Olympika XXIV (2015), 1-46 1

* Stephen R. Wenn is with the Department of Kinesiology and Physical Education, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada.

A Long and Winding RoadIOC/USOC Relations, Money,

and the Amateur Sports Act

Stephen R. Wenn*

In November 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed Public Law 95-606, known asthe Amateur Sports Act (ASA), into law. It represented the U.S. government’s legislativeresponse to the findings of the President’s Commission of Olympic Sports struck by Car-ter’s predecessor, President Gerald Ford, in 1975. Declining U.S. international sportresults in the Cold War era, the surging levels of success enjoyed by Soviet athletes, andothers from behind the “Iron Curtain,” as well as a dismal outcome for the United StatesOlympic Committee (USOC) at the 1972 Munich Olympics where administrative bun-gles and disappointing athlete performances grabbed the headlines, pushed Ford, andeventually federal legislators, to intervene. The central purpose of the ASA was tostreamline the administration of U.S. Olympic affairs, and place the USOC in a betterposition to administer U.S. interests as a means of effecting change to the Olympicresults table (by country). Less well known, or reported, at the time, were clauses thatstrengthened and broadened the USOC’s exclusive rights to the use of the Olympic five-ring logo in U.S. territory. USOC officials had lobbied Congress in advance of the pas-sage of the ASA for enhanced legal protection for the USOC’s rights to the use of Olym-pic marks and emblems. It would be a number of years before USOC officials trulyunderstood the revenue generating platform that it had also received through thesechanges to the ASA. In the 1980s, it employed the ASA as leverage to obtain significantshares of U.S. Olympic television revenue and money flowing from the fledgling TOP(The Olympic Program, now The Olympic Partners) global corporate sponsorship pro-gram. This paper charts the genesis of the ASA and the manner in which it steered IOC/USOC relations concerning Olympic revenue during the IOC presidencies of JuanAntonio Samaranch (1980-2001) and Jacques Rogge (2001-2013), and demonstratesthat the ASA served as a festering source of friction that damaged inter-organizationaltrust. Towards the close of Rogge’s presidency both sides took steps to address this issue,ultimately resulting in a means of distributing U.S. television and TOP funds acceptableto the USOC and IOC through 2040.

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Introduction

In October 2014, Oslo’s withdrawal from the 2022 Olympic Winter Games bidcompetition prompted consternation and hand wringing in Lausanne, Switzer-land where IOC officials considered the troubling reality that only two cities

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from the original slate of six finalists remained. Media commentary focused ona list of provocative IOC needs associated with hosting and how this might havecontributed to Norwegians’ sense of unease with Oslo’s bid, the earlier decisionsof Stockholm, Lviv, and Krakow to shelve their efforts, and that the two citiesremaining, Almaty and Beijing, were located in countries (Kazakhstan andChina) where public dissent is not prized. Cities believed the financial risk out-weighed the possible benefits. It was not a positive circumstance.1

In 2012, former United States Olympic Committee (USOC) President andthe impresario of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, Peter Ueberroth, issued awarning concerning the increasing financial burden tied to bidding for, andhosting, the Olympic Games. “I really hope the IOC can encourage future citiesby making the requirements much simpler, by requiring less expenditure, andthat the actual bid process is not so expensive,” observed Ueberroth, “it doesn’tserve anybody in the present world economy to have these Games costing theamounts they do.”2 The IOC, intoned Ueberroth, risked the less-than-robust bid-ding environment of the late 1970s when the intrusion of world geo-politics andthe pall cast by Montreal’s massive post-Olympics debt, constrained biddinginterest. Oslo’s 2014 decision, which mirrored those rendered in Stockholm,Krakow, and Lviv, confirmed Ueberroth’s prescience on this issue.

Judith Grant Long, a University of Michigan scholar who explored the bur-geoning infrastructural demands on Olympic host cities, highlighted the “IOC’sinterest in recalibrating the infrastructure required of host cities, since the viabil-ity of its mission, and its political power, is predicated on [a] strong candidatepool.”3 Jacques Rogge’s successor, IOC President Thomas Bach, was not tonedeaf on this matter and understood the necessity of confronting challenges tiedto the new bidding and hosting environments. Bach’s Olympic Agenda 2020think tank exercise, and its resulting 20 + 20 recommendations, aimed, in part,at dealing with the host city conundrum. His determination fostered a numberof policy decisions enacted at the IOC’s Extraordinary Session in December2014, decisions that heralded greater succour to prospective host cities.4

The IOC also needed to make the bidding environment more welcomingto U.S. bid cities. The USOC (and U.S. cities) stood removed from the 2018,2020, and 2022 bid processes in light of the embarrassing preliminary rounddefeats of New York (2012) and Chicago (2016), respectively, at IOC Sessionsin 2005 and 2009. Tension between the IOC and the USOC over Olympic rev-enue distribution (that ensnared Chicago),5 sparked by the IOC’s Europeanbloc’s frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations to alter the commer-cial revenue (television rights and global corporate sponsorship fees) distribu-tion formula, and the continuing leverage afforded to the USOC by theAmateur Sports Act (ASA, 1978) in these discussions, explained the USOC’sreticence.6 In the waning months of Jacques Rogge’s presidency, Rogge, IOCnegotiators, and their USOC counterparts (notably Executive Director Scott

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Blackmun and President Larry Probst) bridged this previously intractabledivide on the USOC’s share of future Olympic dollars through 2040, and theUSOC moved forward with prospective bid cities for 2024. By 2024, it willhave been 28 years since the U.S. hosted an Olympic Summer Games. Boston,the candidate city that prevailed recently in the 2014 American domestic bidcompetition, offered the IOC an opportunity to return the Games to U.S. soil,always a fruitful terrain for revenue generation. The inside track was Boston’s,but a groundswell of local opposition to the bid presented tangible concernsfor the Boston bidders, the USOC, and the IOC.7 Boston withdrew from theglobal competition. It was replaced by Los Angeles as the USOC-backed can-didate city, after hurried discussions between Los Angeles officials and theUSOC. Were the IOC to grant Los Angeles the right of hosting the 2024 Olym-pics, it would signal in the most powerful way that the two sides have realizedthat they really do need each other.8

The IOC, USOC, the Amateur Sports Act, and Money:

A Brief Overview

In the 1970s, the U.S. government sought to resolve administrative infightinginvolving the USOC, the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), and the NationalCollegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) as a means of enhancing the perfor-mance levels of future U.S. Olympic teams. The increasing dominance of ath-letes on the international stage who hailed from behind the “Iron Curtain”concerned U.S. government officials who feared for its effect on “Americanprestige abroad.”9 It was thought that this bureaucratic squabbling compro-mised America’s ability to compete with its arch-rival in the global sportingarena, the Soviet Union. The ASA established a new structure for the USOCand elevated its autonomy in the management of U.S. participation in interna-tional amateur sport. It also provided the USOC an avenue for revenue gener-ation by granting it exclusive use of Olympic marks and emblems in itsdomestic territory. However, years passed before the USOC realized that itpossessed the combination to the vault of U.S. Olympic dollars. In 1985, theUSOC secured 15% of TOP (The Olympic Program, now The Olympic Part-ners) global sponsor revenue in exchange for its consent for the inaugural setof multi-national companies to operationalize their TOP marketing platformsin the U.S.10 Later in the same year, emboldened by this financial windfall, theUSOC demanded accommodation financially if television advertisers wishedto continue the existing practice of employing the Olympic rings on U.S.Olympic telecasts.11 The IOC, faced with little legal recourse given that it hadnot previously obtained sufficient legal protection for Olympic marks andemblems, reached an accord with the USOC. The USOC, in asserting its rights

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to permit U.S. Olympic broadcasters to sublicense the use of Olympic marksand emblems to those companies purchasing advertising time, extracted 10%of the value of future U.S. Olympic television contracts from the IOC.12

Soon thereafter, the USOC pressed for a greater share of TOP revenuesand connived with federal politicians to further enhance its share of U.S-gen-erated Olympic television revenue. Again, the USOC was accommodated. TheIOC granted the USOC 18.5%, and later, 20% of TOP revenue, and 12.75% offuture U.S. Olympic television contracts commencing in 2004 (Athens).13 Thefinancial advantage enjoyed by the USOC over the world’s other NationalOlympic Committees (NOCs) pertaining to this revenue stream became anincreasing source of irritation for many IOC members, especially those basedin Europe. Juan Antonio Samaranch’s successor, Jacques Rogge, sought toamend the formula for distribution of Olympic revenue generated from TOPand the sale of U.S. Olympic television rights. The USOC, a privately fundedorganization, dependent upon these sources of revenue for 50% of its operat-ing budget, remained unmoved.14 Given the terms of the ASA, the USOCwielded the hammer in these discussions. However, as Rogge’s presidentialtenure approached its close, he and his IOC colleagues, knowing that the IOCneeded active U.S. bid cities, and the USOC, cognizant that its own efforts togenerate revenue were compromised by the absence of a U.S. host city since2002, were able to find common ground.15

This paper will examine how the Amateur Sports Act shaped IOC/USOCrelations on financial matters since its passage in 1978, specifically how theUSOC leveraged the ASA as a means of securing sizable shares of U.S. televi-sion contracts and revenue raised through the TOP corporate sponsorshipprogram. The breakdown and subsequent path to improved inter-organiza-tional relations through discussions that resulted in a revised distribution for-mula for U.S. television and TOP revenue will also be explored. Primarysources, including material from the IOC and USOC archives, and secondarysources will be examined.

The Origins of the Amateur Sports Act

With the stroke of his pen, President Jimmy Carter ended a three-year investi-gative and legislative process designed to improve U.S. fortunes in Olympiccompetition when he signed Public Law 95-606 in November 1978. DecliningU.S. Olympic performance during the Cold War contrasted with the increas-ing levels of success achieved by athletes from the Soviet Union; this circum-stance was exacerbated by numerous breakdowns in the management of U.S.participation in the 1972 Munich Olympics (where the Soviets ultimately out-stripped the U.S. Olympic team by seventeen gold medals), and triggered a

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reform process launched by President Gerald Ford. In 1975, he established thePresident’s Commission on Olympic Sports (PCOS) as a lever to address thedysfunctional administration of U.S. Olympic sport, reflected most notably byinternecine squabbles between the NCAA and AAU. Ford’s initiative, con-cludes Thomas Hunt, completed the pivot from the approach favoured by hispredecessors Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, each of whom prizedmass sport participation as a means of improving Americans’ fitness, to federalgovernment praxis, hinted at under Richard Nixon in the aftermath of theMunich debacle, dedicated to enhancing elite athlete training and Olympicmedal counts.16 Nixon and Ford sought “a powerful federally chartered butprivately-operated United States Olympic Committee” as the principal meansof nurturing future athletic success.17

In his comprehensive analysis of the scope of the ASA, James Nafzigerhighlighted the administrative inertia that impeded the USOC in the execu-tion of its mandate, the NCAA’s withdrawal from the organization in 1972(until Congress intervened to streamline its administrative structure throughthe ASA), the Munich failure, and the significant results of the legislative pro-cess. Central elements of the ASA included: 1) the AAU’s loss of control overeight Olympic sports; 2) the fact that an organization could serve as theNational Sport Governing Body (NSGB) for only one sport; 3) the establish-ment of the USOC as the pre-eminent coordinating body related to interna-tional amateur athletic competition; 4) details on an athlete’s rights and anarbitration process; and, 5) the USOC’s assigned responsibility to developsport programs nation-wide, with a concomitant role in fund raising.18 Inter-estingly, one of the most important elements of the ASA in relation to theUSOC’s future revenue generation efforts received no attention.

Nafziger, writing in the early 1980s, drew no attention to the assignmentto the USOC of the exclusive rights to the use of the Olympic rings in U.S. ter-ritory. When one considers the size and scope of the USOC’s operations in2015 (its yearly budget was approximately $200 million),19 and the fundsrequired to support its efforts, it is likely the most historically important aspectof the ASA. The iconic Olympic logo, as a possible lever for future revenuegeneration, was not an element of Washington legislators’ thinking; however,they were concerned about the possible expropriation of the IOC’s property.At the time, USOC funding was discussed and debated only in the context ofthe amount of seed money that Congress might funnel to the USOC to launcha new era of U.S. Olympic participation geared to advancing the nation’s hopesin sporting confrontations with the Soviets and East Germans.20

Writing a decade after the passage of the ASA, PCOS Executive DirectorMichael Harrigan explained how the original $30 million in appropriationswas later drawn down to $16 million, and that this money was only transferredultimately to the USOC as a means to save it from bankruptcy at the time of

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the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.21 The entire exercise testedHarrigan’s patience and left him to conclude that while there were individualexceptions, “Liberals don’t give a darn if the U.S. beats the Soviets but areamenable to appropriating money for Olympic sport. Conservatives, on theother hand, want to clobber the Soviets but don’t want to give Olympic sports afederal dime!”22

The decision to tweak the terms of the USOC’s control of the Olympicrings was made in response to suggestions from USOC President Robert Kanein his brief submitted to the Senate Commerce Committee in October 1977.Kane, the former Director (1944-1971) and Dean (1971-1976) of Cornell Uni-versity Athletics, did not advocate modifications as a means of furthering theUSOC’s fund raising efforts, but he offered it as a way of enhancing protectionagainst the unauthorized use of the Olympic marks and emblems. His requestfocused on a desire to refine certain measures (Section 9) in Public Law 805,passed by Congress in September 1950. Public Law 805 resulted in the incor-poration of the United States Olympic Association (its name changed toUnited States Olympic Committee in 1961) and rendered it unlawful for enti-ties other than the USOA (or those granted permission to employ them) to usethe Olympic shield, the five interlocking rings, the words “Olympic” and“Olympiad,” and the motto, “Citius, Altius, Fortius.”23

A long-standing showdown between Avery Brundage, President of theUSOA, and Paul H. Helms, owner and founder of Los Angeles-based HelmsBakery, who acquired exclusive rights to the use of Olympic marks and emblemsin conjunction with his company’s role as bread supplier to the 1932 Los AngelesOlympic Village,24 concluded with the passage of Public Law 805. In 1932, beforeU.S. Olympic officials even seriously contemplated the need to protect Olympicinsignia, Helms had pursued official trademark status throughout the UnitedStates for these identifying marks. Though this application was not approveduntil 1938, he received permission to proceed on a provisional basis.25 In theyears following the Los Angeles Olympics, Helms, who founded his company in1931, expanded his production facilities and successfully peddled Helms Olym-pic Bread with packaging that brandished distinctive Olympic insignia.26 A sportand Olympic booster, Helms established the Helms Athletic Foundation,27 and atthe USOA’s request, dispatched one of his firm’s bakers to Berlin to managebread production for athletes representing the U.S. in the 1936 Summer Olym-pics.28 However, Helms’ commercial activities linking his company’s bread withthe Olympic Movement eventually drew Brundage’s heated ire.

In 1938, Brundage implored Helms to cease and desist from what heviewed as the continued exploitation of Olympic marks and emblems, but hefell silent until he renewed his campaign after World War II through proxies(and Brundage’s American Olympic confederates) such as J. Lyman Binghamand John Terry McGovern. Helms’ donation of $10,000 to the 1948 U.S. Olym-

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pic team, and his efforts to raise an additional $50,000 within Los Angeles’business community did not assuage Brundage, whose disgust for the com-mercial exploitation of the Olympic Movement was well known. Despite hav-ing the stronger legal case, an aging Helms surrendered much of his position(he gave up his legal right to the use of the Olympic rings and the motto,“Citius Altius, Fortius,” but retained use of the word, “Olympic,” and a USOAmark, the Olympic shield). He pledged to take no legal action when the USOAmoved forward with registering the Olympic marks. Much to Brundage’s cha-grin, Public Law 805 afforded Helms the legal right to continue these prac-tices, given he had been lawfully doing so prior to September 1950.29

Nearly three decades later, Kane sought to secure further USOC controlover Olympic marks and emblems, beyond remedy sought through criminalproceedings alone. He asked the Senate Commerce Committee to grant theUSOC exclusive rights to sublicense the use of Olympic marks and emblems,permission to initiate court injunctions against individuals or companiesfound to be making unauthorized use of those same properties, and theopportunity “to recover the funds or property obtained by anyone in violationof the statute, together with the costs and disbursements of legal action,including reasonable attorneys’ fees.”30 It does not appear that in any mannerKane requested these amendments as a means of establishing a significant,future revenue generation platform for his organization. Harrigan’s analysissupports this conclusion. The ASA, Harrigan wrote in 1989, “brought trade-mark language into conformance with current trademark law and strength-ened the USOC’s ability to enforce the protection of its names and symbols.”31

The prospect of criminal proceedings alone did not serve as a sufficient deter-rent for transgressors, but the possibility of criminal proceedings in conjunc-tion with a financial penalty motivated the USOC in its effort more effectivelyto protect the rings from commercial exploitation.32 Unfortunately, from anIOC perspective, Killanin and Berlioux were either unaware of the impendinglegislation or failed to comprehend its potential long-term ramifications. Noone understood the extent of financial clout that President Carter and Con-gress gifted to the USOC when the Amateur Sports Act became law. In a fewyears, as the IOC surely came to realize, the two partners would have to sharethe fruits of the commercial windfalls.

Juan Antonio Samaranch and the

IOC’s Fiscal Reality in the Early 1980s

Juan Antonio Samaranch pursued the IOC presidency with determination andpurpose virtually from the time that he was co-opted by then-President AveryBrundage in 1966. He spent time on the IOC Executive Board, the launching

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pad for any serious run at the office, and successfully sought out the positionof the IOC’s Head of Protocol. This afforded him an opportunity to becomeacquainted more intimately with IOC members, as the particular portfolioserved as the organization’s conduit for communication with the membership.He gathered vital support from Eastern Europe by securing appointment asSpain’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union in the prelude to the 1980 MoscowOlympics. A wave of Latin appointments to key leadership positions in globalsport, such as those achieved by João Havelange (Fédération Internationale deFootball Association) and Mario Vázquez Raña (Association of NationalOlympic Committees), and alliances with both individuals, served him well.The changing tides towards Latin control of the levers of power in global sport,away from its previous Anglo-Saxon axis continued within months of Sama-ranch’s own success with Primo Nebiolo’s triumph in the chase for the Presi-dency of the International Amateur Athletics Federation. Samaranch crafted awell-orchestrated campaign, one backed strongly by a kingmaker in the sportindustry, Horst Dassler, head of the Adidas empire.33 But exactly what kind ofchalice did he seize?

Buffeted by the combined effect of world geopolitics, the Munich tragedy,Montreal’s financial debacle, and the absence of discernible enthusiasm inmajor cities for hosting a Summer Olympic festival given burgeoning costs, itwas a troubled time for guardians of the Olympic Movement. “In 1980, theOlympic Movement was under sustained attack from political powers andwas, indeed, a virtual hostage to world tensions,” concluded former IOC VicePresident and Marketing Commission Chair, Richard Pound. “It was dis-united, well short of universal and had no financial resources to give it theautonomy and independence it needed to resist political pressures.”34 “Every-body was writing the Olympic obituary,” averred Michael Payne, the IOC’s for-mer Marketing Director, who worked closely with Pound in the 1980s and1990s to reconfigure the IOC’s policies regarding revenue generation.35 Thechallenge ahead was daunting, and Samaranch found himself overwhelmedwithin days of his triumph at the IOC’s 83rd Session in Moscow in 1980. “I wasdepressed after the election. I felt so alone, felt that I couldn’t cope with all thedemands of the job, with the sizeable problems that I knew were there and hadto be handled,” confessed Samaranch. “It was a feeling that lasted maybe twoweeks, during which it even crossed my mind how I might withdraw.”36 Hepersevered and trained his sights on the IOC’s shaky financial foundation, oneof its most pressing problems.

In 1974, Samaranch’s predecessor, Lord Killanin, identified the IOC’sdependency on television rights fees for 98% of its income. This prompted himto take action towards refining the organization’s knowledge of the televisionindustry and negotiations practices.37 His principal tool for accomplishing thisgoal was the IOC Television Sub-Committee, formed in 1974 as an offshoot of

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the Finance Commission, headed by IOC Director Monique Berlioux. By1977, Killanin determined that the IOC should take a seat at the negotiationstable with officials from Organizing Committees and television network exec-utives to protect the IOC’s interests and financial security, even though thispolicy was not enacted until the 1984 cycle of negotiations (and even then withminimal success). He grew weary of successive Organizing Committees inMunich, Innsbruck, Montreal, Lake Placid, and Moscow signing contractssubject to IOC approval that undermined the distribution formula for televi-sion revenue established by the IOC, thereby limiting the defined shares forthe IOC, National Olympic Committees (NOCs), and International Sport Fed-erations (ISFs).38

Killanin’s initiative empowered the IOC to take a more active role in nego-tiations in the 1980s, but Samaranch knew that its dependence on televisionmoney remained both static and troubling. When he arrived in Lausanne fol-lowing the Moscow Olympics, the IOC possessed “less than $200,000 inliquidity, and just $2 million in assets.”39 Samaranch soon informed IOC mem-bers that “the financing of the IOC is a matter of some urgency.”40 He formedthe Commission for the New Sources of Financing in 1982, and tasked it toexplore possible avenues for the pursuit of a greater measure of financialautonomy. Horst Dassler monitored this development and pounced, in theprocess capitalizing on his previously nurtured relationship with Samaranch.Dassler pressed the IOC to bundle Olympic marketing rights to a select num-ber of multinational companies for all active Olympic nations through hisnewly formed company, International Sport and Leisure (ISL).41 Such a planoffered the companies access to these countries without the need to negotiatemarketing contracts with individual NOCs. The pursuit of individual deals onthe part of prospective Olympic sponsors, stated Richard Pound, marked “aconvoluted and time-consuming process, inefficient to the point of beinguneconomic.”42 TOP took shape, at least in a conceptual sense, received IOCapproval at its New Delhi Session in 1983,43 and offered the IOC needed diver-sification of its revenue base. But, how might the NOCs view this venturegiven they previously controlled this form of revenue generation in theirrespective territories?

The USOC Exacts a Price for ISL’s Access to the U.S. Market

Of the dozen or so markets that offered significant allure to companies tar-geted by IOC and ISL officials, the U.S. was paramount. The vast majority ofNOCs around the globe, specifically the vast majority without well-developedmarketing programs, viewed the TOP program as “found money” and “hag-gled” for their individual shares of funds that would be channeled to the

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NOCs.44 While this haggling proved a time consuming and tedious process,45

resistance to the project was heightened in Great Britain and the United States,homes to well-developed marketing programs. Officials in Colorado Springsbelieved that the majority of sponsors signing up with TOP (correctly as his-tory reveals) would be U.S.-based, and that it denoted an encroachment on itsmarketing territory. Such sponsors were prospective USOC clients.46 Within24 hours of the IOC Session’s decision in New Delhi, Muriel Cohen, Vice-Pres-ident of Spencer Marketing Services, the company responsible for the USOC’smarketing plan, registered her curiosity concerning the IOC’s plan and soughta meeting with ISL representatives.47

Without the USOC’s consent, TOP would have been still-born.48 The IOCand ISL hoped to have terms of the program finalized with all NOCs on boardby the end of 1983. The USOC did not share this sense of urgency or enthusi-asm for the project. The calendar turned to 1984. When pressed by numerousphone calls and letters from ISL Deputy Managing Director, Jürgen Lenz,USOC Executive Director F. Don Miller informed ISL that further discussionswould be delayed as the USOC’s attention was fully drawn to problems associ-ated with a possible Soviet boycott of the rapidly approaching Los AngelesOlympics. Meanwhile, Organizing Committees in Seoul and Calgary were sti-fled in their efforts to align their sponsorship plans with the new venture,especially with regard to the U.S. market. Frustration mounted in Lausanne,Lucerne (home to ISL), Seoul, and Calgary. A vexed Samaranch intervened,appealing to USOC President William Simon in June 1984 to engage in discus-sions.

Simon had little enthusiasm for Dassler’s plan. Having been elected to suc-ceed Robert Kane as USOC President in January 1981, Simon fielded anentreaty from Dassler who was keen to put forward ISL’s marketing conceptfor his consideration. Simon viewed the proposal as one that would realigncommercial revenue prospects among NOCs, in effect a “share the wealth”plan that would provide the preponderance of financial benefit to the smallerNOCs at the expense of the established ones. He also thought the USOCwould be sacrificing rights enshrined in the ASA. Meeting with Dassler atSimon’s New Jersey home, together with Don Miller, the Adidas boss pre-sented a kickback offer of $5-10 million to him and Miller should they signalthe USOC’s consent. Simon asked Dassler to leave his home.49

Simon’s disturbing initial encounter with Dassler hampered progress.Months passed before USOC officials met with ISL executives. Even then, dis-cussions offered few tangible results. ISL sought an extension from Samaranchof the revised deadline for an agreement, that is, from September 30, 1984, toMarch 31, 1985. Lenz and his ISL colleagues were well aware that a number ofNOCs that remained on the sidelines awaited the final disposition of theUSOC before they themselves offered a firm commitment. His patience tested,

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Samaranch consented to the extension, demonstrating the importance heattached to diversifying the IOC’s revenue base.50

In early September 1984, the USOC pushed its negotiation envelopeacross the table. Don Miller indicated a willingness to execute an agreementon the USOC’s behalf in exchange for 30% of the revenue derived from theTOP program. Miller’s 15-year tenure as an USOC executive, with a dozenyears (1973-1985) as Executive Director, witnessed a massive shift in theUSOC’s quadrennial budget from $4 million to $88 million. “A tall, dignifiedman, given to plain talk and chain-smoking,” Miller was a World War II U.S.army veteran, recipient of a Bronze Star and of two Purple Hearts in the Euro-pean theatre. He had been an NCAA boxing champion at the University ofWisconsin, and he was no push-over.51 Subsequent negotiations resulted in theUSOC’s share being set at 15%, with accords cementing the relationshipsbetween the USOC, ISL, Calgary, Seoul, and the IOC consummated in lateMay 1985.52 Interestingly, those events did not unfold on William Simon’swatch; his term ended three months earlier. His successor, Robert Helmick,became the new guardian of the USOC’s interests. Richard Pound directed theIOC’s efforts in the final stages of negotiations, given Samaranch’s growingconviction that Monique Berlioux was overmatched in the management of thefile.53 Most critically, the ASA provided the USOC with meaningful access towhat swiftly emerged as an impressive revenue generation program, fuelled bythe sweeping effects of globalization and the accompanying search by multina-tional corporations for global marketing platforms. Dassler’s erstwhile confi-dence in his vision proved justified.

Olympic Television Revenue and USOC Aspirations

It was a cool seven degrees Celsius in Lausanne on March 26, 1986, with inter-mittent periods of drizzle, but from a USOC perspective, it was a day of bril-liant sunshine. The USOC’s sustained campaign for a share of U.S. Olympictelevision revenue reached its zenith. On this day, the USOC and IOC inkedthe Broadcast Marketing Agreement (BMA). It channeled 10% of all U.S.Olympic television contracts to the USOC commencing in 1992. These futurepayments were pledged in exchange for the USOC’s consent to the use of theOlympic rings by the respective U.S. Winter and Summer Olympic broadcast-ers, as well as companies purchasing advertising time on their telecasts. Nego-tiations that culminated with the signing ceremony for the BMA coincidedwith the IOC’s struggle to conclude a U.S. television contract with the NationalBroadcasting Company (NBC) for the 1988 Seoul Olympics. At the IOC’sinsistence, rather than applying the 10% deduction to Seoul’s $300 million dealwith the NBC concluded on the same day, or retroactively to Calgary’s record-

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setting $309 million contract with the American Broadcasting Corporation(ABC) reached two years earlier, the Seoul and Calgary Organizing Commit-tees and the IOC each transferred $5 million to the USOC for the same privi-leges granted to future broadcasters and advertisers. Once again, the ASA paidmajor dividends for the USOC.

The path to such an agreement began years before, and again, RobertKane, as he had done in the formulation of the ASA in 1978, figured promi-nently in events (though he stepped down as USOC President in 1981).Although Barney, Wenn, and Martyn detailed the IOC’s approach to these dis-cussions,54 information recently gleaned from Robert Kane’s personal papershoused at the USOC Archives in Colorado Springs assists in better under-standing the calculated manner in which he and the USOC pursued IOC con-cessions.55

The morning following Jack Kelly’s election to the office of the USOCPresident following the conclusion of William Simon’s term in February 1985,Kelly and Kane met for breakfast. Kane was perturbed with the flow of U.S.television dollars out of the country dating back to the Moscow Olympics.NBC committed millions of dollars to the Moscow Olympics for U.S. televi-sion rights, but the money left the country with “the performers, our U.S. ath-letes (USOC) receiving nothing,” concluded Kane. He was committed toaddressing this “inequity.” He temporarily halted his efforts because the USOCshared in the massive surplus from the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics as a resultof its partnership with the Los Angeles Organizing Committee. Kelly grantedKane permission to pursue 10% of the value of the U.S. television contracts. Afew weeks later, Kelly, at age fifty-seven, died suddenly while jogging.56 Kanedutifully persevered. He approached ABC and NBC to plead his case for thetransfer of 10% of their 1988 U.S. Olympic television contracts to the USOC.57

Predictably, the television executives considered this to be a difficult action inthat “they didn’t want to interfere in a matter they would consider aberrent[sic] to their contract with the IOC.” The dogged Kane adopted an alternativeapproach and leaned on a long-time friend for guidance, fellow Cornell alum-nus Barber Conable, a retired member of the House of Representatives (NewYork’s 30th District) who had recently concluded some twenty years of serviceon Capitol Hill.58

Conable, a World War II Marine Corps veteran who saw action at IwoJima, served as the ranking Republican member of the House Ways and MeansCommittee for the final eight years of his tenure in Washington.59 He steeredKane to Representatives Sam Gibbons (D-Florida) and William Frenzel (R-Minnesota), both of whom served on the House Ways and Means Committee.Kane lobbied them to consider a 10% excise tax on future U.S. television con-tracts when the Games were not staged in U.S. territory60 rationalized by theposition that the U.S. Olympic team “was a commodity sent abroad for the

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benefit of other nations.”61 Nothing materialized from these conversations.Conable, a friend of the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee andWashington power broker, Dan Rostenkowski, pledged to prepare the neces-sary brief for another member of the Ways and Means Committee, MichiganRepublican Guy Vander Jagt, who subsequently took up the cause at the Com-mittee-level. But, progress stalled.62

USOC Executive Director George Miller, Don Miller’s successor, a formerdeputy Commander of Strategic Air Command and Vietnam combat pilotwho assumed his USOC post in 1985,63 consulted Kane, seeking permission todeal directly with the IOC on the matter. Kane, who was never concerned withthe manner in which the USOC got its 10%, gave his consent to thisapproach.64 In September 1985, the USOC informed the 1988 Calgary andSeoul Organizing Committees that it required compensation for “its consentfor Olympic telecasts to occur in its territory using Olympic symbols,emblems, network composite logo and general Olympic designations.” It was,in Richard Pound’s view, a “new position,” one with serious financial implica-tions for the IOC.65 Pound’s discussions with Robert Helmick and USOC law-yer Richard Kline did not shake the USOC’s resolve to pursue its path.66 TheIOC’s Head of Legal Affairs, Howard Stupp, believed the IOC would have tonegotiate with the USOC given the secure legal basis of its claim, but neverthe-less queried Samaranch, “why is the USOC now making the claim? Are theygenuinely concerned with the well-being of their marketing program and arethey trying to protect what is rightfully theirs? Or, are they just beinggreedy?”67

What irritated Stupp, and other IOC officials, including Samaranch, wasthat the USOC’s manoeuvre compounded ill feelings arising from the USOC’srefusal to share a portion of the surplus from the Los Angeles Olympic Gamesto offset travel costs of the participating NOCs. NOCs had delivered addi-tional athletes to compensate for the loss of competitors from the boycottingCommunist bloc.68 William Simon and Don Miller used the $110 million toestablish the U.S. Olympic Foundation (now, U.S. Olympic Endowment), anon-profit funding agency.69 The IOC asserted that such a surplus would havebeen impossible without the support of the Olympic teams that expendedgreater revenue in delivering more athletes to Los Angeles. Samaranch force-fully questioned USOC officials on this matter at the IOC Executive Board’smeeting in Calgary in February 1985.70 Still, Samaranch believed that Stupp’sthought on the necessity for negotiations was well considered. He tasked Rich-ard Pound to seek a resolution. “I quite understand your concern,” Samaranchwrote to Pound, “and my personal point of view is that we should try to reachan agreement with USOC before the respective postures become tougher. Ibelieve you are the right person to propose a project of agreement for which Irely completely upon you.”71

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The answer to Stupp’s question concerning the timing of the USOC’s ini-tiative has to do with the lack of progress in Washington, despite the energiesexpended by Kane and Conable. USOC officials would have recoiled at theIOC’s charge that their efforts reflected greed. Kane informed members ofCongress that the USOC was the only NOC that did not receive governmentfunding. And, he asserted that U.S. money essentially funded the OlympicMovement, citing ABC’s purchase of U.S. television rights to Los Angeles for$225 million, with a mere $61 million paid by broadcasters in all other globaltelevision markets.72 However, slumbering legislation soon re-emerged, andGuy Vander Jagt sponsored H.R. 3770 in the House of Representatives onNovember 18, 1985. Ultimately, the 10% excise tax outlined in the bill wastransferred to the Tax Reform Act of 1985.73

Robert Kane and George Miller concluded that the USOC’s two-prongedapproach, whether by design or good fortune, shifted the leverage in negotia-tions in its favour, once the prospect for the excise tax’s inclusion in the TaxReform Act of 1985 emerged. Kane believed that the revival of the excise taxpushed the IOC in the direction of an agreement. “We had strived unavailinglyto convince [the IOC]…. to grant the USOC a 10 percent share of US TVrights fees, but it steadfastly demurred. When the Tax Reform Act of 1985appeared ripe for passage,” wrote Kane, “blockage was suddenly and unexpect-edly released.”74 It was an interpretation shared by George Miller.75

In reality, the IOC was committed to a negotiated agreement with theUSOC in late September and early October 1985, weeks before the introduc-tion of Vander Jagt’s H.R. 3770, to judge by the exchange of thoughts betweenSamaranch, Pound, and Stupp. It was not a matter of ‘if ’ an agreement with theUSOC would be pursued, given the IOC’s understanding that the USOC’sclaim rested on a solid, but admittedly frustrating legal foundation, one thatwould be challenging for a Swiss organization to contest in a U.S. court, butrather ‘when’ and ‘how much’ should be conceded to the USOC. Yet, Poundconfirmed that the prospect of the excise tax was a “relevant factor” and likelyexpedited an agreement. What should not be forgotten is that the USOC, too,was motivated to reach an agreement without the ultimate involvement of U.S.federal politicians. If money flowed to the USOC from Congress, perhaps thelevers of Congressional control over certain elements of the USOC’s opera-tions would also be extended.76 A concern with protecting its autonomy pro-vided the USOC with excellent reasons to bargain, as well.

Pound and the IOC were unwilling to accede to the USOC’s demand for20% of the value of the U.S. television contracts for Calgary, Seoul, andbeyond.77 Ultimately, he, and fellow IOC members Julian Roosevelt (U.S.) andJames Worrall (Canada), who assisted in the negotiations with USOC officials,recommended to the IOC Executive Board that a 10% payment on all futurecontracts be settled directly with the USOC, but with the caveat that the

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USOC lobby Congressional authorities to remove the excise tax from the TaxReform Act of 1985.78 Pound and IOC officials wished to pre-empt any excisetax increases by Congress in the future. The USOC Executive Committee, atthe urging of George Miller, who cited the need to foster good relations withthe IOC, complied with the IOC’s terms and communicated its desire to fed-eral legislators.79

Pound’s delay in moving forward with this recommendation was tied tothe nettlesome U.S. television negotiations for the Seoul Olympics. Adepressed negotiating environment provided a deep blow to Seoul organizerswho looked for $500 million as opposed to the $300 million coaxed out ofNBC through Pound’s diligent work.80 Pound wanted to shelter Calgary andSeoul from significant financial concessions. The fact that the Seoul/NBC con-tract was signed the same day as the BMA was no coincidence. Still, in lessthan a year, the USOC successfully leveraged the ASA to ensure that 15% of allfuture TOP revenue and 10% of future U.S. Olympic television contractswould be delivered to Colorado Springs. For an organization struggling toattain a measure of financial stability in the 1970s, the USOC’s revenue gener-ation capacity received an immeasurable boost. IOC officials could rationalizethese concessions in consideration of the overall growth of commercial reve-nue available with the advent of TOP and the continuing escalation in thevalue of television contracts, not to mention the percentage of this moneyemanating from U. S. corporate sources; however, if IOC officials believed thatthe USOC’s financial ambitions had been fulfilled, they were mistaken.

The USOC, U.S. Olympic Television Money, and Congress

Though the USOC lobbied for 30% of global TOP revenue, it eventually settledfor 15%. With ensuing TOP cycles, the USOC argued, its participation necessi-tated the transfer to Colorado Springs of an enhanced percentage of the gener-ated revenue. While IOC/USOC discussions on these matters were not tension-free, and the USOC’s share grew to 18.5% and then topped out at 20% of totalTOP revenues directed to all NOCs, the IOC understood that without theUSOC’s participation, the TOP program, and the money that it produced for theworld’s other NOCs, would not exist.81 TOP deliberations aside, the USOC’sshare of U.S. television revenue prompted a far more contentious discussion.

USOC officials pressed for 20% of U.S. television contracts in 1989 and1990, but the IOC, represented by Richard Pound, turned aside these entreat-ies. A strong signal that Congress might take renewed interest in the subjectemerged when the Brookings Institution published an article focusing on thedisparity in money paid by U.S. broadcasters, and those in other regions, espe-cially heavily populated Western Europe.82 For instance, the 1988 Calgary

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negotiations for U.S. television rights, managed by Richard Pound and BarryFrank, proved wildly successful through the utilization of a sealed bid processto secure ABC’s eye-popping $309 million offer. However, Juan AntonioSamaranch, committed to blanket television coverage in Europe, was unwill-ing to explore the possibilities offered by emerging private television compa-nies in the region.83 He did not transfer control of European negotiations toPound, who he knew would introduce such rival bidders to the process as ameans of lessening this disparity that angered USOC officials and U.S. televi-sion executives. Samaranch retained control over European negotiations alongwith Marc Hodler, a member of the IOC Executive Board. EBU acquired theWestern European rights to the 1988 Calgary Olympics for $5.7 million.84

A well-rehearsed approach played out in EBU’s discussions with Hodlerand Samaranch. The EBU argued that it operated as a public broadcaster solelyon money provided by federal governments within its territory, and thereforedid not have the revenue resources available to U.S. networks through paidadvertising. EBU’s head of sports programming, Richard Bunn, matter-of-factly informed Robert Lawrence and Jeffrey Pellegrom (authors of the afore-mentioned Brookings Institution article entitled, “Fool’s Gold: How AmericaPays to Lose in the Olympics”) that “unlike the Americans, we don’t bid for therights to the games; we negotiate.”85 CBS shelled out $243 million for U.S.rights to the 1992 Albertville Games, while EBU paid a mere $18 million. TheUSOC denied any involvement in the production of Lawrence and Pellegrom’sarticle, but Lausanne officials were suspicious.86 Within the IOC’s ExecutiveBoard chambers, a concerned Pound lamented EBU’s “sweetheart deals.”87

Before the close of 1989, additional U.S. and Western European Olympic con-tracts further eroded his ability to deal with the USOC. What is more, the con-tracts provided additional cause for Congress, with prodding from the USOCand U.S. television executives, to take action.88

However, as the contest to stage the 1996 Summer Olympics entered itslate stages in 1990, the USOC pulled back from applying further pressure onthe IOC. Officials in Lausanne realized that the USOC did not wish to poisonthe atmosphere with financial demands while Atlanta’s bid was under consid-eration.89 Within a month of the IOC’s decision to award Atlanta the right tohost the Centennial Games in September, 1990, the effects of lobbying on Cap-itol Hill by executives from the U.S television industry and the USOC burstforth in the House of Representatives in the form of the Olympic TelevisionBroadcast Act, sponsored by Tom McMillen (D-Maryland), a former Olym-pian in basketball.

From an IOC perspective, three troubling elements formed the founda-tion for the McMillen Bill: 1) U.S. television broadcasters could not interruptlive coverage of an Olympic event with a commercial; 2) The responsibility fornegotiating U.S. Olympic television contracts would be transferred from the

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IOC to the USOC; and 3) U.S. television networks would be granted anexemption from the Sherman Anti-trust Act, thereby permitting them to sub-mit a pooled bid. Pound sounded the alarm bells in a memo to Samaranch fol-lowing a trip to Washington for a face-to-face meeting with McMillen inJanuary 1991.90 Any limitations on advertising would most certainly cast a pallover offers from U.S. television networks because of the restraint placed ontheir ability to recoup their rights fee from the sale of commercial time. Sec-ondly, if the USOC controlled negotiations, it could set its percentage share ofthe contract, and it surely would be greater than 10%. Finally, a pooled bidfrom the U.S. networks, effectively one absent of a competitive process, wouldsurely have a deleterious effect on the amount of money flowing from the U.S.market.91

Pound was a realist. He understood that the McMillen Bill resulted fromSamaranch’s unwillingness to tackle the alarming disparity between sums paidby the U.S. networks and those in other television markets. “If the networksare really involved in this,” wrote Pound in reference to the call for an exemp-tion to the Sherman Anti-trust Act, “then our problem will be exacerbated[and] until we show that other parts of the world are approaching U.S. levelson a per capita or other appropriate measure, we can expect little sympathyfrom within the U.S.”92

McMillen argued that the U.S., in any number of global ventures, includ-ing military actions such as the one pending in the Middle East (to dislodgeSaddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait), shouldered a disproportionate finan-cial load. His bill, he believed, would have a trickle-down effect for U.S. con-sumers in that prices charged for products by those companies who wererequired to pay immense sums for advertising time on Olympic telecasts (inlight of the needs of the broadcasters paying large rights fees) would be con-strained. Pound framed his hour-long session with McMillen as “cordial” and“worthwhile.” Discussion of these matters with McMillen “without the filter ofthe USOC” proved useful, he recounted. Pound appraised McMillen of theUSOC’s current share of Olympic commercial revenue and its unique positionin this regard compared to the world’s other NOCs. Pound floated the possiblenegative reaction of IOC members resulting from his bill as they prepared tovote on the host city for the 1998 Olympic Winter Games, specifically inregard to Salt Lake City’s candidacy. Reflecting later, Pound mused, might it betime to hire someone to monitor developments in Washington with an eye toproviding advice as to how best to protect the IOC’s interests? The exercise,asserted Pound, demonstrated that “our interests at this time are not/not thesame as those of the USOC.”93

At the IOC Executive Board meetings in April and June 1991, USOC Pres-ident (and IOC Executive Board member) Robert Helmick94 offered a concil-iatory tone in his remarks concerning the U.S. television market and the

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McMillen Bill. Helmick and Pound agreed on one thing. The sums demandedfrom the U.S. market stood in stark contrast to those in Europe, and this real-ity played a significant role in fostering McMillen’s initiative. Helmick believedthat changes in the European television market would have a corrective effecton this disparity in the future. However, his statement that “it was always aconcern to everyone within the Olympic Movement when a government triedto intervene in sport in any way,”95 belied the USOC’s contribution to the craft-ing of the bill, confirmed by McMillen in his meeting with Pound in January.To Pound’s suggestion that the IOC employ a lobbyist in Washington to safe-guard the IOC’s interests, Helmick was resolute: “To seek separate representa-tion in order to attempt to lobby against this bill,” stated Helmick, “wouldproduce very negative effects, as it would in any country if an internationalorganization attempted to become involved in internal politics without callingupon the cooperation of the domestic organization.” Helmick concluded that“it was the USOC’s considered judgement that this could be controlled.”96 Hiscomments reflected that the USOC had perhaps, albeit late in the process,grasped just how much the McMillen Bill would have suppressed the value ofU.S. Olympic television rights, and ultimately its own percentage of proceeds.

The McMillen Bill disappeared from Washington’s legislative agenda in1991. This favourable development for the IOC was linked with the results ofthe IOC’s negotiations with EBU for the European rights to Atlanta’s Centen-nial Games. The key development that pushed EBU to pay $250 million forthese rights to the 1996 Olympics was the competing $300 million offer fromUniversum Film AG (UFA), a German private television network.97

The IOC moved beyond jointly negotiating contracts with the OCOGs inthe wake of the Seoul Olympics, although host city representatives retained anadvisory capacity. Atlanta, for obvious reasons, desired maximum revenuefrom television rights. At the IOC Executive Board meeting in September1991, Pound sensed his boss’s lack of resolve in exploiting the new negotiatingenvironment in Europe when Samaranch opined that perhaps the $90 millionpaid by EBU for the 1992 Barcelona Games might be improved.98 Samaranchextolled EBU’s past production efforts and its ability to guarantee blanket cov-erage in Europe. He “did not think the IOC should be influenced by OCOGsand abandon EBU for private networks which would not cover the Gamesproperly.”99 Pound hammered home his central argument, primarily for Sama-ranch’s benefit: “The IOC could no longer have all its eggs in one basket anddepend almost entirely on U.S. rights. It was also not right for the U.S. to pay adisproportionate price for the rights. The IOC had to broaden its base.” TheIOC’s past approach, voiced Pound, lay at the root of its troubles with theUSOC concerning television money. “The USA knew that the IOC had takenadvantage of it,” and the McMillen Bill had been but one result. “The worlds oftelevision and business had changed,” continued Pound, “everything had

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changed, except for the IOC, which was still selling TV rights as in the1960s.”100

Marc Hodler was more hopeful. He believed blanket coverage and addi-tional revenue were possible.101 The $250 million contract reached with EBUwithin a few weeks provided noticeable relief for Pound, who long campaignedfor a different approach in negotiations,102 and a financial boost for Atlantaorganizers. Samaranch and Hodler could no longer shelter EBU as the emer-gence of private networks in Europe altered the telecommunications land-scape. OCOGs were unwilling to suffer the loss of revenue from not pressingEBU to pay a fee at least close to market value, irrespective of its proven trackrecord in televising the Games, a card that Samaranch often played. Hodlercrossed the Rubicon. Samaranch required additional coaxing.

Long-Term U.S. Television Contracts

Cause More IOC/USOC Fireworks

In describing his attitude to life and work, former President of NBC Sports, DickEbersol, commented, “I like to win, I like to have fun, and I don’t like to wear acoat and tie.” Sports Illustrated’s Sally Jenkins argued that this approach had beencentral to Ebersol’s success in marshalling internal support at NBC to pursue,and later in furtive discussions with Juan Antonio Samaranch and RichardPound to secure, U.S. Olympic television rights for five Olympic festivals at acost of $3.5 billion in 1995.103 For the IOC, the financial security was simply tooappealing, and in addition, future bid committees could more effectively struc-ture their proposals if they understood the extent of available revenue from theU.S. television market. While the contracts for the Sydney and Salt Lake City fes-tivals ($1.2 billion) and the 2004, 2006, and 2008 Games ($2.3 billion) were notthe first multi-festival television agreements negotiated by the IOC, they wereemployed as templates for multiple agreements reached in 1996 and 1997 withother global broadcasters. They firmly established NBC’s ascendance to the sta-tus of America’s Olympic network, a mantle it had sought in connection with itscoverage of the Seoul, Barcelona, and Atlanta Olympics.104

Though cigars were lit in Lausanne and NBC’s New York headquarters,the IOC’s decision bothered CBS, ABC, and Fox executives who had been shutout of the discussions, and angered USOC leaders, who correctly understoodthat part of Pound’s motivation for going forward with the NBC project washis knowledge that the deals locked the USOC into 10% of $3.5 billion.105 In1992, USOC Executive Director Harvey Schiller renewed the call for addi-tional U.S. Olympic television money, but his tense discussions with Pound,who thought it possible to move the USOC’s share to 15% by 2004, whilebriefly promising, yielded nothing.106 His successor, Dick Schultz, lobbied the

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IOC for 20%, as had been the USOC’s position when it invoked the ASA inSeptember 1985.107 Pound, entrusted by Samaranch to manage the IOC’s inter-ests in its discussions with the USOC on financial matters, grew increasinglyfrustrated with those who badgered him. Ebersol’s vision happily coincidedwith Pound’s efforts to stem the USOC’s financial ambitions. Once again, theUSOC turned to Capitol Hill for leverage in discussions concerning its futureshare of U.S. Olympic television revenue.

When the 1996 Olympics opened on the evening of July 19th, weather con-ditions (33 degrees Celsius with 44% humidity) brought a measure of discom-fort to the 83,000 spectators in Atlanta’s Centennial Olympic Stadium.108

Despite the sweltering heat, what should have been a glorious affair for USOCExecutive Director Dick Schultz, took an embarrassing turn. Already irked bythe USOC’s refusal to approve the second contract with NBC in the absence ofa shift in its percentage share, Pound confronted Schultz beneath the stadium,his interest piqued by ongoing consideration of a bill in the U.S. Senate thatwould have granted the USOC veto rights over any U.S. Olympic televisioncontract.109 Pound recalled that “[w]e went bananas,” when informed of thesurreptitious manner in which the USOC tried to advance this legislationunder the cover of the Atlanta Olympics. Samaranch, Pound, and IOC Direc-tor General François Carrard queried Schultz on what he knew of the bill.110

Schultz denied any awareness of the matter.111 Pound pulled from his backpocket a copy of Schultz’s own briefing notes for the USOC’s lobbyists con-cerning the bill and his organization’s needs.112

Schultz’s strategy to approach Washington legislators in clandestine fash-ion while conducting discussions on this matter directly with Samaranch,miffed the IOC President, especially after having signalled his willingness toelevate the USOC’s share to 15%. It was one thing for Schultz to go aroundPound’s back to discuss the issue with Samaranch, but an entirely differentmatter for Schultz to go around Samaranch to Congress. Samaranch assumeda direct role in the talks with Schultz as he sought resolution to the matter; hewas more amenable to accommodating the USOC than Pound.113 Samaranchadvised Schultz to remove the pertinent clauses from the Senate bill.114 Whentempers cooled somewhat, the IOC and USOC leadership teams resolved tomeet in Lausanne in October 1996 to thrash out their differences.115 There,Schultz learned that Samaranch’s mood had improved, at least somewhat.

Samaranch and François Carrard collaborated on the IOC President’sopening remarks for the meeting with Schultz, USOC President Leroy Walker,Deputy Secretary General John Krimsky and Director of International Rela-tions Alfredo LaMont. Pound, Carrard, Payne, and Executive Board members,Thomas Bach, Kevan Gosper, and Anita DeFrantz accompanied Samaranch.“The Olympic Movement,” Samaranch stated bluntly, “is a club, with a set ofrules. Being a member was not compulsory, but members had to abide by the

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rules.” Clearly, the U.S. market was important to the IOC, observed Sama-ranch, as it supplied more than 50% of the television revenue and was home tonine TOP sponsors (of the current 10). However, the USOC “could either be inthe club or out of it.” Still, Samaranch’s spine, stiffened sufficiently by theUSOC’s decision to engage federal politicians, dismissed the thought of ceding15% to the USOC. Having wielded the stick, Samaranch offered the carrot.The IOC had previously determined that commencing in 2004, the OlympicMovement would receive 51% of global television revenue (an increase fromits previously enjoyed 40%). Thus, Samaranch proposed, following Pound’ssuggestion, that the USOC, IOC, ISFs and NOCs receive 12.75% each with theremaining 49% transferable to the OCOG. The USOC was content with12.75%. It was a relief for the USOC, reported Anita DeFrantz (who, as an IOCExecutive Board member, also had a seat on the USOC Executive Committee),who feared that, “the IOC was going to force them to sign something they didnot want.”116 The two sides signed a memorandum of agreement on this and anumber of other financial and marketing matters. As well, they agreed toengage in follow-up discussions in Cancún, Mexico in November.

Within three months, the progress achieved in Lausanne and Cancúnunravelled. When the USOC shipped the revised Broadcast Marketing Agree-ment to IOC officials, a perplexed Richard Pound wondered whether the twonegotiating teams had attended the same meetings. Pound concluded that theAgreement represented an “an outrageous attempt… to obtain everything andmore than [the USOC] would have obtained had it been successful in sneakingthrough the amendments to the Amateur Sports Act during the Atlanta Olym-pics.”117 He informed Samaranch that he met with a USOC lawyer in early Feb-ruary who indicated that the expanded memorandum of agreementSamaranch signed in Cancún “gave the USOC control of the whole televisionagreement for US television, not just the protection of the Olympic marks inthe US.” Pound was flummoxed. “This is so clearly wrong and so far from whatwe actually agreed,” Pound reminded Samaranch that, “you must ask yourselfif the USOC leadership is dealing with you and the IOC in good faith.”118

Samaranch’s continued willingness to engage Schultz in direct discussionsconcerned Pound as the practice undercut his, as well as the IOC staff ’s, author-ity. On TOP matters, Pound was similarly disconcerted. An apology Samaranchissued to John Krimsky for Pound’s tough bargaining, about which Krimskyboasted in front of IOC negotiators, was “not good for team morale.” The tenorand tone of this portion of Pound’s memo was as close to an upbraiding of asuperior as one might imagine. “The USOC does not want any IOC presence inthe US… it wants the entire market left to the exclusive control of the USOC. Ihave well over a decade of experience in dealing with the USOC on commercialmatters,” Pound reminded Samaranch, “and I assure you that this is the objectiveit has in mind and which it pursues relentlessly.”119 Personal attacks by USOC

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officials on Michael Payne and Howard Stupp, and others that aided him innegotiations, must cease, declared Pound. “Mutual respect” was required and theUSOC needed to extend this respect to “those who negotiate just as hard as theUSOC and who expect us to negotiate firmly and fairly in our own interests.”Pound concluded: “All I suggest is that, by having the USOC go around theestablished structure of negotiations every time the IOC representatives do notagree with a negotiating position adopted by the USOC, our ability to defendour interests on a day-to-day basis risks being compromised.”120 Pound coun-selled Samaranch to withhold his signature from the IOC/NBC long term televi-sion deals until the revised BMA was acceptable. Eventually, both sides resolvedissues and pressed forward with the NBC contracts.

NBC and General Electric Smash Competitors

for the 2010 and 2012 U.S. Television Rights

Juan Antonio Samaranch set out a vision for revenue generation as IOC Presi-dent, and his right hand, Richard Pound, along with Michael Payne, did thespadework in enacting it. One of Jacques Rogge’s challenges in the wake of hissuccessful campaign for the IOC presidency was to determine the IOC’sapproach to television contracts post-Beijing, as most markets had contractualterms settled through 2008. He understood the need to instill the IOC withnew knowledge concerning the television industry and its future, and hetasked this responsibility to the IOC Television Rights Commission, a newbody that he himself chaired. The Commission invested considerable timequerying television and media executives about the status of the industry,while also building a sense of trust with all U.S. television networks that thenext U.S contract (for 2010 and 2012) would be subject to a bidding processwithout the possibility of pre-emptive bids (such as those employed by NBC).In the U.S. market, Payne observed, “some fences needed to be mended” withNBC’s competitors. 121

Pound’s previous role as chief negotiator for the IOC in the U.S. market (hestepped down following his loss to Rogge in the presidential election in order toafford the new President an opportunity to set his own path concerning televisionnegotiations) was assumed by Richard Carrión, a Puerto Rican banker and IOCmember, with assistance from Neal Pilson, a former President of CBS Sports.122

The IOC invited five bidders, ABC, NBC, CBS, Fox, and AOL Time Warner, toparticipate. The IOC mandated that all parties sign the final television rights con-tract, a document some 100 pages in length, in advance of two days of negotiationscommencing on June 5, 2003. The five companies assigned their respective legaldepartments to examine the contracts. AOL Time Warner and CBS backed out ofthe negotiations process, leaving the way clear for ABC, Fox, and NBC. The

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USOC, an exceedingly interested observer of the process given its 12.75% share ofthe proceeds, was concerned about the diminishing pool of bidders and appealedto the IOC to delay the negotiations, but the IOC forged ahead. 123

Though prevented from tabling a pre-emptive bid, Dick Ebersol came toLausanne with a novel plan. Not only did NBC bid $2 billion for U.S. televisionrights, but its parent company, General Electric (GE), also wished to join theTOP sponsor community through 2012 with an additional $200 million on thetable. NBC, concluded Payne, “pulled out all the stops,” determined to take themystery out of Rupert Murdoch’s and Fox’s approach.124

The bids were sealed in envelopes and deposited in a transparent vesselwith all bidders present. Following a lunch break, Carrión and his colleaguesretreated to the negotiations room, while the television network executivesretired to their hotel rooms, or in the case of Fox, a nearby casino. Elation wastempered by reality when Carrión read aloud the terms of NBC’s proposal toRogge and the members of the IOC negotiating team. The massive windfalloffered by NBC’s (and GE’s) approach necessitated rapid consideration of themanner in which GE could be welcomed into the TOP sponsor group in lightof its wide ranging product list, which raised the possibility of overlap withother existing sponsor categories. And, how might the USOC respond?Understanding the need for dialogue, Ebersol brought Mark Lewis, Salt LakeCity 2002’s Marketing Director, to Lausanne in an advisory role. Daylightdimmed as Lewis and Payne began to deal with the big issues.125

But the USOC balked. Without anyone with sponsorship expertise presentin its Lausanne delegation—after all, these were to have been television rightsnegotiations—Jeff Benz, a lawyer who accompanied Jim Scherr, the actingUSOC Executive Director, said that the process was moving too fast; theUSOC would consider the proposal in Colorado Springs rather than Laus-anne. The financial aspects of NBC’s proposal, however, were far too enticingfor the IOC to afford the USOC such an extended period of deliberation.Heated words ensued. How could the USOC turn its back on an agreementthat would see it receive $250 million, approximately 70% of its quadrennialbudget? If the USOC blocked the agreement, Payne railed, it would be invitedto a press conference with the IOC the following day to explain the reasons forthe breakdown in discussions. The USOC relented. NBC’s “shock and awe”strategy won the day.126

European IOC Members Chafe at the Financial Impact of the ASA

In June 2009, when asked to handicap the race for the right to host the 2016Summer Olympics, IOC member Ottavio Cinquanta (Italy) commented, “Tome, Chicago is the favorite.” For Cinquanta, it was time for the Olympics to

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return to the U.S. “Why? The dossier is excellent and, for me, yet again, it is amatter of the U.S. contribution to sport. The U.S. has given (the world) ath-letes, organization, television and innovation in competition. The candida-tures are from cities,” observed Cinquanta, “but the cities are in countries, andwhat Chicago’s country has done for sport in general over the years is veryimportant.”127 But, Cinquanta, as future events revealed, did not present anopinion shared by the vast majority of his colleagues. Chicago was summarilydismissed on the first ballot at the IOC’s Copenhagen Session later in theyear.128 Rio de Janeiro rode the “It’s South America’s time” message to victory.

Cinquanta’s view did not reflect the depth of resentment harboured byEuropean IOC members at the lack of resolution to a four-year long discussionbetween IOC and USOC officials designed to reallocate a measure of televisionand TOP sponsor dollars from Colorado Springs to the world’s other NOCs andthe ISFs. Chicago’s demise cannot be explained wholly by anti-USOC sentimentwithin the IOC’s membership, as such an interpretation unfairly overlooks theeffectiveness of the well-crafted bid offered by Rio and the energy of its bid team,and also downplays Jacques Rogge’s desire to expand the Olympic brand to anew continent. Yet it is clear that Chicago was caught in the crossfire betweenUSOC officials committed to preserving the USOC’s level of access to U.S. tele-vision and global corporate sponsor dollars and IOC members no longer willingto accept the status quo. In addition, the USOC angered the IOC by advancingits plans for a U.S. Olympic television network mere months prior to the 2016host city vote, and before those matters of concern had been resolved with itslong-term U.S. television partner, NBC.129

The badly frayed state of IOC/USOC relations was a significant factor.Denis Oswald, a Swiss IOC member, minced no words when he concludedthat Chicago’s fall was “a defeat for the USOC, not Chicago.”130 The antipathybetween the two organizations left a disappointed Chicago 2016 Bid Commit-tee Chair, Patrick Ryan, to liken the two sides to the Hatfields and McCoys.131

In 2008, after three years of fruitless negotiations, Denis Oswald and HeinVerbruggen, two of the three IOC members (the third being IOC MarketingCommission Chair, Gerhard Heiberg) tasked by Jacques Rogge to devise a dif-ferent distribution formula with USOC officials, went public with their frus-trations. Peter Ueberroth, the USOC’s President, was not inclined to cedemoney to the IOC at the expense of the USOC, preferring various plans togrow the revenue pot before percentages shifted such that the bottom line dol-lars to the USOC did not diminish.132 The BMA and the USOC’s share of TOPsponsor dollars “was no longer morally acceptable,” decried Oswald.133 Ver-bruggen’s rhetoric echoed Oswald’s. When compared to the globally generatedcommercial revenue flowing to other members of the Olympic family, hecharged that the USOC received “an immoral amount of money.”134

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Verbruggen and Oswald accused the USOC of “foot dragging” through-out the negotiations. With the Asian and European markets now providingsizable sums of television money, and five of the nine TOP sponsors incor-porated beyond U.S. borders, the USOC’s argument that America funded theOlympic Movement, was far less valid than had been the case previously. Ithad been a significant consideration in the 1980s when the BMA was estab-lished and TOP evolved. Ueberroth countered that U.S. companies still pro-vided the Olympic Movement with 60% of its revenue base. For his part,Ueberroth expressed frustration that the USOC believed it had reachedagreement with Heiberg’s team on a number of occasions only to have thesettlement overturned in Lausanne. Discussions ground to a halt followingUeberroth’s departure as USOC President. Both sides thought a cooling offperiod was advisable; however, the USOC pledged to re-visit the discussionsin 2013 (such that a settlement would come into effect for the 2020 Olym-pics).135 While the USOC could walk away from discussions content that ithad, for the time being, protected its financial interests during challengingeconomic times, the IOC extracted assurance from the USOC that it wouldpursue a new distribution formula, with purpose, in 2013. The USOC’s posi-tion was based on the calculation that in the absence of an agreement withthe IOC, no U.S. city had a reasonable chance for success in an Olympic hostcity competition. No U.S. cities were promoted in connection with the 2018,2020, and 2022 bid contests.

Larry Probst and Scott Blackmun Bring Stability

to the USOC’s Leadership Ranks

A formidable barrier the promotion of improved relations between the USOCand the IOC in the post-Sydney era was the turnstile controlling the USOC’smanagerial suite in Colorado Springs. In the nine years leading up to theOctober 2009 Copenhagen Session, the USOC had six full-time or actingExecutive Directors. Between 2000 and 2004, the USOC had four full-time oracting Presidents (William Hybl, Sandra Baldwin, Marty Mankamyer, and BillMartin). Former President and CEO of John Hancock (a TOP sponsor com-pany from 1993 through 2008), David D’Alessandro, noted that “I’ve had din-ners that lasted longer than some of the management in Colorado Springs.”136

Probst, who succeeded Peter Ueberroth as USOC President in 2008, while crit-icized roundly for Chicago’s loss and the perceived anchor to the bid that theUSOC’s strained relations with the IOC provided, survived the affair, and inJanuary 2010 brought Scott Blackmun, a lawyer and former USOC actingExecutive Director (November 2000-October 2001), into the ColoradoSprings leadership circles. It proved an astute move. Blackmun, the new Exec-

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utive Director, set the needed tenor at his inaugural press conference: “At theend of the day,” he observed, “the IOC is the leader of the worldwide OlympicMovement, and we need to respect that, and we need to spend some time lis-tening.”137

It was a departure in both tactic and tone from Blackmun’s predecessorswho had sparred with IOC officials, leaving Michael Payne to conclude fiveyears earlier: “The battle over revenues… [soured] relationships between theIOC and the USOC, undermining any attempt at a collaborative effort todevelop programs for the broader good of the Olympic Movement. For theUSOC, it was a matter of who really controlled the Olympic Movement. Itsview was that it should be run from its Colorado Springs headquarters and notfrom Lausanne.”138 Blackmun envisioned a different way forward. If the IOCand USOC could function in a more collaborative fashion, the entire OlympicMovement stood to benefit, and the USOC’s interests, notably the prospect forhosting future Olympic festivals in the U.S., might be far better served.

Jacques Rogge wasted little time when he saw the possibility for a thaw inrelations. In 2011, Probst was appointed to the IOC’s International RelationsCommission, while Blackmun was installed as a member of the MarketingCommission. The two Americans employed these opportunities as platformsfor outreach to the global Olympic community, in effect renewing the face ofthe USOC.139

Their focused efforts at diplomacy paid dividends. Richard Pound, nostranger to dealing with USOC officials over revenue matters and the some-times charged negotiating environment fostered by the realities of the U.S.market and the Amateur Sports Act, complimented them on giving “theUSOC a human dimension as opposed to being this gigantic money-raisingorganization that doesn’t care about anything outside of the United States.”140

Central to their success was the fulfillment of Probst’s pledge to re-visit theUSOC’s share of U.S. television money and TOP revenue in 2013. In fact, dis-cussions were fast-tracked and commenced in January 2011.141 A deal wasconcluded the following year that preserved the USOC’s level of U.S televisionand TOP dollars through the 2018 Winter Olympics, but any increases in 2020and beyond would result in the USOC’s share reduced from 12.75% to 7% (fortelevision) and from 20% to 10% (for TOP).142 “We restructured our financialrelationship in a way that I think,” noted Blackmun, “made the IOC feel betterand that was fair for them, and that gave them greater shares of revenuegrowth.”143 The accord established the financial terms of the IOC-USOC rela-tionship through 2040. If any further evidence was needed to signal not justdetente, but an honest desire to work towards shared goals, IOC PresidentThomas Bach welcomed USOC officials into the final stages of his secret nego-tiations with NBC Universal for a $7.75 billion, six-festival (2022, 2024, 2028,2030, and 2032) extension to its U.S. television partner status in March 2014.144

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Conclusions

In 1967, Avery Brundage lamented what he perceived to be the deleteriouseffect of television money on relations between the IOC and its partner orga-nizations, the NOCs and ISFs. “I have deplored on more than one occasion,”observed Brundage in a letter to Roger Coulon, the President of the FédérationInternationale des Lutte Associées (now, United World Wrestling), “the idea offinancial considerations being introduced into Olympic affairs. For the firsttime serious arguments have been provoked and I do not like it!”145

It is true that the IOC sparred with NOCs and ISFs over an acceptablemethod of distributing Olympic television money in the 1960s. However, inthe end, Brundage was content with 1/9th shares of global television revenuebeing channelled to the IOC, ISFs, and NOCs respectively, with the rest pay-able to the OCOGs as had been determined by the “Rome Formula” estab-lished in 1966. But, the ISFs and NOCs were not pacified. And, the OCOGssaw this as too much money being diverted from the funds required to hostthe Olympic Games. Discontent within the NOC and ISF communities mani-fested itself in the formation of the Permanent General Assembly of NOCs(later the Association of National Olympic Committees) and the GeneralAssembly of International Sport Federations (GAISF), umbrella lobby groupsenvisioned as a means of pressing the autocratic Brundage and the IOC forgreater consideration of their concerns in the future.146 As Brundage preparedto retire in 1972, the primary locus of conflict over commercial revenue hadshifted to the Olympic Movement’s share of television revenue (33%) in com-parison to the allotment enjoyed by the OCOGs (67%).

Successive efforts by Organizing Committees in the 1970s to enhancetheir share of television revenue at the expense of the IOC and its partnersforced the hand of Brundage’s successor, Lord Killanin, who first sought toenhance the IOC’s knowledge of the television industry, and subsequentlyinserted its representatives into the negotiations process (commencing withthe 1984 cycle of negotiations) alongside the television executives and OCOGofficials. With respect to television contracts, relations between IOC officialssuch as Killanin, Monique Berlioux, and Chairman of the IOC Finance Com-mission Count Jean de Beaumont, and leaders of OCOGs faced with climbingbudgetary demands because of the expanding costs of hosting Olympic festi-vals, were often fractious. Killanin’s moves, of course, were motivated by aneed to protect the IOC’s financial interests. On the other hand, such actionsaccelerated the organization’s evolution away from the type of sporting bodyenvisioned by the likes of Coubertin or Brundage.147

Juan Antonio Samaranch’s arrival in Lausanne heralded further change, asdid the shifting world of sport within an emerging globalized economy. Sama-ranch recognized the dangerous financial dependency of the IOC solely on

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television money, and sought a means through the TOP program to diversifythe Olympic Movement’s revenue base, while at the same time augmentingsums of money available to OCOGs.148 Samaranch’s vision for financial auton-omy required foot soldiers capable of converting the vision to reality, and inRichard Pound and Michael Payne, he found those individuals.

As events described in this essay demonstrate, much of their time wasdevoted to dealing with USOC officials determined to leverage the AmateurSports Act as a tool for generating revenue for the execution of the USOC’smandate. The time line of IOC/USOC relations in the 1980s and 1990s is lit-tered with episodes that sparked conflict, including the USOC’s initial effortsto pursue a percentage of TOP revenue and U.S. television contracts, theMcMillen Bill, and the eventual establishment of long-term television con-tracts. With the election of Jacques Rogge, the cast of characters in Lausannewho represented the financial interests of the IOC changed. So, too, did thepeople and personalities in Colorado Springs in the post-Sydney 2000 years asa result of diminished stability within the USOC’s leadership ranks. The con-flict between the IOC and USOC over the distribution of commercial revenuepersisted.

At the heart of this disputatious dynamic rested the Amateur Sports Act. Itwas the most significant driver in setting the agenda for financial discussionsbetween the IOC and USOC for three decades. Debates, arguments, and attimes, personality clashes, affected the ability of the two organizations toadvance their mutual interests. Given the USOC’s rights enshrined within theASA, the marriage of the Olympic Games to commercial interests and the bur-geoning sums offered by television networks and corporate sponsors, togetherwith the IOC’s need to safeguard its financial interests along with those of itspartners, the NOCs and ISFs, the Act was destined to serve as a source of con-flict between the IOC and the USOC.

Chicago’s collapse in the 2016 bid competition marked a significant turn-ing point in the narrative of conflict with respect to the distribution of com-mercial revenue. Within a few short months, Scott Blackmun, an individualwho grasped the necessity of improving the working relationship between theIOC and the USOC, arrived in Colorado Springs.149 Rather than investingtheir energies in future U.S. bids that harboured no chance for success, he andUSOC President Larry Probst, who himself bore a few scars from Chicago’sdemise, targeted the troubled inter-organizational relations.150 Their efforts atoutreach did not go unnoticed. “You gradually get to be known. Neither ofthem is a particularly frightening personality,” commented Pound. “They’veworked out a modus operandi that seems to work.”151 An ambitious travelschedule aimed at engaging Olympic officials in discussions fostered betterfeelings, culminating in Blackmun’s invitation to serve on the IOC Marketing

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Commission, Probst’s appointment to the IOC, and the USOC’s decision tosupport a city (Boston) in the 2024 bid city competition.

Boston dropped its prospective host city candidacy in mid-2015, but asLos Angeles, now the USOC’s candidate for 2024, ramps up its efforts tosecure the right to host the 2024 Olympic Games, one observation is abun-dantly clear. In both words and actions, the leaders of the two titans of Olym-pic revenue generation have arrived at a point in time when both partiesunderstand that their individual and collective aspirations, especially thosetied to revenue generation, are better served when collaboration and mutualrespect govern their interaction.

Endnotes

1 See for instance, Matt Bonesteel, “Oslo drops 2002 Winter Olympics bid,leaving IOC with two bad choices,” Washington Post, 2 October 2014,http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-lead/wp/2014/10/02/oslo-drops-2022-winter-olympics-bid-leaving-ioc-with-two-bad-choices/ [15January 2015]; Tony Manfred, “The Olympics Desperately Needed OsloTo Host The 2022 Games, And The IOC Is Outraged They Pulled Out,”Business Insider, 2 October 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/olym-pics-oslo-2022-olympics-2014-10#ixzz3OuGRMF4B [15 January 2015];“Oslo 2022 bid hurt by IOC demands, arrogance,” USA Today, 5 October2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2014/10/05/oslo-2022-bid-hurt-by-ioc-demands-arrogance/16759151/ [15 January 2015].

2 Rick Burton and Norm O’Reilly, “Soaring cost of Olympic host bids con-cerns Ueberroth,” Street & Smith’s Sport Business Journal, 20 August2012, http://m.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/08/20/Opin-ion/Burton-OReilly.aspx [29 November 2014].

3 Judith Grant Long, “Rethinking Olympic Infrastructure,” LSECities.net,October 2013, http://lsecities.net/media/objects/articles/rethinking-olym-pic-infrastructure/en-gb/ [29 November 2014].

4 While the 20 + 20 recommendations cover far more ground than the shiftin bidding policies, important changes in this regard include: 1) placingmore emphasis on pre-existing facilities in assessing bids; 2) permitting cit-ies to place a sport on the Olympic program that has deep cultural connec-tion to the host country; 3) reducing the cost of bidding by limiting therequired number of presentations, authorizing the production of the bidbooks in electronic format only; and, 4) permitting joint city bids, with thepossibility that the two cities are in different countries. “Olympic Agenda2020: 20 + 20 Recommendations,” Olympic.org, http://www .olympic.org/Documents/Olympic_Agenda_2020/Olympic_Agenda_2020 -20-20_Rec-

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ommendations-ENG.pdf [25 January 2015]; and, Philip Hersh, “IOCallows summer or winter Olympics in two countries; baseball, softball getsecond life,” Chicago Tribune, 8 December 2014, http://www.chicagotri-bune.com/sports/breaking/chi-ioc-will-allow-summer-or-winter-olym-pics-in-two-countries-20141208-story.html [25 January 2015]. Earlyindications are that Thomas Bach’s Olympic Agenda 2020 plan has givensome comfort to those considering the financial risks inherent in hostingan Olympic festival. The IOC is looking at a wider field of candidate citiesfor 2024 as opposed to the winnowed field it faced in the context of thecompetition to host the 2022 Olympic Winter Games. Confirmed candi-date cities for 2024 are: Budapest; Hamburg; Los Angeles; Paris; and,Rome.

5 Chicago 2016’s first ballot exit at the IOC vote in Copenhagen in 2009spelled out the high degree of dissatisfaction primarily from European-based IOC members with the lack of progress on a revised Olympic reve-nue distribution deal between the IOC and USOC, and convinced theUSOC to withhold support for future U.S. bid cities given their dim pros-pects for success. See, Stephen R. Wenn, “IOC/USOC Relations and the2009 IOC Session in Copenhagen,” in Robert K. Barney, Janice Forsyth,and Michael K. Heine, eds., Rethinking Matters Olympic: Investigationsinto the Socio-Cultural Study of the Modern Olympic Movement – TenthInternational Symposium for Olympic Research (London, University ofWestern Ontario, 2010), pp. 60-75.

6 Nancy Armour, “Boston will be USOC’s bid city for 2024 Olympics,” USAToday, 8 January 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2015/01/08/boston-2024-us-olympic-bid-city/21458619/ [15 January 2015];Amy Shipley, “Deteriorating USOC-IOC relations threaten both organi-zations,” Washington Post, 22 December 2009, http://www.washington-post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/21/AR2009122101900.html?sid=ST2009122602221 [15 January 2015]; “IOC, USOC finalize new revenuedeal,” ESPN, 24 May 2012, http://espn.go.com/olympics/story/_/id/7967000/ioc-usoc-resolve-differences-revenues [15 January 2015]; and,Wenn, “IOC/USOC Relations and the 2009 IOC Session in Copenhagen.”

7 Support for the bid at the local level was underwhelming. A poll con-ducted by the local National Public Radio affiliate revealed only 40% ofBostonians in favour of the bid, and 50% opposed in light of concernsover cost overruns and the thought that Boston’s transportation systemcould not adequately support the staging of the Games. Jon Kamp, “Bos-ton Area’s Support Still Low for 2024 Summer Olympics Bid, PollShows,” Wall Street Journal 16 April 2015, http://www.wsj.com/arti-cles/boston-areas-support-still-low-for-2014-summer-olympics-bid-poll-shows-1429174872 [28 May 2015]. See also, Juliet Macur, “If 2024Olympic Bid Is a Hot Potato, Boston Has No Appetite,” New York Times,2 April 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/sports/olympics/bos-ton-2024-olympic-bid-is-a-problem-of-usocs-own-making.html?_r=0

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[28 May 2015]. A massive two decade-long highway project, known as“The Big Dig,” prompted many Bostonians to shudder in fear of possibleOlympic-related costs. The highway project was supposed to cost $2.4 bil-lion, but expenditure mushroomed to over $14 billion. With interest, thecost estimate, with the books not closed until 2038, rests at over $24 bil-lion. Justine Hofherr, “Can We Talk Rationally About the Big Dig Yet?”Boston.com, 5 January 2015, http://www.boston.com/cars/news-and-reviews/2015/01/05/can-talk-rationally-about-the-big-dig-yet/0BPodDn-lbNtsTEPFFc4i1O/story.html [28 May 2015]. The USOC commenced areview of the bid given the level of local dissent. Jack Encarnacao, “Boston2024, USOC Huddle to Right Ship,” Boston Herald, 17 July 2015, http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2015/07/bos-ton_2024_usoc_huddle_to_right_ship [23 July 2015].

8 While most insiders pegged Los Angeles as the favourite in this domesticcontest, the USOC initially selected Boston (over Los Angeles, San Fran-cisco, and Washington) to enter the wider competition against the likes ofRome and possible entrants from France (likely Paris) and Germany (Ber-lin or Hamburg). Jere Longman, “U.S.O.C. Chooses Boston as Candidatefor 2024 Summer Olympics,” New York Times, 8 January 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/sports/olympics/boston-to-be-us-bid-city-for-2024-olympics.html?_r=0 [15 January 2015]; Eddie Pells, “Bos-ton the surprise choice for 2024 Olympic bid,” Houston Chronicle, 8 Janu-ary 2015, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/olympics/article/Boston-the-surprise-U-S-choice-for-2024-Olympic-6003380.php [15 January2015]; and, “IOC expects high interest in 2024 Olympic bids,” Sportsnet,15 January 2015, http://www.sportsnet.ca/more/ioc-expects-high-inter-est-in-2024-olympic-bids/rtsn [15 January 2015].

9 Thomas M. Hunt, “Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympic MedalsRace: The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 and American Athletics PolicyReform,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 24 (June 2007):796.

10 Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott G. Martyn, Selling the FiveRings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of OlympicCommercialism (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, rev. ed., 2004),pp. 168-175; and, for a record of the actual signing, see Minutes of theMeeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 28 May 1985, pp. 177-178,International Olympic Committee Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland[hereafter cited as IOCA].

11 This USOC initiative was first conveyed to Juan Antonio Samaranchthrough two telexes from Richard Pound, an IOC Executive Board mem-ber and Chairman of the IOC’s Television Rights Negotiations Commis-sion. See, Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 26 September1985; and, Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 30 September1985, “Seoul 1988 TV-General II” File, IOCA.

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12 This agreement was reached on 26 March 1986, with the signing of theBroadcast Marketing Agreement. Included in its terms were a $15 millionpayment to the USOC, shared by the IOC, and the 1988 Seoul and Cal-gary Organizing Committees, and the USOC’s receipt of 10% of all futureU.S. Olympic television contracts commencing in 1992. Minutes of theMeeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 11-12 February 1986, p. 5;and, Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Seoul, 22-24April 1986, p. 4, IOCA.

13 The path to the USOC’s improved share of TOP money is recounted inBarney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, pp. 177-179. For thetelevision episode, and the IOC’s decision in 1996 to cede 12.75% of U.S.television contracts to the USOC commencing in 2004, see Stephen R.Wenn, “Riding into the Sunset: Richard Pound, Dick Ebersol, and Long-Term Olympic Television Contracts,” in Kevin B. Wamsley, Scott G.Martyn, Gordon H. MacDonald, and Robert K. Barney, eds, BridgingThree Centuries: Intellectual Crossroads and the Modern Olympic Move-ment – Fifth International Symposium for Olympic Research (London:University of Western Ontario, 2000): 37-50. The USOC’s share shifted to18.5% for TOP II (1989-1992), and 20% for TOP III and beyond. It is rel-evant to one’s understanding of these financial matters to know that thesepercentages are the publicized figures, but that the USOC pays a feetowards the administration of the TOP program so they do not representtheir net receipts from TOP. The USOC also now contributes to a fundthat assists in defraying the administrative costs of staging the Games,such as those needed to support doping control. TOP I earned $97 mil-lion, with the succeeding TOP II and III cycles generating $175 millionand $350 million respectively. Scott G. Martyn, “The Struggle for Finan-cial Autonomy: The IOC and the Historical Emergence of CorporateSponsorship, 1896-2000” (PhD dissertation, University of WesternOntario, 2000), p. 264.

14 The collapse of Chicago 2016’s bid in Copenhagen is addressed in detail,in Wenn, “IOC/USOC Relations and the 2009 IOC Session in Copenha-gen.”

15 “IOC, USOC finalize new revenue deal”; and, Tripp Mickle, “ImprovedIOC-USOC relationship on display,” Street & Smith’s Sport Business Jour-nal, 12 May 2014, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/05/12/Olympics/ [15 January 2015].

16 Hunt, “Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympic Medals Race: TheAmateur Sports Act of 1978 and American Athletics Policy Reform,” 796-818.

17 Ibid., p. 804.18 James A. R. Nafziger, “The Amateur Sports Act of 1978,” BYU Law

Review, 1983, Issue #1, Article 9, pp. 47-99, http://digitalcom-mons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1983/iss1/9/ [27 January 2015].

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19 Scott Blackmun reports that the 2013-2016 quadrennial budget for the USOCis approximately $800 million. The budget for any Olympic year is higherthan for non-Olympic years. “Interview with USOC CEO Scott Blackmun,”Universal Sports Network, 22 January 2015, http://universalsports.com/2015/01/22/interview-with-usoc-ceo-scott-blackmun/ [9 March 2015]. Blackmunsat for an interview with host Rick Horrow for the network’s show,“Beyond the Medals – The Business of Sport.”

20 Hunt, “Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympic Medals Race,” pp.161-163.

21 Michael Harrigan, “A Class Act,” The Olympian, January 1989, pp. 14-15.The author would like to express appreciation to Teri Hedgpeth, Archi-vist and Historical Steward, USOC, for locating and subsequently sendinghim a copy of the article.

22 Ibid., p. 15.23 “Amateur Sports Act: Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Sci-

ence, and Transportation, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress,First Session on S. 2036,” October 18 and 19, 1977, p. 87, http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015077913609;view=1up;seq=1 [27January 2015].

24 Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, pp. 31-49.25 Robert K. Barney, “An Olympian Dilemma: Protection of Olympic Sym-

bols,” Journal of Olympic History 7 (September 2002): 10. 26 Available data show production soared with nearly 9 million loaves of

bread produced in 1935 with the number steadily climbing to 15.5 millionloaves in 1939. Sales figures for the bread department which producedcakes, breadrolls, loaves of bread, and doughnuts improved from $1.46million (1935) to $2.6 million (1939). Helms, who drew a nominal salaryin 1932 ($10,000), received $52,000 on a yearly basis between 1937 and1939. The bread business was good! See, Helms Bakeries v. Commissionerof Internal Revenue, 23 T.C. 967 (T.C. 1955), Docket No. 32321, 11 March1955, https://casetext.com/case/helms-bakeries-v-commissioner-of-inter-nal -revenue-1 [27 January 2015].

27 Bulletin of the International Olympic Committee, No. 25, January 1951,pp. 26-28. The article was accessed through the digital archives of theLA84 Foundation, and if one wishes to know the scope of its operations,one can access this article at http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformation-Center/OlympicReview/1951/BDCE25/BDCE25n.pdf [26 January 2015].

28 Helms Bakeries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 23 T.C. 967 (T.C.1955).

29 Barney, “An Olympian Dilemma: Protection of Olympic Symbols,” pp.12-24. Scott Martyn notes that Helms attempted to acquire trademarkregistration of the term, “Olympic Winner” in 1951, but formally aban-doned the attempt in 1953, under pressure from USOC officials. Scott G.

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Martyn, “Toward an Impasse: An Examination of the NegotiationsBehind the Inclusion of the United States Olympic Committee in theOlympic Programme,” in Robert K. Barney, Scott G. Martyn, Douglas A.Brown, and Gordon H. MacDonald, eds., Olympic Perspectives: ThirdInternational Symposium for Olympic Research (London: University ofWestern Ontario, 1996), p. 110.

30 “Amateur Sports Act: Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Sci-ence, and Transportation, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress,First Session on S. 2036,” October 18 and 19, 1977, p. 87.

31 Harrigan, “A Class Act,” p. 14.32 “Amateur Sports Act: Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Sci-

ence, and Transportation, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress,First Session on S. 2036,” October 18 and 19, 1977, p. 87.

33 Simson and Jennings detail the Samaranch/Dassler connection in, VyvSimson and Andrew Jennings, The Lords of the Rings: Power, Money andDrugs in the Modern Olympics (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., Ltd.,1992), pp. 72-84. See also, Deborah Philips and Garry Whannel, The Tro-jan Horse: The Growth of Commercial Sponsorship (New York and Lon-don: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), pp. 57-59. Smit addresses Dassler’srise to power and prominence within the world of global sport in, BarbaraSmit, Sneaker Wars, The Enemy Brothers Who Founded Adidas and Pumaand the Family Feud That Forever Changed the Business of Sports (NewYork: Ecco/Harper Collins, 2008). Hill touches on Samaranch’s relation-ships with Havelange, Vázquez Raña, and Dassler in, Christopher R. Hill,Olympic Politics: Athens to Atlanta, 1896-1996 [2nd Edition] (Manchesterand New York, Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 63-64.

34 David Miller, “Evolution of the Olympic Movement,” in From Moscow toLausanne (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1990), p. 9.

35 Jere Longman, “Juan Antonio Samaranch Dies at 89; Led I.O.C.,” NewYork Times, 21 April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/sports/22samaranch.html?ref=sports&pagewanted=print [21 April 2010].

36 David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Biography of Juan Antonio Sama-ranch (London: Pavilion Books Ltd., 1992), p. 20 [Emphasis Miller’s].

37 “Notes on the Work of the Television Sub-Committee,” 23 June 1974,“TV Divers 1974-1985” File, IOCA.

38 Killanin’s approach is explained in, Scott G. Martyn and Stephen R.Wenn, “A Prelude to Samaranch: Lord Killanin’s Path to Commercial-ism,” Journal of Sport History 16 (July 2008): 40-48. For the successiveseries of Organizing Committee-managed negotiations, see Barney,Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, pp. 103-150.

39 Michael Payne, Olympic Turnaround (Twyford, Berks: London BusinessPress, 2005), p. 9.

40 Ibid., p. 14.

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41 Richard Pound notes that Dassler kept a close watch on these discussions.“In and around the new commission,” wrote Pound, “hovered Horst Das-sler, an inveterate sports politician who was responsible for part of thefamily-owned Adidas operations.” Dick Pound, Inside the Olympics: ABehind-the-Scenes Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the Glory of theGames (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons Canada Ltd., 2004), p. 141. ForDassler’s efforts in pushing forward his sport marketing agenda, see, AlanTomlinson, “The Making – and Unmaking? – of the Olympic CorporateClass,” in Helen Lenskyj and Stephen Wagg, eds, The Palgrave Handbookof Olympic Studies (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), pp. 233-247.

42 Pound, Inside the Olympics, p. 143.43 Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, p. 170.44 Pound, Inside the Olympics, pp. 143, 149-150.45 Payne, Olympic Turnaround, pp. 80-81.46 Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, p. 171.47 Muriel Cohen to Monique Berlioux, 25 March 1983, “ISL Marketing,”

File, IOCA. Scott Martyn unearthed the USOC’s wary approach to theemergence of TOP in, Martyn, “Toward an Impasse.”

48 USOC suspicions about the IOC’s intent, and the relationship with Das-sler and ISL, offers former IOC Marketing Director Michael Payne, waslikely tied to Monique Berlioux’s project with Stanley R. Shefler, Presidentof Intelicense SA Corp on the marketing of pictograms originally used inconjunction with the 1972 Munich Olympic Games (but, more recentlyemployed in Montreal). The USOC resisted Shefler’s attempt to activatethe pictograms in the U.S market, and the scenario drew the IOC, USOC,and Intelicense into protracted legal proceedings. Personal communica-tion, Michael Payne to the author, 13 February 2015. For an analysis ofthe Intelicense matter, see Scott G. Martyn, “Dreams of Grandeur: TheGames of the Twenty-first Olympiad and the Exploitation of the OlympicMystique,” in Kevin G. Wamsley, Robert K. Barney, and Scott G. Martyn,eds., The Global Nexus Engaged: Past, Present, Future InterdisciplinaryOlympic Studies. Sixth International Symposium for Olympic Research(London: University of Western Ontario, 2002), pp. 85-92.

49 William E. Simon (with John M. Caher), A Time for Reflection: An Auto-biography (Washington: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2004), pp. 207-208.Simon wrote that neither he nor Miller “thought it wise to concede con-trol of U.S. Olympic Committee finances to an international organiza-tion. Under federal law, the USOC had exclusive rights to market theOlympic name and symbols in the U.S. Why would we give up thatright?” Michael Payne casts some doubt on Simon’s version of events.Such a meeting might have occurred, but Payne notes ISL was not estab-lished until after the 1982 World Cup. Personal communication, MichaelPayne to the author, 13 February 2015. Had Simon’s memory failed him

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on the timing of the discussion, or had Dassler merely sounded him outon the concept of such a marketing approach in 1981 (based on bundlingOlympic marketing rights to all NOCs) when he still had a business rela-tionship with Patrick Nally, co-founder of the West Nally Group? Forbackground on Nally, see Roger Blitz, “The Godfather of sports market-ing,” Financial Times, 4 May 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1652cf54-fb40-11e0-8df6-00144feab49a.html#axzz3ReiytWCz [13 Febru-ary 2015].

50 Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, pp. 171-173.51 Frank Litsky, “F. Don Miller, 75, U.S. Olympic Committee Chief,” New

York Times, 18 January 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/18/us/f-don-miller-75-us-olympic-committee-chief.html [2 March 2015]; and,“F. Don Miller, Former Head of USOC, Is Dead at 75,” Los Angeles Times,18 January 1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-01-18/sports/sp-26017_1_f-don-miller [2 March 2015]. Miller’s success at the 1943 NCAABoxing Championships in the 155 pound category is chronicled in DougMoe, Lords of the Ring: The Triumph and Tragedy of College Boxing'sGreatest Team (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), pp. 93-95.

52 Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, p. 174.53 Samaranch’s decision reflected his general loss of confidence in Berlioux

and, when combined with the breakdown in their working relationship,marked another step along the path to her dismissal later in the year.

54 Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, pp. 211-213, 224-226.55 Teri Hedgpeth once again supplied the author with important leads in

sifting through Kane’s efforts. The first document is a handwritten sum-mary produced by Kane concerning his efforts to work with Congressio-nal leaders to institute a 10% excise tax on the value of U.S. Olympictelevision contracts. See, “TV Rights Sharing,” Undated, Robert J. KanePersonal Papers, Box 4c, USOC Archives, Colorado Springs [hereaftercited as RJKP]. Based on its content, the document was produced betweenAugust 1991 and Kane’s passing in 1992. The second document is a brief,prepared by Robert Kane, with the likely assistance of his friend, formerCongressman Barber Conable, that was sent to members of the HouseWays and Means Committee. See, Robert J. Kane, “Why the U.S.Deserves a Share of IOC TV Revenues,” Undated, RJKP, Box 4c. Based onthe timeline of proceedings on Capitol Hill, the document dates to mid-1985.

56 Kelly told Kane that the USOC would cover any personal expensesincurred while pursing the revenue. “TV Rights Sharing.”

57 Kane’s memory may have failed him on one count in terms of his recol-lection of events. It would have been impossible for him to convene withNBC officials in early to mid-1985 about its U.S. television contract forSeoul. The first round of bidding, with ABC and CBS officials also

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engaged in the process, was not staged in Lausanne until September. Bar-ney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, p. 221.

58 Ibid. Kane informed Conable on the disparity of funds provided by U.S.networks and those in other markets. “The USOC gets none of thisback. However, of the IOC’s one-third split, it does dole out aid to theneedy nations in what it calls its Solidarity Fund.” Kane implied a lessthan impressed view that Communist nations benefited from these U.S.dollars. “Cuba, East Berlin, Hungary, among others, share in our lar-gesse,” he wrote. Robert J. Kane to Barber Conable, Jr., 11 July 1985,RJKP, Box 4c.

59 Wolfgang Saxon, “Barber B. Conable, 81, Congressman and Bank Chief,Dies,” New York Times, 2 December 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/02/nyregion/02/CONA.html [5 February 2015].

60 Kane, “Why the U.S. Deserves a Share of IOC TV Revenues.”61 “TV Rights Sharing.” 62 Ibid.63 Michael Janofsky, “Miller Quits as U.S.O.C. Chief,” New York Times, 25

August 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/25/sports/miller-quits-as-usoc-chief.html [2 March 2015]. Teri Hedgpeth informed the authorthat USOC President Jack Kelly and Executive Director George Millerwere officially installed in their roles on 9 February 2015. See PersonalCommunication, Teri Hedgpeth to the author, 3 March 2015.

64 “TV Rights Sharing.” 65 Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 26 September 1985. 66 Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 30 September 1985. 67 Howard M. Stupp to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 3 October 1985, “Seoul

’88 TV General II 1985” File, IOCA.68 The widely accepted rationale for a Soviet bloc boycott has been retalia-

tion for the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. This interpre-tation of events has been recently, and effectively, challenged by RobertEdelman, in Robert Simon Edelman, “The Russians Are Not Coming!The Soviet Withdrawal from the Games of the XXIII Olympiad,” TheInternational Journal of the History of Sport 32 (1, 2015): 9-36. On thebasis of declassified archival material in the former Soviet Union, Edel-man makes a compelling case that the Soviets wanted to avenge the U.S.boycott by trouncing its Cold War adversary in 1984 on its home soil.However, the passing of Yuri Andropov and the Soviets’ downing of aKorean commercial airliner changed the course of events. An energizedanti-Soviet movement in the United States, headed by the Ban the SovietsCoalition, dissuaded the Soviets from attending as officials feared for thesafety of the athletes and remained wary of the possibility of defections.

69 Simon, A Time for Reflection, pp. 217-218.

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70 Ibid; and, Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Calgary, 25-28 February 1985, pp. 54-56.

71 Juan Antonio Samaranch to Richard Pound, 1 October 1985, “Seoul ’88TV General II 1985” File, IOCA.

72 Kane, “Why the U.S. Deserves a Share of IOC TV Revenues.”73 “TV Rights Sharing.” Conable updated Kane in early December that the

substance of the bill devised by Vander Jagt had been added to the TaxReform Act through assistance from a number of his “friends” on CapitolHill. Barber B. Conable, Jr. to Robert J. Kane, 6 December 1985, RJKP,Box 4c.

74 Ibid.75 Robert J. Kane, “Alumni Who Aid Athletics,” Cornell Alumni News, June

1986, p. 65. A pdf of the issue can be downloaded from: http://www.goo-gle.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCQQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fecommons.library.cornell.edu%2Fbitstream%2F1813%2F28022%2F1%2F088_10.pdf&ei=6cv5VPiFMuqRsQSEx4GYDg&usg=AFQjCNH8lRnzcf05hXnqOUdCStjHzh4fVg&sig2=cElNQFZ4V60vwgBADqCrkw&bvm=bv.87611401,d.cWc [15 February 2015]. See also,George D. Miller to Barber Conable, 6 March 1986; and, George D. Millerto Robert J. Kane, 7 April 1986, RJKP, Box 4c.

76 Phone conversation, Richard Pound, 20 July 2015.77 “Report to the Finance Commission Paris 6th June 1986,” p. 6, “Seoul 1988

TV General Août-Décembre 1986,” File, IOCA.78 “TV Rights Sharing”; Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board,

Lausanne, 11-12 February 1986, pp. 5, 7; and, Minutes of the Meeting ofthe IOC Executive Board, Seoul, 22-24 April 1986, p. 4.

79 Kane opposed the decision to withdraw the excise tax. “TV Rights Shar-ing.” See also, George D. Miller to Barber Conable, 6 March 1986. GeorgeMiller met with Guy Vander Jagt in Washington in late February toexplain recent developments concerning negotiations with IOC officials.Vander Jagt expressed his pleasure that HR 3770 and the Tax Reform Acthad assisted the USOC in achieving its goal. In his letter to Conable,Miller confirmed that the Tax Reform Act served as “insurance” in theevent that the IOC considered “reneging” on the deal and that nothingwould be done to “perturb” the Tax Reform Act until the IOC signed theBroadcast Marketing Agreement.

80 This tortured set of negotiations is detailed in Barney, Wenn, and Martyn,Selling the Five Rings, pp. 213-226. Seoul’s financial expectations for a U.S.television contract had been set by Calgary’s earth shattering $309 millionABC deal, and the fact that history had shown that the Summer contracthad a value in excess of two times the value of the Winter contract (whenboth were staged in the same year). However, ABC, and the losing suitorsfor the Calgary contract, CBS and NBC, were only too aware, even within

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hours of the conclusion of the negotiations that the price was an inflatedone driven upwards by the use of a sealed bid process devised by RichardPound, and an advisor to the Calgary Organizing Committee, BarryFrank. Even the IOC concluded that ABC stood to lose between $50 and$60 million on the deal. Growing resentment at the sums of money paidby U.S. networks when compared to other global broadcasters, the feelingthat they had been treated shabbily by the sealed bid process in the Cal-gary negotiations, and the time zone difference with Seoul, drove downinterest amongst U.S. television executives. Much of the delay in conclud-ing a U.S. contract in the latter months of 1985 and the early months of1986, and hence the IOC’s need to extend discussions concerning theUSOC’s prospective share of future U.S. television revenue, is attributableto the Korean negotiators’ inability to accept the realities of the negotiat-ing environment and NBC’s extended effort to extract the best possibledeal.

81 Miller, Olympic Revolution, pp. 108-109; and Personal communication,Richard Pound to the author, 9 February 2015.

82 Robert Z. Lawrence (with Jeffrey D. Pellegrom), “Fools’ Gold: HowAmerica Pays to Lose in the Olympics,” Television Quarterly (Fall, 1989):5-10.

83 Peter Ueberroth pressed unsuccessfully for this consideration in relationto the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling theFive Rings, pp. 196-198.

84 NBC paid $300 million for U.S. television rights for the 1988 Seoul Olym-pics, while EBU paid a fraction ($28 million) for Western Europeanrights.

85 Lawrence (with Pellegrom), “Fools’ Gold: How America Pays to Lose inthe Olympics,” p. 6.

86 Payne, Olympic Turnaround, p. 68.87 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 24-26 July

1988, p. 26, IOCA.88 American networks paid $401 million (NBC) and $300 million (CBS) for

the rights to the 1992 Barcelona and 1994 Lillehammer Olympic WinterGames, while EBU acquired European rights for the same festivals for $75million and $24 million respectively.

89 Payne, Olympic Turnaround, pp. 68-69.90 “Notes on the Meeting with Congressman Tom McMillen, Washington,

D.C.,” 17 January 1991, “IOC-USOC” File, Personal Computer Files ofRichard Pound, Montreal, Canada [hereafter cited as PCFRP].

91 Ibid; and, Richard Pound to Edward J. Markey (Chairman, Committee onEnergy and Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance), 30 Sep-tember 1991 (draft), “IOC-USOC” File, PCFRP.

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92 “Notes on the Meeting with Congressman Tom McMillen, Washington,D.C.” Square brackets mine.

93 Ibid.94 A former President of the Fédération Internationale de Natation Ama-

teur, the international sport federation for aquatic sports, Helmick suc-ceeded William Simon as USOC President in 1985. In September 1991, heresigned his office in light of revelations that he had accepted more than$300,000 in consultancy fees for services that placed him in a conflict ofinterest. Former Deputy U.S. Attorney General Arthur Burns conductedan investigation for the USOC, and Samaranch tasked Keba M’Baye,Marc Hodler, and IOC Director General, François Carrard, to conduct aparallel IOC exploration of Helmick’s activities. Helmick fought to retainhis place on the IOC Executive Board, but he was forced to resign his IOCmembership in December. Miller, Olympic Revolution, pp. 220-221. Jour-nalist Michael Janofsky was scathing in his analysis of Helmick’s violationof USOC By-Laws, and the manner in which he had sullied the IOC. Hisresignation from the IOC triggered his immediate loss of positions withthe Executive Boards of the Atlanta Organizing Committee and theUSOC, leaving Helmick to “do little more to help future Olympic effortsthan cheer from the sidelines.” Michael Janofsky, “OLYMPICS; AsHelmick Resigns, His Familiar Rationale Misses the Ethical Point,” NewYork Times, 5 December 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/05/sports/olympics/as/helmick/resigns/his/familiar/rationale/misses/the/ethical/point.html [12 February 2015].

95 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Barcelona, 14-16 April1991, p. 56.

96 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Birmingham, 10-11June 1991, p. 43. While not privy to Pound’s suggestion concerning the pos-sible wisdom in securing the services of a lobbyist in his memo to Sama-ranch, dated 17 January 1991, he knew of the suggestion through Pound’sstatement in, “Marketing Report to the Executive Board Birmingham June1991,” in Annex 12, pp. 108-112 of the aforementioned minutes.

97 It was not UFA’s first attempt to acquire the rights to an Olympic festival.UFA offered $75 million for the rights to the 1992 Albertville OlympicWinter Games, but Samaranch and Hodler settled for $18 million fromEBU. UFA was a Bertelsmann property.

98 Samaranch’s reflection was not accurate. EBU paid $75 million for West-ern European rights, but the entire European market yielded $94.5 mil-lion.

99 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Berlin, 17-19 Septem-ber 1991, p. 42, IOCA.

100 Ibid.101 Ibid.

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102 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 4-6 Decem-ber 1991, pp. 43-44, IOCA.

103 Sally Jenkins, “Peacock Power – Talk about smoking the competition:With the 1996 Atlanta Games already in hand, Dick Ebersol of NBCSports has grabbed five more Olympics – in the years 2000-2008,” SportsIllustrated, 25 December 1995, http://www.si.com/vault/1995/12/25/209185/peacock-power-talk-about-smoking-the-competition-with-the-1996-atlanta-games-already-in-hand-dick-ebersol-of-nbc-sports-has-grabbed-five-more-olympics---in-the-years-2000-to-2008 [11 February2015]. Jenkins returned to the Washington Post in 2000.

104 Six months of secret discussions yielded NBC a six-festival (2022, 2024,2026, 2028, 2030, and 2032) contract through 2032 for $7.75 billion inMay, 2014. This deal followed up on a four-festival agreement (2014,2016, 2018, and 2020) acquired through a competitive bid process for$4.38 billion in June, 2011. NBC can boast an uninterrupted series of 17Olympic festivals having been already broadcast or scheduled for ensuingyears. See, Stephen Wilson, “NBC extends Olympic deal through 2032 for$7.75 billion,” Denver Post, 7 May 2014, http://www.denverpost.com/books/ci_25714725/nbc-extends-olympic-deal-through-2032-7-75b [11February 2015]. CBS was the U.S. Olympic broadcaster for the 1994 Lille-hammer and 1998 Nagano Olympic Winter festivals.

105 James Christie, “Reconcile with U.S. TV Networks, IOC is warned,”Deseret News, 27 February 2001, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/828136/Reconcile-with-US-TV-networks-IOC-is-warned.html?pg=all[12 February 2015]; and, Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC ExecutiveBoard, Nagano, 4-6 December 1995, pp. 63-65, IOCA.

106 Richard Pound to Harvey Schiller, Draft, revised, 3 December 1992,“IOC-USOC” File, PCFRP.

107 Richard Pound to Harvey Schiller, Draft, revised, 3 December 1992,“IOC-USOC” File, PCFRP.

108 The opening to NBC’s coverage of the Opening Ceremony and Bob Cos-tas’ reference to the weather conditions can be found on YouTube at,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxly5ZUclx8.

109 Payne, Olympic Turnaround, p. 69.110 Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 12 May 1999.

Brackets mine.111 Ibid.112 Payne, Olympic Turnaround, p. 69. The IOC was tipped off to the USOC’s

activities in Washington by an NBC staff member tasked to monitorpending federal legislation.

113 And, it seems Schultz and other USOC officials made a habit of pursuingSamaranch when they did not like the answers they received from Poundon financial matters linking the two organizations. In a memo to Sama-

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ranch, dated 13 February 1997, Pound wrote: “The practice of the USOCrunning to you each time I refuse to agree to an unreasonable position ithas adopted is an insult to the IOC and to you as President. It is nothingmore than the actions of a bully which cannot negotiate on the merits ofits position and which thinks you will agree, on a ‘political’ basis, to com-mercially indefensible points.” Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Sama-ranch, 13 February 1997, “IOC-USOC” File, PCFRP.

114 Personal communication, Richard Pound to the author, 12 May 1999.115 While she understood the IOC’s frustration with USOC officials, Anita

DeFrantz informed her IOC Executive Board colleagues that “the USOCwas as tired of the situation as the IOC was.” Minutes of the Meeting of theIOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 8-10 October 1996, p. 16. Pound wasquite concerned about the USOC’s designs for its future financial rela-tionship with the IOC. When in receipt of the USOC’s suggested agendaitems for the meeting in Lausanne, Pound informed Samaranch that, “thenature and extent of the direct challenges to the position of the IOC asleader of the Olympic Movement are even greater than I had expected.”Barring a shift in the USOC’s approach, it was tantamount to a “real dec-laration of war.” Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 10 Septem-ber 1996, “IOC-USOC” File, PCFRP.

116 Minutes of the Meeting of the IOC Executive Board, Lausanne, 8-10 Octo-ber 1996, p. 16.

117 Richard Pound to Juan Antonio Samaranch, 13 February 1997 [ItalicsPound’s]. This careful reading of the draft saved the IOC from the type offinancial disaster that it suffered amidst negotiations for the U.S. televi-sion contract for the 1976 Montreal Olympics. On that occasion, theMontreal Organizing Committee (COJO) obtained IOC consent todeduct 50% of the U.S. television contract for technical services, payabledirectly to COJO, such that the IOC, NOCs, and ISFs received only one-third of $12.5 million as opposed to one-third of the total value of thecontract with ABC, $25 million. It was, in effect, with respect to the per-centage deducted from the U.S. television contract for technical services,the same consideration that the IOC gave to the 1972 Munich OrganizingCommittee. However, the concession to COJO, as had been the case withMunich, was made with the strict condition that no other contracts wouldbe subject to a technical services fee. Montreal organizers proceeded todraft the agreement, and send it to Lausanne for signature. The IOC’slawyer did not notice an addendum to the agreement that rendered alltelevision contracts subject to a technical services fee (50%). The agree-ment was signed by the IOC. It was a costly oversight, one that enragedLausanne officials, who were left with no legal recourse. Stephen R.Wenn, “Television Rights Negotiations and the 1976 Montreal Olym-pics,” Sport History Review 27 (November 1996): 111-138. The sophistica-tion of the IOC’s negotiating and financial management skills hadincreased quantum-fold on Samaranch’s Presidential watch.

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118 Ibid.119 Ibid [Emphasis Pound’s]. Michael Payne concurred with Pound’s con-

temporary assessment. Payne, Olympic Turnaround, p. 68.120 Ibid.121 Payne, Olympic Turnaround, p. 56.122 Ibid., p. 57.123 Ibid., pp. 59-60.124 Ibid., p. 63.125 Ibid., pp. 62-65.126 Ibid., pp. 65-66. The “shock and awe” label was coined by Michael Payne

in reference to NBC’s bid and GE’s sponsorship proposal.127 Philip Hersh, “IOC member Cinquanta: Chicago the favorite,” Chicago

Tribune, 18 June 2009, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/sports_glo-betrotting/chicago_2016/page/2/ [23 February 2015]. The articleappeared in Hersh’s blog, “Globetrotting: A Wordly View of Sports.”

128 Richard Pound, for one, believed that the IOC’s treatment of Chicago’sbid was short-sighted. “This is not the way you deal with the United Statesof America,” Pound intoned. He feared that a guaranteed 18-year gapbetween Olympic festivals on U.S. soil (this would later increase to at least28 years between festivals) might shrink available U.S. commercial reve-nue. Shipley, “Deteriorating USOC-IOC relations threaten both organiza-tions.”

129 Richard Sandomir, “Olympics Channel Draws Rebuke from the IOC,”New York Times, 9 July 2009, http://www.ny-times.com/2009/07/09olym-pics.html [23 February 2015].

130 “Television revenue not important insists Rogge,” More than the Games, 5October 2009, http://www.morethanthegames.co.uk/121st-ioc-session-056536-television-revenue-not-important-insists-rogge [23 February2015].

131 “Chicago bid boss says regional voting, IOC-USOC friction costly,” Reu-ters, 6 October 2009, http://blogs.reuters.com/sport/2009/10/06/chicago-bid-boss-says-regional-voting-ioc-usoc-friction-costly [23 February2015]. The legendary Hatfield –McCoy rivalry pitted the families of Wil-liam Anderson Hatfield (West Virginia) and Randolph McCoy (Ken-tucky) against each other in the post-U.S. Civil War era. Wrote Otis K.Rice: “Antagonisms born of wartime emotions, anger over relatively triv-ial incidents such as the alleged theft of a hog, election-day disputesbrought on by overdrinking, and family disapproval of the romanticattachments of some member were the kinds of experiences that wereshared and understood by countless Americans” of the time. Otis K. Rice,The Hatfields and McCoys (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press,1982), p. 125. But these events, in the case of the Hatfields and McCoys,

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facilitated a decades-long rivalry marked by vendettas and murder thathas become part of American folklore and the subject of television docu-mentaries, a television mini-series starring Kevin Costner and Bill Pax-ton, and numerous literary analyses.

132 “Dispute over Olympic Revenue Sharing May Impact Chicago Bid,” USAToday, 3 June 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-06-03-chicago-share_N.htm [23 February 2015].

133 Ibid.134 “IOC, USOC to revisit Olympic Revenue Sharing,” CBS Sports, 4 June

2008, http://sportsline.com/worldsport/story/10852373 [23 February1015].

135 Juliet Macur, “Olympic Committees Compromise in Revenue-SharingDispute,” New York Times, 28 June 2009, http://nytimes.com/2009/03/28olympics.html [23 February 2015].

136 John Powers, “Boston could benefit from better relationship betweenIOC, USOC,” Boston Globe, 18 January 2015, http://www.boston-globe.com/sports/2015/01/18/boston-could-benefit-from-better-rela-tionship-between-ioc-and-usoc/m1RTtCjkVBXTSqgmo1I2dM/story.html [25 February 2015].

137 Alan Abrahamson, “Scott Blackmun: Arguably the USOC’s last bestchance,” Universal Sports, 6 January 2010, http://universalsports.com/blogs/blog=alanabrahamsonsblog/postid=387006.html [23 February2015].

138 Payne, Olympic Turnaround, pp. 68, 138-140. Payne revealed that dis-putes concerning revenue distribution aside, the two organizationsunderstood the need to protect the value of the Olympic brand when con-fronted with ambush marketers. And, they could collaborate whenrequired. One such example unfolded in 1996 during the Atlanta Centen-nial Olympics, interestingly, at the same time that the IOC and Sama-ranch took much offense to the USOC’s effort to secure support for aSenate bill in Washington that offered changes in the manner in whichU.S. Olympic television contracts would be negotiated and the manner inwhich the money would be distributed. In Atlanta, Nike launched anadvertising platform underpinned by tag lines such as, “You do not winsilver, you lose gold,” “If you can’t stand the heat, get out of Atlanta,” andin a “sarcastic swipe” at the type of themed advertising preferred by offi-cial Olympic sponsors, “We don’t sell dreams, we sell shoes.” Athletes,reports Payne, were disturbed by Nike’s approach and its dismissive atti-tude towards those who might capture silver medals. The IOC and theUSOC were both greatly exercised by Nike’s campaign as it diminishedthe value of Reebok’s USOC sponsorship deal and smeared the Olympicideal. The IOC demanded a meeting with Nike, and such a dialogueoccurred at Atlanta’s Marriott Marquis Hotel. Pound, Payne, and theUSOC’s John Krimsky confronted Howard Slusher, one of Nike founder

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Phil Knight’s trusted executives. Slusher and Krimsky had a heated verbalexchange, highlighted by a challenge to settle their differences “man toman.” Payne noted: “Both men were of similar stature, similar egos, andof questionable fitness. The impending boxing match had definite enter-tainment value, if doubtful sporting discipline, but was probably notgoing to resolve the issue.” Nike reconsidered its approach in the ensuingdays and backed away from its aggressive campaign. Nike supplantedReebok as an official sponsor of the 2000 Sydney Olympics when the lat-ter walked away from its deal with the Sydney Organizing Committee as aresult of a dispute. See Wenn, Barney, and Martyn, Tarnished Rings, pp.115-117.

139 Stephen Wilson, “USOC leaders appointed to 2 IOC commissions,”Washington Post, 11 March 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031103098.html [26 February2015].

140 Powers, “Boston could benefit from better relationship between IOC,USOC.”

141 Wilson, “USOC leaders appointed to 2 IOC commissions.”142 “IOC, USOC finalize revenue deal,” ESPN.com, 24 May 2012, http://

espn.go.com/olympics/story/_/id/7967000/ioc-usoc-resolve-differences-revenues [24 February 2015].

143 “Interview with USOC CEO Scott Blackmun.”144 Mickle, “Improved IOC-USOC relationship on display.” See also, Wilson,

“NBC extends Olympic deal through 2032 for $7.75b.” 145 Avery Brundage to Roger Coulon, 11 September, 1967, Avery Brundage

Collection, Box 207, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Can-ada [hereafter cited as ABC].

146 The struggle over shares of television revenue amongst members of theOlympic Tripartite in the 1960s is detailed in, Stephen R. Wenn, “AnOlympian Squabble: The Distribution of Olympic Television Revenue,1960-1966,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies III(1994): 27-47; and, Stephen R. Wenn, “Growing Pains: The OlympicMovement and Television, 1966-1972,” Olympika: The InternationalJournal of Olympic Studies IV (1995): 1-22.

147 See Barney, Wenn, and Martyn, Selling the Five Rings, pp. 103-150.148 For a brief analysis, see Stephen R. Wenn and Scott G. Martyn, “Juan

Antonio Samaranch’s Score Sheet: Revenue Generation and the OlympicMovement, 1980-2001,” in Gerald P. Schaus and Stephen R. Wenn, eds.,Onward to the Olympics: Historical Perspectives on the Olympic Games(Waterloo, Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), pp. 309-323.

149 In reference to his first five years in office, and to the prior instabilitywithin the USOC’s management ranks, Blackmun observed: “I was lucky.I came in at a really good time. The bar, candidly, was pretty low. We set

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as our two objectives coming in; one, we wanted to substantially increaseour philanthropic revenue because we’re the only national Olympic com-mittee in the world that doesn’t get government support – at least in adeveloped country. And we really wanted to rebuild our relationshipsinternationally … you know, I think it’s worked well.” A determined pushwas applied to the major gifts portion of its fund raising efforts. In 2009,the USOC brought in less than $1 million per year; as of early 2015, it hasraised this figure to $15 million. “Interview with USOC CEO Scott Black-mun.”

150 Wenn, “IOC/USOC Relations and the 2009 IOC Session in Copenhagen,”p. 72.

151 Ibid.