A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of …ahicken/index_files/electoral... · 2008. 3. 10. · Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. Vietnam is included in Table

Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121–151www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

A guide to the constitutional structures andelectoral systems of east, south and southeast

Asia

Allen Hickena,∗, Yuko Kasuyab

a Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Suite #213, 611 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI48104-3028, USA

b Graduate School of International Relations & Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego,CA, USA

Abstract

In 1997 an economic crisis swept through much of Asia. In addition to the various proximalcauses of the crises, e.g. overvalued exchange rates, lax banking regulations, etc., politicalstructures have received much attention. Some claim that problems in countries’ political struc-tures set the stage for the crisis. Others argue that governments’ responses to the crisis werehelped or hindered by existing political institutions. However, research on the consequencesof Asian political institutions is hampered by a lack of basic information on the differentconstitutional and electoral frameworks around the region. This article is an attempt to helpfill this void by providing a description of the constitutional structures and electoral systemsof 17 Asian-Pacific countries since 1945. 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Electoral systems; Constitutions; Plurality; Proportional representation; Mixed systems; Asia

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to provide a succinct summary of the political insti-tutions of Asia. Asia is home to an amazing variety of regimes and institutionsincluding monarchies, socialist systems and long-established democracies. Inaddition, many of the countries in the region are new democracies, having undertaken

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.:+1-734-615-9105; fax:+1-734-764-3522.E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Hicken); [email protected] (Y. Kasuya).

0261-3794/02/$ - see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(01)00053-1

122 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121–151

a transition to democracy within the last two decades as elected legislatures havereplaced authoritarian leaders or powerful bureaucracies. This has spurred an interestin the strengths and weaknesses of particular democratic institutional arrangementsamong those who study the region. The recent Asian economic crisis has also con-tributed to this growing interest in institutions. Policymakers, political reformers andinternational actors (such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank) arebeginning to recognize that the constitutional structure and electoral system a countryadopts can have important implications for democratic stability, economic growthand social welfare.

Unfortunately, research on the political institutions of Asia has thus far laggedbehind the need for such information. Indeed, Asian democracies or semi-democ-racies (with the exception of Japan) have rarely been included in large comparativestudies of institutions. We seek to fill this void. This paper is modeled on severalstudies of comparative institutions in Western or Latin American democracies (e.g.Jones, 1995; Lijphart, 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997).1

The lack of concise comparative descriptions of the electoral systems and consti-tutional structures of Asia does not imply that country-focused scholars are unawareor uninterested in the subject. Quite the contrary, there are numerous case studieswhich explore the political institutions of particular countries in great detail, and wemade grateful use of such work during the research for this paper. What has beenlacking, however, are works that put the institutions of a given country in a broadercomparative context. In the pages that follow we place these country-specific datain that comparative context while using terminology common to other studies ofconstitutional structures and electoral systems. We hope that this information willbe of use to institutional scholars, policymakers and political reformers.

This paper is simply a description of the various constitutional and electoral sys-tems across the region. We do not discuss the origins of the political institutions ina given country, nor do we attempt to assess the quality or effectiveness of theseinstitutions. We also do not review the pros and cons of particular institutionalarrangements. Finally, we do not include information on different party systemsacross the region.2

Data for a total of 17 countries in East, South and Southeast Asia are presentedin the paper.3 Following the convention used by Jones (1995), Powell (1982) andothers, only systems that were independent and had elected governments for a mini-mum of five years are included. We have intentionally made an effort to includeregimes that are typically excluded from comparative institutional studies becausethey are not considered fully democratic. We include in our study any regime thathas held regular elections for at least five years, in which opposition parties were

1 We are especially indebted to Mark Jones’ 1995 article on the institutions of Latin America whichmotivated us to do something similar for Asia.

2 A project is being designed to collect party system information and we hope to include it infuture work.

3 We also chose to include Papua New Guinea due to its close proximity to the region, even thoughit is generally not considered part of Asia.

123A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121–151

allowed to participate. Unlike most comparative studies of democratic institutions,we do not require that those elections be completely open and competitive. Whilemost of the regimes included in the following tables meet the openness and competi-tiveness criteria we also include systems such as Indonesia, Singapore and SouthKorea which have held regular elections, but which, during certain periods, havefallen short in terms of the competitiveness or openness of those elections. As arule of thumb we excluded regimes that held elections for only a minority of thelegislative seats.4

We have attempted to catalogue every regime in Asia that met our criteria betweenthe years 1945 and 2000. In some countries there were significant changes to theelectoral laws and/or political institutions during the period. Where there are changesin the variables listed in a given table over time, such changes are noted by dividingthe country into multiple time periods, e.g. Cambodia I (1953–1970), (1993–1998)and Cambodia II (1998–) (Table 1). In order to keep the tables from becoming overlycomplex, multiple country periods do not carry over from table to table. For example,Table 1 contains Cambodia I and Cambodia II, reflecting a change in the numberof legislative chambers over time. Table 3, by contrast, has only one listing forCambodia since the variables relating to the head of state did not change.

2. Constitutional structure

Table 1 contains three different ways to classify constitutional structures acrossAsia. The first and most obvious is the distinction between a presidential and parlia-mentary form of government. Presidential systems are those in which an executive(a) is elected by a popular vote, (b) holds office for a fixed term (i.e. is not dependenton parliamentary confidence), (c) selects and directs the cabinet, and (d) has somelegislative authority.5 In parliamentary systems the executive is (a) selected by thelegislature,6 and (b) dependent on the legislature’s confidence (Jones, 1995, p. 6).7

Of the 17 countries listed in Table 1, 15 have had a parliamentary system at onetime or another. The majority of these are former British colonies (Bangladesh,Burma, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Sri Lanka) or

4 Based on these criteria the following countries were included: Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, India,Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. Vietnam is included in Table 1. Cambodia is included although the1997 coup d’etat took place only 4 years after elections. China, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, Bhutan andBrunei were excluded altogether because they did not meet these criteria. China, Vietnam, Laos and NorthKorea are communist systems. Brunei is a sultanate while Bhutan is a monarchy. Hong Kong and Macau,as former colonial territories now part of China, were also excluded. Because of the lack of data theelected regimes of 1950s and 1960s South Vietnam and Cambodia had to be excluded from all but Table 1.

5 On the importance of the latter two criteria see Carey and Shugart (1995).6 In many parliamentary systems it is the head of state that formally selects the Prime Minister, but

does so on the advice of the legislature.7 For a more detailed look at the differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes, see

Shugart and Carey (1992) and Lijphart (1992, 1994).


Table 1Regime types in Asia

System Time period Form of government Legislative brancha Federal/Unitary

Bangladesh I 1986–1991 Presidential Unicameral UnitaryBangladesh II 1991– Parliamentary Unicameral UnitaryBurma 1948–1962b Parliamentary Bicameral FederalCambodia I 1953–1970, Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary

1993–1998Cambodia II 1998– Parliamentary Bicameral UnitaryIndia 1950– Parliamentary Bicameral FederalIndonesia I 1950–1959c Parliamentary Unicameral UnitaryIndonesia II 1971–d Hybride Unicameralf UnitaryJapan 1947– Parliamentary Bicameral UnitaryMalaysia 1957– Parliamentary Bicameralg FederalNepal 1990– Parliamentary Bicameralh UnitaryPakistan 1985–1999i Parliamentaryj Bicameral FederalPapua New 1975– Parliamentary Unicameral UnitaryGuineaPhilippines I 1946–1972 Presidential Bicameral UnitaryPhilippines II 1978–1986k Hybridl Unicameral UnitaryPhilippines III 1987– Presidential Bicameral UnitarySingapore I 1965–1991 Parliamentary Unicameral UnitarySingapore II 1991– Hybridm Unicameral UnitarySouth Korea I 1948–1952 Hybridn Unicameral UnitarySouth Korea II 1952–1960 Presidentialo Unicameralp UnitarySouth Korea III 1960–1961 Parliamentary Bicameral UnitarySouth Korea IV 1962–q Presidentialr Unicamerals UnitarySouth Vietnam I 1956–1963t Presidential Unicameral UnitarySouth Vietnam 1967–1975 Hybridu Bicameral UnitaryIISri Lanka I 1948–1972 Parliamentary Bicameralv UnitarySri Lanka II 1972–1977w Parliamentary Unicameral UnitarySri Lanka III 1978–x Hybridy Unicameral UnitaryTaiwan I 1991–1997z Presidentialaa Unicameralbb UnitaryTaiwan II 1997– Hybridcc Unicameralbb UnitaryThailand I 1978–1997dd Parliamentary Bicameral UnitaryThailand II 1997– Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary

a In the “Legislative Branch” column an italicized Bicameral signifies that the second or upper chamberis appointed rather than elected.

b The Prime Minister handed the government over to an army-controlled caretaker government foreighteen months between 1958 and 1960.

c Indonesia fought a war of independence from 1945 through 1949, formally receiving its independenceon December 27, 1949. The 1950 constitution was actually Indonesia’s third constitution. An indepen-dence constitution was drafted in 1945 (and later readopted by Sukarno in 1959) and a short-lived federalconstitution came into being in 1949.

d In 1959 Sukarno abrogated the 1950 constitution and reinstalled the 1945 constitution in its place.This in effect brought the parliamentary era to an end, although the title ‘Prime Minister’ was used todescribe the executive position up until 1966. From 1959 until 1971 the legislature (DPR) and electoralcollege (MPR) were appointed bodies.


Table 1Continued

e An electoral college (MPR) made up of elected and appointed members chooses the Indonesianpresident. The president has broad legislative powers and can appoint and remove the cabinet on his own.The MPR has the power to remove the president at any time.

f Indonesia has two assemblies, one of which, the MPR, is not part of the normal legislative processand meets only once every five years to select the President and set broad policy outlines. It is made upof both elected and appointed members but the majority was appointed until 1999.

g Majority of the upper house is appointed, with only a few elected members.h Majority of the upper house is elected while a minority is appointed.i (9) Martial law was lifted and new (amended) constitution promulgated in 1985, but elections were

not held under the new constitution until 1988. The elections in early 1985 were held under martial lawwith a ban on political parties.

j Pakistan has a more powerful President than many parliamentary regimes (s/he can dissolve thelegislature and appoint and dismiss the cabinet.) However, because the President is not directly electedPakistan is classified here as parliamentary.

k The Philippines was under martial law from 1972 to 1981. The 1973 constitution called for a unicam-eral legislature. However, an elected legislature was not put in place until 1978. From February 1986 toMay 1987 an interim ‘Freedom Constitution’ was in place.

l President-Parliamentary. The 1973 martial law constitution technically established a hybrid systemwith the President as head of State and Prime Minister as head of Government. However, for much ofthe period Ferdinand Marcos filled both positions.

m President-Parliamentary. In 1991 a constitutional amendment was passed creating a President withsome legislative and dissolution powers along side a Prime Minister and cabinet subject to parliamentaryconfidence. The President can appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister.

n The President sat for fixed term, functioned as both the head of state and government but was electedby a 2/3rds vote of the National Assembly.

o From 1952 to 1954 the President chose a Prime Minister who then chose and removed the cabinet.The cabinet was collectively subject to parliamentary censure.

p A 1952 constitutional amendment created an upper chamber. However, due to the war, elections forthe upper chamber were not held until 1960.

q Spans the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Republics (1962–1972, 1972–1980, 1980–1987, 1987–).r During the 3rd and 6th Republics (1962–1972, 1987–) a directly elected President appointed the Prime

Minister and the Prime Minister appointed and removed the rest of the cabinet. The cabinet was notsubject to parliamentary confidence.

s Between 1972 and 1987 South Korea had an electoral college (the NCU) whose job was to elect thepresident. However, unlike the electoral colleges in Taiwan and Indonesia, under the Korean constitutionthe NCU was not considered a second legislative chamber.

t In 1955 a referendum was held which did away with the monarchy and installed Ngo Dinh Diem asPresident. A republican constitution was subsequently adopted in 1956.

u President-Parliamentary. The President with legislative power selects the Prime Minister and cabinetbut they in turn are subject to parliamentary confidence.

v One-half of the Senate was appointed and one-half elected.w After a violent uprising in 1971 a new constitution was passed in 1972 which changed the name of

the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka.x The first presidential elections under the 1978 constitution were not held until 1982.y President-Parliamentary. The President is directly elected, can appoint the cabinet, including the Prime

Minister, and is not dependent on the confidence of Parliament to remain in office. However, the PrimeMinster and Cabinet must maintain the support of parliament to remain in office.


Table 1Continued

z The lifting of martial law and the decision to allow opposition parties to contest elections in 1987was the beginning of a semi-democratic period. However, it was not until the constitutional changes of1991 that the entire legislature was open for competitive election (the first election was held in 1992).Prior to 1991 supplementary elections were held for both legislative chambers, but only a minority ofthe seats were open to contestation.

aa The President appoints the head of the cabinet, the President of the Executive Yuan (the Premier),and the Premier appoints the rest of the cabinet. The appointment of the Premier must be confirmed bythe Legislative Yuan. The President can remove cabinet members. The cabinet is not subject to legislat-ive confidence.

bb Taiwan has a legislative assembly (the Legislative Yuan) as well as a National Assembly. The latterhas no legislative power and until 1996 met only once every four years to select the President andVice-President. Since 1996 the President and Vice-President have been directly elected and the NationalAssembly’s role has been confined to voting on constitutional amendments and holding the power ofpresidential impeachment. In 2000 the National Assembly was changed to a non-standing body electedentirely via list PR.

cc President-Parliamentary. Under a 1997 constitutional amendment the Premier (President of the Execu-tive Yuan) is subject to a no confidence vote by the Legislative Yuan and the President has the powerto dissolve the Legislative Yuan once such a vote has been cast.

dd From 1991 to 1992 members of a coup group that had overthrown the previous government ruledThailand. When democracy was restored in 1992 the pre-coup rules and institutions were largely re-adopted.

were strongly influenced by the British system (Thailand). In addition to these coun-tries, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Nepal and South Korea have also adopted parlia-mentary systems at some point in their democratic history.8 Bangladesh, Burma,India, Indonesia I, Pakistan, Singapore I, South Korea III and Sri Lanka II each havePresidents as their head of state, but are not classified Presidential systems sincethese Presidents are not popularly elected or do not have cabinet and/or legislativeauthority. Five of the countries have had a presidential regime which meets the fourcriteria listed above: Bangladesh (I), the Philippines (I, III), South Korea (I, III),Taiwan (I) and South Vietnam (I).

Seven countries have used hybrid systems that do not fit well into either category.Singapore’s (II) directly elected President has some legislative authority and canappoint and remove the Prime Minister. However, the Prime Minister and cabinetare also subject to parliamentary confidence. Until 1952 the South Korean Presidentsat for fixed term and functioned as both the head of state and government but wasnot popularly elected.9 In Taiwan II the President selects the head of the cabinet (theExecutive Yuan) and the head of the Executive Yuan (known as the Premier) selectsthe rest of the members of the Executive Yuan. However, the Premier is subject toa vote of no confidence by the Legislative Yuan and the President has the power todissolve the Legislative Yuan if a no confidence resolution is passed. Indonesia II

8 Most of these states were monarchies at one time. Empirically it is the case then whenever monarchieshave democratized, they have chosen parliamentary government (Lijphart 1999, p. 142).

9 The President was selected by a 2/3rds vote of the National Assembly.


has a President that is chosen by an electoral college (the People’s ConsultativeAssembly or MPR) made up, in part, of the members of the legislative assembly.10

The President can appoint and remove the cabinet independent of the legislature andhas very broad legislative powers. The President is not subject to the confidence ofthe legislature (House of Representatives or DPR) but the electoral college (MPR)can remove the President prior to the end of his term. In Sri Lanka III and VietnamII a fixed term President with legislative power selected a Prime Minister, but thePrime Minster could be removed by a no confidence vote of the legislature. Finally,the 1973 martial law constitution in the Philippines (II) established a Hybrid systemwith a directly elected President with legislative powers as head of state and a PrimeMinister as head of government. The Prime Minister was nominated by the Presidentand approved by the legislature and the Prime Minister and cabinet were responsibleto the legislature.11 The footnotes to Table 1 include a finer classification of thesehybrid regimes using Shugart and Carey’s (1992) President-Parliamentary andPremier-Presidential categories.12

Table 1 also contains two other ways of classifying regimes: by their legislativestructure and by structure of central–local government relations. Legislatures can beunicameral or bicameral. In bicameral legislatures the upper house can either beelected or appointed. The number of countries with unicameral versus bicamerallegislatures is about equal in the region. Column 4 in Table 1 presents the informationon structure of the legislative branch. Six countries have changed key features oftheir legislative branch over time. Cambodia, the Philippines, South Korea, SouthVietnam and Sri Lanka have switched between a unicameral and bicameral legis-lature. Thailand recently replaced an appointed second chamber with an elected ver-sion.

Countries in the region also differ to the extent the national government formallyshares power with sub-national governments. In federal systems there is a formaldivision of power between the central/national government and sub-national govern-ments (Lijphart, 1999, p. 186). Typically, this includes a formal division of legislativeauthority. Such a formal division does not exist in unitary states. Column 5 in Table1 lists any state that formally declares itself federal in its constitution. Only fourstates have had federal regimes—Burma, India, Malaysia and Pakistan. It is worthnoting that the terms ‘ federal’ and ‘unitary’ mask a good deal of complexity withineach category. There are formally unitary states, such as Japan and the Philippines,which have granted substantial powers to sub-national governments, and there are

10 The MPR’s role goes beyond that of an electoral college. This is discussed in more detail below.11 In practice this hybrid system functioned more like a presidential system. For much of the period

Ferdinand Marcos was both the President and Prime Minister. He was for all intents and purposes an“all-powerful and dominant president” . (Brillantes, 1988, p. 123).

12 Premier-Presidential regimes meet the following criteria: (a) the president is elected by popular vote,(b) the president possesses considerable powers, and (c) there also exists a premier and cabinet subjectto legislative confidence, who perform executive functions. President-Parliamentary systems have thefollowing characteristics: (a) the popular election of the president, (b) the president appoints and dismissescabinet members, (c) cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence and (d) the president asthe power to dissolve parliament and/or legislative powers. (Shugart and Carey, 1992, pp. 23–24).


formally federal states where the powers of sub-national governments are extremelylimited, e.g. Malaysia.

3. Election of the president and presidential vetoes

In the region’s presidential and hybrid systems voters can either elect the presidentdirectly, or choose representatives who then elect the president. Among the presiden-tial and hybrid systems listed in Table 2, eight provide for the direct election of thepresident via the plurality formula: Bangladesh, Philippines I, II, III, Singapore,South Korea II, V and Taiwan II. Sri Lanka also directly elects its president butuses preference voting rather than strict plurality.13

The remaining systems in Table 2 indirectly elect their presidents. From 1948 to1952 (South Korea I) the South Korean President was chosen by a 2/3rds majorityof the National Assembly. In Indonesia I voters elected most of the members ofthe Indonesian parliament (DPR). The 500-member DPR joined with 500 additionalpresidential appointees to form the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). TheMPR met every 5 years to select the president by majority vote. Under the currentIndonesian system the 500-member DPR joins with 65 appointees and 135 otherelected representatives to form the MPR. In Pakistan the president is elected by amajority of an electoral college composed of members of both legislative chambersand the provincial assemblies. South Korea III used a 5000-member electoral collegecalled the National Conference for Unification (NCU) to elect the President usingthe majority rule. The NCU was disbanded under a 1980 constitutional amendmentbut was replaced with a nearly identical electoral college (South Korea IV). Votersin pre-1996 Taiwan elected an electoral body (National Assembly), which thenelected the president on a majority basis. See Table 8 for more details on systemsthat rely on electoral bodies.

There is also quite a variation among the Asian presidential regimes in terms ofpresidential terms and term limits (Table 2, columns 4, 5). The length of presidentialterms ranges from 4 year in the case of Philippines I and Taiwan II to 7 year inSouth Korea IV. A presidential term limit does not exist in Bangladesh, IndonesiaI, Philippines II, Singapore and South Korea II and III while there is a ban on re-election in South Korea IV, and V and Philippines III. Sri Lanka, Taiwan, SouthKorea I, Indonesia II and Philippines I place a two-term limit on their presidents.

Finally, differences in the veto power of presidents are marked. The South KoreaIII and Indonesian presidents are the most powerful in terms of veto power—theirvetoes can not be overridden. Taiwan’s president, by contrast, has no veto power

13 Each Sri Lankan voter ranks up to three candidates for president in order of preference. If no candi-date gets an absolute majority of first preferences all but the top two candidates are declared defeated.The votes of the defeated candidates’ supporters are then transferred to whichever of the remaining candi-dates they have marked as a second preference. If still no candidate has an absolute majority, thirdpreferences are distributed to the remaining two candidates and the candidate with the most votes is thendeclared the winner.


Table 2Presidents in presidential and hybrid systems

System Time period Method of election Presidential Term limit Veto/overrideterm (yr) requirement

Bangladesh 1986–1991 Plurality 5 None Package/majoritya

Indonesia I 1959–1998b Majority of electoral 5 None Package/nonebody (MPR)

Indonesia II 1998– Majority of electoral 5 Two term Package/nonebody (MPR) limit

Philippines I 1935–1972 Plurality 4 Two term Partial &limit package/2/3rds

both housesPhilippines II 1981–1986c Plurality 6 None Partial &

package/2/3rdsPhilippines III 1987– Plurality 6 No re- Partial &

election package/2/3rdsboth houses

Singapore 1991– Plurality 6 None Package(limited)/2/3rdsd

South Korea I 1948–1952 2/3rd vote of National 4 Two term Package/2/3rdsAssemblye limit

South Korea II 1952–1960, Plurality 4 Noneg Package/2/3rds1962–1972f

South Korea 1972–1980 Majority of electoral 6 None Package/noneIII body (NCU)h

South Korea 1980–1987 Majority of electoral 7 No re- Package/2/3rdsIV body electionSouth Korea V 1987– Plurality 5 No re- Package/2/3rds

electionSri Lanka 1978– Preference voting- 6i Two term Nonej

majority limitTaiwan I 1991–1996 Majority of electoral 6 Two term Nonek

body (National limitAssembly)

Taiwan II 1996– Plurality 4 Two term Nonel

limit

a Non-money bills only.b From 1959 until 1971 the MPR was completely appointed by the president.c No presidential elections were held during the martial law period (1972–1981).d Provisions for overriding a presidential appointment veto were added in a 1996 constitutional amend-

ment. In addition to the power to veto certain appointments to government agencies, statutory boards andgovernment corporations, the president must also approve the budgets of some government entities. Thepresident can also veto any changes to the Central Provident Fund and bills affecting foreign borrowing.

e If no candidate could obtain 2/3rds of the votes after two rounds of voting a majority run-off electionwould be held between the top two vote-getters.

f Spans the 1st and 3rd Republics (1950–1960 and 1962–1972).g In 1954 and again in 1969 the constitutions were amended, lifting restrictions on re-elections, thus

allowing the sitting presidents (Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee) to run for re-election.h The National Conference for Unification, headed by the president.i A 1982 amendment allows the president to call for elections any time after serving 4 yr.


Table 2Continued

j Presidential approval is required before the results of a referendum become law.k The president by himself does not have a veto over legislation. However, the Executive Yuan may

veto legislation with the approval of the president. Such a veto can be overridden with a 2/3rds vote inthe Legislative Yuan.

l The Executive Yuan may veto legislation with the approval of the president. Such a veto can beoverridden with a majority vote in the Legislative Yuan. The change from a 2/3rds to majority voteoccurred in 1997.

independent of the Executive Yuan. The Sri Lankan President also lacks veto powerover legislation, although the president’s approval is required before the results ofa referendum become law. In South Korea (I, II, IV, V) and the Philippines presidentshave package vetoes that take a supermajority to overturn. The Bangladeshi andPakistani presidents can veto non-money bills but the veto can be overturned by asimple majority.14 The Philippine president also has a partial or ‘ line item’ veto overbudget-related bills.

In Singapore the position of President is a relatively new invention—created in1991 via a constitutional amendment. However, unlike the heads of state just men-tioned, the Singaporean President cannot veto most legislation. He can however vetocertain government appointments as well as bills that affect the Central ProvidentFund (CPF).15 The President must also approve the budgets of certain governmentagencies and can veto bills relating to foreign borrowing. His veto can be overriddenby a 2/3rds vote of the legislature.16 The presidential veto powers and overriderequirements are listed in Table 2, column 6.

4. Parliamentary systems and heads of state

As is the case in many parliamentary democracies, parliamentary systems in East,South and Southeast Asia separate out the duties of the head of government (thePrime Minister) from the duties of the head of state (a President or Monarch). Usuallythe duties of these heads of state are only ceremonial in nature, however this is notalways the case. Table 3 presents information on the different heads of state in Asianparliamentary systems and their various powers. Seven of the parliamentary systemshave had monarchs as their head of state. In all cases but Malaysia these monarchssit for life. The position of Malaysian monarch and head of state is passed betweennine Malay Sultans, each of whom serves a term of 5 years. The remaining parlia-mentary regimes have presidents as heads of state, none of which are directly elected.

14 In the case of bicameral Pakistan, a majority of both houses is required.15 The CPF was introduced in 1955 to give financial security to retired or disabled workers. Employees

and employers must contribute a percentage of an employee’s salary to the CPF.16 The President may also veto any bill that would curtail his discretionary powers. This veto can only

be overturned by a 2/3rds vote in a national referendum.


Table 3Heads of state in parliamentary systems

System Time period Head of Method of election Term (yr) Veto/overridestate requirement

Bangladesh 1991– President Majority of Parliament 5 Non-money/majorityBurma 1948–1962 President 2/3rds of Parliamenta 5 NoneCambodia 1953–1970; Monarch Non-elected Life None

1993–India 1950– President Electoral collegeb 5 Non-money/majorityIndonesia 1950–1959 President NAc NAc NoneJapan 1947– Monarch Non-elected Life NoneMalaysia 1957– Monarch Elected by Sultansd 5 Non-money/majority

both housese

Nepal 1990– Monarch Non-elected Life Non-money/majorityPakistan 1985–1999 President Electoral Collegef 5 Non-money/majority

both housesPapua New 1976– Monarchg Non-elected Life NoneGuineaSingapore 1965–1991 President Majority of Parliament 4 NoneSouth Korea 1960–1961 President 2/3rds of Parliamenth 5 Nonei

Sri Lanka I 1948–1972 Monarchg Non-elected Life NoneSri Lanka II 1972–1977 President Appointed by Prime 4 None

MinisterThailand 1978– Monarch Non-elected Life any bill/2/3rds both

houses

a The President was elected by a 2/3rds vote of joint session of lower and upper legislative chambers.Candidates were rotated between the various ethnic groups.

b The Electoral college consists of the members of both national legislative chambers together withthe elected members of state assemblies.

c The method of electing the President and his term were to be determined in a Presidential electionlaw but no such law was ever passed. As a result, no presidential elections were held during this period.President Sukarno, President of the short lived Republic of the United States of Indonesia, stayed on asPresident under the 1950 constitution. NA=not available.

d The Monarch is selected from among nine Malay Sultans.e Prior to constitutional amendments in 1983 and 1984, it was unclear what exactly the Monarch’s

veto powers were. The 1983 and 1984 amendments set forth the above rules.f Members of both national legislative chambers together with the members of state assemblies.g The British Monarch.h If, after the first round of votes no candidate received a 2/3rds majority, a second round would be

held. If a second round failed to produce a 2/3rds winner, the plurality candidate would be declaredthe winner.

i The president could veto a state of siege declaration passed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

In Sri Lanka II the Prime Minister appointed the President. The remaining presidentsare elected by an electoral college which combines the national legislature with rep-resentatives from local assemblies (India) or by the national legislature only(Bangladesh, Burma, Singapore, South Korea).

As mentioned, these heads of state enjoy primarily ceremonial powers. However,


several heads of states in Asia do possess some additional powers.17 The most com-mon additional power granted to the head of state is the power to refuse to sign billspassed by the legislature—or veto power. Where granted, veto power is typicallylimited to non-monetary bills and vetoes can be over-ridden by a majority vote ofone or both legislative chambers. This is the case in Bangladesh, India, Malaysiaand Nepal. The Thai King enjoys somewhat greater power than most ceremonialheads of state. He can withhold his consent on any bill and send the bill back toParliament for redeliberation. An override of the King’s veto requires a 2/3rds voteof both houses.18

5. Selection of the legislature

Tables 4–7 contain the basic information for the legislatures in our set of cases.Table 4 contains data for lower or single legislative chambers elected using theplurality formula. Table 5 has the same information for those lower/single legislativechambers elected on a proportional or semi-proportional basis. Table 6 lists systemsthat use two-tier or mixed-member systems to elect the lower/single chamber. Table7 includes data on the make-up and election method of the second or upper chamberin bicameral systems. Basic information common to many or all of these tablesinclude: (1) the electoral formula used to allocate the legislative seats; (2) assemblysize; (3) number of electoral districts; (4) district magnitude; (5) the presence orabsence of thresholds; (6) the term length of legislators, (7) their term limits and (8)whether the legislature includes appointed/reserved seats. Assembly size, the numberof districts and district magnitude often vary over time as the population changes.Where this is the case we included the data from the last election held under a givenset of rules.

5.1. Electoral formulas for the legislature

There are two general types of electoral formulas used to allocate legislative seats,namely, plurality formula and proportional representation (PR). Several countriesemploy a combination of these formulas in mixed-member systems. Such systemswill be discussed in some detail below. Under the plurality formula the candidate(s)with the highest number of votes in a given district is elected. The plurality formulais usually used in single-seat districts, however, several countries use the pluralityformula in multi-seat districts, for example, Thailand’s lower chamber (prior to 1997)(see Table 4), the Philippine Senate (see Table 7) and the provincial seats in Indones-ia’s electoral college (see Table 8). In these three systems voters have as many votesas there are seats to be filled and the highest polling candidates fill the availableseats. Singapore’s system (after 1987) combines a handful of single-seat districts with

17 In most cases these are rarely used.18 The King’s veto power has rarely, if ever, been exercised.

133A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121–151T

able

4L

ower

/sin

gle

cham

ber

elec

ted

usin

gth

epl

ural

ityfo

rmul

a

Syst

emT

ime

peri

odD

istr

ict

mag

nitu

deN

umbe

rof

Ass

embl

yT

erm

leng

thT

erm

limits

App

oint

ed/r

eser

ved

dist

rict

ssi

zese

ats

Ban

glad

esh

1986

–1

300

330

5N

one

30a

Bur

ma

1948

–196

21

250

250

4N

one

Non

eIn

dia

1950

–1

543

545

5bN

one

2c

Japa

n19

47–1

994

1to

5(w

/SN

TV

)13

551

14

Non

eN

one

Mal

aysi

a19

57–

117

017

05

Non

eN

one

Nep

al19

90–

120

520

55

Non

eN

one

Paki

stan

1985

–199

91

207

217

5N

one

10d

Papu

aN

ewG

uine

a19

76–

110

910

95

Non

eU

pto

3e

Phili

ppin

esI

1935

–197

21

120

120

4N

one

Non

ePh

ilipp

ines

II19

77–1

983f

8to

21(w

/m

ultip

levo

tes)

1220

06

Non

e35

g

Phili

ppin

esII

I19

83–1

987h

118

622

06

Non

e34

i

Phili

ppin

esIV

1987

–199

41

250

250

33

term

sN

one

Sing

apor

eI

1966

–198

81

7474

4N

one

Non

eSi

ngap

ore

II19

88–

1,3

to6j

2483

5N

one

Up

to12

k

Sout

hK

orea

I19

50–1

960

1l23

323

34

Non

eN

one

Sout

hK

orea

II19

60–1

961

123

323

34

Non

eN

one

Sout

hK

orea

III

1972

–198

02

(w/

SNT

V)

7723

16

Non

e1/

3of

seat

sm

Sri

Lan

kaI

1948

–197

21n

145

157

5N

one

6o

Sri

Lan

kaII

1972

–197

71n

160

174

6pN

one

6o

Tha

iland

1978

–199

71

to3

(w/

mul

tiple

vote

s)15

539

34

Non

eN

one

134 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) 121–151T

able

4L

ower

/sin

gle

cham

ber

elec

ted

usin

gth

epl

ural

ityfo

rmul

a

aT

hirt

yse

ats

are

rese

rved

for

wom

enel

ecte

dby

Parl

iam

ent.

bA

1976

cons

titut

iona

lam

endm

ent

exte

nded

the

term

to6

year

s.A

1978

amen

dmen

tch

ange

dit

back

to5

year

s.c

Pres

iden

tm

ayno

min

ate

upto

two

mem

bers

ofth

eA

nglo

-Ind

ian

com

mun

ity.

dN

on-M

uslim

min

oriti

esel

ect

10m

embe

rs.

eT

hree

addi

tiona

lm

embe

rsm

aybe

appo

inte

dby

a2/

3rds

vote

inPa

rlia

men

t.f

An

elec

tion

law

was

pass

edin

1977

and

elec

tions

for

anin

teri

mas

sem

bly

wer

ehe

ldin

1978

unde

rm

artia

lla

w.

The

vote

rsco

uld

cast

asm

any

vote

sas

ther

ew

ere

seat

s.H

owev

er,

vote

rsal

soha

dth

eop

tion

ofbl

ock

votin

g--v

oter

sco

uld

sim

ply

wri

teth

ena

me

ofth

epa

rty

onth

eba

llot

and

the

vote

sw

ould

auto

mat

ical

lybe

assi

gned

toth

atpa

rty’

sen

tire

ticke

t.g

Tw

enty

-one

wer

eap

poin

ted

byth

ePr

esid

ent

from

the

mem

bers

ofth

eca

bine

t.Fo

urte

enw

ere

elec

ted

bygo

vern

men

t-sp

onso

red

sect

oral

orga

niza

tions

.h

Ele

ctio

nshe

ldin

1984

.i

Tw

enty

wer

eap

poin

ted

byth

ePr

esid

ent

from

the

mem

bers

ofth

eca

bine

t.Fo

urte

enw

ere

elec

ted

bygo

vern

men

t-sp

onso

red

sect

oral

orga

niza

tions

.j

Aha

ndfu

lof

sing

le-s

eat

dist

rict

sex

ist

alon

gsid

eG

roup

Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Con

stitu

enci

esw

ithm

agni

tude

sof

3–6

seat

s.k

The

Pres

iden

tan

dPa

rlia

men

tca

nap

poin

tup

tosi

xre

pres

enta

tives

each

.l

Som

eso

urce

scl

aim

that

Kor

easw

itche

dto

two

mem

ber

dist

rict

sin

1958

.H

owev

er,

mos

tso

urce

spl

ace

the

chan

geto

two

mem

ber

dist

rict

sin

1972

.m

1/3

ofth

ese

ats

wer

eap

poin

ted

byth

epr

esid

ent.

App

oint

edle

gisl

ator

sse

rved

a3-

year

term

.n

Up

tofiv

e2

or3

seat

dist

rict

sw

ere

allo

wed

natio

nwid

e.o

Parl

iam

ent

coul

dno

min

ate

six

peop

leto

fill

seat

s.p

The

term

for

the

Nat

iona

lA

ssem

bly

was

6ye

ars

with

the

exce

ptio

nof

the

first

Nat

iona

lA

ssem

bly,

whi

chse

rved

for

only

5ye

ars.

The

first

Nat

iona

lA

ssem

bly

had

alre

ady

serv

edfo

r2

year

sas

aco

nstit

uent

asse

mbl

ych

arge

dw

ithdr

aftin

ga

new

cons

titut

ion.


able

5L

ower

/sin

gle

cham

ber

elec

ted

usin

gpr

opor

tiona

lre

pres

enta

tion

(sin

gle-

tier

dist

rict

ing)

Syst

emT

ime

peri

odE

lect

oral

Dis

tric

tN

umbe

rof

Ass

embl

yPa

rty

thre

shol

dT

erm

leng

thT

erm

limits

App

oint

edfo

rmul

am

agni

tude

dist

rict

ssi

ze(y

r)se

ats

Cam

bodi

a19

93–

Clo

sed

list

PR1–

821

120

Non

e5

Non

eN

one

Indo

nesi

aI

1950

–195

9PR

w/

flexi

ble

16a

1625

7N

oneb

4N

one

Up

to18

c

list

Indo

nesi

aII

d19

71–1

999

Clo

sed

list

PR4–

6227

500

11–1

3se

atse

5N

one

75–1

00f

Indo

nesi

aII

I19

99–

Mod

ified

Lis

t4–

8227

500

Non

eh5

Non

e38

i

PRw

ithno

min

atin

gdi

stri

ctg

aA

vera

gedi

stri

ctm

agni

tude

.b

The

rew

asno

part

yth

resh

old

but

tow

ina

seat

aca

ndid

ate

had

tore

ceiv

eat

leas

t30

0,00

0vo

tes.

cT

heco

nstit

utio

nm

anda

ted

that

thre

em

inor

itygr

oups

rece

ive

am

inim

umnu

mbe

rof

seat

s:C

hine

se9,

Eur

opea

ns6,

Ara

bs3.

Ifth

ese

num

bers

wer

eno

tat

tain

edvi

ath

eel

ectio

ns,

then

the

gove

rnm

ent

wou

ldap

poin

tm

inor

ityre

pres

enta

tives

tofil

lth

ese

seat

s.d

From

1975

,on

lyth

ree

part

ies

wer

eal

low

edto

part

icip

ate

inel

ectio

ns.

The

sear

eG

olka

r,th

eU

nite

dD

evel

opm

ent

Part

y(P

PP)

and

the

Indo

nesi

anD

emoc

ratic

Part

y(P

DI)

.e

At

times

anin

tern

alD

PRru

lere

quir

edpa

rtie

sto

have

am

inim

umnu

mbe

rof

seat

sra

ngin

gfr

om11

to13

.f

The

num

ber

ofap

poin

ted

seat

sin

the

DPR

has

vari

edov

ertim

ebu

tst

ayed

betw

een

15an

d25

%of

the

tota

lse

ats.

gPa

rtie

spr

esen

ta

list

ofca

ndid

ates

inea

chof

Indo

nesi

a’s

27pr

ovin

ces.

Eac

hpa

rty

also

assi

gns

itsca

ndid

ates

toin

divi

dual

dist

rict

sw

ithin

each

prov

ince

.V

oter

sca

sta

sing

levo

tefo

ra

part

ylis

t.Se

ats

are

allo

cate

dto

each

part

yin

prop

ortio

nto

the

part

y’s

vote

shar

ein

each

prov

ince

.E

ach

part

y’s

seat

sar

efil

led

byth

ein

divi

dual

cand

idat

esas

sign

edto

the

dist

rict

whe

reth

epa

rty

rece

ived

itshi

ghes

tvo

tepe

rcen

tage

.U

nder

the

Indo

nesi

afir

stel

ectio

nus

ing

thes

eru

les,

the

dist

rict

list

port

ion

ofth

eel

ecto

ral

rule

sw

ere

‘lar

gely

emas

cula

ted’

(ND

I,A

ugus

t19

99)

and

the

syst

emfu

nctio

ned

like

pure

list

PR.

hT

here

isno

thre

shol

dfo

rw

inni

ngse

ats

inth

ecu

rren

tel

ectio

n,ho

wev

er,

apa

rty

mus

tga

in2%

ofth

ese

ats

inth

eD

PRor

3%of

the

seat

sin

the

prov

inci

alan

ddi

stri

ctas

sem

blie

sto

beel

igib

leto

run

infu

ture

elec

tions

.i

Rep

rese

ntat

ives

ofth

em

ilita

ry.


able

6M

ixed

-mem

ber

ortw

o-tie

red

syst

ems

(low

er/s

ingl

ech

ambe

r)

Syst

emT

ime

Tie

rsSi

ngle

orSe

atlin

kage

Ele

ctor

alD

istr

ict

Num

ber

Num

ber

Thr

esho

ldT

erm

Ter

mA

ppoi

nted

/pe

riod

sepa

rate

betw

een

tiers

form

ula

mag

nitu

deof

ofse

ats

leng

thlim

itsR

eser

ved

vote

sdi

stri

cts

intie

r(y

ears

)se

ats

Japa

n19

94–

Lis

tSe

para

teN

one

Lis

tPR

7to

3311

a20

0N

one

4N

one

Non

e

Nom

inal

Plur

ality

130

030

0N

one

Phili

ppin

es19

95–b

Lis

tSe

para

teN

one

Lis

tPR

52c

152

c2%

ofvo

tes

33

Non

eb

Dis

tric

tPl

ural

ity1

208

208

Non

eSo

uth

1962

–L

ist

Sing

leY

esd

Plur

ality

/PR

d51

151

5%of

vote

s4

Non

eN

one

Kor

eaI

1972

and

3se

ats

Nom

inal

Plur

ality

115

315

3N

one

Sout

h19

80–

Lis

tSi

ngle

Yes

ePl

ural

ity/P

Re

921

925

nom

inal

4N

one

Non

eK

orea

II19

87se

ats

Nom

inal

SNT

V2

9218

4N

one

Sout

h19

87–

Lis

tSi

ngle

Yes

,Pl

ural

ity/P

Rf

461

463%

4N

one

Non

eK

orea

III

1996

Maj

ority

assu

ring

f

Nom

inal

Plur

ality

125

325

3N

one

Sout

h19

96–

Lis

tSi

ngle

Non

eL

ist

PR46

146

3%4

Non

eN

one

Kor

eaIV

Nom

inal

Plur

ality

125

325

3N

one


able

6C

ontin

ued

Sri

Lan

kag

1978

–g2n

dSi

ngle

Non

eL

ist

PR29

129

Non

e6

Non

eN

one

1st

Mod

ified

PR2

toov

er22

196

1/8

ofvo

tes

w/p

refe

rent

ial

20in

give

nvo

tingh

dist

rict

Tai

wan

1991

–iL

ist

Sing

leN

one

Lis

tPR

8;41

j2

495%

3N

one

10%

–20%

l

Nom

inal

SNT

V1

to17

2917

6kN

one

20%

m

Tha

iland

1997

–L

ist

Sepa

rate

Non

eL

ist

PR10

01

100

5%4

Non

eN

one

Nom

inal

Plur

ality

140

040

0N

one

aT

helis

ttie

ris

divi

ded

into

11bl

ocs

with

dist

rict

mag

nitu

des

of7–

33.

bT

hepr

ovis

ion

for

am

ixed

-mem

ber

syst

emw

asin

clud

edin

the

1987

Con

stitu

tion

but

ala

wfu

llyim

plem

entin

gth

em

easu

rew

asno

tpa

ssed

until

1995

and

not

used

inan

elec

tion

until

1998

.In

the

inte

rim

both

Pres

iden

tA

quin

oan

dPr

esid

ent

Ram

osap

poin

ted

som

ese

ctor

alre

pres

enta

tives

toth

elo

wer

cham

ber.

cT

here

isa

thre

ese

atca

pon

the

num

ber

ofse

ats

apa

rty

can

win

inth

elis

ttie

r.Se

ctor

alor

gani

zatio

ns,

inad

ditio

nto

part

ies,

are

allo

wed

toco

mpe

tefo

rth

epa

rty

list

seat

s.D

urin

gth

e19

98el

ectio

nson

ly13

part

ies

pass

edth

e2

perc

ent

thre

shol

dan

dso

man

ypa

rty

list

seat

sw

ere

unfil

led.

The

rem

aini

ngse

ats

wer

efil

led

byap

poin

ted

repr

esen

tativ

esfr

omgr

oups

that

fell

beho

ldth

eth

resh

old.

The

rule

was

subs

eque

ntly

chan

ges

tore

quir

eth

atun

fille

dse

ats

bedi

stri

bute

dam

ong

part

ies

abov

eth

e2

perc

ent

thre

shol

d,bu

tbe

low

the

thre

ese

atca

p.d

The

part

yth

atre

ceiv

ed50

%or

mor

eof

the

vote

sau

tom

atic

ally

rece

ived

2/3r

dsof

the

list

tier

seat

s.If

nopa

rty

won

50%

ofth

ese

ats,

the

part

yw

ithth

ela

rges

tnu

mbe

rof

vote

sau

tom

atic

ally

rece

ived

1/2

ofth

elis

ttie

rse

ats.

The

seco

nd-p

lace

part

yre

ceiv

ed1/

3of

the

list

tier

seat

sas

long

asits

vote

shar

ew

asm

ore

than

doub

leth

atof

the

thir

dpl

ace

part

y.Fa

iling

this

,th

ese

cond

plac

epa

rty

rece

ived

2/3r

dsof

the

rem

aini

ngse

ats.

Any

seat

sle

ftov

erw

ere

dist

ribu

ted

toth

eot

her

part

ies

ona

PRba

sis.

eT

hepa

rty

that

won

the

larg

est

num

ber

ofno

min

altie

rse

ats

auto

mat

ical

lyre

ceiv

ed2/

3rds

ofth

elis

ttie

rse

at.

The

rem

aini

ng1/

3rdof

the

list

tier

seat

sw

ere

divi

ded

amon

gth

eot

her

part

ies

ona

prop

ortio

nal

basi

s.f

The

part

yth

atw

ins

the

mos

tse

ats

inth

eno

min

altie

rre

ceiv

esen

ough

seat

sfr

omth

elis

ttie

rto

ensu

reth

atit

has

am

ajor

ityin

the

asse

mbl

y.T

here

mai

ning

seat

sin

the

list

tier

are

then

divi

ded

prop

ortio

nally

amon

gth

eot

her

part

ies.


able

6M

ixed

-mem

ber

ortw

o-tie

red

syst

ems

(low

er/s

ingl

ech

ambe

r)

gSr

iL

anka

isa

two-

tiere

dsy

stem

but

does

not

mee

tth

est

rict

defin

ition

ofa

mix

ed-m

embe

rsy

stem

.T

heor

igin

al19

78C

onst

itutio

ndi

dno

tin

clud

ea

two-

tiere

dsy

stem

.T

hefir

stel

ectio

nsun

der

the

1978

cons

titut

ion

wer

ehe

ldin

1989

,bu

tpr

ior

toth

attim

e(1

988)

the

cons

titut

ion

was

amen

ded

toa

two-

tiere

dsy

stem

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ses

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rty

list

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pend

ent

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plis

t)an

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ree

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cand

idat

es.

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part

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ent

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pth

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rict

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ives

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us”

seat

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arde

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ndid

ate

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est

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ies/

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ps(i

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ding

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est

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y)in

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ortio

nto

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vote

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ceiv

ed.

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idat

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ithth

ehi

ghes

tvo

teto

tals

from

each

part

y’s

list

then

rece

ive

seat

s.iPr

ior

toa

1991

cons

titut

iona

lch

ange

ther

ew

ere

supp

lem

enta

lel

ectio

nsfo

ra

min

ority

ofth

ese

ats.

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first

elec

tion

afte

rth

ech

ange

was

held

in19

92.

j41

natio

nal

seat

san

d8

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sre

pres

entin

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erse

asC

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se.

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rdi

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cts

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ecia

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inal

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rict

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ially

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tione

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nalis

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clud

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en’s

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niza

tions

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uld

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tse

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lm

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rsof

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isla

tive

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n.Si

nce

1991

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eon

lycr

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ling

rese

rved

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nder

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ent

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rved

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sin

both

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list

and

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inal

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rtie

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leas

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inth

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ust

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ong

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est

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ctor

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wer

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ality

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eN

one

dela

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n


able

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lect

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cond

cham

bers

aT

hem

etho

dsus

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tre

pres

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tives

toth

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per

cham

ber

(Cha

mbe

rof

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iona

litie

s)va

ried

from

stat

eto

stat

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ats

wer

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nera

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ican

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grou

psso

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ctth

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stat

e.(S

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pan

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ece

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form

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non

the

seco

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part

cont

ains

info

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ion

onth

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henu

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ted

unde

rA

ssem

bly

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repr

esen

tsth

enu

mbe

rof

seat

sin

each

tier.

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egin

ning

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elec

tion

in20

01th

elis

tPR

tier

issl

ated

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ange

from

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osed

list

toan

open

list

syst

em.

dT

here

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me

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ute

whe

ther

the

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or70

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ein

form

atio

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not

avai

labl

e.f

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nstit

utio

nal

amen

dmen

tel

imin

ated

the

Sena

tein

1971

.g

5of

the

elec

ted

and

5of

the

appo

inte

dse

ats

com

eup

for

rene

wal

ever

y2

year

s.h

The

Kin

gap

poin

ted

the

mem

bers

ofth

eSe

nate

until

1997

whe

na

new

cons

titut

ion

was

pass

ed.


able

8E

lect

oral

bodi

esfo

rpr

esid

entia

lsy

stem

s

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emN

ame

ofbo

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ime

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lect

oral

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tric

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umbe

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ber

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ther

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mag

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d/N

umbe

rle

ngth

rese

rved

seat

sof

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s(y

ears

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nesi

aI

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5b57

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ltativ

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embl

yam

endm

ents

,(M

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som

ele

gisl

ativ

epo

wer

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nesi

aII

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1999

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odifi

ed4

to82

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ltativ

eL

ist

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nstit

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embl

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,(M

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som

ele

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wer

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ality

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orea

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nal

1972

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ural

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lect

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fere

nce

for

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iona

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nA

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bly

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orea

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1980

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ural

ity1

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8no

ne5,

278

7N

one

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wan

gN

atio

nal

1991

–199

6hL

ist

PR20

,80

i10

025

%k

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val

ofA

ssem

bly

cons

titut

iona

lam

endm

ents

SNT

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to10

234j

10–2

0%k


able

8E

lect

oral

bodi

esfo

rpr

esid

entia

lsy

stem

s

aT

heM

PRfo

rmal

lyca

me

into

bein

gin

1971

unde

rPr

esid

ent

Soeh

arto

.Si

nce

1959

an“i

nter

im”

MPR

had

been

inpl

ace

whi

chw

asen

tirel

yap

poin

ted

byth

epr

esid

ent.

As

part

ofth

e19

71fo

rmat

ion

ofth

eM

PRSo

ehar

tose

tfo

rth

the

rule

sre

gard

ing

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mak

e-up

ofth

eM

PR.

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heM

PRco

nsis

tsof

the

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bers

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PR(7

5–10

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char

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poin

ted)

and

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addi

tiona

lm

embe

rsap

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ted

byth

epr

esid

ent.

cT

heM

PRco

nsis

tsof

the

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mem

bers

ofth

eD

PR(3

8of

whi

char

eap

poin

ted)

and

200

addi

tiona

lm

embe

rs,

65of

whi

char

eap

poin

ted.

dE

lect

edby

Prov

inci

alA

ssem

blie

s.e

65ap

poin

ted

repr

esen

tativ

esof

func

tiona

lgr

oups

+the

38ap

poin

ted

mem

bers

ofth

eD

PR.

fT

heN

CU

was

disb

ande

dun

der

the

1980

cons

titut

iona

lam

endm

ents

but

was

repl

aced

with

ane

arly

iden

tical

elec

tora

lco

llege

.g

Mix

ed-m

embe

rsy

stem

.T

heto

ppa

rtof

the

cell

cont

ains

info

rmat

ion

onth

elis

ttie

ran

dth

ebo

ttom

part

cont

ains

info

rmat

ion

onth

eno

min

altie

r.W

hile

afu

llyel

ecte

dN

atio

nal

Ass

embl

yne

ver

had

the

chan

ceto

sele

ctth

epr

esid

ent,

itis

incl

uded

here

for

info

rmat

iona

lpu

rpos

es.

hIn

1990

the

larg

ely

unel

ecte

dN

atio

nal

Ass

embl

yse

lect

edth

epr

esid

ent.

In19

91th

eco

nstit

utio

nw

asam

ende

dan

dth

eN

atio

nal

Ass

embl

ybe

cam

ea

com

plet

ely

elec

ted

body

.Ele

ctio

nsfo

rth

eN

atio

nalA

ssem

bly

wer

ehe

ldin

1991

,199

2an

d19

96bu

tthe

elec

ted

Nat

iona

lAss

embl

yne

ver

sele

cted

apr

esid

ent.

In19

96th

eco

nstit

utio

nw

asag

ain

amen

ded

toal

low

for

the

dire

ctel

ectio

nof

the

pres

iden

tan

dsi

nce

then

,th

eN

atio

nal

Ass

embl

y’s

role

has

been

confi

ned

tovo

ting

onco

nstit

utio

nal

amen

dmen

tsan

dho

ldin

gth

epo

wer

ofpr

esid

entia

lim

peac

hmen

t.In

2000

the

Nat

iona

lA

ssem

bly

was

chan

ged

toa

non-

stan

ding

body

elec

ted

entir

ely

via

list

PR.

i80

natio

nal

seat

san

d20

seat

sre

pres

entin

gov

erse

asC

hine

se.

j22

8fr

omre

gula

rdi

stri

cts

and

6fr

omtw

osp

ecia

lab

orig

inal

dist

rict

s.k

Prio

rto

1991

offic

ially

sanc

tione

dfu

nctio

nalis

tbo

dies

,in

clud

ing

wom

en’s

orga

niza

tions

,co

uld

elec

tse

vera

lm

embe

rsof

the

Nat

iona

lA

ssem

bly.

Sinc

e19

91ge

nder

has

been

the

only

crite

rion

for

fillin

gre

serv

edse

ats.

The

rew

ere

rese

rved

seat

sin

both

the

list

and

nom

inal

tiers

.In

the

list

tier

one

out

ofev

ery

four

seat

sw

onby

apa

rty

had

tobe

fille

dby

afe

mal

eca

ndid

ate.

Inth

eno

min

altie

ron

ese

atw

asre

serv

edfo

ra

wom

anin

dist

rict

sw

ithat

leas

tfive

seat

s.


Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), each with three to six seats. GRCs canonly be contested by teams of candidates from the same party (or allied independents)and at least one member of each team must be from the Malay, Indian or anotherminority community. Voters cast a single vote for a team and the team with a plu-rality of the votes wins all the seats in that GRC.

A few countries in the region make use of multi-seat districts but give voters asingle non-transferable vote (SNTV) rather than multiple votes. Under SNTV thereare multiple seats in each district and each voter has one vote. Seats are awarded tocandidates on a plurality basis. Uses of SNTV include the election of South Korea’sNational Assembly from 1972 to 198019 and Japanese lower chamber elections until1994 (Table 4).

Table 4 lists all of those countries using the plurality formula for electing thelegislature, or lower chamber in bicameral legislatures. As discussed above, countriesthat employ the plurality rule generally use single-seat districts as well. Assemblysize among these countries ranges from a low of 74 in Singapore to 545 in India.Term lengths also vary from three years in Philippines IV to six in Philippines II,III, South Korea III and Sri Lanka II. Only legislators in the Philippines IV face aterm limit (three terms). Several of the countries set aside some seats for appointeesor representatives of particular societal groups. The number of appointed or reservedseats is usually a small percentage of the total seats.

A few countries in the region use proportional representation (PR), where seatsare allocated to parties in proportion to votes obtained. Among PR systems thereare several methods of allocating legislative seats, three of which are found in theregion: Closed list PR, Flexible list PR and Single Transferable Vote. Closed listPR involves each party presenting a list of candidates to the electorate with votersselecting a party rather than a candidate. Parties receive seats in proportion to theiroverall share of the vote. Candidates are then awarded seats based on their positionon the party list. Cambodia and Indonesia II use Closed list PR exclusively to electthe lower legislative chamber (Table 5).20 Several countries combine Closed list PRtogether with the plurality formula in two tiered systems, discussed below.

Indonesia I used flexible list PR to elect the legislature (Table 5). Voters cast onevote for a party list but were also allowed to vote for an individual candidate onthat list. Parties were awarded seats on a PR basis and candidate vote totals wereused to determine the candidate’s place on the party list.21 However, candidates inIndonesia I had to receive at least 300,000 votes in order to win a seat.

Indonesia’s new system (Indonesia III in Table 5) uses a modified version of ListPR. Parties present a list of candidates in each of Indonesia’s 27 provinces. Eachparty also assigns its candidates to individual districts within each province. Whilethe list of candidates assigned to a given district is made public, voters still cast asingle vote for a party list. Seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the

19 Korea electoral rules also restricted nominations under SNTV (i.e. no party could nominate morethan one candidate in a give district.)

20 India and Japan also use List PR to elect the upper chamber (Table 7).21 Sri Lanka also uses PR with preferential voting in a two tiered system, discussed below.


party’s vote share in each province. However, parties do not then assign those seatson the basis of candidate positions on the party list, as is the case in pure List PR.Instead, each party’s seats are filled by the individual candidates assigned to thedistrict where the party received its highest vote percentage.22 This is the system onpaper. However, under Indonesia’s first election using these rules (1999), the districtlist portion of the electoral rules were “ largely emasculated” (NDI, August 1999).Many parties did not submit district lists before the elections and the Election Com-mission (the KPU) allowed parties to unilaterally decide who would fill the party’sseats. In other words it appeared, in practice, to function like pure List PR. It is notclear what the status of the district list rule will be in the future.

No countries use Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems to elect their lowerchamber. However, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka use STV systems for electingtheir upper chamber (see Table 7). In STV systems voters are able to rank as manycandidates as they wish, both within parties and across different parties, in order oftheir preference. Any of the candidates who reach a certain quota23 of first-choicevotes are deemed elected. The surplus votes (votes above the quota) of the just-elected candidates are then transferred to the second-choice candidates as markedon the ballots. At the same time the votes of the candidate with fewest votes aretransferred in a similar manner. Once the vote transfers are complete candidates whohave reached the quota are declared winners. This process continues until all theseats are filled.

Table 5 contains data on those lower or single chambers elected using some formof PR. District magnitudes in these systems range from 1 in some Cambodian dis-tricts, to 82 in the largest Indonesian III district. Indonesia has the largest assemblywith 500 seats compared to Cambodia’s relatively small 120-seat assembly. Termlengths are four or five years and legislators are not barred from re-election in anyof the countries. Many of the assemblies also include appointed seats. Finally,requirements that parties reach a certain threshold in order to win any seats arepresent in Indonesia. In Indonesia II internal chamber rules at times required partiesto have a minimum of 11–13 seats in order to participate in the DPR. In IndonesiaIII there is no threshold for winning seats in the current election. However, a partymust gain 2% of the seats in the national legislature (DPR) or 3% of the seats inthe provincial and district assemblies to be eligible to run in future elections. Candi-dates in Indonesia I had to receive at least 300,000 votes in order to win a seat.

5.2. Mixed-member or two-tiered systems

Several countries in the region have adopted electoral systems that use two ‘ tiers’to allocate seats. With the exception of Sri Lanka these two-tiered systems are also

22 A similar system is used in Slovenia (see Cox, 1997, p. 299).23 See Taagepera and Shugart (1989, p. 27) for a discussion of the different ways of calculating this

quota under STV.


mixed-member systems (Table 6).24 The defining feature of mixed-member systemsis that one tier of seats is allocated nominally while the other tier is allocated onthe basis of party lists. In the nominal tier members are elected solely based on votescast for candidates by name. Usually the nominal tier relies on the plurality formulaand single-seat districts. However, SNTV with multi-seat districts is used in SouthKorea II (Table 6) and in the nominal tier of Taiwanese legislature and presidentialelectoral body.25

Mixed-member systems also contain a tier of seats elected from party lists thatoverlay the nominal tier (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2000). In all but one case this‘ list tier’ is elected using the PR formula (Japan, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailanduse List PR). The exception is South Korea which has used both plurality and a mixof plurality and PR to elect its list tier (discussed below).

Mixed-member systems differ in terms of how many votes voters cast. In SouthKorea and Taiwan voters cast a single fused vote for a candidate in a nominal tierdistrict which also counts as a vote for that candidate’s party for purposes of thelist tier. In the rest of the cases voters cast separate votes for the nominal and list tiers.

Mixed-member systems also vary in terms of whether the two tiers are linked ornot. This linkage can occur at either the vote or seat level. Votes are linked wherethere is a transfer of votes from one tier to another (ibid). Vote linkage does notoccur in any of the cases in Table 6.

The nominal and list tiers can also be linked in terms of seat allocation. At theone extreme, the allocation of seats in each tier can be independent (or parallel) ofseat allocation in the other tier, as occurs in Japan, the Philippines, South Korea IV,Taiwan and Thailand (see Table 6).26 Alternatively, the tiers can be linked, as is thecase for South Korea I, II and III, where a party’s seat total in the nominal tier inpart determines its seat allocation in the list tier.

South Korea’s (often complicated) form of seat linkage has varied over time. From1962 to 1972 (South Korea I in Table 6) the party that received 50% or more ofthe votes automatically received 2/3rds of the list tier seats. If no party won 50%of the seats, the party with the largest number of votes automatically received 1/2of the list tier seats. The second-place party received 1/3 of the list tier seats as longas its vote share was more than double that of the third place party. Failing this, thesecond place party received 2/3rds of the remaining seats. Finally, any left-over seatswere distributed to the other parties on a PR basis. From 1980 to 1987 (South KoreaII) the party that won the largest number of nominal tier seats automatically received2/3rds of the list tier seat. The remaining 1/3rd of the seats were divided among theother parties on a proportional basis. In effect, the systems used for allocating listtier seats in Korea I and II made it very likely that the largest party would controla majority of the seats. However, the 1987–1996 system (South Korea III) formally

24 Sri Lanka’s two-tiered system will be discussed later. See Shugart and Wattenberg (2000) for moreinformation about mixed-member systems. Much of this section draws on their work.

25 The Japanese upper house information is listed in the table on the election of a second chamber(Table 7). Taiwan’s presidential electoral body information is listed in Table 8.

26 Sri Lanka’s two-tiered system will be discussed later.


assured a majoritarian outcome. The party that won the most seats in the nominaltier received enough seats from the list tier to ensure that it had a majority in theassembly. The remaining seats in the list tier were then divided proportionally amongthe other parties. In 1996 (South Korea IV) a new system was adopted under whichthe two tiers are not linked. Parties receive seats from the national tier in proportionto their vote total, with no majority-assuring provisions (Morriss, 1996).

The Sri Lankan electoral system is not a mixed-member system but does havetwo tiers. Candidates in the first tier are not elected solely based on candidate votetotals, as required to be a mixed-member system. Rather, party vote totals help deter-mine which candidates are awarded seats. Nonetheless, it is a two-tiered system andthus shares many of the same features of mixed-member systems. For this reason itis included in Table 6.

Sri Lanka uses a modified form of PR with preferential voting in its first tier.Each voter chooses a specific party list (or independent group list) and up to threeof that list’s candidates. The party or independent group that received the highestnumber of votes in the district receives one ‘bonus’ seat—awarded to its candidatewith the highest vote total. The remaining seats in the district are then awarded toparties/groups (including the largest party) in proportion to the votes received. Partiesdistribute the seats to the candidates from the party’s list with the highest vote totals.Seats in the second tier are allocated in a proportional manner based on nationalparty vote shares.

Table 6 below contains data for all lower/single chambers in the region that electmembers via mixed-member or two-tiered systems. The cells in the table are dividedinto two sections. The top half of each cell contains information about the list tierwhile the bottom half gives information on the nominal tier. Columns 3–6 displaydata on the method for electing each tier. Information on district magnitude, thenumber of districts and the number of seats in each tier is found in columns 7–9.Countries vary widely in terms of the list tier’s percentage of total assembly seats(column 9). In Japan, 40% of the assembly seats are reserved for the list tier com-pared to a low of 15% in Korea (II, III). Electoral thresholds (column 10) are com-mon in many Asian mixed-member/two-tiered systems. Several require that partiesget at least 2–5% of total votes in order to receive any seats in the list tier. SouthKorea I and II required that parties win 3–5 nominal seats in order to receive anyseats in the list tier. In Sri Lanka, parties must receive at least 1/8th of the votes ina given first tier district in order to be eligible for seats in that district. Term lengths(column 11) range from 3 to 6 years and only the Philippines imposes a term limit(column 12). Finally, Taiwan allows for some reserved seats (final column).

5.3. Elected second/upper chambers

Table 7 contains data on elected upper/second chambers in the region. It providesinformation for many of the same electoral dimensions found in Tables 4–6 on thelower/single chambers. Note than Japan I and II both used a two-tiered system withno seat or vote linkage between tiers. Originally the second tier was elected usingSNTV but this was changed to List PR in 1982. The figures in the Assembly Size


column for Japan represent the size of each tier. The table also lists information onfour important aspects of upper chamber makeup. First, column 4 gives the make-up of the electorate. In Burma, India, Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan, states, stateassemblies or local government units elect the upper chamber. In Sri Lanka, thelower chamber elected the upper chamber from 1948 to 1971. In all other casesmembers of the upper chamber are directly elected. Second, the renewal rate is listed.In most cases, half or one-third of members are elected every two or three years.Third, the table presents data on whether there are appointed seats. Finally, the tablealso contains data on the legislative powers of these upper chambers. All have delay-ing power and a few can veto non-money bills by refusing their consent.27 However,only the Philippines Senate has the power to veto all bills.

6. Presidential electoral bodies in the region

Table 8 contains data on presidential electoral bodies used by three countries toelect the president—South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia. The primary purpose ofthese bodies is to elect a president, but unlike an electoral college, they sit for afixed term and may have additional duties apart from electing the president. In SouthKorea, after martial law was declared in 1972, the direct election of the presidentwas replaced with a 5000-member electoral body known as the National Conferencefor Unification (NCU). The NCU was elected on a plurality basis from multi-seatdistricts to a six-year term. In addition to selecting the President the NCU also selec-ted 1/3 of the National Assembly. A 1980 constitutional amendment disbanded theNCU but replaced it with a nearly identical electoral college. This new presidentialelection body had a term of seven rather than six years and no longer had the powerto select the members of the National Assembly.

In Taiwan the presidential electoral body is called the National Assembly andserves a six-year term. Prior to a 1991 constitutional amendment the NationalAssembly was primarily an unelected body. Beginning in 1991 the NationalAssembly was elected using a mixed-member system similar to that used to electthe Legislative Yuan. The nominal tier (bottom of cell) is elected using SNTV frommulti-seat districts. The list tier (top of cell) consists of two districts. The first districtcontains 80 seats representing a nationwide constituency and the second contains 20seats representing overseas Chinese communities. Some seats in both tiers were setaside for female candidates.

Elections for the National Assembly were held in 1991, 1992 and 1996. In 1996the constitution was amended to allow for the direct election of the President. Thischange occurred before the fully elected National Assembly had a chance to selecta new president. Since 1996 the National Assembly’s powers have been restricted

27 By veto power we mean that the consent of the upper chamber is required before a bill becomes alaw. In other words, an upper chamber with veto power can unilaterally block legislation by withholdingits consent.


to voting on constitutional amendments and the power of presidential impeachment.Although the National Assembly never actually selected a president during the periodin which it was fully elected, it is included in Table 8 for informational purposes.In 2000 the National Assembly was changed to a non-standing body elected entirelyusing list PR.

Since 1971 Indonesia’s President has been selected by the People’s ConsultativeAssembly (MPR). Like the National Assembly in Taiwan, the MPR can amend theconstitution. It may also, under exceptional circumstances, remove the president. TheMPR also has the power to pass special legislation that trumps all but the constitutionand to adopt guidelines setting the broad outlines of government policy.28 However,since the MPR lies outside the normal legislative process, and thus is not typicalsecond chamber, it is included here.

From 1971 to 1999 the MPR consisted of 1000 members which sat for a five-year term.29 Half of the total consisted of the 500 members from the parliament(DPR). Of the 500 DPR members 75–100 were appointed and the rest were electedfrom multi-seat districts using List PR. Of the other 500 members, 100 wereappointed by the President to represent social and functional groups. The remaining400 seats were divided among political parties and the armed forces (based on theirshare of DPR seats) and provincial representatives. Although technically the presi-dent appointed only the 100 delegates from the social and functional groups, inpractice he also controlled the remaining 400 seats by virtue of the formal and infor-mal authority the executive branch had over the political parties and provincialgovernments (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 282).30

The rules governing the composition of the MPR were amended in 1999. TheMPR now has 700 members. 500 of these once again come from the DPR, but only38 of the DPR’s members are now appointed. The other 462 DPR members areelected from multi-seat districts using the modified form of List PR described earl-ier.31 Of the remaining 200 members in the MPR, 65 are chosen from representativesof functional groups. The final 135 members are elected by Provincial Assemblies.Each assembly elects five representatives but the method of electing those representa-tives remains unresolved. Before the last election the Election Commission issuednon-binding guidelines stating that Provincial Assembly members should be allowedto vote for up to five candidates with the top five vote-getters then elected to theMPR. This is the information contained in Table 8. However, some of the provincesdid not follow those procedures. Binding legislation on the matter is expected beforethe next election.

28 Under Indonesia’s new system it appears that the MPR may take a more active legislative role.29 The MPR formally came into being in 1971 under President Soeharto. Since 1959 an ‘ interim’ MPR

had been in place which was entirely appointed by the president. As part of the 1971 formation of theMPR Soeharto set forth the rules regarding the make-up of the MPR.

30 Provincial governments were formally under the executive branch.31 List PR with nominating districts.


7. Conclusion

As is clear from the preceding discussion, Asia is home to a wide variety ofconstitutional structures and methods of election. There are both presidential andparliamentary regimes, as well as a handful of hybrid regimes in the region. In termsof electoral systems the region contains single-seat plurality districts, 82 seat PRdistricts, and a number of mixed-member electoral systems. In our descriptions ofthese institutional arrangements we have not included discussions about the qualityof particular democratic institutions or of democracy more generally. Nor have wediscussed the origins or consequences of different institutional configurations. Wehope that the information provided in this paper will help facilitate such discussionand research in the future.

Acknowledgements

We thank the Global Foundation for Research and Scholarship for financial sup-port during the initial phase of this study. We also thank Nathan Batto, Gary Cox,Stephan Haggard, Eric Kuhonta, Arend Lijphart, Andrew MacIntyre, Sylvia Max-field, Kimberly Niles, Matthew Shugart and members of the UCSD Graduate Stu-dents Discussion Group for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thestandard caveat applies.

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Documents

A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of …ahicken/index_files/electoral... · 2008. 3. 10. · Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. Vietnam is included in Table