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A Critique of Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy

Thom Brooks

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal

in American Philosophy, Volume 45, Number 1, Winter 2009, pp. 50-54(Article)

Published by Indiana University Press

DOI: 10.1353/csp.0.0066

For additional information about this article

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http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/csp/summary/v045/45.1.brooks.html
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AbstractRobert B. Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophyof Democracyis a genuine tour de force. Hisaim is both to defend a particular view ofpragmatism originating with the work of

Charles Sanders Peirce and, at the sametime, argue in favour of a new view of delib-erative democracy developed from TalissesPeircean pragmatism. The result is a stun-ning achievement with real persuasivepower. In this article, I will focus on oneworry, namely, that the picture of democ-racy on offer is incomplete. While Talissecorrectly argues that democracy is about

more than elections, democracy is alsoabout more than deliberation between citi-zens. Talisses deliberative democracy isproblematic to the degree its view of delib-eration fails to account for democracy. Ifmy analysis is correct, then I do not aim todemonstrate that Talisses Peircean pragma-tism is incorrect, only incomplete. Thus, thehope of this article is to help develop thispragmatism further.

Keywords: democracy, democratic theory,judiciary, Peirce, pragmatism, Schumpeter,Talisse

I. IntroductionRobert B. Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophy

of Democracyis a genuine tour de force.1

Hisaim is both to defend a particular view ofpragmatism originating with the work ofCharles Sanders Peirce and, at the sametime, argue in favour of a new view of delib-erative democracy developed from TalissesPeircean pragmatism. The result is a stun-ning achievement with real persuasivepower.

Nevertheless, there are a few worries thatwe may have with this important project. In

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this article, I will focus on one worry, namely, that the picture ofdemocracy on offer is incomplete. While Talisse correctly argues thatdemocracy is about more than elections, democracy is also about morethan deliberation between citizens. Talisses deliberative democracy isproblematic to the degree its view of deliberation fails to account for

democracy. If my analysis is correct, then I do not aim to demonstratethat Talisses Peircean pragmatism is incorrect, only incomplete. Thus,the hope of this article is to help develop this pragmatism further.

II. Deliberation and DemocracyTalissesA Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracyis a development of hisprevious Democracy after Liberalism, with the former making explicitthe pragmatist roots and motivations of the conception of democracythat he offers in the latter (viii). Together, these works offer us a new

theory of deliberative democracy.Talisse offers aphilosophy of democracybased on Peircean pragma-

tism (25). This philosophy is built off a particular view of democracy.Talisse defines democracy as a form of politics according to which thelegitimacy of governments and their coercive power rests upon thefreely given consent of the governed (29). Democracy is majoritar-ian, but not simplymajority rule (29). We cannot expect all collec-tive decisions to be unanimous, but should expect certain reasonableconstraints on how decisions are made, especially with regard to theprotection of individual rights. Democracy is also a representativeformof government (29). This is because democratic decisions are notfreely consented to by the people directly, but indirectlythrough electedrepresentatives.

On this view, deliberation is about more than just electing represen-tatives. For example, deliberation concerns questions relating to theorganization of our schools, workplaces, and families . . . within ademocratic politics (94). This seems largely correct. One mistake of

classical democratic theory is the idea that democracies are only gen-uinely democratic on election day itself. Surely, democracies are aboutmore than the act of voting alone. The issues that impact electionresults change from one election to the next and the relative importanceof these issues is itself one product of deliberations about politicsamongst citizens. Moreover, citizens deliberate about more than howthey might vote on election day: they also deliberate about the bestmeans of educating their children or lending support to their families.In these ways, Talisse seems largely correct to highlight the ways in

which deliberation in democracies is about more than the act of votingalone, but extends to other areas of civic life.3

While I agree with Talisse that democracy is about more than elec-tions, democracy is also about more than elections and civic associa-tions. Talisses focus appears fixed on the deliberative discussions held

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between citizens. The problem is that this identifies but one level ofdemocracy. Citizens elect representatives and it is these representativeswho make political decisions on behalf of citizens. There is then delib-eration between citizens about democratic politics, but also betweenelected representatives at a different level. As citizens engage largely

with one another, their representatives engage with one another, too.These two levels of deliberation are not entirely separate and eachinforms the other. For example, debates held in either Congress or Par-liament are not merely deliberations between political leaders, butdeliberations often informed by public opinion and other factors. Ifthis picture is correct, then deliberation is more complex than noted byTalisse. It would not be difficult for him to move beyond a one-dimensional picture of deliberation to a multidimensional picture ofdeliberation, although this move is absent thus far.

Finally, this multidimensional picture has a further element. Talissesfocus is on citizens deliberating with one another about elections andthe civic associations to which they belong. I have added that there is atleast a second level containing the citizens representatives that anydeliberative democratic theory must account for, as well as the interplaybetween these two levels. Of course, this picture is also still overly sim-plistic. We have identified the citizens and their representatives, alongwith the different forms of deliberation each may engage in. However,any plausible picture of democracy has at least two further aspects thatcontinue to remain unaccounted for. These aspects are the bureaucracyand the judiciary.

It is impossible to imagine a well-administered democratic govern-ment without an efficient and highly qualified bureaucracy composed ofcivil servants. Indeed, one of the achievements of Joseph Schumpetersgroundbreaking work was not simply his identification of democracy asrule by the politicians rather than rule by the people, but his identi-fication of the professional bureaucracy as essential to democracy (and

perhaps all modern forms of governance).4

The deliberative democraticpicture we are offered by Talisse focuses on citizens deliberating with cit-izens about civic associations and how they may vote. Yet, democracy isnot simply about elections and associations, but also possesses a bureau-cracy responsible for helping our representatives draft the laws and pub-lic policies that we deliberate about and consent to, as well as createplans for the implementation of these laws and public policies we desireas a deliberative democratic polity. It is far from clear how the delibera-tive model offered by Talisse can account for the bureaucracy without

whom democratic governance would be impossible.The second aspect missing from Talisses account is the judiciary.

Democratic governance is about more than voters and the persons theyelect. Citizens may elect persons to the executive and legislativebranches, but citizens do not normally elect judges and magistrates to

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the judiciary, the third branch of government. It seems clear that adeliberative democratic theory can take account of how deliberationamongst citizens might relate to the activities of the judiciary. However,Talisses theory nowhere makes this case.

III. ConclusionIn this article, I have discussed the relationship between Talisses delib-erative democratic theory and his understanding of democracy. I haveargued that Talisses view of democracy is too limited. He is correct toargue that democracy is about more than elections, but still his accountfails to account for significant parts of any democracy, including a pro-fessional bureaucracy and the third branch of democratic government,the judiciary. If we were to accept Talisses view as presented, then hemust explain: (a) how he might expand his theory to account for these

gaps, offering us a more robust deliberative democratic theory than hedoes, or (b) he should more clearly note that his theory of deliberativedemocracy does not account for major democratic institutions normore than one level of democratic deliberation. Talisses deliberativedemocracy is then not incorrect, but only incomplete.

TalissesA Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracyrepresents a genuineadvance in both our understanding of pragmatism and democratic the-ory. In my view, this understanding can be advanced further with a fewqualifications about how much of democracy a deliberative demo-cratic model will capture and it should abandon the view that Peirceanpragmatism endorses only democracy forevermore. If adopted, theseamendments would make an already attractive philosophy even moreattractive.5

University of [email protected]

NOTES1. See Robert B. Talisse,A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy(London: Rout-

ledge, 2007). All references in the text will be to this work unless otherwise noted.2. See Robert B. Talisse, Democracy after Liberalism: Pragmatism and Delibera-

tive Politics(London: Routledge, 2005).3. However, it is worth noting that deliberating about civic life is not itself

inherently democratic. Nor might the act of voting, as elections regularly takeplace in countries normally characterized as non-democratic, such as SaddamHusseins Iraq. Instead, democracy seems to entail not simply elections and the

right to free association, but opportunities to elect persons who might best repre-sent your interests andopportunities for all to become a candidate for politicaloffice. These latter considerations mark out democracy from other forms of gov-ernance, although these considerations appear in neither Talisses Democracy afterLiberalism nor hisA Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy.

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4. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (NewYork: Harper & Bros., 1942): 28485, 28889, 292. See also Thom Brooks,Plato, Hegel, and Democracy, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 53/54(2006): 2450.

5. This paper was presented as part of the panel Talisses A Pragmatist Philos-ophy of Democracy: Author Meets Critics at the 2008 Political Studies Association

annual conference at Swansea University. My sincere thanks to Bob Talisse forhelpful criticisms, as well as for his engaging work.

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A Critique of Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy.pdf