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A HETEROGENEITY ANALYSISOF THE BOLSA FAMÍLIAPROGRAMME EFFECT ON MENAND WOMEN’S WORK SUPPLY
Clarissa Gondim Teixeira
Introduction•Bolsa Família Program – the Brazilian CCT• Origin: PBF starded in 2003 as a result of the fusion of existing
cash transfer programs
•Motivation: • Achieve the MDGs – short-run poverty reduction
(cash transfer)• Universal policies failure to provide access to basic
services – increase demand for education and health (conditionality)
• Breaking intergenerational poverty cicle – investment in humam capital (conditionality)
IntroductionPBF positive effects:• Increase in food consumption and educational
expenditures (CEDEPLAR, 2005) (IFPRI, 2010).
• Reduction in inequality and poverty rates (Chein, Andrade and Ribas, 2006)
• Increase in school attendance but no consensus on child labor effects (Cardoso y Souza, 2004), (Cacciamali, Tatei y Batista, 2008), (Pedrozo, 2007), (IFPRI, 2010).
Introduction
Frequent criticism concerning negative effects on labor supply:
•No change in income – question the effectiveness of the program
•Generates dependency – concern with exit doors
Introduction• Objectives of the paper are:• Identify the existence of PBF´s impact on men
and women´s participation rate and journey;
• Through the disaggregated analysis by sex, type of occupation and ‘dose-effect’:▫ Explain the relation of receiving cash transfers and
labor supply;▫ Identify and characterise the individuals whose
labour supply are the most elastic.
Literature review• Time allocation theory (Becker, 1965) • Income and subsititution effects (Parker and
Skoufias, 2000)• Multiplier effects (Martínez, 2004)
• Informal work and production function (Cardoso, 1999)
• Additional worker (Stephens, 2001) • ‘Collective approach’ of intrahousehold resource
allocation (Chiappori, 1992)
Literature review• Individual level
Increase in participation rate greater for women- Cedeplar (2005)
Increase in participation rate - IFPRI (2010) Decrease in participation rate and labor hours for mothers -
Tavares (2008) No effect participation rate, decrease in labor hours, increase
for rural women - Ferro Nicollela (2007)
• Municipal level No effect - Foguel Barros (2008) Participation rate: increase rural, decrease urban – Ribas,
Soares, Soares (2010)
•Elegibility criteria: extremely poor families and poor families with children.
•Targeting• Self-declared income verified by cross
checking with formal work data
• Analysis of Single Registry information
• Inclusion and exclusion errors
Bolsa Família Programme (PBF) Bolsa Família Programme (PBF)
Bolsa Família Programme(PBF) Bolsa Família Programme(PBF) Cash Transfers:•Variable transfer of US$7.00 per child or nursing mother maximun of 3 per familiy (avoid incentive to childbearing); •Fixed transfer of US$23.00 only for extremely poor families with or without children.
Monthly per capita income Transfer values (2006)
Below extreme poverty line(US$ 23.00 )
US$ 44.00
US$ 37.00
US$ 30.00
US$ 23.00
Between extreme poverty line(US$ 23.00) and poverty line (US$ 46.00)
US$ 21.00
US$ 14.00
US$ 7.00
Bolsa Família Programme (Bolsa Família Programme (PBFPBF) )
• Conditionalities:- 85% of school attendance;
- Vaccination for children under 6 years old;
- Pre and pos natal care for women.
Bolsa Família Programme (Bolsa Família Programme (PBFPBF) )
• Exit doors:- Age of child (does not punish progression)
- Family per capita income above eligibility – single registriy updated every 2 years (vulnerability )
Labor market of the poor
Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
Labor market of the poor
Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
Men Women
Labor market of the poor• AIBF 82% Urban - PNAD 67% Urban
Source: AIBF 2005 and PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
Men Women
Evaluation estrategy
•Cross section using annual household data – PNAD 2006
Cash transfer supplement
•Quasi-experimental design•Propensity Score •Re-weighted multivariable regression•Cluster in the household level
Empirical Investigation
Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation
Results•The average effect on the probability of
working is not significant for men or women.
Results•PBF does not cause a large work
‘discouragement’•Women are more sensitive to an income
shock
ResultsWork hours Men Women Men Women
Rural -1.08*** -0.34 Agricultural -0.81** -0.67
0.39 0.52 0.37 0.57
Urban -0.35 -1.31** Non-agricultural -0.53* -0.95*
0.28 0.57 0.29 0.51
Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
Results
Work hours Men Women Men Women Formal worker 0.16 -0.70
0.29 0.84 Rural -0.62 -1.00 Agricultural -0.12 -4.41
0.71 2.24 0.70 3.10 Urban 0.30 -0.58 Non-agricultural 0.15 0.00 0.32 0.82 0.31 0.78 Informal worker -0.88*** -0.81*
0.29 0.42 Rural -1.14*** -0.30 Agricultural -0.92** -0.56
0.42 0.56 0.40 0.60 Urban -0.63 -1.38** Non-agricultural -0.83** -1.06* 0.39 0.62 0.41 0.58
Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
ResultsWork hours Men Women Men Women
Self-employed -0.35 -1.16*
0.41 0.61
Rural -0.26 0.19 Agricultural -0.31 -0.85
0.58 0.64 0.53 0.77
Urban -0.44 -3.23*** Non-agricultural -0.40 -1.60
0.56 1.13 0.61 1.02
Paid worker -0.84*** -0.82*
0.28 0.48
Rural -1.77*** -0.93 Agricultural -1.22** -0.66
0.52 0.78 0.49 0.86
Urban -0.24 -0.73 Non-agricultural -0.54* -0.89
0.32 0.61 0.32 0.57
Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
Results
Source: PNAD 2006. Own calculation.
Cost of labor hour (Minimal wage) Men Women
0 -3.87*** -0.76
0.90 0.51
1 -0.93 -0.80
1.21 1.60
2 0.30 0.29
0.59 0.94
Results• Formal work is found to be the least elastic due to
workers’ rights and income stability;
• Urban self-employed women are the most sensitive to the PBF transfer;
• Informal paid rural jobs are the most sensitive for men.
• Unpaid workers reduce their labor hours in contrast with those earning one or two minimal wage
ResultsTransfer Value (R$) Men Women
15 0.04 -0.46 0.41 0.66
30 -0.32 -0.53 0.45 0.81
45 -0.22 -0.95 0.53 0.82
50 -1.49** -1.15 0.58 0.75
65 -0.20 -0.10 0.38 0.57
80 -0.77** -1.23**0.36 0.58
95 -1.07*** -1.13** 0.35 0.57
Conclusion
• One cannot affirm that PBF is responsible for generating dependence on account of income transfers
• The results also confirm that the elasticity of labor supply varies according to sex and type of work.
• Higher effects were found for greater income shock intensities