A Guantanamo Diary— Operation Sea Sign

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114 JFQ / Autumn 1995

A Guantanamo Diary—

Operation Sea SignUSS Whidbey Islandwith 2,000 Cubanspicked up at sea.

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A Guantanamo Diary - Operation Sea Signal

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By W. D A R R E N P I T T S

By late summer 1994 the ex-pansion of refugee operationsjust to the south of Floridahad reached a crisis. The U.S.

naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cubawas already host to more than 14,000Haitian refugees. With existing campsat McCall airfield filling to capacity,U.S. personnel immediately began con-struction of others in the Radio Rangecomplex. As Coast Guard and Navyvessels began interdicting more than3,000 Cuban rafters per day, it was dis-tressing to realize that they also wouldhave to be quartered. Gitmo was ill-pre-pared to provide for the security,health, and welfare of an additional34,000 Cubans at what would amountto $1 million per day.

The subsequent efforts of JTF–160transformed Guantanamo while forc-ing the departure of military depen-

dents to the UnitedStates. This survey of Op-eration Sea Signal focuseson security and opera-tions associated with dis-placed persons with em-

phasis on the critical role of civilaffairs (CA) and psychological opera-tions (PSYOP).

The MissionThe rapid buildup of military in-

frastructure to support Sea Signal re-

vealed potential flaws in deploying CApersonnel. Sufficient capabilities,which should have been a planningfactor, were deployed reactively ratherthan proactively. The delayed arrival ofthe 96th Civil Affairs Battalion as wellas both Army Reservists from the 416th

Civil Affairs Battalion and Marine Re-servists from the 4th Civil Affairs Groupdid not jeopardize the mission, buttheir presence could have facilitatedcommunication with refugees. The ini-tial table of organization for JTF–160,based on CA assets on the ground, wasinadequate for Sea Signal. The primarymission was humanitarian assistance.CA support to Sea Signal included bothcivilian containment and control andcivic assistance.

Civilian containment involvedphysical development of refugeecamps as well as matters of internalcommunication and security. Its suc-cess depended heavily on the degree towhich security forces and CA person-nel augment J-3/S-3 staff and advanceparty/site survey teams. The planningshould have identified civil affairs as aprincipal player in executing theJTF–160 mission.

Civic assistance provided for med-ical, dental, and veterinary care; basicsanitation; logistics and maintenance;and other tasks. Ideally, such projectsare short term, high impact, low cost,and technologically simple, with a rea-sonable certainty of completion. Thiswas a tough litmus test for Sea Signal.Although some missions are simple inconcept, they are logistically difficult.

Multi-Service OperationsOne aspect of integrating civil af-

fairs assets into Sea Signal was multi-service participation. With the excep-tion of Desert Storm and several otherjoint operations, not many efforts havebeen conducted by both Army and Ma-rine civil affairs. Army civil affairs is aspecial operations forces (SOF) assetand Marine civil affairs is a proven Ma-rine air-ground task force (MAGTF) re-source. As such, when a Marine head-

Autumn 1995 / JFQ 115

a Signal

Captain W. Darren Pitts, USMCR, is aide-de-camp to thecommanding general, Reserve Marine Air-Ground Task Force(Command Element Atlantic). He served as a civil affairsofficer during Operation Sea Signal.

support to Sea Signal included civiliancontainment and civic assistance

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quarters is designated the lead JTF com-ponent, it is practical to first use its or-ganic capability before seeking externalsupport. This practice reflects the appli-cation of sound doctrine. With regardto civil affairs, the Army’s ability toconduct large-scale operations such asthose in Haiti could be complimentedby tactically-oriented Marine CA assetswhich focus on operational support inthe tactical AOR.

Since jointness represents the fu-ture of military operations, the MarineCorps should make its CA capabilitiesbetter known to CINCs and the JointStaff. The Marines should consider set-

ting up both formal and informal rela-tionships with their Army counter-parts, active and Reserve. In future op-erations the Marine Corps shouldassign CA liaison officers to CINCs aswell as to Army civil affairs com-mands. This would lead to a better ap-preciation of the unique CA capabili-ties of both services and facilitatetraining among active and Reservecivil affairs units.

Refugee ProcessingOn arrival, Cuban refugees were

typically put in camps to await pro-cessing at the migrant processing cen-ter. Because of a lack of vehicles, somerefugees took up to two weeks to reachthe center. As Coast Guard and Navyvessels continued to pick up rafters atrecord rates, off-loading and transport-ing migrants impacted on vehicularsupport between the camps. JTF–160initiated a database known as the de-ployable mass population identifica-tion and tracking system (DMPITS),consisting of a five-station processingcenter. Fully staffed, it could process1,500 migrants per day, although theaverage was between 800 and 1,200.

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Gitmo airfield converted for 10,000 migrants.

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Haitians await volunteer repatriation.

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Despite DMPITS, family membersoften were housed in separate camps,some for months. This resulted in frus-trating, time-consuming activities tounify families. Because of the intensivelabor and transport needed for familyreunification, increased participationby other organizations should be con-sidered. Governmental organizations(GOs) and non-governmental organi-zations (NGOs) are actual force multi-pliers. Among those organizations atGuantanamo, the Community Rela-tions Service (CRS) of the Departmentof Justice and the World Relief Organi-zation (WRO) were key contributors.CRS was the lead agency for imple-mentation of the Family Reunification

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JTF–160 setting up airtransportable hospital.

DOD ( Alexander C. Hicks, Jr.)

Cubans on board USCGCTampa being searched.

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Military policeconducting quickresponse training.

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InfrastructureJTG-Bulkeley sought to provide a

safe and habitable environment for therefugees and keep the migrant popula-

tion informed on their legal statusand on options such as relocationto Panama (Operation Safehaven)and repatriation to Cuba. In addi-tion, JTG-Bulkeley sought to tar-

get quality of life issues to improve mi-grant living conditions.

Civil affairs focused on develop-ing and sustaining camp infrastruc-ture. Military police and civil affairscommanders met with Cuban campleaders daily, often going tent to tent.A critical aspect of their job was simplylistening, providing information, mak-ing assessments, and advising the com-mander. As soon as health and comfortproblems were resolved, other issueswhich had been festering under thesurface quickly arose.

With CA assistance the campselected government councils (campleaders) to represent their concerns.Typically, they raised issues on their

Program which sought to reunite fam-ily members, many of whom hadbeen separated at sea either prior tointerdiction or during DMPITS process-ing. Because of Sea Signal’s push tosend as many Cubans to Panama aspossible, the program impacted on allfacets of the operation. WRO, on theother hand, arranged the collectionand distribution of donations for therefugee population. Both GOsand NGOs should coordi-nate their activities throughcivil affairs whenever possible.

In late August and early Sep-tember, living conditions became hor-rendous according to one camp com-mander. As average daily temperaturessoared over 100 degrees, trash andhuman waste awaited the arrivingrefugees as well as security forces. Thisenvironment was suddenly home tomen, women, children, and infants.

According to some participants,the civil affairs contingent was initiallya token (comprised of two officers andone enlisted at staff level). With morethan 3,200 migrants arriving each day,security and health problems over-whelmed the facilities. There wereshortages of running water, medical fa-cilities, and sanitation (porta-potties)in the camps.

Airlift and sealift for this humani-tarian mission had to be shared withJTF–180 which was gearing up for a

showdown in Haiti. Living conditionsdeteriorated and tension mounted ascamp populations swelled. Risks tomilitary personnel grew exponentiallyand the political signals from Washing-ton fueled the volatile fire of despairwithin the tent city.

The camps were being constructedand filled to capacity in a matter of days,with command then turned over to in-coming military police units. Was SeaSignal really a military police mission?Refugees, furious over living conditionsand the abrupt change in immigrationpolicy, complained, demonstrated, andeventually rioted.

JAMAICA

CUBA

U.S. NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY

C A R I B B E A N S E A HAlTI

legal status, family reunifi-cation, problems of thesick and elderly, unaccom-panied minors, and treat-ment by the security forces.Easing tensions and thesegregation of single malesand troublemakers enabledcamp commanders to dele-gate greater responsibility

for internal activities to these democra-tically elected leaders.

CA personnel had interpreterswhose background, maturity, and pro-ficiency could vary on a daily basis.Some were school-trained while othersspoke fluent Spanish but could notread the language. There were also dif-ficulties arising from variations in di-alect. But the mission could not havebeen accomplished without linguists.More than once, Spanish-speaking per-sonnel identified and defused volatilesituations before they turned violent.

Crisis, however, was not alwaysthe order of the day. Cuban teacherstaught English to children. Menworked in makeshift craft shops. Recre-ational programs entertained and oc-cupied the general population. By mid-October, security concerns had givenway to intramural baseball, and someCubans even opted to go on daily runswith members of the security force.



JTG-Bulkeley sought to provide a safe and habitable environment

Military police patrollingrefugee camp.

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Shortly after the August 1994demonstrations, the migrant campswere designated as being for singlemales, families, or unaccompanied mi-nors, although single females and mar-ried couples still were housed with sin-gle men in many cases. The maximumpopulation of each camp was set at2,500. In October 1994, additional sub-camps were created to segregateCubans who wanted to be repatriatedor relocated to Panama. Moreover,MAG 291 and Camp X-Ray were estab-lished to administratively segregatethose who endangered the safety andwelfare of others. Those migrants whocommitted infractions were moved toMAG–291 for 7–30 days. Felons andthose who posed serious and docu-mented threats went to Camp X-Ray

indefinitely. From a security perspec-tive Camp X-Ray was impressive, al-though it was not a prison as somehave suggested. Infractions committedby detainees included theft, assaultand battery, prostitution, and blackmarket activities. Their segregation wasintended to avoid a breakdown or dis-ruption of law, order, and discipline inthe camps. Some refugees made impro-vised weapons out of cot ends, tentpoles, soda cans, et al. which were rou-tinely confiscated in security sweeps.

PSYOP SupportIt is important to note that psy-

chological operations were neither au-thorized nor conducted by JTF–160.But PSYOP support in the form of a

military information support team(MIST) was invaluable although ini-tially separate from the CA effort. MISTprovided excellent products and pro-grams for security forces as well as civilaffairs. The stated mission of the teamwas to assist with population control,safety, and sanitation to increase forceprotection.

MIST executed its mission by pub-lishing ¿Que Pasa?, a weekly newspaperfor the Cuban camps, and operating“Radio Esperanza,” which broadcastedfrom 0900 to 1700 daily. The paper ini-tially was ignored by the Cubans whosaid it looked official and did not ade-quately address their interests, namely,obtaining visas and gaining entry tothe United States. Eventually, MIST andcivil affairs linked up, and Cuban-writ-ten contributions were soon introducedinto ¿Que Pasa? Thereafter readershipand overall receptiveness quickly im-proved. MIST personnel came from the1st PSYOP Battalion and the Dissemina-tion Battalion of the 4th PSYOP Groupand operated with civil affairs untilSeptember 1994. MIST provided ex-tremely valuable service to both the JTFstaff and refugee population.

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Erecting tents to houseJTF–160 personnel.

Cuban refugees beingserved on food line.

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PSYOP assets were deployed toCuba before January 1992 to supportOperation GTMO. Planning for the op-eration assumed no more than 2,500migrants, and discussions at U.S. At-lantic Command focused on whetherPSYOP support was even needed forthis type of mission. In the final analy-sis it is important that PSYOP be putunder the operational control of civilaffairs since it allows for coordinatedactivities and more effective support insuch operations.

Security and InfrastructureThe security mission was clear: to

maintain control of the refugee popu-lation and to protect American person-nel assigned to thebase. Two Army mili-tary police battalions,reinforced by two AirForce security policecompanies, provided internal security.A Marine infantry regiment was re-sponsible for external security. Therules of engagement (ROE) for securityforces stressed the humanitarian na-ture of the operation and only cameinto play during demonstrations, out-bursts of frustration, and intentionalacts of violent misconduct.

Military police company com-manders typically had responsibilityfor two refugee camps. Internal as wellas external guards were posted and pa-trolled the camps continuously. Theycarried nightsticks and hand-held ra-dios. Each watchtower had a two-manteam. Marines, on the other hand, pro-vided perimeter security and carriedM–16s. A quick reaction force was kepton standby to quell riots or extractproblem refugees from volatile situa-tions. A few refugees jumped the wireand attempted to swim home. Thiswas an ever-present danger and Ameri-can personnel could only assist swim-mers who requested help.

The ongoing nature of Sea Signalrepresents a unique opportunity for se-curity forces and civil affairs to mastercivilian containment and control pro-cedures. The handling of large num-bers of displaced people raises severalimportant questions for planners and

supported CINCs. First, are JFCs de-ploying and integrating CA assets incontingency operations at the appro-priate time? Also, will valid require-ments be ignored or minimized be-cause the capabilities reside primarilyin the Reserve components? More than90 percent of civil affairs personnel areReservists, and there is only one activeduty civil affairs battalion.

Given the lessons of OperationGTMO in 1992 and those learned fromSea Signal, further debate and perhapssome top-level guidance regarding civilaffairs deployment and employment isneeded before the next JTF reinventsthe wheel. The execution of two simul-taneous civil affairs operations (in

Haiti and Cuba) at the low end of thespectrum challenged those who partic-ipated. What opportunities exist, ifany, for facilitating joint CA trainingfor these operations?

With regard to Guantanamo, onecan only speculate on the rapid plan-ning that accompanied the tasking forSea Signal. In anticipation of future op-erations, should force planners overes-timate the CA dimension of the mis-sion, given the lead time to marshaloperational support?

Despite the aggressive efforts bythe staff of JTF–160, civil affairs wasπan afterthought. Critical tasks mustbe performed from the outset of an op-eration. The world watches CNN.When a crisis is real, everyone knowsit. The question for joint planners andwarfighters is whether the OPLANsand their respective force lists reflectinitial use of Reserve civil affairs units?Or perhaps a better question is shouldthey include them?

JTF–160 enveloped a gray area oflow intensity conflict contingencies—part security, but mostly civil affairs.Most junior officers would argue thatboth security forces and CA personnelshould have arrived on the same air-craft. If Sea Signal is an indication ofthe new politico-military landscape,force planning for security and civicassistance missions requires serious re-thinking.

On May 2, 1995, almost ninemonths after Sea Signal began, the ad-ministration announced a reversal inpolicy. All but a handful of the Cubanswould be allowed to enter the UnitedStates. According to The New YorkTimes, “[Cubans] were being admittedfor humanitarian reasons and becauseWashington feared rioting this sum-mer at the naval base. But recognizingthat the decision to admit them couldset off a new flood of boat people, theadministration said that it would inthe future return all Cuban refugeeswho flee [from Cuba] to that commu-nist country.”

What should we be ready fornext? With regard to civil affairs, SeaSignal reflected both an earnest appli-cation of past lessons and blatant over-sight of others. JFQ



despite the aggressive efforts by JTF–160civil affairs was an afterthought


Documents

A Guantanamo Diary— Operation Sea Sign