A dynamic model of applicant faking

Article

A dynamic modelof applicant faking

Nicolas RoulinUniversity of Manitoba, Canada

Franciska KringsUniversity of Lausanne, Switzerland

Steve BinggeliRice University, USA

AbstractIn the past years, several authors have proposed theoretical models of faking at selection. Althoughthese models greatly improved our understanding of applicant faking, they mostly offer static approa-ches. In contrast, we propose a model of applicant faking derived from signaling theory, which describesfaking as a dynamic process driven by applicants’ and organizations’ adaptations in a competitive envi-ronment. We argue that faking depends on applicants’ motivation and capacity to fake, which aredetermined by individual differences in skills, abilities, and stable attitudes, as well as by perceptions ofthe competition, but also on applicants’ perceived opportunities versus risks to fake, which are con-tingent upon organizations’ measures to increase the costs of faking. We further explain how selectionoutcomes can trigger adaptations of applicants, such as faking in subsequent selection encounters, and oforganizations, such as changes in measures making faking costly for applicants in the long term.

Keywordscompetition, faking, selection, signaling theory

Faking is applicants’ attempts to misrepresent

themselves during the personnel selection pro-

cess. It is a deceptive form of impression man-

agement, or an intentional distortion of the

responses or information provided as a way to

create a favorable impression (Levashina &

Campion, 2006). Faking should be distinguished

from social desirability (Burns & Christiansen,

Paper received 18 February 2014; revised version accepted 14 March 2015.

Corresponding author:

Nicolas Roulin, Asper School of Business, Department of Business Administration, University of Manitoba, 406 Drake

Center, Winnipeg, MB, Canada R3 T 5V4.

Email: [email protected]

Organizational Psychology Review2016, Vol. 6(2) 145–170

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2011) because unlike social desirability, it cor-

responds to a job- or organization-specific

response distortion strategy with the objective

of intentionally and artificially increasing one’s

scores or perceived performance at selection.

Moreover, unlike faking, social desirability

involves voluntary response distortion as well as

involuntary self-deception. Faking has been

studied and discussed extensively in the person-

nel selection literature and remains an important

issue for both scholars and practitioners (Ryan &

Ployhart, 2014). Previous work includes mainly

research on faking in personality tests (Birkeland,

Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006;

Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007; Griffith

& McDaniel, 2006; Ziegler, MacCann, &

Roberts, 2011), but also in interviews (Levashina

& Campion, 2006, 2007), biodata inventories

(Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009, 2012),

or situational judgment tests (Nguyen, Biderman,

& McDaniel, 2005). This work has shown that

faking is prevalent: about 30 to 50% of applicants

use faking when completing tests and 60 to 99%use faking in job interviews to increase their

chances of getting hired (Griffith & McDaniel,

2006; Levashina & Campion, 2007).

Faking can have detrimental consequences

for the selection process. It can affect applicants’

ranking (Stewart, Darnold, Zimmerman, Parks,

& Dustin, 2010; Weiss & Feldman, 2006) and is

a potential threat to the validity of selection

instruments (Gilmore, Stevens, Harrell-Cook, &

Ferris, 1999; Marcus, 2006; Rosse, Stecher, Miller,

& Levin, 1998). Moreover, recent evidence

suggests that applicants who engage in faking

are also more likely to perform poorly on the job

(Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2014) and to

engage in deviant or counterproductive behaviors

at work (O’Neill et al., 2013; Peterson, Griffith,

Isaacson, O’Connell, & Mangos, 2011). In sum,

identifying the antecedents of faking and, ulti-

mately, those who fake is an important concern

for organizations (Stewart et al., 2010).

Several theoretical models have been proposed

to explain the conditions and processes that lead

people to fake (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011;

Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Griffith, Lee, Peterson,

& Zickar, 2011; Levashina & Campion, 2006;

Marcus, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2006;

Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton,

2006; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999; Tett &

Simonet, 2011). Although these models greatly

improved our understanding of applicant fak-

ing, they mostly offer static approaches that

focus on the characteristics of the applicants

and the selection instruments. Dynamic aspects,

such as how faking evolves over time, for

example, based on prior experience, have been

largely neglected. As a rare exception, Leva-

shina and Campion (2006) briefly mentioned

that past faking should influence future faking

in their model for interviews, but they did not

specify the direction of the effect nor its under-

lying mechanisms. So overall, most existing

models ignore the dynamic nature of personnel

selection and therefore the role that adaptive

behaviors of applicants and of organizations play

in faking.

In what follows, we propose a dynamic model

of applicant faking. This is a novel contribution

to the faking literature because, unlike previous

static models, our model portrays faking as an

adaptive response, taking into account accu-

mulated experiences, previous faking, selection

outcomes, and the competitive nature of the

selection process. As such, our model shows how

faking and selection decisions trigger adapta-

tions in applicants’ perceptions, abilities, and

behaviors for the next selection process, and

how it can pressure organizations to change their

selection systems in the long term. Our model is

inspired by the signaling framework proposed

by Bangerter, Roulin, and Konig (2012) that

explains the dynamic relationships between

different actors on the job market in the selec-

tion process. However, unlike Bangerter et al.

who proposed a general framework explaining

a broad range of phenomena (e.g., emergence

of new selection methods, organizations’ recruit-

ment strategies) and applicant behaviors (e.g.,

preparation for selection, strategies to distin-

guish themselves from other job seekers), our

146 Organizational Psychology Review 6(2)



model focuses on applicant faking. The signaling

framework thus provides the overarching back-

ground for our model, which identifies the

specific variables, adaptive mechanisms, and

long-term dynamics involved in applicant fak-

ing. For instance, our model assigns a prominent

role to different forms of competition as an

explanatory factor, which allows us to introduce

new concepts and predictors to the faking liter-

ature. In sum, we translate the general principles

of signaling theory into a series of testable

research propositions that have the potential

to generate novel empirical research to better

understand the antecedents, underlying mechan-

isms, and (direct and indirect) effects of faking,

for both applicants and organizations.

The remainder of this article is structured

as follows: First, we introduce the signaling

theory-approach to personnel selection and

describe its relevance to study the dynamic

aspects of applicant faking. We then apply

some of its key principles to faking and build on

these, to describe our dynamic model of faking,

together with 12 research propositions. Finally,

we delineate directions for future research to

test our propositions.

Signaling theory and itsapplications to applicants’behaviors

Signaling theory is a particularly well-suited

starting point to describe the dynamics involved

in faking. It originates from earlier research

in economics, and was used to describe the

rational exchange of information between job

market actors (Spence, 1973). Spence described

a model whereby education credentials can

emerge over time, and after multiple interac-

tions between applicants and employers, as

a signal that applicants can use to inform

employers of their potential productivity. Sig-

naling theory has also been influential in

research on animal behaviors, and particularly

in understanding how potential mating partners,

but also predators and preys, could exchange

information about their genetic or physical fit-

ness (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999). The use of sig-

naling theory in economics (and management)

has mostly focused on signals display and

interpretation. In sharp contrast, its application

in evolutionary biology research has not only

examined on how animals display and interpret

signals, but also investigated the long-term

evolution of signaling systems. Therefore, and

fundamental to our model, this research high-

lights that organisms’ behaviors evolve over

time through engaging in cycles of adaptations

and counteradaptations, in an attempt to develop

an advantage relative to other competitors. Such

adaptive dynamics are known as escalation

(Vermeij, 1987) or arms race (Dawkins & Krebs,

1979) and fuel the evolution of species over

time. As such, signaling theory allows explain-

ing not only the behaviors of individuals (or

organisms) in one interaction, but also how

multiple interactions between multiple individ-

uals trigger changes of behaviors over time.

Recently, Bangerter et al. (2012) proposed a

general framework of personnel selection based

on signaling theory. According to this frame-

work, applicants and organizations often have

imperfectly aligned interests due to the com-

petitive nature of the selection process. For

instance, applicants have little incentives to

provide accurate information about themselves

to organizations unless it is to their advantage

(i.e., it helps them get the job). Signaling theory

highlights how applicants and organizations

can nevertheless benefit from exchanging so-

called honest signals to reliably assess poten-

tial fit. Honest signals of applicants are signals

that provide reliable information about the

applicant’s true qualities. To be considered as

honest, signals must either be costly, that is,

involve investment costs or must be hard to

fake, that is, are beyond the conscious control

of applicants. Education credentials represent

an example of costly signals because they

require applicants to invest resources to get a

degree. Alternatively, ability test scores are

Roulin et al. 147



hard-to-fake because of their nonfalsifiable

nature. Moreover, honest signals must be

associated with cheating costs, that is, conse-

quences for applicants if they send falsified

signals and get caught (e.g., being elimi-

nated from the selection process). Without

cheating costs, unqualified applicants could

start mimicking the signals sent by qualified

applicants, which would undermine the value

of such signals. The same rules also apply to

signals sent by organizations to applicants, for

instance to guarantee positive reactions from

applicants (Gilliland, 1993). Exchanging honest

signals is thus a way to guarantee an effective

selection process for both applicants and orga-

nizations (Bangerter et al., 2012). Yet, organi-

zations may rely on other types of signals (i.e.,

that are less costly or easier to fake), and may

not invest enough resources to keep cheating

costs high. This is the case when they evaluate

applicants based on interview performance or

personality test scores only, and are thus not

able to distinguish honest from intentionally

distorted responses. In these situations, orga-

nizations give less qualified applicants the

opportunity to send falsified signals to mimic

the qualities of truly qualified applicants, in

other words, to engage in faking.

Translating the principlesof signaling theoryto applicant faking

The framework suggested by Bangerter et al.

(2012) is a general theoretical approach that

underlines the dynamic nature of the selection

process through adaptive behaviors of both

applicants and organizations to selection. It is

a particularly well-suited basis to extend our

understanding of faking because it points to

explanatory mechanisms that have been over-

looked in existing models of faking. In what

follows, we describe four principles derived

from the signaling approach to selection in

which we ground our dynamic model. Based on

these principles, we then outline in more detail

what specific variables should play a role in

explaining applicant faking.

The competition principle

The signaling framework proposes that appli-

cants’ behaviors are (in part) adaptive responses

to the fact that they compete with other appli-

cants for a job. In other words, applicants are

motivated to adapt their behavior if they realize

that simply sending the signals that organiza-

tions expect from them may not be enough to

outperform other applicants. Yet, applicants

differ in their willingness to adapt and their

propensity to send signals that distinguish them

from their competitors. Because of individual

differences in personality or attitudes, some

applicants actively engage in adaptive strategies

to better showcase their qualities to employers

and outperform their competitors, whereas oth-

ers do not. Applying this principle to faking

suggests that applicants’ motivation to fake as

well as subsequent changes in this motivation as

a result of adaptations can be seen as a combi-

nation of adaptive responses to the (perceived)

competition and individual differences in stable

attitudes towards faking.

The mind-reading principle

Applicants try to mind-read organizations to

identify the selection criteria that organizations

use, in order to adapt their behavior adequately

and increase their chances of getting hired.

Moreover, not all applicants are equally able

to detect the criteria and adapt their behavior

accordingly. Some applicants are better at

mind-reading than others because of individual

differences in skills, preparation, or experience

with selection. As such, applicants’ capacity to

fake as well as subsequent changes in this

capacity can be seen as a combination of their

ability to detect organizations’ selection cri-

teria (or the constructs measured by the selec-

tion tools) and individual differences in skills




necessary to meet these criteria (e.g., to fake

effectively).

The vulnerability principle

Signals used by organizations differ in their vul-

nerability to applicants’ adaptations. Some sig-

nals are more difficult to manipulate than other.

Some organizations invest more resources into

limiting applicants’ opportunities to engage in

signal manipulation or into catching manip-

ulators. Additionally, applicants may obtain

information about selection tools used by orga-

nizations, making it easier to adapt their behavior.

As such, applicants’ opportunity to fake can be

seen as contingent on organizations’ investment

(and subsequent changes in this investment) in

hard-to-fake selection methods, in making faking

risky or costly for applicants, and in commu-

nicating how they react to applicants who fake.

PE

RSO

NO

RG

AN

IZA

TIO

N

Faking

Capacity to fake

Motivation to fake

Perceived opportunity vs.

risk to fake

Organizations’ investment in hard-to-fake methods or making faking costly

Competitiveness & competitive

worldviews

Competitive organizational

culture

Perceived competition for the job

Stable attitudes towards faking

Interpersonal skills

Ability to identify the selection

criteria

Dark personality vs.

Integrity/honesty

Job performance of selected applicants

Organizations’ resources

Locus of control

P7P8a

P8b/c

P9

P10

P11

P12

Self-monitoring

Selection outcome

P1

P3

P4a

P5

P6

P2

P4b

Figure 1. A dynamic model of applicant faking. Solid lines/boxes indicate variables and relationships at Step 1(static part of the model) and dotted lines/boxes indicate variables and relationships at Step 2 (dynamic part ofthe model).

Roulin et al. 149



The escalation principle

Escalation states that when organizations rely

on signals that are less costly or easier to fake

(e.g., interview performance), applicants can

easily engage in adaptations to falsify their

signals (i.e., engage in faking), to gain a com-

petitive advantage over other applicants. But

this advantage may be short-lived because other

applicants may engage in similar behaviors.

Moreover, organizations would be pressured to

counteradapt by investing more resources to

increase cheating costs or change the signals

they use, leading to another round of adapta-

tions by applicants, etcetera. Therefore, the act

of faking and how successful it was (e.g., its

impact on test scores or job offers) should not

be the final step of the faking model, but should

also be the starting point for adaptive dynamics

on both the side of the applicant and the side of

the organization.

Based on these considerations, we describe

next a dynamic model of applicant faking (see

Figure 1). In a first step, we describe the vari-

ables and mechanisms leading applicants to

engage in faking. We build our model around

three key antecedents, based on the first three

signaling principles described before: (a)

applicants’ motivation to fake derives from the

competition principle; (b) capacity to fake from

the mind-reading principle; and (c) perceptions

of the opportunity versus risks of faking from

the vulnerability principle. These three ante-

cedents can be found in most faking models (e.g.,

Levashina & Campion, 2006; McFarland &

Ryan, 2000, 2006), despite the use of different

labels, terminology, or arrangements of pre-

dictors, thus facilitating comparisons between

our dynamic model and other models. As a sec-

ond step, based on the fourth principle described

before (i.e., the escalation principle), we describe

how faking can trigger adaptive responses of

applicants to subsequent selection processes, as

well as organizations’ adaptive responses in the

long term. Thus, we propose 12 research propo-

sitions, based on this model.

Importantly, our model includes both pre-

dictors discussed in previous research (e.g.,

individual differences in traits, skills, or abil-

ities) and new predictors suggested by signaling

theory (e.g., various forms of competition).

Thus, our model does not represent a compre-

hensive list of all potential predictors of appli-

cant faking but it focuses on those variables that

are aligned with the principles derived from

signaling theory and that play a central role

for the dynamic adaptations of applicants or

organizations.

A dynamic model of faking – Step1: Antecedents of applicant faking

Applicants’ motivation to fake

Motivation to fake has been identified as an

immediate key predictor of actual faking in

previous models (e.g., Ellingson & McFarland,

2011; Levashina & Campion, 2006; McFarland

& Ryan, 2000, 2006; Tett & Simonet, 2011).

Several potential antecedents of motivation to

fake have been discussed in this literature. For

instance, earlier models have suggested that

applicants may be more motivated to fake if

they believe there is a lack of fit between their

perceived qualities and the job requirements or

organizations’ values (Levashina & Campion,

2006), when faking is perceived as a good

option to obtain a high score on a selection test

(Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd,

2009), or when the job is particularly attractive

(Marcus, 2009; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006;

Snell et al., 1999).

Alternatively, according to the competition

principle derived from signaling theory, appli-

cants’ behaviors can be seen as adaptive

responses to the competition with other job

seekers. As outlined before, competition is a key

explanatory factor of behavior in this perspective

but has largely been neglected by previous

models of faking. The higher the competition,

that is, the greater the pressure to outperform

other applicants, the more applicants may be




motivated (or feel pressured) to emphasize per-

sonal achievements. We thus propose that

applicants’ motivation to fake is directly influ-

enced by their perception of the competition for

the job, such that higher perceived competition

increases the motivation to engage in faking.

Moreover, we argue that perceived competition

for the job depends on three different factors

related to competition: At the individual or

person level, we examine the impact of the stable

dispositions of competitiveness and competitive

worldviews. At the organization level, we dis-

cuss the impact of organizations’ competitive

culture. Finally, we also suggest that stable

attitudes towards faking, grounded in applicants’

values or personality, moderate the relationship

between perceived competition and motiva-

tion to fake. We discuss these variables and

mechanisms in detail next.

Perceived competition for the job. We suggest that

applicants’ motivation to falsify signals will

depend on their perceptions of how many rivals,

that is, similarly or better qualified applicants,

they will face and what rivals will do, in other

words, how strong the competition for the job

is. The more intense the competition is per-

ceived to be, the more applicants will see faking

as an adaptive or legitimate response to out-

perform competitors and get the job. Although

some of the existing models of faking under-

line the importance of applicants’ perceptions

of other applicants’ attitudes and behaviors

(Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Snell et al.,

1999), they do not specifically highlight com-

petition as the key mechanism at play. Yet,

some researchers have pointed out the potential

for such adaptive mechanisms. For instance, the

greater the perceived competition, the more

applicants may believe that ‘‘not faking may

leave them at a competitive disadvantage’’

(Griffith & McDaniel, 2006, p. 7), especially if

faking is perceived to be widespread (Griffith &

Converse, 2011). In such situations, applicants

may believe that honest strategies could get

them eliminated from the selection process

(Morgeson et al., 2007). We thus expect

applicants to be more motivated to fake when

they perceive the competition for the job to be

intense. We discuss next three variables that

fuel this perception.

Competitiveness and competitive worldviews.Competitiveness or attitudes toward competi-

tion as a stable disposition are typically acti-

vated by comparisons between the self and

others in win–lose situations like sport activi-

ties or selection (Kohn, 1992). Competitiveness

has been suggested as an antecedent of faking

previously (Tett et al., 2006; Tett & Simonet,

2011), but the concept of competitiveness as

well as the underlying mechanisms for a rela-

tionship with faking has never been outlined in

detail. Two basic dimensions of competitive-

ness can be distinguished: Competitiveness that

characterizes individuals who enjoy competi-

tions because it provides an opportunity for

self-improvement, and competitiveness that

characterizes individuals who enjoy com-

petitive situations mainly because they gain

satisfaction from winning them (also described

as hyper-competitiveness). The former focu-

ses more on the process (e.g., task mastery)

whereas the latter focuses more on the outcome

(i.e., winning; Houston, Mcintire, Kinnie, &

Terry, 2002; Ryckman, Hammer, Kaczor, &

Gold, 1996). Both dimensions are related to

achievement striving (Ross, Rausch, & Canada,

2003), and thus to a personality facet that has

been suggested to be related to faking (Goffin

& Boyd, 2009). Nevertheless, in our view, only

one dimension should increase the motivation

to fake. More specifically, we suggest that

applicants high in the dimension of competi-

tiveness that is characterized by the motivation

to win (i.e., hyper-competitiveness) may be

more likely to see the selection process as a

competitive tournament, and thus indirectly, to

engage in faking as an adaptive response to win.

Alternatively, applicants who enjoy competi-

tion as an opportunity for development may

perceive every experience with selection

Roulin et al. 151



(including failure) as a way to improve, and

may thus not be more motivated to fake.

Cultural worldviews linked to competition

may be another powerful precursor of faking.

More specifically, competitive worldviews, that

is, the tendency to see the world as a ‘‘com-

petitive jungle characterized by a ruthless,

amoral struggle for resources and power in

which might is right and winning everything’’

(Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, & Birum, 2002,

p. 92) is relevant in this context. People with

strong competitive worldviews perceive the

social world as a Darwinian-type of struggle

where one has to be ruthless at times in order to

survive, and where the strong win and the weak

loose. Competitive worldviews derive from the

personality dimension of tough-mindedness

and exposure to social environments that are

characterized by in-group dominance, inequal-

ity, and competition (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003;

Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). They are related to

derogatory attitudes towards people perceived

as competitors for limited resources (e.g., neg-

ative attitudes or prejudice against minority

groups; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002).

Individuals who believe that the world is a

ruthless, competitive jungle may not necessa-

rily enjoy competitions and winning (as indi-

viduals high in competitiveness do), but believe

that they have to do whatever it takes to obtain

scarce resources, such as a job, before others

take them away. Thus, applicants with strong

competitive worldviews may be particularly

likely to perceive the competition for the job as

being not only high but also as merciless and

hence, indirectly, highly motivated to fake in

the selection process. In summary, we forward

the following proposition about the relation-

ships between the two personal-level forms of

competition and motivation to fake:

Proposition 1: Applicants’ (a) hyper-

competitiveness and (b) competitive world-

views will positively influence applicants’

perceived competition for the job and, indir-

ectly, their motivation to fake.

Competitive organizational culture. Beyond

person-level traits, applicants’ perceived com-

petition may also be influenced by situational

cues suggesting an intense competition to obtain

the job. For instance, some organizations have a

more competitive culture or climate than others

(Fletcher, Major, & Davis, 2008). Similarly,

organizations may sometimes be inclined to

advertise how difficult their selection process is,

to create a reputation of being selective and

increase their attractiveness (Collins & Han,

2004). One way to do that is to promote their very

low selection ratio as early as in their job adver-

tisements and on their websites. Yet, highlighting

how intense the competition is may trigger a

stronger motivation to fake in applicants, as a

response. For instance, Ones and Viswesvaran

(2007) showed higher personality test scores than

the general norm in a sample where the selection

ratio was particularly low (i.e., .03). Although

they did not test if these higher scores were indeed

caused by applicant faking or by other factors, it is

likely that the low selection ratio triggered per-

ceptions of stronger competition for the job. To

reduce faking, Tett and Simonet (2011) suggested

that organizations should downplay the compet-

itive culture of the selection process, for example

by encouraging recruiters to avoid making

applicants aware that ‘‘few are expected to make

the cut’’ (2011, p. 310). We concur with this

position and further suggest that organizations’

competitive culture (e.g., advertising that a fierce

competition is taking place among the elite to get

hired) is likely to trigger perceptions of particu-

larly strong competition for the job and thus,

indirectly, a stronger motivation to fake. We thus

forward the following proposition:

Proposition 2: Competitive organizational

culture will positively influence applicants’

perceived competition for the job and, indir-

ectly, their motivation to fake.

Stable attitudes towards faking. It has been sug-

gested that some applicants are so-called play-

ers who acknowledge the need to adapt the way




they present their credentials (and sometimes

falsify them) to please employers and outper-

form their competitors, while others are so-

called purists who only accept to present their

authentic self, even if it means failing to get the

job (Bangerter et al., 2012; Brown & Hesketh,

2004). In the context of faking, this distinction

suggests that even though all applicants form

perceptions of how much competition they face

when applying for a job, not all applicants will

react to it in the same fashion. If applicants have

positive stable attitudes towards faking (i.e.,

they are players), they will see faking as an

appropriate and adaptive response to deal with

the competition. Alternatively, if applicants

have negative stable attitudes towards faking

(i.e., they are purists), they will refuse to engage

in faking to deal with the competition.

The impact of stable attitudes towards faking

can also be linked to the impact of individual

differences on faking, because some individual

differences determine attitudes towards faking.

For instance, people high in Machiavellianism

believe that others can be manipulated to

achieve their own goals (Christie & Geis,

1970). In the selection process, Machiavellian

applicants may attempt to manipulate the

organization’s representative to get the job.

Accordingly, several models of faking have

highlighted Machiavellianism as a potential

antecedent of applicants’ motivation to fake

(Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Levashina &

Campion, 2006; Tett & Simonet, 2011). And

some studies have found positive relationships

between Machiavellianism and applicant fak-

ing (Hogue, Levashina, & Hang, 2013; Leva-

shina & Campion, 2007; Mueller-Hanson et al.,

2006). We argue that applicants high in

Machiavellianism have more positive attitudes

towards faking, and thus perceive the use of

faking as an acceptable adaptive response to

win the competition for the job. On the other

hand, earlier models have suggested that people

with high integrity (Levashina & Campion,

2006; Snell et al., 1999; Tett & Simonet, 2011)

or who value honesty as a moral or religious

principle (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin

& Boyd, 2009; Griffith et al., 2011; McFarland

& Ryan, 2000) should be less motivated to

fake. And some studies have found negative

relationships between integrity or honesty

and applicant faking (Levashina & Campion,

2007; O’Neill et al., 2013). We therefore argue

that applicants high in integrity or honesty

have more negative attitudes towards faking,

and are likely to reject faking as a potential

response to competition, even when competi-

tion is fierce. Taken together, we propose that

the relationship between perceived competi-

tion for the job and motivation to fake will be

moderated by applicants’ stable attitudes towards

faking:

Proposition 3: The relationship between

perceived competition for the job and moti-

vation to fake will be stronger for applicants

with positive attitudes towards faking, but

weaker for those with negative attitudes

towards faking.

Applicants’ capacity to fake

According to the mind-reading principle,

applicants are motivated to mind-read organi-

zations’ criteria to adapt their behavior and send

the appropriate signals, but they differ in their

ability to do so. Translating this principle to the

context of faking, we propose that applicants

differ in their capacity to engage in faking

because they differ in their ability to identify

organizations’ selection criteria or constructs

that are assessed at selection, and in their

interpersonal skills to use the appropriate fak-

ing tactics. We discuss this in what follows.

Ability to identify the selection criteria. The concept

of mind-reading implies that applicants first try

detecting what qualities organizations are

interested in, and then use this information to

adapt their strategies accordingly (e.g., provide

appropriate responses in an interview or a test).

As such, applicants must be able to detect the

Roulin et al. 153



constructs (or criteria) that are measured or they

will not be able to fake successfully, that is,

improve their scores or raters’ evaluations of

their performance through faking (Levashina &

Campion, 2006; Marcus, 2009; McFarland &

Ryan, 2006). Applicants can try to detect what

criteria are assessed during the selection process

using cues obtained from the organizations (e.g.,

by interpreting the questions that are asked in

interviews or the items in tests). The ability to

identify criteria (ATIC) has been examined in

various selection contexts, and has been shown

to increase both selection performance and fak-

ing (Klehe et al., 2012; Kleinmann et al., 2011;

Konig, Melchers, Kleinmann, Richter, & Klehe,

2007). Moreover, applicants’ ATIC is related to

cognitive abilities (Kleinmann et al., 2011), a

factor positively related to applicants’ capacity

to fake (Levashina et al., 2009; Tett, Freund,

Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012). We thus

propose that the more applicants are able to

detect the constructs that organizations assess at

selection, the higher their capacity to fake.

Interpersonal skills. Detecting what the organiza-

tion is looking for is valuable only if applicants

can use this information to send the right signals

(e.g., engage in the appropriate behavior).

Applicants with higher interpersonal skills or

social skills are likely to be better at interpreting

situational cues from the environment and to

use appropriate faking tactics (Ellingson &

McFarland, 2011; Levashina & Campion,

2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2006). Alternatively,

applicants lacking such skills may fail to use the

right faking tactics at the right time or fake

ineffectively in social situations like employ-

ment interviews (e.g., inappropriately compli-

ment the interviewer, excessively exaggerate

facts). We thus forward the following proposi-

tion about the relationships between applicants’

ATIC and capacity to fake, as well as the

moderating effect of interpersonal skills:

Proposition 4: (a) Applicants’ ability to

identify the selection criteria (ATIC) will

positively influence their capacity to fake,

but (b) this relationship will be stronger for

applicants with stronger interpersonal skills.

Applicants’ perceived opportunity vs. riskto fake

According to the vulnerability principle, moti-

vated and capable applicants will be more

likely to engage in faking if they perceive that

there is an opportunity but little risk associated

with such behavior (Goffin & Boyd, 2009;

Levashina & Campion, 2006; Marcus, 2009;

McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Signaling theory

posits that opportunities and risks depend on

how much organizations invest in making

attempts to falsify signals costly, and on how

applicants perceive this situation. Indeed,

perceived ease versus difficulty of faking is one

of the core features of applicants’ expectations

concerning forthcoming selection procedures

(Schreurs, Derous, Proost, Notelaers, & De

Witte, 2008). Organizations can engage in two

types of strategies to make faking more costly:

Increase the risks of faking for applicants or use

selection methods that are harder to fake.

Organizations’ investments in increasing the riskassociated with faking. In order to make faking

riskier for applicants, organizations can develop

methods to identify and punish applicants who

engage in such behaviors. Previous research has

highlighted several such methods that differ

in effectiveness. First, organizations can engage

in reference or background verification, for

instance to identify falsified information

about education credentials or job experiences

(Kuhn, Johnson, & Miller, 2013; Levashina &

Campion, 2009). Second, organizations can use

bogus items and response elaboration tech-

niques, for instance by presenting applicants

with made-up facts and identifying those who

pretend to know them. Such an approach has

been used to detect faking in biodata invento-

ries (Levashina et al., 2009, 2012; Schmitt &

Kunce, 2002) or personality tests (Fan et al.,




2012). Third, research has examined several

techniques to identify faking in personality

testing (Burns & Christiansen, 2011), including

faking scales or indicators (Kuncel & Borne-

man, 2007; Levashina, Weekley, Roulin, &

Hauck, 2014; Zickar & Drasgow, 1996),

response latencies (Holden & Hibbs, 1995), and

eye tracking technology (van Hooft & Born,

2012). Organizations could then attempt to

correct test scores for faking (Ellingson, Sack-

ett, & Hough, 1999; Goffin & Christiansen,

2003) or eliminate identified fakers (Berry &

Sackett, 2009). However, most of this research

has been done using social desirability scales as

indicators of faking. And social desirability is

arguably not the most appropriate way to cap-

ture faking, which may explain why many such

attempts have been shown to be ineffective or

associated with undesirable effects (Griffith &

Peterson, 2008; Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009;

Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). Finally, organiza-

tions could also expect from interviewers that

they identify fakers during interviews or

assessments (Robie, Tuzinski, & Bly, 2006),

but initial evidence suggests that interviewers

have difficulties to detect faking (Roulin,

Bangerter, & Levashina, 2015).

Organizations’ use of methods to identify and

punish fakers can influence applicants’ percep-

tions of the risk of faking in two ways: First,

organizations can directly inform applicants of

the methods they use. This approach involves

warning applicants that those who attempt to

fake in a test will be caught. Although organi-

zations are often bluffing and cannot actually

catch fakers (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006) and

such an approach may remove actual trait var-

iance, evidence suggests that applicants who

were warned about faking obtained lower scores

on selection tests and faked less (Dwight &

Donovan, 2003; Fan et al., 2012). Alternatively,

organizations can systematically identify and

punish fakers, thus building a reputation of being

efficient at faking detection over time, and

indirectly influencing applicants’ perceptions

and behaviors in the long run.

Organizations’ investments in hard-to-fakemethods. The alternative approach for organi-

zations involves investing in harder to fake

methods, thereby directly reducing applicants’

opportunities to fake. Such methods include

using ability tests (Lievens & Burke, 2011),

combining personality and other predictors

such as ability tests (Converse, Peterson, &

Griffith, 2009), using less transparent items,

tests, or questions (Marcus, 2009; McFarland &

Ryan, 2000, 2006), forced-choice personality

tests (Converse et al., 2008), or speeded

personality tests (Komar, Komar, Robie, &

Taggar, 2010). Organizations can also change

the format of their interviews. For instance,

using a structured interview reduces applicants’

opportunity to fake as compared to unstructured

forms of interviewing (Levashina, Hartwell,

Morgeson, & Campion, 2014). Using interview

questions based on applicants’ past work

experiences (past-behavior interviews) is also

likely to limit the opportunity to fake more than

using questions based on hypothetical scenarios

(i.e., situational interviews) because of their

more verifiable nature (Levashina & Campion,

2006, 2007). In summary, we forward the fol-

lowing proposition about the relationships

between organizations’ investments to make

faking more costly and applicants’ perceived

opportunity versus risks to fake:

Proposition 5: Applicants will perceive

more risk but less opportunity to fake when

the hiring organization invests in (a) increas-

ing the risks associated with faking and (b)

the use of hard-to-fake methods.

Faking behavior

As mentioned before, applicants’ motivation,

capacity, and perceived opportunity versus risk

to fake are aligned with basic principles of the

signaling framework, and are part of several

existing models of faking (e.g., Levashina &

Campion, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2000,

2006; Tett & Simonet, 2011). Although no

Roulin et al. 155



empirical study has yet simultaneously tested

the effect of all these components, research

seems to converge so that all three components

need to be present, at least to some extent,

before applicants actually engage in faking.

That is, in order to fake, applicants need to be

motivated to fake, capable of faking, and per-

ceive the opportunity to fake. For instance,

applicants who are highly motivated and capa-

ble to fake will not engage in faking if they

perceive the risks associated with such behavior

as too high. Alternatively, applicants who are

highly motivated and perceive good opportu-

nities to fake will be less likely to engage in

such behavior if they lack the adequate skills,

that is, their capacity to fake is low. Motivation

to fake appears to be the core predictor, also in

earlier research. A good example of this is

Ellingson and McFarland’s (2011) motivational

model of faking suggesting that applicants will

fake mostly if their motivation to do so is high

enough. In line with these arguments, we pro-

pose that motivation to fake is the prime ante-

cedent of faking behaviors, whereas capacity

and perceived opportunity will play the role of

moderators in this relationship.

Proposition 6: The more applicants are

motivated to fake, the more they will engage

in faking, but this relationship will be mod-

erated by (a) applicants’ capacity and (b)

perceived opportunity to fake.

A dynamic model of faking – Step2: Dynamic adaptations

Research suggests that, overall, faking can be

effective to achieve better performance eva-

luations or scores in interviews (Levashina &

Campion, 2007), personality tests (McFarland

& Ryan, 2000; Peterson, Griffith, & Converse,

2009), or biodata inventories (Levashina et al.,

2009). In some cases, faking may help appli-

cants to obtain the job. For instance, it has been

estimated that if organizations hire half of

applicants they could hire up to 31% of people

who falsified responses during the selection

process (Griffith et al., 2007). Of course, most

organizations have a selection ratio far below

50%, meaning that most applicants (even some

who faked and performed relatively well) will

not be hired. Additionally, some applicants who

faked may get caught and eliminated from the

selection process, especially when dealing with

organizations that effectively invest in

increasing the risk associated with faking.

In line with the principle of escalation, we

propose that faking is not only an outcome but

also the starting point of an adaptive process,

for applicants and for organizations. Therefore,

in a second step, we describe next how initial

faking can trigger adaptive responses of appli-

cants and organizations, together with potential

moderating and mediating mechanisms, which

then influence the probability of future faking.

We first describe how faking, depending on the

selection outcome and the way it is interpreted,

triggers adaptations in the motivation and

capacity to fake in subsequent selection pro-

cesses, mainly via their impact on perceived

competition. Then, we discuss how applicant

faking influences the job performance of new

hires in organizations and, indirectly, gives rise

to organizations’ adaptive responses.

Faking and applicants’ adaptive process

Signaling theory has been used extensively in

animal research to explain the evolution of

species, for instance to demonstrate how pre-

dators or prey are pressured to adapt (over time

and through generations) in order to survive

(Vermeij, 1987; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999). We

suggest that adaptation can also be a response

mechanism for job applicants, because they are

eventually pressured to secure a (good) job to

‘‘survive.’’ They will use the outcome of the

selection process and the feedback they receive

to reevaluate their chances of success in future

selection encounters and adapt their behaviors

accordingly. Yet, we argue that adaptations are

more likely following failure than following




success. When the selection outcome is positive

for the applicant the pressure to adapt is mini-

mal. If applicants receive a job offer, they will

likely not be involved in another selection

process in the near future, and will thus not be

required to adapt their behaviors. If they

advance to the next step of the selection pro-

cess, applicants are likely to interpret this as a

signal that their initial strategy was effective

and simply reuse a similar approach in next

selection encounters. Only when the selection

outcome is negative, that is, when applicants

are rejected or eliminated from the selection

process, are they pressured to adapt their

behavior in their next attempt to increase their

chances of getting hired. Therefore, in the next

paragraphs, we focus on adaptations following

failure at selection and describe how such a

negative outcome can trigger adaptations in

applicants’ motivation and capacity to fake and,

ultimately, influence the probability to fake in

the next selection encounter.

Adaptations in the motivation to fake. Applicants

may experience a failure after engaging (or not)

in faking. If they did engage in faking, one

possibility is for them to learn a lesson and

decide to reconsider their strategy. For instance,

they may try to engage in less faking in sub-

sequent attempts because they realize that they

do not possess the required qualities to fake

effectively. However, the most likely form of

adaptation after failure may consist in engaging

in more faking (or to start faking if they pre-

viously refrained from using such a strategy) in

subsequent selection encounters. Indeed, recent

evidence suggests that applicants who retake a

personality test after initial failure tend to

engage in more faking (Hausknecht, 2010;

Landers, Sackett, & Tuzinski, 2011).

We propose that the underlying mechanism

of this behavioral change resides in applicants’

perception of the competition and their moti-

vation to fake. Failing to get selected and

learning that somebody else received the job is

likely to render the competitive nature of

selection more salient. That is, applicants will

become more attentive to the fact that they are

competing against other, equally well-qualified

or even better job seekers, for a limited number

of jobs. This will increase the perceived com-

petition and motivation to fake at the next

application, ultimately to outperform competi-

tors. If applicants’ motivation to fake was ini-

tially low (i.e., they faked only to a small

extent), the adaptive reaction would be to fake

more. If their motivation to fake was already

higher (i.e., they faked extensively), the adap-

tive reaction would likely be to continue faking,

to remain competitive and possibly try to

engage in more effective forms of faking when

possible.

Proposition 7: Applicants’ failure at selec-

tion will increase perceived competition for

the job and, indirectly, the motivation to fake

in the next selection process.

However, in line with the competition princi-

ple of the signaling framework (see previous

lines), applicants will differ in the way they react

and adapt their motivation to fake following fail-

ure. Accordingly, we discuss in what follows

how individual differences may moderate the

relations described in Proposition 7. We propose

two potential moderators that seem central for

understanding the reactions: Locus of control

and person-level forms of competition.

Locus of control. Applicants may attribute

their failure at selection to internal or external

factors, and this depends to a significant extent

on their locus of control (LoC; Campbell &

Sedikides, 1999). LoC describes the disposi-

tional tendency to believe that one has control

over the external environment (internal LoC)

versus believing that events are due to others,

fate or chance (external LoC; Rotter, 1966).

LoC is one of the four core self-evaluations

traits (Judge & Bono, 2001). Individuals with

internal LoC may initially be more motivated to

fake than individuals with external LoC

because of their strong belief in their own

Roulin et al. 157



agency and ability to influence outcomes.

However, during the adaption process follow-

ing failure at selection, people with external

LoC may be more likely to increase faking at

the next selection process than those with

internal LoC. Indeed, LoC is particularly rele-

vant for understanding how individuals react to

an event and adapt their behaviors to future

contexts (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Weiner, 1986).

This is especially evident in situations that

represent a threat to the self, such as failures

or negative feedback at important tasks. Sev-

eral lines of research suggest that individuals

with internal LoC are better able to deal with

such situations adequately and constructively

because, for example, they engage in more

problem-focused coping, as compared to

emotion-focused coping (Ng, Sorensen, & Eby,

2006). Individuals with external LoC, however,

are more driven by the desire to (defensively)

protect their self-concept, with a tendency to

blame others for their bad fate. In comparison to

those with an internal LoC, individuals with an

external LoC show a stronger self-serving bias,

that is, they are more likely to attribute positive

events (e.g., successes) to themselves and neg-

ative events (e.g., failures) to outside factors

(Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Taken together,

the previous arguments suggest that while

individuals with internal LoC may initially be

more motivated to fake than those with external

LoC, individuals with external LoC are more

likely to attribute past failures at selection to

outside factors, including fierce competition.

Perceptions of high competition should in turn

augment their motivation to fake in the future.

Put differently, we suggest that the proposed

link between failure at selection and motivation

to fake in the future is particularly strong for

applicants with external LoC because they are

more likely to attribute past failure to strong

competition.

Competitiveness and competitive worldviews.The two person-level factors related to com-

petition, competitiveness, and competitive

worldviews, are also likely to moderate how

applicants adapt following failure at their last

application attempt because they should render

elements of competition more salient. Thus,

they increase the likelihood that failure is

interpreted in a way that relates it to elements

of competition, and the motivation to win.

More specifically, individuals high in hyper-

competitiveness enjoy competing against oth-

ers and want to win competitions (Houston

et al., 2002). They should thus be more likely to

interpret their failure at selection in a hyper-

competitive framework, and by reacting in a

way that increases chances of winning the next

competition. Similarly, individuals with strong

competitive worldviews perceive the world as a

competitive jungle where only the strongest

win and obtain limited resources (Duckitt et al.,

2002). They are thus more likely to interpret a

negative outcome as a failure in their struggle

for resources, and will be even more motivated

to do whatever it takes to obtain those resources

at the next occasion. As such, we propose that

adaptations in the motivation to fake following

failure at selection are particularly strong for

applicants high in hyper-competitiveness and

competitive worldviews:

Proposition 8: Applicants’ adaptations in

perceived competition for the next job and,

indirectly, in their motivation to fake will

be stronger for (a) applicants with external

locus of control and applicants who are high

in (b) hyper-competitiveness and (c) com-

petitive worldviews.

Adaptations in the capacity to fake. Because

people learn from experience (Herriott, Levin-

thal, & March, 1985), applicants may also

benefit from experiencing a failure at selection

and hence increase their capacity to fake in

subsequent selection encounters. We argue that

applicants reflect on their failure, evaluate

which faking strategies were effective and

which were ineffective. Moreover, the selection

experience allows them to accumulate general




knowledge about selection methods and selec-

tion criteria used by organizations. Both ele-

ments will ultimately increase their ability to

identify selection constructs and/or criteria (or

to ‘‘mind-read’’ organizations), and apply more

effective faking strategies. This increase in the

capacity to fake is likely to happen despite the

fact that organizations often use different

selection criteria so that specific knowledge

about the criteria for one job in an organization

may be less pertinent for another job. Appli-

cants who go through several selection proce-

dures develop their general ability to detect the

cues and information provided by the organi-

zation, which helps them identify the perfor-

mance criteria (Kleinmann et al., 2011). Indeed,

applicants’ ATIC is positively related to their

experience with selection (Kleinmann et al.,

2011; Konig et al., 2007). As such, we suggest

that applicants’ ATIC and, indirectly, their

capacity to fake increases after a failure (and

even more so after multiple experiences).

Proposition 9: Applicants’ experience with

the selection process will increase their abil-

ity to identify the selection criteria and,

indirectly, their capacity to fake in the next

selection process.

We discussed before how applicants’ inter-

personal skills moderate the initial impact of

their ATIC on their capacity to fake. Similarly,

we suggest that self-monitoring will moderate

the extent to which they benefit from their

experience with selection, in terms of increased

ability. Self-monitoring is the ability to manage

and control one’s expressive behaviors or self-

presentations, and evaluate others’ reactions to

it, in order to achieve the desired impression

(Snyder, 1974). Previous empirical models

have suggested that applicants high on self-

monitoring should be better at faking because

they can more easily regulate their behavior

according to the situation (Ellingson &

McFarland, 2011; McFarland & Ryan, 2000;

Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Yet, studies have

failed to find empirical support for this

relationship (Delery & Kacmar, 1998; Hogue

et al., 2013; Mersman & Shultz, 1998). We thus

suggest that self-monitoring may not have a

direct effect on applicant capacity to fake, but

may facilitate applicants’ adaptations, by

increasing their ATIC. More precisely, because

applicants high in self-monitoring are better at

monitoring and strategically adapting their

behavior, they may benefit more from prior

experience with selection. They may be better

at accumulating valuable insights about how

to identify the performance criteria and how

to obtain high scores, which translates into a

higher capacity to fake in the next selection

encounter. In sum, we forward the following

proposition:

Proposition 10: Applicants’ adaptations in

their ability to identify the criteria and, indir-

ectly, capacity to fake will be stronger for

applicants high in self-monitoring.

Faking and organizations’ adaptive process

Our model also delineates how organizations

adapt to faking as a function of past experiences

at selection. We propose that applicant faking

will trigger long-term adaptive reactions from

organizations only if two conditions are met.

The first condition is that due to applicant

faking, organizations do not hire those appli-

cants who truly are the most qualified for the

job. From a signaling perspective, faking rep-

resents applicants’ attempt to falsify signals in

selection to mimic the qualities of the ideal

applicants. And, as mentioned before, such

attempts are often effective. The second con-

dition is that, due to these suboptimal hiring

decisions, the performance of the new hires is

lower, compared to the truly best applicants

who were not hired. Hence, this effect may not

be observable after only one hire, it becomes

apparent with time, after several hires.

One way to test if faking indeed has such

harmful effects is to explore its impact on the

predictive validity of selection instruments. In

Roulin et al. 159



the employment interview literature, several

researchers have suggested that applicants’ use

of faking may attenuate interview validity

(Delery & Kacmar, 1998; Gilmore et al., 1999;

Levashina & Campion, 2006). Barrick, Shaffer,

and DeGrassi’s (2009) meta-analysis also

shows that applicants who engaged in impres-

sion management obtained much higher ratings

of interview performance, but only slightly

higher ratings of job performance. Moreover,

the relationship between impression manage-

ment use and job performance is likely to be

much weaker (or even negative) if only decep-

tive forms of impression management (i.e.,

faking) are considered (Levashina & Campion,

2006). In the testing literature, although the

impact of faking on the validity of personality

or integrity tests has been debated (Hough,

Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990;

Morgeson et al., 2007; Ones & Viswesvaran,

1998), empirical studies and simulations alike

have provided ample evidence of the negative

effects of faking. For instance, faking reduces

the validity of personality tests, especially if

faking is negatively related to performance and

a small proportion of applicants fake (Komar,

Brown, Komar, & Robie, 2008). It can affect

the ranking of applicants (Griffith et al., 2007;

Stewart et al., 2010; Winkelspecht, Lewis, &

Thomas, 2006), meaning that less competent

applicants who faked may be hired over those

who are both honest and competent (Tett et al.,

2012). When organizations use a small selection

ratio, they may be more likely to hire appli-

cants who engaged in faking (Mueller-Hanson,

Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003).

Recent research also suggests that fakers and

nonfakers differ in their behaviors and perfor-

mance once they are on the job. For instance,

applicants who faked on selection tests exhibit

lower levels of performance on the job than

nonfakers (Donovan et al., 2014). Faking dur-

ing selection is also related to deviant or

counterproductive work behaviors, which may

include wasting organizations’ time, unauthor-

ized absences, or theft (O’Neill et al., 2013;

Peterson et al., 2011). For organizations, the

general conclusion is that applicants’ falsifica-

tions on tests may result in negative outcomes,

such as hiring lower quality applicants.

Yet, there may be exceptions, depending on

the form of faking and the work context. For

instance, faking in employment interviews can

take various forms (Levashina & Campion,

2007) and while some forms of faking (i.e.,

inventing qualifications that one does not

actually possess) are likely to be harmful in

most situations, others (e.g., exaggerating ones’

past accomplishments) could be associated with

abilities that can be valuable is some work con-

texts. As such, the actual relationship between

faking and performance may not always be neg-

ative, but could be zero or even positive

depending on job type. In other words, in situa-

tions where the ability to convince or persuade

others is part of the job description, applicants’

ability to deceive the interviewer and influence

the selection outcome may translate into higher

job performance. In sales jobs, for example, the

ability to exaggerate one’s accomplishments

could translate into the ability to promote the

qualities of products and services to customers.

There is some evidence that impression man-

agement or faking can be positively related to job

performance rated by supervisors or assessors

(Ingold, Kleinmann, Konig, & Melchers, 2015;

Kleinmann & Klehe, 2010), which were probably

influenced by exactly the valuable promotion

abilities mentioned before.

Adaptations in the investment in increasing thecosts of faking and hard-to-fake methods. As

mentioned before, organizations basing their

selection decisions on instruments that are rel-

atively easy to fake, such as personality tests,

may end up hiring a large proportion of fakers.

And, if many fakers are hired, negative out-

comes for organizations, such as a decrease in

overall employee performance or commitment,

or an increase in employee counterproduc-

tive behaviors at work become more likely.

Also, faking may eventually lead to voluntary




turnover or termination for employees who

faked but who actually had a poor fit with the

job or organization. Thus, in line with the

escalation principle derived from the signaling

framework (see previous lines), organizations

will be pressured to adapt their selection

process.

Organizations and applicants find them-

selves in an arms race where adaptation is a

necessity if one wants to avoid that the other

party gets a competitive advantage. For orga-

nizations, this means that they try to minimize

the possibility for unqualified applicants to fake

their way into jobs. But organizations also

compete among one another (e.g., to hire the

best applicants). Adapting the selection pro-

cesses so that the truly most qualified applicants

are hired is also a way to stay competitive. In

sum, in the long run, organizations are likely to

react to frequent faking by increasing the costs

of faking for applicants. As outlined in detail in

previous lines, they can do so by reducing

applicants’ opportunity to fake, such as using

more structured interviews (Levashina &

Campion, 2006), or by increasing the risks

associated with faking, such as engaging in

systematic background checking (Levashina &

Campion, 2009).

Proposition 11: Over time, frequent appli-

cant faking will lead to decreased job perfor-

mance and will trigger adaptations by

organizations, such as growing investments

in (a) increasing the risks associated with

faking for applicants or (b) more hard-to-

fake selection methods.

The extent to which organizations are able to

adapt will depend on their resources. Previous

research has highlighted that institutional pres-

sures, such as financial resources or current

practices, generally influence the choice and

implementation of an organization’s selection

methods (Klehe, 2004). Similarly, organiza-

tions’ resources may limit their capacity to

adapt their selection processes. For instance,

some organizations (e.g., small companies)

may not have the financial resources or the

expertise to invest in rendering faking more

costly. Some organizations may also be better

at discovering the long-term impact of faking

on job performance or terminations than others,

for instance because they regularly assess the

effectiveness of their selection process, have

more sophisticated performance appraisal sys-

tems, or conduct interviews with departing

employees. Those organizations are more likely

to see the benefits of investing in making faking

costly.

Proposition 12: Organizations will be more

likely to adapt and increase the cost of faking

and/or investments into hard-to-fake meth-

ods when they have more resources that can

be allocated to this purpose.

Discussion

Theoretical implications and contributionsto faking research

In this paper, we presented a model of applicant

faking grounded in signaling theory that con-

tributes to the theory and body of knowledge

about applicant faking by underlining the roles

played by applicants and organizations in a

dynamic way. Building on four key principles

derived from the signaling approach to per-

sonnel selection (Bangerter et al., 2012), the

model identifies the specific variables, adaptive

mechanisms, and long-term dynamics involved

in faking. For instance it delineates how faking

depends on applicants’ motivation to fake,

capacity to fake, and perceptions of the oppor-

tunity versus risks of faking. This model

assumes that these three components need to be

present, at least to some extent, before appli-

cants actually engage in faking but that moti-

vation to fake plays the most important role.

The model further outlines how the motivation,

capacity, and perceived opportunity versus risk

to fake depend on, and interact with, inter-

individual differences (e.g., skills and abilities,

competitiveness, attitudes towards faking) and

Roulin et al. 161



organizational factors (e.g., organizations’

investments to make faking costly). Using these

three components as the backbone, our model

allows for comparisons with existing theories

and models, but also empirical findings, on

applicant faking from both the interview (e.g.,

Levashina & Campion, 2006, 2007) and the

testing literatures (e.g., Griffith & McDaniel,

2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2000).

Our model goes beyond existing models of

faking, as it highlights the dynamic components

of faking that have been largely ignored in past

research and emphasizes the long-term impli-

cations of faking for applicants and organiza-

tions. It outlines how applicants’ experience

with the selection process and interpretations of

the selection outcome trigger adaptations in

their motivation and capacity to fake in subse-

quent selection encounters. For instance, it

describes how applicants’ whose faking strat-

egy was unsuccessful and who attributed this

failure to external factors (e.g., competition)

will react by faking more in their next selection

encounter. Over time, accumulated experiences

of failures may trigger vicious cycles where

applicants react with increased dishonesty.

Similarly, our model describes how applicant

faking can impact selection outcomes and,

indirectly, job performance. This pressures

organizations to adapt in the long run, for

instance by changing their selection methods

to increase the costs of faking. We also highlight

factors (e.g., applicant level of self-monitoring,

organizations’ resources) that can act as

moderators of applicants’ and organizations’

adaptations.

Our model also assigns a central explanatory

role to various forms of competition, clarifying

their potential impact on applicants’ motivation

to fake and, indirectly, faking. Competition has

been either ignored or only briefly mentioned in

previous models of faking (Tett et al., 2006;

Tett & Simonet, 2011). Others have suggested

that applicants adapt their behaviors, including

faking, based on their beliefs about what their

rivals will do (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011;

Griffith & McDaniel, 2006; Snell et al., 1999),

but did not outline the mechanisms that trigger

such adaptations. Also, some empirical results

about applicant faking have been attributed to

competition (e.g., Konig, Wong, & Cen, 2012;

Ones & Viswesvaran, 2007; Robie, Emmons,

Tuzinski, & Kantrowitz, 2011), but relations

between competition and faking have not been

directly tested. Our model proposes that appli-

cants are motivated to fake, at least partly, in

response to the competitive situation they face.

In other words, it suggests faking as a way to

deal with the perceived competition for the job.

Moreover, the model describes perceived

competition as influenced by person-level fac-

tors (i.e., competitiveness and competitive

worldviews) and organizational factors (i.e.,

organizations’ competitive culture). Finally, it

also acknowledges the role of individual dif-

ferences as a determinant of applicants’ adap-

tations, posing that attitudes towards faking will

shape how applicants will react to perceived

competition.

Directions for future faking research

We presented 12 research propositions that we

believe can generate novel empirical research.

We next provide some suggestions to test them.

For instance, except for some initial attempts

(e.g., Robie et al., 2011), research examining

the relationship between perceived competi-

tion, or its antecedents, and faking (Proposi-

tions 1 and 2) is limited. As a first step, future

studies could measure person-level forms of

competition and see if they explain significant

variance in applicants’ perceived competition

for the job, motivation to fake, and actual fak-

ing. Initial evidence shows that competitive

worldviews are indeed a powerful predictor of

faking but the precise mechanism is still unclear

(Roulin, Binggeli, & Krings, 2013). Research-

ers could also assess the relationship between

the competitive culture of the hiring organiza-

tion (e.g., by evaluating or experimentally

manipulating the content of organizations’




career websites) and applicants’ motivation to

fake. All the aforementioned proposed research

could also include measures of stable attitudes

towards faking (and/or their proposed ante-

cedents) to test the mediating mechanisms

suggested in Proposition 3.

Future research could further examine the

relationship between applicants’ ATIC and the

capacity to fake (Proposition 4), for instance

using existing ATIC measures (e.g., Kleinmann

et al., 2011) and ‘‘faking good’’ instructions

from personality testing research (e.g., Zickar

& Robie, 1999). More research could also

investigate the effectiveness of various actions

that organizations can implement to make fak-

ing costly for applicants in reducing applicant

opportunity to fake (e.g., Proposition 5), for

instance by comparing faking when organi-

zations advertise (or not) their methods of

faking detection. This avenue has already been

explored, when warning applicants before

completing a personality test (Dwight &

Donovan, 2003; Fan et al., 2012). But such an

approach could be replicated with other meth-

ods, such as job interviews or biodata invento-

ries. More generally, research could examine

the combined effect of applicants’ motivation,

capacity, and perceived opportunity to fake on

actual faking (Proposition 6), and further assess

how they interact to influence faking. Some

researchers have investigated the motivation

part (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2006) or the

ability part (e.g., Mersman & Shultz, 1998), but

not all three components together.

Longitudinal studies could examine how

applicants adapt their behavior over time (e.g.,

following applicants on the job market over the

span of several applications) to test the adap-

tive, dynamic, and long-term aspects of our

model (Propositions 7 and 9). So far, there is

only some initial evidence that applicants’

faking evolves over time, with personality tests

(Hausknecht, 2010; Landers et al., 2011).

Similar research should be conducted with

faking in interviews or other forms of tests.

Moreover, research could examine the

adaptation mechanisms further. As described

before, individuals may react differently to

rejection and thus adapt their strategy of faking

differently (Propositions 8 and 10). Therefore,

future research could study how individuals

who fake react to failure at selection, by

incorporating individual differences related to

attribution and to competition that should

influence the way they adapt their motivation to

fake. Moreover, different adaptations in the

capacity to fake after failure may be studied

by including individual differences in self-

monitoring, because people with low self-

monitoring may simply not be able to learn

from their experience and fake more (Leva-

shina & Campion, 2006; McFarland & Ryan,

2000).

Future research could examine the actual

impact of faking on the quality of hires or job

performance. By definition, faking corresponds to

applicants’ attempts to misrepresent themselves

to increase their chances of getting hired, which

should negatively impact the selection outcomes

for organizations. Yet, despite recent attempts

(e.g., Donovan et al., 2014; O’Neill et al., 2013),

existing evidence is still scarce and the impact of

faking on validity is still debated (Hough et al.,

1990; Marcus, 2006). Interestingly, many studies

suggesting that faking does not impact the validity

of personality tests (e.g., Ones & Viswesvaran,

1998; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006) have used social

desirability to capture faking. But recent research

suggests that social desirability may not be an

appropriate measure of faking (e.g., Griffith &

Peterson, 2008) and it is possible that skilled

applicants faked on these measures. Measuring

faking in high-stake selection contexts can be

difficult, but there are examples of successful

attempts using self-reports, bogus items, or ran-

domized response techniques (see for instance

Konig et al., 2012; Levashina & Campion, 2007;

Levashina et al., 2009).

Finally, future research could examine how

organizations adapt their investment in making

faking costly over time, depending on the overall

quality (and subsequent job performance) of

Roulin et al. 163



hired applicants (Proposition 11), and what is the

actual impact of organizations’ resources on

these adaptations (Proposition 12). For instance,

recent research suggests that the predictive

validity of integrity tests has decreased over time

(van Iddekinge, Roth, Raymark, & Odle-

Dusseau, 2012). At the same time, research has

shown that applicants can easily fake integrity

tests (McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Maybe the

decrease in validity can be explained, at least

partly, by organizations’ incapacity (or lack of

resources) to respond to applicant faking and to

make faking on integrity tests more costly.

Overall, our model highlights a series of spe-

cific factors that dynamically interact to give rise

to applicant faking and outlines short-term and

long-term effects of faking for applicants and

organizations. We believe that testing the dynamic

aspects involved in faking will help advance

research on faking. Our model would best be tes-

ted using a longitudinal approach, as we proposed.

However, we acknowledge that such long-term

investigations can be costly and difficult to

undertake. For example, finding the appropriate

samples and making sure that participants remain

in the study after several selection attempts may be

demanding. To make empirical examination of

our model more feasible, researchers could start by

focusing on a limited number of paths and thus test

a limited number of the research propositions.

Some research propositions could also be tested in

several, subsequent studies.

Conclusion

Personnel selection is, by nature, a dynamic and

adaptive process involving applicants and orga-

nizations. Yet, the existing literature has only

offered static approaches to study faking. Build-

ing on signaling theory, we offer a dynamic

model of applicant faking describing such beha-

viors as an adaptive response to deal with the

competitive nature of the selection process con-

tingent on accumulated knowledge about selec-

tion and organizations’ attempts to make faking

more risky. Moreover, we formulate 12 testable

research propositions deriving from this new

perspective on faking. We encourage researchers

to consider a dynamic perspective on faking that

investigates the interactions between antecedents

of applicant faking and their evolution over time

trough adaptations.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of inter-

est with respect to the research, authorship, and/or

publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the

research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Author biographies

Nicolas Roulin, PhD, is an Assistant Professor

of Human Resources Management at the Uni-

versity of Manitoba. His research focuses on the

use and detection of impression management

and faking in the selection process, interactions

between applicants and interviewers in employ-

ment interviews, applicants’ strategies when

entering competitive job markets, and the use

of social media as selection instruments. His

research has been published in journals includ-

ing the Journal of Applied Psychology, Person-

nel Psychology, or the International Journal of

Selection and Assessment.

Franciska Krings, PhD, is a Professor of Orga-

nizational Behavior at the University of Lau-

sanne. Her research interests include workplace

diversity, stereotyping, fairness and (un)ethical

behaviors. Her research has been published

in journals including the Journal of Applied

Psychology, the Journal of Business Ethics, the

Journal of Vocational Behavior, or the British

Journal of Management.

Steve Binggeli, PhD, was a Visiting Scholar at

Rice University and a doctoral student at the Uni-

versity of Lausanne. His research interests focus

on the identification, the understanding, and the

remediation of discrimination in the workplace.

His research has been published in journals

including the Journal of Business and Psychol-

ogy, Industrial and Organizational Psychology,

or Social Psychology. Dr Steve Binggeli is cur-

rently working as an economist at the Federal

Office for Gender Equality in Switzerland.




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A dynamic model of applicant faking