. And knowing something does

not occur except by encompassing it in one’s knowledge: ‘They

cannot comprehend Him in their knowledge’ [Quran 20:110]” (Fayd

Kashani 1386 Sh, 22). The auxiliary hypothesis that clarifies B is the

following: while human beings cannot reach the divine essence and

substance, they may recognize God to the extent that He has become

manifest in His names and creatures: “[S]o whichever way you turn,

there is the face of Allah!” (2:115).

3. Replying to challenges from outside religion and theology: These

challenges arise from non-religious and non-theological realms. For

example, it is possible that a doctrine or several doctrines, which have

been put forward by a theological school or have been based on a

philosophical principle, conflict with observational or scientific data.

In this situation, the theological school will most likely reply by a

reexamination of some of its auxiliary hypotheses or by inventing

new auxiliary hypotheses. In this regard, some instances of conflict

between religion and science may be mentioned.

4. More explanatory ability: If a new explanatory school fails to

explain more explananda than the previous explanatory schools, it

cannot be regarded as progressive. So, in addition to explaining

those explananda explained by the previous schools, a progressive

theological explanatory program should explain new explananda

that the previous explanatory schools were unable to explain.


5. Better coordination and conformity with the first hard core the

and protective wall: A theological system will be better if, in

contrast with its rivals, it has better coordination with the first hard

core and protective wall.

6. More insights into religious issues that arise with regard to hard

core I and hard core II: A theological system will have an

advantage over its rivals if it appears to open the way to further

insights into the issues pertaining to the hard core I and II. If, in

contrast, a rival system appears to be a dead end in this respect, it

will be at a disadvantage and may eventually be disregarded.

3.2 Standards in the Philosophy of Science

In addition to the above criteria, there are other criteria discussed in the

philosophy of science, the most important of which are simplicity and

the scope of the explanatory domain.

As to simplicity, some writers, such as Peter Lipton (2004), hold that

simplicity is the first characteristic of an attractive explanation. Simpler

explanations allow for more understanding, because simple

explanations include fewer propositions and thus have less complexity.

However, simplicity signifies truth when it is accepted that fewer

assumptions and references lead to less mistakes. However, this is a

controversial issue, and some scholars, such as van Fraassen, reject it.

As to the explanatory domain, it is said that it is more reasonable to

accept a theory that explains more phenomena. Hence, since

justification is enabled through explanation, an attractive explanation is

ideally able to justify more phenomena. There are other criteria

discussed in the philosophy of science as well.

A theological explanatory program meeting the above conditions is

progressive. This idea of a theological explanatory program is


consistent with the history of religions and theological schools. Indeed,

if we look briefly at the history of religions, we see various theological

schools among the proponents of every religion. The question is why

all these various theological schools have emerged in all religions. The

answer will be clear if we note the above-mentioned pressure to explain

and respond to challenges. Indeed, at the beginning, each theological

school presents a few doctrines as its second hard core, beyond the

protective wall, and then develops them by presenting auxiliary

hypothesis. If the doctrines and auxiliary hypotheses of a theological

school can resolve the problems and challenges, it will survive;

otherwise it will be discarded. For example, consider the Jahmiyya

school in Islamic theology, which seems to have been the first

deterministic school in Islam. It was founded by Jahm ibn Safwan (742

CE), who believed in pure determinism. The second hard-core in this

school consisted of the initial ideas of Jahm that clearly confirmed

absolute determinism, according to which human beings had no power,

no free will, and no volition, and God was the only creator and doer of

all works. Jahm drew this doctrine from the first hard core—from such

verses as “And ye will not, unless (it be) that Allah will” (Quran

81:29)—that apparently signifies determinism. Certainly, he had

auxiliary hypotheses about this doctrine, such as the hypothesis that any

kind of causality for a human being is inconsistent with monotheism.

Clearly, this theological explanatory program faced various

challenges. For example, one of the inter-religious challenges to it was

the Quranic verses that confirmed free will for human beings (e.g.,

“Verily, Allah will not change the good and the bestowed condition of

a people until they change what is in themselves” [13:11], and “Let

whoever wills believe and let whoever wishes disbelieve” [18:29]). An

external-religious challenge to this doctrine was its inconsistency with


human inner knowledge that punishing a person who was forced to

commit a sin is wrong. So, Jahm invented a new auxiliary hypothesis

to resolve this inter-religious challenge: he stated that, given the

doctrine of monotheism in Islam, any verse or narration attributing an

action to a human being or anyone other than God must not be taken

literally. This auxiliary hypothesis, in turn, was challenged by the

question “How could one ascertain that such verses were all

metaphorical?” Moreover, this auxiliary hypothesis would result in

further unacceptable consequences. Therefore, to resolve these

challenges to his theology, Jahm introduced another auxiliary

hypothesis that, in its turn, faced a further inter-religious challenge—

namely, its inconsistency with the mission of the prophets: if God has

absolute sovereignty and man has no free will, why did God send

prophets to mankind to call them to religion? Since the Jahmiyya could

not respond to these challenges—e.g., by inventing new auxiliary

hypotheses or expanding the existing auxiliary hypothesis—this

theological explanatory program declined and was eventually replaced

by other theological schools.

After the Jahmiyya, the Muʿtazila emerged, whose second hard core

was exactly contrary to that of the Jahmiyya. The proposed Muʿtazili

second hard core was the absolute human free will. They put forward

this hard core within the framework of a doctrine of delegation (tafwid).

According to this doctrine, after creating the world and human beings,

God delegated all acts to human beings and abandoned any type of

intrusion or interference in the world. The Muʿtazila extracted their

second hard core from elements of the first hard core, such as the verses

that insist on human free will in The Quran (e.g., the two verses that we

mentioned above as challenges to the Jahmiyya).


The Muʿtazila, then, put forward auxiliary hypotheses concerning

this second hard core, among which were the following: (1) God is fair

or just; (2) anyone whose actions are forced or coerced shall not be

punished by God for them; (3) the mission of prophets is to command

good and prohibit evil and to teach human beings the way to salvation;

and (4) the doctrine of rational goodness and evilness—that human

intellect is capable of discerning at least some instances of good and

evil.

The maximum independence of reason was another doctrine within

the second hard core of Muʿtazilite theology. According to this

doctrine, reason could solve all issues in relation to beliefs. The

Muʿtazila showed their loyalty to this doctrine in all their discussions.

One challenge against the Muʿtazili doctrine of the absolute freedom

of human beings was that this doctrine would undermine God’s

absolute sovereignty. The auxiliary hypothesis that the Muʿtazila used

to solve this challenge required a special interpretation of God’s

absolute sovereignty, according to which divine sovereignty did not

include human actions. This solution was soon challenged by other

Muslims as being inconsistent with elements of the first hard core that

indicated that God’s absolute sovereignty was unlimited. Appealing to

verses of the Quran and hadiths of the Prophet that insisted on absolute

human free will, the Muʿtazila parried the challenge and thus saved

their school from decline. Another challenge that was very important

had to do with a famous debate between Abu l-Hasan al-Ashʿari (the

founder of the Ashʿari school of theology, but initially a Muʿtazili) and

his master Abu ʿAli al-Jubbaʾi concerning the necessity for God to

consider the welfare of His servants and the implications of this for a

human being’s fate in the afterlife. “Do you think it is necessary for


God to observe what is best for His servants?” al-Ashʿari asked al-

Jubbaʾi. The latter’s reply to the question was positive. Clearly, his

positive answer was based on the second hard core of Muʿtazilism. Al-

Ashʿari then asked: “What do you think about the fates of three

brothers, one of whom died as a pious believer, the other as an impious

pagan, and the third as an immature child?” Al-Jubbaʾi replied that the

first brother would be rewarded in heaven, the second would go to hell,

and the third would be at peace. “Does God allow the third one to go to

heaven where the first one resides?” al-Ashʿari asked. “No! God tells

him that he is not allowed there, because he did not perform the

righteous deeds that his brother had performed,” al-Jubbaʾi replied. Al-

Ashʿari asked: “What if the youngest brother says to God: ‘It was not

my fault, because You did not allow me to live long enough to perform

acts of obedience?’” “God will say to him: ‘I knew that if you lived

longer, you would sin and be destined to great punishment, so I

considered your welfare in taking your life at an early age,’” al-Jubbaʾi

replied. In response, al-Ashʿari said, “Then the sinful brother may say

to God: ‘Why didn’t you consider my welfare and take my life at an

early age?’” At this point, al-Jubbaʾi was no longer able to reply by

presenting any other assumptions, and this was the point where al-

Ashʿari separated from al-Jubbaʾi and established his own school of

theology.

The main point that occupied al-Ashʿari’s mind was to preserve God’s

absolute sovereignty in all areas. Thus, he invented a new second hard

core for his own theological school to avoid one of the most important

shortcomings of Muʿtazilism. According to this new hard core, all works

and events (even human actions) are created by God. He extracted this

hard core from the first hard core—i.e., the verses of the Quran that

emphasize that God is “the Creator of everything” (6:102) and that “God

created you and what you act” (37:95-96) and other verses that attribute


human actions to the God. However, his new hard core was challenged

severely as well, since the very challenges facing the Jahmiyya could

emerge here as well. Al-Ashʿari was aware of this, so he put forward a

number of auxiliary hypotheses. His first auxiliary hypothesis was an

addition to his new hard core: God is the creator of human actions, and

humans acquire (kasb) them. By this auxiliary hypothesis, he tried to

retain the doctrine of God’s absolute sovereignty and to find a new way

to avoid the charge that he had reverted to determinism.

Various challenges from outside religion and theology also arose

against this theory. Therefore, adherents of the Ashʿarite school

developed new auxiliary hypotheses in order to explain the theory and

respond to the new challenges. However, these new auxiliary

hypotheses were inconsistent (see Sobhani 1414 AH, 2:125-40), and

this inconsistency posed a new challenge to Ashʿarite theology.

Therefore, not only the Ashʿarites failed to eliminate the previous

challenges but also they were faced with a new challenge. Although this

challenge did not result in the complete elimination of Ashʿarism, it led

many Ashʿarite thinkers to abandon it, among whom were Imam al-

Haramayn al-Juwayni (fl. 5th century), Shaykh Muhammad ʿAbduh (d.

1905), and Shaykh Shaltut (d. 1963).

However, a question that arises here is why Ashʿarism failed to

replace Muʿtazilism completely. The answer is that although al-Ashʿari

challenged one of the most important hard cores of Mu‘tazilism, his

school came to be challenged along several fronts. In other words, each

theological school that attempts to replace another theological school

should meet all the above-mentioned required conditions, and the

Ashʿari school failed to meet them, especially the first, third, and fourth

conditions.


A point not to be ignored is that it is possible that a declining

theological explanatory program may emerge again by developing new

auxiliary hypotheses. In this regard, we agree with Popper that no

theory will be falsified completely and definitely.

In any case, progressive theological schools should meet all the

conditions mentioned above; otherwise, their second hard cores would

break and their theological programs would be replaced by a new

program.

Given the above model, it is clear that our approach in explanation

is a unity-oriented approach: theological explanation is such that it

ultimately refers all explanations to a limited explanatory principle; in

other words, it ultimately explains all explananda by one or a limited

number of basic explanatory principles. On the other hand, explanation

occurring at any level shall relate to the hard core. Therefore, lower-

level auxiliary hypotheses are proposed to respond to challenges by

explaining higher-level auxiliary hypotheses. On the other hand, as

mentioned above, higher-level auxiliary hypotheses are around the

second hard core, and the second hard core is formed on the basis of

and around the protective wall and the first hard core. Therefore, all

theological explanations are, in fact, unity-oriented explanations.

The process of developing a theological explanation is like the

process of developing scientific theories, which is based on data

acquired through experiment; based on these data, the theory is formed,

and then it will be examined through the experimental method based on

observations and experiments. The most important difference between

the development of theories in empirical sciences and in theology is that

in theology, instead of experimental and observational data, sacred texts

are central. Since the understanding of these source texts changes over

the course of time, the theologies based on them should be expected to


change. So, in order to develop theological explanation, theologians put

the first hard core as a base for their data. As we saw, in the first step, a

second hard core would be founded after the protective wall. In a second

step, theologians present higher-level auxiliary hypotheses and in

subsequent steps, low-level auxiliary hypotheses will be established.

Usually, theologians modify their auxiliary hypotheses, but sometimes

during the theological explanation process even some elements of the

second hard core or some of the doctrines of the protective wall will be

modified, and thus the theological system itself will be modified.

Clearly, no theological doctrine will discard its protective wall or first

hard core completely. For example, when theologians reject a hadith for

some reasons (e.g., its contradiction with reason or the weakness of its

chain of narrators), they act similarly to scientists when they reject a

theory in light of experimental evidence.

4. Conclusion

Firstly, using the model we tried to construct would protect religion

against decline and distortion. Secondly, the conflict between science

and religion and between reason and religion and the conflict among

theological schools can be resolved through this model. Thirdly, any

theology that is able to fulfill the above criteria would be able to respond

to challenges from alternative religious viewpoints as well as challenges

from non-religious viewpoints; this gives the model a great advantage

over its competitors. Fourthly, by following this methodology, theology

finds a way to explain and resolve its problems in a manner analogous

to that of sciences.

Generally, theological explanations are given in the domain of

boundary questions, which may be divided into two broad kinds: (1)

boundary questions concerning causal explanations for beings and (2)


boundary questions concerning other universal phenomena. Boundary

questions refer to issues that are beyond the domains of other sciences

(including natural sciences and humanities) and hence cannot be

answered or explained within them. Theology develops a worldview,

and in so doing it seeks to explain these questions through an integrative

and unified model.

References

Fayd Kashani, Muhsin. 1386 Sh. Kalimat maknuna. Edited by Sadegh

Hassanzadeh. Qom: Eshragh.

Lakatos, Imre. 1970. “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific

Programmes.” In Criticism and the Growth of knowledge, edited by

Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Lakatos, Imre. 1976. Proofs and Refutation: The Logic of Mathematical

Discovery. Edited by John Worral and Elie Zahar. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Lakatos, Imre. 1978. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.

Edited by John Worrall and Gregory Currie. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Lipton, Peter. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge.

Murphy, Nancey, and George F. R. Ellis. 1996. On the Moral Nature of the

Universe. New York: Fortress Press.

Sobhani, Jaʿfar. 1414 AH. Buhūth fi l-milal wa-l-nihal. Qom: Intisharat Islami.

Documents

A Methodology for Theological Systems: The Relation