A History of the Defense Intelligence Agency

7/31/2019 A History of the Defense Intelligence Agency

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D I A O f f i c e o f H i s t o r i c a l R e s e a r c h

A History of the

Defense InTellIgence Agency


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Contents

1 WhatisMilitaryIntelligence?

3 MilitaryIntelligenceinU.S.History

4 TeAmericanRevolution:TeRootsofU.S.MilitaryIntelligence

6 TeCivilWar:Intelligencein19thCenturyWarfare

10 TeSpanish-AmericanWar:GlobalMilitaryIntelligence

12 WorldWarI:ExpansionandContraction

14 WorldWarII:FromFailuretoriumph

16 ColdWarDilemmas

18 ChallengeandReorganization:TeRiseofDIA

22 Aimeofransition

26 DIAComesofAge

32 TePost-ColdWarChallenge

36 Te21stCentury:Combatingerrorism,ProvidingRelief

40 TeFutureofDefenseIntelligence

41 DirectorsofDIA

42 TePatriotsMemorial


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A History

What is Military Intelligence?

Military intelligence is the product o gatheringinormation about oreign military dispositions,equipment and strategic plans, analyzing thecontents o that inormation, and disseminatingthe ndings to decisionmakers. It appears in threebasic orms tactical, operational, and strategic.

actical intelligence concerns inormation aboutthe enemy that is designed to help decide whichtactics, units, and weapons will most likely contrib-ute to victory in an assigned area. It is a short-term,narrow-use tool that, when properly applied, canbe a signicant orce multiplier. Operational intel-ligence assumes a broader approach. Its purpose

is to conduct military campaigns that accomplishstrategic objectives within specic areas o opera-tion. Finally, strategic intelligence involves a ocuson more overarching, but static actors such asgeography and inrastructure; or long-term trends,such as the application o new tactics or the de-velopment o new resources. Strategic intelligenceis an important tool in the eort to anticipate and

counter threats throughout the world.

Te intelligence process services the need orboth tactical and strategic intelligence. Te rststep, inormation gathering, consists o collectingdata and making it available or analysis. A com-mon method o inormation gathering is the use ounclassied open sources, such as oreign web-

sites, television, newspapers, radio, or openly pub-lished government studies. Oen, this open sourceintelligence (OSIN) provides such basic inorma-tion as population statistics, military maneuvers,and political, social, and cultural trends.

Open sources sometimes do not supply enoughinormation, and other techniques are oen neces-

sary. Analysis o aerial imagery is one commonlyemployed method. A great deal o inormation canbe gleaned rom photo interpretation o detailedhigh-altitude pictures so-called IMIN, or imageryintelligence o a nations inrastructure, militarybases, and even troop movements. Human intelli-gence (HUMIN), signals intelligence (SIGIN), andmeasurement and signature intelligence (MASIN)

can also provide military advantage over oreignenemies. All o these sources provide vital intelligencethat, when properly analyzed, can provide a signi-cant benet to warghters and policymakers.


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Defense Intelligence Agency

Te second step o the intelligence process isanalysis. Intelligence analysts pull together inor-

mation gathered rom many sources to produceall-source nished intelligence that examines local,national, and global issues that may inuence or-eign threats. Tey assess scientic, technical, tacti-cal, diplomatic, military, organizational, or politicalchanges in combination with actors such as geog-raphy, demographics, and industrial capabilities to

anticipate and respond to overseas dangers as wellas assess enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Te third step o the intelligence process isproduction and dissemination. Once analysts have

made their determinations, they compose nishedintelligence reports or both military and civiliandecisionmakers. Intelligence ofcers then dis-seminate these products to relevant policymakerswho decide on a detailed plan o action. One o theintelligence ofcers primary duties is to anticipatethe intelligence needs o decisionmakers and react

accordingly, assigning projects or responding tospecic requests or inormation. Intelligence of-cers oen work very closely with policymakers andwarghters to anticipate inormation requirementsand to more sharply hone the nished intelligenceprovided by analysts.


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A History

Defense Intelligence Agency: A History

Military intelligence is an activity that stretchesback to the colonial period o American history.Te scope and practice o military intelligencehas expanded and contracted over time as need,resources, and intelligence philosophy changedthrough the decades. Nevertheless, military intel-

ligence has played a major role in many o the keymoments in American history.

Te American military intelligence system dur-ing the Revolutionary War was an active and eec-tive instrument that helped counterbalance Britishnumerical and operational superiority. Aer thewar, however, successive presidential administra-

tions and Congress allowed intelligence organiza-tions to wither and disappear. It would be nearly acentury beore organized military intelligence wasormally established in the Military Services. While

decisionmakers generally recognized the impor-tance o good intelligence during wartime, they alsobelieved that it was unnecessary in times o peace. Itwas not until the aermath o World War II, with itscatastrophic intelligence ailure at Pearl Harbor, thatU.S. policymakers accepted the concept o a central-

ized peacetime military intelligence organization.As world war turned to Cold War, a sophisticated,

global intelligence apparatus became necessary tocounter and contain the spread o communism.With questions about the value o peacetime militaryintelligence work settled, policymakers turned theirattention to how that work should be carried out. At

rst, military intelligence activities were ragmentedamong the various service branches, but throughoutthe 1950s, momentum built or the establishmento a centralized military intelligence agency. Teestablishment o the Deense Intelligence Agency in1961 unied the various intelligence activities o theArmed Services. Tough its success was not alwaysassured, the concept behind DIA was a sound one.

Te Agency provided essential intelligence on nearlyall o the Cold Wars major events, and continues tosupport policymakers and warghters in the GlobalWar on error in the twenty-rst century.

Military Intelligence in U.S. History


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The American Revolution:The Roots of U.S. Military Intelligence

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A History

Because o the British superiority in strength andmobility, good military intelligence was vital to

the strategy o the American Continental Army.Perhaps the most amous military intelligenceagent in the American Revolution was Paul Revere.At the outset o the Revolution, Revere and hissecret intelligence network learned that the Britishplanned to raid the towns o Lexington and Con-cord outside o Boston and conscate the weapons

stored there. He and others successully warnedthe local militias, known as the Minutemen, whoremoved weapons caches and resisted the Britishraids. Te Minutemens skirmish with the Britishin Lexington and Concord were the opening shotsred in the American Revolution.

Troughout the war, General George Washing-ton, an experienced soldier who recognized the

value o good intelligence, spearheaded much o thecolonists military intelligence eort. No central-ized intelligence organization existed at the time,but Washington himsel established agent networksin Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, whichprovided him with a great deal o knowledge aboutBritish troop dispositions and movements. He also

used inormation gathered by his agents to plan andconduct military operations throughout the Revo-lution. Knowltons Rangers, an intelligence and re-connaissance unit Washington established in 1776,provided timely and vital intelligence regarding thedispositions and strength o the British army.

John Jay was another notable intelligence o-cer in the American Revolution. Jay played thedominant role in Americas rst counterintelligenceoperations. He conducted hundreds o investiga-tions, arrests, and trials involving many inuentialbusinessmen and political gures loyal to the British

Crown. He also organizedclandestine operatives

and ran dangerous coun-terintelligence missions.Aer the war, Jay laterbecame the rst ChieJustice o the UnitedStates Supreme Court.

Military intelligence

was o vital importanceto the Continental Armyduring the Revolution. It helped counter the su-perior British strength and mobility by inormingAmerican generals about their movements whileit also deceived the British into making strategicerrors. Aer the war, Washingtons administrationmaintained a robust intelligence establishment,

but succeeding Presidencies showed little interestin developing a ull-time, centralized intelligence-gathering agency. Military intelligence work con-tinued to be done on an ad-hoc, as needed basis.

(Let) Detail rom Trenton, 26 December 1776,

by H. Charles McBarron.(Above) Thomas Knowlton led Knowltons Rangers, a group

o 150 volunteers who conducted reconnaissance andcarried out raids against British targets. It was thenations rst specialized military intelligence unit.

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The Civil War:Intelligence in 9th Century Warfare

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Te Union and Con-ederate armies alsotapped each otherstelegraph lines, but mostintercepts came rom cap-

tured enemy telegraph sta-tions. For the most part,the stations were used totransmit alse messages. In

addition to wiretapping, the Civil War also usheredin the widespread use o another innovation in U.S.intelligence operations aerial reconnaissance.Te Union made extensive and successul use o

observation balloons, while the Conederacys owntul attempts were less protable.

Both sides in the Civil War also engaged inother types o covert action at home and abroad.

Tere were plenty o volunteers in the North andthe South who were willing to serve as inormants.Abraham Lincoln himsel had his own privateintelligence sources. Te war also encouraged a ullrange o covert paramilitary, psychological, andpolitical action. Tis work even went on overseas,as both sides sought to sway opinion within the

British and French governments.Te Civil War ushered in a new set o demandsor good intelligence, and both sides did their bestto respond. Nevertheless, the U.S. governmentallowed the resources built up during the war towither once hostilities concluded. While the U.S.Army and Navy maintained their own small intel-ligence apparatus, many viewed intelligence work

only in terms o its wartime utility and saw littleneed or its peacetime maintenance.

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The use o balloons providedUnion orces with an important

aerial reconnaissance tool.

The Civil War Intelligence in 19th Century Warfare


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A History 9

The Civil War Intelligence in 19th Century Warfare

Allen Pinkerton, let, shown here meeting with

President Lincoln, was George B. McClellanschie o military intelligence in the

early days o the Civil War.

Signals Intelligence in the U.S. Civil War

Both the Union and Conederacy depended on the telegraphor communications in the Civil War. Inormation aboutcombat campaigns and normal military business routinelycrossed the wires. Both sides also understood the value ogathering signals intelligence (SIGINT) as a way o obtainingreliable, actionable inormation.

In 1864, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant led the Union Army ona bloody campaign o attrition in Virginia in an eort toexhaust the Conederacys resources. Unknown to Grant,however, Conederate telegraph operators secretly tappedhis telegraph line to Washington. The rebels intercepted many

encrypted messages, but, as ar as is known, were unable todecode any o them. Occasionally, however, Union ocialstransmitted plain language cables, and Conederate soldierstook advantage o the mistake.

On September 12, the U.S. Army quartermaster in Washingtonsent Grants headquarters an unencrypted message asking ora contingent o guards to meet more than 2,400 head o cattledue to arrive the next day at Coggins Point, Virginia. Actingquickly, Conederate soldiers also went to Coggins Point

and arrived beore the Union Army guard. They captured andmade o with the cattle, along with 200 mules, 32 wagons, 300Union troops, and 40 telegraph construction workers.

Thanks to a telegraph intercept, the Conederates, alwaysshort on ood and military necessities, had captured aboutorty days worth o meat or their army and damaged Grantsstrategy o attrition warare.



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0 Defense Intelligence Agency

The Spanish-American War:Global Military Intelligence


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A History

Te United States went to war against Spain in1898 aer the battleship USSMaine blew up while

in harbor in Cuba. U.S. citizens already stronglysupported a Cuban insurgency against Spain, butwhen theMaine exploded, many blamed the Span-ish and pushed the U.S. into war against Spain aew months later. Tis war presented a special seto intelligence demands to the United States. Teprimary theaters o action were Cuba on one handand the Philippine Islands on the other, two loca-tions on opposite sides o the globe.

U.S. decisionmakers set out three major tasksor its Army and Navy intelligence sta. Te rstwas to observe the movements o a Spanish eetsent to the Caribbean to harass U.S. operations.Te second was to monitor a large Spanish eeton its way to the Philippines to oppose U.S. moves

there. Finally, U.S. intelligence needed to maintaina liaison with Cuban insurgents in order to keepabreast o Spanish military dispositions in Cuba.

In order to monitor the Spanish eets, U.S.naval intelligence ofcers set up a large interna-tional network o intelligence agents that providedHUMIN on the location and strength o the

respective Spanish eets. Tis critical inorma-tion allowed the U.S. military to seize initiativeand dictate the pace and timing o operations. Atthe same time, Army intelligence in Cuba gave

U.S. orces a clearer picture o Spanish strengthsand weaknesses on the island and led to a decisive

United States victory in the war. Intelligence opera-tions had again proven their value as strategic andtactical orce multipliers. Even so, aside rom themilitary attach system, which carried many othertasks besides intelligence gathering, and the Ofceo Naval Intelligence (ONI), the U.S. governmentstill did not maintain a large, complex, all-sourcepeacetime intelligence apparatus when the Span-ish-American War ended.

(Above Right) Wreckage o the USS Mainein Havana Harbor, 1898.

(Right) The news that the USS Mainehad blown up

in Havana Harbor galvanized U.S. public oppositionto Spains war with Cuban insurgents.

(Let) This Spanish battery on Corregidor Island in thePhilippines was dismantled and destroyed ater

its discovery by U.S. Navy sailors.


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World War I:Expansion and Contraction



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World War II:From Failure to Triumph


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A History

Te Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on7 December 1941 came as a tremendous shock to the

United States. Failure to predict the attack was an his-toric intelligence ailure and claried the need or an e-ective military intelligence system, even in peacetime,to detect oreign military threats to the United States.Upon the U.S. declaration o war, the United Statesonce again entered into a global international conictwithout a centrally organized intelligence system.

In the wake o the Pearl Harbor attack, both the Armyand Navy made improvements that streamlined their pro-cessing and dissemination capabilities. Joint intelligenceoperations also brought together a modernized version othe Armys MID and the Navys Oice o Naval Intel-ligence (ONI) to coordinate inormation in each phase othe intelligence cycle: collection, production, and dissemi-nation. In addition, President Franklin D. Roosevelt or-

dered the creation o the Oice o Strategic Services (OSS),which conducted special military operations, espionageactivities, and intelligence analysis. Roosevelt also directedthe FBI to gather non-military oreign intelligence in theWestern Hemisphere. Existing Army and Naval intelli-gence branches took responsibility or the rest o the world.

In Europe, American and British intelligence set up

clandestine operations behind enemy lines to coordinatewith local resistance orces. Agents mapped supply dropzones or Allied pilots, set up sae houses or escapedPOWs, helped train resistance ghters in guerrilla warare,and provided intelligence reports to Allied headquarters.Aerial reconnaissance was also widely used during thewar. Within hours o a reconnaissance sortie, photographscould be developed, printed, and interpreted, an innova-

tion that could have decisive eects on operations.In the Pacic Teater, Army intelligence played the

dominant role. Some o its most vital tasks includedHUMIN work. Tis work included exploiting captured

documents and interrogating prisoners o war, providing

geographic intelligence on the poorly mapped areas othe theater, and deploying reconnaissance units to gathertactical military intelligence. For example, in the South-west Pacic Area, jungle-wise coast watchers remainedbehind enemy lines to transmit Japanese movements.General Douglas MacArthur also set up a centralizedSIGIN center. Much o the work o this group involved

listening to enemy radio and radar emissions in order topinpoint deensive locations and troop concentrations.World War II had an enormous eect on U.S. intel-

ligence gathering. It orced policymakers to recognizethe value o an efcient, proessional military intelli-gence apparatus that was capable o gathering, evaluat-ing, and disseminating inormation in a timely way,even in peacetime. echnological advances engen-

dered by the war also contributed to the developmento new intelligence gathering techniques. Neverthe-less, eorts to establish a unied military intelligenceestablishment languished aer the war.

(Above) Japanese-American, or Nisei, translators wereabsolutely essential in the production o military

intelligence in the Pacic Theater during World War II.

(Let) The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor exposed major faws inthe U.S. military intelligence system and illustrated the need or a

unied, coordinated military intelligence establishment.

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A History

As successul as it was in World War II, the U.S.military intelligence structure aced a serious

dilemma as Cold War tensions with the SovietUnion rapidly orced policymakers to conront thenext threat. Although the need or timely militaryintelligence was widely recognized, the Army,Navy, and newly ounded Air Force still separatelycollected, produced, and disseminated inorma-tion. Te system proved duplicative, costly, andineective, as each Service provided separate, andat times conicting estimates.

Several overlapping problems existed in themanagement and control o the long-establishedmilitary attach system as well. Each Servicesoreign attach reported separately to their re-spective ambassadors, and each represented theU.S. separately to the host country military. Te

result was a duplication o eort both on post andbetween posts in neighboring countries. Barriersbetween the Services complicated the coordinationo attach activities with other DoD elements, andthe cost o sponsoring three separate attach ofceswas an expensive, inefcient use o limited resourc-es. Finally, each attach ofce individually collected

and disseminated inormation, which sometimesresulted in conused reporting.

Te Deense Reorganization Act o 1958 soughtto correct these shortcomings by streamlining the

channels o authority within the Department oDeense and eliminating much wasteul duplica-tion. DoD intelligence responsibilities, however,remained vertically stovepiped into the compo-nent Services. Lines o responsibility were unclear,coordination poor, and products oen parochial.Although the Deense Reorganization Act didresolve some problems by rationalizing commandauthority within DoD, the military intelligencesystem remained inefcient.

(Above) U.S. military intelligence capabilities atrophied ater World War II, loweringthe quality o products such as bomb damage assessments during the Korean War.

(Let) The U-2 revolutionized American intelligence analysis o the Soviet threat during the ColdWar. It has been key to supporting missions or the warghter because it provided indications and

warning, threat protection, order o battle, targeting, and bomb damage assessment inormation.



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Challenge and Reorganization:The Rise of DIA




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A History 9

Seeking to correct shortcomings in deense intelli-gence, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed a

Joint Study Group in 1960 to improve ways o e-ectively organizing the nations military intelligenceactivities. Acting on its recommendations, Secretary oDeense Robert S. McNamara ordered the Joint Chieso Sta (JCS) to submit to him a concept or a singleDeense Intelligence Agency that would integrate themilitary intelligence eorts o all DoD elements.

According to the plan submitted by JCS, thenew agency would report to the Secretary o De-ense through the JCS as a unied body o militaryintelligence and counterintelligence entities. Teseparate Services would no longer act as a looseconederation o the independently operatinggroups. Tis new agency would adopt the missiono collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing,

integrating, producing, and disseminating militaryintelligence throughout DoD. Other objectives inthe JCS plan included more efciently allocatingscarce intelligence resources, more eectively man-aging all DoD intelligence activities, and eliminat-ing redundant acilities, organizations, and tasks.

With some minor modications, McNamaraapproved the concept given to him by the JCS and es-tablished the Deense Intelligence Agency on 1 August1961, though it would not become ofcially operation-al until that all. In the summer o 1961, as Cold Wartensions ared over the construction o the Berlin Wall,Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, DIAsrst director, planned and organized the new agency.On 1 October 1961, it began operations with a handul

o employees in borrowed ofce space.

(Above) John F. Kennedys Secretary o Deense,Robert McNamara, approved DIAs

Activation Plan 29 September 1961.

(Let) DIAs John Hughes gave atelevised brieng on the Cuban Missile Crisis

to the nation in February 1963.


1960 Ch ll d R i ti th Ri f DIA


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Following the establishment o DIA, the Services

transerred intelligence unctions and resources tothe Agency on a time-phased basis to avoid any deg-radation in the eectiveness o deense intelligenceactivities. Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis inOctober 1962, Agency organizational eorts contin-ued. In late 1962, DIA established the Deense Intel-ligence School and in early 1963, activated a newProduction Center at Arlington Hall Station, Vir-

ginia. Te Agency also added an Automated DataProcessing (ADP) Center, a Dissemination Center,and a Scientic and echnical Intelligence Director-ate, and soon assumed sta support unctions o

the J-2, Joint Sta. wo years later, DIA acceptedresponsibility or the Deense Attach System, thelast unction transerred by the Services to DIA.

Te Agencys early years were trying ones. TeArmed Services resisted DIAs attempts to estab-lish itsel as DoDs central military intelligenceorganization. Te Cuban Missile Crisis, in whichDIA analysts played a paramount role, presentedthe Agency with its rst challenge beore it had the

chance to rmly establish itsel. Te Vietnam Waralso severely tested the edgling Agencys ability toproduce accurate, timely intelligence over a pro-tracted conict. Other less direct, but no less or-

1960s Challenge and Reorganization: the Rise of DIA

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A History

midable trials during the 1960s included the eortto gather inormation about Chinas rst atomicbomb test in 1964, the state o Chinas armedorces during the chaotic Cultural Revolution, andincreased anti-colonial unrest in Arica.

Crises only multiplied in the tumultuous lateryears o the decade. Te ongoing Vietnam Warwas perhaps the most prominent, but the Six-DayWar between Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, North

Koreas seizure o the intelligence vessel USS Pueblo,and the Soviet invasion o Czechoslovakia, strainedDIAs ability to handle major challenges even as itseorts at organization and consolidation continued.

(Far Let) During the Vietnam War, DIAprovided bomb damage assessments o

targets such as this Hanoi aireld.

(Let) DIA analysts also providedtargets or airstrikes in Vietnam.

(Right) Military intelligence support toground operations was critical toghting a large-scale war against

an elusive enemy. DIA helpedprovide the increased level o

intelligence necessary to support

helicopter insertions againstremote enemy strongholds.

(Below Right) Lt Gen Joseph F. Carroll, USAFFirst DIA Director, 19611969.





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A Time of Transition

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1970s A Time of Transition


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With American involvement in Vietnam wind-

ing down by 1975, deense intelligence acedmassive resource reductions. Te recommenda-tions aired at the Williamsburg Conerence threeyears earlier proved useul. Despite the cutbackin resources, DIA was able to continue producingtimely intelligence by exploiting recent technologi-cal advances. It also modernized the National Mili-

tary Intelligence Center. Ultimately, the Agencymaintained its support to consumers in OSD, theJCS, and the Unied & Specied (U&S) Com-mands despite the depletion o resources.

Intense Congressional review during 1975-76 ledto uncertainty and even more change in the nationalIntelligence Community. Several dierent Congres-sional investigations into charges o intelligenceabuse ultimately spurred President Gerald Fordto sign Executive Order 11905, which claried theunctions o the Intelligence Community and therestrictions in place on it. Within DIA, the leader-ship adopted the delegated production concept,which spread production responsibilities across in-telligence organizations within each service, to oset

heavy production requirements. A report rom theIntelligence Management Study Group also led to areorganization o all DIA production activities in anattempt to streamline the process.

Following the promulgation o Executive Order12036 in 1979, which restructured the IntelligenceCommunity and better outlined DIAs national anddepartmental responsibilities, the Agency reorga-nized around ve major directorates: production,operations, resources, external aairs, and J-2support. Despite these and other community-widereorganization and modernization eorts, cuts inresources and unding during the decade limitedthe communitys ability to collect and producetimely intelligence. Ultimately, these shortages con-tributed to the ailure to predict the overthrow othe Shah in Iran and a misunderstanding o Soviet

intentions in Aghanistan.In act, while resources decreased and DIA

wrestled with ways to maintain quality products,intelligence requirements expanded. In the late

(Right) Following the discovery o a Soviet combat brigadein Cuba in the late 1970s and the resulting concerns over the

intentions o the troops, DIA took the lead in tracking developments.

(Far Right) Vietnam POWs return rom Hanoi during OPERATIONHOMECOMING in 1973. DIA played a major role in monitoring

POWs held by the communist orces in Southeast Asia andbringing them back to the United States.

1970s A Time of Transition

1970s


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A History

1970s, Agency analysts ocused on global eventsrom Central America to China. DIA took respon-sibility or locating and returning prisoners-o-warin Southeast Asia. It grappled with the repercus-sions o expanding state-sponsored terrorism,especially in the Middle East and Arica. DIA setup special task orces to monitor crises such asthe Soviet invasion o Aghanistan, the overthrowo Iranian monarchy, and the internment o U.S.hostages in the American embassy in ehran in1979. Other events that provoked serious con-cern or DIA included the Vietnamese invasion o

Cambodia, the China-Vietnam border war, clashesbetween Libya and Egypt, the Sandinista takeoverin Nicaragua, and the Soviet movement o combattroops to Cuba near the end o the decade.

Deense Attachs

Military attachs play an important historical role in nearlyevery country around the world. The United States Attachshave represented the U.S. to host country militaries, advised

U.S. Ambassadors, and provided inormation on oreign mili-tary capabilities. A ormal Deense Attach System (DAS) wasestablished under DIA in 1965, giving the Agency managerialauthority over attachs worldwide.

Today, as part o DIA, Attachs continue their time-honored worko observing and reporting on in-country and regional military-political developments and supporting the work o Ambassadors,the Secretary o Deense, and the Chairman o the Joint Chieso Sta. The photograph below was taken by a Deense Attachduring a parade in Moscow in the 1970s. In the photograph atbottom, a Deense Attach inspects oreign equipment.

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DIA Comes of Age



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A History

DIA came o age in the 1980s, ocusing heavily onthe intelligence needs o both eld commanders

and national-level decisionmakers. Tis was doneagainst a backdrop o Congressional support orDoD budget increases to enhance readiness, sus-tainability, and modernization. As a part o theseimprovements, the Agency also broke ground orthe Deense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) atBolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. in April1981. Te opening o the DIAC in 1984 improved

the DIAs work by collocating nearly all o DIAsdisparate directorates under one roo, allowing orbetter inormation sharing and more rapid outputo intelligence products. Moreover, the concept ointelligence as a orce multiplier in crises becamea predominant theme in U.S. military intelligencecircles. DIA assembled an all-source integrated

database to enable the Unied and Specied Com-mands to better assess threats as they existed in

the eld, thereby pinpointing enemy strengths andweaknesses. Te Agency also established a Research

Crisis Support Center to provide a central, secure,all-source crisis management center to support theNMIC and the various commands.

One agency product inparticular brought wide ac-claim. In 1981, DIA publishedthe rst in a series o whitepapers on the strengths and

capabilities o Soviet mili-tary orces. Te series, titledSoviet Military Power, metwith great praise in militaryand intelligence circles. DIApublished ten issues over thenext decade, and they became

a respected source o inormation on the militarystrength o the United States chie rival in the world.

(Above Right) DIAs publication o Soviet MilitaryPowerprovided policymakers, U.S. allies, and

the American public with a better understandingo Russian capabilities in the 1980s.

(Right) A critical DIA task in the 1980s was tomonitor the Soviet Unions war in Aghanistan,

which lasted rom 1979 to 1989.

(Let) An F-14A Tomcat rom the aircrat carrierUSS America fies over a Soviet Balzam Class

intelligence collection ship o the Virginiacoast. DIA was able to compile a great

deal o inormation on Soviet intelligence

ships that prowled the U.S. coastlineduring the Cold War.




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1980s DIA Comes of Age


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A History 9

capabilities. Tis inormation was vital or U.S.retaliatory strikes on Iranian oil platorms and in the

aermath o the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark.DIA also supported decisionmakers as threatsarose in other parts o the world. Te intelligenceprovided by the Deense Attach in El Salvador, orexample, prompted massive U.S. assistance to thegovernments struggle against a Communist insur-gency. DIA monitored events in Britains 1982 warwith Argentina over the Falkland Islands. When

U.S. troops invaded Grenada during OperationURGEN FURY in 1983, a special DIA ask Forceresponded to numerous demands or briengs,papers, and intelligence inormation. Te Agencyalso distributed intelligence summaries to assisteld commanders during the operation.

By the middle o the decade, DIA was ully

engaged in collection and analysis eorts or eventsaround the globe. Te Agency kept a close watch on

Israels invasion o Lebanon, the Soviet imbroglioin Aghanistan, the civil war in Chad, and unrest

in the Philippines. errorist attacks, sometimes onAmerican targets, multiplied in the mid-1980s.Indeed, the signicantly large number o hijackings,bombings, kidnapping, murders, and other acts oterrorism led observers to characterize 1985 as theYear o the errorist. Secretary o Deense CasparWeinberger presented DIA with the Agencys rstJoint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 or outstand-

ing intelligence support in 1985, including assis-tance in a series o crises including the hijacking oWA Flight 847 and the cruise shipAchille Lauro,the unrest in the Philippines, and counterterror-ist operations against Libya. Later in the decade,the oyota War between Libya and Chad andthe turmoil in Haiti added to DIAs heavy produc-

tion workload, as did unrest in other parts o LatinAmerica, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, and Pakistan.


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1980s DIA Comes of Age


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During this crisis period, DIA established itsOperational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC),

which served as the primary vehicle or coordinat-ing analytic support during crises. DoD moved,renovated, and upgraded the National MilitaryIntelligence Center (NMIC) so that it was col-located with the National Military CommandCentera move that encouraged the usion omilitary operations and intelligence at the nationallevel. Te Goldwater-Nichols Deense Reorganiza-

tion Act o 1986 designated DIA a combat supportagency, which made it subject to the oversight othe Chairman o the JCS and thereby improvedits combat readiness. DIA also moved quickly toincrease cooperation with U.S. military commands.At the same time, the Agency began developing abody o joint intelligence doctrine that was even

more responsive to the needs o the Services.

The Soviet Invasion o Aghanistan

On December 24, 1979, U.S. intelligence began receiving reportsthat a massive Soviet airlit was underway in Aghanistan andthat Soviet ground troops were streaming into the rugged

Aghan countryside. Their aim was to replace the indigenousAghan communist government with a proxy regime that wasmore willing to ollow Soviet instruction. The ten-year Sovietoccupation was a humanitarian disaster or Aghanistan andan economic and military disaster or the Soviet Union.

The Soviet invasion did, however, provide an intelligencewindall. DIA ocused the bulk o its intelligence resources onthe actions o Soviet orces. It analyzed Soviet military tactics,strategy, and capabilities over the course o the confict and

came away with a much improved understanding o Sovietdoctrine in general. One early DIA report saw an emergingquagmire with ew easy solutions or the occupying orces,stating We believe the Soviets would have to double theirstrength to break the current stalemate.

DIAs improved ability to handle increased production loadsin the 1980s is refected in its expanded reporting on theconfict. It examined other actors bearing on the occupation,such as its disastrous impact on the Soviet and Aghaneconomies and Iranian support to the Aghan resistance. DIAanalysts concluded that Iranian and U.S. interests coincidedinsoar as Soviet expansion in Central Asia was concerned.When the Soviets began their withdrawal in 1988, DIAmonitored the removal o their orces rom Aghanistan.

The occupation o Aghanistan proved too costlyor the Soviet Union to maintain. Here, armored

personnel carriers begin pulling out o the country.

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The Post-Cold War Challenge

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A History

Te collapse o the Soviet Union and the end o theCold War brought major changes and challenges tothe U.S. Intelligence Community. National securitypolicy, ocused on containing the spread o Com-munism or nearly ve decades, was undamentallyaltered, compelling DIA to examine its priorities inthe new era. Drastic cuts in unding and personnel,part o the so-called peace dividend, orced DIAto restructure its directorates in order to operatemore efciently and with ewer resources.

Tis period o reevaluation and restructuringin the Intelligence Community as a whole beganaer the all o Communism in Eastern Europe,the reunication o Germany, and the end o theCold War. During this period, DIA emphasizedimproved management o intelligence produc-tion DoD-wide as resource reductions once again

threatened Agency objectives and depleted stafng.Tis new emphasis enhanced exibility, improvedcooperation with the Service intelligence organi-zations, sharply reduced management overhead,and returned to intelligence basics by ocusing onthe areas o collection, production, and manage-ment. Troughout the world, meanwhile, deenseattachs increased their work o observing military

conditions, evaluating developments in their as-signed countries, and advising the ambassador.Events o the early 1990s compelled a widespreadreview o DIAs role, as the nation conronted adierent set o challenges in a new era o diverseregional conicts. Te dening mission or DIAcame in response to Iraqs invasion o Kuwait in

August 1990. DIA set up an extensive, 24-hourcrisis management cell designed to tailor national-level intelligence support or the coalition orcesassembled to expel Iraqi troops rom Kuwait. At

the beginning o Operation DESER SORM,2,000 Agency personnel participated in the intel-ligence eort. Te Joint Intelligence Center (JIC)that DIA established in the Pentagon to integrateand coordinate intelligence produced by variousagencies was the locus o this work.

(Above) Joint task orces working complex Balkans issues wereresponsible or providing intelligence inormation

that was brie, clear, accurate, and timely.

(Let) Soldiers inspect a downed SCUD missile. DuringOperation DESERT STORM, DIA took part in

the dicult SCUD hunting operations.


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DIA also dispatched more than 100 employeesinto the Kuwaiti Teater to provide intelligencesupport, and deployed eleven National Intelli-gence Support eams overseas. Intelligence theyproduced was key to the overwhelming coalitionvictory. Colin Powell, Chairman o the JCS dur-

ing DESER SORM, noted aer hostilities thatno combat commander had ever received morebenet rom as ull and complete a view o anadversary as U.S. and coalition commanders did

prior to and during the conict. Tis DIA-led eortremains a powerul example o the orce multiply-ing eect that excellent intelligence support canoer operational units in theater.

DIAs restructuring early in the decade andthe experience provided by Operation DESER

SORM prepared the agency or other challengesas well. Organizational reorms and intelligencethreats during the opening years o the decaderesulted in an unprecedented level o integra-

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A History

tion between DIA, the military Services, and theCombatant Commands. Tis arrangement servedthe national security community extremely well

as it surged to provide intelligence support to U.S.and United Nations orces involved in places suchas Somalia, the ormer Yugoslavia, Aghanistan,anzania, Congo, and Haiti.

Intelligence provided by DIA allowed Coalition orces inOperation DESERT STORM to destroy Iraqi early warningradar sites (Far Let) and hardened aircrat hangars (Let).

(Above) DIA supported HUMINT operations against al-Qaida

in Aghanistan. The Deense HUMINT Service became ullyoperational in 1996.

MSIC, The Missile and Space Intelligence Center (Top Right)Huntsville, AL, and AFMIC, the Armed Forces Medical Intel-

ligence Center (Center Right) Ft. Detrick, MD, joined DIA in 1992.

(Below Right) As the decade closed, the Agency prepared orthe eared worldwide Y2K computer system problems. The

preparations not only averted major intelligence ailures butalso improved the overall technical capabilities o DIA.

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A History

Te new millennium brought even more variedchallenges to the Intelligence Community. Prepara-tions or the anticipated Y2K worldwide com-puter crash averted problems but made clear boththe vulnerability o computer databases and thedifculties o database integration. In response,DIA sought to improve its databases and renderthem ully interoperable in order to better meet theneeds o a changing world.

Major transormation in the Intelligence Com-

munity had been in progress since the 1990s, butthe unprecedented challenge o the Global War onerrorism (GWO), which began with the terroristattacks o 11 September 2001, ushered in a new erao integration and cooperation in intelligence. In thewake o the attacks, DIA reshaped and revitalized itsworkorce to meet the requirements o warghters

and decisionmakers in dealing with the asymmetricthreats presented by terrorism, insurgency, and thespread o weapons o mass destruction.

In the months aer the 11 September attackson the Pentagon and World rade Center, the U.S.and its Coalition partners embarked on OperationENDURING FREEDOM, toppling the alibanregime in Aghanistan which harbored the ter-

rorist planners o the 11 September attacks andinstalling a democratic government. Anti-terroristinitiatives took place in other parts o the world aswell, including in the Philippines and the Horn oArica. In March 2003, the United States and Coali-tion orces also launched Operation IRAQI FREE-DOM, the eort to remove Saddam Hussein rom

power and install a new democratic governmentin Iraq. DIA provided intelligence on enemy troopdisposition, weaponry, and damage assessments, aswell as tactical and strategic estimative products.

Te Agency also established and supported the IraqSurvey Group, an interagency body tasked withsearching Iraq or weapons o mass destruction.

(Above) The terrorist attacks on 11 September took the lives oseven DIA employees at the Pentagon.

(Let) Critical intelligence provided by DIA allowed U.S. orces toinvade and occupy Iraq in six weeks. Here, a Marine intelligence

ocer bries a company o Marines at Landing Strip Viperduring Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

(Below) Counter-Insurgency operations in Iraq remain a primary

ocus o DIAs work. Here, U.S. Army soldiers on oot patrolquestion locals about insurgent activities.

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Te Intelligence Community as a whole hasbecome more integrated to conront this new chal-lenge, and DIA has been a major part o this unica-tion o eort. Te Agency also has more than 11,000military and civilian employees deployed around theworld to support a wide range o military opera-tions. It is increasing its investment in the develop-

ment o HUMIN and technical collection capabili-ties to urther improve its surveillance and warningcapabilities. Te multi-dimensional nature otwenty-rst century threats means that the Agencymust be prepared or rapid changes in an unpredict-able and unstable global environment.

DIAs contributions to national security have beeninstrumental in shaping many o the signicantevents in U.S. history. From the rst major chal-lenges it aced during the Cuban Missile Crisisto the current perils presented by internationalterrorism and arms prolieration, DIA has played acentral role in gathering, processing, and produc-

ing intelligence used to deend the United Statesrom oreign aggression. In doing so, it has alsoserved as an eective orce multiplier, allowing U.S.military leaders to project power that is greaterthan the sum o its parts.

DIA has evolved as the nature o national secu-rity threats has changed. During the Cold War, it

was aced with more conventional threats rom theSoviet Union and its allies. In response, DIA eortsocused on deeating state-sponsored militaries thatadhered to inormal, but generally accepted ruleso conduct. Te unconventional, organic nature oglobal, transnational terrorism and counterinsur-gency has meant that Agency personnel have hadto adjust to new challenges, building a more agileorganization to provide intelligence warnings and topass inormation quickly to combat orces.

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A History

Lt Gen Joseph F. Carroll, USAF1961 - 1969

LTG Donald V. Bennett, USA1969 - 1972

VADM Vincent P. de Poix, USN1972 - 1974

LTG Daniel O. Graham, USA1974 - 1975

LTG Samuel V. Wilson, USA1976 - 1977

Lt Gen Eugene Tighe, Jr., USAF

1976 (Acting) 1977 - 1981

LTG James A. Williams, USA1981 - 1985

Lt Gen Leonard H. Perroots, USAF1985 - 1988

LTG Harry E. Soyster, USA1988 - 1991

Mr. Dennis M. Nagy1991 (Acting)

Lt Gen James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF1991 - 1995

Lt Gen Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF1995 - 1996

LTG Patrick M. Hughes, USA1996 - 1999

VADM Thomas R. Wilson, USN

1999 - 2002

VADM L. E. Jacoby, USN2002 - 2005

LTG Michael D. Maples, USA2005 - Present

Directors of DIA


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A History

Major Robert P. Perry, USAAssistant Army Attach, Jordan10 June 1970

Celeste M. BrownDeense Attach Ofce, Saigon4 April 1975

Vivienne A. ClarkDeense Attach Ofce, Saigon4 April 1975

Dorothy M. CurtissDeense Attach Ofce, Saigon4 April 1975

Joan K. PreyDeense Attach Ofce, Saigon4 April 1975

Doris J. Watkins

Deense Attach Ofce, Saigon4 April 1975

Colonel Charles R. Ray, USAAssistant Army Attach, Paris18 January 1982

Chie Warrant Ocer Robert W. Prescott, USADeense Attach Ofce, Guatemala

21 January 1984

Chie Warrant Ocer Kenneth D. Welch, USADeense Attach Ofce, Beirut20 September 1984

Petty Ocer First Class Michael R. Wagner, USNDeense Attach Ofce, Beirut20 September 1984

Captain William E. Nordeen, USNDeense and Naval Attach, Greece28 June 1988

Judith GoldenbergDeense Attach Ofce, Cairo15 July 1996

Staf Sergeant Kenneth R. Hobson II, USADeense Attach Ofce, Nairobi7 August 1998

Master Sergeant William W. Bultmeier, USA, Ret.Deense Attach Ofce, Niamey23 December 2000

Rosa M. ChapaDeense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon11 September 2001

Sandra N. Foster

Deense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon11 September 2001

Robert J. HymelDeense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon11 September 2001

Shelley A. MarshallDeense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon

11 September 2001

Patricia E. MickleyDeense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon11 September 2001

Charles E. SabinDeense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon11 September 2001

Karl W. TeepeDeense Intelligence Agency, Pentagon

11 September 2001


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Letusneverforget

thatgoodintelligencesavesAmericanlivesand

protectsourfreedom.

PresidentRonaldReagan,1981

The Defense InTellIgence Agency seAl


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The Defense InTellIgence AgencyseAl

The dark blue background o the seal signies the unknown or the

threats and challenges o the world around us. The faming torch and its

gold color, which represents knowledge or intelligence, is lighting our

way to a known world symbolized by the blue-green planet. The eternal

search or knowledge and truth is the worldwide mission o the Deense

Intelligence Agency. The two red ellipses symbolize the technical aspects

o intelligence today and in the uture. The 13 stars and the wreath

identiy the Agency as a Department o Deense organization.

PCN7308

Documents

A History of the Defense Intelligence Agency