A Long Row to Hoe: Family farming and rural poverty in developing countries

8/7/2019 A Long Row to Hoe: Family farming and rural poverty in developing countries

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A long row to hoeamily arming and rural poverty in

developing countries


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nef is an independent think-and-do

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We aim to improve quality o lie by

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economic, environmental and social issues.

We work in partnership and put people andthe planet rst.

This report was commissioned by Oxam GB to inorm policy development on agriculture and rural livelihoods and to

stimulate wider debate and discussion about these issues. The views expressed in the report are those o the author

and do not necessarily refect Oxams views.

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Forum; and new ways to measure social and economic well-being.


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Summary 4

Introduction 5

Motivation, aims and objectives 5

Scope and limitation o the report 5

Report structure 5

Backgroundandrationale 6

Agriculture and the development agenda 6

Rural poverty and agricultural revolution 7

Family arming: a note about vocabulary 9

Theemergingconsensusonamilyarming 11

Elements o the consensus 12

How much o a consensus? 14

Limitationsotheprod-povconsensus 16

Diversity: one size does not t all 16

Agricultural research up to the job? 18

Even i we grow it, will we have a market? 21

Intensication, ertiliser and energy prices: whatHappens when the price o oil skyrockets? 22

For many, climate change will make successulamily arming ever more dicult 25

Voting with their eet: arming is just not cool 26

Towardsanewpolicyandactionagenda 29

Implications or policy and action 29

The longer-term vision 29

In the nearer term 29

Endnotes 36

This report aims to add a new

dimension to ongoing debates and

policy prescriptions around livelihoods

and poverty reduction in rural areas

o the developing world. It examines

current interest in the proposition

that enhancing the productivity oamily arms is the most eective

way to reduce rural poverty in the

developing world. It concludes that

while this can play an important role,

poverty reduction on a mass scale,

particularly in Arica, will require a

more comprehensive and integrated

approach.

Contents


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long row to hoe: amil y arm ing and rural pover ty in developing c ountries 4 A long row to hoe: am ily armi ng and rural pover ty i n developing countries 5

Introduction

Motivation,aimsandobjectives

This report aims to add a new dimension to ongoing debates and policyprescriptions around livelihoods and poverty reduction in rural areas o thedeveloping world. Specically it addresses the proposition that increasedproductivity o amily arms is the critical pathway or widespread rural poverty. Theultimate objective o the analysis reported here is to strengthen the policy andimplementation agenda addressing rural poverty reduction.

Scopeandlimitationothereport

This report ocuses on the developing world (including sub-Saharan Arica, LatinAmerica and the Caribbean, South and Southeast Asia). The breadth o theliterature and experience relating to agriculture and poverty in the developing worldnecessitated a selective approach. As the report seeks to cast light on some areas

and issues that have not so ar been prominently debated, it does not engagewith others, and specically, with econometric methods and debates around thedenition and measurement o productivity and poverty.

Reportstructure

The remainder o the report is in our main sections. The next section lays out thebackground to our interest in t his area. The ollowing section explores the elementso the emerging consensus on agricultural productivity and poverty reduction. Inthe third section, we develop our critique o the consensus, while the nal sectionoutlines a revised policy and action agenda.

Summary

This report examines the current interest in the proposition thatenhancing the productivity o amily arms is the most eective wayo reduce rural poverty in the developing world.

his proposition that we term the prod-pov consensus is examined rom aumber o angles including agro-ecological and socio-economic diversity, thee-structuring o the agri-ood system, agricultural research, rising ertiliser prices,

imate change, and the assumption that young people will be content to live inral areas and construct their livelihoods around agriculture.

ur conclusion is that while increasing the productivity o amily arms in Arica canay an important role, poverty reduction on a mass scale, particularly in Arica, will

equire a more comprehensive and integrated approach.

he nal section o this report explores ve likely strategies or rural people,epending on the context within which they live, their situation, and their interests.hese strategies are:

Agricultural intensication.

Agricultural intensication with support.

Continuing to arm primarily or own consumption.

Seeking income in other parts o the rural economy.

Migration.

actors and points o potential intervention that will enable each strategy toontribute more eectively to poverty reduction are identied.


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I the logic supporting productivity growth and the core policy prescriptions haveremained unchanged, what has evolved dramatically is the context within whichthese policies are expected to deliver positive outcomes or rural people. Indeed,the economic, political, institutional, and global contexts could not be more dierentrom what they were in the 1960s and 1970s. O particular importance in this regardis the dominance since the late 1980s o the neo-liberal economic and politicalagendas.

Ruralpovertyandagriculturalrevolution

Lipton claims that 70 per cent o the worlds dollar-poor live in rural areas, and thatrural shares o poverty intensity are substantially higher (than urban shares); andin Arica and Asia poverty is even more rurally concentrated.4 Some key povertystatistics are given in Table 1 (comparable rural poverty statistics are not available).Further, the livelihoods o the dollar-poor are inextricably linked to agriculture: asa global average they derive around 50 per cent o their income rom agriculturalemployment (hired or sel-employed).5

In recent years, much has been made o historically unprecedented rates ourbanisation in the developing world, and credible projections indicate that by theyear 2030 nearly 60 per cent o the population o low- and middle-income countrieswill live in urban areas. Do these predictions weaken the case or a ocus on theagricultural sector? Not necessarily. First, projections indicate that by 2035, 50per cent o the poor will still live in rural areas.6 Second, the act that most o the

urban growth will occur in secondary cities and towns means that the dichotomybetween urbanisation on the one hand and agriculture on the other is probablyless stark than might at rst appear.7 This is the argument o those who highlightthe importance o ruralurban linkages and the positive upstream and downstreameconomic eects associated with agricultural growth. Finally, some suggest thatbecause urbanisation in Arica is largely de-coupled rom economic growth,8agriculture has a critical role to play in creating rural opportunities that can helpmoderate the rate o rural to urban migration.

Since the 1970s, some countries have experienced signicant i not dramaticsuccess in reducing rural poverty. Most observers agree that the cornerstone o thissuccess was the increase in agricultural productivity commonly associated with theso-called Green Revolution.9 The revolution resulted rom the use o productivity-enhancing technology (particularly new rice and wheat varieties combined withertiliser) in (largely) irrigated environments. The widespread adoption o thesetechnologies took place in the context o activist states investing in inrastructuredevelopment and input and credit supply, while supporting and stabilising theprices o cereal crops.10

Table1:Povetystatistics-Oxamocuscountriescomparedtotheirrespectiveregions.

Country Region

Total population(millions,yr = 2000)

Rural population(millions,yr = 2000)

Overall povertyheadcount ratio($2PPP1/day)

Overall povertyheadcount ratio($1PPP/day)

Ethiopia 79 67 78* 23**

Sub-Saharan Arica 731 478 77** 46#

India 1,120 795 81* 35*

South Asia 1,636 1129 77** 31#

Honduras 7 4 44# 21+

Latin America and theCaribbean 569 127 25** 10**

Sources: World Development Indicators Database; + = 1998; # = 1999; * = 2000; ** = 2001.

PPP1

- purchasing parity power

gricultureandthedevelopmentagenda

nce the 1950s, thinking about economic development has gone through severalycles, running hot and then cold on the role and importance o the agriculturalector. The amily arming that continues to characterise rural economies inuch o the developing world has been variously sidelined by a desire or rapiddustrialisation; pushed toward modernisation; exploited to support urban initiativesnd elites; and promoted as the motor o economic growth. Even within the moreonstrained eld o rural development, the approach to and place o agriculture hashited signicantly over time,1 refecting broader ideas and trends about the state,e environment, the global economy and the dynamics o development (Figure 1).

he proposition that in most o the developing world, and perhaps particularly inub-Saharan Arica (hereater Arica), agriculture is the only realistic driver or massoverty reduction and rural development is now accepted by many academics,ternational development organisations and national governments.2 While dierentnalysts highlight dierent acets o this basic proposition, and a number o

mportant associated themes and caveats have been introduced, academic andolicy discourse are coalescing into what can be seen as an emerging consensus.

his emerging consensus includes broad agreement as to the rationale or a ocusn the productivity o amily arms as well as the policy agenda needed to enablend support increased productivity.

s is obvious rom the historical analysis o rural development ideas by Ellis andggs, there is nothing new in the notion that increasing amily arm productivity

hould be the cornerstone o rural economic development.3 Indeed the need tocrease agricultural productivity has been central to rural development thinkingnce at least the 1960s. And, despite many shits in higher level developmentolicy, there is a hard core o policy prescription that has remained virtuallynchanged, including the need or applied agricultural research, productivity-nhancing technology, unctional extension services, production credit, and

mproved input provision systems.

Backgroundandrationale

1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

rising yields on efficient small farms

process, participation, empowerment

SL approach

community development

small-farm growth

integrated rural development

market liberalisation

participation

PRSPs

Dominant Paradigms and Switches

Some Sequential Popular Rural Development Emphases

modernisation, dual economy

Figure1.Dominantandsequentialthemesinruraldevelopment

ource: Ellis & Biggs (2001).

SL sustainable livelihoods; 2. PRSPs Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.


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Familyarming:anoteaboutvocabulary

A number o terms are used more or less interchangeably to reer to poor ruralpeople in the developing world who are engaged to some degree in agriculture.Each o these terms draws attention to one or more aspects or characteristics o thelives, production systems or economic and political relations o armers (Table 2).

Taken at ace value, each term is partial and thereore problematic. For example,there is no absolute size (in land area) below which arms across the developingworld can be considered small. Small arms in semi-arid rain-ed areas are otensignicantly larger than small arms in irrigated or high rainall areas. At the sametime, the realities o diversied rural livelihoods, increasingly blurred boundariesbetween cash and ood crops, and the plethora o channels through which land isaccessed, diminish the value o most o the other terms in the table.

Thereore, as an imperect compromise, in the remainder o this report we will usethe terms amily armers, amily arms and amily arming to reer to the highlyheterogeneous population o rural people whose livelihoods depend to somedegree on arming and who pursue their arming primarily with their own and/ortheir amilys labour. We recognise the limitation o this term, particularly in that ithides the complex gender relations that characterise agriculture production in manyareas, such that, or example, a husband and wie may simultaneously pursue bothindependent and joint arming activities. In choosing this term we do not assumeany innate superiority to the organisation o arming around amily units,24 but simplyrecognise that or many poor rural residents throughout the developing world thisorganisational model refects an important aspect o the reality o their daily lives.

Beore proceeding, it is important to note t hat in much o what ollows relatively littleemphasis is placed on gender as a central actor in the agriculture and povertyreduction story. Are we saying, thereore, that gender is not an important variablein the construction o and outcomes associated with rural livelihoods; that in manyareas women are not heavily engaged in arming; or that in some cases, comparedto men, they nd themselves in relatively low reward arming activities? No, certainlynot. We are suggesting, however, that the notion that the uture or rural women,particularly in Arica, should be generally and necessarily tied to small-scale armingand the ood-security needs o their amilies is no longer tenable. Rather, we must

Table2:Manytermsorarmersandarming.

Aspect or characteristic o armeror arming activity Term

ScaleP Small-scale armerP Large-scale armer

ObjectiveP Subsistence armerP Semi-subsistence armerP Commercial

Level o engagementP Full-time armerP Part-time armerP Opportunistic armer

Origin or level o inputs used P Family armerP Low-external-input armingP Mechanised arming

ViabiltyP Resource-poor armers

P Marginal armers

Political economy within which armingtakes place

P Peasant armerP Small-holder armer

he Green Revolution, however, did not eliminate rural poverty even in thoseountries and regions or example, India and South Asia where its eects wereost pervasive. In addition, much has been made by some observers o secondeneration problems with Green Revolution technologies: there is, or example,vidence that rice yields in Asia are levelling out11 and serious questions are beingsked about natural resource degradation and the long-term sustainability o some these intensive systems.12

evertheless, when seen as a step in an ongoing process o agrarianansormation, the contributions o the Green Revolution in terms o rural povertynd ood security are indisputable

developments in rural Asia give some basis or optimism, rural poverty in Arica haso ar proven to be much more intractable. The vast majority o the residents o Aricaave yet to share in the benets o global economic growth. This increasing globalsparity is refected in the act that ew countries in Arica are realistically expectedmeet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the 2015 target date.13

he analysis o rural poverty and agriculture in Arica in oten made via contrasteither implicit or explicit with the Asian experience. Specically, the deepnd persistent rural poverty that characterises much o Arica is linked by manyommentators with the disappointing perormance o the agricultural sector and

pecically with the idea that Arica has not yet experienced its Green Revolution.he usual explanations or Arica not replicating the Asian model include theominance o rain-ed agriculture; high agro-ecological diversity;14 relatively lowral population densities; a lack o proven, productivity-enhancing technology;ysunctional research, extension, input supply and credit systems; thin andegmented markets; poor policy environments; and generally dysunctional (and inome cases predatory) states. The act that there has been little supply response,ven ollowing more recent moves to liberalise agricultural markets in Arica, isxplained by arguments around states continuing to intervene too much or toorbitrarily; the sharp decline in investment in key public goods that coincided witharket liberalisation; and a lack o attention to market co-ordination problems.15ontinuing this ocus on state investments and markets, Poulton et al., suggest thate dierence in the Asia and Arica Green Revolution experience can be explainedy the act that in Asia, critical elements o supply chains were identied wherevestment would have wider stimulative eects; pump-priming was large enoughver a sucient time to cause major and permanent shits in expectations andructural relations; and to a lesser extent public sector investment was made in aay that promoted complimentary private sector investment.16

are needs to be taken, however, as it is certainly not appropriate to concludeat agriculture in Arica remained stagnant over the last ve decades; nor thatrmers have not adopted new crops,17 technologies and production systems, whilexploiting new markets and institutional arrangements.18 There is, in act, a growingerature that argues that those promoting a doomsday view o agriculture in Aricanore on-going, undamental and positive change.19 There have even been claims

at a small number o countries have experienced at least partial (i.e. location- orrop-specic) Green Revolutions. However, more recent developments in tworominent cases Zimbabwe20 and Malawi21 demonstrate the very tenuousature o some o these gains.

is important to note the many limitations o the AsiaArica comparison, andarticularly the act that the present macro-economic and policy climate isndamentally dierent rom that which prevailed during the heyday o the Asianreen Revolution.22 For example, todays dominant neo-liberal economic model o

mited state intervention essentially rules out the price support and stabilisationolicies and other subsidies that were so central to the Asian experience. Further,ne o the eects o structural adjustment has been to weaken agricultural supportervices that are supposed to develop and promote new technologies. In thisght, and given the generally weak state o market systems in Arica and a lack oommercial orientation among amily armers, some authors have raised seriousuestions about the viability o a Green Revolution in Arica based on a market-ased transormation.


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Box1.Therhetoricoanemergingconsensus.

DFID: agriculture should be placed at the heart o eorts to reduce poverty there is a mass o evidencethat increasing agricultural productivity has beneted millions through higher incomes, more plentiul and cheaperood, and by generating patterns o development that are employment intensive and benet both rural and urbanareas.25

NEPAD: Improvement in agricultural perormance has potential to increase rural incomes and purchasing poweror large numbers o people. Thus, more than any other sector, agriculture can uplit people on a mass scale. [...] avirtuous cycle can be started o reduced hunger, increased productivity, increased incomes and sustainable povertyreduction.26

TheWorldBank:Rural poverty is as diverse as are the rural poor in their livelihood strategies, but in most othe poorest developing countries agriculture is the main source o rural economic growth. That is why improvedagricultural productivity and growth are central to the Banks strategy.27

USAID: For many developing countries, overall economic growth, trade expansion, and increased income-earningopportunities depend on the perormance o the agricultural sector. [] In developing countries, increases inagricultural productivity must be accelerated to bringing down current levels o ood insecurity and meet the ood,job creation, and income needs o new populations.28

CGIAR: Agricultural growth is critical to achieving the MDGs. As the vast majority o potential beneciaries o theMDGs depend on agriculture or a living, higher agricultural productivity is a precondition or achieving the goal oeradicating extreme poverty and hunger. [] Smallholders chances o rising out o poverty depend directly on theirability to increase the productivity o their crop and livestock husbandry activities.29

FAO: Agricultural production growth in developing countries has strong direct and indirect eects on non-agricultural growth. Perhaps more importantly, the positive impact o agricultural growth on poverty reduction ismore than proportional to the relative importance o the sector to the economy.30

Theemergingconsensusonamilyarming

The starting point or this work is our contention that over the lastew years there has been a signicant consolidation o opinionaround the proposition that increasing the productivity o amilyarms will be the most eective means o addressing rural povertyin the developing world (Box 1). Because o the very tight linkbetween productivity enhancement and poverty reduction that is atthe heart o the consensus, hereater in this report we will reer tothis as the prod-pov consensus.

egin to place at centre stage rural womens and mens interests in generatingucient income to build an array o economic and social assets. For some thisay be through amily arming, or others it may be through independent arming,hile or yet others it may involve non-arm employment or migration. The point isat we must avoid the trap that by ocusing on and taking gender seriously weevelop a vision o the world that consigns womens opportunities to a particularnction and sector, and especially one that places them in low-reward activities.t the same time, we recognise that the promotion o change within the armingector must take account o the specic needs and circumstances o social groupsincluding women who may otherwise remain disadvantaged. We return to thisthe last section o this report.

We are not suggesting that there is anything particularly new or radical in thisonsensus: as seen above, enhanced agricultural productivity has been part o theral development agenda or some ve decades. Rather, the prod-pov consensus

efects the act that agriculture is (again) moving up the international developmentgenda, pushed in part by the act that the MDG process, the HIV/AIDS crisis ande Commission or Arica have brought the breadth and depth o rural poverty backto stark relie.31


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P Revamped nancial systems to meet amily-arm credit needs.

P Improved risk management policies.

P And where all else ails, targeted saety net programmes.

While the public sector must:

P Invest in provision o basic inrastructure, health, education and other humancapital to improve market access and to improve the range o nonarmopportunities available to small arm households, including permanent migrationto urban areas. 40

The details o this policy agenda are laid out by other authors: or example, Poultonet al., on improvement o agricultural markets and basic nancial services in Arica;41Lipton on crop research;42 and Deininger on land reorm.43

There is a growing literature that highlights the importance o unctional institutions,and thereore institutional reorm and institution strengthening, as a pre-requisite oragricultural productivity growth,44 and as can be seen rom the policy agenda abovethese institutional issues are central to the prod-pov consensus. Indeed the abilityo productivity growth to deliver the desired pro-poor outcomes will depend to asignicant degree on change in the institutional environment. Given the generallylong-term nature o institutional change, however, this act alone must certainlytemper the short-term expectations associated with the prod-pov consensus.

Table3.Theconsequencesoagriculturalgrowth.

Level Eect o agricultural growth

Farmeconomy

Higher incomes or armers, including smallholders

More on-arm employment as labour demand rises per hectare, the area cultivated expands, or requencyo cropping increases. Rise in arm wage r ates.

Ruraleconomy

More jobs in agriculture and ood chain upstream and downstream o arm.

Increased jobs and incomes in rural economy allow better nutrition, better health and increasedinvestment in education amongst rural population. Lead directly to improved welare, and indirectly tohigher labour productivity.

Generates more local tax revenues and demand or better inrastructure roads, power supplies,communications. Leads to second-round eects promoting rural economy.

Linkages in production chain generating trust and inormation, building social capital and acilitating non-arm investment.

Reduced prices o ood or rural residents who buy in ood net

Nationaleconomy

Reduced prices o ood and raw materials raise real wages o urban poor, reduce wage costs o non-armsectors.

Generation o savings and taxes rom arming allows investment in non-arm sector, creating jobs andincomes in other sectors.

Earning o oreign exchange allows import o capital goods and essential inputs or non-arm production.

Release o arm labour allows production in other sectors.

Source: Irz et al.38

lementsotheconsensus

he prod-pov consensus, with its ocus on increasing the productivity o amilyrms, is rooted in historical understandings o the drivers o economic growth,nd the view that there are near universal (i.e. across time and space) linksetween rising agricultural productivity and economic transition. There is a vastody o literature in this area including classic work by Peter Timmer, John Mellor,arl Eicher, Michael Lipton and others. In a recent paper Lipton argued that thenks between productivity, arm size and economic transition can be summariseds ollows: throughout history increases in agricultural productivity have uelledconomic transitions,32 and, in the early stages o economic transition amily armsre at a distinct advantage.33

second touchstone on the prod-pov consensus is the spatial distribution ooverty and the make-up o rural livelihoods in much o the developing world. Thegic goes as ollows. First, there is the acknowledgement that poverty remainsrgely a rural phenomenon and that most poor people in rural areas derive at leastome o their livelihoods rom agriculture. Then, as argued by Lipton, there is thect that in capital-constrained economies the greatest employment eects can beained by investing where capital costs per extra workplace are relatively low i.e.griculture.34 Further, Lipton argues that or the rural poor, armland is their majorsset type and it is thereore credible that more poverty reduction is likely to bechieved by raising returns to armland than to other assets. Finally, the act that

e poor spend the bulk o their income o ood, and especially staples, means thatocal arming restrains and stabilises the price o the poors main consumables.his logic leads to the conclusion that agriculture must necessarily be at the core any poverty-reduction strategy. To put it another way, only agriculture has theotential to have the breadth o impact that is required to address rural povertyuccessully.

he consensus is concerned undamentally with the need to increase theroductivity o agriculture. Irz et al., identiy 12 positive consequences o agriculturalrowth, the eects o which can be seen at t he level o the arm, the rural or theational economy (Table 3).35 For each positive consequence, they also identiy aumber o qualications and preconditions, which illustrate both the complexity ande context specicity o the potential relationship between productivity growth andoverty reduction. Most authors and agencies promoting the consensus view alsoghlight (either ollowing rom or as an adjunct to productivity gains) the importance strengthening ruralurban linkages and the development o the rural non-armector.

number o studies provide empirical evidence to support the relationship betweenroductivity growth and poverty reduction. These are reviewed by Irz et al., whoso report results rom their own cross-country study that suggest to them that

agricultural productivity is an important determinant o poverty, and that increasesyield have the potential to lit a large number o individuals out o poverty.36

hirtle et al.,s reading o t he literature leads them to conclude that growth appears be pro-poor, except in the Latin American countries, where extreme inequality in

e distribution o incomes, and especially land, prevents the poor rom gaining.37

s well as general agreement concerning the importance o agricultural growth oroverty reduction, there is also much agreement around the policy agenda required oster growth. Underlying this agenda is a now well-known analysis o the

onstraints to increased productivity, including a lack o technology and inormation;appropriate land tenure arrangements; market ailures or inputs and outputs; andoor inrastructure.

hus, according to Hazell, in order to oster growth in the productivity o amily arms,overnments, NGOs and the private sector must work to ensure: 39

Targeted agricultural research and extension.

Tenure security and ecient land markets.

More eective marketing organisations.


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suciency and based on low-external-input systems, inter-cropping, traditionalvarieties and local seed systems.

The point here is not to evaluate these various propositions in detail, but ratherto draw attention to the act that t he importance o the agricultural sector, andamily arming in particular, or poverty reduction is still being debated, with thedierent perspectives refecting, amongst other things, disciplinary, institutional, andgeographical backgrounds. Nevertheless, it is air to say t hat the proposition thatincreasing the productivity o amily arming is essential or poverty reduction is nowwidely accepted amongst academics, policy-makers and development practitionersalike.

gricultural exports have long been a mainstay o many developing countryconomies and, over the last two decades, there has been much emphasis on theeed or developing countries to stimulate non-traditional agricultural exports. Whileome examples o this strategy are very well known or example, resh vegetablesnd cut fowers rom Kenya and coee rom Viet Nam the prod-pov consensus isot undamentally about agricultural exports (be they traditional or non-traditional).ather, as argued by Hazell, the ocus must be primarily on the supply o staplerains to domestic markets.45 We will return to this point later.

nally, it is important to note Hazells acknowledgement above that not all ruraleople will have a uture in arming, and associated with the prod-pov consensus isdiscussion o the need or exit strategies or them.

owmuchoaconsensus?

describing the consensus around the importance o agriculture productivityrowth or rural poverty reduction, we have used the term emerging becauseis consensus in neither universal nor monolithic. There are both academics andolicy-makers who do not support this view o the development potential o thegricultural sector, and in some cases, t hey specically highlight the limitations omall-scale amily arming. It would certainly be a mistake to assume that the notionat the agriculture sector should modernise through large-scale, mechanised,put-intensive production systems is completely dead.

he work o Collier and OConnell illustrates an approach that downplays the role the agricultural sector in poverty reduction.46These authors use the notions oesource endowment and location to classiy countries in A rica as Resource-Rich,esource-Scarce Coastal, or Resource-Scarce Landlocked, accounting or 35 perent, 35 per cent and 30 per cent o the Arican population respectively.47They thenuggest that the best strategy or sustained growth o Resource-Rich countries iskely to be through exploitation o their primary resources (oil, minerals and theke), while the Resource-Scarce Coastal countries may have to ocus on addingalue to resource-based exports. As or the Resource-Scarce Landlocked countries,eir ability to rise to middle-income status may be tied to the success o theirore ortunate neighbours, the discovery o untapped natural resources, or theevelopment o new service exports. It is noteworthy that amily arming plays norominent role in this analysis o opportunities or sustained income growth.

ther authors ocus on the role o industrial exports in growth and povertyeduction. For example, Sderbom and Teal argue that, over the last 30 years,e long-term income growth o Arican countries was closely linked to exporterormance.48 They also conclude that only international (not regional) markets willlow Arican countries to develop labour-intensive exports. Teal goes urther: it isnly in urban-based export industries that the growth o employment can be rapidnough to absorb the rapid growth in labour supply, and such employment creationhow income growth can be directly linked to poverty reduction.49

is also true that even amongst those who are primarily concerned with agriculture

nd rural development there is less than universal agreement on the uture o amilyrming. For example, in recent years the process o rural livelihood diversicationas received considerable attention, in relation to Arica 50 and Asia.51The basicbservation is that non-arm income is increasing as a proportion o all income. Thisas prompted some to question whether agriculture is as powerul a lever or ruraloverty reduction as has been suggested. On the other hand, there is evidence non-arm income being used to invest in productivity-enhancing technology;52hile others have argued that diversication away rom agriculture may reduce theillingness (o particularly poor people) to make the investments in new agriculturalchnology. 53

nally, some observers intimate that the route o arm productivity enhancementintensication promoted via the prod-pov consensus is actually a danger tomily armers. Here the suggestion is that intensication can create dependencyn external inputs and global markets; open the door to genetically modied croparieties and increased indebtedness; reduce biodiversity; and impact negativelyn ood security. Some call or sustainable intensication oriented towards sel-


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middle countryside or remote areas) and the quality o natural resources (goodor poor).59 They use this ramework and their own reading o the last decadesdevelopment experience to suggest some likely agricultural developmenttrajectories (Table 4). This is obviously a very simplied and schematic analysisbut it highlights nevertheless two extremely important points. First, the rural worldis heterogeneous, and this heterogeneity has direct and signicant implicationsor agricultural development. Second, or three o the six location-resourcecombinations, Wiggins and Proctor conclude that the potential or agriculturalintensication is, and is likely to remain, very limited. The implication o this is t hatthe goal o reducing rural poverty by increasing the productivity o amily arms islikely to be achieved in only some rural areas. This seems to be accepted in therecent DFID paper Growth and Poverty Reduction: the Role o Agriculture whichhighlights the need to give priority to agricultural development in places wheresignicant productivity gains are possible and the potential links to the widereconomy are strongest.60 It is also echoed by Poulton et al., who conclude thatwhile smallholder agriculture in less avoured areas o Arica perorms vital oodsecurity and welare unctions, it is unlikely to unction as a driver o growth.61 Onthe other hand, Omamo suggests that in areas with low agricultural potential andlow population density (in Eastern and Central Arica) improved animal health,breeding or disease resistance, and improved nutrition and pasture managementwould be good triggers or broad-based productivity growth.62

However, socio-economic heterogeneity is an additional dimension that must beconsidered. 64 Here we are interested in dierences in gender, age, marital status,education, ethnicity, caste, relationship to land, wealth, and so on. These actors can

be associated with dierent opportunity structures and broadly dierent livelihoodpatterns. They are also associated with type and level o engagement in agricultureand dierent levels o interest in and ability to invest in productivity enhancinginnovation. Clearly, the importance o these actors will depend on the context, theagricultural system and the requirements o the intensication technology. Wealth,or example, may or may not be a determinant o technology adoption.

Building on earlier work around recommendation domains, some authors havesuggested that rather t han ocus on the individual socio-economic actors it ismore important to understand how combinations o actors aect peoples interestin and ability to implement a given agricultural innovation.65 Those with neither theinterest nor the resources are unlikely adopters, as are those who may have theresources but or whatever reason lack the interest. On the other hand, those withboth interest and resources are the obvious potential adopters, while those who areinterested but who lack the necessary resources may adopt i provided with somekind o assistance (or example, inormation, credit etc). The point here is simply thatonly a proportion o arming amilies will have both the interest and resources toincrease their productivity, and thus to benet directly rom intensication. This leads

Table4.Developmentimplicationsolocationandnaturalresourcequality.

Quality o natural resources

Location Good Poor

Peri-urban Emphasis will likely be on micro-scale, high-value arming and livestock activities

Middlecountryside

These areas will likely move toward specialised,market-oriented arable arming and livestockproduction.

These areas will likely remain in extensive armingand livestock, and will only develop a limited non-arm economy

Remotecountryside

Few proven strategies or development o theseareas; likely to remain in subsistence arming.

Few proven strategies or development in theseareas; likely to remain in low-productivity subsistencearming, generating very small or no surpluses.

Source: Wiggins and Proctor63

rst, we note t hat the prod-pov policy agenda appears to take or granted theroposition that amily armers can benet rom agricultural growth within therevailing global economic and institutional contexts. The agenda shies awayom any suggestion that amily armers in developing countries might not get air deal under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules or more specically in theirealings with the increasingly globalised agri-ood system. Neither does it seriouslyuestion the current neo-liberal orthodoxy concerning the role o state subsidies (orxample, or ertiliser) or the desirability o (even temporary) protection o domesticarkets rom cheap ood imports.

econd, we note that increased agricultural productivity is only likely to come abouthere there is social, political and economic stability. It is sadly ironic that the

stablishment o these basic conditions has been most problematic in A rica wheree need to impact on rural poverty is greatest. In the ace o continuing confictnd civil strie not to mention the ravages o the HIV/AIDS pandemic it is clearlynrealistic to assume that the complex o policies, incentives, investments, markets,nd supporting institutions which underpins the prod-pov consensus will easilyevelop and fourish.

hird, it is important to draw attention to t he act that that the pro-poor outcomesnvisaged in the consensus will depend on increasing demand or ood and othergricultural products.54 While some increase in demand will arise simply because population growth, the real boost will come rom a growing and dynamic urbanector. While Hazell makes an explicit link between the prod-pov analysis andomestic grain markets, without growing urban demand or locally produced oode assumption o a strong link between increased agricultural productivity andidespread rural poverty reduction is untenable.55 Some authors have stressed thect that with urban population growth and rising incomes, demand or livestockroducts in the developing world is set to increase dramatically.56 The argumentthat this so-called livestock revolution, and its requirement or vast quantities o

oncentrated livestock eeds (largely rom cereal grains), will signicantly increaseemand or locally produced grain. The case or such a livestock revolution ands potentially positive knock-on eects or amily armers is certainly compellingr China, India and some other Asian countries. It is dicult in the short-term to

ee this particular dynamic establishing itsel in much o Arica, however, where, ineneral, rapid urbanisation has been de-coupled rom economic growth57 and aasis or sustained economic growth in urban areas has yet to be established.

iversity:onesizedoesnotftall

here is now considerable academic literature on the challenges associated withgro-ecological diversity and relative merits o investment in areas with marginalr low agricultural potential.58 Nevertheless, we suggest that the prod-pov analysisbeing interpreted and promoted in a way that leads to the expectation that

gricultural productivity growth is a general and broadly applicable strategy or ruraloverty reduction.

this section, we argue that agro-ecological and socio-economic diversity,articularly in non-irrigated areas will likely reduce signicantly the povertyleviation eects o agricultural intensication. In other words, the potential oruccessul productivity enhancement, and the associated poverty reduction eects,re likely to be signicantly more site- and context-specic than oten portrayed.

Wiggins and Proctor provide a simple but useul ramework that brings togetherormation on two important actors: location relative to markets (peri-urban,

Limitationsotheprod-povconsensus

Beore exploring some specic elements o the prod-povconsensus, it is important to make three preliminary points.


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Table5.Addingsocio-economicdiversitytotheWigginsandProctorramework67

Quality o natural resources

Distance romurban areas Good Poor

Peri-urban

W&P: Emphasis will likely be on micro-scale, high-value arming and livestock activities

MiddleCountryside

W&P: Likely move toward specialised,market-oriented arable arming andlivestock.

W&P: Likely remain in extensivearming and livestock, and will onlydevelop a limited non-arm economy.

Remote

W&P: Few proven strategies ordevelopment; will likely remain insubsistence arming; may becomeattractive in uture.

W&P: Few proven strategies ordevelopment; will likely remainin low-productivity subsistencearming, generating very small or nosurpluses.

Families with interestand motivation

Families withresources

Yes No

Yes 33 5

No 3 5



Yes No

Yes 33 5

No 3 5



Yes No

Yes 5 5

No 5 5

Individuals withinterest and motivation


Yes No

Yes 5 5

No 5 5



Yes No

Yes 5 5

No 5 5

3 = likely

33 = more likely

5= unlikely

consideration o the distribution o direct and indirect (or example, employmentnd linkage) eects o productivity growth, and recognition that the nature andagnitude o any indirect poverty eects will depend on the combination o agro-cosystem, development trajectory, arming technology and the like.

Table 5, we have integrated this view o socio-economic diversity into theWiggins and Proctor ramework. This table highlights the act that even within thosereas that are considered to have clear potential or agricultural development thenks between productivity growth and poverty reduction are likely to be contingent,artial, and highly complex.

ow we are let with a dicult question: What are the implications o this moreealistic approach or expectations about the ability o agricultural productivity tompact positively on mass rural poverty? While this question demands detailednd site-specic analysis, one conclusion seems certain: in many areas, increasedgricultural productivity is unlikely to drive the kind o broad-based rural povertyeduction claimed by those promoting the prod-pov consensus.

agriculturalresearchuptothejob?

n essential element o the prod-pov consensus is that armers must have access productivity-enhancing technology. In whatever orm as new crop varieties,gronomic recommendations, pest control strategies, whole production systems

r whatever technology that is adapted, reliable and protable is an absoluteequirement. Over the last two decades, the accepted view o the process ogricultural technology development has grown to include armers, NGOs ande private sector in addition to publicly unded research.66 However, this newppreciation o armers research, participatory research, and innovation systems,oes not reduce the importance o eective ormal, public sector research,articularly when poor, amily armers are being targeted.

he two main sources o publicly unded agricultural research are the nationalystems on the one hand and the international systems on the other. As is to bexpected there is tremendous variation among the national agricultural researchystems in terms, or example, o size, organisational models, sta proles,eographical and crop coverage, budgets, and so on. The 16 international researchentres o the CGIAR system also have dierent geographical and researchandates, and as well varying in organisation, size, nancial stability, and record o

mpact.68

ter a decade or more o expansion into areas such as participation, gender andatural resource management, there have recently been calls or the CGIAR to re-cus its eorts on basic crop improvement, where it has historically demonstrated

s strong comparative advantage in developing global public goods.69 The logicere is that the national research systems, NGOs, and the private sector will thenork with armers to adapt the crop germplasm and strategic research outputsom the CGIAR centres to suit local conditions. However, the notion that such antegrated, global agricultural innovation system can be made to work or poor

mily armers in the developing world needs to be very careully examined.

here are three key assumptions: that the national agricultural research systemsave (or could quickly develop) the capacity to adapt strategic research outputsom CGIAR centres and elsewhere; that the private sector will carry at least some the burden o this adaptive research; and that amily armers, and perhapsspecially women, are in a position to participate in adaptive research at the levelequired to deliver signicant benets. Unortunately, in parts o the developingorld, and perhaps particularly in Arica, these assumptions are problematic.

the rst place, unding or public-sector agricultural research in much o theeveloping world is in long-term decline.70 In addition, even ater years o multi-nd bi-lateral donor support, national agricultural research institutions in Aricaontinue to struggle with t he agro-ecological heterogeneity and the range oops and problems or which they are responsible. Nor is it sucient to say thatgricultural research must and will be strengthened: years o experience has clearlyemonstrated that this is a very long-term project and even then, much easier saidan done.71While considerable attention is now being given to new partnerships


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even in key Fair Trade commodities such as coee, tea and cocoa, have been ableto participate.

The growth o supermarkets in the developing world poses another potentialproblem or amily armers. Whether they are wholly owned subsidiaries o rmsbased in the North, regional rms, joint ventures, or national companies, modernsupermarkets work to t he same basic logic o standardisation, cost reductionand logistic eciency. The experience in the UK and elsewhere has amplydemonstrated the diculties that smaller-scale armers have in successullysupplying supermarkets. Is there any reason to think that amily armers in thedeveloping world will be any more successul? At risk, o course, is the access thatamily armers have to their own domestic markets, without which the link betweenproductivity enhancement and poverty reduction will be very tenuous indeed.

Boselie et al., studied two successul examples rom South Arica and Thailand osmall-armer engagement with supermarkets (Table 6).81They concluded that inthese cases six actors underpinned the successul outcomes:

1. The producers worked co-operatively and were tightly coordinated.

2. The supermarket or supplier played an active role in organising theproducer groups, providing technical expertise or physical inputs.

3. Access to electronic communications technology.

4. Produce was chilled or rapidly delivered to a chilled acility.

5. Producers had to supply high-quality produce on a consistent basis.

6. Public-private partnerships.

On the other hand, Schwentesius and Gmez studied a lime growers co-operativethat tried and ultimately ailed to supply supermarkets. They concluded that it was relatively dicult to address the research question o whether small growersbenet rom sales to super-markets, simply because it was dicult to nd manysmall growers who were selling (resh ruit and vegetables) to supermarkets aresearch nding in itsel.83

In relation to Latin America, where supermarkets are already the dominant orcein ood retail, Reardon and Berdegu propose our elements o a basic policyposition:84

1. Accept that supermarkets are here to stay.

2. Recognise that supermarkets can be engines o market development.

Table6.Examplesosmall-armerengagementwithsupermarkets.

CompanyCountry BusinessMechanism or controland compliance

Numbers osmallholdersinvolved Support structures

Alice/South Arica

FFV producergroup supplyingsupermarkets.

Out-growerscheme; EUREP-GAP certicationwithin two years. 300-400

Public-privatepartnership.

TOPS / Thailand Supermarket chain

Preerred supplierswith national publiccer tication. 500-600

Aliation withinput supplier;public-privatepartnership.

Source: Boselie et al.82

nd collaborative arrangements, through, or example, the CGIARs Challengerogrammes, these initiatives are unlikely to make-up or more undamentalstitutional shortcomings.72 Without signicant research capacity at the appliednd adaptive end o the spectrum, where the challenge o agro-ecological andocio-economic heterogeneity is greatest, the global public goods produced by theternational centres will be o little, i any, value to poor, amily armers.73

econd, the assertion that the private sector will invest in agricultural research,articularly when the potential users are poor, amily armers in marginal areasrowing primarily ood crops or domestic markets, must be questioned.74 Indeed,s noted by most observers, in Arica there is little sign o private sector investmentagricultural research outside a limited number o cash crops, such as cotton andbacco. It seems likely that a similar situation will persist in other marginal, largely

ain-ed areas, where much o the ocus is and will likely remain on the production ood crops or own consumption. While some innovative models or harnessinge power o private sector research or the benet o poor armers have recentlyeen suggested, to date these have not been tested in any substantive way. 75

hird, while the role o armers in technology adaptation at arm level is nowell appreciated, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that poor people will be bothotivated and able to devote time and other resources to the ne-tuning ochnology. This may be particularly the case in situations where arming is only one

mongst several sources o income.76

other words, the regions where rural poverty is deepest and most persistentncluding Arica are the least likely to be able to provide the agriculturalchnology whose availability is assumed by t hose promoting the prod-pov

onsensus. Without this technology, there can be little productivity enhancement.What, then, is the real basis or promises o productivity-driven poverty reduction in

ther the short or the medium terms?

veniwegrowit,willwehaveamarket?

he last two decades have seen major restructuring o the global agri-oodystem. Some o the salient characteristics o this restructuring are an increasingoncentration o power among a relatively small number o transnational rms;ommodities and their components increasingly seen as globally substitutableputs or ood manuacturing; and a rapid expansion in South-to-North trade inesh ruit and vegetables. Another important development has been the changingcus o regulation within the agri-ood system, rom national governments andterstate organisations to the private sector and other third party organisations.77his shit, driven in large part by the demands o ood retailers in the developedorld, represents another signicant change in the exercise o power within theod system.

nally, in recent years there has been much interest in what has been called theupermarket take-o throughout the developing world, including Arica.78 A growingody o research shows that supermarkets in the developing countries are no

nger serving only urban and upper class customers but are rapidly penetrating allegments o ood marketing.

l o these developments are likely to pose serious challenges to amily armers.aced with such challenges, the classic response would be to seek to becomeore competitive by improving eciency or quality. Alternatively, there is theption o developing and exploiting higher value niches within the market. Theevelopment o non-traditional export chains such as resh vegetables rom AricaEurope are an example o this latter response, as are Fair Trade and other social/

co labelling schemes.

an initiatives such as these benet large numbers o amily armers? Evidenceom Kenya indicates that while the export horticulture sector began with signicantputs rom amily armers, much production is now centralised and under theontrol o integrated companies.79 While jobs are being created, these are morekely to be or arm labourers and women working in pack houses than or amilyrmers.80 On the other hand, while some producers and communities seem to gainom schemes such as Fair Trade, so ar only a very small minority o amily armers,


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The need to increase crop productivity is central to the prod-pov consensus and it isassumed that in many situations increased ertiliser use will be essential to achievethis goal. The prod-pov policy prescriptions that are expected to promote ertiliseruse are improved transportation inrastructure and better unctioning input markets(to reduce the cost and improve timeliness o availability); improved credit provisionand risk management strategies; and improved technology (ertiliser-responsivecrop varieties and management strategies).

Petroleum products are the eedstock or nitrogen ertiliser production. This act,combined with the relatively high cost o ertiliser, and generally low levels oertiliser-use eciency, means that in places like Arica the economics o ertiliseruse will be particularly sensitive to rising energy prices. In other words, i the peakoil scenarios that have been projected by some analysts come to pass, 91 andoil prices increase signicantly, then the very amily armers whom the prod-povpromoters seek to help may be the most seriously aected. Thus, in the ace orising energy prices, the applicability and sustainability o productivity enhancementbased on increasing inorganic ertiliser intensity cannot be taken or granted.

DevelopingDeveloped

1970/71 1980/81 1990/91 2000/01

50

60

Consumption(milliontonnes)

0

10

20

30

40

Figure 2. Nitrogen ertiliser nutrient consumption.

Source: van Dam using data rom the International Fertilizer Industry Association.86

Table7.Fertiliseruseintensity(kgoertilisernutrientsperhaoarableland).

Region Fertiliser intensity (kg/ha)

Arica, south o Sahara 8

Latin America and the Caribbean 90

North America developed 100

South Asia 114

East and Southeast Asia 131

European Union 208

Source: FAO; YEAR 2001.

Worry about the implications o supermarket dominance in terms opotential exclusion o small rms and arms.

Help these small rms and arms to meet the challenges o supplyingsupermarkets where possible; and help develop alternative marketswhere it is not.

learly, eective organisation will be absolutely essential i amily armers are supply supermarkets successully. We will return to this point, as well as the

hallenge o developing alternative markets, in the last section.

ntensifcation,ertiliserandenergyprices:whathappenswhenthepriceo

ilskyrockets?

he prod-pov consensus assumes that productivity growth can be realised bymily armers without putting into ur ther jeopardy the natural resource base onhich they depend. In other words, the whole proposition rests on the assumptionat protable and sustainable intensication trajectories either already exist, or cane identied in the short term.

we go back to the ramework o Wiggins and Proctor reerred to earlier, we mightonclude that it is only in Peri-urban and Middle-countryside areas with goodatural resources that such sustainable intensication trajectories will be needed.

n the other hand, as people will clearly continue to live and arm in the otherreas, some o which, by denition, have limited natural resource endowments andre prone to degradation, the need or sustainable production systems is clearlyore general.

ne key resource is soil, and the management o soil ertility is a undamentalart o sustainable crop production. Approaches to soil-ertility management onmily arms in the developing world have evolved considerably over the last 50

ears: rom what was primarily a ocus on the use o chemical ertiliser to boostrop production, researchers now highlight a broader range o approaches andutrient sources. At least in the research community, the value o integrated nutrientanagement the judicious manipulation o nutrient stocks and fows85 is nowidely accepted. Nevertheless, chemical ertiliser is still the bedrock o soil-ertilityanagement in many arming systems and most intensication trajectories. As a

esult, nitrogen ertiliser use in the developing world continues to increase rapidlyFigure 2).

some situations, and particularly the Green Revolution areas o Asia, ertiliserse is well entrenched and ertiliser intensity (i.e. the rate o application in kg/ha)already relatively high. In contrast, in much o Arica, overall intensity o ertiliser

se is still very low ( Table 7). Averages such as these hide considerable variationmong countries, and as Craword et al., demonstrate, some 15 countries in Aricaegistered rapid growth in ertiliser intensity, albeit rom small initial levels in thearly 1990s87. In Arica, some 40 per cent o all ertiliser is applied to maize andn additional 20 per cent to other cereals and pulses; however, the intensity o

pplication is generally higher on tobacco, sugar and cotton, and lower on cerealsncluding maize).88

he common explanations or low ertiliser use in Arica include high costs, a lowroportion o irrigated land, a predominance o traditional crop varieties that are notrtiliser responsive, and low population density (i.e. relative land abundance). Acent study by the Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) showed that the retail price urea in Nigeria, Malawi and Zambia was on average 46 per cent higher than in theSA.89 Tellingly, the cost rom arrival at the port to the point o sale was on average5 times higher in the three Arican countries. It is also important to note that these

gures do not take account o the cost o transportation rom the point o sale toe arm, which can also be considerable. In part, based on these higher costs,nderson hypothesised that in Arica many improved agricultural technologies,cluding the use o inorganic ertilisers, are actually not more protable than existingractice and entail enough low-grade risk to make them unattractive.90 In addition,ecause much o the data are not representative or relevant, there is a systematicverstatement o the extent o responsiveness o crops to applied ertilizer in Arica,lative to what is achievable under most arm conditions.


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In a similar review o likely eects on the arid and semi-arid tropics, Sivakumar etal., suggest that overall climate change and attendant impacts on water resourceswill add additional layers o risk and uncertainty to an agricultural system that isalready impacted by land degradation due to growing population pressure. Theygo on to note that while armers in arid and semi-arid areas have, over many years,developed strategies to deal with natural climate variability, the impacts o climatechange have not been actored into these strategies.100

Jones and Thornton undertook a very dierent type o study that neverthelesspoints in the same direction.101 Using a series o high-resolution methods and aprocess-based crop growth model they simulated maize yields in Arica and LatinAmerica to 2055, and postulated three major types o response to climate change:

1. Maize yields increase.

2. Maize yields decrease, but to an extent that can be readily handled bybreeding and agronomy.

3. Maize yields decline so drastically that major changes may have to be madeto the agricultural system, or even human population may be dispersed.

By 2055, because o temperature increases and rainall dierences, in nearly three-

quarters o the countries they studied maize yields were projected to decrease.

However, they go on to make two key points:

1. The aggregate production impacts o possible uture climate change to 2055on smallholder rained maize production in Latin America and Arica arecomparatively modest a decline o around 10 per cent and, it is reasonableto expect this level o decrease to be compensated or by plant breeding andtechnology interventions.

2. The aggregate results hide enormous variability. In some areas increasedyields may allow intensication o agriculture and concomitant increase in ruralwealth. However, in areas where a yield reduction o 1 ton or more is expected,considerable disruption to rural lie may occur.

Finally, they suggest that it is unlikely that other staple crops including commonbeans that are a particularly important source o dietary protein in some areas willbehave as tolerantly (as maize) under climate change.

It is hard to escape the conclusion, even accepting all the uncertainty around theexact timing, location and magnitude o climate change eects, that the context ormany amily armers, and particularly t hose in marginal areas, is likely to becomeever more challenging. In t he best o circumstances, technology developed through

agricultural research may help to mitigate some o these negative eects. However,given the other not insignicant challenges acing amily armers, and the limitationso agricultural research highlighted above, it is probably air to conclude that climatechange will act to reinorce other dynamics already observable in rural areas,including migration and diversication. Greater climate variability may aect peopleswillingness and ability to respond to market signals or agricultural products andtheir motivation to invest in intensication, particularly in areas without irrigation.

Votingwiththeireet:armingisjustnotcool

Implicit in the prod-pov consensus is the idea people in the developing worldparticularly young people will be content to continue to live in rural areasand build their livelihoods around agriculture. There is, however, good reason tobe sceptical o this assumption. It is well recognised that in many parts o thedeveloping world young men and women, and particularly those with someormal education, have been turning their backs on arming or many years. Thebasic economic argument is that migration results when the nancial rewardsrom arming are less than those associated with other activities. But clearly theexit rom arming is not just about low wages: indeed young people in Arica have

is certainly true that there are many alternatives to inorganic ertiliser. In someaces the use o animal manure, agro-orestry, crop rotation, legumes, livingulch, compost, and other soil-ertility-enhancing technologies are part oaditional practice, in other situations they have been actively promoted or usey amily armers.92, Here it is important to note t hat one critique levelled at public-ector agricultural research is that it is generally resistant to innovations thathallenge conventional wisdom or that did not originate rom within the researchstablishment. Organic arming is a good example, as is the ongoing and quiteeated debate around the System o Rice Intensication (SRI).93 For this reason,ome argue that we are not yet in a position to know t he real potential o theseternatives to inorganic ertiliser.

evertheless, it has not yet been clearly demonstrated that, over a variety o agro-cologies, these alternative technologies will support the high level o productivitynhancement that underpins the prod-pov consensus (or example, or organicoee;94 or SRI;95 and or low-external-input arming in Kenya96). Further, asese are predominately biological technologies, their use is oten highly context

pecic, which means that they must be actively adapted to particular agro-cological and socio-economic conditions. While much o the responsibility orcal-level adaptation must ultimately be carried by the armers themselves, thesechnologies clearly imply an even greater burden or national agricultural research.97s noted above, however, it is precisely at this level o local adaptation that the

ational agricultural research systems ace their greatest challenge. Signicantrogress on this ront is unlikely without radical change in the organisation, stang,anagement and unding o agricultural research.

ormany,climatechangewillmakesuccessulamilyarmingever

moredifcult

goes without saying that maniestations o climate or example, rainall patterns,rought and fooding aect amily armers in the developing world on a dailyasis. How the events observed today are linked to longer-term processes oimate change remains unclear. However, there can be no question about thect that the medium- to long-term outlook or amily armers is clouded by t hereats associated with climate change. While projections o the extent, timingnd impacts o climate change are still imprecise, there is agreement that it is aatter o when not i, and that the poor in the developing world are likely to suersproportionately.98 The strong link between poverty, rural areas and engagementagriculture that was cited earlier partly explains this disproportionate burden.

relation to crop production, the key impacts associated with climate change arekely to be through air temperature, rainall patterns, atmospheric C O 2 levels,mporal and spatial distribution o extreme events, and sea level change. In

ome situations higher C O 2 levels, more rainall and higher temperatures mayave positive eects on the growth and productivity o some crops. Elsewhere,rought and higher temperatures will have negative eects. Given the continuedncertainties about climate change, and the potential or complex, interactingects on crop production, projections o impacts on agriculture in the developing

orld can only be indicative.

he literature on the likely eects o climate change on agriculture is large andannot be reviewed here in detail. Nevertheless, some recent papers illustrate therection o the latest thinking. Zhao et al., reviewed projected impacts o climatehange on agriculture in the humid and sub-humid tropics. They suggest that whilee global economic impacts o climate change on agriculture are expected to be

elatively minor (because o osetting gains and losses), the adaptive capacity human settlements in Arica and Latin America is low and vulnerability is high.ore specically, agricultural productivity in lower latitude and lower income

ountries is more likely to be negatively aected. This conclusion points again the disproportionate eects on the poor reerred to above. These authors also

uggest that increasing climate variability is likely to be more important than changeaverage climate, and highlight the act that all International Panel on Climate

hange (IPCC) assessments suggest that climate variability and climate changeprimarily droughts) will generally have signicant impacts on almost all armingystems in Arica.99


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In this light, we can return to the discussion o exit strategies that within theprod-pov consensus is usually seen in terms o providing viable alternatives orthose who are unable to undertake or benet rom productivity-enhancing armintensication. The general assumption is that it will be only poorer and otherwisedisadvantaged rural residents who will need these strategies. What we aresuggesting, however, is that some o the very people who ought to be the basiso a productivity-driven rural transormation those who are young, educated andmotivated may be the least likely to remain in rural areas, with their own mass-exitstrategy being the logical outcome o their rising aspirations. What would their exitmean or the dream o a dynamic agricultural sector based on amily arms? Howwould their exit aect the expectations or rural poverty reduction that t he prod-povconsensus places on the shoulders o the next generation o amily armers?

Perhaps all that can be said at this point is that i rooting a livelihood in amilyarming is already challenging, it can only become more so as the eects ohigher energy prices, globalisation, and climate change take hold. In order to getahead, those let arming the land will need to actively identiy and probably adapttechnology, organise, respond to national and global markets, innovate on theinstitutional ront, and much, much more.

Without the ull engagement o the next generation o young people, this seemslike a very tall order indeed. This raises a question: what eects will signicant

progress toward MDG 2 (Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girlsalike, will be able to complete a ull course o primary schooling) have on the lieaspirations and choices o rural youth? This question may be particularly importantin relation to Arica, where a ocus on improving girls education has the potential tobring undamental change to those agricultural systems that are currently so heavilydependent on womens labour. Studies rom throughout the world have indicated agenerally positive link between human capital (education) and migration.

We do not wish to imply that continued or even increased migration out o ruralareas will mean the end o agriculture. Indeed, rural out-migration may resultin real economic opportunities or those who remain. For example, dependingo who migrates and in what circumstances, there may be opportunities orthe enlargement and/or consolidation o arms, and or increased levels ospecialisation. Depending on the rate o migration, rural wage rates may alsoincrease. These possibilities point to a potential positive link between migrationand the transormation o amily arming. Thus, while out-migration may play arole in allowing productivity gains in some amily arms, this suggests that suchproductivity gains may be associated with less broad-based poverty gains than hasbeen suggested.

P The ability o public-sector agricultural research to provide the agriculturaltechnology required to support widespread productivity gains, particularly inrain-ed areas.

ontinued to join the fow o rural-to-urban migrants despite evidence that by thete 1980s urbanrural wage dierentials had nearly disappeared,102 employmentpportunities in urban areas are oten limited and living conditions precarious. Thisgain highlights Cohens observation that in Arica (and contrary to most historicalxperience) urban migration and urbanisation more generally have been de-nked rom urban economic growth, and points to the role o other actors such aserential access to social services in migration decisions.103

nother actor that has long been underscored in the ruralurban migration is thetraction o the bright lights o the cities. We can hypothesise that with the growingresence o the media in rural areas (TV, lms, music, advertising), and the ever-xtending reach o tourism, this attraction should be stronger today than ever. In theontext o globalisation, the attraction will go beyond the nearest town o nationalapital, and extend to a global suite o products, brands, images, lives, liestyles,nd locations.

While clearly not realistic or attainable by most rural youth, these globalisedspirations provide a powerul point o ocus that is clearly non-local. Specically,is process o the globalisation o youth aspirations is likely to mean that amiliar,cal gures (mother/ather; pastor/imam; uncle/aunt; teacher; master armer etc)se much o their previous power to guide, inspire and motivate. In other words,ompared to Premier League ootball stars or pop music stars, these t raditional

ocal heroes become increasingly irrelevant.

We are suggesting, as has Rigg that globalisation o aspirations will increasingly leadeople to leave rural areas or at least to disengage rom agriculture. In Riggs words:

Education, newspapers, radio and television, and consumerism

more generally have prooundly altered the way that rural people think

about work, arming and their and more particularly, their childrens

utures. Rural existences are becoming almost as monetized in countries

like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia as are urban lives. Farming has

become, oten in little more than a decade, a low status occupation to be

avoided. This view has a marked generational component: it is younger

people who most urgently and ervently wish to build utures that avoid

arming.104

he central problem is that there is a major disconnect between aspirations o ruraleople and local enterprise ecologies: while the aspirations may be increasinglyniversal, it is impossible or rural people in the developing world to achieve thema their local (rural) economies, and via amily arming in particular.

While the orthodox response is that agricultural wages must rise so that they areompetitive with urban wages, it seems likely that the issue is not simply aboutage dierentials. Clearly, poor access to social services in most rural areas is aajor problem. In addition, there are other intractable problems associated with

griculture (or example, it is hard, dirty, manual, low-status, and it is just not cool)

at will over-ride an apparently rational analysis o income potential, ood securitynd the like (just as is the case or many o todays migrants). At the ext reme, were hypothesising that, at least or educated rural young people, t he opportunityost o time is essentially their perception o their potential earnings in Lagos,angkok, London, Paris, or New York (the act that their perceptions may be widelyaccurate is quite irrelevant).

Work with commercial tomato growers in Ghana illustrated a less extreme scenario,hich is, however, equally problematic or the view that youth will remain engagedagriculture. Here, young rural men temporarily engaged in small-scale, intensivemato production in a highly instrumental way. For t he majority, their goal was tosengage rom arming105 and they used their not-inconsiderable prots to buildouses, get married and set themselves up in trading but seldom to investedagriculture.106 While it can be argued that their investment in the rural economyill be benecial to those remaining in arming, the picture that emerged rom thisork was o a short-term, quick-money107 approach to arming that raises importantuestions in relation to environmental management and sustainability.


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The implications o high levels o agro-ecological and socio-economic diversity.

The ongoing restructuring o the global agri-ood system, and the potentialimplications or amily armers access to their own domestic markets.

The ability o public-sector agricultural research to provide the agriculturaltechnology required to support widespread productivity gains, particularly inrain-ed areas.

The robustness, in the ace o rising oil prices, o an agricultural-intensication

strategy dependent on inorganic ertiliser.

The medium- and long-term implications o climate change.

The assumption that young people in the developing world will be content to livein rural areas and construct their livelihoods around agriculture.

this to imply that amily arming will have no role to play in rural poverty reduction,r that raising the productivity o amily arms will not be an important mechanism oroverty reduction or some people in some areas? No. Is it to say that the thinkingehind and the agenda associated with the prod-pov consensus are withouterit? No. However, it does seem likely that the prod-pov consensus, as it is beingromoted in some quarters, is directly and immediately relevant only to some areasnd some people. While we might also expect important indirect poverty eects romgricultural intensication in these relevant areas, even taking these into account,ast areas and many millions o poor, rural residents will likely be let untouched byese policies. Thus our conclusion is that while increasing the productivity o amilyrms can play an important role, poverty reduction on a mass scale, particularly inrica, will require a more comprehensive and integrated approach.108

mplicationsorpolicyandaction

helonger-termvision

ltimately, the achievement o even the relatively modest goals or povertyeduction enshrined in the MDGs will require undamental shits in the way that

conomies are organised at local, national, regional, and global levels. Some o theost important o these shits include:

The establishment o peace, democratic accountability, and political and economicstability as a prerequisite or broad-based and sustainable poverty reduction.

A recognition that global economic growth is a relatively inecient means odelivering poverty reduction.109

An approach to debt relie that takes explicit account o impacts o debtrepayment obligations on the ability o debtor countries to deliver the basic set ohuman rights to their citizens.110

Reorm o the WTO, and the world trading system more generally, so thatdeveloping countries are no longer systematically disadvantaged.

Reorm o the governance structures o the international nancial institutions sothat they better refect the interests o the developing world.111

Towardsanewpolicyandactionagenda

The analysis presented in this report raises questions about theprod-pov consensus and its ability to deliver broad-based povertyeduction, and specically about:

Inthenearerterm

However, there is also much than can be done in the near-term. Incorporatingsome o the key actors that were highlighted in the earlier sections o this report,Figure 3 suggests some o the main strategies that we might expect rural people indierent contexts to adopt. It highlights again the range o strategies relevant to ruralpeople as they struggle against poverty and the act that arm intensication is onlyone amongst these. This gure should be seen as a heuristic, illustrating generalrelationships between key actors and likely strategies. It is not meant to guidedecision-making or strategy vis--vis particular areas or programmes.

First, to support Strategies 1 and 2, we consider those amily armers who maybe in a position to increase the productivity o their arming activities.

In order or Strategies 1 and 2 to yield the desired outcomes, depending on theparticular context, some or all o the elements associated with t he prod-pov policyagenda including investment in inrastructure, strengthening o agriculturalresearch and extension, reorm o input and output markets will be required. Thisis already a very broad agenda, and as previously indicated, it will require long-term,concerted and co-ordinated action by governments, donors, the private sector,NGOs, and rural people. In addition, economic policies that support sustainablegrowth in the urban and industrial sectors will be required in order to boost demandor locally produced agricultural products.

We have already expressed doubt about the ability o agricultural research todeliver the innovations that amily armers will require to enhance their productivity.There are two sides to this. The rst relates to the way that agricultural researchis conceptualised, organised and pursued. Specically, public-sector agriculturalresearch that aims to serve poor, amily armers needs to move rom a researchstance to something more akin to the private sector understanding o new productdevelopment.112Such a shit would have undamental implications or how researchis prioritised, organised, managed, monitored and evaluated (Box 2).

The second concern in relation to agricultural research is the need or a signicantlystronger ocus on what can be called the sustainable agriculture agenda. Earlierin this report, we highlighted the link between productivity enhancement and theuse o inorganic ertiliser, and the challenges posed by increasing petroleum prices.

Resource constraints

likely to be lifted by

state, private sector or

NGO intervention?

Having a source of

significant non-farm or

remittance income?

Likely strategies

YES YES YES 1. Farm intensification

NO YES 2. With appropriate support, farm intensification

NO YES 3. Continue to farm primarily for own consumption

NO 4. Migrate

5. Seek income in local rural economy


NO 4. Migrate

5. Seek income in local rural economy


NO 4. Migrate

Living in a context (in terms

of natural resources &

market access as suggested

by Wiggins & Proctor) that

presently supports farmintensification?

Interested in

investing in

farming as a

farming as a key

livelihoodcomponent?

Having control of or

access to the various

resources required for

intensification?

Figure3.Likelystrategiesoruralpeoplevis--visarmintensifcation.


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is true that both the national and international research systems have done andontinue to do some research on productivity enhancement that is not dependentn ertiliser. The knowledge generated rom these disparate activities, however,emains poorly integrated and largely inaccessible.

o begin to rectiy this situation, a concerted eort is now required to address thellowing questions:

What is extent o the knowledge base supporting sustainable productionsystems and particularly those not dependent on inorganic ertiliser andpesticides?

Where is relevant research being carried out, and by whom?

What are the actors constraining a greater ocus on these alternatives by theagricultural innovation system?

In the light o the above, how best can t he useul knowledge and technologythat armers will n

Documents

A Long Row to Hoe: Family farming and rural poverty in developing countries