1

A HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN AFRICA,

1975-2010

BY

BOLARINWA, JOSHUA OLUSEGUN

MATRICULATION NUMBER: 059015003

B.A. (IFE) 2001; M.A. (LAGOS) 2006

BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POST

GRADUATE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS, IN PARTIAL

FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN HISTORY AND STRATEGIC

STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS

FEBRUARY, 2014

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SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the Thesis:

“A HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN AFRICA, 1975-2010”

Submitted to the School of Postgraduate Studies

University of Lagos

For the award of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.)

is a record of original research carried out

By:

BOLARINWA, JOSHUA OLUSEGUN

In the Department of History and Strategic Studies

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AUTHOR’S NAME SIGNATURE DATE

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1ST SUPERVISOR SIGNATURE DATE

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1ST INTERNAL EXAMINER SIGNATURE DATE

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2ND INTERNAL EXAMINER SIGNATURE DATE

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SPGS REPRESENTATIVE SIGNATURE DATE

DEDICATION

THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO THE ALMIGHTY GOD.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing of this thesis has been made possible by the special grace of God. I return all the

glory and adoration to the almighty God for being the Alpha and Omega in all my undertakings.

To claim I bore it all alone would be dishonest indeed. I am indebted to a number of people and

institutions for their invaluable moral and material support throughout the period of my

doctoral studies. Foremost are my supervisors, Dr. David Aworawo and Dr. Ademola Adeleke.

Specifically, I must thank Dr. David Aworawo in a very special way for always being there for me

– willing to listen to all my frustrations, ready to read and comment on my usually very lengthy

pieces of manuscripts no matter how disjointed – from the first draft of the research proposal to

the manifestation of the final thesis. His frank and incisive comments and suggestions

immensely strengthened this thesis both in form and substance. For that and a lot more, I owe

him an indelible academic debt. I thank you sir, it is only God that can truly reward you

proportionately for all you have done for me to succeed in this programme. I am convinced that

God has destined our path to cross.

I owe Dr. Ademola Adeleke a lot. He has been ordained by God to be my academic

mentor and guardian in life as his tremendous help, suggestions and corrections have made this

thesis worthy and acceptable to all. I sincerely cannot forget your help, support and

encouragement in my life; especially in this programme and the successful completion of this

thesis. Sir, I am short of words, but I know that the eternal God that created the heaven and the

earth shall ceaselessly bless and uphold you and your family in all your endeavours in life

(Amen). I am very grateful sir.

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I am particularly indebted to Dr. Michael Ogbeidi for his support and encouragement

throughout my doctoral programme. His suggestions and additions have contributed to the

writing and completion of this study. Sir, God in his infinite mercy

shall continue to show you and your family his divine favour and whatever you lay your

hands upon in life shall prosper (Amen).

I cannot forget the enormous help and support of my lovely and ever-ready

Departmental Postgraduate Coordinator, Dr. Tunde Oduwobi who personally ensured the

success of this thesis; you have been wonderful to me. Sir, I pray to almighty God to bless and

enrich you and your family in all your undertakings in this life (Amen).

I thank God for blessing the Department of History and Strategic Studies with intelligent,

helpful and committed lecturers whose constructive criticisms and suggestions have shaped the

writing and the completion of this thesis. I thank Professor (Mrs.) Olufunke Adeboye, Head,

Department of History and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos; Professor A.O. Akinyeye, Dean,

Faculty of Arts, University of Lagos; Prof. Bayo Lawal, former Ag. Dean Faculty of Arts, University

of Lagos; Professor R.T. Akinyele, Professor (Mrs.) Eno Blankson Ikpe; Drs Kehinde Faluyi, Nkem

Onyekpe, P.O. Njemanze, Paul Osifodunrin, Irene Osemeka; Messrs M.O. Junaid, L.C. Dioka and

Mrs. Olawoyin.

My gratitude also goes to the Director and Staff of the United Nations Economic

Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Union (AU) for providing me a research abode

during my stay in Addis Ababa in July 2012. Special mention should be made of Professor Said

Adejumobi who took me round and gave me materials at UNECA. I also acknowledge the

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immense support of the Staff of the NEPAD Secretariat in Midrand, and various African

diplomats based in Pretoria and Addis Ababa whom I interviewed. The vital insights they gave

me greatly strengthened this thesis.

I specially appreciate the moral, academic, financial and fatherly help and support given

to me by my Director-General, Professor Bola A. Akinterinwa and my lovely Director of Research

and Studies, Professor Ogaba Oche. I also appreciate the unrelenting efforts of Professor Bukar

Bukarambe and Professor Charles Dokubo of the

Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), for their useful suggestions to make my

study and particularly, this thesis a success. I am most indebted to both of them for their

fatherly advice and so much pressure they put on me to complete this programme. I thank

Professors Amadu Sesay and Victor A.O. Adetula of the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife and

the University of Jos for encouraging and suggesting useful ideas from their wealth of

experience in the course of my study, conception and the writing of this thesis. I cannot but also

remember my colleagues in the Department of History and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos

for their contributions and unrelenting support. They have all been steadfast and dependable

since our paths crossed.

I thank my parents, uncles and aunties, sisters and brothers for their love that gave me

reason to forge on. I thank Mr. Olawale Sunday Bolarinwa my younger brother specially and his

wife Abosede Merit Bolarinwa for all their support throughout my programme. My special

thanks go to my supportive darling wife, Princess Adeola Rukayat Bolarinwa and my lovely

children Prince Israel Adebola Bolarinwa and Prince Joseph Adedeji Bolarinwa for their prayer,

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patience, understanding and moral support throughout the programme. I appreciate the prayer

and support of my grandmother, Madam Charlotte Jolade Adufe Idowu, thank you mama and

aunty Peace Edet Uko for her support.

Above all, I give glory to the Lord Almighty for granting me his grace, mercy, good health

and wisdom to pursue this programme to the end.

Joshua Olusegun Bolarinwa

February, 2014

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAPSAP Africa’s Alternative Programme to Structural Adjustment Programmes for

socio-economic recovery and transformation

AD Accelerated Development

ADB African Development Bank

AEC African Economic Community

AGOA African Economic Growth and Opportunity Act

AMU Arab Maghreb Union

APPER Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery

APRM African Peer Review Mechanism

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AU African Union

CIEC Council for International Economic Cooperation

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CSSDCA Council for Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa

DAC Development Assistance Committee

EAC East African Community

ECA Economic Commission for Africa

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

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EEC European Economic Community

EEC-ACP European Economic Community – African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries

EFTA European Free Trade Association

EU European Union

FAL Full Act of Lagos

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FTA Free Trade Area

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GNP Gross National Product

GNIpc Gross National Income per capita

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G8 Group of Eight

HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries’ Initiative

HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

HSGIC Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IFIs International Financial Institutions

IMF International Monetary Fund

ISI Import Substitution Industrialisation

LAFTA Latin American Free Trade Association

LDCs Less Developed Countries

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LPA Lagos Plan of Action

MAP Millennium African Development Plan

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MNCs Multi-national Corporations

NAI New African Initiative

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations

NIEO New International Economic Order

OAU Organisation of African Unity

ODA Official Development Assistance

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OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PPPs Public - Private Partnerships

RECs Regional Economic Communities

SADC Southern African Development Community

SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference

SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes

SSA Sub-Saharan Africa

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNECLAC United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

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UN-ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council

UNIDO United Nations Industrial and Development Organisation

UN-NADAF The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s

UNO United Nations Organisations

UN-PAAERD United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and

Development

WB World Bank

WDR World Development Report

WTO World Trade Organisation

WWII World War Two

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page i

Certification iii

Dedication iv

Acknowledgements vi

List of Abbreviations xi

Table of Contents xiv

Abstract xviii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study 7

Statement of the Problem 9

Aim and Objectives of the Study 10

Significance of the Study 11

Scope and Delimitation of the Study 12

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Research Questions 12

Operational Definition of Terms 14

Theoretical Framework 21

Literature Review 32

Methodology 33

Endnotes 38

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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

Introduction 40

The Origin of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos 47

Transition from the Lagos Plan of Action to the NEPAD 53

The Adoption of the African Economic Community 55

The Origin of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 57

Conclusion 59

Endnotes 63

CHAPTER THREE: THE ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAGOS PLAN OF

ACTION (LPA) AND THE FINAL ACT OF LAGOS (FAL), 1980-2000

Introduction 64

Background to the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos 68

The Logic behind the Formulation and Adoption of LPA 71

The LPA: Underlying Inter-African Diplomatic Process 77

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Objectives and Strategies 85

The LPA and Self-Reliance Model 88

The New International Economic Order Campaign and the LPA Design 94

Implementation of the LPA 97

Conclusion 99

Endnotes 106

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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC) (THE

ABUJA TREATY, 1991-2001)

Introduction 107

Background to the Conception of the African Economic Community 111

Summary of all the Stages 112

Objectives of the Community 114

Organs of the Community 115

AEC Orientation and Its Provisions 119

Relations between AEC and the Regional Economic Communities 127

The African Union and the African Economic Community 134

AEC and the Promotion of Intra-African Trade 136

Creating Favourable Conditions 138

Obstacles to Integration and Implementation of the AEC 140

Political Implications of the Treaty and the New World Order 142

Conclusion 146

Endnotes 151

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CHAPTER FIVE: THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD) AND AFRICA’S

ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION, 2001-2012

Introduction 152

Background to the Conception of NEPAD 156

Rationale for the NEPAD 157

Process of Development of the Final Initiative 163

Provisions of the NEPAD 170

NEPAD and the Partners 176

Financing NEPAD 177

Understanding Key Frameworks of NEPAD 188

Progress made by Africa over the Past Decade 195

Challenges and Drawbacks 199

Conclusion 201

Endnotes 206

CHAPTER SIX: COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION (LPA), AFRICAN

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC) AND THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR

AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD) ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

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Introduction 207

Content of the LPA 209

Objectives, Goals and the Characteristics of the Lagos Plan of Action 212

The Provisions of the AEC: An Improvement on the Restraint Mechanisms 217

The Objectives of the AEC 217

Content of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 219

Objectives, Goals and the Characteristics of NEPAD 226

Implementation Arrangements of the LPA, AEC and NEPAD 238

Funding of the LPA, AEC and NEPAD 244

Comparative Evaluation of the LPA, AEC and NEPAD Initiatives 254

Conclusion 257

Endnotes 264

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction 265

Summary 271

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Conclusion 274

Contributions to Knowledge 276

Recommendations 277

Endnotes 278

Bibliography 292

Appendices 314

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ABSTRACT

Development initiatives in post-independence Africa have been influenced by the social,

economic and political conditions of the continent as well as the dominant development

thoughts at different times. Africa has experienced a very low level of economic development

since the 1970s compared to other regions of the world, and in response, several development

initiatives have been articulated since the 1980s which reflect the continent’s preferred

development agenda. The African economic crisis intensified from 1975 onwards when African

countries experienced economic collapse, and a plunge followed by continuing decline in the

following decades. Several sources indicate that from 1960 to 1980, Africa recorded a

cumulative GNP growth of 1.8% while population growth was 2.5%. In the early 1980s, pictures

of starving African children shocked the world. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), signed in 1980,

was aimed at tackling the African economic crisis with greater resilience, based on the capacity

of African states to mobilize natural resources and foster greater mutual economic integration

and cooperation. However, the LPA recorded very little success. This was followed by the Abuja

Treaty in 1991, which aimed at establishing an African Economic Community (AEC). It formally

came into existence in 1994 and like the LPA; the Abuja Treaty did not achieve much success.

Addressing this failure, African leaders in 2001 adopted the New Partnership for Africa's

Development (NEPAD) as the continent’s official development programme. This thesis examines

the historical moments that led to the design and implementation of development initiatives in

Africa, using the LPA, the AEC and the NEPAD as comparative case studies. It focuses on the

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significance of the historical evolution and shift from the LPA’s and AEC’s state-led, inward-

looking, collective self-reliance model to NEPAD’s outward looking model. It also examines the

level of implementation of the LPA, AEC and what progress has been recorded in the

implementation of NEPAD in the past decade. The study has drawn from a wide range of

sources such as government records, reports of international organisations as well as oral

information to analyse Africa’s development initiatives. It employs

dependency/underdevelopment and public-choice perspectives to explain how domestic

conditions and global realities have dictated Africa’s economic development options. Capturing

the differences in the contexts within which the initiatives were crafted and the variations in

their orientations, the thesis uses a combination of historical explanation and structured

focused comparison that allows for different, but structurally linked accounts of the processes

to assess the relevance and level of success of the three initiatives. It argues that African states’

common concerns about their vulnerability in the global economy have informed the design of

the initiatives. Hence, the shift from the LPA to NEPAD has been dictated by changes in global

realities and circumstances. It also contends that individual African governments’ concern with

vulnerability nationally and internationally has been one of the major factors responsible for the

low level of implementation. These are some of the issues that need to be addressed for

development initiatives in Africa to fulfill their objectives.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

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Anticipating independence, Ghana‟s first President, Kwame Nkrumah declared: “if we

get self-government, we will transform the Gold Coast (Ghana) into paradise in ten

years”.1 President Nkrumah made that enduring remark with his own country, Ghana, in

mind; but the statement has a general application and undertone across Africa. On the eve

of independence from European colonial rule, it was inevitable that Africans and their

leaders would look forward to their impending freedom with great anticipation, hope and

resolve. Butressing this, Walter Rodney on his part said: „African independence was

greeted with pomp, ceremony and a resurgence of traditional African music and dance.‟

„A new day has dawned‟, „we are on the threshold of a new era‟, „we have now entered

into the political kingdom‟- those were the phrases of the day, and they were repeated

until they became clinches. But, all the „to-ing‟ and „fro-ing‟ from Cotonou to Paris and

from London to Lusaka and all the lowering and raising of flags cannot be said to have

been devoid of meaning.2

Accordingly, independence was expected to represent freedom from colonial rule

and an opportunity to carry out rapid development. Unfortunately, by the 1970s the high

expectations had generally faded as the expected rapid economic transformation failed to

materialize. The leaders of different African countries sought to understand the

complexities of the economy and ways of promoting rapid development.3The

phenomenon of neo-colonialism cries out for extensive investigation in order to

formulate the strategy and tactics of African emancipation and development.4A major

response was the crafting and adoption of development initiatives.

This work is a historical study of Africa‟s development initiatives namely, the

Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (LPA) 1980-2000,

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African Economic Community (AEC) otherwise called the Abuja Treaty 1991-2000 and

the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD), 2001. Reference is also made

to a number of other initiatives where they help to understand the nature and

implementation of the three major initiatives.

Africa's poor economic growth has been chronic rather than episodic. Many

analysts point to Africa's growth during the 1950-60 and 1960-1970 periods, and the

subsequent slowdown from the mid-1970s, as an argument that Africa's post-

independence governments severely undermined the potential for rapid economic growth.

It is apparent, however, that even in the most successful sub-period during the late

colonial period, Africa's growth lagged behind the rest of the world. In a quite different

perspective, many analysts at the start of Africa's independence from colonial rule in the

early 1960s believed that Africa's long period of slow growth would end once the

colonial yoke was removed. This has not happened, and in fact, growth plummeted.

Africa‟s per capita income growth averaged 2.1 percent in the mid-1950s, 1.5

percent in the 1960s, 0.8 percent in the 1970s, and –1.2 percent in 1980s (population-

weighted), in fact, the 1980s were particularly disappointing as income per capita fell

annually by 1.7% against the modest increases in the preceding decades, while the

investment ratio crumbled from 24.5% of GDP at the end of the 1970s to only 15.5% of

GDP by 1989. Whereas Africa closed the 1960s and 1970s with trade surpluses of

US$1.8 billion and US$229.1 billion, respectively, it suffered a massive deficit of US$7.7

billion by close of the 1980s and the stock of debt almost doubled to US$256.9 billion

between 1982 and 1989.5

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Added to this was the rise of the number of Africa‟s least developed countries

during the decade of the 1980s from 17 to 28. That is why this decade was referred to as

Africa‟s lost decade. Output per capita continued to decline from 1990 to 1998 at a rate

of –0.9 percent per year. This record of growth is perhaps,one of the greatest

disappointments and surprises of recent African history. A remarkable 21 out of 42

countries for which data are available experienced negative per capita economic growth.

There were a few notable success stories. Equatorial Guinea and formerly war-torn

Mozambique led the way with growth rates averaging 8.4 and 5.5 percent per annum,

respectively.

Traditionally fast-growing Mauritius and Botswana achieved per capita growth of

more than 4 percent per year, while Uganda grew at a rate of 3.3 percent per year. Ghana,

a long-standing reformer since the early 1980s, grew at a rate of 1.5 percent. It is

estimated that 47 percent of the population of Africa lived in abject poverty, below one

dollar per day in 1990.6Finally, in terms of human development index, which takes into

account life expectancy and literacy as well as per capita GDP, showed that they were

very low on the continent which continued till the millennium.

Immediately after independence, the development strategies in Africa had one

goal, human development. This was to be achieved within long and medium term

development frameworks whose objectives were to: eradicate the “colonial structure” that

had been imposed on African economies, speed up economic growth and to improve

living standards of the people. For example, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere

introduced “Africanisation” and “Ujamaa and Kujitegemea” programmes in Ghana and

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Tanzania in 1957 and 1962 respectively as unique “home grown” post-independence

development strategies.

The programmes were radical departure from the British colonial mode anchored

on self-reliance. Because of the force behind the programmes, they had tremendous

impact on the elders, farmers, market women, youths, civil/public servants, as well as

small-scale businessmen. The key feature of African development initiatives in the 1960s

was the important role the state played. The state allocated to itself a central role in the

development process, building social and economic infrastructure and providing social

services to the impoverished people of the continent.

Another feature of the development initiatives in the 1960s was the import

substitution strategy, which ensured adequate protection of local industries and

employment. This development strategy, with the central role for the state and the

protection of local industries and employment would come to be condemned and

dismantled by the international financial institutions. African leaders realised that the

most effective way to develop Africa and Africans was to involve the state in economic

activities in order to ensure that there was fairness in the distribution of the benefits from

national income and growth.

The new states, therefore, invested heavily in social services, particularly

education and health. Huge investments also went into the building of economic

infrastructure such as roads, ports, communications facilities and factories. There were

also similar investments in electricity in Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and other

countries followed the same path after they achieved independence. In order to reduce the

dependence of Africa on the colonial powers, i.e. to gain economic independence, import

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substitution strategy (ISI) became the key element of the development strategies across

Africa.7

However, the three initiatives analysed in this study have been generally based on

the free market ideology with emphasis on small government, and reduction in welfare

spending. For example, the popular report named after its author, Elliot Berg, issued in

1981 by the World Bank (Washington Consensus), while criticizing the adoption of LPA

prescribed a movement of African countries away from state-run economies and toward

free market systems. However, the Berg's report, officially titled “Accelerated

Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Plan for Action,” asserted that African

governments could increase exports and better develop rural economies through market

reforms. Berg recommended a significantly smaller role for governments in the national

economies and proposed greater private-sector involvement in key industries.

Following the release of the report, the World Bank and Western nations placed

conditions on the aid they gave to African countries based on Berg's recommendations.

These conditional aid packages became known as Structural Adjustment Programmes

(SAPs) and emphasized liberalization of interest and exchange rates, among other

reforms. The sweeping changes demanded by donor nations' SAPs distressed many

African governments, which now had to choose between subsidizing public-sector

programs such as health and education and receiving needed developmental assistance

from the West, while debt burdens increasingly debilitated African economies.8

The socio-economic and political problems facing the continent were many and

these have engaged the attention of regional, sub-regional and international organizations

at various times. Notably, on the continent the Organization of African Unity (OAU),

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now African Union (AU), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

(UNECA) have played instrumental roles in the processes that led to the emergence of

these development initiatives.The outcome of this was the adoption of the Monrovia

guideline renamed Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos.9

The Lagos Plan was

expected to serve as Africa's economic development plan between 1980-2000. It was also

designed to promote development, cooperation and integration of African economies and

thus, increase self-sufficiency and self-sustenance. It was also envisaged to be a self-

reliant, African driven development strategy and financed with Africa's bountiful natural

and human resources.10

Other initiatives or strategies were introduced after the World Bank proposals,

these include; the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990,

(APPER) which later became UN Programme of Action for Africa‟s Economic Recovery

and Development (UN-PAAERD) 1986, the African Alternative Framework to Structural

Adjustment Programme for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP)

1989; and the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (ACPPD)

1990, the UN New Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) 1991

etc.11

Further measures were also taken to reduce the worsening crisis. One such

measure is the effort to create the African Economic Community (AEC) otherwise known

as the Abuja Treaty on June 3, 1991, which became operational in May 1994. The

adoption of the AEC was seen as vital for Africa‟s economic survival and integration of

African economies and to serve as vehicle for enhancing socio-economic development in

their respective countries.12

This was followed by NEPAD which was introduced in 2001.

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NEPAD, unlike the LPA and the AEC, which called for a new international economic

order, proposed a new relationship (partnership) between African states and the

international community in an attempt to benefit from opportunities of globalization.

Most of the initiatives between 1975 and 2010 including the major ones like the

LPA, AEC and the NEPAD were envisaged as self-reliant, self-sustaining, and seen as

African-driven especially the NEPAD.13

However, the support these initiatives had

received differed, since the historical periods that witnessed their emergence were quiet

unique. These changes in time, space and the realities faced by African countries inform

the need for this study.

Statement of the Problem

The issue of Africa‟s economic development has for a long time attracted the attention of

scholars and policy makers. Since independence, Africa‟s grave development crisis

especially from the 1970s has generated a growing body of analyses, debates and

prescriptions as to who, and what is responsible for Africa‟s underdevelopment,14

what

has gone wrong and what should be done, both within and outside the continent? Yet,

Africa‟s economic crisis persists.

Scholars like Walter Rodney, Adebayo Adedeji and Claude Ake among others

have alluded Africa‟s development crisis to external factors and contradictions in global

economic systems, while others like G.B. Ayitte and S.K.B. Asante have argued that

Africa‟s development crisis is due largely to internal factors like economic

mismanagement, prebendalism, leadership problems and corruption (out of 54 countries

in Africa, about 50 of them are listed among the most corrupt in the world). Thus, despite

all the efforts made by its leaders through development initiatives, Africa still remains the

34

least developed continent of the world with 20 of the 31 or so least developed countries

of the world in the past four decades.15

This is the problem and other issues that this work

examine. It attempts to consider the questions of why the African economic crisis has

persisted and why Africa has realised so little of its potential and why so much of its

wealth goes outside of the continent. And, what role development initiatives has played

in efforts to reverse the scourge of underdevelopment?

At independence, in the early 1960s, the expectations of African peoples for

socio-economic development, as already noted, were high. Twenty years after, Africa

was not able to indicate any significant growth rate or satisfactory index of general well-

being.16

Many explanations have been given and continue to be given as to what

constitutes the root-cause of development failure. By the early 1970s it had become

obvious that Africa‟s development directions at all levels were not on the right path. It

had become clear to most African states that if Africa was to get out of its low-level

economic trap, low income, underdevelopment and poverty and lay the foundation for

any significant process in economic decolonization, new economic strategies at all levels

would have to be formulated and rigorously pursued.

In the 1970s the performances in the areas of trade, industry, agriculture, capital

and infrastructure were unsatisfactory. In the area of trade, African countries still

conducted trade mainly with their former colonial powers, notably France and Britain

despite efforts to diversify trading partners. The basic exports of most countries consisted

of few agricultural products (e.g. oil palm, cocoa, rubber, coffee, groundnut etc.) whose

world prices have fluctuated over the years and undermined African plans for

development. The industrial sector was also poorly developed. The main preoccupation

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of most African governments since the attainment of independence has been the

promotion of import substitution industries (ISI). It was strongly believed that these

efforts would lead to full industrialization in the long run; however, the picture of the

industrial sector in late 1970s showed that the industrial sector had performed poorly

between 1970 and 1979,17

and especially from 1975.

In a sense, all history is transition from one stage to another, but some historical

situations along the line have more clearly distinguishable characteristics than others as

indicated in Africa‟s quest for development since independence.18

This study therefore,

attempts to historicize the evolution of Africa‟s development initiatives from the LPA to

NEPAD against the background of changes that have taken place between 1975 to the

present time.

The research work also attempts to find out the strengths and weaknesses of the

initiatives between the periods in view especially the LPA, AEC and NEPAD. It also

explores the opportunities and benefits, which the African continent will derive from the

development agenda in the 21st

century and above all, the role Africans will play in

remaking their future.The need therefore to study African development initiatives is

informed by these realities.

Aim and Objectives of the Study

In broad terms, the aim of this study is to undertake an historical account of Africa‟s

development initiatives with special emphasis on three of Africa's historic and

outstanding development initiatives- the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), the African

Economic Community (AEC) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development

(NEPAD). In specific terms, the objectives of the research are as follows:

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1. To study the historical background and dynamics of development initiatives in

Africa, notably the LPA, the AEC and the NEPAD.

2. To examine the similarities and/or differences among the various plans in terms of

content, funding, and implementation arrangements.

3. To identify the strengths and weaknesses of the LPA, AEC and the NEPAD in

African development.

4. To evaluate the overall contribution of the LPA, AEC and the NEPAD to Africa‟s

economic development.

5. To identify lessons learnt by NEPAD from the experience of past development

initiatives (LPA and AEC) and recommend solutions to the problems identified.

Significance of the Study

The study has academic, political, social and historical dimensions and is significant in

many respects. It contributes to the ongoing debate within and among governments, the

civil society groups, scholars and development experts on the appropriate development

strategy to overcome Africa's poverty and underdevelopment. It also contributes to

knowledge on an ideal macro-economic framework that will best address the social

conditions, needs and the containment of poverty in Africa.

This in turn can enable their participation in the making, implementation and

evaluation of policies that affect them. It goes a long way in building social, economic

and political relations among African peoples, governments and states. A study of this

nature is of significance to African states and the AU, in terms of cooperation and

integration in the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Scope and Delimitation of the Study

37

This research work focuses on the historical evolution and evaluation of three major

African development initiatives, the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), African Economic

Community (AEC) and the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD). The

choice of the three is informed by the historical circumstances that led to their emergence

and their significance in Africa's quest for development.

The study covers the period 1975 to 2010 when African scholars, leaders and

informed public intensified the theorizing and debating about Africa‟s lack of growth and

development. Hence, the conception and impetus for broader and more viable regional

arrangements for Africa‟s development was strengthened by two important developments

in the mid-1970s.

First, there was the 1974 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the

New International Economic Order (NIEO), which drew attention to economic

cooperation among developing countries as its key element. Second, there was the

signing in February 1975 of the celebrated Lome Convention that brought together, the

hitherto divided French and English speaking African states, creating a new political

climate and economic structure favourable to more meaningful cooperative interactions.

These developments led to a new push for development initiatives in Africa –

supposedly broader in scope and more sustainable than those of the earlier decade. The

terminal date, 2010 is significant because it was the period when many African countries

acceded to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This makes it possible to

assess the impact of good governance on development and provides the opportunity to

evaluate NEPAD‟s contribution to Africa‟s development after about a decade of its

existence.

38

Research Questions

This study attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What are the historical antecedents and dynamics that informed the formation and

internationalization of the LPA, AEC and the NEPAD?

2. What are the differences and/or similarities among the LPA, AEC and the

NEPAD in terms of content, funding, and implementation arrangements?

3. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the LPA, AEC and the NEPAD in

Africa‟s development?

4. In what ways did the LPA, AEC the NEPAD contribute to Africa‟s economic

development in the period under study?

5. What lessons can the NEPAD, which is the new development initiative, learn

from its predecessors, the LPA and the AEC?

The answers to these questions will enable the researcher to propose some

concrete solutions that benefit African economies and peoples, by suggesting ways to

make the NEPAD a truly people-oriented development initiative.

Operational Definition of Terms

Development- It is quantitative and qualitative advancement. It is also the positive

transformation or change of people‟s ways of living, attitudes and behaviours for the

better. The term “development” in international parlance therefore, encompasses the need

and the means by which to provide better lives for people in poor countries. It includes

not only economic growth, although that is crucial, but also human development

providing for health, nutrition, education, and a clean environment.

39

Underdevelopment- Underdevelopment takes place when resources are not used to their

full socio-economic potential, with the result that local or regional development is slower

than expected. It also results from the complex interplay of internal and external factors

that allow less developed countries only a lopsided development progression.

Underdevelopment makes sense only as a means of comparing levels of development. It

is very much tied to the fact that human social development has been uneven and from a

strictly economic view-point some human groups have advanced further by producing

more and becoming wealthier.The moment that one group appears to be wealthier than

others, some enquiry is bound to take place as to the reason for the difference.

Strategies/Initiatives-Strategy is used in this work to refer to perspective, position, plan,

and pattern. It is a complex web of thoughts, ideas, insights, experiences, goals, expertise,

memories, perceptions, and expectations that provides general guidance for specific

actions in pursuit of particular ends.

International Financial Institutions (IFI)- These are the two Bretton Woods

institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These are the

institutions used by the developed countries to impose strict conditions and

conditionalities on aids, loans and other assistance given or solicited for by the

developing countries. This in turn affects specific African programmes aimed at growth

and development. Of course, strictly speaking, any multilateral organization with

financial operations is an IFI – for example, the regional multilateral banks, regional

monetary authorities, some agencies of the United Nations that disburse funding, etc.

New International Economic Order-This is the North-South dialogue, especially on the

need for more primary products by the developed countries. On the other hand, the New

40

International Economic Order was a set of proposals put forward during the 1970s by

some developing countries through the United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development to promote their interests by improving their terms of trade, increasing

development assistance, developed-country tariff reductions, and other means. It was

meant to be a revision of the international economic system in favour of Third World

countries.

Theoretical Framework

To do a historical evaluation of Africa‟s development initiatives and understand their

strengths and weaknesses, relevance and challenges in bringing about development in

Africa, the theoretical approaches employed in this study are the

underdevelopment/dependency and the public choice perspectives.

The Underdevelopment and Dependency Perspective

The Underdevelopment and Dependency school gained prominence in the former

colonies as from the 1950s and 1960s especially when some scholars felt both the

perspectives of liberalism and classical Marxism could not adequately explain the

persistent problem of underdevelopment in the former European colonies. Dependency

can be defined as an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the

external influences political, economic, and cultural on national development policies.19

Theotonio Dos Santos emphasizes the historical dimension of the dependency

relationships in his definition:

[Dependency is]...an historical condition

which shapes a certain structure of the world

economy such that it favors some countries

to the detriment of others and limits the

development possibilities of the subordinate

economics...a situation in which the

41

economy of a certain group of countries is

conditioned by the development and

expansion of another economy, to which

their own is subjected.20

Scholars of this school included Raul Prebisch, Hans Singer, Andre Frank and

Samir Amin. Prebisch and his colleagues were troubled by the fact that economic growth

in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in the poorer

countries.21

Indeed, their studies suggested that economic activity in the richer countries

often led to serious economic problems in the poorer countries. Such a possibility was not

predicted by neoclassical theory, which had assumed that economic growth was

beneficial to all (Pareto optimal) even if the benefits were not always equally shared.

Prebisch's initial explanation for the phenomenon was very straightforward: poor

countries exported primary commodities to the rich countries that then manufactured

products out of those commodities and sold them back to the poorer countries. The

“Value Added” by manufacturing a usable product always cost more than the primary

products used to create those products.22

Therefore, poorer countries would never be earning enough from their export

earnings to pay for their imports. They argue poorer countries should embark on

programs of import substitution so that they need not purchase the manufactured products

from the richer countries. The poorer countries would still sell their primary products on

the world market, but their foreign exchange reserves would not be used to purchase their

manufactures from abroad. Three issues made this policy difficult to follow.

The first is that the internal markets of the poorer countries were not large enough

to support the economies of scale used by the richer countries to keep their prices low.

The second issue concerned the political will of the poorer countries as to whether a

42

transformation from being primary products producers was possible or desirable. The

final issue revolved around the extent to which the poorer countries actually had control

over their primary products, particularly in the area of selling those products abroad.

These obstacles to the import substitution policy led others to think a little more

creatively and historically at the relationship between rich and poor countries. At this

point dependency theory was viewed as a possible way of explaining the persistent

poverty of the poorer countries. The traditional neo-classical approach said virtually

nothing on this question except to assert that the poorer countries were late in coming to

solid economic practices and that as soon as they learned the techniques of modern

economics, then the poverty would begin to subside.

However, Marxists theorists viewed the persistent poverty as a consequence of

capitalist exploitation. And a new body of thought, called the „world systems approach‟,

argued that the poverty was a direct consequence of the evolution of the international

political economy into a fairly rigid division of labor which favored the rich and

penalized the poor. The dependency/underdevelopment scholars argue further that

countries are dependent and underdeveloped because they were colonized, and that

colonialism undermined indigenous institutions (political, economic and administrative),

technology, initiatives etc., and so became dependent on foreign requirements for their

development.23

There are three common features to the views which most dependency theorists

share. First, dependency characterizes the international system as comprised of two sets

of states, variously described as dominant/dependent, center/periphery or

metropole/satellite. The dominant states are the advanced industrial nations in the

43

Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The dependent states

are those states of Latin America, Asia, and Africa which have low per capita GNPs and

which rely heavily on the export of a single commodity for foreign exchange earnings.

Second, the views have in common the assumption that external forces are of

singular importance to the economic activities within the dependent states. These external

forces include multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign

assistance, communications, and any other means by which the advanced industrialized

countries can represent their economic interests abroad. Third, these views of dependency

all indicate that the relations between dominant and dependent states are dynamic

because the interactions between the two sets of states tend to not only reinforce but also

intensify the unequal patterns.

Moreover, dependency is a very deep-seated historical process, rooted in the

internationalisation of capitalism. In short, dependency theory attempts to explain the

present underdeveloped state of many nations in the world by examining the patterns of

interactions among nations and by arguing that inequality among nations is an intrinsic

part of those interactions. In their view the only way out to break loose of the capitalist

system is through radical means.24

Reinforcing this conclusion, Walter Rodney emphasised that African

development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international

capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa

over the last five centuries. He stressed that all of the countries named as

„underdeveloped‟ in the world are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with

44

which the world is now pre-occupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonialist

exploitation.

African and Asian societies were developing independently until they were taken

over directly or indirectly by the capitalist powers. When that happened, exploitation

increased and the export of surplus ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of their

natural resources and labour. That is an integral part of underdevelopment in the

contemporary sense.25

A related but more encompassing approach is presented by

Mkandiwire who argues that some countries are developed while others are not, not

because of the strategies adopted, but of the willingness and the readiness coupled with

the efforts to develop on their own. The views of „internalists‟ and „externalists‟ on why

some countries are developed and others are not as observed by Mkandiwire.26

The Dependency School also argued for a re-conceptualisation of the purpose of

integration schemes in the Third World. It reiterates that, economic integration should

aim at creating economic stimulus among member states, an alternative development

strategy that will enhance rapid economic development and eliminate underdevelopment.

Some members of this school have advocated for a re-examination of such issues that

bother on the politics of regional integration. This path has been illuminated by works of

S.K.B. Asante, Ralph Onwuka and Amadu Sesay. These scholars writing about regional

integration and economic development now consider serious the conditioning impact of

exogenous factors on development process. They argued that the integrative efforts of

African countries centre on „the hegemonic input and dominant influence of the North,‟

which have conditioned and determined the outcome of development.27

45

The internalist view falls into the liberal argument, a logic which IMF and World

Bank follow that; economic mismanagement, corruption and prebendalism distort the

optimal functioning of the market. Inefficient working of the economy, government

parastatals and corporations are shown as evidence of this. From this perspective, the

state is personalized by rulers who rule in the interest of personal power and self-

aggrandizement.28

The „externalist perspective‟ presents the second opposing view. Here, crises of

underdevelopment are traced to external factors generated by structural deficiencies and

contradictions in global economic system. To them developing countries are trapped

through debt burden and structural adjustment policies. From this perspective, the

developing countries have been more of victims than beneficiaries of external and

internal policy initiatives. As argued by Banwo:

Thus when an approach to development

fails, there is a switch, to another which, in

its turn, is promoted as the new fashion,

when that also fails to produce the required

development, another switch is made and so

on. The changes are presented as the product

of sophisticated thought about development

problems; "we are learning from

experience" is the justification for the switch

but when, after a few years, the new

approach has achieve no more than its

predecessors the same process is repeated.29

46

Public Choice Perspective

Public choice applies the theories and methods of economics to the analysis of political

behaviour, an area that was once the exclusive province of political scientists and

sociologists. Public choice originated as a distinctive field of specialization a half century

ago in the works of its pioneers, Kenneth Arrow, Duncan Black, James Buchanan, and

Gordon Tullock. Public choice has revolutionized the study of democratic decision-

making processes.30

As James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock artfully defined it, public choice is

“politics without romance.” In the conventional “public interest” view, public officials

are portrayed as benevolent “public servants” who faithfully carry out the “will of the

people.” In tending to the public‟s business, voters, politicians, and policymakers are

supposed somehow to rise above their own parochial concerns.31

One key conclusion of public choice is that changing the identities of the people

who hold public office will not produce major changes in policy outcomes. Electing

better people will not, by itself, lead to much better government. Adopting the

assumption that all individuals, be they voters, politicians, or bureaucrats, are motivated

more by self-interest than by public interest. Public choice recognizes that men are not

angels and focuses on the importance of the institutional rules under which people pursue

their own objectives.

Given the problems endemic to majority-rule voting, public choice also suggests

that care must be exercised in establishing the domains of private and collective choice;

that it is not necessarily desirable to use the same voting rule for all collective decisions;

47

and that the public‟s interest can be best protected if exit options are preserved by making

collective choices at the lowest feasible level of political authority.32

Actually, it is impossible to explain the processes of development and evaluate

development initiatives within a single theoretical strand; development plans, policies

and strategies are outcome of one and/or a combination of several ideas emanating from

development thinking that change over the years.33

A historical evaluation of the LPA,

AEC and NEPAD must therefore be seen in a broader societal framework. It is for this

reason that this study adopts the underdevelopment/dependency method. The advantage

of using this method is in its emphasis on addressing issues from holistic and inter-

disciplinary perspective, rather than treating the issues under consideration in isolation to

other factors. It is a comprehensive approach to the study of development.

Thus, using the underdevelopment/dependency perspective, which emphasises

holistic method of investigation, we have discovered that both internal and external

factors are responsible for third world underdevelopment. For instance, it is true that

colonial exploitation set the pace for underdevelopment of the third world. However, the

unwillingness and poor commitment by third world governments after independence to

pursue development programmes to their logical conclusion have also contributed to the

problems of development in the third world.34

Literature Review

Scholarly works devoted to the study of African development strategies/initiatives have

witnessed a significant increase since the 1970s. Many of the existing works has provided

a valuable background for this research. A thematic approach has been adopted for the

48

literature review in order to show the gaps in the existing works and how this study

intends to provide and fill the gap so identified.

The first category of works was pioneered by the United Nations Economic

Commission for Africa (ECA). The ECA sponsored several studies that analyzed and

prescribed solutions to Africa's grave development crises. This view is projected in

Adebayo Adedeji‟s works, Statement to the Economic and Social Council of the United

Nations Second Regular Session; The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos

Plan of Action: A Regional Approach to Economic Decolonization; Draft Plan of Action

for the Implementation of the Strategy for African Development for the 1980s; The

African Economy: Prospects for Recovery and Sustained Development; Africa and the

World Economy: A Case for Remaking Africa; From Lagos Plan of Action to the New

Partnership for African Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive

Act: Wither Africa; Claude Ake‟s Social Science as Imperialism: A Theory of Political

Development; The Political Economy of African Developmentand G.T.Verhelst‟s No Life

Without Roots: Culture and Development.

These works have questioned orthodox assumptions within the context of African

development since independence. Among these assumptions was the long held view that

growth alone would spread benefits to the poorest majority in African countries. The

authors have revealed that expectations after independence were that the increased output

of goods and services would trickle-down to the poorest sectors. African countries

therefore developed policies, programmes and development strategies based on these

western theories. To Adedeji, the ECA's conception of economic development is that it

should involve more than growth in the GDP, higher savings and investment rates and a

49

greater share in international trade; rather, that African countries should not ignore

certain non-quantifiable factors. Development should centre on well-being of the

individual and society, it should be a complete restructuring and transformation of its

dependence to a self-reliance and self-sustaining as well.35

While Ake acknowledged that Africa‟s backwardness and lack of development,he

was convinced, was out of this new thinking that the E.C.A and O.A.U jointly crafted the

Lagos Plan of Action as an indigenous African development strategy. An indigenous

development strategy was seen as significant in laying the foundation for economic

decolonization, since the political decolonization was not enough after about two decades

to deliver the expectations of independence. Such a strategy involves the installation of a

new economic order, based on a firm principle of self-reliance and sustainment at the

regional level, which will contribute to, and benefit from a new international economic

order (NIEO).

In his „Political Economy of African Development‟ Ake36

has also challenged the

divorce between political and economic analysis of African crises. To him, the current

crises in Africa have political origin with economic consequence, which are grave. Its

sustenance is pinned on the false thinking that it is purely an economic crisis. In line with

this position, he asserted that solutions identified in the Lagos Plan could best be termed

as bourgeois response to imperialism and underdevelopment. Thus, an objective

understanding of the political, economic, social, and cultural structures that will bring

about change and sustain it will be necessary for the realization of the goals and

objectives of development strategies in Africa.

50

Verhelst,37

however, presents a brilliant account of cultural dimension, in addition

to the economic and political dimensions to development. He argues that it is the totality

of the values, norms, attitudes and beliefs of a society, which shape its social, political

and economic organizations and inculcate a general feeling towards development. His

conclusions are significant in the sense that local knowledge and values must be the

starting point for people-centred alternative path to development. His findings also show

that while some cultures create major obstacles to development, not all of Africa's

cultures are negative and problematic.

The second category, are specific research works that concentrate on the role of

the development strategies in Africa from the Lagos Plan of Action, which show varied

findings. As in the earlier works, „Development Question‟ remains the central theme.

However, while earlier works dwelt on the discourse and discussion on why Africa has

remained undeveloped decades after independence and were calling for strategies to

overcome the crisis, this category focused on the role of the earlier strategies and policies.

The major studies in this category include S.K.B. Asante‟s African Development:

Adebayo Adedeji’s Alternative Strategies; T.M. Shaw‟s works: Towards a Political

Economy of the Lagos Plan: Innovation, Interest and Ideology and The African Crises:

Debates and Dialects over Alternative Development Strategies for the Continent;

R.O.Olaniyan‟s O.A.U’s Perception of and Strategy for the Management of Africa’s

Underdevelopment and Economic Crisis; Accelerated Development in Sub-saharan

Africa: A Plan for Action sponsored by the World Bank and Adedeji‟s Draft Plan of

Action for the Implementation of the Strategy for African Development for the 1980s.

51

The work of Asante38

is an evaluation of the Lagos Plan from the political

economy approach; he came up with the conclusions that the Lagos Plan is “Africa's

Economic Magna Carta.” He argues that by adopting the Lagos Plan, Africa is now in a

better position to respond to intra-continental problems and extra-continental pressure.

However, his findings question the political structure and cultural foundations of the plan.

As such, he recommends that if the Lagos Plan is to achieve its objectives and goals as a

self-reliant development strategy, the structure of politicsneed to be made conducive to

the pursuit of the objectives of the plan.

Important questions have also been raised about self-reliant development strategy,

which is the major theme of the Lagos Plan. Shaw,39

in his studies questioned the extent

to which the Lagos Plan pays attention to the practical implications of adopting a self-

reliant development strategy. His works evaluated the Lagos Plan in respect of the

expected role of external contributions to assist in the realization of the goals of a self-

reliant development. His conclusions show that foreign aid can endanger such intentions

by diverting the attention of African governments away from the need for radical

domestic economic reforms. However, external efforts are necessary to compliment

genuine domestic efforts, especially when recipient African countries determine the

priorities and procedures.

In a related work, Olaniyan evaluated the strategy to manage Africa's

underdevelopment based on O.A.U's perception of the continent's problems.40

He

concluded that, the Lagos Plan was not well informed as a strategy by endogenous

impediments in the continent and the capacity of African countries to meaningfully

embark on a programme of self-reliance. Undue obsession with the problems of

52

dependency and external exploitation can underscore the potentials of the plan to deliver.

Looking inwards he reiterated, will show that problems of conflicts, or productive base,

corruption and bad governance and the menace of debt should serve as lessons for

Africa's alternative development strategies.

However, the World Bank sponsored researches in response to these challenges

are complete departures from the tenets of Lagos Plan self-reliant and self-sustaining

principles. The Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Plan for Actionis the

Bank's response to the indigenous strategy of ECA and OAU. The report discusses the

factors that explain slow economic growth in Africa in the decades following

independence. It analyses policy changes, programmes orientations needed to promote

faster growth, and recommends to donors that aid to Africa should be double in real

terms. The loans aid and increased funding of Africa's development were conditioned on

the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) including greater private

sector involvement, deregulation and devaluation etc. The SAP conditionalities were

however incongruous with economic, social and political performances in African

countries.41

While Adedeji in a study that challenges the World Bank position noted that, the

search for alternative development paradigms in Africa needs fundamental change and

transformation not just adjustment. To him an African alternative to structural adjustment

must involve the remaking of the polity, economy, and society; and not just (narrow,

economic and mechanical change. Failure of African governments to translate ideas in

the Lagos Plan into operational programmes and implement them is one of the continent's

crises itself. African leaders abandoned regional strategies and policy frameworks that

53

had been conceived in the 1980s in a rush for quick-fix foreign aid and balance of

payment support. Instead of undertaking the restructuring of their economies, they opted

for programmes that guarantee them foreign exchange and allowed external debt

rescheduling.42

The literature in the third category solicited for a democratic, participatory and

„partnership‟ approach to development planning which include Victor Adetula‟s AEC and

the New World Order: The Future of Economic Regionalism in Africa, Dede Brownson‟s

keynote address in African Economic Treaty: Issues, Problems and Prospects,and

Manelisi et al.‟s African Union and Pan-African Parliament.

While Adetula43

in a study that supports the above trend argues that from LPA to

Abuja Treaty (AEC), the consensus of African leaders on collective self-reliance and

regional cooperation cannot be mistaken. However, the experimentation in Africa on

collective self-reliance within the framework recommended by the ECA has yielded very

little result. He therefore, proposed that the existing OAU-ECA economic groupings do

not demonstrate the unity of the processes of economic, political and social integration

required towards the resolution of African crisis. He reiterated that, given the

proliferation of integrative activities within the region, the conception and

operationalization of the AEC Treaty could be regarded as a breakthrough from

underdevelopment and dependency.

In addition, Dede posits that the African Economic Community (AEC) could

justifiably be considered as the first concrete step towards meeting the challenge of the

1990s towards charting a new path based upon the collective wisdom and the collective

strength of this vast continent. He stated that though the road to regional economic

54

cooperation and integration has been littered with dead or dying inter-governmental

organizations-from the East African Economic Community to the Mano River Union. He

argues that, perhaps one of the most valid criticisms of economic integration efforts is the

failure of virtually all regional integration organizations to involve the broad masses of

the people in the process.44

Manelisi et al reiterated the above assertion that the adoption of the Abuja Treaty

(AEC) of 1991 was a proposal to foster the economic, social and cultural integration of

the African continent. They said the treaty recognizes earlier efforts towards forging

economic integration of the continent, dating as far back as from 1968-1980. They argued

that, the AEC Treaty also recommends the creation of an African Union and a Pan-

African Parliament and that the establishment of the two bodies was scheduled to take

place over a period of six phases with the Pan-African Parliament as the final stage,

initially intended to be implemented in 2034.45

The fourth category of literature specifically analyzes the journey of African

development strategies from the Lagos Plan of Action to the NEPAD. The authors

showed the provisions, aims, objectives, and achievements of the several initiatives

Africa has adopted so far. The literature include Adebayo Adedeji‟s Draft Plan of Action

for the Implementation of the Strategy for African Development for the 1980s, P.A.

Nyong‟o‟s From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD: The Dilemma of Progress in

Independent Africa, J.O.Adesina‟s Development and the Challenge of Poverty: NEPAD,

the Post-Washington Concensus and Beyond, Sola Akinrinade‟s The New Partnership for

Africa’s Development: Dispensing the Begging Bowl or plus ca change, plus cest la

meme chose?, D.Omoweh‟s The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD):

55

Another False Start?,W. Nkuhlu‟s NEPAD: A New Chapter in African-led Development,

Z. Randriamaro‟s NEPAD, Gender and the Poverty Trap: The Challenges of Financing

for Woman Development, H.Wayemo‟s The New Partnership for Africa’s Development

(NEPAD): The Role of Civil Society and A. Baah‟s History of African Development

Initiatives.

In his argument, Adedeji outlines seven documents, which he sees as Africa's

preferred development agenda in the 1980s and the 1990s. These include the Lagos Plan

of Action, 1980; African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986; United

Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986;

African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme, 1989; African

Charter for Popular Participation for Development, 1990; United Nations New Agenda

for Development of Africa, 1991and the African Economic Community (AEC), 1991.46

However, these documents were not given support and funding. To him the welcome

accorded the NEPAD is due to its goal of partnership with the international community.

He cautions that renewed efforts to forge a future for the continent should not be done at

the expense of principles enshrined in the LPA.

In the same vein, Nyong'o discusses the relationship between the NEPAD

initiative and other previous initiatives. To him, the Lagos Plan and Final Act of Lagos

and the African Economic Community received little attention because the West were

generally hostile to arguments advanced by the advocates of the new international

economic order (NIEO).47

The NEPAD initiative is welcomed because it tackles the issue

of good governance. The document also sets up mechanisms that can put politics at the

command of economics in Africa. NEPAD unlike the Lagos Plan speaks about

56

democracy and unlike the Lagos Plan, which was an 'economist' document, NEPAD

document is conscious of 'political economy' and role of subjective factors in influencing

the processes of social transformation. The study recommends that NEPAD should adopt

a more participatory and accountable approach to African development.

The work of Adesina is an assessment of African condition as presented by the

NEPAD initiative and its option for poverty reduction. He argues that NEPAD initiative

has its underpinnings in the neo-liberal economic policy, and opened to the process of

globalisation. NEPAD initiative he argues is better understood as a simplistic reading of

global and domestic difficulties facing Africa. He expresses worry that the politics of the

NEPAD remains at the level of marketing, which, is donor focused and not on human

resource in Africa. His conclusions are thought provoking, that the NEPAD initiative is

both a challenge and an opportunity to both African people and leaders.48

Akinrinade and Omoweh discuss the origins, objectives, goals and prospects of

the NEPAD. These scholars argue that NEPAD is a basis for a proposed new relationship

between African states and the international community in an attempt to movethe

continent forward into the 21st century. Omoweh

49 observed that NEPAD is a Pan-

African initiative rooted in African philosophical discourse. Akinrinade however,

raisedimportant questions on the mobilization of resources and partners at various levels-

global, regional, domestic levels to ensure the achievement of NEPAD goals and

objectives. His conclusions are that the NEPAD initiative should dispense with the

egging bowl mentality to avoid further dependency.50

Nkuhlu's position is that the NEPAD initiative presents a new chapter in African-

led development. The NEPAD initiative therefore in his argument does not seek to

57

replace or compete with existing initiatives. Instead, Africa through NEPAD initiative,

together with other arrangements will identify priorities and needs for themselves and

pursue them in an integrated and coordinated manner. An important dimension he

introduced is that the African Peer Review Mechanism will enhance African ownership

of its development agenda. The peer review mechanism will be a system of self-

assessment that ensures that policies of African countries are based on best current

knowledge and practices, which emphasizes good governance.51

Randriamaro's work is significant in the sense that it presents a gender dimension

of the NEPAD discourse. It also assesses the challenge of financing women for

development in Africa. The report denounced the macro-economic dimension of the

NEPAD initiative, which is the structural adjustment programme of IMF and the World

Bank. Such a plan is seen as being insensitive to gender.52

The relevance of this finding

lies in drawing attention to the plight of women on the African continent and the need to

integrate women perspectives in the development process.Wameyo53

draws attention to

how the civil society can participate in the process of economic integration, social

development, poverty eradication and governance in Africa.

Baah‟s work is also significant as it traced Africa‟s development path from

colonial times which he described as (the period when Africa was “raped” and robbed of

its natural resources by the imperialists and empire builders); through the “Golden

Decade” of the 1960s (the period of political freedom, self-realisation, economic growth

and increased standard of living); to the 1970s (a decade of political instability); to the

1980s and 1990s (the decades of decay) and concludes with the developments and

activities early in the millenium especially with the advent of NEPAD and expressed

58

some hope that if NEPAD is fully implemented, Africa will experience growth and

development as anticipated at independence. He added that it is unfortunate that, the

period during which Africans had the opportunity to initiate their own development

policies was very short, lasting less than a decade from independence (between 1960 and

1970). Since then all initiatives have been designed by “aliens” for Africa and, they have

all failed. The failure is evidenced by the ever growing debt and increased incidence of

poverty on the African continent.54

It is evident from the review of the above literature that scholars have evaluated

each development strategy in its epoch. They have also provided various insights into

Africa‟s development crisis especially on the need for the various development initiatives

which Africa has embarked on and why most of it has failed. However, it is also clear

that none of the scholarly works reviewed seems to dwell on a comparative evaluation of

Africa's indigenous development strategies. There is a need, therefore for the historical

and comparative analysis to discern similarities and differences, hence, an appropriate

development strategy that best suits Africa's quest to overcome poverty and

underdevelopment in the 21st century and benefit from the globalization process.

Methodology

This study adopts the historical method and it is therefore, descriptive and analytical.

Both primary and secondary sources have been consulted and employed for the study.

These include oral interviews with academics, researchers, policy makers, practitioners

and diplomats, in Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia. Data on the subject of research in

various libraries, government and non-governmental organizations, publications of

international organizations and the internet were consulted.

59

An attempt has been made to carry out a historical and content analysis of

published articles, relevant textbooks, journals, newsletters, magazines and the African

Union (AU) and NEPAD documents as well as electronic sources. Information from the

diverse sources has made it possible to undertake a clear evaluation of Africa‟s

development initiatives.

60

Endnotes

1. K. Nkrumah, quoted in Bukar Bukarambe, “Historical Overview of Africa‟s

Development Efforts,” in NEPAD in the Nigerian Dock (Lagos: NIIA and Print

Serve Nigeria Ltd., 2004),16.

2. W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Abuja: Panaf Publishing, 1972

and 2005), 345.

3. Interview with Prof. Bukar Bukarambe, NIIA, 20/10/10.

4. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, viii.

5. S.K.B. Asante, African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies

(Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991), 139-140.

6. Ibid., 140.

7. A. Baah, “History of African Development Initiatives,” Paper presented at the

African Labour Research Network Workshop, Johannesburg, South Africa, 22-23,

May (2003), 2; interview with Prof. Joram Biswaro, Addis Ababa, 13/07/12.

8. Ibid., 1; interview with Amb. John Shinkaye, AUC, Addis Ababa, 16/07/12.

9. O.A.U, “The O.A.U 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development

of Africa,” www.uneca.org.adfm/riefforts/ref/other2.htm (accessed 7/7/2011), 1.

10. A. Adedeji, "From Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African

Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither

Africa?"Keynote address presented at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa,

Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April (2002),1-2.

11. NEPAD, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),”

www.kairoscanada.org (accessed 21/11/ 2011), 54.

12. M. Ndulo, “African Economic Community and the Promotion of Intra-African

Trade,” Africa Notes (May, 1992): 1-2; interview with Dr. Donald Kabekuka,

Addis Ababa, 15/07/12.

13. R.O. Olaniyan, “O.A.U's Perception of and Strategy for the Management of

Africa's Underdevelopment and Economic Crises,” Nigerian Journal of

International Affairs 14, no. 1 (1988): 206.

14. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 33.

61

15. P. A. Nyong‟o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD: The Dilemma of

Progress in Independent Africa,” Paper presented at the African Academy of

Sciences, Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April, (2002), 5.

16. Olaniyan, “O.A.U's Perception of and Strategy for the Management of Africa's

Underdevelopment and Economic Crises,” 206.

17. Ibid., 210.

18. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 43.

19. O. Sunkel, “National Development Policy and External Dependence in Latin

America,”The Journal of Development Studies 6, no. 1 (1969): 23.

20. T. Dos-Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” in Readings in U.S. Imperialism,

ed. K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), 226.

21. R. Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal

Problems (New York: United Nations, 1950), 2; Hans Singer, “The Distribution

of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries,” American Economic

Review 40, no. 2 (1950): 3.

22. Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal

Problems, 3.

23. A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York:

Monthly Review Press, 1967); Samir Amin, Essay on Social Formations of

Peripheral Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

24. R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (New Jersey:

Princeton University Press, 1987), 54.

25. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 287.

26. Ibid, 288.

27. T. Mkandawire, “African State Responses to Economic Cycles and Economic

Crises: A Preliminary Note,” African Studies Association (Washington D.C.:

November 1982) : 45.

28. V.A.O. Adetula, AEC and the New World Order: The Future of Economic

Regionalism in Africa, Monograph 1(Jos: Centre for Development Studies,

University of Jos, 1996), 25; S.K.B. Asante, Regionalism and Africa's

Development: Expectations, Reality, and Challenges (New York: St. Martin‟s

Press, 1997), 96; R.I. Onwuka and A. Sesay, The Future of Regionalism in Africa

(London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1985); interview with Prof. V.A.O. Adetula,

Jos, 10/06/11.

62

29. A. Banwo, “Theoretical Issues in Political Economy,” in Issues in Contemporary

Political Economy of Nigeria, ed. H. A. Saliu (Ilorin: Sally and Associates, 1999),

14-15.

30. W. F. Shughart II, “Public Choice,” The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics,

Library of Economics and Liberty, 2008 (accessed 26/7/12), 2.

31. K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd

ed. (New York: Wiley,

1963), 23; Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1958), 13.

32. J. M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical

Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

Press, 1962), 15.

33. A. Ebo, “Dependency and Neocolonialism in a New World Order” in Issues in

Contemporary Political Economy of Nigeria, ed. H. A. Saliu, 55.

34. Ibid., 57.

35. A. Adedeji, “Statement to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

Second Regular Session,” Geneva, United Nations, 12 July 1979.

36. C. Ake, Social Science as Imperialism: A Theory of Political Development

(Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1979); “The Political Economy of African

Development,” Paper presented at the International Conference on Africa: The

Challenges of Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development, Abuja, Nigeria,

15-19 June, 1987.

37. G. T. Verhelst, No Life without Roots: Culture and Development (London: Zed

Books, 1990).

38. Asante, African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies.

39. T.M. Shaw, “Towards a Political Economy of the Lagos Plan: Innovation, Interest

and Ideology,” in Continental Crises: The Lagos Plan of Action and Africa's

Future, ed. D. F. Luke and T.M. Shaw (New York: University Press, 1984); T.M.

Shaw, “The African Crises: Debates and Dialects over Alternative Development

Strategies for the Continent,” in Africa in Economic Crisis, ed. J. Ranvenhill

(London: Macmillan, 1986).

40. Olaniyan, “O.A.U's Perception.”

41. World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Plan for Action

(Berg Report),1981.

63

42. A. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan

ofAction: A Regional Approach to Economic Decolonization,” Lecture delivered

under the Distinguished Lecture Series of the Nigerian Institute for Social and

Economic Research (NISER), University of Ibadan, 23 March 1983.

43. Adetula, AEC and the New World Order: The Future of Economic Regionalism in

Africa.

44. B. N. Dede, “Keynote Address,” in African Economic Treaty: Issues, Problems

and Prospects,ed. M. A. Ajomo and Adewale Omobolaji Conference Series No. 3

(Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1993).

45. G. Manelisi, F. Kornegay and R. Stephen, “African Union and Pan-African

Parliament: Working Paper,” Paper presented at the African Institute of South

Africa, Pretoria, 2000.

46. Adedeji, “From Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African

Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither

Africa?”

47. P. A. Nyong'o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD: The Dilemma of

Progress in Independent Africa,” www.anc.org.za/pubs/umrabulo15/plan.htm

(accessed 21/10/ 2011).

48. J.O. Adesina, “Development and the Challenge of Poverty: NEPAD, the Post

Washington Consensus and Beyond,”www.codesria.org/archives/

ga10/%20GA201-5/Jimi_O.Adesina.pdf (accessed 11/12/ 2011).

49. D. Omoweh, “The New Partnership for African's Development (NEPAD):

Another False Start?” Nigerian Social Scientist 6, no. 1 (March, 2003); interview

with Prof. Dan Omoweh, Covenant University, Ota, 10/05/11.

50. S. Akinrinade, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Dispensing the

Begging Bowl or Plus ca change, plus cest la meme chose?” in The New

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Challenges and

Development,ed. E. Obadare and D. Oyewole (Lagos: Centre for Democracy and

Development, 2003).

51. W. Nkuhlu, “NEPAD: A New Chapter in African-led Development,” in The New

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Challenges and

Development,ed. Obadare and Oyewole.

52. Z. Randriamaro, “NEPAD, Gender and the Poverty Trap: The Challenges of

Financing for Women Development,” www.web.ca/~iccf (accessed 12/12/ 2011).

64

53. H. Wayemo, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): The

Role of Civil Society,” in The New Partnership for Africa's Development

(NEPAD): Challenges and Development, ed. Obadare and Oyewole.

54. A. Baah, “History of African Development Initiatives.”

65

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN AFRICA

Introduction

This chapter presents a historical origin of development initiatives in Africa. An attempt

is made here to locate the historical origin of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), the African

Economic Community (AEC) and the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development

(NEPAD), which are the three outstanding continental development initiatives being

considered and compared. The period between the introduction of the LPA and the

NEPAD witnessed other developments in the continent's attempt to overcome her

development problems. This period is reviewed in this chapter as a transition from LPA

to NEPAD. Commencing from the collective self-reliance, import-substitution and

embracing integration resulted by the Lagos Plan (LPA-1980) and African Economic

Community (AEC-1991) to the ownership and partnership of New Partnership for

Africa‟s Development (NEPAD-2001), from structural adjustment inspired by the Berg

Report, to the G8 engagement of the Africa Action Plan, up to the achievement of shared

responsibility and the common interest in the Report of the Commission for Africa in the

year 2005.

What is stated above is the description of the major development strategies for

Africa in the past 33 years. The path has been complex and certainly affected by

international context and has witnessed the assessment of a continent, at first seemed

“strongly critical” towards old colonial powers, then was the capable “beneficiary” of

privileges guaranteed by its strategic positioning during the cold war years, and finally

acted as a horse breaking into a trotting race towards globalisation. It is worth noting that

66

the development of the various initiatives was characterized by individual shades and

different approaches. This is why it is necessary to show a major distinction between

strategies internally promoted by the Africans themselves, from those proposed by

external factors.

The former which included import substitution strategy were people-centred and

succeeded in terms of human development; the latter have been based on the free market

ideology. The firsts were those of the early 1980s that resented a strong sense of

rebellion, and pushed for the affirmation of self-reliance, self-sufficiency and self-

support. Those of the new millennium are instead open to the concept of full self-

awareness of their own responsibilities, of more concrete and constructive nature and also

being more attentive towards joint work with Western donors, an element that turned up

to the enforcement of infrastructures for the valorisation of the continents‟ five regions.

The Origin of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos (LPA)

Although, debate regarding Africa‟s development emerged before, during and

immediately after the decolonization process (most symbolically launched at the

Bandung Conference of 1955), it was really in the 1970s that questions pertaining to how

and where Africa would “fit” into the wider international political economy became

prominent. Most resolutions adopted by African leaders through the OAU in the early

years of independence had aimed at the notion that the economic integration of Africa

was a prerequisite for real independence and development. This was the main theme of

the declarations from Algiers (1968), Addis Ababa (1970 and 1973), Kinshasa (1976) and

Libreville (1977).1 But from the late 1970s onwards, Africa became progressively

67

inundated with various development plans, frameworks, agendas and declarations all

aimed (to varying degrees) at promoting development and, later, democracy.

The main programs are listed below:

− Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980). Claimed to promote

autocentric development and greater cooperation within Africa.

− The African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights (Nairobi 1981) and the Grand Bay

Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights. Spearheaded by African civil

society but adopted by the OAU to encourage human rights on the continent.

− Africa‟s Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER) – 1985.

− OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the

Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990). Claimed to emphasize

Africa‟s will to determine its own destiny.

− The Charter on Popular Participation adopted in 1990; claimed to place ordinary

Africans at the “centre of development”.

− The Kampala Document (1991). Stipulated that peace, security and stability are

inseparable conditions and the basis for development and co-operation in Africa.

− The Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community – 1991.

− The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993). African

leaders pledged themselves to promote peace and stability in Africa.

− Cairo Agenda for Action (1995). Claimed to “relaunch” Africa‟s political, economic

and social development.

− African Common Position on Africa‟s External Debt Crisis (1997). Sought to find a

common strategy for tackling Africa‟s debt crisis.

68

− The Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999) and the

Lomé Declaration on the framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional

Changes (2000).

− The 2000 Solemn Declaration of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development

and Cooperation. Claimed to establish principles for the sponsorship of

democracy and “good governance” in Africa.

− The Constitutive Act of the African Union. Adopted in 2000 at the Lomé Summit

(Togo), entered into force in 2001.

− The Omega Plan. Prepared in 2001 by Abdoulaye Wade, president of Senegal and

premised on four central pillars, dealing with the building of infrastructures,

notably information and communication (ICT), education and human resource

development, health and agriculture.

− The New Africa Initiative of 2001, promoted by Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika and

the precursor to NEPAD.

− The New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD): adopted as a program of the

AU at the Lusaka Summit (2001).

In brief, Africa has never been short of plans and programs for development.

However, what arguably has united such declarations has been the fact that the vast

majority has been elitist programmes drawn up with very little popular consultation. Even

a widespread knowledge of their existence on the continent has often been lacking.2

The

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Organization for

African Unity (OAU) have played significant roles in the conception and introduction of

the Lagos Plan of Action. The ECA, as the first pan-African organization had right from

69

its inception on 29 April 1958 devoted itself to the struggle for formulation of an

alternative economic strategy and policy which was believed, if properly executed, would

lead to economic decolonization of Africa.3 The Organization of African Unity, which

was established five years later, in 1963, as pan-African political organization, lent its full

political support to the ECA in its endeavor to enhance economic development in Africa.4

The ECA was greatly inspired by the activities of the Economic Commission for

Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), then under the leadership of Raul Prebisch,

his work has played a prominent role in the analysis of international economic relations

among different countries of different levels of development.5 Like the ECLAC, the

ECA's first step was to redefine Africa's development strategy and evaluate development

theories, policies and strategies of the 1950s and 1960s. But unlike ECLAC, which

identified that the solution to 'unequal trade' was located in industrialization through

import substitution strategy, the ECA concluded that the best way to solve Africa's

economic problems and dependence was through self-reliance.6

The development strategy and policies of the 1950s emphasized growth

maximization and trickle-down mechanism. The ECA viewed this as a calculated strategy

to mislead the developing countries.7

ECA therefore, saw the need to introduce an all-

African concept of economic strategy. The earlier attempts by the ECA and OAU to

generate economic development strategy can be traced to the early 1970s. The earlier

economic strategies which laid the foundation for the making of the Lagos Plan of Action

(LPA) included the ECA's 'Africa's Strategy for Development in the 1970s. This was

adopted as resolution 218 (X) of February, 1971 by the ECA Conference of Ministers.8

70

This nineteen-page document is a re-examination of earlier strategies recommended by

the first and second United Nations Development Decades.

The first United Nations Development Decade was from 1960 to 1969.

Development policies during this period were designed to overcome obstacles and

eliminate bottlenecks to economic growth by redistributing productive assets, developing

human resources, controlling population growth, and increasing productive capacity in

unproductive sectors of developing economies.9

The goal of this decade was growth

through social change. Most of the opportunities provided by the first UN Decade was

not utilized due to lack of regional back up and follow up. In order to benefit from the

opportunities provided by the UN to assist developing countries, „the Africa's Strategy for

Development in the 1970s‟ was introduced to provide a regional strategy for the Second

United Nations Development Decade. This decade was from 1970 to 1979. Emphasis of

this decade was on channeling assistance to “the poorest of the poor” and also, it was

meant to be a “people-oriented, problem-solving form of assistance.”10

These efforts were complimented by the OAU in 1973 through the Declaration on

Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence adopted by the Assembly of

Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its 10th

Ordinary Session.11

By 1975, it became evident to ECA/OAU that global strategies

promulgated for the first and second United Nations Development Decades for the 1960s

and 1970s were in themselves insufficient for a greater future of Africa.The philosophies

of the strategies outlined in the two UN development decades emphasised resource

transfers which were grossly inadequate, creating dependence on such assistance, without

71

considering the effects of such on improving national capabilities for generating,

retaining and distributing real income and servicing debts.12

The conception of the Lagos Plan of Action as from 1975 was as a result of new

thinking in the ECA and the support of the OAU. Earlier strategies were deemed by the

ECA to be inadequate because of several reasons. First, the ECA saw the need for a new

development strategy because earlier declarations were informed and based on inherited

theories of development, which emphasized trickle down economic growth.13

Also, the rate and direction of internal socio-economic change were linked to

export markets and the imports of skills, technology and capital goods and services as

well as consumer goods. Rather than advocate for complete break away from

dependence, the earlier strategy advocated diversification of export commodities. Apart

from dependence on export of agricultural commodities, the export-oriented strategy also

depended on export of minerals, hydrocarbons, timber etc. without attempts to develop

alternative renewable potentials for expanding and diversifying the economies. The

earlier strategies also placed emphasis on import substitution industrialisation policy.

This policy had concentrated on consumption goods whose production has entailed

importation of capital goods, technology, managerial skills and intermediate inputs that

furthered Africa's dependence on the outside world. This made the search for a new

strategy unavoidable and urgent.14

The immediate cause for a new strategy was the approaching Third United

Nations Development Decade for the 1980s, and the demand for the establishment of a

New International Economic Order (NIEO). The case for NIEO came for deliberations

before the United Nations General Assembly at its Sixth Special Session in April/May

72

1974. The demand was based on the belief that a re-arrangement of international trade

would both accelerate and diversify economic growth in the world economy on an

equitable and fair basis. The ECA also reasoned that if Africa is to benefit from the

NIEO, then, it must first promote a self-re-examination and install a new national social

and economic order in Africa as a whole.15

In line with this thinking, in 1976, the ECA came up with a document titled the

Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International

Economic Order in Africa, 1976-1986. The Revised Framework was approved and

endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in June 1977.16

The Revised Framework was expanded and improved upon through a series of internal

ECA Secretariat brainstorming exercises and a series of specialised meetings of joined

effort by the ECA and other bodies. The ECA and OAU had meetings, discussions

centred on „Perspectives of Development and Economic Growth in Africa up to the year

2000‟ held in Monrovia in February 1979. The ECA also had joint Seminar with United

Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) on „Alternative Patterns of Development and

Life Styles for the African Region‟ held in Addis Ababa in March 1979.17

The efforts of the ECA to come up with a genuine African approach to

development that emphasised looking inwards was further rekindled by the need to

prepare the International Development Strategy (IDS) for the Third United Nations

Development Decade, 1980 to 1989. The ECA saw this as a timely and significant

opportunity to contribute to the content and scope of the IDS because they did not have

such opportunities in the First and Second United Nation's Development Decades.

73

Accordingly, at the ECA Conference of Ministers of Development and Planning

and at the same time, which was the 14th

Session of the ECA held in Rabat, Morocco, in

March 1979, the Development Strategy for Africa during the Third United Nations

Development Decade was prepared. At the conference, the Ministers decided that the

strategy should be submitted to the Heads of State and Government at their meeting in

Monrovia in July, 1979, and to submit same to the United Nations Organisation.18

They

also decided to prepare for submission to the Heads of State and Government a draft:

Declaration of Commitment of the Heads

of State and Government of the

Organization of African Unity on

Guidelines and Measures for National and

Collective Self Reliance in Social and

Economic Development for the

Establishment of a New International

Economic Order.19

At the meeting of the Heads of State and Government in Monrovia, Liberia, in

July, 1979, both the strategy and declaration were considered and adopted and were

renamed the Monrovia Strategy and the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment

respectively. It was also at the Monrovia meeting that the Heads of State decided to hold

an Economic Summit in Lagos in April, 1980.The ECA Conference of Ministers again

met in early April 1980 and prepared for consideration of endorsement of the Heads of

State and Government, The Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia

Strategy forthe Economic Development of Africa.

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its Second Extra

Ordinary Meeting devoted to economic development problems of Africa, held in Lagos

on 28th

and 29th

April, 1980; named the adopted plans as the Lagos Plan of Action for the

Economic Development of Africa (LPA), 1980-2000 and the Final Act of Lagos, 1980.20

74

Transition from Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for Africa's

Development (NEPAD)

The promulgation of the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa

(LPA), 1980-2000 and the Final Act of Lagos, 1980 became a springboard for more

assessments and formulation of alternative development policies by the World Bank and

United Nations. The World Bank generally disagreed with the laid down principles and

objectives contained in the Lagos Plan of Action. Whereas the African leaders and their

partners in the ECA, who participated actively in the formulation and introduction of the

LPA saw the problem of African continent as basically economic in nature, and so came

up with measures aimed at national and collective self-reliance in economic and social

domains. They agreed with other third world countries that the restructuring of

international economic relations was the panacea to the development problems they

faced.21

The principles and objectives outlined in the LPA were to achieve self-reliance

and self-sufficiency. This Africa hoped to achieve through proper planning in

Agriculture, industry and environmentally sound use of resources. Necessary political

and economic institutions to bring about this were also recommended.22

The World Bank

on the other hand criticized the African countries for not undertaking necessary reforms

in the public sectornecessary to stimulate growth. The Bank instead favored a private

sector led economy. The LPA was also criticized for being too ambitious in its

projections on what Africa could achieve in terms of industrial growth.23

The World Bank therefore set up an assessment of possibilities of overcoming

underdevelopment of Africa through a different approach from the strategy of LPA.

Professor Eliot Berg was appointed to head the team of evaluators that assessed the

75

African condition. The World Bank team came out with a report entitled: Accelerated

Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. Just like the LPA, the Berg

Report also analyzed the African economies sector by sector. It was also dissatisfied with

the rate at which Africa was developing. Above all, it criticized the LPA for being silent

on issues of bad governance, corruption, mismanagement of public funds, the role of

overblown bureaucracies and the parasitic nature of the state.24

The state-led development model, which relied upon heavily subsidized social

welfare, industrialization through tariff-supported import substitution, foreign exchange

controls and deficit financing of public expenditure was deemed by the World Bank to be

unsuitable and antithetical to growth in the private sector. Growth, it argued will only be

effected by the private sector, and in turn it is the private sector that they needed to

overcome underdevelopment. The solutions to underdevelopment as recommended by the

World Bank were therefore two- first was the need to roll back the state to its traditional

role as regulator and second, to open up the economy to private sector participation and

the rule of market forces through liberalisation. The World Bank and other donor

countries introduced new economic reform policy packages to African governments as

conditions for aid disbursements. These policies were made manifest in the Structural

Adjustment Programmes (SAP) of the mid-1980s.25

African leaders considered SAP as too harsh without considering the social

dimensions. This is because of the demand for withdrawal of subsidy on social services

such as water, health, education etc., and also demands for reduction of public sector

expenditure. Also, the basic principles of self-reliance outlined in the LPA could not be

abandoned. The ECA and African governments therefore took a more acceptable

76

approach. Following this, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU,

in July 1985 adopted the Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER),

1980-1990. The adoption of APPER was further informed by great drought disasters in

Africa between 1983-1984, which aggravated Africa's food dependency, necessitating

African governments to act and save their economies. APPER translated the broad

principles of the LPA into practical sets of activities and policies for implementation

within a five-year period.

In solidarity with the efforts of African leaders the United Nations General

Assembly convened a special session exclusively to consider the African crisis, from 27th

May to 1st June 1986. In order to harmonize the position of Africa before presentation at

the UN Special Session, African Ministers of Economic Planning and Development from

28th

to 30th

March, 1986, convened at the first extraordinary session of the ECA to

consider Africa's submission to the Special Session of United Nations General Assembly

on Africa's Economic and Social Crisis, before it was submitted to the OAU Council of

Ministers which also met in an extraordinary session on 30th

and 31st March, 1986. The

outcome of this session of the United Nations Special Session was the adoption of the

United Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development

(UN-PAAERD, 1986). The policies and measures, which the UN Special Assembly

Session recognized, are same as defined by APPER.26

The APPER and UN-PAAERD documents tried to come to terms with SAP and

to propose to the UN body economic programmes and objectives under which the

African governments could engage the donor countries and international financial

institutions in joint endeavour to tackle economic and social backwardness of Africa. In

77

order to harmonize the positions of the World Bank on 'good governance' and the

OAU/ECA on factors such as debt burden, trade gaps and how clearly APPER and UN-

PAAERD could be implemented without harmful effects SAP had overlooked, in 1989,

the ECA produced the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment

Programme for Socio- Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP). This was

endorsed by the Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa OAU Summit in July,

1989. The grand aim of AAF-SAP was to sustain the commitment to self-reliance. It also

considered the social dimensions of SAP.27

AAF-SAP as a human-centred strategy also took into account shift in global

politics in the late 1980s especially to issues of good governance and democracy in

holding any „international development discourse.‟ This coincided with the end of the

cold war. The period also marked the inauguration of democracy's third wave or Africa's

second independence with opening of the political space in several states to pluralistic

political competition.28

In line with this and to prepare for the challenges ahead, the ECA

prepared for and held the International Conference on Popular Participation in the

Recovery and Development Process in Africa, held at Arusha, Tanzania, on 12th

February

1990. It culminated in the adoption of The African Charter for Popular Participation for

Development (1990).29

This received the approval of the Heads of State and Government

of the OAU at its 26th

Summit at Addis Ababa in July, 1990. They further committed

themselves to promote „popular participation of their peoples in the processes of

government and development.‟30

The African continent further demonstrated the commitment to take responsibility

for continental development through adoption of the Abuja Treaty in 1991 by the OAU

78

Summit. The Abuja summit took place in Abuja, Nigeria and reviewed the

implementation of the UN-PAAER.D. The review provided the basis for Africa's

submission to the UN in September, 1991. The review concluded that the economic and

social crisis facing African continent had continued unabated.31

Despite the adoption of programmes of political and economic reforms through

SAP by more than 30 countries, only little change was noticed and poverty seemed to be

on the increase.32

Some of these countries included Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania,

Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Ghana, Tanzania, Gambia, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria.33

This was the basis for the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the United Nations

Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF) (1991). African States

committed themselves to assume responsibility for continental development by:

The restoration of peace and social stability;

the promotion of regional and sub-regional

economic cooperation and integration;

the improvement of living standards; equality

of opportunity for women and the

intensification of the democratization process;

the promotion of investment; the

development of human resources and

capacity building; the protection of the

environment and the promotion of sustainable

development; the integration of population

factors into thedevelopment process; the

pursuit of agricultural and rural development

policies and strategies in order to fully

integrate rural economies in their national

context; achieve food security and strengthen

self-reliance in food; the intensification of

south-south cooperation; and, the increased

role of non-governmental organisations.34

79

The international community on its part pledged to provide full and tangible

support to Africa in its effort to achieve sustained and sustainable growth and

development primarily in the areas of:

Solution to Africa's Debt problem; increased

resource flows; enhancing Africa's export

earnings by providing more open access to

markets and by supporting the diversification

of African economies, especially of

commodity diversification; regional economic

integration; arresting environmental

degradation and enhancing scientific and

technological capacities.35

The programme emphasized the principle of shared responsibility and full partnership for

the achievement of the goal of development in Africa. The idea of full partnership was

thus born out of UN-NADAF, 1991; this formed the bedrock for millennium

development planning in Africa.

The Adoption of African Economic Community (AEC)

As the growing consensus on what was wrong with Africa – namely a lack of democracy

and excessive state interference in the economy – emerged, confrontation with the

developed world over the evils of a dependency generated by the global capitalist system

gave way to “dialogue”. This actuality was confirmed with the formulation of the African

Economic Community (AEC) in 1991. The AEC was established by the Abuja Treaty at

an OAU Summit in June 1991, but only came into force in May 1994 after the requisite

numbers signed up for ratification. Its main aim was to establish a pan-continental

economic community by 2025, predicated on the by now standard fare of „the gradual

removal, among Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods,

services and capital.‟36

80

Like many other African plans and declarations, the Abuja Treaty failed to

meet its stated objectives. Even taking 1994 and not 1991 as its starting point, the Treaty

failed in meeting the target of its First Stage (1994–1999) which was to be the

strengthening of existing regional economic communities within a period not exceeding

five years. From the above, the Second Stage (1999–2007), of stabilizing tariff barriers

and non-tariff barriers, customs duties and internal taxes within a period not exceeding

eight years was never met. Other Stages followed the same fate.

The specific objectives of the AEC are:

− To promote economic, social and cultural development

and the integration of African economies in order to

increase economic self-reliance and promote an

endogenous and self-sustained development;

− To establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the

development, mobilization and utilization of the human and

material resources of Africa in order to achieve a self-

reliant development;

− To promote co-operation in all fields of human

endeavour in order to raise the standard of living of African

peoples, and maintain and enhance economic stability,

foster close and peaceful relations among Member States

and contribute to the progress, development and the

economic integration of the Continent;

− To coordinate and harmonize policies among existing

and future economic communities in order to foster the

gradual establishment of the Community.37

Many of these ideals are now replicated by the New Partnership for Africa‟s

Development (NEPAD). Interestingly, the AEC Treaty included punishment for states

not adhering to its conventions, something that NEPAD promoters have, as various “test

cases” such as Zimbabwe have demonstrated, shied away from. After all, the AEC Treaty

states quite clearly that „Any Member State, which persistently fails to honour its general

undertakings under this Treaty or fails to abide by the decisions or regulations of the

81

Community, may be subjected to sanctions by the Assembly.‟ Among such general

undertakings are the „recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples‟

rights‟ and „accountability.‟38

The Origin of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) owed its origin to efforts of

African leaders as from 1999 to initiate new programmes aimed at economic recovery

and sustainable development in the 21st century. In doing this, the initiators took note of

changes in global politics, which shifted towards shared responsibilities and full

partnership for the achievements of the millennium development goals and opportunities

of globalization. NEPAD owed its origin to two outstanding initiatives. The first initiative

was President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa's African Renaissance Project, which later

became Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MARP), and the

second, was President Abdouleye Wade of Senegal's Omega Plan.39

Thabo Mbeki, who was President Nelson Mandela's Deputy before becoming the

president of South Africa, seized the opportunity after being elected to promote African

recovery at the dawn of a new millennium through an initiative of African renaissance.

Mbeki resurrected the concept of African renaissance from African philosophical

discourse- Pan-Africanism, Ubuntu, Negritude and Black Consciousness; as a basis for

new attempts at policy formulation and self-reliance.40

At OAU Summit in 1999, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, then the chairperson of

the OAU was mandated to join President Mbeki in coordinating the programme.

President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria was also added to the group at the G-77 Summit

in 2000. President Mbeki at Davos, Switzerland presented the MARP at the 'World

82

Economic Forum' on 28 January, 2001.41

He presented it to the international community

as in African initiative that would depend on African people. According to Thabo Mbeki:

We can and must move away from

measures that further entrench the

dependence of Africa on aid. It is

necessary that the peoples of Africa gain

conviction that they are not, and must not

be wards of benevolent (guardians but

instruments of their own sustained

upliftment.42

The second initiative, the Omega Plan of President Abdouleye Wade of Senegal

was very critical of external development assistance. His plan placed strong emphasis on

infrastructural development, education, training, health and agriculture. He argues that

such a focus is necessary, if Africa is to boost its productivity and face the competition of

an increasingly globalized economy. He argued that better transport connections among

African countries will promote regional trade and integration. If all these were done,

Africa can be part of world trade significantly. Wade saw his Omega Plan as 'Keynesian'

in inspiration emphasising central role of government in promoting investment in key

sectors of the society.43

The MARP and Omega Plans were both presented at the conference of African

Ministers of the United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Algiers between 8th

to 10th

May, 2001. ECA also presented a document, Compact for African Recovery and

pledged to provide technical and analytical support. In order to refine and harmonize the

two documents so as to present a common vision for African future, the ministers

referred the plans to a committee of experts who held workshops in Abuja, Nigeria; and

Dakar, Senegal. The harmonized version was submitted to the Heads of State and

Government Summit in Lusaka, Zambia on 1lth

July, 2001 for further refinement and

83

adoption. The outcome was the name “New African Initiative (NAI)” which was adopted

by the African Heads of State and Government.

At the OAU Summit, a 15-man Implementation Committee of Heads of State and

Government under the Chairmanship of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria was set

up and a Steering Committee of ten members.44

The Steering Committee and experts

finalized the policy framework. At the inaugural meeting of 23 October, 2001 in Abuja,

Nigeria, the name was changed from New African Initiative to the New Partnership for

Africa's Development.45

NEPAD generally calls for a new relationship of partnership

between Africa and the international community to overcome the underdevelopment and

poverty of the continent and exclusion in a globalising world.

Conclusion

On the eve of the 21st Century the African crisis had reached its peak. Most countries had

accumulated foreign debt to the tune of over 150% of their GDP over the two past

decades of structural adjustment. Many countries in Africa were forced by the Bretton

Wood institutions to spend over a third of their export earnings on foreign debt servicing.

As a result of the combination of structural adjustment policies and corruption, living

standards plummeted further and the key indicator of well-being, life expectancy - in

Sub-Saharan Africa was 30 years less than that in the economically advanced countries –

a situation former President Castro of Cuba described as “a true genocide.”46

Based on a 1996 World Bank report A Continent in Transition and under intense

and sustained pressure from the international civil society organisations to forgive Africa

of its huge debt, the Bank and the IMF came up with the Heavily Indebted Poor

Countries (HIPC) initiative. This initiative required African and other poor countries in

84

Latin America and Asia to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a

condition for debt relief and access to the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

and the World Bank concessional loans and grants. In the PRSPs, governments were

required to demonstrate their commitment to democratic governance, transparency,

accountability, poverty reduction and the Washington consensus in return for debt relief

and increased assistance.47

Another World Bank Report in 2000 Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?,

emphasised the need for reducing conflict and improving governance, investing in

people, increasing competitiveness and diversification, improving aid effectiveness and

reducing dependence of Africa on aid. Many countries in Africa have since prepared

either interim PRSPs or full PRSPs. They included Benin Republic, Burkina Faso,

Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,

Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,

Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In addition to the PRSPs other

important initiatives that have been taken in recent times include the UN Millennium

Summit and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Omega Plan and the

Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MARP) which were combined to form the

New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD).48

The World Bank/IDA is also developing a new initiative known as Assistance

Strategy for Africa (ASAF) with the purported aim to complement the effort by African

countries within the framework of NEPAD. Though, NEPAD, like previous African

development initiatives (especially the LPA and the AEC), has its shortcomings, but it

also opens up new opportunities for creating a balanced relationship between the state

85

and the market, promoting the capacity of state and civil society institutions and

increasing the autonomy of the state by combating corruption and curbing the domination

of special interests.

86

Endnotes

1. I. Taylor, “Partnership through Accommodation? African Development Initiatives

and Universal Policy Prescriptions” in Africa, Regional Cooperation and the

World Market-Socio-Economic Strategies in Times of Global Trade Regimes,ed.

Henning Melber (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006), 12.

2. Ibid., 13-14.

3. A. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan

ofAction: A Regional Approach to Economic Decolonization,” Lecture delivered

under the Distinguished Lecture Series of the Nigerian Institute for Social and

Economic Research (NISER), University of Ibadan, 23 March 1983, 324; A.

Adedeji, “The Social Implications for Africa of the New International Economic

Order,” World Symposium on the Implications of the New International

Economic Order, Geneva, 19 January, 1976, 11; A. Adedeji, “General

Introduction” in Towards A Dynamic African Economy: Adebayo Adedeji:

Selected Speeches and Lectures 1975-1986, ed. J.C. Senghor (England: Frank

Cass,1989), 23; A. Adedeji, “Africa and the International Development Strategy

for the United Nations Third Development Decade,” Second Substantive Session

of the Preparatory Committee of the General Assembly for the International

Development Strategy (New York: 20 June 1979), 17.

4. R.O. Olaniyan, “O.A.U's Perception of and Strategy for the Management of

Africa's Underdevelopment and Economic Crises,” Nigerian Journal of

International Affairs 14, no. 1 (1988): 205.

5. S.K.B. Asante, African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies

(Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991), 51.

6. Olaniyan, “O.A.U's Perception of and Strategy for the Management of Africa's

Underdevelopment and Economic Crises,” 205.

7. G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Democracy and Development in Africa: A Tribute to

Claude Ake,” Paper presented at the 4th

Annual Lecture in Honour of Claude Ake

at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 30th

November, 2000, 8.

8. ECA Document, Resolution 332 (XIV) E/CN: 14/ECO/90/Rev.3 of 25 June 1986,

3; ECA Document, E/Cm: 15/6/Rev.3-African Alternative Framework to

Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and

Transformation (AAF-SAP), Addis Ababa, July 1989, l.

9. Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Democracy and Development in Africa: A Tribute to Claude

Ake,” 8.

10. Ibid., 9.

87

11. Asante, African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies, 43.

12. A. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan

ofAction: A Regional Approach to Economic Decolonization,” 272.

13. Ibid., 325.

14. Ibid., 326.

15. Ibid., 327.

16. Ibid., 328.

17. Ibid., 329.

18. Ibid., 330.

19. ECA Document, Resolution 332 (XIV), 332.

20. Ibid., 54.

21. P. A. Nyong‟o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD: The Dilemma of

Progress in Independent Africa,” Paper presented at the African Academy of

Sciences, Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April, (2002), 3.

22. A. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan

ofAction: A Regional Approach to Economic Decolonization,” 273.

23. Ibid., 274.

24. Nyong‟o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD,” 4.

25. www.unu.edu/unupbooks

26. A. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan

ofAction: A Regional Approach to Economic Decolonization,” 230.

27. Ibid., 231.

28. Ibid., 232.

29. P. A. Nyong‟o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD: The Dilemma of

Progress in Independent Africa,” 4.

88

30. S. Akinrinade, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Dispensing the

Begging Bowl or Plus ca change, plus cest la meme chose?” in The New

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Challenges and Development,

ed. E. Obadare and D. Oyewole (Lagos: Centre for Democracy and Development,

2003), 230.

31. Asante, African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies, 210.

32. O.A.U, “Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of

African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and

Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World,” AHG/Draft. Dec. 1 (XXVI)

Rev.2, Addis Ababa 9-11 July, 1990, 4.

33. Akinrinade, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Dispensing the

Begging Bowl or Plus ca change, plus cest la meme chose?,” 6.

34. Asante, African Development: Adebayo Adedeji's Alternative Strategies, 189.

35. J. Dong-Joo, Impacts of Structural Adjustment Programmes on the Development

of Sub- Saharan Africa, www.arabia.co.kr/en/academic.htm (accessed 8/10/2011),

13.

36. UN Document, E/CN.14/493/Rev.3, February 1971, 7; UN Document,

“Implementation of the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of

Africa in the 1990s: Report of the Secretary General, United Nations General

Assembly,” Document A/51/228, Fifty-first Session of the UN General Assembly,

August 1996, 12.

37. OAU, “The African Economic Community Treaty,” 1991, 3.

38. Ibid., 4.

39. Ibid., 5.

40. D. Omoweh, “The New Partnership for African's Development (NEPAD):

Another False Start?” Nigerian Social Scientist 6, no. 1 (March, 2003): 37.

41. H. Melber, “NEPAD: South Africa, African Economics and Globalization”The

League Searchlight, 2, no. 10 (June, 2004): 15.

42. Akinrinade, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Dispensing the

Begging Bowl or Plus ca change, plus cest la meme chose?,” 8; Interview with

Prof. Said Adejumobi.

43. Ibid., 5.

89

44. D.A. Rondinelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive

Approach to Development Administration (London and New York: Routledge

1993), 36.

45. Akinrinade, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Dispensing the

Begging Bowl or Plus ca change, plus cest la meme chose?,” 10-13.

46. Omoweh, “The New Partnership for African's Development (NEPAD): Another

False Start?,” 38.

47. World Bank Report, A Continent in Transition, 1996.

48. World Bank Report, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century, 2000.

90

CHAPTER THREE

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAGOS

PLAN OF ACTION (LPA) AND THE FINAL ACT OF LAGOS (FAL),

1980-2000

Introduction

This chapter presents how the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos

(FAL) were conceived, adopted, and promulgated in 1980, and how it became a

springboard for more assessments and formulation of alternative development policies by

the World Bank and United Nations. The LPA involved the installation of a new

economic order based on the firm principles of self-reliance and self-sustainance; at the

regional level on the concentration of efforts which would lead to the achievement of an

increasing measure of collective self-reliance among African states; and, at the

international level, on the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO)

among others.

Immediately after the adoption of the LPA, the World Bank generally disagreed

with the laid down principles and objectives contained in the LPA. Whereas the African

leaders and their partners in the ECA, who participated actively in the formulation and

introduction of the LPA saw the problem of African continent as basically economic in

nature, and so came up with measures aimed at the national and regional levels for

collective self-reliance and self-sufficiency in economic and social domains. They agreed

with other third world countries that the restructuring of international economic relations

was the panacea to the development problems they faced.1

91

Background to the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos

The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development

strategies has been more sharply felt in Africa than in the other

continents of the world. Indeed, rather than result in an

improvement in the economic situation of the continent,

successive strategies have made it stagnate and become more

susceptible than other regions to the economic and social crises

suffered by the industrialised countries. Thus, Africa is unable to

point to any significant growth rate, or satisfactory index of

general well-being, in the past 20 years (1960-1980). Faced with

this situation, and determined to undertake measures for the basic

restructuring of the economic base of our continent, we resolved

to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on

collective self-reliance. Thus, following a series of in-depth

considerations of' the economic problems of the continent by our

Ministers and by groups of experts, we adopted at our 16th

Ordinary Session, held in Monrovia, Liberia, in July, 1979 the

“Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of' the Heads of State

and Government of the OAU on the guidelines and measures for

national and collective self-reliance in economic and social

development for the establishment of a new international

economic order.” In adopting the Declaration, we recognised

“the need to take urgent action to provide the political support

necessary for the success of the measures to achieve the goals of

rapid self-reliance and self-sustaining development and

economic growth.”2

The African continent represents a region which faced economic problems of the utmost

severity at a time when the global economy itself was ravaged by inflation,

unemployment and the effects of a world recession. Africa contained 21 of the world's 45

least-developed nations. Its total Gross National Product accounted for only 2.7 percent

of the world's product and Africa had the lowest average per capita income in the world.

Many African countries lacked basic medical and health care facilities while food

shortages and severe unemployment affected a very high proportion of African peoples.

Internal African development strategies of the past have been subjected to critical

investigation in an attempt to assess the sources of the continent's development problems.

92

Despite its vast natural resources and the praiseworthy efforts of many African

governments, the continent as a whole was unable to show any significant economic

expansion or growth. The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action represented an initiative undertaken

by the defunct Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) in conjunction with the U.N. and

the Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A.) to develop a successful regional strategy

for African development. It aimed at economic growth in African states in different

sectors including food and agriculture, industry and in environmental and energy matters.

It adopted specific as well as general targets with time limits, for each aspect of

economic planning. The Plan was full of good programmes and under many of its

schemes the E.C.A. was designated to play a role in co-ordination, support and technical

assistance, thus enhancing relations between the O.A.U. and the U.N. framework. At that

time, the biggest proposal in the Plan was for an African Common Market to be

established by the year 2000.3

Overall, immediate post-independence regional economic arrangements failed to

produce envisaged economic development in the continent. More importantly, they failed

to reverse the continent‟s dependence and vulnerability to external economic forces. One

explanation for this unenviable record was the reluctance of African governments to

accept the long-term commitments that were required by regional cooperation

arrangements and the implicit restraints on their autonomy over national policy making.

This was compounded by concerns about the distribution of the potential and real

benefits of economic cooperation, particularly, against the backdrop of differential levels

of development and resource endowments of the various states involved in regional

economic groupings.

93

Disappointment with immediate post-independence development initiatives

informed the need for broader, more viable and more inward-looking initiatives

beginning in the 1970s. The defining characteristic of the initiatives of the 1970s onwards

was that they explicitly challenged the external domination of the continent and therefore,

stressed the urgency of curtailing the external vulnerability of African economies. In this

regard, the successful ratification of the ECOWAS treaty in 1975 by hitherto divided

French and English-speaking West African states was a turning point in region building

in the continent in that it came to serve as a catalyst for the establishment of other region-

wide initiatives, all geared at evolving inward-looking economic development. The

initiatives that followed the ECOWAS Treaty were precursors to the LPA‟s self-reliance

strategy that became popularised in the 1980s.4

The asymmetrical and unequal character of Africa‟s economic relation with the

industrialised world became more conspicuous in the 1970s. The multiple crises that hit

the global economy symbolised by the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the

OPEC induced oil shocks and the resulting energy crunch, and the continuing stagflation

of the mid 1970s, revealed the extreme vulnerability of African economies to external

forces.5 An ECA initiated review of the development paradigms and strategies pursued

by Africa during the early years of independence revealed that the continent‟s

performance was substantially below all the targets set by the United Nations Second

Development Decade.6

These unsettling realities engendered a reassessment and redirection of Africa‟s

policy options the national and regional levels. Consciousness of the limits of the

paradigm of extroversion in Africa‟s development strategies that emerged in the mid-

94

1970s with the and signing of the ECOWAS Treaty reached a turning point in 1980 with

the adoption of the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL).

The LPA departed fundamentally from earlier African development cooperation

strategies in advocating partial disengagement from global economic processes and

linkages and also in emphasising inward-looking, self-reliant and self-sustaining

development.7

More than any earlier African development initiatives, it made regional

economic cooperation the centerpiece of Africa‟sdevelopment. Moreover, in contrast to

narrowly based and parallel regional schemes of the earlier decades, the LPA envisioned

linking Africa‟s five main economic regions into a continent wide economic space, an

African Common Market, by the year 2000.8

Given the centrality of the LPA in Africa‟s regional cooperation history and

against the backdrop of the perception that NEPAD‟s option of greater engagement with

global economic processes constituted a reversal of the prescriptions of the LPA, an

understanding of the shifts contained in the NEPAD must of necessity commence with an

evaluation of the core logic of the LPA and the context within which it was formulated.

The Logic behind the Formulation and Adoption of LPA

The LPA represented the first continent-wide effort by Africans to forge a

comprehensive, unified approach to the economic development of the continent.9 It was

the offshoot of the idea that:

“Africa‟s development could not be merely a passive result

of the world system to which the continent had been bound

by the historical legacies of slave trade, colonialism and the

various neo-colonial associations and agreements such as

the Lome and Yaounde Conventions with the European

Economic Community.”10

95

It consisted of a listing of what had to be done to put the continent on a self-sustaining

growth path.11

The LPA was a short, medium and long-term programme, covering a

broad range of issues related to the socio-economic development of the continent.

However, a detailed examination of the contents of the LPA is not intended here.

Rather, this study focuses on elements of the inward-looking economic orientations of the

initiative and its overall regional character. These elements do not only distinguish the

LPA from earlier African development strategies, but also define the differences in

orientation among the LPA, AEC and the NEPAD. They are therefore, of particular

significance for this study.

The LPA was adopted against the backdrop of two decades of stagnation in

output; worsening balance of payments brought about by deteriorating terms of trade;

increasing payments for the import of high-level skills, capital goods, spare parts and

equipment, raw material inputs, marketing, shipping and insurance services; widespread

unemployment and mass poverty.12

More importantly, it emerged in response to the realisation that past policies were

not viable and sustainable for the realisation of the objectives of self-reliance, poverty

eradication, reduction of unemployment, equitable distribution of the benefits of

development and economic growth, sovereignty over natural resources and equitable

participation in international decision-making processes. African Heads of State and

Government summarised the background under which the LPA was formulated in the

following words: “the effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies has

been more sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents of the world.”13

96

Indeed, rather than result in an improvement in the economic situation of the

continent, successive strategies have made it stagnate and become more susceptible than

other regions to the economic and social crises suffered by the industrialised countries.

Thus, Africa was unable to point to any significant growth rate, or satisfactory index of

general well-being, in the period between 1960-1980. Faced with this situation, and

determined to undertake measures for the basic restructuring of the economic base of our

continent, Africa resolved to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on

collective self-reliance.14

Formulated against the backdrop of dissatisfaction with past

approaches to African development, the LPA was understandably conceived as an

instrument for redressing the imbalance inherent in African economies, including their

excessive external dependence.15

Thus, the philosophy underpinning the LPA and the FAL was self-reliance, at the

national and inter-country levels.16

It called for the development of capacities and

capabilities at the national and inter-country levels, to formulate and apply autonomous

decisions, to generate and implement independent ideas, to identify problems and analyse

them in terms of domestic, African and extra-African requirements for their solutions. It

also emphasised the need to develop capacities and capabilities at national and inter-

country levels to meet, albeit progressively, the greater parts of the region‟s needs in

terms of factors of production and of final goods and services. 17

A corollary of the LPA‟s basic philosophy of self-reliance was the concept of

internally generated, self-sustaining development. In other words, in addition to basing

African development and economic growth on internal factors of production, distribution

and consumption, there was a felt need of making such development sustainable in terms

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of techniques of production, the composition of goods and services and of the style of

development and economic growth, that was to constantly draw on the reserve power of

the society to renew itself over time.18

Together, self-reliance and self-sustenance implied

the need of making domestic human, physical and financial resources the constant stimuli

for the economic growth and development of the continent.19

The single theme that ran across the thirteen chapters of the LPA was that “Africa

must actively strive to reduce its dependence on external nations and replace this

dependence with a self-sustaining development strategy based on the maximum internal

use of the continent‟s resources.”20

This required that African states veer dramatically

from the economic paths they had pursued since independence and link their economic

futures to those of their equally fragile neighbours (South-South cooperation). However,

self-reliance and self-sustenance in the LPA context did not mean autarky or complete

disengagement from the global economy.

Rather, it emphasised a meaningful redefinition of interdependence.21

This

stemmed from the perception that from the early days of independence, African

economies both individually and collectively through the various immediate post-

independence regional economic initiatives had been dependent on those of the North,

particularly the former metropolitan countries of the Organisation of Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD). The effects of this dependence had generally

been negative and even worsened with the multiple global economic crises of the 1970s.

There was therefore, a pressing need for a change in the nature and character of this

relationship.

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The LPA: Underpinning Inter-African Diplomatic Process

As observed earlier, by the late 1970s, a development gap emerged amongst African

states, as the continent was slowly dividing into semi-peripheral and peripheral states.

The former, relatively affluent and comparatively successful economies (Ivory Coast,

Kenya and Malawi; and oil-exporting states like Algeria, Gabon and Nigeria) were more

inclined to acquiesce to continued engagement in the liberal global political economy

despite the devastating effects of the global economic crises of the 1970s. The latter (a

majority of African states), however, were most hard-pressed by the global economic

slump and were inclined to be supportive of disengagement from the global economic

order.22

In light of the apparent divergence of interests amongst African states, it was

certain that formulating a common approach to resolve the continent‟s economic

development dilemmas was challenging. It would therefore be of interest to „unpack‟ the

processes that made possible the emergence of an African consensus that produced the

policy of partial disengagement, self-reliance and self-sustenance contained in the Lagos

Plan of Action (LPA) and the Full Act of Lagos (FAL) in 1980. This section gives an

account of the various actions and efforts of the UNO, the OAU, the ECA technocrats,

and African leaders that culminated in the formulation of the LPA and the FAL.

The struggle to formulate an alternative economic strategy for the

economicdecolonisation of Africa can be traced to the creation of the Economic

Commissionfor Africa (ECA) in 1958. However, the impetus for the series of actions that

eventually led to the Monrovia Strategy in 1979 and the LPA in 1980 could be located in

1975. Indeed, the LPA could be seen as the culmination of a four year long effort,

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initiated and led by the Economic Commission for Africa, together with the Organisation

of African Unity (OAU), to review the development paradigms and strategies that Africa

had pursued since independence in the 1960s.23

The assessment showed that Africa faced

a serious development crisis and that of the five regions of the globe (Africa, Europe,

Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, andWest Asia) performance in

the African region was the worst.24

Against this backdrop and within the context of the

New International Economic Order (NIEO) campaign:

“it became imperative that Africa should first put its house in

order otherwise, it risked remaining marginalized and

„peripherised‟ even in a reconstructed international

economy.”25

Accordingly, in 1976 the ECA crafted its first landmark document entitled, The Revised

Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the NIEO in Africa. This became the

intellectual and theoretical foundation of Africa‟s self-reliant and self-sustenance

strategy, upon which the Monrovia Strategy (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and

the Final Act of Lagos (1980), were subsequently built.26

The Revised Framework argued that a credible and appropriate development

strategy for Africa must satisfy four fundamental principles: self-reliance; self-

sustenance; the democratisation of the development process; and a fair and just

distribution of the fruits of development through the progressive eradication of

unemployment and mass poverty.27

The ECA technocrats evolved a sort of self-reliant

development charter for the continent that had as key elements:

·The internalisation of the forces of demand that

determine the direction of development and economic

growth process, including the patterns of output;

·Increasing substitution of domestic factor inputs for

external factor inputs;

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·Increasing the participation of the mass of the people in

the production andconsumption of the social product;

and

·Increasing self-sustenance through the promotion of the

patterns and processof a holistic human development in

which the different sectors, and programmes and

activities mutually supported and reinforced each other,

so that when related to the internalisation of the forces of

demand and supply, the whole economic, social and

political system develops its own internal dynamics.28

The revised framework was an articulation of the ECA technocrats‟ idea of the

kind of continent they envisaged for the African peoples and the development strategy,

which had to be adopted to establish it. Their basic proposition was that an increasing

measure of self-reliance and self-sustaining development was a most important

accompaniment of political independence since it was to lead to economic

decolonisation. The argument was that a development strategy based on the four pillars –

self-reliance, self-sustenance, democratisation of the development process, and the fair

distribution of the fruits of development, called for a complete departure from the past. It

was to be inward-looking rather than externally-oriented. The ECA therefore, embarked

on evolving and promoting a development strategy and ideology, which was to be

genuinely African and not imitative of western models as had hitherto been the case.29

Recognising that African states and their governments were the principal actors in

the eventual operationalisation of the Revised Framework, the ECA technocrats were

resolved on having it endorsed by the relevant African states‟ auspices. Accordingly, in

1976, African Ministers of Planning And Finance (who constituted the Executive

Committee of the ECA) approved the Revised Framework. In June 1977, the Assembly

of Heads of State and Government of the OAU also endorsed it. The ECA technocrats

interpreted this endorsement as marking the beginning of a breakthrough in bringing

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about Africa‟s long cherished self-reliant development strategy. However, the awareness

persisted that a lot still had to be done.30

As a result of this awareness, between 1976 and 1979, the ideas contained in the

Revised Framework were expanded and improved upon through a series of internal ECA

secretariat meetings and conferences, alongside a number of specialized consultations

such as the “OAU-ECA Colloquium on Perspectives of Development and Economic

Growth in Africa up to the year 2000,” held in Monrovia in February1979 and the Joint

ECA-UNEP seminar on “Alternative Patterns of Development and Life Styles for the

African Region,” held in Addis Ababa in March 1979.31

The continuous search for a genuinely African approach to development was

given a great spur by the need to prepare the International Development Strategy for the

Third UN-Development Decade (IDS).32

To ensure that Africa played an important role

in determining the contents and the scope of the international development strategy for

the decade of the 1980s, and to avoid been left out as in the previous decades, the ECA

technocrats, together with African ministers of Planning and Development agreed to

prepare a development strategy for Africa.With valuable input from proposals worked out

by a number of sectoral conferences (such as the conference of African Ministers of

industry, the Conference of African Ministers of Trade and the Conference of African

Ministers of Transport, Communications and Planning),33

an African strategy was

finalised during the ECA Conference of Ministers of Development and Planning and the

fourteenth session of the commission held in Rabat, Morocco, in March 1979.34

After the preparation of the African Strategy, the African Ministers of Planning

and Development also resolved to prepare a “Declaration of Commitments of the Heads

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of State and Government of the OAU on Guidelines and Measures for National and

Collective self-reliance in Social and Economic Development for the Establishment of a

NIEO.” These two documents were then presented to African Heads of State and

Government during their meeting in Monrovia in July 1979. Upon the adoption of both

the Strategy and the Declaration of Commitments by the African Heads of State and

Government in Monrovia, they became known as the “Monrovia Strategy and the

Monrovia Declaration of Commitments respectively.”35

Meanwhile, during the Monrovia meeting, and in light of the critical importance of

the two documents, the African Heads of State agreed to hold an extra-ordinary Summit

devoted exclusively to economic issues in Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980. More

importantly, they commissioned the Secretary General of the OAU, in collaboration with

the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, “to draw up annually

specific programmes and measures for economic cooperation on sub-regional, regional

and continental basis.”36

Pursuant to this charge, the OAU and the UN-ECA proceeded to

give substance to the Monrovia Declaration, by preparing a plan of action for its

implementation. During the ECA Conference of Ministers in Addis Ababa, in April 1980,

the African ministers and the ECA technocrats came up with a detailed Plan of Action for

endorsement by African heads of state and government, titled: “The Plan of Action for

the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for Economic Development of Africa.”37

This document was adopted by the African leaders, at their Economic Summit in

Lagos later in April, and it became known as the “Lagos Plan of Action forthe Economic

Development of Africa 1980 – 2000.”38

The LPA was accompanied bythe Full Act of

Lagos, which consisted of a statement of the kinds of economic and political institutions

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and agreements that were to be put in place for the effective realisation of the principles,

programmes and projects enunciated in the LPA. The Plan was also presented to the

United Nations General Assembly at its eleventhspecial session in September 1980 and it

became an integral part of the International Development Strategy for the Third United

Nations Development Decade.39

Objectives and Strategies

The LPA was fashioned to tackle the continent‟s multifarious problems, so that it could

not only initiate and nurture an internally generated and self-sustaining development and

economic growth process, but also attain national and collective self-reliance.40

It was

designed to lay a durable foundation for internally generated, self-sustained processes of

development and economic growth based on the twin principles of national and collective

self-reliance.The LPA emphasised the reorientation of Africa‟s development strategies

with implications for sectoral linkages, processes of planning and plan implementation,

and participation in the development process.41

For example, for industry to function properly, natural resources had to receive

proper attention, and transport and communication had to be well organised to facilitate

the delivery of goods and services where they were needed. Its thirteen chapters

therefore, dealt with all economic and social sectors: food and agriculture; industry;

natural resources; human resource development and utilisation; science and technology;

transport and communications; trade and finance; economic and technical cooperation;

the environment; least developed countries; energy; women and development; and

development planning, statistics and population.

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On agriculture, proceeding from the premise of gravity of the food situation in

Africa, the LPA aimed at engendering self-sufficiency in food and a diminishing

dependence on exports and expatriate technical assistance. Increased volumes of

resources were to be allocated to agriculture to bring about a qualitative and quantitative

improvement in agricultural output.42

Still within the framework of the strategy of

limiting external dependence, the LPA cautioned against the type of agricultural

mechanisation that could rather increase Africa‟s dependence on others.More

importantly, emphasis was on the production for African consumption (markets),

although African countries were urged to continue to grow export crops forvital foreign

exchange earnings.43

In the area of industry, the United Nations Industrial and Development

Organisation‟s (UNIDO‟s) declaration of the 1980s as “the African Industrial

Development Decade” provided the impetus.44

The LPA aimed at increasing Africa‟s

share of the world industrial production from a meagre 0.8 percent in 1980 to 1.0 percent

in the short term (up to 1985), 1.4 percent in the medium term (up to 1990) and 2 percent

in the long term (by 2000).45

Within this time frame, it was proposed that at the

continental level, various national industrial structures would have been integrated into a

common continental economy.

At the national level, industries were to be linked to one another as well as into

other sectors of the economy “so as to promote interdependence among them and achieve

harmonised industrialisation and overall economic development.”46

Within the LPA self-

reliance philosophy, African countries were cautioned to select technology that was

socially suitable, compatible with resource endowment, and that was capable of

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increasingly reducing Africa‟s over dependence on the developed countries for

technology.47

Although, the need for greater cooperation and self-reliance ran through the

entireLPA text, it was most articulate in the industry section in the series of measures that

had to be taken at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, to achieve the industrial

targets laid down by the plan. At the national level for example, the LPA counselled

individual countries: to create a machinery to coordinate and promote industrial

cooperation between the country concerned and other countries of the sub region and

region; and on the need for African countries to lessen their excessive dependence on

imported industrial inputs.48

At the sub-regional and regional levels the LPA contended that: Member states

were convinced of the fundamental role of intra-African industrial cooperation, in all its

various forms, as an instrument for self-reliance and acceleration of industrial

development to achieve the Lima target for Africa, taking into account, in particular, the

discouraging attitude of developed countries, and of the present low progress in the intra-

African cooperation.49

In light of the centrality of intra-African cooperation in the domain of

industrialisation, African states decided to adopt the following far-reaching measures:

·Preparing sub-regional and regional plans for the creation

of major industrial complexes whose cost and production

capacity would exceed national financial and absorptive

capacities;

·Creating multinational regional or sub-regional institutions

to make an inventory of and exploit shared national

resources;

·Giving high priority to the establishment of multi-national

industries in Africa, especially in such basic areas as

metallurgy, foundry, chemicals etc., with high investment

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cost; expand bilateral industrial cooperation amongAfrican

countries through joint ventures;

·Strengthening existing African regional institutions such

as the African regional centre for technology; the African

regional centre for engineering design and manufacturing;

the African development fund;

·Establishing machinery to monitor industrialisation at the

sub-regional level;

·Creating industrial cooperation areas without customs

barriers;

·Creating of multi-national institutions to promote financial

flow and the acquisition of technology to Africa;

·Undertaking measures at national, sub-regional and

regional levels to facilitate fuller utilisation of excess

industrial production capacity in Africa.50

The LPA‟s emphasis on cooperation and integration was premised on the fact that

the initiative had as ultimate goal the promotion of continental economic unity via the

creation of an African economic community. This made economic integration and

cooperation the center piece of the LPA. And as Browne and Cummings put it: „without

regionalism, the LPA collapsed both as a concept and as a strategy.‟51

Probably the most

significant message in the LPA was the recognition that “Africa‟s economic development

required a far greater degree of cooperation among African nations than had been hereto

far evident.”52

The LPA preamble emphasised that “efforts towards African economic

integration must be pursued with renewed determination in order to create a continent-

wide framework for the much needed economic cooperation for development based on

self-reliance.”53

The LPA aimed at creating, at the national, sub-regional and regional

levels, a dynamic and interdependent African economy that could pave the way for the

establishment of an African common market leading to an African economic

community.54

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The approaches to planned development that emerged from the LPA twin

principles of self-reliance and self-sustenance were premised on the thesis that in the

circumstances of the African region at the time, and in the context of self-reliance and

self-sustenance, the supply of natural resources and raw materials expected to be

available for development and economic growth; and the choices of commodity and

service composition of output was to determine the pattern of skills to be developed, the

pattern of equipment to be imported or produced at home, and the type of institutional

services to be organised.

In effect, the LPA called for fundamental restructuring of African economies,not

only in increasing the share of goods and services, but in changing the sources of inputs

into the process of production and distribution and the ownership of the factors and

institutions of production and distribution.55

The LPA insisted that “Africa‟s almost total

reliance on the export of raw materials must change. Rather, Africa‟s development and

growth must be based on a combination of Africa‟s considerable resources, her

entrepreneurial, managerial and technological resources, and hermarkets (restructured

and expanded), to serve her people.”56

Consequently, the fact that trade and monetary issues, constituted central elements

in Africa‟s discontent with the Post-WWII international economic order, the LPA

resolved to make the expansion of intra-African trade the mainstay of its self-reliance

strategy and to take measures to geographically and structurally diversify Africa‟s trade

patterns.57

In the area of inter-African trade, a series of measures were recommended with

well-defined time frames, for the reduction and elimination of trade barriers amongst

African states, beginning with the establishment of appropriate preferential trade areas

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within the framework of the ECA – Multinational Programming and Operational Centres

(MULPOCs).58

This was to be followed by strengthening existing economic integration groupings

and the creation of new ones where deemed desirable. The LPA also emphasised the need

to explore possibilities of processing locally available raw materials for marketing within

the African region and the establishment of African multinational production co-

operations and joint ventures.59

Meanwhile, to facilitate the quick and efficient movement and preservation of

goods, the LPA recommended the establishment and improvement of the necessary

transport and communications links among the various African states. The

aforementioned measures were aimed at gradually reversing the „colonially induced‟ low

volume of trade exchanges between African states, with the ultimate ambition of

establishing an African Common Market by 2000.60

In the realm of trade relations with

other regions of the world, the LPA advocated a geographical and structural

diversification of Africa‟s colonial and postcolonial trade patterns.61

Geographically, the LPA called for a systematic exploitation and exploration of

trade and economic cooperation potentials with other developing countries and regions

within the framework of proposals for the establishment of a generalised system of trade

preferences among developing countries. In other words, the LPA advocated a shift from

the prevalent dependent North-South trade relations, to presumably more balanced South-

South economic relations. South-South economic cooperation was to be supplemented in

the LPA dispensation with the expansion of trade and economic cooperation with the

developed countries with centrally planned economies.62

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Structurally, the LPA called for measures to enforce and strengthen state (national)

control of foreign trade by way of state intervention or private indigenous corporations,

or a combination of both. Meanwhile, within the ambit of calls for a New International

Economic Order (NIEO), the LPA resolved on setting up a new trading framework at the

international level including agreement on new trading rules and principles covering,

amongst others, structural adjustment, preferential treatment for developing countries,

and elimination of protectionist measures that hampered access of manufactures and

semi-manufactures from developing countries to markets of developed countries.63

It also

argued for the regulation of the operations of transnational corporations in the region with

a view to eliminating all forms of restrictive business practices and controlling transfer

pricing. The ultimate goal was to increase Africa‟s share of world trade in manufactures

within the framework of the 30 percent target set for the developing countries as a

whole.64

Another important area where the LPA proposed measures for restructuring to

serve its self-reliance strategy was finance. At the national level, it called for a complete

restructuring and re-orientation of the policies and programmes of monetary and financial

institutions imported into Africa (central banks, commercial banks), in such a way as to

integrate them better in the development objectives of each African country.65

At the sub-

regional level, member states were expected to integrate theirnational monetary

arrangements into sub-regional multilateral clearing and paymentarrangements, in line

with negotiations for the creation of preferential trade areas.66

More importantly, at the regional level, the LPA envisioned strengthening the

financial capacity of the African Development Bank (ADB), so that it could be able to

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offer more assistance to member states in their development efforts.67

It also called for the

establishment of an African Monetary Fund and an African mutual guarantee and

solidarity fund. These financial institutions and structures were intended to make African

states self-reliant and less dependent on the structures and institutions of the Western

dominated global monetary and finance order.

This notwithstanding, the important role of external resources for the

implementation of the policy prescriptions of the LPA and FAL has been

acknowledged.68

Foreign aid and technical assistance had implications for the viability of

the LPA and the FAL. The argument was however, that self-reliance did not preclude

relevant external assistance. The LPA expected the international community to assist

African countries in their efforts to mobilise the necessary human, material and financial

resources by massively transferring resources to the continent.69

Concretely, the LPA called for the intensification of international negotiations on

a fundamental reform of the international monetary system;70

it emphasised that African

states take necessary steps for establishing an adequate international financial framework

to sustain their development efforts; and appealed to the industrialised countries and

international financial institutions to give increased financial assistance and aid to

Africa.71

In this particular respect, the LPA, called for increased Official Development

Assistance (ODA) for the LDCs, the softening of the conditions and criteria for obtaining

such assistance and the cancellation of all debts contracted by African countries.72

The foregoing expectations created the impression that the initiative was only

inward-looking in declarations, but largely externally dependent for implementation.73

John Ravenhill captured this perception when he argued that “for the most part, the plan

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appears to be little more than a plea for externally-financed self-reliance. Rather than

meeting the costs of development from internally-generated resources, international

donors are expected to foot the bills.”74

However, proponentsof the LPA have contended

that most of the resources for the attainment of the goalsof the LPA were to be internally

generated, and external resources were only a supplement. The LPA echoed this point by

stating that, “these outside contributions should only supplement our own effort; they

should not be the mainstay of our development.”75

The foregoing analysis shows that the LPA constituted a radical departure from

earlier outward-oriented African development strategies. It represented a challenge to the

nature of Africa‟s links with the global economy and had as ultimate goal engendering a

„partial disengagement‟ of the continent from the system. The question, however, arises

as to the circumstances that informed the design of such anarguably radical policy

framework by African leaders and technocrats.

The LPA and Self-Reliance Model

The LPA was the off-shoot of the combined influence of the unsettling realities of the

international political economy in terms of the constraints and limitations imposed on

developing countries by the structures and the operational principles of the Post-WWII

trade and monetary orders; the dominant economic and development ideas as they tended

to interpret and explain the post war global order; and the overall natureof North-South

relations within the context of the Cold War, the lessons of the OPEC cartel‟s concerted

action and the challenge posed by the call for a new international economic order

(NIEO).76

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Although, these external constraints were mediated by poor domestic institutions

and policies, African leaders discounted the role of domesticpolitical factors in Africa‟s

economic failures. They tended to believe that the removal of external constraints was

most crucial in Africa‟s development prospects. Therefore, the nature and character of the

LPA was informed more by perceptions about the external environment than by

considerations of the realities of the domestic environment.

The 1970s were a decade of economic upheavals and the energy crisis engendered

by the OPEC concerted action was one of the most devastating of these upheavals. In

many developing countries, particularly the least developed, the impact of the crisis was

so severe that their per capita income was reduced quite substantially.77

John Stoessinger

has contended that “if the impact of oil prices on the Western world was dramatic, it was

devastating on the poorer nations. In 1976, for example, when OPEC quadrupled oil

prices, the increase in the bill for the developing countries more than cancelled out the

foreign aid they were receiving.”78

The developing world in general and the weak,

predominantly primary-product centred and external trade-dependent African economies

in particular were the hardest-hit by the rapid sequence of energy related shocks of the

1970s.79

First, industrial production in the North was dependent on the cheap supply of

petroleum energy that was, until the OPEC cartel action, a monopoly of Western

controlled multinational oil corporations. The energy crunch forced a contraction in the

industries of the North because of the unprecedented increases in the cost of energy.

Moreover, African countries were specialised in a narrow range of primary products that

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had little or no elasticity of supply. They could not, therefore, adjust their supplies in the

face of the decline in demand.

Meanwhile, as a result of the increases in the cost of production in the North, the

prices of manufactured goods that were in high demand for development projects in the

South more than quadrupled. Lacking the foreign exchange to pay for the much-needed

manufactures, the South embarked on heavy borrowing, marking the beginning of the

debt crisis. The Third World debt crisis originated partly from the first OPEC oil shocks

of 1973. The oil price hikes created a situation wherein, suddenly, the oil-rich nations

earned billions of dollars – while on the other hand poor oil importing nations were made

to suffer.80

The extreme vulnerability of the developing countries to the oil crunch of

the1970s underscored the implications of their dependent relationship with the North. It

equally led to the intensification of calls for a new international economic order and

eventually led to the formulation of alternative development initiatives, which for African

countries was epitomised by the Lagos Plan of Action‟s self-reliance strategy. Although,

the OPEC cartel action had devastating economic effects on the developing world, it had

the positive effect of demonstrating to Third World countriesthat they could acquire

strength in their intercourse with the North, through concerted action.

The dramatic success of OPEC between 1973 and 1979 has been described as a

seismic event in world affairs that directly affected virtually all dimensions of

international politics. Most Third World countries took great pleasure in seeing the non-

western oil-producing states of OPEC wrest control over the international oilmarket from

northern industrialised states and their multinationals. It ended the developed world‟s

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previous domination of virtually every important dimension of international economic

exchange.81

The NIEO Campaign and the LPA Design

The issue of a development strategy for the Third World in general and Africa in

particular has been complex and ambiguous. The debate over a development paradigm

for the developing world has revolved around the question of whether development

should be conceived in accordance with the demands of the prevailing international

order, or conversely, whether it is necessarily in conflict with it. The question has always

been, as Samir Amin puts it, “can the international order be transformed and adjusted to

the priority demands for Third World development, or conversely, can the latter only be

the result of the reverse adjustment?”82

Against the backdrop of the perception that the post-WWII international

economic order was both unjust and biased against the developing countries of the

South,83

and in light of the multiple crises that emerged within the system in the1970s,

the developing countries concluded that only a transformation of the world order, to

incorporate their priority needs could engender genuine development. They conceived

what became, perhaps, the most widely publicised plan for bridging the gap between the

North and the South – the project for a new international economic order (NIEO).84

A detailed analysis of the NIEO Campaign is not intended here. Rather, this study

limits itself to an overview of the substance and content of the calls for a NIEO and an

appraisal of how the limited outcomes of the NIEO negotiations prompted African states

to adopt the alternative policy of partial disengagement embodied in the Lagos Plan of

Action.The cleavage between periphery and centre states in the global economy was

formalised in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) by

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a group system, in which 120 poor states (originally 77) adhered to a united position in

making concrete proposals for the complete reform of international economic relations

between the rich and poor states.85

During the 1970s common LDCs proposals for international economic reforms

(first made explicit and given coherence by the UNCTAD) evolved to comprise a set of

formal demands for a new international economic order.86

During much of the 1970s, the

NIEO provided the agenda for North-South dialogue, that was however, displaced in the

1980s by an ascendancy of bilateralism championed particularly by the IMF and the

World Bank. In substance, the NIEO was the aggregated demands for economic reforms

of interest to the LDCs. The demands were intended to bring about increased resource

transfers from rich to poor states on improved terms and in a manner that could facilitate

the initiation and implementation of development policies in the South.87

The issues tabled for negotiation by the LDCs included:

The implementation of the UNCTAD‟s Integrated Programme forCommodities,

alongside the establishment of the Common Fund as itscentrepiece;

The liberalisation and extension of the Generalised System of Preferences forLDCs

exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods;

Increase in LDCs‟ share of the world industrial output to 25% by the year2000;

The establishment of a link between the creation of new special drawing rightsin the

IMF and development assistance;

Increased stabilisation of international reserves and exchange rates bymovement

away from the dollar as the linchpin of the international monetary system;

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Increased access to IMF and commercial loans with lower interest rates,longer

payment periods and lesser conditionalities;

A comprehensive international approach to the management of debtconfronting the

LDCs;

Conformity of advanced industrialised states with the target of 0.7% of GNPin

official development assistance to LDCs;

Enhancement of science and technology;

International regulation of multinational corporations;

The development of enhanced research and development capacity within LDCs.88

These demands were informed by the conviction that the Northern dominated

global economy had produced an uneven distribution of income and influence at the

expense of the South. The resource transfer that was sought in the NIEO was, in the view

of the Third World, to eliminate the international sources of their economic and political

weakness. Besides the call for resource transfers, the NIEO also focused on the

establishment of new principles to guide international economic relations.

Understandably, the NIEO was as much a demand for alteration in standards of conduct

and norms governing economic relations as a demand for resource transfers.89

Although, the NIEO campaign hardly matched the drama of OPEC confrontations

with the advanced industrial states and the oil multinationals, it nevertheless constituted

an organised effort that attempted to completely transform the North‟s established and

dominated post-war economic order.The seriousness of this challenge was indicative of

the relative power position of the South in the 1970s.

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Because the major post-WWII international economic institutions were

established when most Third World countries had not yet attained independence, these

states, to enhance their position and voting power in multilateral economic decision

making, pressed for: 1) the expansion of the membership of existing organsof the UNO

family of institutions; 2) taking negotiations of economic importance from forums

excluding LDCs into institutions where they were represented, and 3) creating entirely

new international economic institutions to champion developing countries‟ interests (such

as UNCTAD, UNIDO, and the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations).90

Overall, the developing countries‟ strategy consisted of “attempting to

subordinate multilateral decision-making on economic matters in the IMF, IBRD, GATT,

and elsewhere to the authority and supervision of organs in the United Nations, where

less developed countries enjoyed a voting majority.”91

Less developed countries pressed

hard to legitimise the new principles uponwhich they hoped a new world economic order

had to be built through the passage of a number of U.N resolutions.92

Most of these

resolutions pushed through the UN General Assembly tended to enhance the sovereignty

of LDCs, and were structured to alter long-standing principles of international law

regarding rights of foreign investors, and replacing the market mechanisms with

commodity agreements or commodity cartels in international commerce for raw

materials.93

However, the principles advanced by the LDCs and the strategies they adopted for

their actualisation became a bone of contention between the states of the North and those

of the South. While the South saw the principles enshrined in the NIEO campaign as

seeking to establish a just and equitable global order, the North interpreted them as an

118

attempt for a wholesale redistribution of resources and political-economic power in the

international system from advanced industrialized states of the North to countries of the

Third World.

The North was therefore, opposed to the massive restructuring of international

economic institutions and the norms of behaviour they embodied as called for by the

NIEO campaign.The furthest they were willing to go was to agree to highly specific,

selective reforms in international trade, financial, or investment relations that took into

account particular economic needs of LDCs and over which most Northern states were in

agreement. They essentially isolated and “domesticated” a few of the most palatable

demands for a new international economic order on which they were willing to

negotiate.94

And by 1979; it had become evident that the bid by the Third World for a NIEO

was a failure. And as Adebayo Adedeji puts it:

In spite of the 6th and 7th Special Sessions of the UN

General Assembly, in spite of the UNCTAD IV and V, we

are no nearer to establishing a NIEO now than we were in

1974…one is not been alarmist if one says that between

1974 and now {1979} the international situation has gone

from bad to worse.95

Although, the demands of the less developed countries for a far-reaching reform of

the international economic system were not met in any comprehensive fashion, the

continued emphasis in the NIEO performed an important agenda-setting function for less

developed countries. “It proved the means by which Third World countries placed their

political-economic priorities alongside Cold War issues and intra-western economic

concerns in international diplomacy.”96

It removed Third World countries from the

position of mere objects of world politics, to that of non-negligible actors.

119

More importantly, the NIEO demands provided legitimacy and greater coherence

in less developed countries regional and national foreign economic policy making.

Indeed, it brought about increased multilateral economic cooperation among Third World

states and emboldened unilateral bargaining by LDCs with foreign firms, public and

private financial institutions, and advanced industrial states. It is within this context that

the impact of the NIEO calls on Africa‟s development options can be evaluated.

Although, some African technocrats and scholars have argued that the issues raised in the

NIEO negotiations were of no direct relevance to Africa‟s development challenges.97

The

study contends that they played a very important role in the formulation of Africa‟s self-

reliant development strategy contained in the LPA.

First, Africa‟s peculiar situation in the global economy as the most economically

backward region and the least prepared of all Third World regions for the NIEO

invariably implied thatif it were to benefit from the negotiations for a new international

economic order, then it had to be well organised as a group, to be able to articulate and

project its specific needs and interests within the broader NIEO framework.98

Therefore,

the need for concerted action for meaningful and fruitful participation in the NIEO

negotiations induced greater cooperation amongst African states that eventually evolved

to the inward-looking, collective-self-reliance development strategy contained in the

LPA.

Moreover, the failure of the NIEO negotiations clearly demonstrated to African

countries that as the least developed region in the world, the continuation of the

traditional patterns of economic cooperation and dependent relationship (trade and aid)

with the prosperous industrialised states of the North was not going to help them become

120

economically prosperous. To secure Africa‟s long-term interests and to achieve the goal

of economic independence, which could make their political independence more

meaningful, African statesmen, leaned on the failure of the NIEO campaign, to strive to

put the ownership, control and management of their national economies in their own

hands and in the hands of their citizens. The most concrete manifestation of this new

African resolve was the self-reliant and self-sustenance agenda defined in the LPA.

Implementation of the LPA

The LPA which was adopted in 1980 to ensure self-reliant and self-sustaining

development among other objectives especially by increasing food production, food

security and reducing food losses through the improvement of agriculture and by so

doing, industries can be developed; could not be achieved. The LPA document explicitly

stated that it will be funded from the internally generated resources and that external

resources and aid would only be complementary.

Unfortunately, the LPA relied on external funding for its implementation, which

were not forthcoming as the external donors especially the World Bank had already

expressed its dissatisfaction with the provisions of the economic blueprint through an

assessment report prepared by a team led by Professor Elliot Berg. The report accused the

LPA document of assigning so much role to the state, particularly, in the provisions of

social and essential services and recommended removal of subsidy and less role to the

state. Though, many African countries still went ahead to implement the provisions of the

economic blueprint.

Many African countries embarked on national policies to improve agriculture and

food production to achieve food security and industrialization as observed above, but

121

instead of this, there was growing dependence on food imports which was accompanied

by increase in agricultural production of non-food crops for export, instead semi-finished

or finished products.

Specifically, in Burkina Faso, during the 1960s and part of the 1970s, cotton

production was roughly 2000 tons a year; by 1984 it was 75, 000 tons. Even Chad, with

all of its difficulties had a record high of cotton harvest in 1984. Kenya, while promoting

its agricultural policy encouraged large scale of production of coffee between 1982-1986.

Lesotho continued on its land tenure policy which led to inefficient land utilization and

lack of improvement largely for the agricultural sector.99

The Green Revolution was a major agriculture policy in Nigeria. It was

introduced in 1980 and was intended as a programme to ensure self-sufficiency in food

production and to introduce modern technology into the Nigerian agricultural sector

largely through the introduction of seeds which included rice production, fertilizers and

tractors. It encompassed a wide range of projects supportive to the nation‟s agricultural

development; this included 11 River Basin Development Authorities, Ministry of Water

Resources, National Food Production Programme and the Agro-service Centres, even the

distribution of fertilisers was part of the efforts to develop agriculture.100

Ghana introduced Economy Recovery and Agriculture Sector Rehabilitation

Programme, the goal was to enhance the Ministry of Food and Agriculture‟s capacity to

provide effective policy and institutional support for rehabilitation and recovery of

agricultural production and productivity covering crop and fishery, and thereby

contribute to overall economic growth and improvement in living conditions.101

122

In Tanzania, agriculture performed relatively well in the 1980s especially in crops

like pulses, starches, oil seeds and cereals, while export crops like coffee, cotton and tea

performed poorly reflecting unfavorable terms of trade.102

Algeria consolidated its

agricultural policy of „collective estate farms and producer cooperatives‟ which built on

the production of cereal crops and livestock. Though, like many other African countries it

was characterized by failure.103

Cameroon in the 1980s embarked on agricultural reforms

which led to the increase in the production of cash crops like cocoa, coffee and cotton

among others, instead of food crops.104

In a nutshell, there was bias in favour of cash crops to generate foreign exchange

in many parts of Africa from 1980 onwards. This became significant across the continent

after the adoption of the LPA. The strategy of export-led growth was seen by most

African leaders and their foreign advisors as the route to industrialisation and requiring

cheap food supplies and in turn the subsidisation of food prices yet, while these policy

deficiencies (i.e. inappropriate domestic policies), were increasingly recognised, it must

be acknowledged that African countries have been victimised by external forces too,

especially the introduction of SAP which eclipsed the enthusiasm towards the LPA and to

overlook its prescriptions. Unfortunately, the LPA had no binding force on the member

states. Thus, not only was the effective impact on member countries difficult to assess,

but more importantly, it was difficult to compel member states to observe fundamental

commitments made in treaties and conventions105

considering the character of regimes in

Africa.

Prominent among the policies that were imposed on Africa and adopted by

countries in the 1980s were privatisation, liberalisation and fiscal austerity. There were

123

domestic policy shortcomings in terms of patterns of production and expenditure,

specifically between 1979-1981, the prices of some African leading export commodities

such as coffee, copper, cocoa, groundnuts, tobacco, cotton, rubber, tea and oil

experienced sharp declines experiencing loss of revenue. There was also increasing

external indebtness. Since, the adoption of the LPA, the main preoccupation of African

countries was crisis management for economic revival.

In fact, as observed by Adebayo Adedeji, Africa experienced severe and

widespread drought in 1984-1985 which affected as much as 34 African countries in all

sub regions of the continent and resulted in dramatic food scarcity, depletion of livestock

and water shortages e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Cameroon, Central African Republic,

Algeria, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra

Leone, Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda among others. Indeed, between 1980 and 1990,

Africa‟s growth rate was -2.5 percent with the population growing at 4.5 percent. In fact,

the 1980s was regarded as Africa‟s lost decade because the LPA could not achieve its

stated objectives.106

Conclusion

Certainly, among the various initiatives to emerge in the „80s and „90s, the Lagos Plan of

Action for the Economic Development of Africa (drafted in April 1980 and adopted by

the Organization of African Unity in December 1980), deserves a particular attention.

Inspired by strong protectionism, its thesis had oriented the economical politics of many

African States and, although sometimes causing distortions, it was still perceived at the

beginning of the 1980s as a panacea. Unfortunately, collective self–reliance, and the

protection of the rising industry, has not given space for the development of a real

124

economic growth; the imposition of high taxes resulted only in the creation of inefficient

productive systems not stimulating to extraneous competition; a controlled economy yet

again has determined the bad allocation and waste of resources.107

In order to consider concrete measures for the implementation of the Monrovia

Declaration (July, 1979), the Lagos Plan of Action with the conviction that:

“Africa‟s underdevelopment is not inevitable”, established

that “Africa‟s huge resources must be applied principally to

meet the needs and purposes of its people”(….) “Africa‟s

almost total reliance on the export of raw materials must

change”(…) “Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-

reliance.108

This is not to say that the continent should

totally cut itself off from outside contributions. However,

these outside contributions should only supplement our

own effort: they should not be the mainstay of our

development.”109

The Lagos Plan set itself the target of strong growth (7% a year), based on

agricultural change (4% annual growth) and subsequent industrialization (9.5% annual

growth).110

The plan‟s tone was extreme and strongly anti-western. Its inevitable failure

was due to the launching of a strong industry, while omitting (not only through words) an

indispensable “agriculture revolution”, targeting an improvement in the food situation. Its

point of force relied in the idea that Africa‟s development could not be merely a passive

result of the world system, the weaknesses of the plan was in the individualisation of the

means of implementation, mostly perceived as the acquisition of irrational overlapping of

western elements.

International financial institutions such as World Bank and International

Monetary Fund, responded to the decadence driven by the precepts of the Lagos Plan of

Action by sustaining alternative choices based on privatisation, liberalisation and fiscal

austerity. However, such political choices “became ends in themselves, rather than means

125

to more equitable and sustainable growth,” as acknowledged by J. Stiglitz in the year

2000.111

126

Endnotes

1. R.M. D'Sa, “The Lagos Plan of Action-Legal Mechanisms for Co-operation between

the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations Economic Commission for

Africa,” Journal of African Law 27, no. 1(Spring, 1983): 4.

2. OAU, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000

(Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1981), 9.

3. D'Sa, “The Lagos Plan of Action-Legal Mechanisms for Co-operation between the

Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations Economic Commission for

Africa,” 5-21.

4. W. Zartman, “The Future of Regionalism in Africa,” in Africa Contemporary Record,

ed. Colin Legum, 23, 1990 – 1992 (New York and London: African Publishing

Company, 1992), 13; O. Ojo et al, African International Relations, 2nd

edition

(London, New York and Lagos: Longman, 1987), 23.

5. S.K.B. Asante, Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality, and

Challenges (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997),39.

6. A. Adedeji, “From Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African

Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither

Africa?” Keynote address presented at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa,

Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April (2002), 3.

7. OAU, Lagos Plan of Action, 17.

8. Ibid., 99.

9. R. Browne and R. Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report (Lawrenceville:

Brunswick Publication Company, 1985), 35.

10. S. Amin, “Africa: From the Lagos Plan (1980) to the World Bank Plan and the

UnitedNations Conference (1980),” in Maldevelopment – Anatomy of Global Failure,

ed. Samir Amin (Tokyo, London and New Jersey: The UN University Press and Zed

Books, 1990), 1.

11. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report, 23.

12. Adedeji, “From Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African

Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither

Africa?” 4.

13. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report,151.

127

14. T.M. Shaw, “The African Crises: Debates and Dialects over Alternative Development

Strategies for the Continent,” in Africa in Economic Crisis, ed. J. Ranvenhill

(London: Macmillan, 1986), 108.

15. J.G. Senghor, Towards a Dynamic African Economy: Selected Speeches and Lectures

by Adebayo Adedeji, 1975 – 1986 (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1989), 344.

16. Adedeji, “From Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African

Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither

Africa?,” 5.

17. Ibid., 6.

18. Senghor, Towards a Dynamic African Economy,344.

19. Ibid., 345.

20. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report, 25.

21. T. Dos-Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” American Economic Review, no. 60

(1970): 231-236.

22. T. Mkandawire, “African State Responses to Economic Cycles and Economic Crises:

A Preliminary Note,” African Studies Association (Washington D.C.: November

1982): 45.

23. Adedeji, “From Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African

Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither

Africa?,” 5.

24. U.N General Assembly Resolution 3101 (S.vi) and 3202 (S.vi) of May 1974 cited in

Senghor, Towards a Dynamic, 309.

25. Adedeji, “From Lagos Plan of Action”, 7.

26. Ibid., 8;

27. A. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan ofAction: A

Regional Approach to Economic Decolonisation,” Lecture delivered under the

Distinguished Lecture Series of the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic

Research (NISER), University of Ibadan, 23 March 1983, 328-331.

28. Ibid., 332.

128

29. Adedeji, “From Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African

Development and From the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither

Africa?,” 7.

30. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan ofAction,”

328-331.

31. Ibid., 331.

32. Ibid., 331-332.

33. Ibid., 332.

34. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report, 150.

35. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action,”

332.

36. Ibid., 333.

37. P. A. Nyong‟o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD: The Dilemma of

Progress in Independent Africa,” Paper presented at the African Academy of

Sciences, Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April, (2002),1.

38. Adedeji, “The Evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action,”

332.

39. Ibid., 333.

40. A. Adedeji, “The Lagos Plan of Action: Main Features and Some other Related

Issues,”International Conference on „OAU, ECA, the Lagos Plan of Action and the

Future of Africa‟ (Ile Ife Nigeria: University of Ife, 26 March 1984): 1-2.

41. Ibid., 5.

42. OAU, LPA, Chapter 5; Browne and Cummings, The Lagos Plan, 82-83.

43. Ibid., 85.

44. UNIDO, “The Implications of Raising Africa‟s Share in the World Industrial

Production by the year 2000,” CMK.3/INR/TP/3 (UNIDO, 1979).

45. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report, 83-84.

46. OAU, LPA, Chapter 11.

129

47. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report, 83-84, 84.

48. Ibid., 85.

49. Ibid., 85

50. Ibid., 84-86; OAU, LPA, Chapter 11.

51. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report, 28.

52. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report, 85.

53. OAU, LPA, Preamble Paragraph 14 (VI).

54. Brown and Cummings, The Lagos Plan vs the Berg Report, 83-84, 28.

55. Adedeji, “The Lagos Plan of Action: Main Features and Some other Related

Issues,”4-5.

56. OAU, LPA, Preamble Paragraph 14 (ii).

57. Ibid., Paragraphs 250 and 251.

58. Ibid., Paragraph 250 (ia).

59. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 250 (iii).

60. Ibid., Paragraph 250 (iv).

61. Ibid., Paragraph 251.

62. Ibid., Paragraph 251(b).

63. Ibid., Paragraph 251(c).

64. Ibid., Paragraph 251(d).

65. Ibid., Paragraph 251(f).

66. Ibid., Paragraph 252.

67. Ibid., Paragraph 253 (a-b).

68. Ibid., Paragraph 254.

130

69. Adedeji, “The Lagos Plan of Action: Main Features and Some other Related Issues,”

5.

70. Ibid., 6.

71. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 252 (a, b, c).

72. Ibid.,Paragraph X.

73. S. Amin, “Africa: From the Lagos Plan (1980) to the World Bank Plan and theUnited

Nations Conference (1980),” in Maldevelopment – Anatomyof Global Failure, the

United Nations University/Third World Forum, ed. Samir Amin(Tokyo, Londonand

New Jersey: The UN University Press and Zed Books, 1990), 89.

74. J. Ravenhill, “Africa‟s Continuing Crises: The Elusiveness of Development,” in

Africa in Economic Crisis, ed.JohnRavenhill (Basinstoke, Hampshire and England:

Macmillan, 1986), 35.

75. OAU, LPA, 8.

76. Ibid., 9.

77. R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (New Jersey, Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1987), 106.

78. J. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations: World Politics in our Time, 9th

Edition (New

York and London: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), 33.

79. T. M. Callaghy, “Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Foreign Economic Relations of

Sub-Saharan African States,” in African Dilemmas of Development and Change,

ed.Peter Lewis (Boulder: West View, 1998), 383.

80. J. Nyerere, “The Debt Bomb,” Time, January 10, 1983, 46.

81. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, 220.

82. Amin, “Africa: From the LPA,” 3

83. J. A. Hart, The New International Economic Order: Conflict and Cooperation in

North-South Economic Relations, 1974 – 1977 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire

and London: Macmillan Press, 1985), 3.

84. W. A. Lewis, TheEvolution of the International Economic Order (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1977), 3.

131

85. United Nations, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics (New

York: United Nations, 1984), 54.

86. S. R. Walters and D. H. Blake, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, 4th

edition

(New Jersey: Princetice-Hall Inc., 1992), 217.

87. Ibid., 218.

88. Ibid., 218.

89. Ibid., 218-219.

90. Ibid., 220.

91. Ibid., 219.

92. United Nations,“The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New

International Economic Order,” UN Monthly Chronicle 11 No. 5.

93. Walters and Blake, The Politics of Global, 59.

94. Ibid., 221.

95. Adedeji, “The Lagos Plan of Action,” 2.

96. Walters and Blake, The Politics of Global, 221.

97. Adedeji, “The Lagos Plan of Action,” 3.

98. Adedeji, “The Lagos Plan of Action,” 4.

99. M. Lundahl, Economic Crisis in Africa: Perspectives on Policy Responses (New

York: Routledge, 1993), 118.

100. J. V. Waterworth, “Green Revolution Methodology in Nigeria,” Experimental

Agriculture, no. 1, 16, Cambridge University Press (1980): 2-5.

101. G. B. Ayittey, Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa‟s Future (Palgrave:

Macmillan, 2005), 3-5.

102. J. Crees, “Changing Agricultural Policy in Tanzania,” in Animal Power for Weed

Control, ed. P. Starky and T. Simalenga (Wageningen: CTA, 2000), 172.

103. K. Laoubi and M. Yamao, “The Challenge of Agriculture in Algeria: Are Policies

Effective?,” Journal of International Affairs, 3, no. 12 (2012): 3.

132

104. M. Tina, “Agriculture Policy in Cameroon,” Official Blog, Centre for African

Affairs and Global Peace (January, 2012): 2.

105. Lundahl, Economic Crisis in Africa, 119.

106. Ibid., 120.

107. M. E. Gattamorta, “The Evolution of Development Strategies for Africa: From the

Lagos Plan of Action to the Report of the Commission for Africa,”CEMISS

Quarterly, (Spring, 2005): 81.

108. OAU, LPA, Article 5.

109. OAU, LPA, Article 14.

110. OAU, LPA, Article 66 (a).

111. A. Baah, “History of African Development Initiatives,” Paper presented at the

African Labour Research Network Workshop, Johannesburg, South Africa, 22-23,

May (2003), 7.

133

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)

(THE ABUJA TREATY, 1991-2000)

Introduction

The inability of the Lagos Plan of Action to promote Africa‟s economic revival in the

1980s, led to the articulation of a new framework for Africa‟s economic development by

African leaders in 1991. This was the African Economic Community (also called the

Abuja Treaty). This chapter examines the adoption and the promulgation of the African

Economic Community (AEC) in 1991which could justifiably be considered as the first

concrete step towards meeting the challenges of underdevelopment and poverty in the

1990s and also seen as a drive towards charting a new path based upon the collective

wisdom and the collective strength of Africa.

Background to the Conception of the AEC

The formation of the AEC in 1991 heralded a new historical mark of African integration

efforts. The AEC was established by the Abuja Treaty at an OAU summit in June 1991,

but only entered into force on 12 May 1994 after the required numbers signed up for

ratification. In 1980, in fact, when the OAU Extraordinary Summit adopted the Lagos

Plan of Action, the LPA attempted to develop itself a major step towards the goal of

African integration. The AEC Treaty otherwise known as the Abuja Treaty provided for

the African Economic Community to be set up through a gradual process, which would

be achieved by coordination, harmonisation and progressive integration of the activities

of existing and future regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa.

The ultimate objective of the LPA was to establish a continent-wide economic

134

community.1

This, however, was to be contingent on the level of progress of integration

at the sub-regional and regional levels. In the light of the poor performance of the LPA

inspired RECs, the signing of the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic

Community (AEC) had been controversial. Fine and Yeo have summarised this

perception in the following words: the fact that African leaders, first in the Lagos Plan of

Action (LPA) of 1980 and then in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, have elected to pursue the

quixotic goal of an African Common Market – in spite of their continual failure to begin

removing even the modest impediments to the flow of goods and services within the

region – would suggest that their agenda is driven by political rather than economic

considerations and by domestic rather than regional pressures.2

However, proponents of the Abuja Treaty have hailed it as providing a continental

framework, with the potential of rationalising the continent‟s integration institutions and

organs.3

It has been described as a giant step towards Africa‟s long-cherished goal of

unifying the fragmented and vulnerable national economies into a single, more powerful

economic bloc with a view to translating into reality the dream of pan-Africanism and

continental integration. Although, the Abuja Treaty has been showcased as the

culmination of a long process of efforts at continental consolidation, beginning with the

OAU charter in 1963, through various OAU summits to the LPA however, concerns

about the risks of the further weakening and marginalisation of Africa in the global

economy against the background of the resurgence of regionalism in the 1990s,

constituted the most immediate impulse for the signing of the Treaty.4

Long before the establishment of the OAU, African leaders had recognised that

cooperation and integration among African countries in the economic, social and cultural

135

fields are indispensable to the accelerated transformation and sustained development of

the African continent. This was concretised in 1963 in the objectives of the OAU Charter,

as well as in the OAU Summits of 1973 and 1976, and the Monrovia Declaration of

1979. In 1980 the OAU Extraordinary Summit adopted the Lagos Plan of Action, as a

major step towards that goal. During that Summit, the African leaders stated their

commitment, individually and collectively, to promote the economic integration of

Africa, in order to facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse. They also

committed themselves to promote the economic and social development and integration

of their economies and, to that end, to establish national, regional and sub-regional

institutions leading to a dynamic and interdependent African economy, thus paving the

way for the eventual establishment of the African Economic Community.

The commitments in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos were

translated into concrete form, in Abuja, Nigeria, in June 1991 when the OAU Heads of

State and Government signed the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.

The AEC Treaty has been in operation since May 1994 when the required number of

instruments of ratification for its coming into force was deposited with the Secretary

General of the OAU/AEC.

At the regional and sub-regional levels, African countries have embarked on

various programmes for the promotion of integration, and have established organisations

and institutions to support their effort. So far, the AEC has established direct working

relations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West

African region, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the

Central region, and in the East and Southern regions, the Common Market for East and

136

Southern Africa (COMESA). In the Southern Region the AEC has been dealing with the

Southern African Development Community (SADC).

In North Africa, there is the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) which has no direct

contact with the AEC, so far. Apart from these Regional Economic Communities (RECs),

there are other groupings like the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa

(UEMOA) and the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), all of

which are engaged in the promotion of integration. All these organisations were already

in existence and operating when the AEC Treaty was signed in Abuja in June 1991.

The major characteristics of the African Economic Community compared to

similar communities is that it is being established in six stages, according to the provision

of the Abuja Treaty (Articles 6 and 88), mainly activities of the RECs. This makes the

AEC different from other integration organsations. In fact the Abuja Treaty makes it clear

that the establishment of the AEC is the final objectives towards which the activities of

all the RECs (existing and future) shall be geared (Article 88).

In recognition of this fact, the Abuja Treaty has set up the modalities for

establishing the AEC; they consist of six stages of variable duration over a transition

period not exceeding thirty four (34) years, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

Each of the stages consists of specific activities to be implemented concurrently.5

The AEC founded through the Abuja Treaty, signed in 1991 and entered into force

in 1994 is envisioned to be created in six stages:

1. (to be completed in 1999) Creation of regional blocs in regions where such do not

yet exist.

2. (to be completed in 2007) Strengthening of intra-REC integration and inter-REC

137

harmonisation.

3. (to be completed in 2017) Establishing of a free trade area and customs union in

each regional bloc.

4. (to be completed in 2019) Establishing of a continent-wide customs union (and

thus also a free trade area).

5. (to be completed in 2023) Establishing of a continent-wide African Common

Market (ACM).

6. (to be completed in 2028) Establishing of a continent-wide economic and

monetary union (and thus also a currency union) and Parliament.

End of all transition periods: 2034 at the latest.

Summary of all the Stages

First Stage (Five years)

Strengthening of existing RECs and establishing new ones in regions where they do not

exist.

Second Stage (Eight years)

(i) At the level of each REC, establishing tariff and non-tariff barriers, customs duties

and internal taxes at the May 1994 level, and determination of the time table for the

gradual liberalisation of regional and intra-community trade, and for the harmonisation

of customs duties vis-a-vis third states;

(ii) Strengthening of sectoral integration, particularly in the fields of trade, agriculture,

money and finance, transport and communications, industry and energy; and

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(iii) Coordination and harmonisation of the activities of RECs.

Third Stage (Ten years)

At the level of each REC, the establishment of Free Trade Area and a Customs Union.

Fourth Stage (Two years)

Coordination and Harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff barriers among various RECs

with a view to establishing a Continental Customs Union.

Fifth Stage (Four years)

Establishment of an African Common Market (ACM).

Sixth Stage (Five years)

Consolidation and strengthening of the structures of the ACM, including free movement

of peoples and factors of production; creation of a single domestic market and Pan

African Economic and Monetary Union, African Central Bank and African Currency;

Establishment of a Pan African Parliament.

Despite the above six stages, the Abuja Treaty states that the cumulative

transitional period shall not exceed forty years from the date of its entry into force. It

also provides for measures to be taken concurrently, with regard to the formulation of

multinational projects and programmes for the promotion of a harmonious and balanced

development among Member States. However, the stages are not inflexible; the process

can be expedited with regular verification of completion of the stages.

Objectives of the Community

The African Economic Treaty establishing the African Economic Community was

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adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) heads of State Meeting in Abuja,

Nigeria, on June 3, 1991. The adoption of the treaty must be seen as vital for Africa‟s

economic survival, faced as the continent is by growing marginalization in the world.

The objectives of the Community, as set out in article 4 of the Treaty, are as follows:

(a) to promote economic, social, and cultural development and the integration of African

economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and an indigenous and self-

sustained development;

(b) to establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the development, mobilization

and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve a self-

reliant development;

(c) to promote cooperation in all fields of human endeavor in order to raise the standard

of living of African peoples and maintain and enhance economic stability, foster close

and peaceful relations among member States and contribute to the progress, development

and the economic integration of the continent; and

(d) to coordinate and harmonize policies among existing economic communities in order

to foster the gradual establishment of the Community.

The community, as can be seen from the goals it seeks to achieve, is not simply a

trading arrangement or a mechanism for promoting cooperation in production based on

the creation of a common market. In addition to integration of national markets and

cooperation in production, the States joining the Community undertake to cooperate with

each other in certain functional areas as well as in others, e.g. social, political, financial

and monetary matters. Economic integration makes good economic sense.

If successful it will lead to a bigger market for both primary and finished

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products. It will help the continent meet international competition more effectively,

particularly now that there is a re-orientation of world trade and capital flows to the

eastern European countries, leaving Africa in the cold. It could lead to faster development

and more jobs. Integration would also allow Africa to focus on the promotion of a higher

degree of economic cooperation at all levels with particular emphasis on joint

development of primary commodities through rationalisation of investments in

commodity production and managing suppliers at the national and regional levels.

Organs of the Community

The Community has the following organs:

a. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government;

b. The Council of Ministers;

c. The Pan-African Parliament;

d. The Economic and Social Commission;

e. The Court of Justice;

f. The General Secretariat; and

g. The Specialised Technical Committees (seven in number as follows):

h. The Committee on Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters;

i. The Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs;

j. The Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters;

k. The Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources

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and Environment;

l. The Committee on Transport, Communications and Tourism;

m. The Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs;

n. The Committee on Education, Culture and Human Resources.

The Treaty has different chapters and articles covering various issues in all the above

social and economic sectors, and the operating modalities of its organs as well. In

addition, there are provisions on the legal aspects of the Treaty as well as on the function

of the high officials of the Secretariat.6

The AEC and Its Provisions

The Abuja Treaty marked the beginning of a shift in the orientation of and approach to

Africa‟s regional integration and cooperation. This was reflected in the character of post-

Abuja regional initiatives, which were based on the precepts of economic openness and

market efficiency. These initiatives embraced different principles “for achieving

progressive economic cohesion than their fate-driven predecessors which were based on

protectionist, closed economy policies of the kind which typically pervaded development

thinking in Africa, for more than three decades.”7

In this regard, the signing of the Abuja Treaty, rather than being the culmination

of the LPA inward-looking regionalism, could be seen as marking the beginning of the

capitulation of African governments to the ethos of the liberal paradigm. Not only did the

Abuja-inspired regional groupings reflect respect for and observance of certain

fundamental principles and basic undertakings, they equally shifted the exclusive focus

on government, to involving the people, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the

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civil society and the private sector.8

This shift from states to markets, influenced by externally imposed structural

adjustment programmes (SAPS), has aimed at revamping the African development model

since 1985. This shift has resulted in what Percy Mistry has seen as “second generation”

integration attempts, gathering steam since 1992, certainly under the behest of the Abuja

Treaty. In principle, this new approach abandoned the “ossified, static, protected-fortress

approach” to integration among closed, state-run economies. It has been seen as “a means

of consolidating national economic policy shifts towards greater liberalisation, market

orientation, competitiveness and efficiency.”9

Nevertheless, like the LPA, post Abuja regional integration initiatives have had to

rely on achieving these ambitious objectives at the sub-regional and regional levels,

before attempting to achieve them at the global level, in a world where Africa has yet to

overcome a large number of disadvantages in order to compete.10

Therefore, like the

LPA, regional economic communities are central building blocks of the Abuja Treaty‟s

objective of establishing a pan-African community.11

And although the Abuja treaty was

signed in disregard of the failure of Africa‟s sub-regional communities to achieve their

stated objectives, it is seen to have inspired the reform and transformation of the

continent‟s regional economic groupings, supposedly making them more likely to attain

stated goals.

For example, it led to the transformation of the PTA into the Common Market for

Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994; it also saw the transformation of the

Southern AfricanDevelopment and consultative Council (SADCC) into the Southern

African Development Community (SADC) in 1992; the re-lunching of the activities of

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the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 1998; the revival of the

defunct East African Community (EAC) in 1999; and more importantly, it was one of the

influencial factors coupled with the changing times of that era that brought about the

review of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993.12

The AEC is believed to have inspired „revised treaties‟ of the various regional

communities which are said to be more elaborate, containing measures that could help

overcome the obstacles that bedevilled the implementation of the earlier initiatives and

specific arrangements to enforce treaty agreements.Of particular importance are measures

to harmonise national strategies and policies with those of the region and to refrain from

any unilateral action that could hinder the attainment of the regional objectives.

For example, member states have pledged, in accordance with their respective

constitutional procedures, “to take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment and

dissemination of such legislation as may be necessary for the implementation of the

provisions of the Abuja Treaty.”13

This has been in light of the fact that dissimilarities

and divergences in national laws and policies of member states regulating key areas of

cooperation have been a major legal impediment to economic cooperation.14

In the area of community institutions, the AEC treaty and the reviewed treaties of

RECs seem to have endowed them with greater powers of supranationality than had been

allowed under the LPA dispensation. For example, the Abuja Treaty establishes a

transparent organic link between the supreme institution of the Community and the

member states. In this regard, Article 8(3) of the treaty confers on the Assembly ofHeads

of State and Government, the supreme organ of the Community, power to „give

directives, coordinate and harmonise the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and

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social policies of member states.‟

More importantly, the Abuja Treaty has made the decisions of the Community

binding on member states. For example, the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State,

and the resolutions of the Council of Ministers are binding on member states as well as

the subordinate institutions (Article 10(1) and Article 13(2)). The revised treaties of

Africa‟s major RECs have all adopted this binding character of community decisions on

states from the AEC.15

Besides, unlike the LPA and the earlier regional communities, ECOWAS, PTA

and ECCAS, which have focused attention essentially on market integration, Abuja

primarily adopts a production focused approach or, specifically, collaboration for

expansion and diversification of material production. This approach emphasises

broadening the regional production base and agricultural production in the framework of

a variety of cooperative schemes and arrangements. It is based on the premise that

expansion of mutual trade can take place only if the African countries are able to produce

the desired merchandise in sufficient quantities to meet each other‟s demand.

Therefore, gradual harmonisation of industrial and agricultural policies and joint

industrial and agricultural planning and production are complementary to integration.16

However, Abuja like the LPA and the earlier regional economic integration schemes has

adopted the traditional linear pattern of integration, with the aim of moving the continent

within the space of twenty five years into a customs union, a common market and finally

the African Economic Community.17

Embracing all aspects of African economic and social life, the Abuja Treaty is

said to provide a framework for the re-examination of the roles of the myriad of African

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organisations and institutions, streamlining their activities and mobilising them

purposefully to address the pressing problems of African economic and social

development. Given its all-embracing character and mandate, Abuja even more than the

LPA has faced the great challenge of having to move from talk and prescriptions to

action and to change the assumption that once goals for regional cooperation have been

set, implementation will automatically follow.18

Although, it may sound harsh to qualify the Abuja treaty as a failure, however, its

fate was not different from that of the LPA. Despite its innovativeness, both in terms of

goals, methods and orientation, the Abuja Treaty like the LPA has thus far remained only

a declaration of intent, with minimal concrete achievements. Signed in 1991, the AEC

only became operational in 1994, because of the reluctance of member states to ratify the

treaty. The rationalisation of Africa‟s multiple regional organisations, a central element in

the Abuja Treaty is yet to bear fruits, ten years after the signing of the treaty.

Moreover, the decision to merge the Secretariats of the AEC and the OAU seemed

to have submerged the community and rendered it ineffective. And in 2001, with the

emergence of a new African economic initiative (NEPAD), and the transformation of the

OAU into the African Union, the role and place of the AEC in Africa‟s regional

economic development agenda has become even more obscure.

Relations between the African Economic Community (AEC) and Regional

Economic Communities (RECs)

The Abuja Treaty has accorded special recognition to the critical role of the Regional

Economic Communities in the stages of establishing the African Economic Community.

Accordingly, a Protocol has been concluded on Relations between the AEC and RECs,

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which should serve as an effective instrument and framework for close cooperation,

programme harmonisation and coordination as well as integration among the RECs on

the one hand, and between the AEC and RECs on the other. This Protocol has the major

advantage of enhancing the status and role of the OAU Secretariat which is also the

Secretariat of the AEC, in all matters pertaining to the implementation of the Abuja

Treaty.

In November 1996, the Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC) of the

AEC held its first ministerial session in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, and inter-alia, adopted its

work programme which is designed to accelerate the integration process in the continent.

The AEC Assembly of Heads of State and Government held its inaugural session in

Harare, Zimbabwe on 2 June 1997. This was a momentous occasion in the process of

African economic integration. The session was addressed by the then Chairmen of

ECOWAS, COMESA, ECCAS, IGAD, SADC and UMA, on the progress achieved in

their respective regions in the implementation of the AEC.19

In 2007 and 2008, the African Union (AU) adopted two protocols that are

significant for economic integration in Africa. These are the Protocol on the Relations

between the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities [Protocol on

Relations]20

and the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human

Rights [Protocol on the African Court of Justice].21

The former aims at addressing a

difficult problem with Africa‟s economic integration, which is the existence of multiple

regional economic integration organisations with overlapping memberships, and no clear

principles of co-ordination among them. The latter establishes a court with jurisdiction

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over issues that potentially encompass those arising under the Treaty establishing the

African Economic Community [AEC Treaty].22

The AEC Treaty was the foundation of an attempt to create an economic

community covering the whole of Africa – a continent with 53 sovereign states as at then.

If were successful, the African Economic Community would have been the largest

economic integration organisation (in terms of membership) in the world. The adoption

of the Protocol on Relations and the Protocol on the African Court of Justice provides an

auspicious moment to examine a fundamental question: what is the relationship between

the AU, Africa‟s regional economic Communities (RECs) and the African Economic

Community (AEC)? This is a complex question, which has so far not received any

systematic examination in the discourse on Africa‟s economic integration. 23

Finding

answers to the question and clarifying the relationship are important for the success of

economic integration in Africa.

In 1994, the AEC Treaty entered into force as observed in the section above. The

treaty envisages the creation of an African Economic Community over a period of thirty-

four years using six defined stages of evolution. 24

Rather than start from scratch, the

AEC uses existing RECs as the building blocks of the African Economic Community. 25

In other words, progress by the RECs is progress for the AEC and a step closer to

the African Economic Community. In the words of Article 88(1) of the AEC Treaty, the

African Economic Community „shall be established mainly through the co-ordination,

harmonization and progressive integration of the activities of [RECs].‟26

The RECs are

ultimately to merge or be absorbed to form the African Economic Community. This is a

unique and quite complicated approach to economic integration. Usually, countries form

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economic communities – free trade areas, a customs union, economic unions or complete

economic integration.

Indeed, to date, it appears that the only known case of a successful „merger‟ of

RECs was the merger of the European Community with the European Free Trade Area to

form the European Economic Area.27

A more recent attempt is the Union of South

American Nations28

which is a free trade zone that unites the Common Market of the

Southern Cone and the Andean Community. Remarkably, although the RECs are the

building blocks of the African Economic Community, they are not members of the AEC

or parties to the AEC Treaty.

It is the individual African states that are parties to the AEC Treaty and the

treaties creating the RECs. Indeed, states are often parties to more than one REC. These

raise complex questions. To what extent are the RECs bound by decisions of the AEC?

Since the RECs, which have their own legal personality, are not parties to the AEC

Treaty, what is the legal basis for assuming that they will merge and form the African

Economic Community? Indeed, it is difficult to predict whether the RECs would

willingly merge with the AEC.

One may also query whether the AEC had the will or legitimacy to impose its

vision of an African Economic Community on the RECs.29

If they were to merge and

form the African Economic Community, what will be the legal status of the RECs after

the merger?30

None of these questions is effectively addressed in the Protocol on

Relations. Nor do the founding treaties of the RECs shed any light on these issues. For

example, the Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa31

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envisages the conversion of COMESA into an organic entity of the African Economic

Community.32

This appears to suggest that COMESA does not envision the formation of the

African Economic Community as its demise. However, the treaty provides that the

Authority of Heads of State and Government may, on the recommendation of the Council

of Ministers, terminate the operations of the COMESA.33

This suggests that a legal

mandate exists for bringing COMESA to an end, if that is what will be needed after the

formation of the African Economic Community.

Neither the Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West

African State34

nor the Treaty establishing the East African Community35

contains any

provision directly relevant to their status after the formation of the African Economic

Community. The RECs‟ treaties were drafted after the AEC Treaty. Therefore, one would

have expected that they will address issues of their relations with the AEC and of their

status after the formation of the African Economic Community more comprehensively

and, perhaps, uniformly. As organisations created by treaties, the state parties retain an

inherent right to terminate the treaty36

if that is what will be needed for them to form the

African Economic Community.

As the RECs are progressing further on the stages of integration, the merger issue

should engage the AEC‟s attention. Indeed, I would suggest that negotiating a merger

protocol should start now given the complexity and size of the undertaking. It should

address inter alia issues relating to the following: the post-merger legal status of the

RECs; their assets and liabilities after the merger; whether the merger is compulsory or

voluntary and, if compulsory, how that is going to be enforced; when the merger is to

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occur (simultaneously for all the RECs or incrementally after each reaches the needed

stage of integration); the status of their personnel; and the status of active RECs, such as

the Southern African Customs Union, which have not been recognized as building blocks

of the AEC.

The anticipated merger of the RECs raises other issues. Some, like the EAC, are

at an advanced stage of development. It is difficult to predict whether they would

willingly merge with their less progressive counterparts such as the Inter-Governmental

Authority on Development. It is also arguable whether a merger of the RECs will be

supported by interest groups within the RECs. Public choice theorists characterise

international organisations as bureaucracies that are more responsive to the demands of

organised interest groups including their staff.

As Vaubel noted, „like all bureaucracies, international organizations fight for their

survival and for more powers and resources. Thus, it is more difficult to abolish an

international organization than to establish it or to reduce its powers and resources than to

increase them.‟37

Indeed, already, an appreciable number of staff cases have appeared

before the courts set up by the various RECs, evidence of people trying to protect their

„turf‟.38

The number of staff cases and the tenacity withwhich they appear to have been

pursued lend some credence to Rasul‟s thesis that economic integration has become a job

generating venture for Africa‟s educated elite,39

and raise the prospect of obstructionist

litigation before and during the merger.

Additionally, the RECs are legal systems in their own right. Unlike the AEC,

they are expressly endowed with separate legal personality.40

Accordingly, even before

the merger, there is the need to structure and manage the relations between the AEC and

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the RECs‟ legal systems as well as among the RECs. The Protocol on Relations does not

go far in addressing these complicated relational issues. Effectively and boldly addressing

the problems resulting from multiple memberships and the troubling relational issues

between the AEC and the RECs, and among the RECs, will require legal imagination,

economic thought and strong institutional and political will. There was an urgent need for

the AEC to actively rationalise the relations among the RECs and between the RECs and

itself.41

These issues were were not effectively adderessed from 1991 to 2000 when the

Abuja Treaty was implemented. The AEC thus faced numerous structural challenges. The

2006 AU moratorium on the establishment and recognition of more RECs was an

important first step.42

So far, it has been heeded. I suggest that another important step will

be for the AEC to adopt a protocol founded on a „one country–one community

membership‟ of the eight AU recognised RECs principle. With the help of national

institutions and commissioned experts, countries should be guided to decide based on

predominately economic criteria, which RECs best suit their needs taking into account

the fact that the ultimate realisation of the vision of an African Economic Community

may help address some of their needs. This should not be viewed as an inappropriate

infringement on state sovereignty, but as a measure needed for effectively pooling state

sovereignty for a common good.

Indeed, the legal foundation for such a protocol can be sought in Article 5(1) of

the AEC Treaty. In it, member states undertook to „create favourable conditions for the

development of the Community and the attainment of its objectives, particularly by

harmonising their strategies and policies‟, and to „refrain from any unilateral action that

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may hinder the attainment of the said objectives‟. I argue that the unilateral decision of

AEC member states to be members of multiple RECs creates unfavourable conditions for

the development of the AEC. Admittedly, getting support for and enforcing this protocol

will be difficult. It will be the ultimate test not only of the enforcement powers of the

AEC, but also of member states‟ commitment to the realisation of its vision beyond their

political rhetoric of support.

Non-complying states should be threatened with expulsion and ultimately

expelled from the AEC and all but one of the RECs to which they are members.43

This

study observes that the vision of an African Economic Community should not be founded

on the ideal of all African countries as members. The European Community does not

consist of all states in Europe. The North American Free Trade Agreement covers less

than all countries on the North American continent. And the World Trade Organization

comprises less than all the countries of the world. There is no legitimate reason why an

African Economic Community cannot consist of something less than all of Africa!

For a continent consisting of 53 (now 54 with the emergence of South Sudan in

July 2011) states, a few of them dysfunctional, collapsed or collapsing, and many with

different levels of socio-economic, legal and political development, the pursuit of this

ideal will delay, indeed thwart, the timely realisation of a noble economic vision. Writing

in the context of the collapse of the OAU, Professor Kufuor perceptively observed that

„unrestricted access in the form of virtually no entry requirements led to the tragedy of

the regional commons, the degrading of the OAU as an organization of any value.‟44

Won‟t the stature, integrity and effectiveness of the OAU/AU have been enhanced

if it consisted of say twenty democratic, human rights respecting, socially and

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economically developed states that extend the benefits of the organisation to non-

members on defined conditions? Like Professor Kufuor, it is observed here that Africa‟s

economic integration is being devalued, delayed and diluted due to the fact that countries

are able to sign up at will without strict prior defined and continuous commitments to

implementation.

An African Economic Community that consists of a few African states can extend

through conditioned agreements the benefits of integration to other countries that need

not necessarily be its members.45

The expansion of economic space need not be a

concomitant of the expansion of institutional space. The „one country–one community

membership‟ principle should be combined with the full integration of the RECs into the

legal framework of the AEC by making them members. It is unfortunate that neither the

Protocol of Relations between the African Economic Community and the Regional

Economic Communities, nor the new Protocol of Relations does this.46

For the RECs to

become members of the AEC there should be an amendment to the AEC Treaty.

The AEC Treaty did not have a membership provision or criterion, but assumed all

African states as potential members. By becoming fully signed-up members of the AEC,

the RECs will be bound by all AEC laws, including laws that aim at rationalising and co-

ordinating their activities. They will become subject to AEC enforcement processes and

active and interested participants in its decision making process. This will help in the

elimination or at least minimisation of potential conflict of laws, policies and jurisdiction.

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The African Union (AU) and the AEC

Africans have long aspired to be politically united. The OAU was a first step towards this

goal. However, economic integration and political unification are two distinct ideas.

These two ideas should not be convoluted. They need not be pursued together. Indeed,

the former is definitely achievable without the latter. In my opinion, a principal problem

with economic integration in Africa is the non-realisation of this truth.47

In Africa, there

has been a convolution of these two ideas. This convolution of ideas has led to an

inappropriate structuring and fusion of institutions, which ultimately ill-serve the

objectives of economic integration.

For the AEC, the problem of mixing the economic with the political began when

its founding treaty declared in Article 98(1) that „the Community shall form an integral

part of the Organisation of African Unity.‟48

Article 99 went on to declare that the treaty

and protocols adopted under it shall form an integral part of the OAU Charter. With these

provisions, it appears that the drafters thought it unnecessary to expressly give the AEC a

separate legal personality; accordingly, the treaty is silent on this issue.49

What was meant

by „an integral part‟ was not defined.

But the immediate effect of these provisions was that the institutions or organs of

the OAU were co-opted to perform the functions of the institutions established by the

AEC Treaty. There appears to have been no careful thought as to whether, as then

structured, the OAU institutions suited the needs of economic integration. The

Constitutive Act of the African Union50

did not address this problem. After passing

references to the African Economic Community in the preamble, it simply provided that

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the „Act shall take precedence over and supersede any inconsistent or contrary provisions

of the [AEC Treaty]‟.

Historically and comparatively, it is worth recalling that the Treaty for East

African Co-operation51

which established the East African Community had „as an

integral part of the Community‟52

the East African Common Market. However, unlike

the situation with the AEC, the Treaty for East African Co-operation established at least

two institutions devoted specifically to the common market, namely the Common Market

Council and the Common Market Tribunal.53

More recently, Professor Asante has decried the use of the organs of the OAU

(now the AU) as the basic organs of the AEC.54

These organs are ill-equipped to meet the

challenges of integration. The effect of this fusion of institutions has been the loss of

identity of the AEC. Indeed, as he graphically puts it, the AEC had no „letterhead of its

own‟, it „had, in fact become just a division, albeit an important one, of a continental

political institution‟.55

In his view, which I endorse, „the AEC surely required distinct and

separate institutional arrangements‟.56

The African Court of Justice was, perhaps, the best

example of the inappropriateness of the convolution of institutional roles.

The Court of Justice of the AEC57

was to be an important institution for the

enforcement of AEC law. It was to be independent of all the other community

institutions. Its mandate was to „ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and

application of [the AEC Treaty] and shall decide on disputes submitted thereto pursuant

to [the AEC Treaty].‟58

The detailed law regulating the court was to be set out in a

protocol. But, it appears that this distinct court devoted to economic integration issues

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will never be established. Its functions will now be performed by the African Court of

Justice and Human Rights [African Court of Justice].59

The African Court of Justice consists of sixteen judges who must all be nationals

of states that are parties to the Protocol on the African Court of Justice.60

The subject

matter jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice is broad. In theory, it covers potentially

any international dispute arising between states that are parties to the Protocol of the

African Court of Justice. The jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice, as outlined in

Article 28 of the Statute on the African Court of Justice, is wide enough to cover the AEC

Treaty and any laws adopted by the AEC.

The strength of a court depends not only on its independence and subject matter

but also on its personal jurisdiction. Under Article 29 of the Statute of the African Court

of Justice, the following entities are entitled to submit cases to the court on „any issue or

dispute‟61

provided for in Article 28: states that are parties to the Protocol of the African

Court of Justice; the Assembly; the Parliament and other organs of the AU authorised by

the Assembly; and a staff member of the AU. A state that is not party to the protocol may

not submit a case to the African Court of Justice;62

the court has no jurisdiction to hear a

dispute involving such a party.

Equally, it does not appear that the RECs, the building blocks of the AEC, have

standing before the court. The fact that the court has no jurisdiction over states that are

not parties to the protocol, even though they may be parties to the AEC Treaty, poses a

challenge to judicial enforcement of the treaty. Surely, under traditional international law,

states, as an attribute of their sovereignty, cannot be dragged to an international tribunal

without their consent. But, in the context of regional economic integration,63

this

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jurisdictional gap will not aid the uniform application and enforcement of community law

within member states.

In my opinion, this jurisdictional gap is a reflection of inattention to the

importance of legal issues in integration. A foundation for instability is laid where uneven

obligations, in terms of the enforcement and enforceability of community law, are

imposed on member states. It is difficult to conceive of a stable and effective economic

community where community law is not uniformly applicable within and enforceable

against member states. Indeed, the very essence of integration is defeated; „uniformity in

the meaning of law is part of the constitutional glue that holds the Community

together.‟64

Individuals also have an important role to play in economic integration, not least

in ensuring the implementation of community laws. For example, the COMESA, EAC,

ECOWAS and SADC treaties provide fairly liberal rules on individuals‟ participation in

the communities‟ judicial processes. Indeed, to date, individuals have been responsible

for almost the entire disputes settled by their respective courts.65

The Statute of the

African Court of Justice adopts a radically different approach. Except for human rights

claims, individuals have no standing before the African Court of Justice.

On matters relating to the interpretation, enforcement and validity of AEC laws,

individuals cannot bring an action in the African Court of Justice. A provision in the

earlier Protocol on the Court of Justice of the African Union,66

which allowed individuals

to access the court under conditions determined by the Assembly and with the consent of

the state concerned, has been omitted from the Statute on the African Court of Justice.

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Accordingly, the African Court of Justice resembles the international adjudication regime

category in Schneider‟s typology of dispute settlement systems.67

Such a regime is ill-suited for the level of integration envisaged under the AEC

Treaty, although it may adequately serve the needs of the AU– the political

organisation.68

The absence of locus standi for individuals restricts the number of

potential disputes that may be brought to the African Court of Justice. It makes the

dispute settlement process unavailable to some of the most important players in the

integration process, including consumers, traders, corporate bodies and investors. It fails

to utilise a principal medium through which the community–state relationship is

strengthened in economic integration.

A plausible solution, which is still more restricting compared to the standing rules

of COMESA, EAC and ECOWAS courts, will be to allow individuals to litigate before

the African Court of Justice with the special leave of the court69

or after exhausting local

remedies. Another option is to create a reference procedure between national courts and

the African Court of Justice. This alternative will provide individuals with indirect access

to the court. In general, governments are reluctant to submit to binding interstate dispute

resolution processes. Indeed, of all the cases so far brought before the COMESA, EAC,

ECOWAS and SADC courts, only one involved inter-state parties.70

In the absence of individual standing, the African Court of Justice might be

underused and may be consigned to „abject inactivity and irrelevance,‟71

as far as

economic integration issues are concerned. One can only imagine what would have

happened to the COMESA, ECOWAS and EAC courts if individuals did not have

159

standing before them. Granting private right of action will ensure the use of the African

Court of Justice, and prevent its descent into inactivity and irrelevance.

Arguably, the absence of individual rights of action reflects a desire of states to

dominate the African Court of Justice, even if only indirectly, and cut off the court from

any relations with those most affected by economic integration. The absence of

individual standing is inconsistent with the position in other African regional economic

treaties. It is recommended that any revisions of the Statute of the African Court of

Justice should provide for individual standing either directly, with special leave of the

court or after exhausting local remedies, or indirectly through reference from national

courts.72

Perhaps if the distinct identity of the AEC had been maintained and its economic

integration agenda and the concomitant needs of the agenda held in focus, these shortfalls

might have been avoided. As a court for the political organisation, the AU, it is

unproblematic; its structure and jurisdiction closely resemble the International Court of

Justice of the United Nations. But, as a court that also has jurisdiction over economic

integration issues, its structure and jurisdiction are highly inadequate.

To my knowledge, it is the only court with jurisdiction over an economic

integration agreement whose jurisdiction is not compulsory. A party to the AEC Treaty

that has not ratified the Protocol of the African Court of Justice is not subject to the

jurisdiction of the court.73

As has been argued above; this will seriously affect the

application and enforcement of AEC law. Individuals and national courts, key players in

the success of any economic integration agenda, have no direct or indirect relations with

the courts.

160

The relationship between the AU, AEC and Africa‟s RECs is complex. It does not

appear that treaties and protocols are adopted with much careful thought on the complex

legal issues involved in economic integration. It is the hope of this writer that the newly

established African Union Commission on International Law74

will devote considerable

space on its agenda to the legal aspects of economic integration on the continent.

If Africa‟s economic integration is to succeed, its legal aspects have to be taken

more seriously and it should be clearly divorced from the political unification agenda.

Admittedly, the socio-economic and political challenges that bedevil Africa‟s economic

integration are enormous and real. However, in my opinion even if all these challenges

were to disappear, there is so much in the realm of law that, if unaddressed, will still

hinder the success and effectiveness of economic integration in Africa.

African Economic Community and the Promotion of Intra-African Trade

African leaders have long recognized the need for closer regional ties as a way to

overcome the fragmentation of the continent which is one of the major constraints to its

economic development. The economic integration of Africa was the central theme of the

1980 Lagos Plan of Action, the special United Nations Session on Africa in 1986 and

numerous other high level statements and reports on African policy and development

strategy. More recently it has found expression in the creation of the Africa Union.

Economic integration is perceived by many African leaders and governments as a

promising vehicle for enhancing economic and social development in their respective

countries. This can come about through the reinforcement of the regional infrastructure, a

more efficient system of payment, greater markets, greater access to credit, a more inter-

related system, a greater mutual awareness among economic agents operating in the

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different countries and, above all, through a growing technical complimentary and a

greater development and integration of the productive sectors of African countries.

As observed earlier, there are currently several African integration schemes. These

include the Community for East and Southern African states (COMESA), the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development

Community (SADC), the Central African Customs and Economic Union (EDEAC), the

African and Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM), the Comite Permanent

Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes

Countries (CEPGL), and one may add the South African Customs Union.

Most of these have achieved very little. The traditional explanation of the failure

of integration schemes in Africa is that there is a lack of political will in the member

countries that is necessary to see integration succeed, expressed in the chronic non-

observance of commitments undertaken within the respective agreements and in the

insufficient use of the instruments set up by these agreements.75

To seek the causes of the weakening of integration solely in the functioning of the

regional or sub-regional institutions or in the legal instruments governing them would

undoubtedly be to take an inadequate view of its complex and diverse nature. The

differences in approach to the balance of payments by different counties are as

responsible for the failure of these schemes as their incorrect design and the inadequacy

of the traditional instruments, based on trade liberalization, in helping to solve the current

problems of economic development in Africa.

In addition, most of these schemes have achieved very little partly because they

lack a regulatory framework, and tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade have not been

162

reduced. The tempo and mode of integration basically depends on the development

strategies and external linkages adopted by the countries participating in the process. If

the more ambitious goal of creating an African Economic Community is going to be

achieved, bolder efforts than has hitherto been the case will be needed to create an

enabling environment.76

Creating Favorable Conditions

In Article 5 of the Treaty, member States undertake to create favorable conditions for the

development of the Economic Community. Each member state is required to take all

necessary measures to ensure the enactment and dissemination of such legislation as may

be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Several articles in

the Treaty require member States to take measures to eliminate customs duties, other

restrictions or prohibitions, administrative, as well as all other non-tariff barriers and the

adoption by member States of a common external customs tariff.

Among the problems that would probably require immediate attention in the free

trade area are many related to the implementations of these provisions. The negotiations

and regulations for the reduction of tariffs will inevitably be complex. The

implementation of many of these decisions and measures will require the development of

normative rules to give effect to the decisions.

These rules would, in turn, have to be assimilated into the laws of the member

States. This will require a great effort in the harmonization of all Community trade laws

and not just those limited to, for instance, customs regulations. Article 7 of the Treaty sets

up various organs to implement Community objectives. These are the Assembly of heads

of State and Government Council of ministers, a Pan African Parliament, the Economic

163

and Social Secretariat, Court of Justice, the general secretariat and the specialized

technical committees.

This leads us to the question whether the Community Treaty has created an

institutional framework with which there would exist a body with a clear mandate and

capacity to undertake the complex task of harmonizing Community trade laws. This

could spearhead the creation of a physical, technical and legal infrastructure that would

support regional exchanges in goods, services, labour and capital.77

The Community Treaty does not expressly set up, as one of its objectives, the

unification of trade laws in the Community. It also does not set up, among its specialized

committees, one to deal with legal issues and, in particular, the harmonization of trade

laws and commercial practices in the Community. Article 25 which deals with the

establishment of specialized technical committees establishes a total of seven

committees. The committees are: the committee on rural economy and agriculture

matters; the committee on monetary and financial affairs; the committee on industry,

science and technology, energy, natural resource and environment; the committee on

transport, communications and tourism; the committee on health, labor and social affairs

and the committee on education, culture, and human resources.

The special technical committees will play an important role in the implementation

of the objectives of the Community, as they are charged with among other things, the

preparation of projects and programs of the Community, the supervision, follow-up and

evaluation of the implementation of the decisions taken by the organs of the Community,

ensuring the coordination and harmonisation of projects and programs and submitting

164

reports and recommendations on the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. As

has been stated, none of the committees is a legal committee.78

The fact that there is no legal committee among the technical committees,

provided for in Article 25, means that there is no organ especially charged with furthering

cooperation in the development of the Community trade laws and commercial practices

and providing for their progressive unification. This means that work of harmonisation of

the laws and commercial practices will be carried out in a piece-meal manner by anyone

of the several committees that may wish to unify a particular area of the law. This is

unsatisfactory and should be immediately remedied. The implementation of community

decisions will to a large extent depend on the working out of satisfactory legal

instruments to implement Community programs.79

Obstacles to Integration and Implementation of the AEC

Africa is faced with a multitude of problems that make economic integration much more

difficult. Several factors may be mentioned: the economic nationalism that was strong at

independence has left its mark. Many countries seem to go into economic integration

agreements without any intention of parting with some measure of national sovereignty.

Membership has been sought in the past in these groupings as being a sign of being a

good African and as a way to obtain external development assistance. African countries

have to accept that membership of an economic community has serious long term

implications for the countries involved. It entails very close cooperation with one‟s

neighbors and very often, traditional rivalry and differences do impede the integration

process.

165

Differences in linguistic, political systems, legal and administrative systems have

to be overcome. There is the problem of low priority accorded to the implementation of

integration programs vis-à-vis national ones which are very often supported and financed

by influential international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. For example

under the structural adjustment programs in place in most African countries, domestic

considerations take precedence over sub-regional integration preoccupations. There is the

inadequacy of the economic infrastructure to support economic integration.80

For instance, one of the major constraints on the growth and development of inter-

African trade has been the inadequacy of payment and financial systems in place in

Africa. IncreasedAfrican trade will need finance and financial instruments such as

banking networks providing letters of credit, export credits, and other financial services.

There are the diversified currency exchange regimes and payment restrictions that prevail

in Africa. Integration will require the adoption of collective policy measures to facilitate

the liberalization of payment and exchange restriction and to enhance the convertibility of

national currencies.

The existence of border conflicts, numerous conflicts, civil wars, and linguistic

rivalries especially English and French, compounded by racial suspicion of the continent

especially between black Africans and Arab Africans can hamper economic integration.

The hostile world economic environment has meant that many of the regions‟ countries

are preoccupied with short-term recovery. There is also the lack of an acclaimed

integration leader in the region with impeccable credentials such as a domestic economic

track record of monetary and financial stability, diligent implementation of Community

166

programs, a willingness to assume requisite responsibilities and a dominant position in

regional trade and finance.81

Political Implications of the Treaty and the New World Order

In conclusion, it might be useful to look at the political implications of the proposed

Economic Community for Africa and its wider implications for the new world order. If

Africa fails to integrate, African economies will continue to deteriorate and the continent

will continue to become even more irrelevant to the global scheme of things. The

unipolar world of today and consequently the relative flexibility afforded African States

by that system of international relations is gone. The collapse and irrelevance of

communism as an ideology and system of government: the liberation of Eastern Europe,

the disintegration of the former Soviet Union; and the success of economic integration in

Europe has all made the idea of an African Economic Community both irresistible and

irreversible.

Similarly, the current global trend in favor of the creation of regional economic

groupings – which was referred earlier – has rendered Africa‟s efforts in that direction

look rather late incoming. Another political implication of the African Economic Treaty

is the need for regular and intensified consultation and cooperation between African

governments and inter-governmental institutions and agencies. The entire edifice of the

Community is predicated on such interaction, to be realized successfully.82

The Treaty further implies the subordination or at least abridgement of aspects of

national sovereignty. This is a precondition for the success of the Community. Many

provisions in the Treaty relate to matters in which national authorities exercised virtually

exclusive prerogative. An insistence on, and a commitment to, such a tradition by

167

competent authorities in member States of the Community would seem to be

incompatible with the realization of the objectives of the Community. The Treaty

assumes that all over Africa, democracy will replace non-democratic regimes which have

characterized the African political scene in recent memory. The Treaty provides for

democratic institutions. The Pan African Parliament is to be elected by continental

suffrage. It would be unusual for a government that itself is not itself a product of the

democratic process to allow democratic elections of members of the Community

parliament.

Without any doubt, the establishment of the African Economic Community in

itself constitutes yet another case of the institutional building on the continent. The

uniqueness of the experiment derives from the fact that for the first time the continent

seems to have combined the search for its true political economic, social, scientific and

cultural destiny in one gigantic effort.

The political implications of the Community also relate to the wider international

environment. Late as this African initiative would seem, the continent has served notice

of is readiness to adjust to changing times. The Treaty enjoins Community members to

present a common front in all international fora. If this injunction is adhered to, it is likely

to result in better deals for African countries which have, so far failed to exhibit much

needed cohesion in global negotiations.83

Other regions of the world that have tended to divide and rule Africa in their

economic and social interactions with the continent are consequently likely to re-think

their strategies. All these have implications for the evolving new world order. Obviously,

an Africa that is attempting to put its economic, social and political house in order is

168

bound to play a more credible role. An Africa that is erecting and strengthening relevant

institutions in order to correct the mistakes and neglects of the past is better suited to play

a role. An Africa that has recognized and embraced the relevance and efficacy of

democracy, human and peoples‟ rights and popular participation in government is one

which the rest of the word can hardly take for granted.

An Africa that has decided to relegate ideological wrangles and conflicts on the

background, in favor of cooperation, coordination and collaboration is bound to attract

greater credibility and respect globally. It is for these reasons that the decision to

establish an African Economic Community is a decision with far reaching political,

economic, social, cultural and scientific implications not only for Africa but indeed for

the new world order if the objectives are achieved. Let us hope the Community becomes

a reality, for the continued fragmentation of Africa can only spell disaster for the

continent and its people.84

Conclusion

As the growing consensus on what was wrong with Africa, namely a lack of democracy

and excessive state interference in the economy – emerged, confrontation with the

developed world over the evils of a dependency generated by the global capitalist system

gave way to “dialogue”. This actuality was confirmed with the formulation of the African

Economic Community (AEC) in 1991. The AEC was established by the Abuja Treaty at

an OAU Summit in June 1991, but only came into force in May 1994 after the requisite

numbers signed up for ratification. Its main aim was to establish a pan-continental

economic community by 2028, predicated on the by now standard fare of „the gradual

169

removal, among Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods,

services and capital.‟

So far, like many other African plans and declarations, the Abuja Treaty has

failed to meet its stated objectives. Even taking 1994 and not 1991 as its starting point,

the Treaty has thus far failed in meeting the target of its First Stage (1994–1999) which

was to be the strengthening of existing regional economic communities within a period

not exceeding five years. It has also failed to achieve the Second stage (1999–2007), of

stabilizing tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers, customs duties and internal taxes within

a period not exceeding eight years.

It is unlikely, judging on the evidence so far, that the remaining four stages which

are; (to be completed in 2017) Establishing of a free trade area and customs union in each

regional bloc; (to be completed in 2019) Establishing of a continent-wide customs union

(and thus also a free trade area); (to be completed in 2023) Establishing of a continent-

wide African Common Market (ACM); (to be completed in 2028) Establishing of a

continent-wide economic and monetary union (and thus also a currency union) and

Parliament will be met and follow the same fate.

The Abuja Treaty was intended as a corrective to the institutional inadequacies of

the LPA. However, although the Abuja Treaty appeared to have strengthened Africa‟s

regional communities, by endowing them with supranational institutions, the impact of

these transformations has been minimal. Contrary to expectations, the endowment of

regional institutions with supranational authority seemed to have increased the lethargy

of African governments to engage in regional arrangements. African governments

appeared to have developed the perception that the Abuja Treaty imposed maximum

170

constraints on their discretionary decision-making powers with minimal prospects for the

realisation of immediate benefits.

The Abuja Treaty lays the ground work for the creation of the African Economic

Community (AEC), whereby the economies of the Member States of the AU will be fully

integrated. The goal of the AEC is to transform African economies into a single

economic and monetary union, with a common currency, free mobility of capital and

labour. It is the desire of the leadership of the continent as stipulated in the Constitutive

Act to have an African Central Bank, an African Monetary Fund and an African

Investment Bank in place when the AEC is fully functional.

This presupposes that Africa as a whole would have gone through all the stages of

integration. The RECs, which constitute the building blocks of the AEC, would at this

stage merge their programmes into one. Despite the progress made by Member States

towards economic cooperation, the creation of the AEC is hampered by conflicts as well

political, economic and social governance challenges in some parts of the continent.

Overall, the RECs have made some progress in the integration process. However,

major efforts are still needed to harmonize their policies. COMESA, ECOWAS, SADC,

EAC, and ECCAS have achieved Free Trade Area (FTA) while IGAD and CENSAD are

in the process of having their own. COMESA, ECOWAS and ECCAS had planned to

have their own Customs Union by the year 2008, but this has not yet materialised; instead

COMESA and ECOWAS expected to launch their Customs Union by 2009 which they

also failed to achieve, while ECCAS also intended to achieve it in 2010, but that did not

happen too.

171

SADC on the other hand planned to have its Customs Union between 2010-2012

which also has been postponed. EAC is already in Customs Union and hope to fully

implement all programmes to support the Customs Union from 2010, though, the

programme of implementation has not commenced, while the remaining RECs are

exerting efforts towards the attainment of this goal. However, there are certain challenges

that hinder the integration process.

Despite the fact that some RECs have protocols on free movement of persons,

goods and services, the implementation process by some Member States is very slow.

Additionally, in some RECs that have achieved FTA, there are some Member States

which have not complied with the FTA Protocol. Indeed, peace and security are the

prerequisites for the development and economic growth of any region. The AU has put in

place an African Peace and Security Architecture designed to promote Peace and Security

in Africa. One of the main pillars of this Architecture is the establishment of a continental

early warning system that RECs could adopt in order to prevent any further conflict at

regional and continental level.

Regional Economic Communities have to position themselves as building blocks

within the broader continental vision. The effort by COMESA, SADC and EAC in the

Tripartite Summit held in October 2008 in Kampala, to create a single FTA is

commendable as it will contribute to the early realisation of the AEC. However, the

establishment of the AEC poses a challenge, more so as it is not certain whether the

creation of a continental Customs Union by 2019 could be achieved. The importance of

timing and sequencing these activities are critical for the success of these initiatives. The

continent‟s development endeavours are also compounded by numerous challenges,

172

prominent among which are the HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis pandemics, which

pose serious threats to human capital development.

The current global economic crisis may also pose its own challenges as well as

create opportunities for regional economic integration in Africa. On the one hand, it

could spin-off a slowdown in trading and economic activities, and adversely affects the

revenue of Member States; while on the other hand; it could force African countries to

trade more amongst themselves and engage in higher volume economic transactions with

each other, thus facilitating the integration process.85

Although, the Abuja-AEC plan did

not achieve much success, yet significant progress was recorded by the regional

organisations in the area of conflict resolution. Infact, the AU is a further advance, rooted

in the Abuja Treaty.

In the final analysis, despite the surviving rhetoric of commitment of African

states to the goals of the Abuja Treaty, they have remained as unwilling as ever to make

the necessary sacrifices for its implementation. Abuja, like Lagos and most of the related

regional economic communities, has remained a paper organisation “whose elaborate

treaties have become nothing more than memorials to faulty development strategies.”86

Cooperation and integration have not advanced in the continent and Africa‟s

development predicaments that informed the formulation of the LPA and then the Abuja

Treaty, have persisted or even worsened, calling therefore, for new approaches. A recent

reaction is the emergence of Africa‟s new development initiative, the NEPAD. This

transition from Africa‟s traditional inward-looking orientation to cooperation and

integration epitomised by the LPA and the AEC, to the new extra-regional partnership

evolved by the NEPAD is the object of the next chapter.

173

Endnotes

1. OAU, Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community – AEC (Abuja: June

1991): Preamble.

2. ECA, “ECA and Africa‟s development 1983 – 2008,” (Addis Ababa: ECA, 1983): 39.

3. J. Fine and S. Yeo, “Regional Integration in SSA: Dead End or a False Start?,” Paper

prepared for African Economic Research Consortium Project on Regional Integration

and Trade Liberalisation in SSA, Nairobi, Kenya, 1994):429.

4. S.K.B. Asante, “Comparative Analysis of the Treaties of the African Economic

Community and the Economic Community of West African States,” in ECOWAS:

Perspectives, ed. Jeggan C. Senghor, 15-22.

5. www.panafricanperspective.com (accessed 13/12/2011).

6. OAU, AEC,Article 4, 8.

7. Asante, “Comparative analysis of the Treaties of the African Economic Community,”

23.

8. S.K.B. Asante, Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality, and

Challenges (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 89.

9. Ibid., 181.

10. P. S. Mistry, “Africa‟s Record of Regional Cooperation and Integration,” African

Affairs 99, no. 397 (October, 2000): 559-560.

11. Ibid., 560; OAU, AEC, Chapter XIX, Article 88.

12. Asante, Regionalism and Africa, 90.

13. OAU, AEC, Article V.

14. Asante, Regionalism and Africa, 93.

15. Ibid., 96; ECOWAS Treaty (1992) Article 19(8); COMESA Treaty (1994) Article

8(3); and the SADC Treaty (1992) Article 19(8).

16. Asante, Regionalism and Africa, 98.

17. K. Riechenberg, “The Merger of Trading Blocks and the Creation of the European

Economic Area: Legal and Judicial Issues,” Tulane Journal of International and

Comparative Law4, (1995): 63.

174

18. Ibid., 64.

19. Ibid., 65.

20.“Protocol on the Relations between the AEC and RECs,”

http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/AU-RECs-Protocol.pdf(accessed

26/11/2011).

21. Ibid.

22. OAU, AEC, 30.

23. J. Senghor, “The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community: An

Introductory Essay,”African Yearbook of International Law (1993), 183.

24. OAU, AEC, 31.

25. AU, Decision on the Moratorium on the Recognition of Regional Economic

Communities, Assembly/AU/ Dec.112 (VII), 2006.

26. AU, Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 3, 1999.

27. Protocol on Relations, supra note 1, Article 5(1)(d).

28. Riechenberg, “The Merger of Trading Blocks,” 64.

29. Ibid., 65.

30. Ibid., 67.

31. UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional

Economic Communities (2004), 94.

32. COMESA, Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,

1993.

33. Ibid., Article 178(1) (c).

34. Ibid., Article 192(1).

35. ECOWAS, Revised Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African

States, Article 2(1), 1993.

36. EAC, Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community, Preamble, 1999.

37. UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 54(b) 1969.

175

38. R. Vaubel, “International Organization,” in The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, ed.

C. K. Rowley and F. Schneider, (Springer: 2003), 319.

39. COMESA, Article 192(1).

40. R. Shams, The Drive Towards Economic Integration in Africa, Hamburg Institute of

International Economics, Discussion Paper no. 316 (2005), 6–7.

41. COMESA, Article 186(1).

42. UNECA, 95.

43. OAU, AEC, Article 5(1).

44. AU, “RECs Moratorium Decision,” supra note 6; K. O. Kufuor, “The Collapse of the

Organization of African Unity: Lessons from Economics and History,” Journal of

African Law 4, (2005):132-133.

45. AU, “Constituent Acts,” Article 4.

46. Kufuor, “The Collapse of the Organization of African Unity,” 133.

47. Ibid., 133b.

48. Ibid., 134.

49. EAC, Article 3, supra note 17.

50. AU, Accra Declaration, Paragraph 2(a), 2007.

51. OAU, AEC, supra note 3.

52. AEC, Article 98(2).

53. AU, “Constituent Acts,”supra note 7.

54. Kufuor, “The Collapse of the Organization of African Unity,” 133.

55. AU, “Constituent Acts,”Article 1(1).

56. AU, “Constituent Acts,”Articles 5, 30–31, 32–42.

57. S. K. B. Asante, “Towards an African Economic Community,” in Towards an African

Economic Community, ed. S. K. B. Asante(Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa,

2001), 23.

176

58. Ibid., 24.

59. Ibid.,25.

60. A. O. Obilade, “The African Court of Justice: Jurisdictional, Procedural and

Enforcement Problems,”in African Economic Treaty: Issues, Problems and

Prospects, ed. M. A. Ajomo and Adewale Omobolaji Conference Series no. 3 (Lagos:

Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1993), 312.

61. OAU, AEC, supra note 3 Article 18(2).

62. Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,

www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm (accessed 4/11/2011).

63. Ibid., Article 3(1).

64. Ibid., supranote 42 Article 30.

65. Ibid., supranote 42 Art. 18.

66. Ibid., supranote 42 Article 31.

67. The case of the African Court of Justice represents an inappropriate extension to

economic integration of an approach developed for and workable in a purely

political context.

68. S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995),

135.

69. ECOWAS Court of Justice, Olajide Afolabi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,

2004/ECW/CCJ/04, 2004.

70. Ibid., 18.

71. A. K. Schneider, “Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in

International Trade Organizations,”Michigan Journal of International Law20 (1998–

1999): 679–733.

72.Ibid., 734

73. CARICOM, Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community

including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, 2001, Article 222.

74. Schneider, “Getting Along”, 735.

177

75. T. Maluwa, “The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes among African States, 1963–1983:

Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends,”International and Comparative Law

Quarterly 38 (1989): 299.

76. Protocol A/P.1/1/91 on the Economic Community of West African States Court of

Justice (as amended Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/11/04).

77. Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice, supra note 42 Article 29(2).

78. Statute of African Union Commission on International Law (2009), available at

http://www.africaunion. org / root / au

/Documents/Treatiestext/STATUTE%200F%20THE%20AUCIL-Adopted% 20-

%20Feb%202009.pdf (accessed 9/11/2011).

79. E. Kulusika, “The Lawyer and the Challenges of Economic Integration,” Zambia

L.J.32, (2000): 20.

80.AU decisions on African Integration, http://www.africa-

union.org/root/ua/Newsletter/EA/(accessed 14/11/2011).

81. M. Ndulo, “African Economic Community and the Promotion of Intra-African

Trade,”Africa Notes(May, 1992), 1.

82. Ibid., 2.

83. K. D. Hwang, “Some Reflections on African Development Strategies in the

21stCentury: From the LPA to NEPAD,”Journal of International and Area Studies

16, no. 2, (2009), 125-142.

84. I. Taylor, “Partnership through Accommodation? African Development Initiatives

and Universal Policy Prescriptions” in Africa, Regional Cooperation and the World

Market-Socio-Economic Strategies in Times of Global Trade Regimes, ed. Henning

Melber (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006), 9-39.

85. AU, Status of Integration in Africa (SIA),Second Edition (April 2009), 2-3.

86. Ibid., 4.

178

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD) AND

AFRICA’S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION, 2001-2012

Introduction

In 1999, as the 20th

century drew to a close, many African leaders began to present ideas

on the path to Africa‟s economic transformation in the 21st century. Many of the

perspectives were harmonised in the course of 2000 and 2001 and the result was the

establishment of the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) in 2001. This

chapterdiscusses the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)which owes its

origin to efforts of African leaders as from 1999 to initiate new programmes aimed at

economic recovery and sustainable development in the 21st century. In doing this, the

initiators took note of changes in global politics, which shifted towards shared

responsibilities and full partnership for the achievements of the Millennium Development

Goals and opportunities of globalization.

Background to the Conception of NEPAD

The LPA‟s regional self-reliance strategy became the most popularised element of

Africa‟s international relations from the 1980s onwards, forming the hub of all African

economic development cooperation endeavours. It envisioned the broadening of existing

regional economic groupings and creating new ones with the ultimate goal of establishing

a continent-wide economic community. However, despite the establishment and

broadening of regional economic communities (RECs), and despite the signing of the

famous Abuja Treaty in 1991 establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), the

record of achievement of collective self-reliance remained disappointing.

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From the signing of the LPA in 1980, to the establishment of the AEC in 1991

and beyond, the pace and pattern of socioeconomic and political development in the

continent did not improve. If anything, Africa performed even worse in the 1980s and

1990s than it did in the 1960s and 1970s.1

Arguably, the most important problem facing

African countries and to which utmost attention must be directed is the problem of

persistent underdevelopment characterised by low economic growth, deteriorating human

welfare, and lack of economic structural and social transformation. In 2004, Africa had

13% of world‟s population but less than 2% of its GDP. Sustained growth has eluded

many African countries for several years and human welfare degraded significantly

during the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, many African countries were off track to achieve the

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).2

Thus, Africa at the dawn of the 21st century cuts the picture of gloom,

despondency and desperation; the deplorable state of the continent contrasts sharply with

the fortunes of almost every other civilization. The HIV/Aids pandemic is a terrible

menace particularly, to Africans threatening to reduce life expectancy by up to 20 years

imposing costs on Africa up to 50% more than any other part of the South; over 340

million Africans live on US$1 or less per day, 20% i.e. 1 in every 5 live in countries

ravaged by conflicts and civil wars, many more children are conscripted as soldiers and

mortality rate of children under five years stand at an alarming 140 per thousand or 14%.

Primary school enrolment is dropping, food production is dropping on the one

hand (due to a myriad of both natural and economic factors) while on the other,

population growth rate is rising, exacerbating poverty levels in the continent. Many

African countries from the West to the East and from the South to the North and to the

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central- Benin Republic, Niger, Liberia, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Zambia,

Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, and Sudan among others were in the throes of

famine and desperate food shortages. Only 58% of our population has access to clean

drinking water and average life expectancy at birth is 54 years. Africa‟s peripheral

influence in the global economy has further waned, commodity prices are dipping and

Africa‟s share of primary products has also dwindled.3

As we were beginning to heave a sigh of relieve at the prospects of peace in

Congo Democratic Republic, military mutiny broke out in Cote D‟Ivoire, ceasefire

collapsed in the Sudan and guerrilla warfare intensified in Uganda and Liberia. The

authors of the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) initiative refer to the

situation in Africa as „abnormal‟, in reality political disorder and socio-economic malaise

have always characterised the continent. The foregoing, coupled with the changing

contours of international political economy reinforced the enormity and urgency of the

challenge for Africa.

The political climate of the mid-1990s, the third wave of re-democratisation of the

continent, the emergence of determined and progressive political leadership, the ouster of

some of Africa‟s longest serving despots- Kamuzu Banda, Mobutu Sese-Seko, Didier

Ratsiraka, Frederick Chiluba and Houphet-Boigny (by natural death), plus the milestone

abrogation of military authoritarianism in Nigeria and, restoration of normalcy to and

successful elections in Sierra-Leone augured hope for the continent that has been

severally denounced with many obnoxious adjectives- hopeless, beleaguered, dark and so

on.4

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Thus, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a product of the

continuing search by African people and its leaders to create pan-African structures that

can lead to the social and economic transformation of the continent in a rapidly

“globalising world.”5

It is a holistic, integrated sustainable development initiative for the

economic and social revival of Africa involving a constructive partnership between

Africa and the developed world. It is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common

vision and a firm and shared conviction that they have a pressing duty to eradicate

poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of

sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the

world economy and body politic.

The initiative is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves

and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising

world. It is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the

international community to overcome the development chasm. The partnership is to be

founded on a realisation of common interest, obligations, commitments, benefit and

equality. The initiative is premised on African states making commitments to good

governance, democracy and human rights, while endeavouring to prevent and resolve

situations of conflict and instability on the continent.

Coupled to these efforts to create conditions conducive for investment, growth

and development are initiatives to raise the necessary resources to address the

development chasm in critical sectors that are highlighted in the Programme of Action,

such as infrastructure, education, health, agriculture and ICT. Resources will be

mobilised by way of increasing savings and capital inflows via further debt relief,

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increased targeted ODA flows and private capital. There will be an emphasis on the

better management of public revenue and expenditure. The founding document of the

NEPAD contains both a strategic policy framework and a Programme of Action.

The NEPAD offers a historic opportunity for the advanced countries of the world

to enter into a genuine partnership with Africa, based on mutual interests and benefit,

shared commitment and binding agreement, under African leadership. In proposing the

partnership, Africa recognises that it holds the key to its own development. The adoption

of a development strategy, together with a detailed programme of action marks the

beginning of a new phase in the partnership and cooperation between Africa and the

developed world, including multilateral organisations.6

Rationale for the NEPAD

The idea of developing a new Agenda for African Recovery dates back to 1999. President

Thabo Mbeki, President Olusegun Obasanjo and President A. Bouteflika, as leaders of

three major organisations representing the interests of Africa and the South, found

themselves in a unique position to put Africa's case to the global community. They

realised that Africa has been reacting for too long to ideas and offers of support from the

rest of the world, without developing and articulating its own vision and programme of

action.

Africa has produced a variety of initiatives and programmes of action in the past,

in particular the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty Establishing the African

Economic Community. However, for a variety of reasons, including timing, a lack of

capacity and resources, a lack of political will and the interference of outside interests in

the Cold War era, the plans failed in their implementation.

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A convergence of favourable circumstances within the continent and

internationally provides the ideal opportunity now to take the existing plans, e.g. for

economic integration, forward within the context of a new initiative developed by

Africans for Africans. Faced with the challenge of addressing poverty and

underdevelopment, both in their respective countries and on the continent, and with

demands to address world forums on African issues, the Presidents resolved to request

the OAU to mandate them to prepare a comprehensive development programme that

could serve as a foundation for the regeneration of the continent and the forging of a new

partnership with the rest of the world, more specifically the industrialised countries and

multilateral organisations. This would be a programme that went beyond debt reduction,

which was the immediate trigger for the initiative. The end result is the New Partnership

for Africa's Development (NEPAD).7

Process of Development of the Final Initiative

The mandate for the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme

(MAP) had its genesis at the OAU Extraordinary Summit held in Sirte, Libya during

September 1999. The Summit mandated President T Mbeki of South Africa and President

A. Bouteflika of Algeria to engage Africa's creditors on the total cancellation of Africa's

external debt. Following this, the South Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and the

G77, held in Havana, Cuba during April 2000, mandated President Mbeki and President

Olusegun Obasanjo to convey the concerns of the South to the G8 and the Bretton Woods

institutions.

Realising the correlation between the two mandates and the fact that debt relief

forms but one critical aspect of the overall development agenda for Africa, the OAU

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Summit held in Togo in July 2000 mandated the three Presidents to engage the developed

North with a view to developing a constructive partnership for the regeneration of the

Continent. Following from this, the three Presidents raised the issue of a partnership with

the leaders of the G8 at their Summit in Japan during July 2000. The work on developing

the MAP then began in earnest and a process of engagement on a bilateral and

multilateral level was pursued. For example, a presentation on MAP was made to the

World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2001.8

The first concept paper was prepared by President Mbeki and was approved by

the other two Presidents in September 2000. A Steering Committee was appointed to

develop a more detailed proposal immediately thereafter. Each President appointed two

members to the Steering Committee in October 2000. After a number of consultations

with the three Presidents regarding an evaluation of past and current development

agendas for Africa, the Steering Committee produced a Policy Framework document,

Draft 3 (a), in February 2001. Draft 3 (a) was both a vision statement and an outline of a

Programme of Action for the political, social and economic recovery of the African

continent. It argued the case for the initiative, its timing and its strategic focus, as well as

outlining actions, duties and responsibilities for African leaders on the one hand and for

industrialised countries on the other.

The next four months were then devoted to the preparation of a detailed

Programme of Action.The OMEGA Plan was conceived by President A. Wade and was

first presented at the Franco-Africa Summit in Yaounde, Cameroon in January 2001. It

was then also presented at the OAU Extraordinary Summit in Sirte in March 2001. The

three original MAP Presidents became aware of the Omega Plan for the first time at the

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World Economic Forum in Davos on 30 January 2001. The OMEGA Plan is premised on

four central pillars, dealing with the building of infrastructures, including the new

technologies of information and communication (ICT), education and human resource

development, health and agriculture.9

At the 8th Session of the African Ministers of Finance in Addis Ababa in

November 2000, the Executive Secretary of the ECA, Mr. K.Y. Amoako, was tasked

with developing a Compact for Africa's Renewal. The document that he produced was

then presented and discussed at the Conference of African Ministers of Finance in

Algiers, Algeria from 8 to 10 May 2001. The ECA New Global Compact with Africa

discusses operationalising the MAP and is comprised of six Chapters. During the 5th

Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya from 1 to 2 March 2001, President

Obasanjo made a presentation on the MAP and President Wade of Senegal presented the

OMEGA Plan.

The work being done by the four Presidents, i.e. Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo,

Bouteflika and Wade, was endorsed and it was decided that every effort should be made

to integrate all the initiatives being pursued for the recovery and development of Africa.

In reaching this decision, the Summit recognised the synergy and complementarity that

existed between the various initiatives. In the final analysis, Africa has to present a

single, coordinated plan to its international cooperating partners. To have more than one

initiative will be confusing to Africa's partners, will undermine credibility and will

inevitably lead to a splitting of scarce resources, focus and capacity.10

The Conference in Algiers of 8-10 May 2001 discussed above represented the

first step in carrying forward the mandate for integration given by the Extraordinary

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Summit in Sirte in March 2001. Apart from the ECA Compact, the MAP and the

OMEGA Plan were also discussed and the Ministers urged the experts of the three

initiatives to work together to achieve the merger and consolidation. Following this, a

meeting of experts from nine African states, as well as the MAP Steering Committee, was

held in Abuja, Nigeria from 2 to 4 June 2001.

Following the Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Senegal and Egypt were included

on the Steering Committee, along with South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria. At the Abuja

meeting, Gabon, Mali, Tanzania and Mozambique were also invited to attend. The Abuja

meeting discussed the issue of merger in general, while the majority of the meeting was

utilised to further develop the MARP Programme of Action. Input papers were provided

by a number of states under each of the 8 Themes and these were extensively

workshopped to arrive at a consolidated background paper per Theme. A Theme on

Environment was also added.

An integration team was assembled at the Development Bank of Southern Africa

following the Abuja meeting. The task of this team was to produce a comprehensive,

coherent plan from the papers and positions developed at the Abuja Workshop, which

they did.

Furthermore, a meeting was held in Dakar, Senegal from 11-13 June where the final

details of the OMEGA Plan were discussed. A broad spectrum of the Senegalese public

and private sectors was represented at the meeting, as well as a number of countries,

including South Africa, and multilateral organisations. President Bouteflika sent a Special

Envoy to the meeting, his Minister for African Affairs, to further develop the process of

merging the various initiatives.

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Following this, the MAP Steering Committee held a meeting in Cairo, Egypt from

18 to 21 June. Apart from the five core Steering Committee states, Ghana, Kenya,

Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Libya also attended the meeting. The aim of the

Cairo meeting was to finalise the MAP Programme of Action documents and also to

discuss the merger of the MAP and the OMEGA Plan into one consolidated initiative.

Most of the discussion at the meeting centred on the MAP theme documents.11

Good progress was made in finalising these Programme of Action documents.

The meeting agreed that there must be a two-page summary of each of the MAP

Programme of Action Theme papers. The Programme of Action is designed to give effect

to the strategic framework outlined in the MAP Draft 3 (a) document. The question of the

MAP/OMEGA integration was discussed on the last day, and Senegal repeated their

assertion that they were fully in favour of the merger of the two documents. A framework

and process for the integration was agreed upon to guide the drafting and integration

team, dealing with the work at the conceptual, sectoral and structural levels.

The integration process continued again after the Cairo meeting and culminated in

the production of the MAP Final Draft 3 (b) on 29 June. The executive summaries arising

from Cairo were utilised to produce this document, consisting of a framework and the

key priorities and programmes. Finally, a meeting of the five core MAP Steering

Committee countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt) was held in

Pretoria, South Africa on 2 and 3 July 2001. The OAU and the ECA were also invited

and the ECA Executive Secretary himself attended. MAP Final Draft 3 (b) was presented

to the meeting. Following much vigorous debate, the meeting was successful in finalising

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a common, coordinated and integrated document for presentation to the OAU Summit in

Lusaka, Zambia (9-11 July).

The document, entitled A New African Initiative: Merger of the Millennium

Partnership for the African Recovery Programme and the Omega Plan (NAI) was

unanimously approved by the members of the Steering Committee. The Steering

Committee formally presented the consolidated initiative to the five initiating Presidents

and their representatives in Lusaka on 9 July 2001. The presentation was preceded by a

consultative meeting between President Mbeki and President Wade in Pretoria on 7 July

and a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the five Steering Committee states was held in

Lusaka on 8 July to discuss the finalised common initiative and the procedure for

introducing the document to the Summit.12

On 11 July 2001, the NAI was presented to the OAU Summit of Heads of State

and Government in Lusaka, Zambia. It was enthusiastically received and was

unanimously adopted by the Summit in the form of Declaration 1 (XXXVII) of the

Summit. In the post-Lusaka period, an extensive programme to lobby support for the

initiative has been undertaken. This began with the UN ECOSOC Ministerial meeting on

16 July in Geneva, the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy on 20 July, and the SADC Summit in

August in Blantyre, Malawi.

It was also a crosscutting agenda item during the World Conference against

Racism in September in Durban, South Africa. Engagement with key continental and

international cooperating partners will be ongoing, in particular with the AU, the REC's,

the G8, the EU, the UNO, and the Bretton Woods institutions. Synergies and linkages

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will be consciously established with all existing processes and initiatives on the

continent, e.g. the TICAD and Sino-Africa initiatives.

Finally, the first meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation

Committee, as mandated at the OAU Summit in Lusaka to drive the process forward, met

in Abuja, Nigeria on 23 October 2001. The Committee, comprising Nigeria, South

Africa, Algeria, Senegal, Egypt, Mozambique, Botswana, Tunisia, Mali, Ethiopia,

Mauritius, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon and Cameroon, finalised a name for

the initiative, namely the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the

definitive text. NEPAD replaced NAI, which was merely intended to be a working title

for the purposes of the OAU Summit.

Furthermore, the Committee finalised the management structures for NEPAD,

consisting of the Implementation Committee, which will meet three times a year and

must report annually to the AU Summit, a Steering Committee, comprising personal

representatives of the five initiating Presidents and a Secretariat, to be based in South

Africa. The Committee also identified a list of five priorities that are to be pursued in the

short term to their next meeting. This meeting marks the start of the critical

implementation phase of the initiative.13

Provisions of the NEPAD

The Programme itself contained a vision, a perspective, and the outlines of a plan for the

redevelopment of Africa. It clarified the objectives and approach to development projects

that were being appraised, further developed and negotiated between partners in Africa

and the rest of the world. These objectives and ideas have been modified from time to

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time to accord with the new situation as it develops. The MAP presents a multi-faceted

Programme of Action. The priority areas included:

· Creating peace, security, and stability, including democratic governance,

without which it is impossible to engage in meaningful economic activity;

· Investing in Africa's people through a comprehensive human resource

strategy;

· Harnessing and developing Africa's strategic and “comparative advantages”

in the resource based sectors to lead the development of an industrial

strategy;

· The diversification of Africa‟s production and exports;

· Increasing investments in the Information and Communication Technology

sector, in order to bridge the digital divide;

· The development of infrastructure including transport and energy; and

· Developing financing mechanisms.

The desired objectives through its implementation included the acceleration of efforts to

eradicate poverty on the continent and to significantly increase new investments by

mobilizing both domestic and especially foreign savings and capital. Participating

African leaders are required to form a “Compact” committing themselves to the

Programme and a Forum of African Leaders. The Forum would make decisions about

sub-programmes and initiatives and review progress on its implementation.

The Plan envisages both Africa-wide and regional initiatives. Conflict prevention

and the eradication of infectious diseases are examples of programmes that will be

continental in scope. Economic development initiatives, such as the development of

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agriculture and agro-industries, economic infrastructure, the promotion of

competitiveness and economic integration will be managed at regional or sub-regional

levels. Another continental initiative was to be the development of regulatory frameworks

for key sectors like telecommunication and energy. The Africa Connection (the

telecommunication strategy for Africa already agreed to) was a case in point. African

governments were already working together on conflict prevention and resolution

measures and this was seen as a good beginning.14

Although, the NEPAD saw partnership with the rest of the world as essential to

the success of the Initiative, the focus of the NEPAD was not to be based on increased aid

but on increased investments in viable infrastructure and business opportunities. It was

also to be based on “market access.” Nevertheless, “targeted aid” and technical support to

address capacity constraints and urgent human development priorities would still be

required.

Here certain developed countries, multilateral institutions and (global and

national) private sector players were to be targeted. Western political leaders were

already being engaged in supporting the Initiative and there was considerable goodwill

and commitment for the Programme from them.In his drive for a new partnership with

the developed world, the MAP presented the issue as one of “historic opportunity” for the

advanced countries of the world to enter into a genuine partnership with Africa, based on

mutual interests and benefit, shared commitment and binding agreement.

At the same time, the NEPAD in proposing the partnership with the outside world

recognised that Africa itself held the key to its own development. The adoption of a

development strategy, together with a detailed programme of action, was to mark the

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beginning of a new phase in the partnership and cooperation between Africa and the

developed world. On the other hand, the commitments of the developed world had to be

translated into action, including such commitments as those agreed in the Cairo

Declaration of the EU/Africa Summit, the Skagen Declaration of the Nordic Countries,

the programmes of the G8 (e.g. DOT Force, Health infrastructure development), and the

UN Millennium Summit Declaration.

International development targets in health, education, gender equality, debt

reduction, poverty reduction and ODA had to be met as promised. It is this commitment

that would act as quid-quo-pro for African commitment to “good governance.” So it was

not entirely an African responsibility for its own development. It was still based on the

goodwill of the former donors.15

Some African leaders were quite serious about their commitments. The

Implementing Committee of the African Heads of States, presided over by President

Obasanjo of Nigeria, who will henceforth chair the Committee, began to effect the

implementation of the NEPAD on October 23, 2001. In his speech Obasanjo drew the

attention of those present to what he called “the prevailing environment in Africa,” which

was marked by, among other things, “the emergence of a leadership … that is committed

to economic renaissance of the continent, as encapsulated in the New African Initiative

programme.” He also briefed the Implementation Committee on the meetings that had

been held between the G8 and selected group of African leaders at Chequers, United

Kingdom in September 2001; and at the European Union (EU) in Brussels, Belgium in

October 2001 respectively, during which the New African Initiative was endorsed by the

European partners.

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The Committee also approved a number of mechanisms for the implementation of

the NEPAD. These included the adoption of the revised New African Initiative

Document- NEPAD-dated October 2001.16

The English version was adopted as “original

text” embodying the philosophy, priorities, and implementation modalities of the

Initiative. It was also decided that “the official name of the initiative” was to be the New

Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD). The Committee also decided that the

Governing Structure of NEPAD was to be composed of an Implementation Committee of

Heads of State and Government; a Steering Committee and a Secretariat. A detailed

Organogram reflecting this structure was also adopted, which is as follows:

a. The Implementation Committee, with President Obasanjo as Chairman and Presidents

A. Bouteflika and A. Wade as Vice Chairmen respectively, who will meet once in every

four months. It also reaffirmed its composition, in accordance with the decision of the

Lusaka Summit of the OAU in July 2001;

b. The Co-ordinating NEPAD Secretariat, with a very small staff, which is to be located

in Pretoria, South Africa;

c. The Steering Committee, which was charged with the task of developing a strategic

plan for marketing NEPAD at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

This was with the aim of mobilizing domestic support and facilitating private-public

sector partnership in Africa as well as enhancing international partnership. The Steering

Committee is also to continue preparations for the proposed conference on Financing

NEPAD in Dakar, Senegal in January 2002.

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d. The Task Teams/Lead Agencies to urgently identify and prepare specific

implementable projects and programmes, which are to be the responsibility of specific

organisations such as the OAU/AU, UNECA, ADB, etc. These were to be as follows:

i. Capacity-Building on Peace and Security -OAU;

ii. Economic and Corporate Governance-UNECA;

iii. Infrastructure-ADB;

iv. Central Bank and Financial Standards-ADB;

v. Agriculture and Market Access- OAU.

The Implementation Committee also agreed that African leaders should set up

parameters for “Good Governance to guide their activities at both the political and

economic levels”. In this regard, it decided that the Committee adopts an appropriate

“peer review mechanism and a code of conduct.” The Committee also “expressed the

hope that Africa‟s development partners will complement these efforts by playing their

own part”. All this went to show that the “parameters for Good Governance” and “Peer

Review Mechanism” were all tailored not to free the African people, but to please the

“development partners” so that they can “play their part” in financing the NEPAD.17

Since “conflict resolution” was regarded as an important element in the “New

Initiative,” the Implementation Committee also reaffirmed its conviction that peace and

security were necessary pre-conditions for “sustainable development”- a new catchword

for “development” and “modernisation.” The Committee, therefore, decided to set-up a

subcommittee on Peace and Security to focus on conflict management, prevention, and

resolution, particularly within the context of NEPAD process.

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The members of this Sub-committee were named to be Algeria, Gabon, Mali and

Mauritius, with South Africa as its Chairman. The Sub-Committee was to report to the

next meeting of the Implementation Committee. Thus, Nigeria and South Africa-“the Big

Boys”- became the kingpins around which the NEPAD was to be managed, supervised,

and implemented. The Implementing Committee decided that all other initiatives

promoted by individual African countries should be subsumed under the NEPAD

process, to represent a basis on which Africa can collectively and effectively cooperate

with its “development partners.”

In line with the geopolitics of the “development partners,” the Implementing

Committee also paid attention to the international political environment and reviewed the

“danger posed to international peace and security by terrorism, including its negative

impact on socio-economic development of Africa and the New African Initiative

process.” It agreed that concerted international action should continue to be taken against

“this growing menace,” while ensuring that the issue of underdevelopment in Africa is

not ignored. Thus, here, just like elsewhere in the NEPAD process, the concern about

“terrorism,” which was not defined, became an aspect of assuring the “partners” that

Africans were not only serious about “Good Governance,” but also against the “menace

of terror.”18

The Programme of Action of the NEPAD itself is quite extensive. It covers such

concerns as: the need to reduce the proportion of the people living in extreme poverty by

half by the year 2015; the need to increase the enrolment of children of school going age

by the same year; the need to make progress towards gender equality and the empowering

of women by eliminating gender disparities in all social fields; the need to reduce infant

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mortality rates by two thirds by the year 2015, as well as the need to make provision for

access to reproductive health facilities and services for all those in need by the same

target dates. The implementation of national strategies for the achievement of

“sustainable development” by the year 2005, so as to reverse the loss of environmental

resources by 2015 is also targeted.19

All these hopes are anchored on the need to promote peace, democracy, human

rights, and sound economic management as well as regional co-operation and economic

integration. At the Implementation Committee meeting in Abuja, President Obasanjo

called on African leaders to abandon “afro-pessimism” and embark on a new optimism

based on a “Marshall Plan.” Indeed, the NEPAD itself was dubbed Africa's “Marshall

Plan” because it is modelled along lines of the U.S. Plan for European reconstruction

after World War Two. In the same vein the NAI-NEPAD involves wide-ranging and

hugely ambitious targets such as peace and democracy, education, investment and IT,

communications and infrastructure. This, according to the chairman of the NEPAD

Implementation Committee, will liberate Africa with the “overwhelming support from

the G8, the international community, and the world press.”20

NEPAD and the Partners

The NEPAD is premised upon the hope that the G-8 “development partners” will provide

the required financial backing to its implementation. Indeed at the very inception of the

MAP and the Omega Plan, the thinking behind the two “Initiatives” was that if Africa is

to get out of the development trap, it must do so by becoming fully integrated into the

global economy.

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Indeed, the whole conception of Mbeki‟s concept of the “African Renaissance” is

deeply premised on this understanding. His briefings at G-8 Meetings were intended to

put across this conviction to the economic superpowers and to appeal to them for support

the programme upon the understanding that a new African had come to the realisation

that it must be responsible for its own development so long as the donor community plays

its part. This was the approach taken at the World Economic Forum at Davos on the 21st

July 2001.21

The G-8 in response put in place an Action Plan for Africa at their Genoa Summit

Genoa Summit. The G-8 agreed to support African efforts to resolve African problems.

Peace, stability and the eradication of poverty were seen as among the most important

challenges Africa faced in the new millennium. The G-8 also welcomed the New African

Initiative, which in their view was based on the principles of responsibility and

ownership, with an emphasis on democracy, transparency, good governance, rule of law,

and human rights as fundamental factors of development.

This initiative, in their opinion, provided the basis for “a new intensive

partnership” between Africa and the developed world. They pointed to the significant

progress that had been made on conflict resolution in several parts of Africa, but they still

argued that in many places conflict still remained a major obstacle to economic and social

development. They therefore, urged for continued commitment to conflict prevention,

management and resolution by the international community in partnership with African

governments, the African Union and Sub-regional organisations.22

On this basis, the G-8 pledged continued support to the consolidation of

democracy, pluralism, and electoral fairness in an increasing number of African

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countries. They encouraged similar progress towards political openness where democratic

principles and the rule of law were weak. They also stressed the importance of working in

partnership with African governments to improve access of African products to world

markets, attracting foreign direct investment, and the promotion of investment in key

social sectors, in particular health and education. They also pledged commitment to the

implementation of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which would

result in the release of resources for such expenditure.

They stated: We have decided today to forge a new partnership to address issues

crucial to African development. We are committed to promoting this objective with our

African partners and in multilateral fora - in the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF, and

in a new Round of WTO negotiation. Our partnership will support the key themes of the

New African Initiative, including:

· Democracy and political governance;

· Prevention and reduction of conflict;

· Human development, by investing in health and education, and tackling

HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, including through the Global AIDS and Health

Fund;

· Information and communications technologies;

· Economic and corporate governance;

· Action against corruption;

· Stimulating private investment in Africa;

· Increasing trade within Africa and between Africa and the world;

· Combating hunger and increasing food security.23

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To take this process forward, they decided that each of them will designate a high

level personal representative to liaise with committed African Leaders on the

development of a concrete Action Plan which was approved at the G8 Summit in

Canada.” With the above, the stage was set in motion in the new relationship with the

“development partners.” Since then, G-8 “personal representatives” have been appointed

as part of the G-8 Genoa decisions. They have been meeting and liasing with “committed

African Leaders” to develop a concrete “Action Plan” approved at Kananaskis, Alberta,

Canada on 26th and 28th June 2002. In a speech by one Robert R. Fowler, “Personal

Representative” of the Canadian Prime Minister for the G8 Summit African Plan

delivered to the Canadian Institute for international affairs on November 15, 2001,

Fowler had this to say about the NEPAD:

“In effect this initiative, this new partnership-

the NEPAD. ... Acknowledges that the current

approach to pursuing developing in Africa

simply has not worked and that there‟s not

enough to show for billions of dollars and

decades of development assistance. I think

also that the authors of the New African

Initiative understood full well that they had to

do something about it and something fast

because tolerance both inside and outside

Africa for this constant demand that we

reward failure and continue to reinforce it

without much reinforcing of success was a

paradigm that simply had to change. So

NEPAD offers a different kind of paradigm. It

offers the prospect of concentrating

engagement on those countries that are

prepared to take political and economic

decisions necessary to make this new plan

work. And the prospect of reinforcing success

in the Botswana‟s, the Namibia‟s, the South

Africa‟s, the Mozambique‟s, the Mali‟s and

Ghana‟s and Senegal‟s and lots more”24

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With this understanding, the process of developing the G8 Africa Plan on the

basis that some countries will be isolated and marginalized while others are rewarded had

begun. The partnership was not to unite Africa to tackle its own problems, but to

disorganise them on the basis of new western philanthropy- a new recolonisation. The

process begun with the first meeting of the G-8 “personal representatives for Africa”

chaired by Fowler being held in London soon after the Genoa Summit. In addition to

these representatives, there was a “mixed bag” of African “Sherpas” who also

participated in these meetings.

The emerging structures of the NEPAD were also in place ready to take part in

these discussions. They included the NEPAD support secretariat, headed by Professor

Wiseman Nkulu, who is President Mbeki‟s Economic Advisor; and the five-nation

steering Committee, which included South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Senegal and Algeria.

The president of this entire process is President Obasanjo of Nigeria. In addition, the

African Union agreed to the nomination of 15 members of the implementation

committee, which will also participate in deliberations relating to this initiative with the

partners. This is the same committee we referred to above which met in Abuja to agree

mechanisms for implementation. The task of the G-8 “personal representatives for

Africa” is to prepare a response to the African Initiative.25

This response will then form the basis of a G-8 Action Plan. Fowler in his speech

stated that their response will consist of their own conclusions about how to make

NEPAD work, deciding which challenges to take up immediately. He added: “It's quite

possible that as time progresses we will decide to expand that focus and move into other

areas. But what we want to do is some things, a relatively small number of things right

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and to demonstrate that this paradigm can be changed.” This will, according to him, will

determine the “Sherpa process.” The process is also supposed to involve the United

Nations and key non-G8 development partners, many of who, according to Fowler “have

been an awful lot more generous to Africa than most G8 countries and more committed

in their support.” He gave examples of The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and all

members of what is being called “the G point 7” Group.

What the G-8 was doing was to ensure that the G-8 Africa Action Plan was both

focused and coherent “and not the standard kind of summit Christmas tree which tends to

lump together a variety of disparate initiatives.” The G-8 Africa Plan is to “add real value

to addressing the systemic challenges which are confronting Africa.” These include the

binding commitments to reduce by half the number of people living in extreme poverty

by 2015; the provision of universal education-universal access to primary education also

by 2015; to eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary school enrollment by

2005; and reducing infant and child mortality ratios by two-thirds by 2015, to reducing

maternal mortality ratios by three-quarters by 2015, to providing access to all to

reproductive health services by 2015 and implementing strategies for sustainable

development by the same year.26

As we saw above, these are the basic objectives, which

the NEPAD seeks to address immediately. The long-term objectives of NEPAD are

poverty eradication, sustainable development, the demarginalisation of Africa in the

globalisation process and the promotion of the role of women in all activities.27

More specifically, it aims for a real GDP growth rate in excess of 7% per annum,

on average, over the next fifteen years. In addition, it aims to meet the agreed

International Development Goals (IDGs) which are:

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* Reducing the proportion of people living in extreme

poverty by a half between 1990 and 2015;

* 100% primary school enrolment by 2015;

* Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary

enrolment by 2005;

* Reducing infant and child mortality rates by two-thirds

and maternal mortality by three-quarters between 1990 and

2015;

* Achieving full access to reproductive health services by

2015; and implementing national strategies for sustain-

able development by 2005 so as to reverse the loss of

environmental re-sources by 2015.28

The G8, from Genoa and Muskoka Summits, undertook commitments designed to

support Africa in its new development path. Particularly, key development-related

commitments were made by G8 members as observed above in Kananaskis, Canada in

2002, Gleneagles, Scotland in 2005, which included doubling aid to Africa and L‟Aquila,

Italy in 2009. By and large, the above commitments by the G8 members are at the

forefront of the partnership with Africa. Along with relevant sector specific

commitments, notably, the G8 2009 L‟Aquila Food Security Initiative and the 2010

Muskoka Initiative on Maternal and Child Health, together these represent a critical

juncture for assessing the attainment of the MDGs by Africa and G8 partners‟

commitments in support of Africa‟s development priorities.29

Financing NEPAD

NEPAD is estimated to cost USD64 billion annually. At its Summit, the G8 promised

only USD6 billion. This amount was already mentioned in Monterrey where USD12

billion inaid had already been approved for developing countries, half of it would go to

Africa. Yet, it is estimated that if most of the wealth stolen from Africa and placed in

Western Banks could be returned to Africa, nobody would need the G8.

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NEPAD appeals for massive Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) based on

recognition that his source of funding is dwindling. Paragraph 38 of the NEPAD

document states, “The first priority is to address investors' perception of

Africa…especially with regard to security of property rights, regulatory frameworks and

markets.”30

This position is consistent with the policies of IMF and the World Bank

advocated over the last two decades. Partnership in this sense is seen as assurance to

multinational corporations, commercial banks, and international financial and trade

institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO, that Africa is investable, that it is

easy to repatriate wealth and that it provides a secure environment for investors.

Empirical evidence shows, however, that private capital flows usually follow

economic growth - and there is no such growth in Africa. UNCTAD‟s 2000 report

reveals that Africa, with its poor growth prospects, has attracted very little FDI. Investors

will certainly not be lured by promises of good governance and democracy. As the same

report shows, Africa's share in FDI has declined from a yearly average of 2% in 1990-

1994 to less than 1% since 1999.31

Understanding Key Frameworks of NEPAD

Although, NEPAD was initially criticized from others who viewed it as an overwhelming

neoliberal orientation, it has been acclaimed to be an opener of new chapter of history in

Africa to achieve a common vision and a firm and shared conviction to eradicate poverty

and to place Africa on a path of sustainable growth and development (NEPAD 2001).

That is, NEPAD was constructed as Africa's organic political product designed to pull the

continent out of its past developmental limbo by setting it on the path to peace, security,

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democracy, good political and economic regional governance, and respect for the rule of

law in the new millennium.

The key frameworks NEPAD are:

Peace and Security Governance

NEPAD places emphasis on peace and security as prerequisites for development.

The NEPAD Initial Action Plan presented to and endorsed by the inaugural summit of the

African Union (AU) in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, clearly underlined this. The

Action Plan indicated that NEPAD is based on a three-pronged strategy, the first element

of which is establishing conditions for sustainable development, including peace and

security and improved governance. To reinforce this, it proposed a Peace and Security

Initiative, designed to support the efforts and conflict management mechanisms of the

AU and regional organizations. The AU Summit in 2002 underscored particular elements

of the NEPAD Initial Action Plan by adopting a Protocol establishing a Peace and

Security Council (PSC). The Council is envisaged as the collective security mechanism

for the continent, and it is intended to ensure timely and effective response to conflict and

crises.32

The PSC in conjunction with the chairperson of the commission can institute

sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a member

state. That is, it has the power and authority not only to undertake peace-making and

peace-building functions, but also to recommend to the assembly intervention in

situations where the national independence and sovereignty of a member state is

threatened by acts of aggression. Although security was traditionally regarded in

predominantly military terms as maintenance of territorial integrity or national

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sovereignty, it is now considered as a much broader, and as inextricably linked to

development.

Indeed, it is increasingly apparent that while insecurity threatens development, so

too lack of development undermines security. In this sense, Cilliers argued that “where

resources are scarce, as is the case across much of the continent, the object of political

contestation is to secure economic consumption - which in turn is best guaranteed by

capturing state power or replacing the state in a particular region, such as in the Kivu's in

eastern DRC.”33

NEPAD ties its ability to maintain peace to the availability of „peace funds,‟34

lack of funds has been pointed out as the main reason for the difficulties facing the AU

peace-keeping force in Darfur. The mission is reported to face severe shortages of

resources, making it difficult to reach out to the hungry and starving people in the region.

In order to make it successful, the mission requires funds from the international

community for motor vehicles, helicopters, and ambulances, and this is where NEPAD

looks upon the foreign partners for assistance.

As an evolving new security architecture in Africa, nevertheless, the AU/NEPAD

security regime pursue strengthening the capacities of regional organizations in conflict

management and resolution through maximizing the use of domestic but also external

resources. In this context, NEPAD has already served to attract external resources from

Africa's development partners towards peace and security. Although these various

assistances have been limited to logistics, NEPAD has played its important role in

providing opportunities for cooperation between Africa and Western powers in

strengthening the fragile security structures on the continent.35

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Economic and Regional Governance

NEPAD is geared toward establishing an enabling environment for FDI in the continent.

That is, the FDIs occupy the center stage in NEPAD's development strategy and resource

mobilization. In this sense, NEPAD postulates that increased private capital flow to

Africa is an essential component of a sustainable long-term approach to filling the

resource gaps.36

Given that Africa's inability to deal with the process of globalization is

an outcome of structural impediments in the form of resource outflows and unfavorable

terms of trade,37

nevertheless, it seems uncertain that FDIs help address these problems as

long as globalization has “increased the ability of the strong to advance their interests to

the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, finance and technology.”38

Admittedly, NEPAD faced resistance from others who regarded it as an attempt

by more powerful countries to entrench their domination. Within the context of the

neoliberal programs embodied in NEPAD centered on the free market, informed by the

logic of trickledown economics and with a number of conditionalities, some critics

pinpoint that NEPAD can at best worsen rather than reduce poverty .The skeptics see that

the local benefits from globalization are far outrun by the globalizers' activities that

deplete local resources without generating development.39

Another important NEPAD's

mission is to pursue debt reduction and cancellation.

Over US$200 billion debt burden for Africa is the single biggest obstacle to the

continent's development. Most of this debt is illegitimate in nature, having been incurred

by despotic and unrepresentative regimes. African countries spend almost US$14 billion

annually on debt service. In order to address the debt burden, thus, the Heavily Indebted

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Poor Countries (HIPC) program was initiated by the World Bank and International

Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996.

Yet, Africa's recent disappointment came from the G8 meeting in Gleneagles,

Scotland in July 2005. In fact, the G8 deal fell short of the promises of 100% debt

cancellation made by G8 officials in 2004, and it did not take full effect until 2006. The

deal still leaves the majority of African countries on “debt row,” required to meet harmful

economic conditions as a condition for future debt relief or cancellation.40

Since the IMF has restructured HIPC in 1996,41

nonetheless, the initiative has had

notable success, both in terms of the levels of relief it has delivered, and in ensuring that

this relief is channeled towards poverty reduction. To date, relief totaling more than

US$60 billion was agreed for 32 countries only 23 (18 African countries) countries have

received full cancellation), reducing their debts by around two-thirds, and freeing up

resources for spending on poverty reduction. Poverty-reducing expenditures in countries

that receive HIPC assistance are projected to have increased from 6.4% of GDP in 1999

to 8.4% of GDP in 2007.42

Yet, the debt relief under HIPC, though necessary for some

short-term economic growth, is certainly not sufficient for long-term sustainable

development.

And it has come to most of African countries under HIPC with serious socio-

economic problems such as unemployment through donor dictated structural policies of

privatization. Moreover, these countries are threatened to be stripped of many

strategically important national assets through a reckless privatization program that was

not adequately monitored for its economic and social effects on the people. Thus,

although HIPC attempted to tackle its shortcomings by expanding its definition of

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unsustainable debts, making greater relief available to more countries, and by making

relief available sooner, it still remains to be seen whether the money spent in debt

repayment will be re-channeled toward just reducing poverty or ultimately eradicating it

in Africa and seize the momentum of development.

For a long-term development strategy, indeed, NEPAD recognizes sub-regional

and regional approaches as necessary for achieving economic growth and sustainable

development through improving Africa's competitiveness, considering that as markets

most African countries are small.43

The NEPAD document notes that “the five sub-

regional economic groupings on the continent must be strengthened,”44

and that sub-

regional and regional approaches to development “will also go a long way in kick-

starting the regeneration of the continent.”45

As noted earlier, regional governance approaches within the LPA and the Abuja

treaty establishing the AEC employ the term 'region' or 'regional integration' to refer to

geographically-based regional groupings within Africa. Since the NEPAD's inception, in

fact, the NEPAD initiators intended to use the RECs as the building blocks of NEPAD

and have the role of guiding and facilitating the implementation of projects and programs

under the NEPAD framework. Common markets that connect member states and

encourage interregional economic cooperation contribute to the realization of this goal.

In this context, it can be noted that the Common Market for Eastern and Southern

Africa(COMESA) is one of such formation that generates regional and interregional trade

and economic cooperation; however, basing economic integration on geographic location

often leads to the questioning of the rationale regarding the inclusion of members from

outside the geographic vicinity.46

Considering that NEPAD failed to go beyond referring

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to 'the goals of achieving a Common Market and an African Union', moreover, it needs to

further strengthen regional integration mechanisms through developing and evolving the

AEC plan.

Currently, more important and urgent task to address is that rationalisation and

capacity building must be undertaken before the RECs can fully discharge their

responsibility for implementation. According to NEPAD, in fact, no rigorous assessment

of the capacity of national governments and the secretariats of the RECs was conducted

before assigning them responsibility for leading the implementation of NEPAD

programs. Thus, it is essentially required of strong political will to lead rapid

rationalization of the RECs through strengthening capacity building which has been

initiated with the support of the African Capacity Building Foundation, though the

progress of capacity building remains slow.

Political and Democratic Governance

The APRM, described as an „African solution to Africa‟s problems,‟ committed African

leaders to promoting and holding one another to account for the quality of governance in

their respective states, through a process of peer review and lesson-sharing. The process

was designed to be free from external (read neo-colonial) influences, and was meant to be

funded entirely by the African states that acceded to the mechanism. The APRM

generated so much interest in the west precisely because it emerged at a time when the

prevailing thinking amongst the donor community was that unless African peoples took

ownership of the solutions for Africa‟s governance problems, it was becomingly

increasingly remote that the donor influence would be able to achieve any significant

development targets.

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By 2004, Ghana became the first state to begin the self-assessment process that

ultimately concludes with a country report being presented before the other participating

member states on a country‟s governance standards and practices. In 2005, the West

African nation was joined by Kenya, Rwanda and Mauritius who launched their own

processes. The APRM was now also supported by the key institutions of the APR Panel

of Eminent Persons and a Secretariat based in Midrand, Johannesburg.

The Panel of Eminent Persons was responsible for maintaining the standards and

integrity of the APRM process at national level, whilst the Secretariat coordinated the

logistical and practical arrangements that facilitated the lengthy and convoluted process

of preparing the Country reports. Whilst there were some early wrinkles to be ironed out,

the early country experiences suggested that not only was the APRM an innovative idea,

but that it was having innovative effects in the countries which were implementing it.

In 2005, 16 countries had acceded to the APRM on a voluntary basis. By 2007,

another 14 states had seen the value in joining the mechanism, this figure brings the total

number of African countries embracing the scheme to 30 as 2010; and between

December 2011 and May 2013 (at the 21st AU Summit of Heads of State and

Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) four other countries joined bringing to 34 the

total number of participating nations.47

Yet, despite the early indicators that suggested the

APRM could profoundly impact the governance practices of participating states, it began

to lose momentum by 2008.

Resignations and terminations saw the APR Panel reduced in size and capacity to

oversee the quality of the review process in the APRM member states. Furthermore, the

fixed terms of its members had expired, but no extensions had been approved or

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replacements provided for the existing Panel members. The secretariat was likewise

denuded of capacity with the vacation of the office of its Executive Director, and no

replacement selected. Furthermore, the institutional status of the APRM Secretariat itself

was causing massive headaches for the staff who worked there.

With no formal host agreement between the APRM Secretariat and the South

African Government, the travel arrangements of the Secretariat staff became a logistical

nightmare, with visas and work permits creating institutional uncertainty over the future

of the unit within South Africa. The relocation of the unit to Addis Ababa was mooted at

this time, further complicating the institutional functioning of the Secretariat staff.

At the same time, the continental leadership of the APRM was becoming

increasingly unclear. The two early protagonists, South Africa‟s Thabo Mbeki, and

Nigeria‟s Olusegun Obasanjo, had both reach the limit of their two-term Presidencies,

and were no longer part of the APR Forum of Heads of State and Government. The APR

Forum was responsible for taking the decisions that could resolve the institutional

challenges in the Panel and Secretariat, but with no clear champion for the APRM, critics

of the mechanism began composing its obituary, consigning it to the growing scrap-heap

of well-meaning but poorly executed African initiatives that had gone before.

Concurrently, the funding of the APRM became an issue. Despite protestations

that the APRM should be funded by Africa membership fees and the national government

should cover the costs of a review, the reality of the APRM funding process has never

lived up to these ideals, with the possible exception of South Africa, from a limited

perspective. In almost all participating states conducting reviews, the APRM process has

been supported by the donor community in that country. Thus, donors along with other

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stakeholders in the APRM process began to enthuse less about the APRM‟s innovation

and focus more on results. It was this question that began to expose some of the original

documents which guide the APRM process from accession to implementation.48

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is designed to monitor and assess

the progress made by African countries in meeting their commitment toward achieving

good governance and sustainable development. A positive aspect of the APRM is that it

notes that governance problems are central determinants of Africa's development

challenges. Indeed, one of the most innovative features of NEPAD has been referred to

the APRM.

Given that the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs was of

paramount importance for African leaders to maintain their regime security, moreover, an

introduction of the APRM can be highly acclaimed for opening a new history of

establishing a governance instrument targeted at domestic issues.49

In this regard, it is

argued that “the APRM presents opportunities for strengthening democracy to ensure that

the basis of governance transcends the narrow confines of personal rule, patron-client

relations or ethno-religious politics.”50

The peer review is done by a seven-member

Independent Panel of Eminent Persons (IPEP), which conducts countries through the

various stages of the review process.

Instead of policing the actions of the acceding governments, the ultimate goal of

theAPRM is to assist governments in their commitment to good governance through

helping countries adopt optimal policies, standards, and practices that lead to political

stability, economic growth, and sustainable development. Thus, submission to the review

process is 'voluntary' and there exist no sanctions placed upon wrongful governments. In

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this context, countries which signed up have possibilities to opt out if the process proves

intrusive. Moreover, the AU lacks the power to compel countries to either sign up to the

review process or comply with standards of good governance. This is a major limitation

that has left the APRM under the aegis of the AU as a “lame leviathan.”51

Within this context, another critical point for the APRM to overcome is the issue

regarding its ranking system. The ranking system was recommended by the Canadian

Prime Minister Jean Chretien, in his speech delivered at the UN Summit in Monterrey,

Mexico on March 21 2002. Under the system, African countries would be ranked from 1

to 53, in three areas: good governance, human rights and corporate governance. The idea

of ranking countries is that top performers will be eligible for an enhanced package of aid

and investment from the developed countries.

However, African leaders tend to be reluctant to criticize others on human rights

and on sensitive political issues. For this reason, even though the APRM requires African

governments to agree on certain performance standards, and the criteria of evaluating

their performances in terms of economic, corporate, and political governance, it is

intrinsically limited to achieve good results. Moreover, some critics have expressed fears

that the Western powers could attempt to utilize the APRM to sanction African countries

selectively, as has occurred over Zimbabwe.52

That is, the review mechanism could

become an instrument through which “donors impose collective penalties on African

countries in cases where African leaders who are declared pariahs by external actors are

not sanctioned by their African peers.”53

The aforementioned critical perspectives on the APRM has opened up

considerable room for African civil society organisations to seek out parallel processes to

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hold African governments and leaders accountable to their stated commitments and

decisions. Indeed, civil society participation in the APRM process is crucial to the

credibility of the review process as it will help ensure that the review report represents a

consensus of views on a country's quality of governance, rather than being limited to

what the government in question would like to make public. In this sense, civil society is

seen to act as a watchdog over the credibility of the country reviews.

However, civil society can and should be more than just a watchdog. It often has

more information on local circumstances and specific issues than government -

information which can add range and depth to the peer review. Most importantly perhaps,

peer review represents a window of opportunity for civil society to influence policy and

translate policy into credible commitment. Although, it would be naive to think that the

peer review process will induce massive governance improvements in no time at all, this

does not mean that the process cannot lead to real changes within a meaningful time

span.54

Progress Made by Africa over the Past Decade

Without a doubt, Africa has made good and significant progress in improving political

and socio-economic governance policies and implementation. Relative successes have

been recorded in governance, conflict management systems, peace and security;

economic growth and public fiancé management; and women‟s empowerment. On a

sector basis, the Continent has pushed forward targeted development policies and

programmes on Agriculture and Food Security; Infrastructure; Education; Health; Trade

and Market Access; Information and Communications Technology; Environmental

Sustainability and Science and Technology.

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(a) Peace and Security

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) championed by the African

Union, has been instrumental in advancing sustainable conditions for

development on the continent. Through the five main pillars of APSA including,

the peace and Security Council, Continental Early Warning System, and African

Standby Force, the AU has intervened in conflict situations including Burundi

(AU mission in Burundi-AMIB), Darfur, Sudan (AU Mission in Darfur, AMIS,

followed by the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Somalia, AMISOM). Indeed, crisis

points and number of fragile states on the continent have reduced with rising

growth recorded in many post-conflict countries in the course of the past

decade.55

(b) Democracy and Good Governance

Democracy and good governance are taking foothold in Africa more than ever

before. Multi-party elections are now the norm rather than the exception.56

In

2002; African countries adopted the Declaration on Democracy, Political,

Economic and Corporate Governance and the Charter on Democracy, Elections

and Governance in 2003, demonstrating commitment of the continent‟s Leaders

to strengthen democracy.57

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a prime and credible

model for good governance. A voluntary and novel monitoring policy instrument

and direct offshoot of the AU declaration,58

as observed earliear, currently 34 (as

at January 2014) AU member states have acceded to the Mechanism and opened

up their governance systems for the review and assessment. Out of this 34; 17

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countries which include Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Algeria, Ethiopia, Rwanda,

Mauritius, Uganda, Benin, Burkina Faso and Lesotho among others have

completed the peer review process and are on the second report.59

The APRM

focuses on four main facets of governance and thematic areas, namely:

Democracy and Political Governance; Economic Governance and Management;

Corporate Governance and Socio-economic Development.60

At the continental level, the Constitutive Act of 2000 establishing the AU

prohibits the unconstitutional change of governments as a means of ensuring that

democratic standards, codes and principles are respected by member-states.61

Uniquely, while preserving the established international practice of respect for the

principle of non-interference by any Member state in the internal affairs of

another, Africa has led the world in inscribing in its regional legislative document

the right of the African Union to intervene in a member country pursuant to an

Assembly decision in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes,

genocide and crimes against humanity.62

The AU has also displayed zero tolerance for unconditional changes of

government through a provision in its Constitutive Act. Since the adoption of the

Act, six African countries (Mali and Guinea-Bissau being the most recent in 2011

and 2012) have been suspended for unconstitutional change of governments, and

two of them were only reinstated after restoring democratic governance. Infact,

over a decade, Africa is transforming its governance landscape through a

collective approach of peer learning and sharing for effective development.63

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(c) Economic Growth and Public Finance Management

Since the early 2000s, the macroeconomic fundamentals including the average

growth rate on the continent have been steadily rising at a fast rate of 3-5%

compared to the negative rates of previous decades and by world standard.

Though, this growth trajectory was interrupted by the global financial and

economic crisis, good progress is being made by African economies attributed to

sound promotion economic and corporate governance systems.

Notably, marked improvements in public financials management have

been achieved regarding budgetary management, tax systems, reduction in costs

of doing business, support services for policy coordination and coherence,

contract enforcement, public sector accountability and transparency, as well as, a

more conductive environment for private investment and growth. The World

Bank observed that sound macro-economic policies have helped Africa to quickly

rebound from the global economic downturn.

Specifically, „Doing business‟ in Africa has now changed for the better.

The rate on investment on the continent is one of the most attractive globally,

signifying that Arica is ready for business. Investment opportunities are

expanding in relatively fast growing see as telecommunication, banking

agriculture, infrastructure, energy and consumer goods. This is a great potential

for lasting growth, wealth creation and prosperity on the continent.

(d) Domestic Resources for Development

Having reorganized that the primary responsibility for Africa‟s development lies

within the continent itself, African governments are actively mobilizing domestic

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resources for their programs and projects. Internally generated revenue in Africa

improved significantly from U$$129 billion (1997-2002), to U$$472 billion in

2008. Domestic revenue represented 94% of total sources of financing for Africa

in 2009.

This is now the major source of Africa in 2009. This is now the major

source of development finance, reflecting the continent‟s commitment to

mobilizing domestic savings and public revenues for development, as

complementary to external development assistance. In all, domestic resources

improved four-fold between 2002 and 2008 showing strong commitment by

African countries to mobilize local funds for their development projects.64

(e) Attaining the MDGS

Africa is moving in the right direction regarding attaining the MDGs. NEPAD, as

the AU strategic framework, has provided the response mechanism to support the

achievement of the MDGs. Thus, NEPAD is intrinsically liked to the continent‟s

quest to achieve the MDGs. Broadly, over the ten year period; progress towards

MDGs in Africa is mixed with good record in net primary school enrolment,

gender parity in primary education, political empowerment of women, access to

safe drinking water, debt sustainability targets curtailing the spread of HIV/AIDS.

An important element of the positive progress registered is the successful

establishment by countries of a wide-range of African-led institutional

innovations to facilitate progress towards MDG attainment. African governments

have embraced new and expanded social protection programmes; MDGs-based

planning; decentralization of MDGs mechanisms from improved services

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delivery; and national policy coordination and harmonization systems. In all, the

increasing political support for the MDGs is worthy of note, as the AU Assembly

tracks progress on MDG attainment on an annual basis. The progressive steps in

realizing the targets especially in areas of education and gender are

commendable.65

(f.) Implementation of Africa’s Priority-sectorProgrammes

National and continental efforts towards implementing Africa‟s commonly-

identified and agreed sector policy frameworks are being consolidated and

strengthened. Key focus areas include:

i. Agriculture and Food Security

A historic change is underway in Africa‟s agriculture sector focusing on the

implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development

Programme (CAADP), spearhead by the AU and NEPAD. Agriculture sector‟s

performance on the continent has been positive and improving in recent years

wherein all regions witnessed an increase in average agricultural growth rates of

approximately 3.0% between the 1990s and 2008. In 2010, 10 African countries

met the 6% growth rate while 19 others attained moderate agriculture GDP

growth rates of 3 to 6%. Out of the 25 countries that have presently signed the

CAADP Compact, 19 countries have formulated CAADP-based investment plans

and these have been independently reviewed and validated.

ii. Infrastructure

The adoption of the programme for infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)

as the integrated continent-wide vision, strategic framework and agenda for

220

infrastructure development is a major policy-measure focusing on development of

infrastructure on the continent. The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA)

was established by some G8 countries to support Africa‟s infrastructure

endeavours. While a lot is being done through the development of transport

corridors, sub-regional energy pools, water and sanitation, and aviation reforms,

ICT sector has been growing at a phenomenal rate in Africa. Investments in the

mobile phone sector which is the most dominant ICT category jumped from U$$

8.1 billion in 2005 to almost U$$70 billion in 2010.

Revenue from mobile phone operations has become a major source of

revenue for most African countries averaging 7% of tax receipts. The number of

mobile phone users has also increased from 11milion in 2000 to 200 million in

2005 and now approaching the 400 million mark.66

Recently in January 2011,

African leaders signaled their commitment to prioritising the implementation of

regional infrastructure projects through the adoption of the presidential

infrastructure Champion Initiative. The AU-NEPAD initiative focuses on political

sponsoring and championing of key cross-border and regional infrastructure

projects for delivery and impact. In specific, seven (7) regional-focused projects

have been endorsed for high-level interventions and support to advance

implementation action in infrastructure.

(g) Gender and Women Empowerment

51 out of the 53 (now 54) AU member States have ratified the Convention on the

Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and several

countries had aligned their national legislations to the provision of CEDAW. Over

221

70% of AU Member-States formulated national gender policies and national

action plans for implementation while a number of pro-gender specific

legislations have been enacted at national level. It is evident that women

participation in political representation, economic and corporate life has improved

significantly in the last decade.

At the decision making level the continent has seen a rapid increase in the

representation of women at regional, national and local parliament. Evidently, the

empowerment of African women is no longer a political slogan but concrete

deliverables are being achieved at national level as we have seen in Nigeria,

Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Tunisia, Malawi, Cameroon,

Ethiopia, South Africa, and Algeria just to mention a few.67

Challenges and Drawbacks

Africa remains a continent in transition with some success stories to tell. However,

challenges still exist, requiring strong African actions and partnership support. Pro-

market macroeconomic policies have not created enough jobs, especially for Africa‟s

fast-growing urban youth. Positive average growth rates on the continent need to be

translated into inclusive growth and poverty reduction.

Thus, a lot still needs to be done in employment creation; sustainability and

consolidation of good governance; addressing pockets of protracted crisis points for

lasting peace and security; modernizing public sector for better services delivery;

eliminating corruption; promoting intra-regional trade and investment, meet the MDGS

especially health-related goals; domestic resource mobilization; work harder on value-

222

adding for raw materials; and develop and effectively utilize human and institutional

capacities, particularly for public policy design and implementation.68

(a) The MDGs Challenge

Serious concerns still remain in attaining the MDGs. Africa has the highest

proportion of people living in extreme poverty within the developing nations.

Slower progress is recorded in addressing poverty reduction, unemployment,

environmental sustainability and most health-related goals. With less than two

years remaining to the set date for MDGs attainment, some African countries may

not be able to achieve these internationally agreed development goals. Factors

such as the additional burden posed by the adverse impact of global financial,

food, energy and climate crises; and weak employment growth have restrained

MDGs achievement. The global partnership for the MDGs has also fallen short of

its promises due principally to the lack of political will and fallen through on

commitments made by some G8 and OECD countries.

(b) The Partnership Constraint

Africa, with the inception of the AU and its NEPAD Programme at the beginning

of the new millennium, prioritized cooperation and partnership to support Africa‟s

development goals. Official Development Assistance (ODA) Plays a critical role

in this equation but constraints associated with aid disbursement, management

and delivery remain. Also Aid within the broad context of development and its

alignment with Africa‟s consensual sectoral priorities are challenges to be

addressed. For instance, ODA investment in agriculture has increased in recent

years, a large and increasing share is still devoted to short-term food aid

223

interventions. The current level of ODA disbursements under the African Food

Security Initiative is far below the expected pledges.

On the other hand, the G8 and OECD members are supportive of Africa‟s

health systems and health capacities. ODA commitments of health in Africa

increased from US$5.4 billion in 2005 to US$9.4 billion in 2008, though the bulk

of the funding is directed at infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS. Through G8

support, the Global Fund for AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) was

established and consequently fully funded. African countries were able to provide

Anti-Retro Viral (ARV) therapy to nearly 3 million people in 2008, an increase of

39% from 2007. Africa has been able to reverse to some degree the scourge of

HIV/AIDS and TB while immunization rates have also improved substantially

and the fight against malaria being consolidated.

Addressing the issues in the current international aid architecture is

fundamental. These include the fulfillment of the commitments by Africa‟s

development partners and the effectiveness of Aid, which remains a cause for

concern. Conditionality is still a serious challenge and progress on this

commitment has been limited, despite the pledge to improve performance in this

area through the framework of Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action

(AAA).

In particular, use and strengthening of country systems and mutual

accountability has been slow to materialize. Continental response has been the

recent establishment by the AU and NEPAD of the Africa platform for

Development Effectiveness (APDev) as an organizing mechanism focusing on

224

Aid Effectiveness, South-South partnerships with Capacity Development as the

core driver to achieve results. Primarily, APDev meets the NEPAD objective to

systematically engage OECD/DAC and strengthen the African voice in the reform

of the Aid architecture.69

(c) G8 Delivery on Commitments

Collectively, the G8 is significantly off-course to meet its 2005 Gleneagles

commitment to substantially increase Aid to Africa. Over the course of the past

decade, the gap between the promises of the G8 and Africa‟s other development

partners on ODA remains wide. Though ODA to Africa increased from US$29.5

billion in 2004 to an estimated US$ 46 billion in 2010 (around US$40 billion in

2004 prices), it is still far below the commitment of the projected sum of US$ 64

billion (using 2010 prices). By this, Africa has received only about half of the

increase implied based on the 2005 commitment resulting in a large shortfall

estimated at about US$18 billion in 2010 prices.

More appreciably, G8 partners need to consistently set out or agree on

detailed plans as to how monitor the ODA increase of US$25 billion and sectoral

commitments, made at the various Summits particularly Gleneagles. However, G8

effort to account for the delivery of its commitment on a global scale through the

2010 Muskoka Accountability Report is well acknowledged by Africa as a major

step in the right direction. Bridging the gap in delivering commitments by both

sides will adequately address issues of quality, quantity, predictability and timely

delivery of ODA to Africa, without conditions that limit the policy and

225

implementation space available to African countries. Indeed, this will lend the

essential partnership support to Africa‟s development and reforms.70

Conclusion

The New Partnership for Africa-NEPAD is a product of the continuing search by African

people and its leaders to create pan-African structures that can lead to the social and

economic transformation of the continent in a rapidly “globalising world.” On the other

hand, NEPAD is an instrument of contestation between Africans seeking self-

determination in their development efforts and those forces that seek the continuation of

the exploitation of the continent‟s resources upon which the accumulation of their wealth

depends. Since the initiative was created, a number of scholars and civil society

organizations have acutely criticized NEPAD as a top-down, elitist and state-centric

approach bound to fail.

In this context, NEPAD is seen to be widely considered to be a closed system that

has shut its doors against bonafide stakeholders including civil society organizations. The

organization is still undergoing an acceptability test from the African citizenry who were

not consulted at the formative stage of the initiative. Hence, the debate on how to engage

the activities and further expand the reciprocal relationships between NEPAD and civil

society organization should be upheld.

It is encouraging, however, that the debate on the APRM has opened up space for

African civil society organizations to establish “parallel processes” to hold African

leaders accountable to their stated commitments. Indeed, the continent has witnessed a

multitude of conferences involving civil society actors, NEPAD officials and African

leaders, although this has not been diffused throughout the whole continent.

226

From the perspective of Afro-pessimism, NEPAD has been severely attacked by

the critics who argue that the initiative have undertaken a priori a commitment to uphold

and strengthen the Development Merchant System (DMS) and its neoliberal economic

policy, perpetuating economic dependence instead of promoting economic self-reliance

and self-sustainment. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the problem with Africa is

not a matter of greater openness and/or integration.71

This implies that the real problem with Africa is not openness or a need for

greater integration per se, but rather is the nature of its openness/integration; that is,

dependence on primary commodities, lack of diversification in export, and the

unfavorable terms of trade is a source of the vulnerability of African economies.72

Hence,

these structural impediments to tackle will be key to the future direction and success of

NEPAD in particular dimension of economic and regional governance.

Despite the aforementioned skeptical concerns, an important aspect of the

NEPAD initiative is that, instead of donors and development institutions prescribing

policies that they would assist, the NEPAD initiative calls for development partners to

support policies and programs that are initiated and created by African themselves,

though they are not yet fully inclusive of whole African peoples including the grassroots,

civil society and a host of other stakeholders. That is, the initiative attempted to take

Africa away from the era of conditionality to where Africans themselves can set priorities

and impose conditions of good governance on themselves with a view to addressing the

fellow states' problems of 'ownership' and 'partnership'.73

Thus, NEPAD is distinct from previous African development strategies such as

the LPA and the AEC in that the former were defined as Africa-owned programmes at

227

least in theory with their own self-prescribed conditionalities in practice. Indeed, unlike

the externally-imposed conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank which

overshadowed the African continent for the last two or more decades, the NEPAD

architects developed self-identified and self-imposed conditions for improving the

prospects for reform sustainability in Africa.

Yet, the question of NEPAD's "ownership" remains controversial in that the

African continent has depended (and is depending) so much on external actors for its

financing. In fact, the unequal relationship between the West and Africa is intrinsically

linked to the lack of "reciprocity, complementarity or symbiosis that characterizes

genuine partnerships".74

To some extent, nonetheless, the sense of optimism created with

the advent of NEPAD in Africa can be compared to the euphoric mood of past

development experiences.

Just when the continent got deeply trapped into the state of darkness and despair,

African leaders have succeeded in putting a new face on the international image of Africa

by introducing an initiative that has managed to attract the attention of even the cynics

inside and outside the continent.75

Given that NEPAD seeks to build on the achievements

of the past, as well as reflect on the lessons learned through painful experience, so as to

establish a global, regional and local partnership that is both credible and capable of

implementation, thus, NEPAD should be given a chance to evolve into its inclusive and

balanced African development strategy in the 21st century.

228

Endnotes

1. S. Gelb, “South Africa‟s role and Importance in Africa and for the Development of the

African Agenda,” Paper prepared for the UK Department of International

Development (Braamfontein: Edge Institute, 2001): 8.

2. E. Nnadozie, “NEPAD, APRM and Institutional Change in Africa,” in The African

Union and the New Strategies for Development in Africa, ed. Said Adejumobi and

Adebayo Olukoshi (Dakar:DPMF and CODESRIA, 2009), 136-162.

3. R. M. Tawfik, “NEPAD and African Development: Towards a New Partnership

between Development Actors in Africa,” Council for the Development of Social

Science Research in Africa, African Journal of International Affairs11, no. 1(2008):

55–70.

4. Ibid., 60.

5. K.D. Hwang, “Some Reflections on African Development Strategies in the 21st

Century: From the LPA to NEPAD,”Journal of International and Area Studies,16, no.

2(2009), 125-142.

6. J. O. Adesina et al. Africa and Development Challenges in the New Millennium: The

NEPAD Debate, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2006), 15.

7. S. K. B. Asante, Implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Development

(NEPAD): Challenges and the Path to Progress(Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and

Sciences, 2006), 15.

8. Ibid., 16.

9. Ibid., 17.

10. A. Bujra, Pan-African Political and Economic Visions of Development:From the

OAU to the AU: From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for

African Development (NEPAD)(Addis Ababa: Development Policy Management

Forum, 2004), 17.

11. Ibid., 18.

12. D. Gopinath, “AFRICA: Doubt of Africa - Iraq Diverted Attention from Thabo

Mbeki's Sweeping African Development Initiative, Institutional Investor 28, no.5

(2003):107.

13. R. Hayman et al. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Internal

and External Visions (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, Centre of African Studies,

2003), 11.

229

14. D. W. Nabudere,“NEPAD: Historical Background and Its Prospects,” Prepared for

presentation at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa held in Nairobi, Kenya, 26

– 29 April, 2002, 13.

15. Ibid., 14.

16. AU, “The New Partnership for Africa‟s Development Document,” Abuja, 2001, 57.

17. Ibid., 58.

18. B.Y. Ikuli, The Philosophy of the New Partnership for Africa's Development

(NEPAD): A Critique (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 2006), 15.

19. R. Ilorah, “NEPAD: The Need and Obstacles,”African Development Review, 16, no. 2

(2006):223-251.

20. J.M. Luiz, The New Partnership for African Development: Africa's Response to its

Underdevelopment, ERSA Policy Paper, no.22. (Wits: Econometric Research

Southern Africa, 2003): 11.

21. S. Matthews, “Investigating NEPAD's Development Assumptions,”Review of African

Political Economy, no.7, (2004):497.

22. S. Mesple-Somps, “Le nouveau partenariat pour le developpement de l'Afrique

(NEPAD): trois elements de critique,”Revue Canadienne Des études du

Développement27, no. 2 (2006): 137-148.

23. Ibid., 149.

24. R. R. Fowler, Speechby the Personal Representative of the Canadian Prime Minister

for the G8 Summit African Plan delivered to the Canadian Institute for international

affairs on November 15, 2001, 15.

25. Ibid., 16.

26. T.J. Moss, African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors (Boulder:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 17.

27. AU, NEPAD, 15.

28. Ibid., 16.

29. AU Commission and NEPAD Agency, “Accountability Report on Africa-G8

Commitments: 2001-2010,” 2011, 6-7.

30. AU, NEPAD, 38.

230

31. UNCTAD Report, 2000, 10.

32. AU, NEPAD, 38.

33. AU Peace and Security Council Report, 2002, 3.

34. Ibid., 4.

35. Having acknowledged NEPAD as Africa's main development framework, the EU and

the US have assisted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

logistically in the latter's peace-keeping operations in the sub-region.

36. AU, NEPAD, Paragraph 153.

37. Ibid., Paragraph 34.

38. Ibid., Paragraph 33.

39. The oil-rich Niger Delta region is a case in point. For decades, successive Nigerian

governments have been beholden to the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) that

possess the technology, technical expertise, and capital to exploit the country's oil.

The exploitation has caused serious environmental damage, human-rights abuses,

economic oppression, and inequitable resource allocation.

40. Africa Action,Campaign to Cancel Africa's Debt, http://www.africaaction. org/

campaign new/debt.php (accessed 5/12/2012).

41.IMF‟s Modification of HIPC,

http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/ebook2/contents/part4(accessed 12 /11/2012).

42. DFID, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/mdg/debt-hipc-faqs.asp(accessed 12/12/ 2012).

43. The majority of African countries have small populations with gross domestic

products of less than US$4 billion. Thus, individually they do not provide attractive

markets nor the economies of scale to make major infrastructure investments

viable,http://www.triomedia. co.za/work/nepad/newsletters/2008/issue209_2 .(25/12/

20).

44. AU, NEPAD, Paragraph 94.

45. AU, NEPAD, Paragraph 191.

46. Egypt's membership in COMESA raises the question of the relevance of the

membership of a North African state to an Eastern and Southern African

organization. At the same time, the non-membership of South Africa in the

231

organization also raises questions among the proponents of regional economic

integration on the propriety of such exclusion.

47. Interview with Dr. Maiyaki, 14/ 07/12.

48. Ibid.

49. Interview with Dr. Abdoulie Janne, 04/ 05/12.

50. Interview with Prof. Said Adejumobi, 15/ 07/12

51. Ikuli, The Philosophy of the New Partnership, 16.

52. The EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in February 2002, and a month later

Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth body,

bttp://www.zimfa.gov.zw/cun-ent/004. Pdf (accessed 15/09/ 2012.

53. Ikuli, The Philosophy of the New Partnership, 17.

54. Indeed, lessons learnt from Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa where the peer

review has been conducted show that civil society in these four countries expressed

strong concern that government would either increasingly dominate the governing

council with government officials or would fill it with civil society representatives

considered to be government friendly.

55. Interview with Prof. Joram Biswaro, 13/07/12.

56. Interview with Dr. Maxwell M. Mkwezalamba, 13/07/12.

57. Interview with Dr. Ibrahim A. Mayaki, 14/ 07/12.

58. A chat with Dr. Jide M. Okeke, 14/07/12.

59. Ibid.

60. An audience with Dr. Bankole Adeoye, 04/05/12.

61. Interview with Dr. Michel Sidibe, 04/05/2012.

62. Interview Prof. Said Adejumobi, 15/07/2012.

63. An interaction with Dr. Donald Kabekuka, 15/07/2012.

64. World Bank Global Development Finance (2010) and International Monetary Fund

(IMF) Regional Outlooks (2010).

232

65. AU Commission and NEPAD Agency, “Accountability Report on Africa-G8

Commitments: 2001-2010,” 10.

66. United Nations International Telecommunication Report, 2010.

67. UNECA Presentation at the United Nations Special Summit on MDGs, Newyork,

September, 2010.

68. AU “Commission and NEPAD Agency,” 11.

69. Ibid., 12.

70. Ibid., 13.

71. AU, NEPAD, Paragraphs32 & 33.

72. Moss, “African Development,” 18.

73. Ibid., 18.

74. Ibid., 19.

75. Since 2001, no world leader could conclude a speech with relevance to Africa without

reference to NEPAD. The G8 has been pressured to introduce the Africa Action

Plan, Partnership Forums with regional clubs of the wealthy such as the EU have

been established, and discussions within South-South Cooperation fora on NEPAD

have taken place.

233

CHAPTER SIX

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION (LPA),

AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC) AND THE NEW PARTNERSHIP

FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD) ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

This chapter presents the comparative analysis of the three initiatives alongside their

treaties and level of achievements within the period in view.

Content of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)

The rationale for the development and introduction of LPA is located in the opening

paragraph to the preamble of the plan. African Heads of State and Government argued

that global development strategies for the first and second United Nations

Development Decades for the 1960s and 1970s did not fulfill Africa's dreams for socio-

economic development after independence.1

The immediate cause for the LPA was the

need to benefit from the opportunities of the approaching Third United Nations

Development Decade for the 1980s, and the need to create a national economic and

social order individually and collectively, in respect of the decision of the United

Nations General Assembly at its sixth Special Session in April/May 1974 to call for

a New International Economic Order.2

The LPA basically is a document with thirteen chapters, 354 paragraphs and

Annexes I to IV. In each chapter, the LPA explained the state of phenomenon being

addressed, general and specific actions to mitigate the problem, implementation plans,

researches where needed and projects and programmes that would be undertaken

individually and collectively. Chapter I centres on the state of food and agriculture on

234

the continent. It considered the areas of food losses, food security, food production,

forest production, research, extension services and other agricultural services.

Chapter II is on the industry in Africa and further declared the years 1980 to 1990

industrial development decade in Africa.3 Chapter III considered the potentials of

Africain terms of natural resources. Lack of information on resource endowments

was identified as a problem in this area. Africa needs to harness these resources to

finance development. Chapter IV considers the human resource development and

utilization and laments the growing underdevelopment and under-employment as well

as illiteracy problem in the continent.4

Chapter V centred on science and technology. This area noted as important in

raising African standard of living and for relieving misery in the rural areas.5 Science and

technology is also noted as important in creating and sustaining industrial sectors of the

continent. Chapter VI is on transport and communications. This area is viewed with

importance especially in promoting socio-economic integration of Africa and intra- and

extra-African trade.6 Chapter VII focused on trade and finance. The document notes the

vitality of domestic trade.7

It also considers ways of eliminating barriers to international

trade. This chapter considers ways of financial regulations, mobilizing

financialresources, domestic,8 and external

9 for development purposes.

Chapter VIII addressed measures to build up and strengthen economic and

technical cooperation including ways of creation of new institutions and strengthening

existing ones. Collective efforts are needed to establish institutions, which can help

member-states of the OAU to develop capabilities and infrastructure because some of

them are too poor to do so alone.10

Existing institutions include ECA, ADB, the

235

Association of African Central Banks and the African Institute for Economic

Development and Planning (IDEP).11

Chapter IX is on environment and development. Environmental problems of

African countries differ and need to be prioritized by individual countries.12

They include

desertification and drought, deforestation and soil degradation, marine pollution, human

settlements, mining etc. Cooperative efforts, education, training and legislation

areoutlined as requirements for control.13

Chapter X notes the plight of the least

developed African countries who deserve more attention. The countries need more

development Official Development Assistance (ODA), aid, debt cancellation.14

Chapter

XI is on energy and notes the increasing demand on energy supply, while decrying

continuous impact of rising prices of petroleum.

Chapter XII is on women and development and outlines strategies for

encouragement of women's efforts in all spheres and sectors of the economy.15

Specifically, it called for inclusion of women in higher administrative and policy making

levels. Chapter XIII is the last chapter and is centred on importance of development

planning, statistics and population planning.

The LPA document also has Annexes I to IV, Annex I is the Final Act of Lagos

(FAL). The plan of action and the implementation arrangements are stipulated therein.17

Annex II is on the resolutions on the participation of Africa in international negotiations.

The conclusion of the document is with vote of thanks, Annex IV.

Objectives, Goals and Characteristics of the Lagos Plan of Action

The LPA in 1980 articulated the objectives of economic development in Africaas:

i. the deliberate promotion of an increasing measure of national self-reliance;

ii. the acceleration of internally located and relatively autonomous process of growth

236

and diversification and the achievement of self-sustained development process;

iii. the democratization of the development process;

iv. the progressive eradication of mass poverty and unemployment and a fair,

justdistribution of income and the benefits of development among the populace;

and

v. the acceleration of the process of regional integration.

Specifically, African leaders committed themselves individually and collectively

to promote:

- human resource development;

- science and technology;

- food production and supply;

- industrial development;

- natural resource development;

- entrepreneur ship, technical manpower and technology abilities;

- environmental care;

- socio-cultural values and cultural identity; and

- development plans to accelerate rapid socio-economic development and

transform African states.19

The objectives and goals of the LPA were expected to be achieved between

1980-2000. The commitments of African leaders are expected to lead to creation at

national, sub-regional and regional levels of a dynamic and interdependent African

economy and which will in turn pave way for the establishment of an African common

market leading to an African economic community in the year 2000.20

237

The LPA emphasised self-reliance at two levels as a prerequisite for the

achievement of its objectives. At the first level, African leaders shall choose the

strategy of self-sustaining industrialisation and collective self-reliance. These in turn

demand the development of human resource to ensure full mobilisation for the

industrial development process, infrastructure will be needed, and energy will be

developed in different form to meet the need of Africa's growing population. The

development strategy emphasized effective control of African government on their

natural resources.21

The continent is endowed with abundant human and natural resources; the

problem lies in the lack of control and utilisation of these resources and lack of

utilisation of these resources for development. The strategy also called for increased

role of government in the process of socio-economic formation. Government are to

act as planners, to initiate planning networks, linkages, plan monitoring facilities,

control mechanisms, information systems and feedback. They are also to act as

allocators ofnational resources through fiscal and monitoring policies, incentives and

disincentives.22

At the second level, the strategy emphasised the establishment and strengthening

existing sub-regional economic cooperation arrangements towards the creation of an

African common market in the year 2000. The main objectives of the community will

include the promotion of development; cooperation and integration of its member

states in all economic, social and cultural fields for the purpose of fostering closer

relations improve standard of living and dignity of African peoples. The significance of

LPA fundamentally lies in the principles of self-reliance and self-sustaining strategy to

238

manage Africa's poverty and underdevelopment problems and in the quest for

regional integration.

In general, the LPA views self-reliance and self-sustainment in terms of capability

and capacity to make indigenous resources as primary for development and economic

growth. Instead of basing development on external demands for resources or internal

wants, self-reliance argues that it should be based on internal needs. The LPA also

argues that through cooperation and integration, African countries will be better

positioned to pool their development efforts together, instead of development on

individual basis. Through this, they will be in position to capture economies of scale

by sharing joint institutions and increasing agricultural and industrial production

capacities and take advantage of larger market.

The Provisions of the African Economic Commuinty (Abuja Treaty): An

Improvement on Restraint Mechanisms

The ultimate objective of the LPA was to establish a continent-wide economic

community.23

This, however, was to be contingent on the level of progress of integration

at the sub-regional and regional levels. In light of the poor performance of the LPA

inspired RECs, the signing of the Abuja Treaty establishing the AEC has been

controversial.

Fine and Yeo have summarised this perception in the following words: The fact

that African leaders, first in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980 and then in the

Abuja Treaty of 1991, have elected to pursue the quixotic goal of an African Common

Market – in spite of their continual failure to begin removing even the modest

impediments to the flow of goods and services within the region – would suggest that

239

their agenda is driven by political rather than economic considerations and by domestic

rather than regional pressures.24

However, proponents of the Abuja Treaty have hailed it as providing a continental

framework, with the potential of rationalising the continent‟s integration institutions and

organisations. It has been described as a giant step towards Africa‟s long-cherished goal

of unifying the fragmented and vulnerable national economies into a single, more

powerful economic bloc with a view to translating into reality the dream of pan-

Africanism and continental integration.25

Although, the Abuja Treaty has been showcased as the culmination of a long

process of efforts at continental consolidation, beginning with the OAU charter in 1963,

through various OAU summits to the LPA however, concerns about the risks of the

further weakening and marginalisation of Africa in the global economy against the

background of the resurgence of regionalism in the 1990s, constituted the most

immediate impulse for the signing of the Treaty.26

The Abuja Treaty marked the beginning of a shift in the orientation of and

approach to Africa‟s regional integration and cooperation.27

This was reflected in the

character of post-Abuja regional initiatives, which were based on the precepts of

economic openness and market efficiency. These initiatives embraced different principles

“for achieving progressive economic cohesion than their fate-driven predecessors which

were based on protectionist, closed economy policies of the kind which typically

pervaded development thinking in Africa, for more than three decades.”28

In this regard, the signing of the Abuja Treaty, rather than being the culmination

of the LPA inward-looking regionalism, could be seen as marking the beginning of the

240

capitulation of African governments to the ethos of the liberal paradigm. Not only did the

Abuja-inspired regional groupings reflect respect for and observance of certain

fundamental principles and basic undertakings, they equally shifted the exclusive focus

on government, to involving the people, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the

civil society and the private sector.29

This shift from states to markets, influenced by externally imposed structural

adjustment programmes (SAPS), has aimed at revamping the African development model

since 1985. This shift has resulted in what Percy Mistry has seen as “second generation”

integration attempts, gathering steam since 1992, certainly under the behest of the Abuja

Treaty. In principle, this new approach abandoned the “ossified, static, protected-fortress

approach” to integration among closed, state-run economies. It has been seen as “a means

of consolidating national economic policy shifts towards greater liberalisation, market

orientation, competitiveness and efficiency.”30

Nevertheless, like the LPA, post Abuja regional integration initiatives have had

to rely on achieving these ambitious objectives at the sub-regional and regional levels,

before attempting to achieve them at the global level, in a world where Africa has yet to

overcome a large number of disadvantages in order to compete.Therefore, like the LPA,

regional economic communities are central building blocks of the Abuja Treaty‟s

objective of establishing a pan-African community.31

Although, the Abuja treaty was signed in disregard of the failure of Africa‟s sub-

regional communities to achieve their stated objectives, it is seen to have inspired the

reform and transformation of the continent‟s regional economic groupings, supposedly

making them more likely to attain stated goals. For example, it led to the transformation

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of the PTA into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in

1994; it also saw the transformation of the Southern African Development and

consultative Council (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community

(SADC) in 1992; the re-lunching of the activities of the Economic Community of Central

African States (ECCAS) in 1998; the revival of the defunct East African Community

(EAC) in 1999; and more importantly, it brought about the review of the ECOWAS

Treaty in 1993.

The AEC inspired (revised treaties) of the various regional communities are said

to be more elaborate, containing measures that could help overcome the obstacles that

bedevilled the implementation of the earlier initiatives and specific arrangements to

enforce treaty agreements. Of particular importance are measures to harmonise national

strategies and policies with those of the region and to refrain from any unilateral action

that could hinder the attainment of the regional objectives. For example, member states

have pledged, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, “to take all

necessary measures to ensure the enactment and dissemination of such legislation as may

be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Abuja Treaty.”32

This has

been in light of the fact that dissimilarities and divergences in national laws and policies

of member states regulating key areas of cooperation have been a major legal impediment

to economic cooperation.33

In the area of community institutions, the AEC Treaty and the reviewed treaties

of RECs seem to have endowed them with greater powers of supranationality than had

been allowed under the LPA dispensation. For example, the Abuja Treaty establishes a

transparent organic link between the supreme institution of the Community and the

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member states. In this regard, Article 8(3) of the treaty confers on the Assembly of Heads

of State and Government, the supreme organ of the Community, power to „give

directives, coordinate and harmonise the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and

social policies of member states‟.

More importantly, the Abuja Treaty has made the decisions of the Community

binding on member states. For example, the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State,

and the resolutions of the Council of Ministers are binding on member states as well as

the subordinate institutions (Article 10(1) and Article 13(2)). The revised treaties of

Africa‟s major RECs have all adopted this binding character of community decisions on

states from the AEC.34

Besides, unlike the LPA and the earlier regional communities, ECOWAS, PTA

and ECCAS, which have focused attention essentially on market integration, Abuja

primarily adopts a production focused approach or, specifically, collaboration for

expansion and diversification of material production. This approach emphasizes

broadening the regional production base and agricultural production in the framework of

a variety of cooperative schemes and arrangements. It is based on the premise that

expansion of mutual trade can take place only if the African countries are able to produce

the desired merchandise in sufficient quantities to meet each other‟s demand.

Therefore, gradual harmonisation of industrial and agricultural policies and joint

industrial and agricultural planning and production are complementary to integration.

However, Abuja like the LPA and the earlier regional economic integration schemes has

adopted the traditional linear pattern of integration, with the aim of moving the continent

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within the space of twenty five years into a customs union, a common market and finally

the African Economic Community.35

Embracing all aspects of African economic and social life, the AEC is said to

provide a framework for the re-examination of the roles of the myriad of African

organisations and institutions, streamlining their activities and mobilising them

purposefully to address the pressing problems of African economic and social

development. Given its all-embracing character and mandate, Abuja even more than the

LPA has faced the great challenge of having to move from talk and prescriptions to

action and to change the assumption that once goals for regional cooperation have been

set, implementation will automatically follow.36

The Objectives of the African Economic Community

(a) To promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African

economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and

self-sustained development;

(b) To establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the development, mobilisation

and utilisation of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve a self-

reliant development;

(c) To promote co-operation in all fields of human endeavour in order to raise the

standard of living of African peoples, and maintain and enhance economic stability,

foster close and peaceful relations among Member States and contribute to the progress,

development and the economic integration of the Continent; and

(d) To coordinate and harmonize policies among existing and future economic

communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the Community.37

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Content of the NewPartnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

The basic rationale for the NEPAD can also be located in the preamble of the

document. African Heads of State and Government took this step because they shared

the conviction that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty on the continent and

to place their countries individually and collectively on the path of sustainable growth

and development. They lamented the condition of underdevelopment and exclusion of

the continent in a globalising world.38

The development and introduction of the NEPAD also stems from the desire to

ensure that the continent achieves the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).39

The

MDG are: to reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half

between1990 and 2015; to enroll all children of school age in primary schools by 2015;

to make progress towards gender equality and empowering women by eliminating

gender disparities in the enrolment in primary and secondary education by 2015; to

reduce infant and child mortality ratios by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015; to

reduce maternal mortality ratios by three-quarters between 1990 and 2015; to provide

access for all who need reproductive health services by 2015; to implement national

strategies for sustainable development by 2005, so as to reverse the loss of

environmental resource by 2015.40

The NEPAD initiative proposed a new relationship

between African states and the international community to be based on the principle of

shared responsibility and partnership as a better approach to coexist and benefit from

opportunities of the 21st

century.41

The NEPAD document is divided into eight (8) chapters, and contains 207

paragraphs. Chapter I is an introduction which clearly stated that the poverty and

245

backwardness of Africa stand in stark contrast to the prosperity of the developed world.42

Chapter II assessed the condition of Africa in today's world, between poverty and

prosperity. It stated that Africans could participate effectively in the global economy

and body politic.43

Chapter III is on the new political will of African leaders to take their destiny

into their hands. They recognized the need for their peoples to participate in

democracy and the need to deal with issues of disease, poverty, debts and conflicts on

the continent. Chapter IV is an appeal to peoples of Africa to renew confidence in their

leaders despite past impoverishment due to slavery, corruption and economic

mismanagement in thecontinent.44

Chapter V outlines the programmes of action. The strategy for achieving

sustainable development in the 21st century. The long-term objectives of the NEPAD

and goals are based on the millennium development goals.45

Chapter VI is titled: a new

global partnership. Here the NEPAD declared the importance of upholding the dignity

of humanity,46

it also emphasized the need to negotiate critically the establishment of a

new relationship with industrialized countries and multilateral organizations.

Chapter VI is centered on the implementation of the new partnership for Africa's

development. Here the responsibility was largely given to Heads of State who will have

to prioritize the projects and programmes that will be undertaken. Chapter VIII is

conclusion with a final note that the NEPAD should give hope to the African child.

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Objectives, Goals and Characteristics of NEPAD

The NEPAD in 2001 clearly identified two fold long-term, objectives, as contained in

the document.47

They are:

1. To eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries both individually

and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and thus

haltthemarginalization of Africa in the globalization process.

2. To promote the role of women in all activities.

The goals of the NEPAD are also clearly stated in paragraph 68, they are:

a. to achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of

above 7 percent per annum for the next 15 year; and

b. to ensure that the continent achieves the agreed millennium goals.

The strategy is expected to produce the following outcomes:48

i. economic growth and development and increase employment;

ii. reduction in poverty and inequality;

iii. diversification of productive activities, enhanced international competitiveness

and exports; and

iv. increase African integration.

As regards timing of the development initiative. It is based on prescriptions of

the Millennium Development Goals. The MDGs are to reduce the proportion of people

living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015. This means the NEPAD has

only 3 years to accomplish these goals. As for implementation -strategies for sustainable

development by 2015, the NEPAD has no time left.49

To attain the objectives of the NEPAD, African leaders took joint responsibility

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- strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution

at the regional and continental levels, and ensuring that these mechanisms

are used torestore and maintain peace;

- promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their respective

countries and regions, developing clear standards of accountability,

transparency and participatory governance at the national and sub-national

levels;

- restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability especially by developing

appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and

introducing appropriate institutional frameworks to achieve these standards;

- instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets

and auditing of private companies and the public sector;

- revitalising and extending the provision of education, technical training and

health services, with high priority given to tackling HIV/AIDS, malaria and

other communicable diseases;

- promoting the role of women in social and economic development by

reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training, by the

development of revenue generating activities through facilitating access to

credit, and by assuring their participation in the political and economic life of

African countries;

- building the capacity of states in Africa to set and enforce the legal

framework, as well as to maintain law and order;

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- promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification

into agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and export

markets.50

African leaders expect their partners who include developed countries

and multilateral institutions to take responsibilities and obligations;

- to support material mechanisms for and processes of conflict prevention,

management and resolution in Africa, as well as peace keeping initiatives;

- to accelerate debt reduction for heavily indebted African countries in

conjunction with more effective poverty reduction programmes, of which the

strategic partnership with Africa and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

(PRSP) initiatives are an important starting point;

- to improve debt relief in Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows to Africa

andto meet the target level of the ODA flows equivalent to 0.7 percent of each

developed country's gross domestic product (GDP) within an agreed period.

Increased aid flows will be used to complement funds released by debt reduction

for accelerating the fight against poverty;

- to translate into concrete commitments the international strategies adopted

in the fields of education and health;

- to facilitate the development of a partnership between countries, international

pharmaceutical corporations and civil society organizations to urgently secure

access to existing drugs for Africans suffering from infectious diseases;

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- to admit goods into markets of the developed countries through bilateral

initiatives, and to negotiate more equitable terms of trade for African countries

within the WTOmultilateral framework;

- to work with African leaders to encourage investments in Africa by the

private sector.

- to set up coordinated mechanisms to combat corruption effectively, as well as

commit themselves to the return of monies of such practices to Africa.51

The combine effort is expected to help create enabling environment for

development for development. The strategy for achieving sustainable in the 21st

century defined in the NEPAD has the following structure:

a. condition for sustainable development.

b. Sectoral priorities, and

c. Mobilising resources.

Under the conditions for sustainable development, the NEPAD recognizes

that actions need to be taken in three different areas: peace, security, democracy and

political governance; economic and corporate governance; and sub-regional and

regional approaches to development. The first action area is further divided into

peace and security, and democracy and political governance. Under its peace and

security initiative, NEPAD envisages action in four areas namely, preventing,

management and resolution of conflict, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace

enforcement, post conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and

combating illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and land mines.52

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Actions under democracyand political governance consist of commitments to

practice good governance. The two other conditions for sustainable development are the

economic and corporate governance initiative, and the sub regional and regional

approaches to development. Regional integration is crucial to the diversification of

African economies and to reverse de-industrialisation and marginalisation of the

continent.53

Under sectoral priorities, NEPAD lists actions to be undertaken under six (6)

major headings:

bridging the infrastructure gab (with a special attention to bridging the digital

divide and investing in information and communication technologies);

human resource development initiative (including reversing the brain drain);

agriculture;

the environment;

culture

science and technology.

The final element of the strategy for achieving sustainable development is the

mobilisation of resources. This listed two approaches: capital flows and market access.

Capital flows initiative proposed action in four major areas namely, increasing domestic

resource mobilisation, debt relief, ODA reforms and private capitalflows.54

A major

emphasis here is on reliance on continental resources to attain development goals.

Another important component of the NEPAD initiative that makes it

different from the previous initiatives especially the LPA and the AEC, is the

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is expected to enhance African

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ownership of its development agenda.55

The APRM operates through a system of

self-assessment that ensures that policies of African countries are based on best

current knowledge and practices. The APRM is located under NEPAD's democracy

and political governance initiative. The mechanism expects the actions of African

leaders to conform to well-known international standards of good governance. The

APRM will be measured through Charter of UN (1945), Constitutive Act of AU (2000),

Declaration on the Framework for the OAU Responses to Unconstitutional Changes of

Government (2000).56

Participation of APRM is open to all members of the African

Union. There will be four types of reviews, namely:

First, country review, to be carried out within eighteen (18) months of a country

becoming member of the APRM process;

Second, periodic review which is to take place every two to four years;

Third, a member country can, for its own reasons, ask for a review that is not

part of periodically mandated reviews; and

Fourth, early signs of impending political or economic crises in a member

country would be a course for instituting a review. Other member countries can

call for such a review in a spirit of goodwill in order to help the country

concerned.

The APRM will in turn be reviewed by the conference of the participating countries once

every five years.57

The need for APRM is to ensure that policies adopted are well

implemented; standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic

growth, sustainable development and foster integration in the continent are adhered to.

This also stems from Africa's past experience with other development efforts; where

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conflicts and bad governance among other problems contributed to retarding the

development process in the continent. As observed earlier, as at January 2014; out of the

54 countries in Africa, only 34 have signed the Memorandum of Understanding to be

peer reviewed, 17 have been peer reviewed and undergone second reports, and only

South Africa has undergone third review and has indicated interest to submit the third

report.

Implementation Arrangements of Lagos Plan of Action, African Economic

Community and the New Partnership for Africa's Development Initiatives

a. Implementation Arrangements of the Lagos Plan of Action

The international development strategy for the Third United Nations Decade

emphasized that the primary responsibility for the development of developing

countries rests upon the countries themselves.58

It is in this light that the LPA also

emphasized that the foundations of sound, self-reliant and self-sustaining

development and economic growth must be laid at the national level. In fact Adedeji59

writes that about 90 percent of the plan must be initiated and implemented at the national

level.

Again, the IDS for the third UN Decade also stresses that effective action by the

international community is indispensable. To this end, the LPA implementation

arrangement was divided into three levels; national, sub-regional, regional and

international levels.

Implementation at National Level

The first step for the implementation of the LPA at national level is the

familiarisation of the government and peoples with the aims, objectives and

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characteristics of the LPA. It was recommended to Member states of the OAU to

organise national seminar or conference with a view to examine issues raised in the

LPA, particularly, in relation to the situations and the problems facing the particular

MemberState. In the second step, member states are expected to be informed through

such seminars about the Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the

New International Economic Order; the Monrovia Strategy for the Development of

Africa; and International development Strategy for the third UN decade among others.

In the third step, member states are required to critically diagnose or analyse its

resources- natural, demographic, manpower, agricultural, and industrial; as well as its

infrastructural facilities and social services. The fourth step is to revamp the machinery of

government and other development support institutions to make them more development

oriented.60

Implementation at Regional Level

Regional organizations are assigned significant roles to play in the

implementation of the LPA:

i) the role of regional development finance organizations such as the African

Development Bank (ADB) and the Arab Bank for Economic Development of

Africa (BADEA);

ii) the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU); and

iii) the role of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

With respect to the role of financial institutions, the LPA expects their activities

to be guided henceforth by its philosophy, goals and objectives. They are to support

African countries with financial and policy assistance, technical capabilities

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particularly in the areas of project identification, analysis, formulation and

implementation.

The OAU and ECA secretariats will collaborate in the monitoring of the LPA's

implementation. The ECA specifically will deal with conceptual problems related to

LPA implementation.61

Implementation at Global Level

The LPA expected the international community to supplement its efforts towards

implementation by:

i.. the provision of grants and loans at concessional terms both bilaterally and

multilaterally, and untying of such grants and loans;

ii. the provision of technical assistance geared to gradual buildup of national

capabilities and institutions as basis of self-reliance and self-sustainment;

iii. improved trade terms to enable member states to earn foreign exchange for the

purchase of needed and identified factor inputs that are not available at home;

iv. provision of scholarships for training in appropriate institutions abroad;

v. provision of facilities in overseas institutions for formal or on the job training

which may be financed by member states themselves or by aid provided by host

governments or third parties; and

vi. review and appraisal of the progress being made in the implementation of the

strategies and the LPA.

The LPA also called for the creation of conducive politicaland economic environment,

devoid of military rivalry between superpowers and requested that disarmament will

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enable resources to be made available for development purposes instead of wasting them

on war.62

The LPA document under Annex I, the Final Act of Lagos (ii) outlined the

implementation of the LPA under two heads:

a. African Economic Community; and

b. Stages of Implementation.

The African Economic Community is expected to be setup by the year 2000, so

as to ensure economic, social and cultural integration of the continent. This community

is expected to promote collective self-reliance, and self-sustaining development of

member state, their cooperation and integration in the economic, social and cultural

fields. The Secretary General of the OAU was authorized to appoint a drafting

committee at ministerial level to prepare the draft treaty establishing the African

Economic Community, and submit the draft for consideration to the Assembly of Heads

of State and Government by 1981.The stages of implementation of the LPA is made

of commitments of African leaders are to adhere to during the decades of the 1980s

and 1990s respectively.

During the decades of the 1980s, African leaders committed themselves with

respect to implementation of LPA to strengthen the existing regional economic

groupings in other regions in Africa, so as to cover the continent as a whole (central,

eastern, southern and northern Africa). They also committed themselves to

strengthen, effectively, sectoral integration at the continent level and particularly, in

the fields of agriculture, food, transport and communications, industry and energy.

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Lastly, to promote coordination and harmonisation among the existing and future

economic groupings for a gradual establishment of an African Common Market.

During the decades of the 1990s, African leaders committed themselves with

respect to implementation of LPA to take steps for further sectoral integration through

harmonization of strategies, policies and economic development plans, promotion of joint

projects; particularly in the economic fields; and harmonization of financial and

monitoring policies. African leaders also committed themselves to take measures to effect

the establishment of an African Common Market and other measures that would lead

to the attainment of the aims and objectives of the African Economic Community.63

The secretaries of the OAU and ECA were authorised to take measures in respect

to making arrangements for the implementation of the LPA and submit reports.64

The

LPA therefore in addition to making arrangements for implementation at national,

regional and global levels, also stipulated the stages of in which implementation is to be

done. The formation of economic community, groupings and other forms of economic,

social and cultural integration by member states are expected to indicate that the LPA

is being implemented. The ultimate aim of it all will be the formation of African

Common Market, leading to the establishment of African Economic Community by the year

2000.

b. Implementation Arrangement of the African Economic Community

The Abuja Treaty lays the ground work for the creation of the African Economic

Community (AEC), whereby the economies of the Member States of the AU will be fully

integrated. The goal of the AEC is to transform the then fifty three economies of Africa

into a single economic and monetary union, with a common currency, free mobility of

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capital and labour. It is the desire of the leadership of the continent as stipulated in the

Constitutive Act to have an African Central Bank, an African Monetary Fund and an

African Investment Bank in place when the AEC is fully functional. This presupposes

that Africa as a whole would have gone through all the stages of integration. The RECs,

which constitute the building blocks of the AEC, would at this stage merge their

programmes into one.

Despite the progress made by Member States towards economic cooperation,

the creation of the AEC is hampered by conflicts as well political, economic and social

governance challenges in some parts of the continent. Some of the sectoral programmes

carried out by RECs relate to: water, agriculture, energy, and infrastructure. Out of these

sectors, some progress has been made to tackle matters pertinent to the region as well as

accelerating the overall regional integration process.

However, although these sectors are vital for the integration process, the focus

and the approach within the RECs differ, as does the implementation of the activities

agreed upon. Whilst RECs are implementing their own activities, they also need to focus

on a broader continental vision. As per Article six of the Abuja Treaty on the modalities

for the establishment of the Community, there are specified activities that have to be

implemented in six stages by the Regional Economic Communities recognised by the

AU.65

Overall, the RECs have made some progress in the integration process. However,

major efforts are still needed to harmonize their policies. COMESA, ECOWAS, SADC,

EAC, and ECCAS have achieved Free Trade Area (FTA) while IGAD and CENSAD are

in the process of having their own. COMESA, ECOWAS and ECCAS had planned to

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have their own Customs Union by the year 2008, but this has not yet materialised; instead

COMESA and ECOWAS expected to launch their Customs Union by 2009 which they

also failed to achieve, while ECCAS also intended to achieve it in 2010, but that did not

happen too. SADC on the other handplans to have its Customs Union between 2010-

2012.

EAC is already in Customs Union and hope to fully implement all programmes to

support the Customs Union from 2010, while the remaining RECs are exerting efforts

towards the attainment of this goal. However, there are certain challenges that hinder the

integration process. Despite the fact that some RECs have protocols on free movement of

persons, goods and services, the implementation process by some Member States is very

slow. Additionally, in some RECs that have achieved FTA, there are some Member

States which have not complied with the FTA Protocol. Indeed, peace and security are

the prerequisites for the development and economic growth of any region.

The AU has put in place an African Peace and Security Architecture designed to

promote Peace and Security in Africa. One of the main pillars of this Architecture is the

establishment of a continental early warning system that RECs could adopt in order to

prevent any further conflict at regional and continental level.Regional Economic

Communities have to position themselvesas building blocks within the broader

continental vision. The effort by COMESA, SADC and EAC in the Tripartite Summit

held in October 2008 in Kampala, to create a single FTA is commendable as it will

contribute to the early realisation of the AEC. However, the establishment of the AEC

poses a challenge, more so as it is not certain whether the creation of a continental

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Customs Union by 2019 could be achieved. The importance of timing and sequencing

these activities are critical for the success of these initiatives.66

The continent‟s development endeavours are also compounded by numerous

challenges, prominent among which are the HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis

pandemics, which pose serious threats to human capital development. The current global

economic crisis may also pose its own challenges as well as create opportunities for

regional economic integration in Africa.

On the one hand, it could spin-off a slowdown in trading and economic activities,

and adversely affects the revenue of Member States; while on the other hand; it could

force African countries to trade more amongst themselves and engage in higher volume

economic transactions with each other, thus facilitating the integration process. Regional

integration in Africa has been the main focus of African Countries since the

establishment of the then Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) and now AU. A

number of declarations have been made by Member States to move the integration

process in Africa forward.

Similarly, the Abuja Treaty, Lagos Plan of Action, African Private Sector Forum

among others, emphasize the need to promote regional integration in Africa. The Abuja

Treaty signed on 3 June 1991and became operational on 12 May 1994 stipulates that

African States must endeavour to strengthen the Regional Economic Communities

(RECs), in particular by coordinating, harmonizing and progressively integrating their

activities in order to attain the African Economic Community (AEC) which would

gradually be put in place during a thirty-four (34) year transition period subdivided into

six (6) varying stages.

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In brief, the major objectives were among others to promote economic, social and

cultural development and the integration of African economies in order to enhance

economic self-reliance as well as to promote an endogenous and self-sustained

development and to coordinate and harmonise policies among existing and future

economic communities, in order to foster gradual establishment of the Community.67

On the 9th of September 1999, the Heads of State and Government of the then

OAU issued a Declaration (the Sirte Declaration) calling for the establishment of an

African Union, with a view, inter alia, to accelerating the process of integration in the

continent to enable it playits rightful role in the global economy while addressing

multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded as they were by

certain negative aspects of globalization. During the Second and Third Conferences of

African Ministers of Integration, held in Kigali in June 2007 and Abidjan 2008,

respectively, various important recommendations came up, namely:

• Need for the Commission, in close collaboration with other key stakeholders to review

the Abuja Treaty, taking into account the Sirte Declaration;

• Need for the Commission to elaborate a Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) for

RECs;

• Need for the Commission to coordinate the activities of RECs as well as to harmonize

policies and programmes as a key strategy to enhance rationalization process;

• Need to encourage and promote free movement of persons, goods, capital and services

among and across all RECs, in order to bring about accelerated continental integration.

As part of assessing progress in the implementation of Africa‟s Economic

Integration Programme in line with the Treaty establishing the African Economic

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Community, the African Union Commission (AUC) conducted the first assessment in

2008.The assessment report was presented and discussed during the Third Conference of

African Ministers in charge of Integration held in Abidjan, in Cote d‟Ivoire from 22 to 23

May, 2008. Further, the report was submitted for adoption by the Assembly of the

African Union held in Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt, from 30 June to 1 July 2008.

The AUC has now prepared this second report in close collaboration with the

RECs on the status of integration in Africa. This report contains information on the

implementation process of the integration agenda as set out in the Abuja Treaty. It is

meant to assist the political decision -makers of the continent and give some ideas as to

how to speed up the economic and political integration of the continent. Based on the

objectives set by the AEC in the following areas: Free Trade Area, Customs Union,

Monetary Union and Economic Union, nothing has really been achieved.68

c. Implementation Arrangements of the New Partnership for Africa's

Development

In the case of the NEPAD, the task of implementation has been given to the Heads of

State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC). The Implementation

Committee comprises 15 African Heads of State representing the five regions of the AU

(three states per region). These states are; Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali,

Cameroon, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa,

Botswana and Mozambique. The committee arranged to meet at least three times a year. The

functions of the implementation committee include:

identifying strategic issues that need to be researched, planned and managed at the

continental level;

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setting up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of mutually agreed

targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards;

reviewing progress in the implementation of past decisions and taking

appropriate

steps to address problems and delays.

NEPAD is clearly a project of the OAU/AU.69

The implementation committee has to

report annually to the AU summit.

An outstanding feature of the NEPAD implementation arrangement is the

provision of management structures. The implementation committee is part of this

structure. Another tier of the management structure is the Steering Committee. The

Steering Committee is composed often (10) members, two (2) representing each country.

They are made up the personal representatives of the five (5) initiating presidents -

Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt.70

The Steering Committee is responsible for developing the terms of reference for

identified programmes and projects and with overseeing the work of NEPAD secretariat.

The steering committee meets on a monthly basis and holds workshops to assist in

developing of programmes and projects for implementation. As part of the

management structures, the NEPAD operates a temporary secretariat located at

African Development Bank of South Africa, Midrand. Mr. Wiseman Nkuhlu served

as the Executive Officer, now headed by Dr. Ibrahim A. Mayaki. The secretariat

operates in association with ADB, ECA and the AU to oversee the implementation of

NEPAD projects and programmes.

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The NEPAD recognised the need to prioritise its plan. It reasoned that if any

meaningful change is to be made, then certain key areas need to receive quick attention.

These areas are; communicable diseases- HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis,

information and communications technology, debt reduction and market access. The

Heads of State Implementation Committee is also responsible for setting policy and

programme and project priorities to be pursued. For a start, the NEPAD document

identified priority projects to include; agriculture, promotion of the private sector, and

infrastructure and regional integration.

The justification for the quick attention to agricultural sector is derived from the

explanation of Africa's food crisis. Between 1997-99, statistics show that 200 million

people or 28% of Africa's population are chronically hungry, compared to 173 million

in 1990-1992.71

At the end of the 1990s, 30 countries had over 20% of their population

undernourished, and in 18 of these, over 38% of the population were chronically hungry.

As of 2001, about 28 million people in Africa were facing food emergencies,

due to droughts, floods and strife, of which some 25 million needed emergency food

and agricultural assistance.72

Food imports have increased, with Africa spending an

estimated US$18.7 billion in 2000 alone. It received food aid of 2.8 million tons in 2000;

this is evidence of external dependency that need to be reversed.73

Immediate projects in agriculture recommended by the NEPAD are in the area of

operation of the integrated land and water management action plan for Africa. It also

recommends the best use of Africa's fragile agricultural base. On the part of partners

such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the World Bank, African

Development Bank (ADB) and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and other

264

bilateral donor agencies, they are expected to strengthen and refocus the capacity of

Africa's research and extension systems.74

With respect to the promotion of the private

sector, the NEPAD recommends the formulation of guidelines and policies that will

boost business activities on the continent as a prerequisite for the achievement for the

objectives and goals of the plan. It recommended that this should be tailored to the

needs and condition of Africa.

The private sectors will not function effectively without availability of

infrastructure and the benefits of the private sector driven economy will not be felt in the

whole continent without cooperation and integration. NEPAD identified the

development of infrastructure therefore as crucial and identified many energy,

transport, telecommunications and water projects that are crucial to Africa's

integrated development.75

These projects are to be implemented at various stages, in

collaboration with ADB, the World Bank and other multilateral institutions to provide

funding. The view of the initiators of the NEPAD is that unless the issue of infrastructure is

linked to regional integrated development, the dream of effecting change on the continent

will not materialise.

Funding of Lagos Plan of Action, African Economic Community and the New

Partnership for Africa's Development

a. Funding of Lagos Plan of Action

The achievement of any development depends on its viability in terms of finance

resource. It the case of the LPA, the formulators of the plan did not address the crucial

issue of funding comprehensively in the document. It is only in two sectors namely;

agriculture, and transportation and communication sectors that some figures are

indicated. This observation is supported by Browne and Commings76

who argued that it

265

would have been more useful if some clearer indication of the probable sources for the

funds needed to implement the LPA had been provided.

In the agricultural sector, the LPA indicated that a total investment required over

the 1980-85 period for the implementation of programmes amount to about US$21,400

million at 1979 prices. In addition, expenditures for inputs would rise by about US$560

million over the same period.77

These figures are quiet much and required the

commitment on the part of African leaders to meet up. Olaniyan78

observed that exports of

most African countries, which consist of few agricultural goods such as cocoa,

rubber,coffee, oil palm, timber etc., and whose prices have fluctuated over the years, this

in turn has undermined African development.

In the transportation and communications sector, the LPA document indicated

that the cost of 550 projects that were ready for immediate implementation, plus the

cost for studies relating to 221 remaining projects in the sector amounted to a total of

US$8.85billion. These projects spread across roads transport, railway transport,

maritime transport, ports, inland water transport, telecommunications, communications

by satellite, manpower training in telecommunications and postal services.79

However, the conference of Ministers of Economic Development at its sixth

meeting, which at the same time was the fifteenth session of the EGA, addressed the

issue of financing the LPA. According to these ministers, domestic savings could be

mobilized for reinvestment in plan projects by both conventional and new measures

and that as regards foreign exchange, there was room for savings in out payments for

such services as banking, insurance, shipping, civil aviation, marketing and

distribution. To them, if national accounts/ transactions are closely scrutinised, there

266

will be much savings, which can in turn be reinvested.80

This proposition on funding of

the LPA though prudent, but does not give assurance of funding for the LPA. And so it

is not adequate as a means of financing a self-reliant development plan.

Adedeji as quoted by Asante tried to differentiate between financial and real

resources and between domestic and external resources needed for the implementation

of the LPA. To him emphasis for financing the LPA should be on factor inputs and

institution building. Though, this does not mean that financial resources are not

important. In fact the LPA relies on external funding, since it argues that self-reliance

does not mean „autarky.‟81

Factor inputs in this sense includes Africa's abundant natural resources-land,

forest, water, minerals and petroleum resources, and also, human resource. Internal

sources of foreign exchange earnings, domestic savings and new sources to be

identified. External sources include foreign aids, grants, and loans on concessional

term both bilaterally and multilaterally. African leaders were expected to play key

roles in mobilizing resources for the implementation of the LPA.82

The UN, OAU,

ADB, World Bank, and other institutions were also expected to play supportive roles

in providing funding of implementation of the LPA.

b. The Funding of the African Economic Community

In accordance with the relevant Protocols, Member States shall, within a time-table to be

determined by the Assembly, harmonize their monetary, financial and payments policies,

in order to boost intra-community trade in goods and services, to further the attainment of

objectives of the Community and to enhance monetary and financial co-operation among

Member States. To this end, Member States shall:

267

· Use their national currencies in the settlement of commercial and financial

transactions in order to reduce the use of external currencies in such

transactions;

· Establish appropriate mechanisms for setting up multilateral payments

systems;

· Consult regularly among themselves on monetary and financial matters;

· Promote the creation of national, regional and sub-regional money markets,

through the co-ordinated establishment of stock exchanges and

harmonising legal texts regulating existing stock exchanges with a view to

making them more effective.

· Cooperate in an effective manner in the fields of insurance and banking;

· Further the liberalisation of payments and the elimination of payment

restrictions, if any, among them and promote the integration of all existing

payments and clearing mechanisms among the different regions into an

African Clearing and Payments House; and

· Establish an African Monetary Union through the harmonisation of

regional monetary zones.

The annual regular budget of the Community, which constitutes an integral part of the

OAU regular budget, shall be prepared by the Secretary-General and approved by the

Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council. The budget shall be funded by

contributions made by Member States in accordance with the scale of assessment of the

OAU.

268

Upon the recommendation of the Council, the Assembly shall determine the

conditions under which the financial contributions of Member States may be

supplemented or, where necessary replaced by the proper resources of the Community. It

is amazing that other than the contributions made by the Member-States which was not

even regular, the AEC did not enjoy much continental or development partners support

for the funding its projects which also were more driven by the RECs.83

c. The Funding of the NEPAD

The NEPAD clearly recognized the importance of mobilizing resources for the

implementation of its plan. The goals of the NEPAD are based on Millennium

Development Goals (MDG) standards. The most important of these goals to the

NEPAD is to reduce the population of poor Africans by half by 2015. To achieve

this goal requires a minimum growth rate of 7% GDP on a sustained basis. In the 1990s

average growth rate GDP was 2.1% and population growth rate was 2.8% per annum,

this was expected to double in 25 years.84

To achieve the estimated 7% annual growth rate needed to meet the MDG by

2015, the UNECA, World Bank, Africa indicators, 2001, estimated the resource gab in

1998 to be $64 billion or 12% of GDP. To obtain these resources, the NEPAD

document was clear that it will require domestic savings, as well as improvements in

the public revenue collection systems. It also stipulated that resources will be obtained

from outside the continent.85

Particularly, the resource requirement for the NEPAD is dealt with under the

capital flows initiative. Two broad categories of capital flows are identified; domestic and

external. Domestic resources can be broken into private savings, public finance, export

269

earnings, financial/ capital market and risk perception. Also, external flows are

subdivided into foreign direct investments (FD1), portfolio (equity) flows, official

development assistance (ODA), debt remission, capital repatriation and market access.86

The NEPAD further notes that African countries loose a significant proportion of

their savings to capital flight. It therefore recognized the need to create conditions that

promote private sector investments by both domestic and foreign investors in the

continent. It requested the establishment of Special Drawing Rights for Africa and

acommitment by developed countries to pledge their treasury bills to finance the plan.87

The role of debt relief in saving resources for development is also addressed by the

NEPAD. Africa countries especially the poorer countries of the continent require greater

resources to reduce poverty, which the debt trap has, continue to exacerbate. The NEPAD

recognized the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP), which it believes, would

enhance the capacity to utilize increase ODA flows. The reforms are to be done in

partnership with the World Bank and IMF.88

The vulnerability of African economies due to dependence on primary production

and export of mineral resources is addressed under the Market Access Initiative. NEPAD

acknowledge the problem of trade differences and decline in export earnings. One of the key

components of domestic resources needed to for implementation of the plan is through

export earnings. Current trade policies and trade preferences do not favor African countries.

The action plans developed by the NEPAD to redress this anomaly include effective

utilization of market access; benefiting from current conventions in ACP-EU

partnership agreements, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and in

harmonizing trade rules and procedures.

270

The actions plans also includes arrangements to enter into negotiations with the

World Trade Organization to address areas of trade policies and other areas that will

create room for better market access to developed countries markets. Provisions are to

be made also of sound policies, incentives and enabling environment for promoting

the private sector. In addition, the NEPAD recognizes the importance of the small

and medium enterprises and the informal sector and the need to channel assistance to

them. This will go a long way in the reducing poverty on the continent.89

It is clear from this comparative evaluation that the task of financing the NEPAD

is a herculean task to African leaders, in fact under present timing and condition, African

states would need to work harder to meet the MDGs by 2015.

Comparative Evaluation of the LPA, AEC and NEPAD Initiatives

The LPA, AEC and NEPAD initiatives were introduced at different historical periods

with a common intention to improve the living standards of people in the continent.

However, they have some similarities and differences and even contrasting features. Both

plans claim African ownership of the development process and both seek to promote

self-reliance and self-sustenance on the continent.

Whereas the immediate cause for introduction of the LPA was the need to benefit

from the opportunities of the UN third development decade in the 1980s, and

restructure the continent in respect of the restructuring of global economy as a whole,

in form of a new international economic order. While the AEC was introduced because

the LPA was seen as failing and not achieving its aims, most especially, the Structural

Adjustment Programme has left Africans worse off.

271

Thus, necessitating the creation of the AEC which advocated the strengthening of

the existing regional economic communities and some cases create new ones in order to

drive development at the regional levels carrying people along. The NEPAD on the

other hand desired to benefit from opportunities of globalisation era in the 21st century

and NEPAD set its targets to achieve the MDGs. Instead of the NIEO supported by LPA,

which was viewed by the developed countries as confrontational.90

The NEPAD called

for a new relationship to be based on shared responsibilities and partnership.

In terms of content, the LPA has 13 chapters, 354 paragraphs, and four Annexes;

the AEC has 22 chapters, 106 paragraphs while the NEPAD has 8 chapters and

contains 207 paragraphs. The AEC and LPA are therefore, wordier in content than the

NEPAD. In terms of objectives and goals, the LPA identified the objective of economic

development in 1980 basically as to promote self-reliance and self-sustaining

development and regional integration.

The basic concerns were on poverty reduction, fighting un-and

underemployment, and reducing the gap between the rich and poor in Africa; while the

AEC was very specific in its objectives as to promote economic, social and cultural

development with special emphasis on the integration of African economies in order to

increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained

development. The NEPAD on its part was more precise with its objectives, which it

outlines in two folds: to eradicate poverty and integrate women in the development

process. The goals of the NEPAD are also clearly stated which entailed achieving a

gross domestic product (GDP) on a sustainable basis of 7% for the next 15 years and

272

secondly to ensure that the continent achieves the MDG. The LPA and the AEC were

not so succinct in this area.

The timing for the LPA was from 1980 to 2000 (20 years) for the attainment of

its objectives. The time has been spent, and the goals of self-reliance and self-

sustainment have not been achieved. The overall picture of living standards in the

continent in the beginning of the 21st century shows that not all objectives and goals of

the LPA have been achieved. LPA recorded some achievements in the area of promoting

activities of regional cooperation and integration initiatives. These include the Arab

Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

(COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African Development

Community (SADC), and the Community of Sahel -Saharan States (CED-SAD).

The LPA has also succeeded in promoting economic cooperation between

countries that are poor and economically dependent and stronger and economically

endowed countries. The LPA has not succeeded in its aim of increasing sub regional

trade.91

By the end of 1980s; almost none of the targets set out by the LPA for a gradual

establishment of an African Common Market was achieved. As such through the

Treaty of Abuja, signed in June 1991, a new date was set for attaining a pan African

Economic Community (AEC). This date was set for 2025 as a new target and the

community is to comprise of 52 states, now 54 and more than 600 million people.92

In addition it shows that Africa was the poorest in the world with not less than

half of its total population living on less than $ 1 per day; Africa also accounted for only

1 percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP), while the income distribution

273

favors the rich compared to the poor; 1 out of every 5 Africans lives under armed

conflict; African economies were fragmented and highly dependent on primary sector

petroleum, mining and agriculture with little value added; the debts profile of the

region has risen and had the largest population infested with HIV-AIDS.93

This shows

that the LPA is far from achieving the objectives of improving living standards in the

continent. The failure of the LPA is often blamed on the World Bank for not

supporting the LPA and introducing SAP, which did not consider social dimensions

to adjustments on the continent.94

Although, it may sound harsh to qualify the Abuja Treaty (AEC) as a failure,

however, its fate has not been too different from that of the LPA. Despite its

innovativeness, both in terms of goals, methods and orientation, the Abuja Treaty like the

LPA has thus far remained only a declaration of intent, with minimal concrete

achievements. Signed in 1991, the AEC only became operational in 1994, because of the

reluctance of member states to ratify the treaty. The rationalisation of Africa‟s multiple

regional organisations, a central element in the Abuja Treaty is yet to bear fruits, twenty-

one years after the signing of the treaty.

Moreover, the decision to merge the Secretariats of the AEC and the then OAU

seemed to have submerged the community and rendered it ineffective. And in 2001, with

the emergence of a new African economic initiative (NEPAD), and the transformation of

the OAU into the African Union, the role and place of the AEC in Africa‟s regional

economic development agenda has become even more obscure.95

In the case of the NEPAD its time frame is set for 2015 to reduce number of

Africans living in extreme poverty by half. This means that the NEPAD has only 3 years

274

left. As for the implementation strategy for sustainable development by 2005, the

NEPAD could not achieve it, because it suffered the problem of funding. There is a

need to review the timetable in line with realities on the continent especially in view of

resources needed to achieve this target. Already, it has been stipulated that if Africa is to

reduce poverty, it needs to achieve a GDP growth rate of 7% per annum and that

given its present low savings and investment ratio, the continent would need $64

billion of resource inflows every year. This is about 12% ofAfrica's gross national

income per annum.96

Adedeji has observed that this exceeds all ODA flows to all

countries, which stood at US$62.27 billion in 1999.97

In the area of implementation arrangements, the LPA placed much emphasis on

creating a sound foundation at the national level. This responsibility was invested in

African leaders. The arrangement provided for stage-by-stage implementation of projects

and programmes which was expected to culminate in the introduction of an African

Economic Community by the year 2000. As for the AEC, its emphasis was on regional

economic communities to be strengthened and equipped in order to facilitate

development and create self-reliance by creating African Common Market by the year

2025 following 6 stages of implementation; but no progress has been made in this area.

Infact, except stage one of strengthening and creating new regional economic

communities where needed, others stages have far from being achieved. In the case of

the NEPAD, its implementation rests on the Heads of State Implementation Committee

(HSIC), the Steering Committee, and the NEPAD Secretariat. Already priority areas

have been identified which need funding. These include projects in agriculture,

275

promotion of the private sector, and infrastructure development and regional

integration.

Most development initiatives in Africa encounter setbacks due to lack of capacity

in the area of finance to implement the plans. The LPA was not very clear on the area of

funding. Asante equally observed that the plan is not fully costed and argues that the

implications for a self-reliant development are not fully considered. Without this the

LPA resembles a mere shopping list without realistic appraisal of potential costs and

possiblesources of finance.

The AEC was clear about the funding, but lacked political will for mobilization

of resources especially at the continental level and members‟ contributions were not

forthcoming.98

The NEPAD on the other hand provides a reliable estimation of the

resource gap needed to achieve the target of 7% annual GDP growth implied by the

MDGs and other goals of NEPAD. This was put at $64 billion or 12% of GDP to meet

the 2015 poverty reduction target.

The LPA had relied on both internal and external funding to implement the plan.

It relied on the political will of its leaders to mobilize these resources. Most African

countries were characterize by conflicts- Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Liberia etc.; disease such as Malaria, H1V-

AIDS ravaged the continent, droughts and many other disasters ravaged the continent

thus limiting resources that would have gone into development purposes.

African leaders were responsible for some of the conflicts on the continent due

to corruption, mismanagement, and violations of human rights. Some simply did not

want to leave office and so personalised the state. Internal sources of funding could not

276

be relied upon. The second option was to depend on external sources. Developed

countries have often blamed African countries for the underdevelopment of the

continent. The same thing goes for the AEC, as the leaders did not show any sign of

seriousness which affected the funding.

The relation between donors and recipients is not always good, but that of

master-servant, patron-client, which promotes dependency. Asante observed that

aid programmes is not usually determined on the basis of the recipient African

country's need, but rather on the donor's priorities and procedure.99

Adedeji also argues

that along with foreign assistance has been the practice whereby foreign advice and

expertise hold sway over project identification, design, management, advice on

the choice of technology, and influence of economic and social policy.100

The SAP

policy of the IMF and World Bank is an example. The NEPAD also relies on internal

and external sources of funding. It should learn lessons from other development

initiatives in the past especially the LPA and the AEC as discussed below.

The LPA and the AEC did not address the issue of democracy and their role in

promoting development. Most African leaders came into government through

unconstitutional means. Accountability, the rule of law, respect for fundamental rights

of the people were put aside in pursuance of self-aggrandisement, and perpetuation of

power to the detrimentof development of the continent,101

yet the LPA and the AEC

were silent on this.102

The NEPAD on the other hand stated clearly that one of the

conditions for sustainable development is democracy and good governance.103

The NEPAD went further to put in place a mechanism to check the conduct

African leaders in form of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The

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mechanism is expected to review the adherence of member countries to implementation

of policies, best standards and practices that lead to political stability; high economic

growth, and sustainable development and foster integration. The issue of

unconstitutional change of government, which the LPA and the AEC failed to

address, is addressed by the NEPAD under APRM, what is left is the political will to

carry it out.104

The LPA's justification for demanding for a NIEO to restructure the world

economic system was based on the dissatisfaction with the system, especially due to

performances of African countries in international trade. Building on the provisions of

the LPA, the AEC advocated for an African Common Market, African Union and an

African Parliament. The NEPAD outlined strategies for renegotiating international

trade arrangements to improve equity in WTO rules and regulations, reduce inequality

in international commerce and have better and more access to foreign markets.

Added to this, is the need to address with all seriousness the issue of dependence

on primary sector and to add value to products exchanged. This will increase their

market share and revenue of the countries. Moreover most African countries are poor

in terms of resources and depend almost completely on the assistance of other bigger

countries that should take the lead in this regard.

Some scholars such as Adesina, Randriamaro, and Nyong'o; have also expressed

concern with the macro-economic framework of the NEPAD, which is neo-liberal

policy. This is borne out of the experience with the SAP as recommended by the

World Bank and IMF as a remedy to structural problems on the continent.105

Nyong'o affirms that NEPAD does not oppose the SAP policy as the LPA did by

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introducing an alternative (AAF-SAP).106

One of the strengths of the LPA is the

emphasis that development should be people centered, i.e. food, health, water,

education, communications etc., and should not reduce to mere quantifiable factors

such as GDP, higher savings and investment rates. But rather it should lead to the

well-being the individual and society. The NEPAD also recognises these priorities

and believes in the market to create them. Adesina observed that the neo-liberal

policy, which NEPAD subscribes to, emphasised wealth creation for few rich people at

the detriment of majority whom are poor.107

Infact, a tabular representation of how

African countries performed between 1960 and 2010 is presented below in order to

buttress the comparative evaluation of the three initiatives under study.

Looking at table 1 below, it is observed that the countries generally did very well

in the 1960s and 1970s especially until the mid-1970s; they did badly in the 1980s and

1990s, due to conflicts and other factors, while many have been doing very well since the

turn of the century at least till 2008 before the Global Economic Crisis. The average

growth in per capita income per year for most African countries between 2001-05 is 22%,

which is much better than the decade before it. The experience ranges from high growth

countries like Mozambique, Tanzania and Sudan (Because of oil and in spite of conflict),

to Zimbabwe, which in an unmitigated disaster under Mugabe with a decline in per capita

income by over 6% per year.

Table 1: Economic Performance and Per Capita Income Growth Rates of Selected

African Countries between 1961-2005

Country 1961-1970 1971-80 1981-90 1991-

2000

2001-05

1.13 1.18 0.77 1.20 1.83

Congo DR (Conflict) 0.43 -2.54 -2.04 -8.12 1.17

Ethiopia (Conflict) * * -0.98 0.38 3.03

Kenya 1.30 4.28 0.37 -0.83 1.35

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Malawi 2.26 2.97 -2.00 1.70 0.44

Mali * 1.59 -1.61 1.32 3.27

Mozambique (Conflict)

Nigeria

*

3.65

*

2.6

-0.53

-103

2.36

1.25

6.72

3.56

Rwanda (Conflict) 0.22 2.25 -1.05 1.27 2.91

South Africa 3.48 2.26 -1.05 1.27 2.91

Sudan (Conflict) -0.77 0.71 0.00 3.29 4.23

Tanzania * * * 0.09 4.79

Uganda (Conflict) * * -0.12 3.50 2.08

Zambia 0.68 -1.96 -2.14 -1.66 2.99

Zimbabwe 2.98 -0.12 0.70 -0.63 -6.17

Other countries that have been in conflict since 1990

Angola * * -.061 -1.38 7.46

Burundi 2.39 0.79 1.28 -3.18 -0.85

Chad -0.93 -3.86 2.78 -0.49 9.93

Congo. Rep 1.36 3.35 1.84 -1.64 1.29

Eritrea * * * 2.88 -0.66

Guinea – Bissau * -1.76 2.54 -0.87 -3.07

Liberia 2.06 -1.10 -10.55 3.82 -4.73

Senegal -0.69 -0.82 0.26 0.33 2.26

Sierra Leone 2.44 0.47 -1.32 -5.26 9.39

Somalia -100 -1.81 1.59 * *

Note: Countries are defined as conflict countries if they have been involved in war in the 1990s or later or

in a conflict that has cost more than 1,000 lives since it started.

Source: Arne Bigsten and Dick Durevall, The African Economy and Its Role in the World Economy; the

Nordic African Institute, 2008.

From the table above, looking at the group of conflict countries, we see a few cases of

very rapid growth. In Chad and Angola, the boom in oil drives this, while Sierra Leone

has bounced back from a huge income decline during the conflict. Burundi, Eritrea,

Guinea-Bissau and Liberia continue to experience falling per capital incomes. Clearly,

civil war has been an important cause of bad economic performance in Africa, and the

elimination of remaining conflicts as well as maintenance of peace is obviously very

important for progress in poverty reduction. There is by now an extensive literature

relating civil wars to the economy, which shows that bad economic performance is one

important cause of civil strife.

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Table 2: General Economic Performance of Africa between 2001 – 2010

Year GDP at

Current

Market

Prices

(Million US $)

GDP

Growth

(%)

Per Capital

GDP (US$

2001 886,788 4.3 678

2002 1,228,335 5.7 671

2003 841,441 5.2 785

2004 934,449 5.6 940

2005 1,077,834 5.9 1077

2006 1,200,540 6.2 1207

2007 1,329,660 6.4 1372

2008 1,517,834 5.6 1570

2009 N/A 2.5 1446

2010 N/A 4.5* N/A

Source: African Statistical Year Book, 2010.

From the above table (Table 2), the last decade (2001 – 2011) witnessed African states

pursuing relatively prudent macro-economic policies, with economic growth picking up

across the continent. Consequently, during the period: 2000 – 2007, in which the policy

approaches were applied, Africa experienced sustained real GDP growth rates ranging

from 4.3% to 6.4% respectively. This is attributable to relatively improved security and

stability situations in the continent as well as good governance and prudent macro-

economic policies. In absolute terms, per capita GDP increased from US $ 678 in 2001 to

US $ I, 446 in 2009, representing over 113% increment for the 7-year period.

Conclusion

If the elements of state capacity, autonomy and partnership with development actors are

indeed central to African development, to what extent have these elements been

addressed in African development plans from the Lagos Plan of Action up to NEPAD? A

review of African development plans before NEPAD reveals that there were significant

281

gaps in dealing with these elements. When the African development predicament

emerged at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, African

governments responded with the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). As a product of its

historical moment the LPA reflected the African development thought of that time, with

its emphasis on collective self-reliance and state-led development.

In this view the state was the leading actor and should bear the burden of

elaborating the social, economic and cultural policies that enable the mobilisation of the

resources and capabilities of the country. The LPA also emphasised the role of the state

in the fair distribution of both development burdens and benefits. Although, it did not

explicitly discuss the role of the state in development, the LPA made it clear that the state

was both part of the development crisis and the main agent for its resolution. The

strategies that had been adopted by African states were, according to the LPA, mainly

responsible for the crisis.

Although, the LPA provided for African integration, it did not adequately address

the crucial elements for African development discussed above, namely, capacity,

autonomy and partnership. While concentrating on sectoral programmes, the Lagos plan

did not adopt a detailed strategy for building the capacity of domestic institutions in

African countries. The plan also dealt with the African development predicament as a

mainly, if not purely, economic crisis; corruption and clientalism were not major

concerns.

Thus, it was not only the lack of external support that led to the less than

successful implementation of the LPA but also the internal flaws of the plan itself. The

AEC suffered the same fate like the LPA, although it aimed at creating an African

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Economic Community with a common customs union and common tariff and common

market through strengthening of the existing regional economic communities and in some

cases create new ones in order to drive development. The AEC aimed at achieving all

these in six stages, which it has barely achieved the first stage due to lack of political will

and poor funding. Returning to NEPAD, many analysts and commentators share the view

that its ideological orientation is based on the neo-liberal mode of development.108

However, this orientation reflects the post-Washington consensus; it does not

explicitly aim at eroding the role of the state, as claimed by some African analysts, but

instead advocates a partnership between state, market and civil society, with the main

emphasis on the first two actors. The compromise language of NEPAD is clear

throughout the document. While it praises the neo-liberal development model and argues

that the increasing commitment of African states to market-oriented economies is a sign

of hope and progress, it also notes that the role and capacity of the state are matters of

concern. According to the document, „the weak state remains a major constraint on

sustainable development in a number of countries.109

Indeed, one of Africa‟s major

challenges is to strengthen the capacity to govern and to develop long-term policies‟.

Accordingly capacity-building for state institutions is given a high priority, at least

theoretically, in the initiative.

To sum up, the African development plans of the eighties and nineties

concentrated on establishing an alternative development strategy to Structural

Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), a strategy in which the state would play a central role in

the development process. Some of these plans realised that there had to be reform of

public management systems and capacity building for state institutions, while others

283

relied on a partnership between the state and civil society to achieve a people-centered

model of development. However, these plans were skeptical about the role of the private

sector; while admitting a private-sector role theoretically and claiming to want to

encourage this role, no action plans were adopted to achieve the integration of the private

sector in African development strategies.110

Thus, NEPAD, which is the continent's most recent development initiative,

should ensure that the mistakes of the LPA and the AEC are not repeated. Like previous

African development initiatives, has its shortcomings, but it also opens up new

opportunities for creating a balanced relationship between the state and the market,

promoting the capacity of state and civil society institutions and increasing the autonomy

of the state by combating corruption and curbing the domination of special interests. On

the other hand the initiative depends heavily on foreign capital for its implementation,

and it does not say how it will match people-centered development with private sector-

led growth.

284

Endnotes

1. OAU, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000

(Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1981), Paragraph 1.

2. Ibid., Paragraph 4.

3. Ibid., Paragraph 52.

4. Ibid., Paragraph 88.

5. Ibid., Paragraph ll5.

6. Ibid., Paragraph 205.

7. Ibid., Paragraph 250.

8. Ibid., Paragraph 282.

9. Ibid., Paragraph 255.

10. Ibid., Paragraph 258.

11. Ibid., Paragraph 259.

12. Ibid., Paragraph 266.

13. Ibid., Paragraph 267.

14. Ibid., Paragraph 275.

15. Ibid., Paragraph 299.

16. Ibid., Paragraph 300.

17. Ibid., Paragraph 99.

18. A. Adedeji, “The Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: Five Years

Later” in Economic Crises in Africa:African Perspectives on Development

Problems and Potentials, ed. Adedeji, A. and Shaw, T. (Colarado: Lynne

Rienner Publishers Inc., 1985), 15; A. Adedeji, “After Lagos Plan and New York

What Next,” A Public Lecture delivered at the El Fateh University Tripoli,

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 10 May 1981, 5.

285

19. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 6.

20. Ibid., Paragraph 6.

21. R.O. Olaniyan, “O. A. U's Perception of and Strategy for the Management of

Africa's Underdevelopment and Economic Crises,” Nigerian Journal of

International Affairs 14, no. 1 (1988): 207.

22. ECA, Transforming African Economies: Economic Report on Africa2000 (Addis

Ababa: 2001), 63.

23. CARICOM,Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean

Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, 2001, Article

222.www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments.jsp?menu=secretariat

(accessed 4/11/ 2011).

24. Eritrea v. Ethiopia, Law Africa L. R. 6, 1999.

25. K.D. Hwang, “Some Reflections on African Development Strategies in the

21stCentury: From the LPA to NEPAD,”Journal of International and Area

Studies,16no. 2, (2009):125-142.

26. I. Taylor, “Partnership through Accommodation? African Development Initiatives

and Universal Policy Prescriptions” in Africa, Regional Cooperation and the

World Market-Socio-Economic Strategies in Times of Global Trade Regimes, ed.

Henning Melber (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006), 9-39.

27. AU, Report on the Status of Integration In Africa (SIA),Second Edition, April

2009, 2-3.

28. S. E. Kulusika, “The Lawyer and the Challenges of Economic Integration,”

Zambia L.J.32 (2000): 20.

29. Ibid., 21.

30. http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Newsletter/EA/ Contenueng.htm (accessed

4/11/ 2011).

31. M. Ndulo, “African Economic Community and the Promotion of Intra-African

Trade,”Africa Notes (May, 1992):1.

32. AU Report, 2-3.

33. Ibid., 4.

286

34. Ibid., 5.

35. Ibid., 6.

36. Ibid., 7.

37. OAU, “Treaty Establishing the African `Economic Community,” Abuja, 1991, 8.

38. W. Nkuhlu, “NEPAD: A New Chapter in African-led Development,” in The New

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Challenges and Development,

ed. Obadare and Oyewole (Lagos: Centre for Democracy and Development,

2003), 36.

39. Ibid., 36.

40. AU, “The New Partnership for Africa‟s Development Document.” Abuja, 2001,

10.

41. Adedeji, “The Monrovia Strategy,” 308.

42. Ibid., 308.

43. Adedeji, “The Monrovia Strategy,”312.

44. Ibid., 315.

45. Ibid., 317.

46. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 100.

47. Ibid., Paragraph 101.

48. W. Nkuhlu, “NEPAD: A New Chapter in African-led Development,” 32.

49. S. Akinrinade, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Dispensing the

Begging Bowl or Plus ca change, plus cest la meme chose?” in The New

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Challenges and Development,

ed. E. Obadare and D. Oyewole (Lagos: Centre for Democracy and Development,

2003), 10.

50. D. Omoweh, “The New Partnership for African's Development (NEPAD):

Another False Start?” Nigerian Social Scientist 6, no. 1 (March, 2003), 3-4.

51. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 189.

287

52. AU, NEPAD, 24.

53. Ibid., 25.

54. Ibid., 25.

55. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 195.

56. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 197.

57. R. Browne and R.J. Cummings, The Lagos Plan of Action Vs the BergReport:

Contemporary Issues in Africa Economic Development, ed.R. Browne and R.J.

Cummings (Washington D.C: Howard University Press, 1983), 23.

58. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 42.

59. Olaniyan, “O. A. U's Perception,” 207.

60. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 222.

61. Adedeji, “The Monrovia Strategy,” 319.

62. S.K.B. Asante, African Development: Adebayo Adedeji’s Alternative

Strategies,(Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1993), 17.

63. Adedeji, “The Monrovia Strategy,” 315.

64. Ibid., 316.

65. AU, Report, 6.

66. Second Report of the Conference of African Ministers on Integration, held in

Kigali in June, 2007, 15.

67. Third Report of the Conference of African Ministers on Integration, held in

Abidjan in May 22-23, 2008, 13.

68. Ibid., 15.

69. AU, NEPAD, 55.

70. Ibid., 55.

71. Ibid., 56.

288

72. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 148.

73. OAU, LPA, Paragraph 151.

74. AU, NEPAD, 30.

75. AU, NEPAD, 57.

76. P. A. Nyong'o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD: The Dilemma of

Progress in Independent Africa,” www.anc.org.za/pubs/umrabulo15/plan.htm

(accessed 21/10/ 2011), l.

77. Akinrinade, “The New Partnership for Africa's Development,” 16.

78. G. Laporte, “Regional Cooperation and Integration in Africa: An Agendafor

Action at the National Level,”in Regional Cooperation and Integration in the

World Today: Papers from the First Open Forum, Maastricht Province of

Linburg, 20 April 1993,67-75.

79. AU, NEPAD,54.

80. Nyong'o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD,” 2.

81. AU, NEPAD,54.

82. Adedeji, “The Monrovia Strategy,” 5.

83. Asante, African Development,61.

84. Ibid., 65.

85. Adedeji, “The Monrovia Strategy,” 319.

86. C. Ake, Democratization of Disempowerment, Centre for Advanced Social Science

(Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1994), 25.

87. Nyong'o, “From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD,” l.

88. AU,NEPAD at Work: Summary of NEPAD Action Plans, July 2002.

89. W. Nkuhlu, “NEPAD: A New Chapter in African-led Development,”32.

90. J.O. Adesina, “Development and the Challenge of Poverty: NEPAD, the Post

Washington Consensus and Beyond,” www.codesria.org/archives/

289

ga10/%20GA201-5/Jimi_O.Adesina.pdf (accessed 11/12/ 2011).

91. Z. Randriamaro, “NEPAD, Gender and the Poverty Trap: The Challenges of

Financing for Women Development.” www.web.ca/~iccf (accessed 12/12/2011).

92. D.A. Rondinelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An

Adaptive Approach to Development Administration ,(London and New York:

Routledge, 1993), 4.

93. H. Abdel-Rahman, „The New African Initiative: Challenges of Poverty and

Aspirations of Renaissance‟, Al-Ahram, 17 November, 2001, 5.

94. T. Akin, Globalisation and Social Policy in Africa, (Cairo: Center for Arab-

African Studies, 2001), 13.

95. ECA, “ECA and Africa‟s Development 1983-2008” (Addis Ababa: 1983), 39.

96. J. Akokpari, “NEPAD‟s African Peer Review Mechanism: Prospects and

Challenges of Implementation,”OSSREA Newsletter, 21no. 3. (2001), 9.

97. A. Anangwe, “State and Development: Relying on Foreign Capital subverts

Africa‟s Development Agenda,”Third World Network, (2002), 3.

98. K. Arthur, “NEPAD and African Development: The Musings of an Academic

Pessimist,”Paper presented at the 14th Biennial Congress of the African

Association of Political Science (AAPS), Durban, South Africa, 2003, 7.

99. Y. Bangura, “New directions in State Reform: Implications for Civil Society in

Africa,” UNRISD Discussion Paper no.113(Geneva: United Nations Research

Institute for Social Development), 15.

100. J. F. Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, (London: Longman,

1993), 7.

101. B. Beckman, “The Liberation of Civil Society: Neo-Liberal Ideology and

Political Theory,”Review of African Political Economy, no. 38 (1993), 23.

102. D. Chimanikire, “The Role of NGOs in African Economic Development,” in

The Challenges of Globalization to Democratic Governance in Africa: What Role

for Civil Society and Other Stakeholders?, ed. A. A. Jalloh (Addis Ababa:

Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), 2003), 15.

103. J. Cilliers, “NEPAD‟s Peer Review Mechanism,”ISS Papers no. 64(Pretoria:

Institute for Security Studies, 2002), 23.

290

104. J. Cilliers, “Peace and Security through Good Governance: A Guide to the

NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism,”ISS Papers no. 70(Pretoria: Institute for

Security Studies, 2003), 17.

105. Department of Trade and Industry, Millennium Partnership for the African

Recovery (MAP), (Pretoria: Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2001), 13.

106. ECA, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and

Transformation, (New York: United Nations, 1990), 11.

107. ECA, Compact for African Recovery, (Addis Ababa: United Nations, 2001), 7.

108. O. Edigheji, “The African State and Socio-Economic Development: An

Institutional Perspective,”Paper presented at the Workshop on Africa: Politics and

Economy, National Council of Provinces, Cape Town, 2003, 5.

109. P. Farlam, “Working Together: Assessing Public-Private Partnerships in

Africa,”NEPAD Policy Focus Report no. 2, 2005, 11.

110. S. Gelb, “NEPAD: Opportunities and Challenges,” in Charting a New Course:

Globalisation, African Recovery and the New African Initiative, ed. R. Gibb, T.

Hughes, G. Mills and T. Vaahtoranta (Johannesburg: South African Institute of

International Affairs, 2002), 25; T. L. Kasongo, “Reinventing the State as a

Leading Development Agent in Africa under Globalisation,” African Journal of

Political Science, no. 4. (2003): 11-13.

291

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter concludes the research work; it entails the summary of findings, contribution

to knowledge and recommendations.

Summary

The work examined the nature and impact of development initiatives on Africa‟s

development efforts. Specifically, it focused on the three major initiatiaves- the LPA,

AEC and NEPAD. The overall assessment of the initiatives is that the LPA and the AEC

were not successful and NEPAD‟s performance has been impressive. The work

established that the major reason for the failure of the LPA and the AEC was the lack of

political will and commitment by the member-states to the different blueprints in addition

to their narrow focus; necessitating the need for NEPAD which has been seen to be

holistic and comprehensive in approach and implementation.

To place the shift from the LPA to the NEPAD in historical perspective, the thesis

began with an account of efforts at region building prior to the Lagos Plan of Action

(LPA), focusing on the overall rationale for economic cooperation and integration in the

continent. The study further observed that regional cooperation emerged as a central

element in Africa‟s international relations as early as the first years of independence. It

was recognised as a necessary condition for the transformation and long-term sustainable

development.

292

It established that the issue of Africa‟s economic development has always

attracted the attention of scholars and policymakers. Many explanations have been given

and continue to be given as to what constitutes the root-causes of development failure and

dependence on former colonial masters. These include geographical isolation and

weather shocks, the colonial experience which has robbed Africans of their self-

confidence, the African cultural mentalities which are not conducive to development,

high ethnic and linguistic fragmentation, the lack of sufficient financial aid to kick-start

the development process, the international environment which is not always conducive to

the development of poor countries, ill-informed development policies, bad governments

and socio-political instability etc.

The study revealed that, after a relatively fast economic growth in the early 1960s,

the rate of increase in real GDP in 1970 was moderate and estimated at about 1.8 per

cent. With population growing at an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent, the African

region, in 1970, was still experiencing a positive, albeit modest, increase in per capita

income. An opposite trend prevailed during the 1970s with an average annual growth rate

of 0.4 per cent of the GDP over the decade and a corresponding decrease in per capita

income of about 0.3 per cent. The overall result was a steady decline in primary

commodity production and exports as the engine of growth in Africa; a trend which

prevailed over a long period. In fact, the average annual growth rate of African economy

in the 1980s was -0.1%,1

in the 1990s it was 1.2% while in the millennium (from the year

2000) it was 4.9% before the global economic crisis in 2008. It should be noted however,

that, in spite of the above, there were signs that Africa‟s development was not on the right

path.

293

First, agriculture, which is the mainstay of most African economies, grew by

only 1.3 per cent per annum between 1970 and 1980. Although, food production

increased at a higher average annual rate of 1.9 per cent, it was much below the rate of

the growth of the population.

Second, the structure of the African economies, in 1980, was characterised by the

predominance of the service sector, which increased from 40.8 per cent of GDP in 1970

to 50.2 percent in 1980. Agriculture, mostly agricultural export, accounted for 22.8 per

cent of GDP in 1980 as against 33.4 per cent in 1970, while the respective figures for

industry were 27 per cent and 25.7 per cent. It should also be noted, however, that

industry in 1980 was composed mainly of mining. Manufacturing accounted for only 10

per cent of GDP in 1980 as against 9.5 per cent in 1970.

Third, Africa‟s expenditure pattern was also following an unhealthy trend. While

domestic savings as a percentage of GDP increased only marginally from 17.8 per cent in

1970 to 18.3 per cent in 1980, the share of gross fixed capital formation increased sharply

from 16.2 per cent in 1970 to 24.9 percent in 1980. In other words, Africa has been

increasingly relying on external sources to finance its development.

Fourth, Africa‟s external sector also did not improve significantly in the 1970s.

In 1980, the index of export volume of developing Africa was about 17 per cent lower

than the level in 1970. During the same period, the index of import volume increased

tremendously by over 90 per cent. Moreover, Africa‟s trade was mostly directed to other

regions of the world. Intra-African trade continued to decline in the 1970s from the

already small level of 6.7 per cent of total trade in 1970 to 4.7 percent in 1980. Such a

294

situation not only underlines Africa‟s over-dependence on the external world but also

exposes its limited productive capacity, weak transport and communication systems and

unsatisfactory payments arrangements, which are mainly tied to the developed countries.

Finally, while Africa‟s outstanding debt was about US$ 48 billion, in 1980, there were

signs that such amount would increase steadily as the average rates of increase in the late

1970s was about 15 per cent and that the conditions under which these resources were

made available were growing more difficult.2

For example, average interest rates increased from 5.7 per cent in 1975 to 8.5

percent in 1980 while maturity period declined from 20.3 years in 1975 to 15.7 years in

1980 and the grant element reduced from 29.9 per cent in 1975 to only 15.8 per cent.

With rising economic problems making it difficult for most African countries to generate

sufficient returns to service their debts, the latter cannot but increased steadily. It was in

the above context that African leaders adopted and endorsed development plans, which

included the LPA, AEC and the NEPAD. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) was the first

landmark and expression of African economic self-consciousness. Viewed from historical

perspective, the deeper meaning of this economic Magna Carta of Africa is that

economic dependency is a consequence of mental dependency. Thus, in order to get

access to mental independence leading to economic independence, the LPA policymakers

undertook to face three major tasks, namely: to challenge the conventional wisdom of

inherited theories of development and economic growth; to analyze the impact of

imitative life-styles and borrowed foreign concepts and ideologies on Africa‟s social and

economic transformation; to make African authorities accept the need for a fundamental

change.

295

Historically, LPA is a culmination of an effort of four years initiated by the

Economic Commission of Africa (ECA). Thus, in 1976, ECA proposed a Revised

Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in

Africa. The uniqueness of LPA was its emphasis on collective self-reliance, self-

sustaining development, and economic growth. The reason for this emphasis was for

Africans to move away from the external dependence.3 The Lagos Plan of Action laid the

foundations for a genuine development of the African region. As the growing consensus

on what was wrong with Africa – namely a lack of democracy and excessive state

interference in the economy emerged, this actuality was confirmed with the formulation

of the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991. The AEC was established by the

Abuja Treaty at an OAU Summit in June 1991, but only came into force in May 1994

after the requisite numbers signed up for ratification. Its main aim was to establish a pan-

continental economic community by 2034.

After twenty years (by the year 2000) of development programmes, two thirds

of the rural and one third of the urban population of sub-Saharan Africa remain below the

poverty level. Infant mortality rates average 105 per thousand for Africa compared to 70

for all developing countries. Child death rates in Africa were at twice the level for all

developing countries. Daily caloric supply per capita is 2000 compared to 2500 for all

developing countries. Only 25 per cent of the rural population in Africa had access to safe

water compared to 40 per cent for other developing countries. The percentage of age

group enrolled in secondary schools was between 20 per cent (Kenya, Zambia and Cote

d‟Ivoire) and 30 per cent (Nigeria).

296

This compares with 35 per cent for India, 40 per cent for China and Indonesia, 53

per cent for Malaysia and Mexico. The percentage of age group enrolled in the post-

secondary system is less than 3 per cent in Africa compared to 7 per cent in Indonesia

and10 per cent in Brazil. What about Africa‟s performance on domestic savings? No

African country has achieved a domestic savings rate of 10 per cent of GDP; Ghana at 8

per cent, Zambia at 9 per cent. Low-income levels cannot explain this poor savings

performance – because both India and China are also low income but their domestic

savings rates were 23 per cent and 35 per cent respectively.4Of course, it is a widely

known fact that the emergent economies in East Asia propelled themselves to remarkable

heights during the past three decades on the back of high domestic savings, which were

well invested.

The New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) seems to be a

response to the “crisis of initiative” resulting from the failure of the LPA and the AEC. It

is defined as a pledge by African leaders to eradicate poverty and place their countries on

a path of sustainable (economic) growth and development. NEPAD seems to respond to

two major issues relating to the economic development of poor countries, namely: the

effectiveness of development aid and the market economy as a solution to

underdevelopment. First, concerning the effectiveness of development aid, the World

Bank published a report “Assessing Aid” which provided a new impetus to the

macroeconomic effectiveness of aid.

This report argues that aid effectiveness depends on specific circumstances in

recipient countries, particularly, sound economic policies and good governance. NEPAD

promised to meet this conditionality, and in return, get a massive aid inflow for Africa to

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escape from economic stagnation and poverty. However, the problem is that a country

may receive development aid and become aid dependent. Moreover, this dependency

may have negative effects on economic growth in return.5

Conclusion

This study is a historical evaluation of Africa‟s development initiatives namely, the

Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (LPA) 1980-2000,

African Economic Community (AEC) 1991-2000 and the New Partnership for Africa‟s

Development (NEPAD), 2001 to date. Since their independence, most African countries

were confronted with one crisis after another, the deterioration actually started from 1975

when African countries experienced a true collapse, a plunge followed by continuing

decline in the 1980s and 1990s. Many analysts at the start of Africa's independence from

colonial rule in the early 1960s believed that Africa's long period of slow growth and

development crisis would end once the colonial yoke was removed. Unfortunately, this

did not happen and African scholars began to ask why it was so? Following this, African

leaders in collaboration with ECA drafted and adopted development initiatives as way out

of development crisis.

Regarding design, it has analysed the shift, from the traditional state-led, inward-

looking, collective self-reliance prescriptions of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the

African Economic Community (AEC) to the outward-looking, market-oriented

prescriptions of NEPAD. It focused on analysing the level of implementation of the self-

reliance model of the LPA and AEC, and the prospects of and challenges to be overcome

for the sustained implementation of the NEPAD. This thesis has advanced some

arguments relating to the design and implementation of development initiatives in Africa.

298

It has argued that African states‟ common concerns about political and economic

vulnerability in the global economy have inspired the design of several initiatives in the

continent.

Within this context, it is argued that the shift in orientation from state-led inward-

looking collective self-reliance (LPA and AEC), to market-friendly extra-regional

partnership (NEPAD) has been informed by changes in international realities and

circumstances. Also, the LPA and the AEC have ceased to be reference points for

Africa‟s development as they both suffered from poor implementation, while NEPAD has

been in operation a little over a decade now and has recorded some progress and sends a

message of hope especially, in the area of good governance.

Since, the adoption of the LPA, the main preoccupation of African countries was

crisis management for economic revival majorly through the development of agriculture,

but this did not work out. In fact, Africa experienced severe and widespread drought in

1984-1985, which affected as much as 34 African countries in all sub regions of the

continent and resulted in dramatic food scarcity, depletion of livestock and water

shortages e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Algeria,

Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, among others. Indeed, between 1980 and

1990, Africa‟s growth rate was -2.5 percent with the population growing at 4.5 percent.6

In fact, the 1980s was regarded as Africa‟s lost decade because the LPA could not

achieve its stated objectives. Although, the Abuja Treaty was signed in disregard of the

failure of Africa‟s sub-regional communities to achieve their stated objectives and to

strengthen regional economic communities among others, so far, like many other African

299

plans and declarations, the AEC has failed to meet its stated objectives. Even taking 1994

and not 1991 as its starting point, the Treaty has thus far failed in meeting the target of its

First Stage (1994– 1999) which was to be the strengthening of existing regional

economic communities within a period not exceeding five years.7

However, what really sets NEPAD apart from previous endeavours is the fact that

it is more holistic and contains the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which

seeks to monitor and advice on governance issues. The work reveals that the major

reason for the failure of all the initiatives is the lack of political will and commitment by

the member-states and they have used borrowed ideologies of economic development

without sufficiently being sensible to the African development crisis.

In the same vein, a number of important findings have been made in the course of

the research. First, the work has established that Africa has recorded a very low level of

economic development since independence. This was evident in Africa‟s economic

indices since the 1960s. The growth rate of forty or so countries of sub-Sahara Africa

recorded only 1.8 percent annually between 1960 and 1970 while the population growth

averaged about 2.5 percent during the same period.

Africa‟s economic condition hardly improved in the 1970s; in fact, it worsened.

The average growth rate dropped to 0.4 percent between 1970 and 1981, and by 1982 the

„African crisis‟ reached alarming proportions. If anything, Africa performed even worse

in the 1980s and 1990s than it did in the 1960s and 1970s. Arguably, the most important

problem facing African countries and to which utmost attention must be directed is the

problem of persistent underdevelopment characterized by low economic growth,

300

deteriorating human welfare, lack of economic, structural and social transformation and

particularly, the problem of governance. The NEPAD came on the stream to address

these problems in 2001.8

Second, the work has revealed that the general path to get Africa out of the

underdevelopment trap has been through development initiatives, most of which

unfortunately did not succeed. The LPA and AEC have ceased to be the reference

frameworks of Africa‟s economic development, while NEPAD, after thirteen years of

experience, is inspiring some hope.

The AEC on the other hand, sought to promote Africa‟s economic development

through strengthening of the existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and in

some cases where there was none, to establish new one. This was agreed to be

implemented in six stages to end in 2034. However, the AEC could barely achieve its

first stage.9

The study has also found that lack of political will affects the three initiatives,

a major reason for the failure of the LPA and AEC was that their focus was restricted and

not comprehensive. NEPAD has been more holistic in its focus which is reflected in

attention paid to issues such as good governance, political stability, conflict resolution,

attention to support from foreign partners, in addition to focus on regional integration and

self-reliance, self-sustenance and self-sufficiency. This is evidently a major factor for the

relative success and the uniqueness of NEPAD compared to the LPA and AEC.

Contributions to Knowlegde

The research has contributed to the understanding of the nature of development

initiatives and their contributions to Africa‟s economic development in many respects.

301

i. This study has demonstrated that Africa‟s poor economic performance

from the 1970s onward in the face of the high optimism that was raised at

independence necessitated the articulation of development initiatives in

Africa beginning with the LPA, AEC and the NEPAD.

ii. The study has established the differences and similarities both in terms of

content, funding and implementation arrangements of the LPA, AEC and

the NEPAD.

iii. The study has also revealed the major strengths and weaknesses of the

three initiatives. The LPA emphasised self-reliance and the AEC focused

on regional integration while the NEPAD emphasises good governance

and political stability in addition to self-reliance and regional integration.

Regarding weakness, all the initiatives have been negatively affected by

poor funding, lack of political will on the part of African leaders and lack

of support from the West.

iv. The work has established that the contributions of the LPA and the AEC

to Africa‟s economic development were inconsequential and

insignificant. NEPAD has clearly made the greatest contribution to

Africa‟s development among the three initiatives, although much is still

left to be done.

v. Finally, the study has demonstrated that NEPAD has learnt a great deal of

lessons from its predecessors (the LPA and the AEC) which reflects

better funding, more support from foreign partners and especially the

302

identification of the link between political stability, good governance,

conflict resolution and economic development.

Recommendations

Following the above;

First, it is recommended that an initiative designed for Africa should be effective

and efficient and be able to positively affect Africa‟s economic developmentin a

holistic manner in order to involve issues which impinge on development.

Second, development initiatives to be successful will need to be specific in the

modalities for implementation beyond general prescription.

Third, since development initiatives focus on the continent, the ways and means

by which states can be fully involved in the workings need to be indicated.

Fourth, there is need for African leaders to show more commitment and

seriousness to their responsibilities for their own development, this will enable

them to win the confidence of their development partners (donors).

Fifth, African states will need to involve African peoples who are its greatest

treasures in the mobilization of resources for development that affects them. The

private sector, formal and informal sectors, small and medium enterprises have a

role to play in this regard.

Sixth, the issue of market access should be handled with seriousness by breaking

away from the dependence on primary products to adding value as a way of

gaining access to foreign markets to earn revenue.

303

Seventh, African states would need to work harder to meet the MDGs by 2015.

And African leaders should demonstrate the political will to achieve African

development.

Eight, stronger AU commitment to regional integration should focus on the RECs

serving as pillars and building blocks of regional and continental integration.

Partnership support for the implementation of major regional programmes and

projects is essential.

Finally, it is also recommended that development initiatives should have

mechanisms for assessment and evaluation to measure performance and

encourage compliance.

304

Endnotes

1. A. Adedeji, “The African Economy: Overview and Prospects for Recovery and

Sustained Development,” in The Leadership Challenge for Improving the

Economic and Social Situation of Africa, ed. Adebayo Adedeji and Tariq Husain

(Ota: African Leadership Forum, 1988), 1; interview with Dr. Bankole Adeoye,

South Africa, 04/05/12.

2. Ibid., 2; Prof. Amadu Sesay, OAU, Ile Ife, 23/08/12.

3. Ibid., 2-3; interview with Dr. Abdoulie Jane, South Africa, 04/05/12.

4. Adedeji, “The African Economy: Overview and Prospects for Recovery and

Sustained Development,” 2.

5. D. Aworawo, “Development Crisis and Ideological Shift: Africa‟s Economic

Policy in an Era of Global Recession,” African Journal of Governance and

Development 1, no. 2 (June, 2012): 19; World Bank, Assessing Aid, (1998), 11;

Arne Bigsten and Dick Durevall, The African Economy and Its Role in the World

Economy (Uppsala: The Nordic African Institute, 2008), 15; interview with Dr.

I.A. Maiyaki, Addis Ababa, 14/07/12.

6. Adedeji, “The African Economy: Overview and Prospects for Recovery and

Sustained Development,” 2; interview with Dr. M.M. Nkwezalamba, Addis

Ababa, 13/07/12.

7. S.K.B. Asante, Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality, and

Challenges (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 90; interview with Prof. Said

Adejumobi, ECA, Addis Ababa, 15/07/12.

8. S. Ntibagirirwa, “Towards an African Philosophy on Economic Development,”

Paper presented at a Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, University of

Pretoria, May 18, 2010, 4-5; interview with Prof. Bolade Adeniji, LASU, Ojo,

28/08/12.

9. Asante, Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality, and

Challenges, 96; interview with Prof. Amadu Sesay, OAU, Ile-Ife, 23/08/12.

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http://www.africaunion.org / root / au

/Documents/Treatiestext/STATUTE%200F%20THE%20AUCIL-Adopted%

20-%20Feb%202009.pdf (accessed 9 November 2011).

www.panafricanperspective.com (accessed 26/11/2011).

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF

AFRICA (LPA) 1980-2000

Contents

PREAMBLE

CHAPTER I

FOODANDAGRICULTURE

CHAPTER II

INDUSTRY

CHAPTER III

NATURAL RESOURCES

CHAPTER IV

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND UTILISATION

CHAPTER V

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

CHAPTERVI

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

CHAPTER VII

TRADE AND FINANCE

CHAPTER VIII

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MEASURES TO BUILD UP AND STRENGTHEN ECONOMICAND TECHNICAL

CO-OPERATION INCLUDING CREATION

OF NEW INSTITUTIONS AND STRENGTHENING OF EXISTING ONES

CHAPTER IX

ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER X

THE LEAST DEVELOPED AFRICAN COUNTRIES

CHAPTER XI

ENERGY

CHAPTER XII

WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER XIII

DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, STATISTICS AND POPULATION

ANNEX I

FINAL ACT OF LAGOS

ANNEX II

RESOLUTION ON THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION

ANNEX III

RESOLUTION ON THE PARTICIPATION OF AFRICAIN INTERNATIONAL

NEGOTIATIONS

ANNEX IV

VOTE OF THANKS

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PREAMBLE

1. The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies has been more

sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents of the world. Indeed, rather than result

in an improvement in the economic situation of the continent, successive strategies have

made it stagnate and become more susceptible than other regions to the economic and

social crises suffered by the industrialised countries. Thus, Africa is unable to point to

any significant growth rate, or satisfactory index of general well-being, in the past 20

years. Faced with this situation, and determined to undertake measures for the basic

restructuring of the economic base of our continent, we resolved to adopt a far-reaching

regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance.

2. Thus, following a series of in-depth considerations of' the economic problems of the

continent by our Ministers and by groups of experts, we adopted at our 16th

'Ordinary

Session, held in Monrovia, Liberia, in July, 1979 the "Monrovia Declaration of

Commitment of' the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the guidelines and

measures for national and collective self-reliance in economic and social development for

the establishment of a new international economic order".

3. In adopting the Declaration, we recognised "the need to take urgent action to provide

thepolitical support necessary for the success of the measures to achieve the goals of

rapid self-relianceand self-sustaining development and economic growth", and declared

as follows:

(i)"We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments

and peoples, to promote the economic and social development and integration of our

322

economieswith a view to achieving an increasing measure of self-sufficiency and self-

sustainment.

(ii) "We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments

and peoples, to promote the economic integration of the African region in order to

facilitate and reinforce social and economic intercourse.

(iii) "We commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments

and peoples, to establish national, sub-regional and regional institutions which will

facilitate the attainment of objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment.

(iv) More specifically, we commit ourselves, individually and collectively, on behalf of

our governments and peoples, to:

(a) give an important place to the field of human resource development by starting to

eliminate illiteracy;

(b) put science and technology in the service of development by reinforcing the

autonomous capacity of our countries in this field;

(c) achieve self-sufficiency in food production and supply;

(d) implement completely the programmes for the United Nations Transport and

Communications Decade for Africa;

(e) realise the sub-regional and regional internally located industrial development;

(f) co-operate in the field of natural resource control, exploration, extraction and use for

the development of our economies for the benefit of our peoples and to set up the

appropriate institutions to achieve these purposes;

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(g) develop indigenous entrepreneurship, technical manpower and technological abilities

to enable our peoples to assume greater responsibility for the achievement of our

individual and collective development goals;

(h) co-operate in the preservation, protection and improvement of the natural

environment;

(i) ensure that our development policies reflect adequately our socio-cultural values

inorder to reinforce our cultural identity; and

(j) take into account the dimension of the future in the elaboration of our development

plans including studies and measures aimed at achieving a rapid socio-economic

transformation of our States.

(v) "We hold firmly to the view that these commitments will lead to the creation, at the

national, sub-regional and regional levels, of a dynamic and interdependent African

economy and will thereby pave the way for the eventual establishment of an African

Common Market leading to an African Economic Community.

(vi) "Resolving to give special attention to the discussion of economic issues at each

annual Session of our Assembly, we hereby call on the Secretary General, in

collaboration with the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission

for Africa, to draw upannually specific programmes and measures for economic co-

operation on sub-regional, regional and continental bases in Africa."

4. In order to consider concrete measures for the implementation of the Monrovia

Declaration, we resolve to hold this Extraordinary Session in Lagos, Nigeria, to be

devoted tothe economic problems of our continent.

324

5. In assessing those problems, we are convinced that Africa's underdevelopment is not

inevitable. Indeed, it is a paradox when one bears in mind the immense human and

natural resources of the continent. In addition to its reservoir of human resources, our

continent has 97per cent of world reserves of chrome, 85 per cent of world reserves of

platinum, 64 per cent of world reserves of manganese, 25 per cent of world reserves of

uranium and 13 per cent of world reserves of copper, without mentioning bauxite, nickel

and lead; 20 per cent of worldhydro-electrical potential, 20 per cent of traded oil in the

world (if we exclude the UnitedStates and the USSR); 70 per cent of world cocoa

production; one-third of world coffee production, 50 per cent of palm produce, to

mention just a few.

6. Thus Africa, despite all efforts made by its leaders, remains the least developed

continent. It has 20 of the 31 least developed countries of the world. Africa is susceptible

to the disastrous effects of natural and endemic diseases of the cruellest type and is victim

of settler exploitation arising from colonialism, racism and apartheid. Indeed, Africa was

directly exploited during the colonial period and for the past two decades; this

exploitation has been carried out through neo-colonialist external forces which seek to

influence the economic policies and directions of African States.

7. The structural weaknesses of African agriculture in agricultural globality are well

known: low production and productivity, and rudimentary agricultural techniques. This

situation obviously gives rise to insufficient agricultural growth, especially of food

production, in theface of the rapid population growth and has resulted in serious food

shortages and malnutrition in the continent.

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8. We view, with distress, that our continent remains the least developed of all the

continents: the total Gross Domestic Production of our countries being only 2.7 per cent

of the world's per capita income and averaging US$ 166.

9. We view, with disquiet, the over-dependence of the economy of our continent of

theexport of basic raw materials and minerals. This phenomenon had made African

economies highly susceptible to external developments and with detrimental effects on

the interests of the continent.

10. Thus, in the 20 years from 1960 to 1980 the average annual rate of growth continent-

widehas been no more than 4.8 per cent, a figure which hides divergent realities ranging

from 7 per cent growth rate for the oil exporting countries down to 2.9 per cent for the

least developed countries. Yet, if the world economic forecast for the next decade is to be

believed,the over-all poor performance of the African economy over the past 20 years

may even he agolden age compared with future growth rate.

11. This situation has led us at this Extraordinary Session devoted to the economic

problems of Africa to an agonising but frank reappraisal of the present situation and of

the future prospects of African economic conditions. In so doing, as we look back at the

political constraints on the development of our continent caused by colonial and racist

domination and exploitation, we also look forward with hope that Africa, which has

survived the brutalities of imperialism, racism and apartheid, has the resilience to pull

itself out of the economic malaise in which it finds itself.

12. The independence of Zimbabwe, after years of armed struggle waged by the

Zimbabwe people under the leadership of the Patriotic Front and with the active support

of the Organisation of African Unity, marks the final turn in the total political liberation

326

of' the continent. This event has ushered in renewed and desperate attempts by the

Pretoria regime toarrest the tide of history and to perpetuate the status quo in Namibia

and South Africa itself. South envisaged "constellation" of Southern States is part of this

diabolic design – ascheme which would bring independent States under the same

political, economic and militarydomination by the apartheid regime as the Bantustans.

We shall continue to pursue, withvigour, the liberation of the last remaining outposts of

exploitation, racism and apartheid.

13. The same determination that has virtually rid our continent of political domination is

required for our economic liberation. Our success in exploiting our political unity should

encourage us to exploit the strength inherent in our economic unity. We therefore resolve,

in the context of our Organisation, to unite our efforts in the economic field. To this end,

certain basic guidelines must he borne in mind:

14. (i) Africa's huge resources must be applied principally to meet the needs and purposes

of its people;

(ii) Africa's almost total reliance on the export of raw materials must change. Rather,

Africa's development and growth must be based on a combination of Africa's

considerable natural resources, her entrepreneurial, managerial and technical resources

and her markets (restructured and expanded), to serve her people. Africa, therefore, must

map out its ownstrategy for development and must vigorously pursue its implementation;

(iii) Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance. This is not to say that the continent

should totally cut itself off from outside contributions. However, these outsid

econtributions should only supplement our own effort: they should not be the mainstay of

our development;

327

(iv) as a consequence of the need for increased self-reliance, Africa must mobilise her

entire human and material resources for her development;

(v) each of our States must pursue all-embracing economic, social and cultural activities

which will mobilise the strength of the country as a whole and ensure that both the efforts

put into and the benefits derived from development are equitably shared;

(vi) efforts towards African economic integration must be pursued with renewed

determinationin order to create a continent-wide framework for the much needed

economic co-operationfor development based on collective self-reliance.

15. On the basis of these guidelines, we, the Heads of' State and Government, meeting in

Lagos at the 2nd Extraordinary Session devoted to Africa's economic problems, decided

to adopt the following Plan of Action as well as the Final Act of Lagos. In so doing, we

are conscious of the tremendous effort which will be required of us, individually and

collectively, to attain the goals we have set for ourselves in these documents. We are

confident that wehave the determination to overcome the obstacles that may lie in our

path and that our Organisation and its General Secretariat will be able to enlist the active

support of the international community as well as of the relevant international

organisations.

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APPENDIX 2

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)

Contents

PREAMBLE

CHAPTER 1

DEFINITIONS

CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHMENT, PRINCIPLES, OBJECTIVES, GENERAL UNDERTAKINGAND

MODALITIES

CHAPTER III

ORGANS OF THE COMMUNITY

CHAPTER IV

REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES

CHAPTER V

CUSTOMS UNION AND LIBERALISATION OF TRADE

CHAPTER VI

FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RIGHTS OF RESIDENCE

ANDESTABLISHMENT

CHAPTER VII

MONEY, FINANCE AND PAYMENTS

CHAPTER VIII

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

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CHAPTER IX

INDUSTRY, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENERGY, NATURAL RESOURCESAND

ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER X

TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATION AND TOURISM

CHAPTER XI

STANDARDISATION AND MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS

CHAPTER XII

EDUCATION, TRAINING AND CULTURE

CHAPTER XIII

HUMAN RESOURCES, SOCIAL AFFAIRS, HEALTH AND POPULATION

CHAPTER XIV

CO-OPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS

CHAPTER XV

SPECIAL PROVISIONS IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES

CHAPTER XVI

SOLIDARITY, DEVELOPMENT AND COMPENSATION FUND

CHAPTER XVII

FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER XVIII

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

CHAPTER XIX

330

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL

ECONOMICCOMMUNITIES, REGIONAL CONTINENTAL ORGANISATIONS

ANDOTHER SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

CHAPTER XX

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY, THIRD STATES

ANDINTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

CHAPTER XXI

RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, THIRD STATES, REGIONALAND

SUB-REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND INTERNATIONALORGANISATIONS

CHAPTER XXII

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

PREAMBLE

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Organisation of

African Unity (OAU);

1. The President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

2. The President of the People's Republic of Angola

3. The President of the Republic of Benin

4. The President of the Republic of Botswana

5. The President of the Republic of Burkina Faso

6. The President of the Republic of Burundi

7. The President of the Republic of Cameroon

8. The President of the Republic of Cape Verde

9. The President of the Central African Republic

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10. The President of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros

11. The President of the People's Republic of Congo

12. The President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire

13. The President of the Republic of Djibouti

14. The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

15. The President of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

16. The President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea

17. The President of the Republic of Gabon

18. The President of the Republic of the Gambia

19. The President of the Republic of Ghana

20. The President of the Republic of Guinea

21. The President of the Republic of Guinea Bissau

22. The President of the Republic of Kenya

23. The King of Lesotho

24. The President of the Republic of Liberia

25. The Leader of the 1st of September Revolution of the Great Socialist People's Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya

26. The President of the Republic of Madagascar

27. The President of the Republic of Malawi

28. The President of the Republic of Mali

29. The President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

30. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Mauritius

31. The President of the Republic of Mozambique

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32. The President of the Republic of Namibia

33. The President of the Republic of Niger

34. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

35. The President of the Republic of Rwanda

36. The President of Sahrawi Democratic Arab Republic

37. The President of the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe

38. The President of the Republic of Senegal

39. The President of the Republic of Seychelles

40. The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

41. The President of the Republic of Somalia

42. The President of the Republic of the Sudan

43. The King of Swaziland

44. The President of the United Republic of Tanzania

45. The President of the Republic of Chad

46. The President of the Republic of Togo

47. The President of the Republic of Tunisia

48. The President of the Republic of Uganda

49. The President of the Republic of Zaire

50. The President of the Republic of Zambia

51. The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe

MINDFUL of the principles of international law governing relations between States;

BEARING IN MIND the principles and objectives set forth in the Charter of the

Organisation of African Unity;

333

CONSCIOUS of our duty to develop and utilise the human and natural resources of the

Continent for the general well-being of our peoples in all fields of human endeavour;

RECOGNIZING the various factors which hinder the development of the Continent and

seriously jeopardise the future of its peoples;

HAVING REGARD to the various resolutions and declarations adopted by ourAssembly

inAlgiers in September 1968, in Addis Ababa in August 1970 and May1973 providing

that the economic integration of the Continent is a pre-requisite for the realisation of the

objectives of the OAU;

HAVING REGARD to our decision taken in Libreville in July 1977 endorsing the

Kinshasa Declaration adopted by our Council of Ministers in December 1976 concerning

the establishment of an African Economic Community, objective to be attained in

successive stages;

CONSIDERING the “Monrovia Declaration of Commitment on the Guidelines and

Measures for National and Collective Self-reliance in Economic and SocialDevelopment

for the Establishment of a New International Order” and which, interalia,calls for the

Creation of an African Common Market as a prelude to an African Economic

Community;

CONSIDERING FURTHER the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos ofApril

1980 reaffirming our Commitment to establish, by the year 2000, an African Economic

Community in order to foster the economic, social and cultural integration of our

Continent;

FINALLY CONSIDERING our Declaration made on the occasion of the Twenty-fifth

Anniversary of the OAU and, in particular, the reaffirmation of our commitment and our

334

determination to take the necessary steps to accelerate the establishment of the proposed

African Economic Community;

NOTING that the efforts already made in the sub-regional and regional sectoral economic

co-operation are encouraging and justify a larger and fuller economic integration;

NOTING the need to share, in a equitable and just manner, the advantages of cooperation

among Member States in order to promote a balanced development in all parts of the

Continent;

Have decided to establish an African Economic Community constituting an integral part

of the OAU and hereby agree as follows:

1. Member States undertake to create favourable conditions for the development of the

Community and the attainment of its objectives,particularly by harmonising their

strategies and policies. They shall refrainfrom any unilateral action that may hinder the

attainment of the saidobjectives.

2. Each Member State shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, take all

necessary measures to ensure the enactment and dissemination ofsuch legislation as may

be necessary for the implementation of the provisionsof this Treaty.

3. Any Member State, which persistently fails to honour its general undertakings under

this Treaty or fails to abide by the decisions or regulations of the Community, may be

subjected to sanctions by theAssembly upon the recommendation of the Council. Such

sanctions may include the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership and

maybe lifted by the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council.

4. All measures envisaged under this Treaty for the promotion of a harmonious and

balanced development among Member States, particularly, those relating to the

335

formulation of multi-national projects and programmes, shall be implemented

concurrently within the time period specified for the attainment of the objectives of the

various stages outlined in paragraph 2 of this Article.

5. The transition from one stage to another shall be determined when the specific

objectives set in this Treaty or pronounced by the Assembly for a particular stage, are

implemented and all commitments fulfilled. The Assembly, on the recommendation of

the Council, shall confirm that the objectives to a particular stage have been attained and

shall approve the transition to the next stage.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the cumulative transitional

period shall not exceed forty (40) years from the date of entryinto force of this Treaty.

7. This Treaty, drawn up in four (4) original texts in the Arabic, English, French and

Portuguese languages, all four (4) texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with

the Secretary-General of the OAU who shall transmit a certified true copy thereof to the

Government of each signatory State.

8. The Secretary-General shall notify Member States of the dates of deposit ofthe

instruments of ratification or accession and shall upon the entry into force of this Treaty

register the same with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE, Heads of State and Government of Member Statesof the

Organisation of African Unity have signed this Treaty.

Done at Abuja, Nigeria on the Third of June

Nineteen Hundred and Ninety One.

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APPENDIX 3

THENEWPARTNERSHIPFOR FRICA’SDEVELOPMENT(NEPAD) OCTOBER

2001

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. AFRICA IN TODAY’S WORLD: BETWEEN POVERTY ANDPROSPERITY

- The historical impoverishment of a continent

- Africa and the global revolution

III. THE NEW POLITICAL WILL OF AFRICAN LEADERS

IV. APPEAL TO THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA

V. PROGRAMME OF ACTION: THE STRATEGY FOR

ACHIEVINGSUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A. CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

- The Peace, Security and Political Governance Initiative

(i) Peace and Security Initiative

(ii) Democracy and Political Governance Initiative

- The Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative

- Sub-regional and Regional approaches to development

B. SECTORAL PRIORITIES

- Bridging the Infrastructure Gap

(i) All Infrastructure Sectors

337

(ii) Bridging the Digital Divide: Investing in Information and

CommunicationTechnologies.

(iii) Energy

(iv) Transport

(v) Water andSanitation

- Human Resource Development Initiative [including reversing thebrain drain]

(i) Poverty Reduction

(ii) Bridging the EducationGap

(iii) Reversing the Brain Drain

(iv) Health

- Agriculture

- The Environment Initiative

- Culture

- Science and Technology Platforms

C. MOBILISING RESOURCES

- The Capital Flows Initiative

(i) Increasing Domestic Resource Mobilisation

(ii) Debt Relief

(iii) ODA Reforms

(iv) The Private Capital Flows

- The Market Access Initiative

(i) Diversification of

Production

338

(ii) Mining

(iii) Manufacturing

(iv) Tourism

(v) Services

(vi) Promoting the PrivateSector

(vii) Promoting African Exports

(viii) Removal of Non-tariff Barriers

VI. A NEW GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

- Establishing a new relationship with industrialised countries and multilateral

organizations

VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FORAFRICA’S

DEVELOPMENT

- Projects

(i) Agriculture

(ii) Promotion of the Private Sector

(iii) Infrastructure and Regional Integration

- Needs assessment

- Management mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development

VIII. CONCLUSION

PREAMBLE (INTRODUCTION)

1. This New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African leaders, based

on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have apressing duty to

339

eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a

path of sustainable growth and development, and at thesame time to participate actively

in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination

of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of

underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world.

2. The poverty and backwardness of Africa stand in stark contrast to the prosperity of the

developed world. The continued marginalisation of Africa from the globalisation process

and the social exclusion of the vast majority of its peoples constitute a serious threat to

global stability.

3. Historically accession to the institutions of the international community, thecredit and

aid binomial has underlined the logic of African development. Credit has led to the debt

deadlock, which, from instalments to rescheduling, still existsand hinders the growth of

African countries. The limits of this option have beenreached. Concerning the other

element of the binomial – aid – we can also notethe reduction of private aid and the upper

limit of public aid, which is below the target set in the 1970s.

4. In Africa, 340 million people, or half the population, live on less than US $1 perday.

The mortality rate of children under 5 years of age is 140 per 1000, and life expectancy at

birth is only 54 years. Only 58 per cent of the population have access to safe water. The

rate of illiteracy for people over 15 is 41 per cent.There are only 18 mainline telephones

per 1000 people in Africa, compared with146 for the world as a whole and 567 for high-

income countries.

340

5. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development calls for the reversal of this abnormal

situation by changing the relationship that underpins it. Africans are appealing neither for

the further entrenchment of dependency through aid, norfor marginal concessions.

6. We are convinced that an historic opportunity presents itself to end the scourgeof

underdevelopment that afflicts Africa. The resources, including capital, technology and

human skills, that are required to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment

exist in abundance, and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources

and to use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed

to a sustained human development effort and poverty eradication, as well as a new global

partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest.

7. Across the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves tobe

conditioned by circumstance. We will determine our own destiny and call onthe rest of

the world to complement our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope.

Democratic regimes that are committed to the protection of human rights, people-centred

development and market-oriented economies areon the increase. African peoples have

begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership.

These developments are, however, uneven and inadequate and need to be further

expedited.

8. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development is about consolidating and accelerating

these gains. It is a call for a new relationship of partnership betweenAfrica and the

international community, especially the highly industrialized countries, to overcome the

development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations.